DOCUMENT RESUME

ED 266 436 CS 008 338

AUTHOR Marzano, Robert J.; Hutchins, C. L.
TITLE Thinking Skills: A Conceptual Framework. A Special
Issue of "Noteworthy."
INSTITUTION MidContinent Regional Educational Lab., Aurora,
CO.
SPONS AGENCY Office of Educational Research and Improvement (ED),
Washington, DC.
PUB DATE 85
NOTE 64p.
PUB TYPE Information Analyses (070)
EDRS PRICE MF01/PC03 Plus Postage.
DESCRIPTORS Abstract Reasoning; *Cognitive Processes; Curriculum;
Educational Change; *Educational Research; *Learning
Theories; Memory; *Models; *Psychological Studies;
Schemata (Cognition)
IDENTIFIERS *Thinking Skills

ABSTRACT
The first chapter of this publication, which focuses
on a new definition and integration of thinking skills in the
curriculum, presents a model that unifies current research and theory
with a new understanding of the traditional notion of content and
with a different approach to instruction. The model proposed in this
chapter synthesizes recent research around three interactive
elements, which make up the second through fourth chapters: (1)
content thinking, which includes declarative, procedural, and
contextual knowledge, and the integration of these elements; (2)
reasoning, which consists of transferring content (that is, storage
and retrieval of declarative, procedural, and contextural xilowledge),
matching these elements with what is already known, and restructuring
or producing new knowledge; and (3) learning to learn, which
describes attending (paying attention), setting goals, monitoring
attitudes, and selfevaluating the thinking processes. The document
concludes with a discussion of a few restructuring issues considered
necessary for the systematic teaching of thinking skills;
specifically, how each of the three thinking skill areas necessitates
fundamental changes in schools, testing, evaluation, and the
integration of instruction. (EL)

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Reproductions supplied by EDRS are the best that can be made
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 A Special Issue of Noteworthy

,,i CrAl
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ri 16;1'4*
fr.+1 lig,

A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION
Robert J. Marzano NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF EDUCATION
EDUCATIONAL RESOURCES INFORMATION
CENTER (ERIC)
C. L. Hutchins This document has been reproduced as
received from the person or organization
originating it.
U Minor changes have been made to improve
reproduction quality.

Points of view or opinions stated in this docu

ment do not necessarily represent official NIE
position or policy

MID-CONTINENT REGIONAL EDUCATIONAL LABORATORY

 1

.1 'oteworthy is a publication of the Mid-continent Regional

Educational Laboratory (McREL). McREL is a non-profit
organization, funded in part by contracts and grants from the
Office of Educational Research and Improvement (OERI) of
The United States Department of Education. This issue of
Noteworthy has been supported by a contract from OERI. The
opinions expressed do not necessarily represent official OERI
or Department of Education policy.

McREL serves a seven-state region consisting of the states of

Colorado, Kansas, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, South
Dakota and Wyoming. Its mission is to help improve educa-
tional practice in this region and further the quality of edu-
cation across all groups of students.

3
 A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

Robert J. Marzano
C. L. Hutchins

Copyright © 1985
by the Mid-continent Regional Educational Laboratory
Aurora, Colorado Kansas City, Missouri
MIIINIMIMME11=1111=1111=11111M1111

4
 DEDICATIONS

To Dr. Daisy Arredondo for her part-

nership and support.

R. J. M.

To Miriam F. Jeffrey for many hours of

inspiration, especially those early morn-
ing classes for one.

C. L. H.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Yvonne Theisen for typesetting.

Steve Niemczura for graphics and design.

Lyn Moran Hutchins for proofreading.

