Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Marketing Channels
The Marketing Channel
as a Social System
• The channel can be affected not only by economic variables, but also
the fundamental behavioral dimensions present in all social system
such as conflict, power, role, and communication processes.
Conflict in the Marketing Channel
• Conflict exists when a member of the marketing channel perceives
that another member’s actions impede (obstruct) the attainment of
his/her goals.
Conflict versus Competition
• Competition: behavior that is indirect, and impersonal
• Off-invoice allowances,
• Bill-back allowances
• Slotting allowances
Problem :
• Forward Buying
• Diverting
• Undercutting
Consumer promotion
• Sampling
• Couponing
• Premiums
• Free with purchase
• Offers in Mail/email
• Price off
• Games
• Loyalty schemes
• Contests
Trade versus consumer promotion
Behavioral Processes in
Marketing Channels
The Marketing Channel
as a Social System
• The channel can be affected not only by economic variables, but also
the fundamental behavioral dimensions present in all social system
such as conflict, power, role, and communication processes.
Conflict in the Marketing Channel
• Conflict exists when a member of the marketing channel perceives
that another member’s actions impede (obstruct) the attainment of
his/her goals.
Conflict versus Competition
• Competition: behavior that is object-centered, indirect, and
impersonal
Online stores of retailers Direct online sales modes applied by whole sellers and
retailers (e.g., www.zbird.com/)
Online stores of manufacturers Direct online sales channels of manufacturers (e.g., Vancl)
Direct online transaction
channels Online auction Selling products online by the competitive auction mode
Group No: 6
Pooja Pant (119278042)
Nisanpreet Bal (119278100)
Reshu Hooda (119278101)
Rajeev Ranjan
Manu A R
Arpit Bangur (119278088)
Akash Baibhav (119278020)
Rajat Katiyar
Ashwin Kumar
Parmeshwar Sharma (119278011)
Ankit Bhansali
1
AGENDA
• Arrow/Schweber Electronics
• Value Chain
• Business Model
• Express Part Internet Delivery Service
• Possible solutions
• Pro & Cons of Scenarios
• Decision
2
Arrow/Schweber Electronics
• Broadline franchise distributor of electronic parts
• It was the largest company of Arrow group
• Top position among electronic distributors
• Sales of $2.07 billion in 1996
• It managed sales of Big four suppliers to customers contributing to 25% to 35% of
the sales
• Distributed two types of chips:
– Standardized
– Proprietary
• Had a long supplier list numbering 56 in 1997
• Types of order served
– Book and Ship
– Value added
3
Value Chain
LARGE OEM
Customers
Suppliers Distributors
(CM/ OEM)
5
Express Part Internet Delivery Service
• Independent distributor which developed an internet based trading system
around a multi-distributor bulletin board
• Will enable distributors post inventories and prices to bulletin board
• Provide customers( large or small) opportunity to shop for prices
• Help distributors and suppliers gain new customers
• Convenient experience for both customers and distributors
• Anonymous listing of distributors
• Fee of 6% charged by express
• Shippers appointed by express will pick up parts from distributors and ship
directly to customers
• Express will review the order, perform credit check and acknowledge
accepted orders to the customer and route them electronically to the
appropriate distributor
6
Possible Solutions
• Accept the Express parts internet distribution service proposal
• Reject the Express parts internet distribution service proposal and continue with
the current business model
• Reject the Express parts internet distribution service proposal and build its own
web-based system
• Accept the Express parts internet distribution service proposal and build its own
web-based system
7
Solution 1: Accept Express proposal
PROS
• Accessible to 50,000 new customers increasing sales mainly transactional
customers
• Cost time and effort savings in serving and converting low price shoppers into
potential customers
• 70 % of the commodity product sales to transactional customers are
manufactured by major suppliers – major suppliers will lose pricing control
• Reduction in shipping costs
CONS
• 6% margin to express
• Anonymity - No customer interaction
• Lose the possibility of converting transactional customers into relationship based
customers
• No business through referrals
• Not sustainable in the long run – might be excluded from the value chain
• Losing on the sale of value added products 8
Solution 2: Reject Express proposal and continue with
the current business model
PROS
• Maintain customer relationship
• Focus on VA sales and improve the service, consistently grow sale volume of VA
content.