5
 TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
AN OVERVIEW I

A New Learning and Teaching Model 3

Content Thinking 3

Reasoning 5

Learning -to -Learn 7

Unification 8

Advance Organizer 9

CONTENT THINKING 10

Declarative Knowledge 10

Procedural Knowledge 19

Contextual Knowledge 20

Integration of Declarative and Procedural

Knowledge 21

REASONING 23

Transferring 24

Matching 25

Restructuring 31

LEARNING-TO-LEARN 38

Attending 38

Setting Goals 39

Monitoring Attitudes 40

Self- evaluating 42

RESTRUCTURING ISSUES 45

The Teaching of Content Thinking 46

The Teaching of Reasoning Skills 47

The Teaching of Learning-to-Learn Skills 47

Evaluation 48

Instruction 48

REFERENCES 50
AN OVERVIEW
OVERVIEW
Helping students learn how to think effec-
tively is a high priority for every educator.
We are all aware of how much the future
demands that students be able to process
ever-increasing amounts of information,
make complex decisions and cope with the
uncertainties of a rapidly changing world..
If our instincts did not to tell us how impor-
tant thinking skills are, a variety of studies
and reports have made the point. For exam-
ple, the presidentially commissioned report, A
Nation At Risk (1983), indicates that higher
levels of thinking skills should be taught in
schools. The Educational Commission of the
Statcs, in a report entitled The Information
Society: Are High School Graduates Ready?
(1982) states that:
Today's minimum skills are demon-
strated successfully by a majority of
students. Higher order skills, however,
are achieved only by a minority of 17-
year -olds. If this trend continues, as
many as two million students may
graduate in 1990 without the skills nec-
essary for employment in tomorrow's
marketplace. (p. 2)
The College Board and other educational
groups have also emphasized the importance
of curriculum change that will ensure the
teaching of thi iking skills in America's
schools. These calls parallel the messages
contained in such recent best-sellers as Mega-
trends (Naisbitt, 1982) and In Search Of Ex-
cellence (Peters and Waterman, 1982).
1
No educator would deny the importance of
trying to teach students how to think. The
problem is how it should be done.
One approach is the introduction of a spe-
cial,.supplementary activity to help students
master thinking skills. This add-on approach
to improving higher level thinking skills of-
fers little hope for success. One difficulty is
that it requires cramming yet another activ-
ity into an already tight curriculum. Too of-
ten we have met the demand for change by
adding another course to the curriculum.
The current course of study simply can't
stand another entry unless some equally de-
sirable activity is displaced.
Block (1985) suggests another obstacle to in-
troducing thinking skills as a separate course
in the curriculum. He points out that the
current "back-to-basics" movement is an ef-
fort to counter the anti-egalitarian effect of
crcating discrete programs for select groups
and select types of learning (e.g., gifted and
talented, learning style programs and com-
puter literacy). He argues that because edu-
cation functions as a centrist force in our so-
ciety, the continued fracturing of a core cur-
r;culum reduces the effect that common ex-
periences and shared values have in holding
the society together. As a result, add-on pro-
grams will face stiff pressure from public
policy, no matter how logical they are.
Another reason that an add-on approach is
not likely to succeed is provided by Bereiter
7
(1984). He warns that unless thinking skills
instruction is integrated into existing instruc-
tional practices it will not be reinforced and
used. Such an approach, he argues, will go
the way of all frills. In other words, since
thinking is what schools are supposed to be
all about, if the approach used to teach
thinking is not a part of every course, it is
unlikely that students or teachers will
assimilate it into their routines for learning
and teaching.
Another difficulty with most current ap-
proaches to teaching thinking skills is that
they start with the premise that basic think-
ing skills already are taught but that "higher
level" or "hi her order" skills are not taught,
In fact, the current research and theory on
information processing or "thinking" does not
support a distinction between a set of "lower"
level skills and a different set of "higher"
skills. If there is a higher-lower distinction
to be made, it is in the varied levels of com-
plexity inherent in the content we ask stu-
dents to master or the problems we ask them
to solve.
What is needed is a reconceptualization of
our current curriculum and instructional
practices. We need to integrate a systematic
approach to introducing thinking skills into
the school experience so that students can
develop the skills to cope with ever-increas-
ing complexity in their studies as well as life
in general. To do that will require the de-
velopment of a new, unified approach to
defining what we mean by thinking skills
and the integration of those thinking skills
into the daily interplay among teacher, stu-
dents and curriculum.
The development of such an approach will
mean a significant change in current peda-
gogy. Current state-of-the-art instructional
models arc not as learner-oriented as they
need to be. These models represent theories
about instruction more than they do theories
about how people 1,:arn. For example, Ben-
jamin Bloom's mastery learning model was
developed within the traditional framework
of ensuring that students master "content."
The model emphasizes the importance of
defining a concrete outcome for an instruc-
tional activity, presenting or modeling in-
2
formation or skills to be mastered, providing
students with an opportunity to learn with
appropriate guidance and feedback, and
building speed and accuracy through inde-
pendent work; the outcome is then measured
by some paper and pencil, objective test.
Similar models have been suggested by many
others.
These step-by-step approaches to teaching do
not directly accommodate differences in how
students process information and they do not
take into account the most recent un-
derstanding we have from such fields as cog-
nitive psychology ana psycholinguistics. For
example, most current teaching tries to assure
"objectivity" in the teaching and testing pro-
cess by asserting that there is only one "right"
answer and only one "right" way to arrive at
that answer. In the Bloom model the student
is asked to demonstrate mastery of an
"objective" before he or she goes on to an-
other objective. Neither life nor advanced
work in any academic area is like that.
Current research and theory on cognition
suggest that knowledge of an academic area
is fluid and generative. As we learn more
we reshape or restructure what was previ-
ously learned. Consequently, students need
to develop thinking skills that will help them
identify contexts in which alternative an-
swers are possible and to identify optional
strategies for arriving at those answers.
Thinking is not likely to flourish when all
that is required of students is to figure out
the teacher's or textbook writer's conception
of a given content area.
That is not to suggest that a thinking skills
program should igi.ore "content." Quite the
contrary, a comprehensive approach to im-
proving thinking skills will emphasize the
mastery of content; but it will do so by help-
ing students organize and process content in
a generative way. Thus, in addition to pro-
viding students with a framework for mas-
tering content, lc would also help them de-
velop strategies for processing information
and help them consciously develop learning
skills. Introducing such an approach into
most class-ooms will require a significant
shift in how teachers view curriculum and
what they do with it. Such an approach also
8
will have a dramatic impact on how teachers
and students work together, what their goals
are and how we judge their achievements.
Fortunately, there is new theory and research
to sustain such a shift in our conceptions of
teaching and learning. The purpose of this
chapter is to present a model that unifies
current understanding of thinking and learn-
ing with a new understanding of the tradi-
tional notion of "content." The model implies
an entirely different way of approaching in-
struction. Those who are familiar with such
areas as cognitive psychology, artificial in-
telligence, psycholinguistics and human moti-
vation will be. able to identify how the model
is tied to those theoretical bases. For those
not familiar with recent developments in
these areas, it will provide an introduction to
somc of the most significant new ideas avail-
able for improving education.
MIPAIII
A New Learning and
Teaching Model
The model proposed synthesizes recent re-
search around three interactive elements:
1. Content Thinking
2. Reasoning
3. Learning-to-Learn.
These elements are interactive; none of the
elements is easily taught alone. Nor, in isola-
tion, do they closely resemble how we actu-
ally think. Any approach to defining content
must take into account the way in which the
mind processes that content and the motiva-
tion for learning the content.
We see these elements as so interactive that
we have described our approach as a "unitary
model." We believe this approach is consis-
tent with the comprehensive approach to cur-
riculum suggested by Tyler (1975) and Gow
and Casey (1983) and current theory on hu-
man behavior. It also ;s consistent with
3
Sternberg's (1984) insistence that instruction
in reasoning and thinking be based on sound
theory and the best available research.
At the core of our unitary approach is An-
derson's 1983 model of cognition. His own
words provide the best way to describe a uni-
tary approach to cognition:
The most deeply rooted preconceptions
guiding my theorizing is a belief iii the