• VA contribution as a percentage of Sales had increased from 2% in 1977 to 80% in
2000
• Continue improving the value added content, short delivery lead time and
inventory management as main values of the company
CONS
• Lose out on the online business
• Lose out on existing customers who are able to get competitive on Express
• Convenient for customers to compare and place order
• Not sustainable in long run
9
Solution 3: Reject the Express proposal and build its own web-
based system
• There is a time lag between the change in buying behavior, by the time customers
will get familiar with online ordering , your portal will be ready
• Initial set up Investment : 1 million
• Promotion through Already existing distribution
PROS
• It will facilitate the booking and ordering system and further reduce customer’s
lead time.
• It will reduce sales expense especially BAS sales expense.
• It can help A/S differentiate itself from competitors by providing low price efficient
“one-stop-shop”
• Arrow already has a website where all product details are displayed
CONS
• Lose out immediate customers through Express
• Arrow’s own portal will take time to function
10
Solution 4: Accept the Express parts internet distribution service
proposal and build its own web-based system
PROS
• Accessible to new customers on Express
• Presence in online space
• Arrow will be able to serve the existing customers at lower price as compared to
Express (6% margin to Express)
• Continue improving the value added content, short delivery lead time and
inventory management
• It will reduce sales expense especially BAS sales expense.
CONS
• Loss in shipping and booking revenue
• Loss of 6% margin for Arrow due to selling on Express
• Investment in launching aggressive marketing campaign
11
THANK YOU
12
Clique Pen’s Case
Syndicate:
Class of YP 50 B
Introduction
U.S Home
Meetings with
VP of marketing
& products
Cliques Pen managers
Under U.S.
Clique Pens U.S
Home, Clique
was formed Home Clique
Pens has
by two was Pens was
grown steadily,
Mennonite founded bought by
and its stable
cousins in by Bob U.S Home
of brands sold
Kansas City Utley
worldwide
U.S Writing Implements Industry
in 2013
O Competitor: BIC, Scripto, Pentel, Pilot,
Papermate, and Sharpie
O 20 billion pens and pencils were sold
worldwide in 2012
O Little brand loyalty from customer
O Hyper competitive among mass brands
O Pens & Pencils were viewed as
commodities except high season
Marketing & Promotion
O Back to school promotions
O Clique allocated:
15% advertising
30% consumer promotion
Grade
on
PROFITABILITY”
Submitted by:
Group No.: 6
Manish Kumar (131326)
demand for increasing investment by the company. The problem identified is increasing the
market share equivalent to the Competitors in Jalgaon Market. There exist three alternatives
which are as - Mr. Kumar should leave the situation as it is, Mr. Kumar should disallow the
distributorship of Sachin Agency, Mr. Kumar should convince Mr. Sachin Mandore for
further investments, and continue with the agency. The decision is to go with the third
Problem statement-
Evaluation of Alternatives-
Agency. As this relation has been going on for long, it would allow the relationship to
stay intact.
Cons – Nutripack could not tap the potential market share, also this would lead to
with Sachin Agency has been long so breaking it might not be a suitable idea. Sachin
Decision-
The third alternative that is “Mr. Kumar should convince Mr. Sachin Mandore for further
investments, and continue with the agency” is the most proffered alternative.
Reasons –
Monthly Expenses
No Unit
Particulars s Price Total
Motor
Vehicle 2 18000 36000
Salesman
Salary 3 4000 12000
Salesman
Bonus 3 1000 3000
Driver 2 3000 6000
Delivery boy 2 3000 6000
Godown
Keeper 1 3000 3000
Helper 1 3000 3000
Operator 1 7000 7000
Computer 1 500 500
Printer 2 1000 1000
Internet 1 450 450
Telephone 1 500 500
Admin Exp 1 500 500
Godown 300
rental 0 7 21000
TOTAL 99950
1199
Annual Expense 400
Monthly Income
Particulars Gross Net
51570
Turnover 54000000 CP 000
14128
Margin 4.50% 7.7
24300 33909
Net Margin 00 04
Security 42160
Deposit 1000000 24
Return 8%
Net return 80000
25100
Total Return 00
64154
24
retur 39.12
n %
Hence, the return he gets by staying with nutripack is 39.12% as compared to 10.5% from
people’s bank.
Increased reputation.
To reduce the problems between Sachin Agency and Retailers, following steps could be
followed –
o Uniform schemes and cash discounts across all outlets of similar value.
o Increase personal visits to retailers.
Natureview
Farm
Group 4
Section A
l Chhabra | Abhishek Biswas | Chetan Dua | Diwaker Redhu | Kartikeya Bahl | Anubha
201001 | 150201002 | 150201029 | 150201035 | 150201041 | 150
Case
Overview
• Natureview Farm,Inc. - Small Yogurt Manufacturer
Natureview Farm
Timeline
1989: founded in Cabot, Vermount manufactured and
marketed refrigerated cup yoghurt with 2 flavors (plain and
Vanila)
Natureview Farm
Main Issues
An unplanned exit by its venture
capital investors
Natureview Farm
Market
Trend: 74%
67%
58%
44%
26%
Organic food market expected to grow from $6.5 billion(1999) to $ 13.3 billion in
worth in 2003
Characterstics of buyers:
• High income
• More educated
• Live in northeast and west (majorly)
Natureview Farm
Market
Trend:
channel used by organic food consumers Yogurt market share by
Region
29%
46% 27% 26%
25%
25% 22%
supermarket
small health food store Northeast Midwest
narural food supermarket Southeast West
Natureview Farm
Market
Trend:
Yogurt market share by packaging segment 12.50%
9%
8%
9%
3%
74% 2%
Growth
8-oz cups and smaller
8-oz cups and smaller childern's multipack Children's multipacks
32-oz cups others 32-oz. Cups
Natureview Farm
Market
Trend:
Distribution Channel Sales
3%
Super Natur
marke al
t foods
Chann Chan
el nel 97%
Natureview Farm
Length of
Channel
to Market
Natureview Farm
Competitor
s:
Yogurt Market share by Brand:
5% 24%
15% 35%
33%
15%
23% 7%
19%
24%
Natureview Farm
The
Challenge:
Income statement, 1999
Revenues 13000000
COGS 8190000
Gross Profit 4810000
Expenses
Administration/freight 2210000
Sales 1560000
Marketing 390000
Research and development 390000
Net Income 260000
Natureview Farm
The
Challenge:
Revenue Growth rate 1999 2000 2001
1118000
8-Oz. Cups 86% 3% 0 11515400 11860862
1300000
Total
0 13371800 13754390
Revenues
Natureview Farm
Growth
Strategies: Current Product New Product
Market Product
Current Market Penetration Development
Strategy Strategy
Natureview Farm
Options:
Natureview Farm
Option 1:
Mr. Walter Bellini, Vice President Of
sales
Natureview Farm
Option
2:
Mr. Jac
k
Operat Gottlieb, Vice
ions Preside
nt Of
Expan
d 4 SK
Nation Us of t
ally int he 32-
o supe oz Size
r marke
t Chan
nel.
Natureview Farm
Option 3:
Introduce 2 Children’s
Multipack into Natural Foods
Channel
Natureview Farm
Natureview Farm
• Potential for high growth
expected 1.5% market share • High expense - 3.04 million
after 1 year(35 million units)
2
(Northeast and
Number of regions west)
Retailers 20
Natureview Farm
Incremental Option 1
Income Statement 2000 2001
Expected sales in units 35,000,000 42,000,000
Price per unit 0.46 0.46
Revenue 16,100,000 19,320,000
Cost per unit 0.31 0.31
COGS 10,850,000 13,020,000
Advertising Expense
Advertising per region 1,200,000 1,200,000
Total 2,400,000 2,400,000
Sales & Administrative
Marketing Staf 120,000 120,000
Sales Force 200,000 200,000
Broker's fee (4%) 644,000 772,800
Total 964,000 1,092,800
Slotting Fee
Number of SKUs 6
One SKU fee per chain 10,000
Retail Chains 20
Total Slotting Fee 1,200,000
Trade Promotion
Cost per promotion per retailer(Northeast) 7,500 7,500
Number of retailers 11 11
Cost per promotion per retailer(west) 15,000 15,000
Number of retailers 9 9
Promotion periods per year 4 4
Total cost of promotions 870000 870000
Net Profit -184,000 1,937,200
Natureview Farm
Natureview Farm
Natureview Farm
• Fewer competition • High risk
• Lower on average trade • Low Dollar share of 32 oz cups
promotion expense
• Sales force expansion cost
• Higher profit margin for
$160,000
32oz versus 8oz
Natureview Farm
sales price 2.70
retailer margin(27%) 0.73
price to retail 1.97
distributor margin( 15%) 0.30
sales price for natureview 1.68
Number 0f regions 4
Retailers 64
Natureview Farm
Incremental Option 2
Income 2000 2001
Expected sales in units 5,500,000 5,500,000
Price per unit 1.68 1.68
Revenue 9,240,000 9,240,000
Cost per unit 0.99 0.99
COGS 5,445,000 5,445,000
Advertising Expense
Advertising per region 120,000 120,000
Total 480,000 480,000
Sales & Administrative
Marketing Staf 160,000 160,000
Broker's fee (4%) 369,600 369,600
Total 529,600 529,600
Slotting Fee
Number of SKUs 4
One SKU fee per chain 10,000
Retail Chains 64
Total Slotting Fee 2,560,000
Trade Promotion
Natureview Farm
Natureview Farm
• Leverage current relationships • Low expected revenue
within nature foods channel
• Requires R&D to develop
• Natural foods channel growing product
faster than Supermarkets
• Miss opportunity to enter
• Low cost Supermarkets before competitors.