unity of human cognition, that all
higher cognitive processes, such as
memory, language, problem solving, im-
agery, deduction and induction are dif-
ferent manifestations of the same un-
derlying system." (Anderson, 1983; p.1)
Anderson was not the first to propose a uni-
tary conception of cognition. Several others
have used a unitary approach to explain such
constructs as problem solving (Newell and
Simon, 1972), inference (Lehnert, 1978) and
general schema systems (Bobrow and Wino-
grad, 1977). Anderson has simply taken the
idea farther than anyone else in explaining
thinking.
The remainder of this chapter will introduce
our unitary approach to defining the nature
and interaction of the three elements of our
model (content thinking, reasoning and learn-
ing-to-learn).
ff----
1. Content Thinking
Anderson and others (Johnson-Laird, 1983;
Winograd, 1973) distinguish between two
types of memory:
a. Declarative
b. Procedural.
Our model incorporates these two types of
memory as two different kinds of content
thinking along with a third:
c. Contextual.
 a. Declarative Knowledge
Declarative knowledge contains information
about the world; in the broadest sense, it is
the substance of everything we know. As
Sywlester puts it, declarative memory con-
firms who/what/when/where/why facts. He
also indicates that "mastei y of a procedure or
skill often begins at the declarative memory
level" (1985; p. 71). This assertion is consis-
tent with research findings about learning
classroom contentnamely that without fac-
tual knowledge students have little success in
acquiring the procedures within a content
area (Heller and Rcif, 1984; Larkin, 1981;
Anderson, 1982). We can generalize, then,
that one type of knowledge or thinking nec-
essary for understanding content is factual
or declarative knowledge. Later we will sug-
gest a structure for organizing declarative
content that is consistent with research on
cognition.
b. Procedural Knowledge
Procedural memory contains our knowledge
of how to do things. It is a second type of
knowledge or thinking necessary for under-
standing content. For example, a sailor knows
such declarative information as the names of
various parts of a boat and the characteris-
tics of certain types of storms. But without
procedural information about how to raise a
sail and how to tack, sailing would still be
difficult.
An important characteristic of procedural
knowledge is that it is integrally linked with
declarative knowledge. The operational steps
a sailor goes through to tack or that a cook
goes through to "cream" sugar and butter are
inextricably tied to the content of sailing
and cooking. These operational steps usually
do not generalize to other situations.
In broad terms, the distinction between de-
clarative and procedural knowledge defines
two quite different domains of content. We
not only want students to know the facts and
concepts that define subjects such as history
or algebra, we also want them to be able to
carry out procedures that are inherent in ti.e
"content" of that subjectsuch as using
4
primary resources in a history class or learn-
ing how to balance two sides of an equation
in algebra. In general, this distinction be-
tween declarative and procedural knowledge
is not alien to how most teachers think about
the content of what they teach. In practice,
however, they are not always able to define
the declarative knowledge of their subject or
the procedural knowledge of their discipline.
Current practice could be improved if teach-
ers and curriculum developers systematically
identified and distinguished the declarative
and procedural knowledge they want their
students to master.
c. Contextual Knowledge
Contextual knowledge is the knowledge we
must have about the conditions under which
it is appropriate to carry out a specific pro-
cedure. We must know the context or what
And..:rson calls the "antecedent conditions"
that establish a framework for deciding
when and which procedure to execute. Thus,
given the context experienced by most first
graders, the symbols
2+2
would lead students to add the figures and
provide the answer 4. But, if the same cues
(2 + 2) are presented in an advertising con-
text, a designer might see the task as devis-
ing a new way to graphically use the symbols
to convince someone that buying a new
product is as simple as "two plus two." The
context, then, for when a procedure should
be used is as important as the procedure it-
self. Many times the recognition of the con-
text in which it is appropriatc to carry out a
specific process corresponds to what we think
of as common sense. Context is seldom
tlught directly in most classrooms.
Earlier we stressed the importance of view-
ing declarative, procedural and contextual
knowledge in a unified way. An illustration
of how the three elements arc unified when
we think is found in the format of an
if/then statement called a "production"
within cognitive psychology. Productions op-
erate like computer programs in the mind.
Consider the following:
I0
 IF: 1: it is snowing,
2: the time is before 9:00 a.m.
on a work day,
3: the snow accumulation is six
inches; and,
4: the car I need to get to work
is in the garage,
THEN: I shovel the driveway.
Technically the if part of the program in-
cludes the declarative knowledge an individ-
ual has about the nature of snow, its effect
on driving conditions, etc. It also includes
the contextual information about the fact
that today is a day I have to get to work;
the action implied by the then part of the
program (shoveling the driveway) is the pro-
cedural knowledge.
In summary, a student needs three kinds of
knowledge to master content: 1) declarative
knowledge about the content, 2) procedures
inherent to the content and 3) the contextual
conditions under which the procedures
should be used. In the absence of any three
of these elements, the student will not be
successful. For example, if a person had no
factual knowledge about snow or did not
know how to shovel a driveway, he or she
would not be able to engage in the appropri-
ate action. Equally important, if a person
did not recognize that it was Monday and
time to get to work, he or she would not
know it was appropriate to apply the
knowledge of the concept of snow to the
procedure of shoveling. If the context were
different, if it were Sunday, not Monday, the
appropriate action might be to go out
sledding with friends rather than shovel the
driveway.
The processes of matching up these elements
of content brings us to the second part of the
model.
MEM--
2. Reasoning
Reasoning is the process by which we inte-
grate the three kinds of content we have just
5 11
defined. Our framework for defining rea-
soning is also adapt-d from the work of An-
derson. His model of reasoning was con-
ceived as a set of linear micro-processes he
used to develop a computer simulation pro-
gram called ACT, Adaptive Control of
Thought. Our model should be understood as
a metaphor for his since we assume that rea-
soning skills appropriate for classroom use
are much more holistic than those designed
for computer simulation. Our model consists
of these three elements:
a. transferring content (i.c.,...storage and
retrieval of declarative, procedural and
contextual knowledge),
b. matching these elements with what is
already known, and
c. restructuring or producing new
knowledge.
These three elements of reasoning cannot be
ordered hierarchically; that is, one is not of a
higher order than the other. All are neces-
sary elements of reasoning. They are all es-
sential to any reasoning process.
a. Transferring
This process is what a great deal of school
learning is all aboutteaching us to "know"
by memorizing and recalling different ccn-
tent inherent in specific subjects, or problem
areas. Using the previous example, we must
know about snow, identify its depth, know
the effects of different levels of snow on
driving conditions, recognize that this is
Monday and we must be at work by nine,
know what time it is, etc.
According to Anderson, knowledge of this
type is a by-product of effectively storing
and retrieving information in memory. This
implies that students should not simply be
presented with information; but they should
also be taught effective storage and retrieval
techniques so as to make recognition more
efficient. In fact, very little instruction of
this kind goes on in most schools now. Later
we will discuss instructirnal strategies for
hclp:ng students improve their tranfcrring
skills.
 b. Matching
The concept of matching is best explained by
Powers (1973) and Glasser (1981). Glasser,
for example, posits that our minds have
"comparing stations" that control for what we
attend to and direct our behavior, Thus, for
example, if you have your "room comfort sta-
tion" on as you read this chapter, your body
is subconsciously monitoring the temperature
and other room conditions. So long as they
are within a range you find acceptable, noth-
ing happens. But, if the door is suddenly
opened and you feel a cold draft, you will
match these incoming signals with your
repertoire of temperature-controlling proce-
dures and you will execute one that is appro-
priate to the situation. You might, for ex-
ample, decide to get up and close the door or
ask the person who came through the door to
close it. On the other hand, if you arc in a
context where such actions would be inap-
propriate, you might decide to move to an-
other room where it is warmer. From a cy-
bernetic point of view these comparing sta-
tions are central to human behavior. We arc
always looking for or controlling for an-
tecedent conditions. When we recognize in-
formation that does not match with what we
want or expect, we review our options and
change our behavior.
In the real world, of course, this matching
process can be either quite simple or quite
complex. And, people possess considerably
different levels of this reasoning skill. The
more sophisticated their matching skills arc,
the more "comparing stations" they can use.
This sophistication, by the way, is related to
our ability to recognize and distinguish com-
plex levels of content.
Fortunately, we can classify and group the
different types of matching processes. It is
this classification that produces a list of
thinking activities that are most frequently
identified as "higher order thinking skills."
We will describe all of these classifications in
more detail in Chapter 3, but here is a brief
description of each matching skill:
CategorizingGiven
(1) the infinite
6
number 01' discriminate stimuli in the
world, categorizing helps a person
"render the unfamiliar familiar, and
because one is able to generalize about
an object based on knowledge about its
category, one is able to know more
about the object than just what can be
ascertained by looking at it." (Mervis,
1980; p. 279).
(2) Reasoning AnalogicallyFew skills
are as pervasive or essential to one's ex-
istence as the ability to reason analogi-
cally. Broadly defined, analogical rea-
soning occurs when unfamiliar stimuli
are introduced with some reference to
the more familiar. (Alexander, 1984).
Thinking by analogy involves solving a
problem by applying knowledge from
one domain or situation to another. It
is most typically presented by a prob-
lem like: "limb is to tree as leg is to
chair."
(3)
ExtrapolatingExtrapolation is the
process of matching the patterns in one
area of content with information in a
totally different context. For example,
we might extrapolate some process in
cooking (kneading dough) and apply it
to hand washing a sweater.
(4) Evaluating EvidenceEvaluation of
evidence refers to the procedures for
determining whether information fol-
lows prescribed rules of logic. Com-
monly this translates into identifying
whether a claim is supported by rele-
vant information. Toulmin (1958;
Toulmin, et al., 1979) has developed a
model which helps us evaluate the logic
of claims. (In many thinking skills
programs this process is called critical
thinking.)
(5) Evaluating ValueThis is the pro-
cess of matching information presented
with a value system, frequently your
own internalized value system. This
matching process is consient with
Paul's (1984) conception of "dialectic"
thinking which he asserts is the pri-
mary thinking skill of the future.
12
 c. Restructuring
The final type of reasoning skill is the build-
ing or restructuring of information in long-
term memory. Anderson calls this step
"execution." The outcome of this effort is, in
a sense, the production of new knowledgeat
least for the individual involved.
There are three restructuring skills:
(1) ElaboratingElaborating is a pro-
cess by which we infer information
which is missing. Various categories of
inference have been developed. War-
ren, et al., (1979) for example, distin-
guish among three general types of in-
ferences such as elaborations about
concept characteristics, elaborations
about causality, and elaborations about
context. Halliday (1967) and Grimes
(1972) add that one can also elaborate
about purpose or goal. Elaboration
adds to and greatly expands on what
we perceive or recognize.
(2) Problem SolvingVan Dijk and
Kintsch (1983) state that problems oc-
cur when there is an explicit goal to be
reached and there are specific opera-
tions or mental steps to be performed to
reach that goal. An intrinsic character-
istic of problems is that there is missing
information and the solving of the
problem involves providing that infor-
mation. (For example, finding the
"unknown term" in algebra.) The miss-
ing information may be declarative,
procedural or contextual in nature.
When the missing information has been
supplied the problem is usually solved.
(3) InventingInventing is the process
of turning a very general idea into a
finished product. It is a form of cre-
ativity. As a process, it is far less
structured than problem solving in ei-
ther its form or outcome. The product
of inventing can be a written informa-
tion, such as an essay or a poem, a new
machine, a painting, a musical composi-
tion, etc.
7 13
A key point to remember is that restructur-
ing creates new knowledge, no matter what
its form. This distinction may be difficult to
understand because we usually associate the
idea of knowledge production with a prod-
uct: a book, a finding, a theory, etc. Those
are knowledge products, but at a psychologi-
cal level, the conclusions we arrive at are
also knowledge products. Whenever we are
confronted with a problem, attempt to create
something or simply elaborate on what we
perceive, we are building new knowledge.
3. Learning-To-Learn
The third type of thinking we call "learning-
to-learn." This type of thinking is, in a
sense, our conscious control of the other two
functions; it is "thinking about thinking."
Specifically the process includes:
a. Attending
b. Setting goals
c. Monitoring attitudes
d. Self-evaluating our thinking
processes.
Research on cognition points out that all
these functions can be consciously managed.
And, within the framework of a unified
model, they must be a part of the overall ef-
fort to help students improve their thinking.
Teaching these functions directly frees them
from the tyranny of learning only what oth-
ers have thought before; it is the way we can
advance productivity in our society.
In Chapter 4 we will consider learning-to-
learn in depth. Below we briefly describe
each component:
a. Attending
Both Glasser (1981) and Powers (1973) point
out that any individual has thousands of
"comparing stations." Unfortunately, our
working memory can cope with only a few of
these stations at a time (Norman, 1969). This
means that at any given moment we must
select the comparing stations we use. In
common language the selection of a compar-
ing station is called focusing attention. Fo-
cusing attention or limiting the number of
comparing stations we have "turned on," in-
creases our efficiency at accomplishing
tasksso long as we do not exclude impor-
tant contextual information. Neisser (1967)
calls this a controlled state; Lindsay and
Norman (1977) call it a conscious state. Ev-
erything becomes more streamlined because
there are fewer options to consider. At the
same time, however, we must recognize that
in focusing our attention on a small set of
comparing stations we have depressed or re-
duced our ability to use other stations or,
speaking more informally, considering other
options.
b. Goal-Setting
There are two types of attention: automatic
and voluntary (Lura, 1973). Automatic atten-
tion is the attention we involuntarily give to
data or information that occurs sponta-
neously in our environment. Voluntary at-
tention is goal driven; we chose to respond to
one set of stimuli over another. In other
words, we are either consciously controlling
what we attend to or reacting unconsciously
to stimuli in our environment. When we set
a new goal, we activate a new set of compar-
ing stations by focusing our attention on
those stimuli that are relevant to the goal.
Helping students understand that they con-
sciously make decisions about what compar-
ing stations they will use and helping them
to understand how they can control attention
through specific goal-setting behavior aids
them in improving the efficiency of their
thinking as well as their sense of satisfaction
in accomplishing what they have undertaken.
c. Monitoriug Attitudes
Once goals are set, epistemic thinking be-
comes an important factor in learning. Epis-
temic thoughts are those attitudes that form
the basis of one's reality. (For example, the
8
thought, "This task should be easy for me" is
epistemic. It would control behavior relative
to the task.) McCombs (1984) asserts that this
type of thinking is the driving force behind
goal-seeking behavior. At a common sense
level most of us would agree that our belief
about whether we can successfully ac:om-
plish a task has a great deal to do with our
motivation or willingness to undertake the
task. Weiner (1972) and others suggest that
another important epistemic thought is our
attitude as to whether effort versus ability is
more likely to produce success. If we believe
that effort is the key ingredient in success
we are more likely to be motivated and to
accept responsibility for carrying out the
task. If, however, we belief that ability (or
luck or the work of others) is the key to suc-
cess and we doubt our ability to carry the
task out, we are less likely to assume respon-
sibility for the work or to appear to be moti-
vated. In other words, a useful attitude is
that sustained effort will eventually lead to
success.
d. Self-evaluating
Once an individual actually engages in a
task, i.e., sets out to accomplish a goal, the
process becomes cybernetic. That is, we use
the goal as a means of changing and correct-
ing our behavior much as a guided missile
changes direction and speed based on the in-
formation it receives relative to the ap-
proaching target. In a sense, we are con-
stantly learning as we monitor these signals
and redirecting our efforts. The key to how
well we learn is the degree to which our
monitoring activities are conscious. If we ac-
tively examine the feedback data we get and
evaluate it in terms of the extent to which it
suggests we are approaching our target, we
are more likely to learn. If we don't have
good feedback data or if we don't listen to
it, we are less likely to learn.
Unification
As mentioned previously, the model vac have
described is only an analogy for the real pro-
cess of thinking. In the process of thinking
we don't break the steps down as neatly as
we have described them here and they do not
14
occur in a neat, linear fashion as suggested
by our lists; that is why we have described
the model as "unitary." But, at the same
time, by breaking the process down into ele-
ments, albeit abstract elements, we can help
students improve their thinking skills.