Natureview Farm
sales price 3.35
retailer margin(35%) 1.17
price to retail 2.18
distributor margin( 9%) 0.20
price to wholesaler 1.98
wholesaler margin( 7%) 0.14
Selling price for natureview 1.84
Natureview Farm
Incremental Option 3
Income 2000 2001
Expected sales in units 1,800,000 2,070,000
Price per unit 1.84 1.84
Revenue 3,312,000 3,808,800
Cost per unit 1.15 1.15
COGS 2,070,000 2,380,500
Sales & Administrative
Marketing Staf 250,000 250,000
complimentary case (2.5%) 82,800 95,220
Total 332,800 345,220
Net Profit 909,200 1,083,080
Natureview Farm
Our
recommenda
tion:
Natureview Farm
• Most viable option to reach a goal of $20
million Revenues
• First-Mover Advantage
Natureview Farm
Action
Plan:
• Leverage the
relationship with
brokers to strike a deal
Design Trade
promotions
• Deploy maximum
resources to make
• Diferential pricing
Natureview Farm
Marketing Mix : 8-oz , $0.78, Presence in supermarket
among other yogurt manufacturers,
in-store Promotion.
Natureview Farm
Any Questions? Natureview Farm
Case Analysis: Goodyear-The Aquatred Launch
Group 10
Ataul Karim (P16005), Justin Fernandez (P16018), Sahil Jain (P16022), Rishi Kharbanda (P16028), Mainak Pradhan (P16042)
Background
Consumer: Goodyear segmented tire buyers into four categories – price-constrained buyers,
value-oriented buyers, quality buyers, commodity buyers. In 1992, 45% of tire buyers were price
oriented, 22% were brand oriented and 33% believed the outlet was not important.
Company: Goodyear operated 41 plants in the US, 43 plants in 25 other countries, 6 rubber
plantations and more than 2000 distribution outlets worldwide. It ranked 3 rd in worldwide sales
of new tires. It also had a strong track record in launching innovative products.
Context: In the 1970s and 1980s, the US tire industry experienced three important changes- the
emergence of the radial tire to replace the older “bias” and “bias-belted” tire constructions,
increase foreign competition and change in the nature of demand from consumers and car makers
were observed. In 1989, Goodyear started the NEWEX project, to develop a new and exciting
replacement market tire. The Aquatred was developed after comparing 10 different designs on
performance and consumer preference.
Is Aquatred the right product for the dealers and for the consumers? If yes, whether distribution
should be expanded and if so, what specific channels or retailers should be added? Is it the right
time to launch the Aquatred?
Aquarted product is a patented technology and its launch will ensure that Goodyear is innovation
driven company. To move from the promotional discounts, company should focus on the
advertisement and try to attract the customers through the quality features of the product. The
launch of Aquarted during winter Olympics is a right decision as the product is in initial phase
and hence extensive marketing is needed. Price of the product should be kept slightly high (8-
10%) so that the price-oriented customers as well as quality oriented customers could be
targeted. For distribution purpose, selective distribution model should be adopted to gain the
market coverage with more control.
So our outcome is that Goodyear should launch the Aquarted product keeping in mind the
following recommendations:
Premium pricing
Launch during winter Olympics
Selective distribution channels
Invest more in advertisement than promotions