Advance Organizer
The pages that follow expand the model with
additional research and theory. The organ-
ization follows the order in which the model
was outlined in this chapter:
Content Thinking
Declarative Knowledge
Concepts
Relationships
Patterns
Procedural Knowledge
Contextual Knowledge
Reasoning

Transferring
Storing
Retrieving
Matching
Categorizing
Reasoning Analogically
Extrapolating
Evaluating Evidence
Evaluating Value
Restructuring
Elaborating
Problem Solving
Inventing
Learning-to-Learn
Attending
Setting Goals
Monitoring Attitudes
Self-evaluating the Thinking
Process.

15
9
iiiMMINM1111----
CONTENT THINKING
The introduction identified three types of
"content thinking" or knowledge:
1. Declarative
2. Procedural
3. Contextual.
This chapter will describe all three types and
how they can be integrated into instruction.
1. DECLARATIVE KNOWLEDGE
Rcccnt years have seen breakthroughs ir. our
understanding of declarative or factual
knowledge. We now know enough about it to
draw some conclusions for instruction. For
example, we know that declarative knowl-
edge is hierarchical in nature. Basic units
are put together to form complex organiza-
tional structures.
a. Concepts
The most basic unit of declarative knowledge
is the concept. Within education the term
"concept" is widely misused to represent a va-
riety of constructs. Here we use it in a tech-
nically rigorous way. A concept is the so-
cially accepted meaning of one or more
words which express the idea or object sym-
bolized by the concept (Klausmeicr and Sip-
10
plc, 1980; p. 78). For example, the word dog
is a label society uses to represent four-
legged animals with certain characteristics.
Although we will describe concepts in some
depth shortly, for now we can liken concept
knowledge to word or vocabulary knowledge.
We might say that vocabulary knowledge is
the outward indication of an individual's
store of concepts. It is no wonder, then, that
vocabulary knowledge has been cited as one
of the strongest predictors of general aca-
demic ability. For example, Anderson and
Frcebody (1981) report that the strong rela-
tionship between vocabulary and general in-
telligence is one of the most robust findings
in the history of intelligence testing.
b. Propositions
The hierarchical level of information above
the concept in complexity is the proposition.
Propositions are groups of concepts organized
in such a way as to be true or false.
Thus . . . 'John' is a concept but is not
information that can be true or false in
nature . . . whereas 'John is ill' would
be a proposition because it could be
true or false (van Dijk, 1980; p. 207).
Thcrc is ample research evidence to show the
primacy of propositions in processing infor-
mation (Bransford and Franks, 1971). That
is, we naturally organize information into
propositions. They are so basic to the pro-
cessing of information that we might say
16
they constitute a good operational definition
of an "idea."
c. Relationships
One level higher in the organization of
knowledge arc relationships. Relationships
link one proposition to another. To illus-
trate, consider the following:
Bill is tall but ...
he doesn't play basketball.
Hcrc there are two propositions: 1) "Bill is
tall" and 2) "he does not play basketball."
These propositions are connected using a re-
lationship signaled by the linguistic conjunc-
tion "but." Note that this particular relation-
ship indicates that two propositions have a
negative or contrasting relationship to each
other in some way. Conventional instruction
in grammar does not emphasize this distinc-
tion and, instead, suggests that all conjunc-
tions f unction in the same way. Research
indicates that if we cannot recognize these
basic relationship differences between ideas
(propositions), processing breaks down
(Kintsch and van Dijk, 1978; Waters, 1978).
d. Patterns
/Above the level of relationships is a larger
organizational structure of information
called the pattern of knowledge. For exam-
ple, when you read a chapter in a textbook
you look for the overall pattern of the in-
formation It might be that the chapter is
actually about some major generalization or
it might describe a set of events that hap-
pened in a given order. Generalization and
sequence are both examples of organizational
patterns. If we miss the overall organization
of a piece of information we might be able
to understand bits and pieces of it, but we
will not understand the information as a
unified whole (Meyer, 1975).
Unfortunately, most textbooks are not writ-
ten in a format that makes these organiza-
tional patterns obvious to students (Pearson,
1981). Similarly, information presented
orally in content area construction is not or-
11
ganized into salient patterns. For the most
part, then, the burdcn is on the student to
create some type of organizational pattern
for information read or heard. In fact, stud-
ies indicate that the most successful students
look for or create patterns as a basic com-
prehension strategy (Goetz, Palmer and
Haensly, 1983); less successful learners do not
appear to have this metacognitive awareness.
Fortunately, current research indicates that
students can be taught organizational pat-
terns and how to use them as basic tech-
niques for understanding content area mate-
rial (Taylor and Samuels, 1983; Leslie and
Jett- Simpson, 1983).
Knowing the declarative information within
a content area, then, requires a knowledge of
the concepts, propositions, relationships and
organizational patterns for propositions.
Three of these four declarative elements rep-
resent distinct areas for instruction. That is,
instruction can and should be planned for
concept attainment, relationship identifica-
tion and pattern recognition. Proposition
recognition has been excluded from the list
because there appears to be no need to teach
children this form of information organiza-
tion. As mentioned previously, propositions
are basic to thinking. One theory of infor-
mation processing--called the semiotic exten-
sion theoryasserts that humans are geneti-
cally predisposed to organize information
into propositions (McNeill, 1975). In other
words, organizing information into proposi-
tions is so fundamental to thinking that no
formal instruction in the nature of proposi-
tions is necessary. Research supports this
point. For example, Sachs (1967) found that
while memory for specific aspects of a sen-
tence faded quickly, the memory for the
propositional sense of a sentence was re-
markably stable. Similar findings have been
reported by Pearson (1974-75) and Bransford
and Franks (1971).
Below, we briefly consider instruction strate-
gies for teaching concepts, relationships and
patterns.
(1) Concept Attainment
In the previous section we likened concept
knowledge to word knowledgeknowing the
17
label (word) society uses to represent a con-
cept. Before discussing instructional tech-
niques for teaching concepts we should go
into a little more depth about the nature of
concepts.
Some theorists believe that concepts are basi-
cally linguistic in nature (e.g., Klausmeier
and Sipple, 1980; Fodor, 1976). For example,
Condon (1968) believes that until a label
(word) is established for a set of experiences
no concept exists. That is, without the label
there is no conceptonly experiences stored
in long-term memory. The label organizes
these experiences into a unified whole.
Other theorists stress the "imagery" nature of
concepts (e.g., Richardson, 1983; Paivio,
1971). Imagery means more than just
"pictures in the mind." Mental images in-
clude the tactile, auditory, emotional and vi-
sual aspects of perception (Sheikh, 1983).
For example, when you ride on a roller-
coaster you store in you; long-term memory
all the sensations (sounds, feel, emotion) as-
sociated with the ride as well as mental pic-
tures of the ride. Those theorists who stress
the imagery aspects of concept knowledge,
then, claim that you must have a "primary
experience" in order to develop a concept.
This perspective is consistent with the theo-
ries of Piaget.
The imagery nature of our knowledge of
concepts is usually overlooked. Instead, vo-
cabulary instruction usually focuses on lin-
guistic development; that is, we ask students
to learn dictionary-like definitions. In the
absence of an image or experimental base for
the concept, particularly abstract concepts,
many students develop only the ability to
rotely define the concept without integrating
it into their working knowledge.
Instruction will be most effective when it in-
tegrates both the linguistic and imagery na-
ture of concepts; the two perspectives are in
no way contradictory. That is, instruction in
concepts should highlight both the linguistic
or verbal nature and the visual, tactile, audi-
tory and emotional nature of the concept. A
logical sequence for concept development in-
struction would be to begin with those char-
acteristics which are related to imagery. For
12
18
example, students should first have experi-
ences which create images of the concepts.
They should then be given a label for those
experiences. They might then be asked to
describe what they know about the label.
Over time this description will become more
and more precise until it finally evolves into
what we might call a technically accurate
definition.. A straight-forward instructional
process for concept instruction might follow
these steps:
Step 1. Provide primary experiences
that develop images for the concept
(e.g., visual, tactile, auditory, emo-
tional).
Step 2. Provide students with a label
or word to represent the concept.
Step 3. Require students to describe
the concept in their own words. Let
them draw on the full range of their
experiences. Help them link it to other,
related knowledge and contrast it with
other concepts that have some similari-
ties with the one being learned.
Step 4. Over time
have students
sharpen their descriptions of the con-
cept until it evolves into a technically
accurate definition.
Step 2, 3 and 4 are familiar to most subject
area teachers. The stumbling block in this
process is usually Step 1. How can you pro-
vide primary experiences in all concepts you
want to teach? If you wish to teach the con-
cept of "parachuting" to young students do
you take then up in an airplane and give
them direct experiences?of course not. Step
1 need not be a stumbling block because
primary experiences do not have to be direct.
Imagery characteristics can be developed by
"guided imagery"imagining what an experi-
ence is like. In effect, this is the way we ob-
tain primary experiences about most con-
cepts. Few people have parachuted from an
airplane. However, most people have jumped
from a limited height, felt a strong wind
rushing against them and stood at a great
height. They put the memory of these expe-
riences together to form their concept of
parachuting even though they have never di-
rectly experienced it.
Guided imagery, then, is a way of artifi-
cially creating primary experiences for con-
cepts within a classroom setting. The tech-
nique has a rich theoretical and research ba-
sis. Guided imagery has long been used in
psychotherapy under the name of.oneirother-
apy (Sheikh and Jordon, 1983). It has been
shown to be basic to most memory techniques
(Bellezza, 1981; Paivio, 1971) and is one of
the most powerful techniques currently in
use in sports training (Suinn, 1983). For ex-
ample, athletes spend a significant amount of
time mentally imaging the feat they are
about to perform. Also, many of the learn-
ing techniques which purport to integrate
left and right brain functions (e.g., Hart,
1983; Zdenek, 1983) are basically adaptations
of guided imagery.
One important feature of these four concept
attainment steps is that they gradually build
to a structured definition of the concept.
Klausmeier and Goodwin (1971) suggest that
a complete definition should include the
following components:
a linguistic definition of the concept
the defining attributes of the con-
cepts
examples and non-examples of the
concept
the taxonomy of which the concept
is a part including the superordinate-
coordinate-subordinate relations of
the particular concept to other
concepts
some of the principles (or situations)
in which the concept is used
kinds of problems whose solution
will involve the use of the concept
the names of the attributes of the
concept and related vocabulary
words.
13
The importance of concept development im-
plies a need for direct, systematic instruction
in vocabulary. This was Becker's (1977) rec-
ommendation after a thorough analysis of
the research on various interventions for the
educationally disadvantaged.
Direct instruction in all concepts is not prac-
tical, however. For example, Harris and Ja-
cobson (1972) identify over 7,000 words
(concepts) used in elementary school text-
books. Direct instruction in these concepts
would require students to learn about 30 new
words per week. However, other vocabulary
studies have established that a relatively
small number of words account for the ma-
jority of the concepts encountered by stu-
dents. For example, of the 86,741 common
English words identified by Carroll, Davies
and Richman (1971) over 40 percent ap-
peared only once in all of the books, journals
and newspapers they studied. Dupuy (1974)
has proposed a viable solution to the problem
by operationally defining a "basic"
conceptone which is commonly used in the
English language and forms the basis for
many other words. That is, if you know a
basic word it provides a vehicle to
understand many other words. Dupuy has
estimated that there are only 12,000 basic
words in the English language and only 7,000
are used in K-12 classroom. If these 7,000
basic words were taught systematically it
would require students to learn only 15 new
words per week. Marzano (1984) asserts that
the process can be streamlined even further
if words are presented in "clusters"groups
of related concepts. In a study of elementary
school concepts he found that over 50
percent of those concepts could be organized
into 15 clusters and over 75 percent into 25
clusters. All elementary school concepts
could be organized into 61 clusters.
The names of the 15 clusters and some exam-
ple concepts from Marzano's word list are
shown in Table 2.1.
19
 TABLE 2.1

15 Clusters Identified in Elementary Textbooks (Marzano, 1984)

Clusters: Examples of Words in Number of Cumulative

Each Cluster and Descriptions Concepts in Number of
Clusters Concepts

1. Occupations/careers: man- 364 364

ager, mayor, coach, bus-
inessperson, printer, publisher
2. Types of motion: action, 321 685
stillness, chase, plunge
3. Size/quantity: time, large, 310 995
amount, many, monstrous, two
4. Animals: pet, dog, snake, 289 1284
spider, bird
5. Feelings /emotions: feeling, 282 1566
terror, shame, anger, sad,
happy, love, excitement
6. Food/meal/types of eating: 263 1829
supper, meal, cookie, meat,
vegetables, butter, cook
7. Time/time relationships: 251 2080
lifetime, noon, season,
month, today, earlier,
now, afterward
8. Machine/engines/tools: 244 2324
equipment, engine, oven,
hammer, ax, spoon
9. Types of people: 237 2561
women, boy, neighbor,
dweller, hero, enemy, mother
10. Communications: talk, 235 2796
explain, suggest, question,
command, vow, complain
11. Transportation: car, plane 205 3001
bicycle, ship
12. Mental actions: plan, 193 3194
search, teach, select, believe
13. Human traits: lazy, 175 3369
patient, stubborn, humorous
14. Location/direction: 172 3541
here, back, inside
15. Literature/writing: 171 3712
story, word, poem, pen,
telegram

14 20
One of the reasons why instruction that
teaches words in clusters is more efficient is
tied to the way our short-term and long-term
memories work. Research suggests that when
we are trying to learn something that will
not extinguish easily overtime, we must move
it from our short-term memory to our long-
term memory. We do that by tying the con-
cept we are learning to something we already
know; hence the close tie that has been rec-
ognized between our ability to see associa-
tions among things and our ability to learn
them. When we pull the cluster of concepts
like the one we are about to learn from our
long-term memory down into our working
short-term memory and hook the new concept
into our working understanding of related
ideas, that is the best and most efficient time
to learn other, related concepts.
Thus, our instructional recommendation is
that we teach concepts in clusters that are
semantically similar or related. The current
practice is to have students learn a series of
somewhat unrelated words each week. For
example, one week's vocabulary or spelling
words are frequently drawn from a story be-
ing read. This practice increases the mental
operations involved and favors those students
whose out-of-school experiences or general
intelligence makes it easier to perform these
operations.
Going one step farther, we recommend that
teachers focus on word clusters that includs,
words from vocabulary lists one grade level
higher than the grade they teach since most
standardized tests include words from the
next higher grade than tit student is in to
increase the difficulty level of the item.
Practically, this is not difficult if you use a
list such as Marzano's (1984) that organizes
all elementary vocabulary words around clus-
ters, by grade level difficulty.
Concept attainment, then, can be approached
in a manner that is consistent with the way
individuals naturally learn. We believe that
such an emphasis would increase the declara-
tive content knowledge of all students, espe-
cially those who traditionally have trouble
with content area concepts.
(2) Relationship Identification
15
The way an individual usually recognizes
relationships between ideas is by looking for
various syntactic, semantic and rhetorical
signals for those relationships. For example,
in the sample sentence used earlier the word
but signaled that the two propositions had a
contrastive relationship. Many theorists in
the area of linguistic study called "discourse
analysis" have attempted to classify the vari-
ous types of relationships that can exist be-
tween ideas (e.g., Halliday and Hasan, 1976;
Pitkin, 1977). Five basic relationships have
been identified: 1) addition, 2) contrast, 3)
time, 4) causality and 5) reference. Marzano
and Dole (1983) define these relationships in
the following way for instructional purposes:
1. addition: two ideas "go together" in
some way; e.g., "He is kind and he is in-
telligent."
2.. contrast: two ideas "don't go to-
gether" in some way; e.g., "He is tall but
he isn't a good basketball player."
3. time: one event happens before,
during or after another event; e.g., "He
went home- Then he went to the game."
4. cause: one :vent causes another;
e.g., "He went home because Jana went
home."
5. reference: two ideas share a com-
mon concept e.g., "I like Yvonne: she is
nice."
Students can L taught to look for these rela-
tionships as a way of "linking" information.
We call this process "relationship identifica-
tion." It requires that students:
Identify separate ideas that are related.
Identify the type of relationship be-
tween the ideas, (e.g., addition or con-
trast).
Identify the linguistic signal for the
relationship (e.g., and, or, but).
Activities such as these have been shown to
increase students' comprehension and under-
standing of the nature of textual information
21
(Robertson, 1968; Marshall and Glock, 1978- ships can be further subdivided into 22 dif-
1979). At a more sophisticated level, Ander- ferent relationships each with its own mean-
son (1978) has developed a diagraming tech- ing and linguistic signals. These 22 relation-
nique for relationships which can be used as ships arc illustrated in Figure 2.2.
a study skill activity with complex content
area material. In Anderson's procedure stu-
dents are taught to identify the basic rela- Figure 2.2
tionship between ideas in textbooks and use
symbols (e.g., arrows, equality signs, inequal- Types of Relationships
ity signs) that represent how ideas are related
in an outline representation of the informa- Addition
tion.
1. Equality:
Relzitionship identification activities can also He is tall and he is h:indsome.
go far beyond the level of simply teaching 2. Restatement:
students to recognize relationships. Some I am tired. In fact, I am exhausted.
very deep levels of abstraction can be dis- 3. Example:
cussed and highlighted by considering the He does many things well. For example,
underlying meaning signaled by relationships. he is excellent at cards.
To illustrate, consider the following: 4. Summation:
He does many things well.
She was beautiful but He cooks. He sews.
she was not conceited In he is an excellent homemaker.
Here there are two propositions joined by a Contract
contrast relationship. Recall that the purpose
of a contrast relationship is to convey the I. Antithesis:
message that the joined ideas in some way I will be there, tyl I won't be happy.
"do not go together." A student's ability to 2. Alter native:
recognize this relationship would indicate Either it will rain or it will snow.
one level of awareness. Another level would 3. Comparison:
be the consideration of why these two propo- Bill is tall. In comparison his brother is
sitions "don't go together." That is, the asser- short.
tion that "being beautiful" does not go with 4. Concession:
"not being conceited" implies some basic be- I don t like violence. Nonetheless. I'll
liefs on the part of the author of these meet you at the fights.
propositions about how people who are beau-
tiful sometimes behave. Questions and dis- Time
cussion which highlight this level of meaning
are akin to what Doyle (1983) metacom- I. Subsequent action:
prehension activities. The more sophisticated They went to the game. Aiwward they
these relationships become and the more they went to the dance.
require the readers to bring some knowledge 2. Prior action:
to the text that is not explicitly contained in They went to the dance after they went
it, the more we approach the kind of inter- to the game.
pretive skills we try to teach students when 3. Concurrent action:
they arc confronted with quality literature Bill thought about Mary while Mary
and complex thought. thought about Bill.

Another way of increasing the sophistication Cause

of relationship identification is to make
finer distinctions among the different types I. Direct Cause:
of relationships. Forexample, Marzano He won the race la maintaining his
(1983) has shown that the five basic relation- concentration.

16
2. Result:
Bill went home. Consequently the party
ended.
3. Reason:
He went to the store be.:ause he needed
food.
4. Inference:
Mary is going on a long trip. In that
case she should plan well.
5. Condition:
Unless you stop, I will leave.
Reference
1. Same word reference:
Bill is my friend.
I like Bill.
2. Personal pronoun reference:
BjE is my friend.
I like him.
3. Synonym reference:
Bill bought a new car.
This automobile is one of his nicest
possessions.
4. Metaphoric:
Bill went to Seattle.
This haven La the weary is located
Washington.
5. Related concept reference:
Bill bought a new ca.
The fires alone cost $400.
6. Whole idea reference (this, that):
Mary went out with Bill.
This bothered Mike.
Relationship identification helps students be-
gin to see the interccanectedness of ideas and
the necessity of creating linkages in the in-
formation they read or hear.
(3) Pattern Recognition
Patterns are organizational structures which
"hold together" large blocks of information.
A relationship might join two ideas, a pat-
tern might unify 50 ideas. To illustrate a
pattern consider the following:
I have a regular routine I follow in the
morning. First, I sit up on the edge of
the bed to see if I'm alive. Then, I
brush my teeth and wash my face.
Then its time for my morning jog.
usually go from 2 to 5 miles depending
on the weather. Next I ....
The unifying structure for this information
is a sequence of events that happen in a set
order:
First I sit up on the edge of tlie bed.
Then I brush my teeth.
Then it's time for my jog.
Next I ....
Sequence is a very basic pattern used to or-
ganize many different types of information.
Six basic patterns, including sequence, have
been identified (Marzano and Dole, 1983).
They include:
1. sequence patterns
2. topic patterns
3. generalization patterns
4. process patterns
5. similarity patterns
6. dissimilarity patterns.
As examples of these other patterns we de-
scribe topic patterns and generalization pat-
terns below:
Topic patterns are those in which the charac-
teristics of a single concept or a few concepts
are described. Characteristics are: a) states
of being, b) habitual actions and c) unusual
actions for the concept. When you identify a
concept pattern you are actually identifying
characteristics of a concept. For example,
here is a pattern organized around states of
being:
My car is the nicest on the block.
It is painted blue with white trim.
It has white-wall tires and a 409 engine.
Generalization patterns are those in which a
set of propositions is an example of another
proposition; here is an example:
At times life gets difficult.
I Finances become a problem.
17
23
 A period of poor health may develop.
Family problems can crop up.
Work may become boring.
Here the first sentence is the generalization;
the others are the examples. In many cases a
generalization pattern contains a summary
statement at the end, thusly:
In short, it's easy to lose your zest for
living.
To a degree, generalization patterns are re-
lated to topic patterns. The primary differ-
ence is that topic patterns contain character-
istics of a concept; generalization patterns
contain examples of a statement.
The first step in teaching pattern recognition
is to tcach students the different types of
patterns by name. Once this is done students
can use those patterns to organize informa-
tion they read or hear. To illustrate consider
the following excerpt from a social studies
text:
Islamic laws include dietary rules.
Food must be prepared according to
these rules. Foods that may and may
not be used are listed. Muslims may
not drink alcohol. This includes wine,
beer, and whiskey. They are not al-
lowed to eat pork, either. Devout Mus-
lims often say that people who drink
alcohol or eat pork are unclean. By Is-
lamic definition, then, many [people]
are unclean.
Islamic law also includes criminal law.
The Koran lists punishments for crimes
against property or persons. The Koran
says that thieves should have their
hands chopped off. Each kind of crime
has its own punishment.
Islamic law carefully explains the place
of women in society. Islamic women
must obey their husbands in all matters.
An Islamic husband may have four
wives. Each wife has her place. Usu-
ally, Islamic wives are allowed to leave
their homes for only a brief time.
They may not deal with men other than
their husbands.
18
One pattern students might sec in this pas-
sage is a topic pattern about the concept
"Islamic law":
Islamic law includes dietary rules:
Food must be prepared according to
them.
Restricted and non-restricted foods
are listed.
The Koran lists specific punishments.
Thieves have their hands cut off.
Each crime has a specific punishment.
It also explains the place of women:
Women must obey their husbands.
Wives have their place.
Wives are allowed to leave home only
for a brief time.
Another pattern a student might see in this
information is a generalization pattern:
Islamic law is very restrictive:
It dictates which foods can and
cannot be eaten.
It prescribes specific and harsh
punishments for criminals.
It limits the activities of women.
The point is that no single pattern exclu-
sively fits the passage. In fact, many pas-
sages have all six patterns. This has strong
implications for teaching declarative infor-
mation; it suggests that a teacher should act
as a guide in helping students see the many
ways of organizing information within the
content area. Rather than being viewed as
static data to be learned as presented by the
teacher or textbook, content should be
viewed as fluid information which can be
arranged in many ways to best fit tilt) prior
knowledge of the student.
Highlighting the interpretational nature of
content is not new to curriculum theory.
Hawkins (1974) refers to this as "unpacking"
24
the curriculum; Bussis, Chittenden and
Amarel (1976) refer to it as accessing the
"deep structure" of the curriculum.
1111101111111.1.11.111.11111
2. PROCEDURAL KNOWLEDGE
Procedural knowledge is knowledge of how
to do things. As mentioned in Chapter 1, it
is intimately tied to declarative knowledge.
If students do not know the factual knowl-
edge of a content area they cannot learn pro-
cedures which are built on that factual in-
formation. As Sywlester (1985) says, mastery
of a procedure begins with declarative
knowledge. This is supported by current re-
search on teaching; specifically, without ba-
sic declarative knowledge, students have dif-
ficulty learning the procedural knowledge
within a content area (Heller and Reif, 1984).
Although obviously important, procedural
knowledge is frequently overlooked in in-
struction. For example, Bcycr (1984) asserts
that insufficient instruction in procedural
knowledge about school work is a leading
factor in the poor performance of many stu-
dents. The implication is that content area
teachers should identify those procedures
specific to their content and explicitly teach
and reinforce them. For example, a social
studies teacher might identify such proce-
dures as map reading or locating information
in a reference book. A mathematics teacher
might identify procedures for solving spe-
cific types of problems. Science teachers
need to identify the various processes or pro-
cedures involved in their respective areas.
Sometimes a relatively simple laboratory ex-
ercise may involve dozens, even hundreds, of
such procedures. If the teacher is not aware
of this complexity, it is easy to fail to build
the prerequisite knowledge necessary to be
successful. The effect is to penalize the less
able student.
Research indicates that when learning a pro-
cedure an individual will progress through
three stages. Fitts (1964) calls the first stage
the cognitive stage. At this stage the learner
can verbalize the process (describe it, if
asked) and can perform at least a crude ap-
proximation of the procedure. According to
19
Anderson (1983), at this stage it is common to
observe verbal "mediation" during which the
learner rehearses the information required to
execute the skill. In the second stage, called
the "associative stage" by Fitts, the perfor-
mance of the procedure is smoothed out. At
this stage errors in the initial understanding
of the procedure are detected and dropped
along with the need for verbal rehearsal.
During the third stage, the autonomous stage,
the procedure is refined. It is at this level
that the procedure becomes automatic
(Laberge and Samuels, 1974). That is, the
procedure once called on by the learner is
automatically executed and takes very little
of the available space in working memory.
The stages described by Fitts and Labcrge
and Samuels parallel research by Hall and
others. Their research suggests that when a
person encounters a new operation or an in-
novation one can usually observe a predica-
ble set of stages through which they progress
as they deal with the new knowledge (Hall,
1976). They are identified in Figure 2.3.
Figure 2.3
Brief Definitions of Stages of
Concern About the Innovation.
Awareness: Unconcerned about the in-
novation.
Informational: Concerns about general
characteristics of the innovation and
what is required to use it.
Personal: Concerns about one's role and
possible conflicts between that role and
anticipated demands of the innovation.
Management: Concerns about time, or-
ganizing, managing, and making the in-
novation work smoothly.
Conseque-nce: Concerns about stz.dent
outcomes.
Collaboration: Concerns about working
with others in use of the innovation.
Refocusing: Concerns about finding
another and even more effective way.
25
ViriiIIIM110101
To illustratc a possible approach to teaching
a proccdurc, using the stages suggested by
Fitts and the others cited, a teacher might
begin by idcntifying the declarative informa-
tion essential to understanding the concepts
ticd to the procedure.
The first stage would be accompanied by
making sure that students had an opportunity
to understand how the procedure is related to
knowledge already learned. Questions asked
and answered about cach proccdurc might
includc: What is it likc? How does it com-
pare with other procedures? What arc its
parts? What are its functions? What are
other things that might be confused with the
proccdurc but are not like it? Why is the
proccdurc important? Why should I know
about it?
At the second stage, the procedures would be
explicated, described, broken down into their
components or subprocesses. Students will
want to ask questions like: Is this the right
way? Docs it work likc this? Docs this part
of the proccdurc fit with the other parts? As
this stage proceeds, students will naturally
smooth out procedures even if they are ini-
tially inefficient. This smoothing out process
usually involves adaptation to each student's
own style. The students may delete, add or
combine elements to make it work for them.
During this phase it will be important for
the teacher to provide feedback about the ef-
fects of these modifications.
Moving students to the third stage requires
systematic and consistent use of the procc-
durc. Anderson (1982) claims that for very
complex procedures a relatively long period
of practice time is required. This is consis-
tent with the recommendations of Hunter
(1984) and Good, Grouws and Ebmeicr (1983)
that students should receive ample opportu-
nity for independent practice.
Simply stated, we recommend that effective
procedural instruction include the identifica-
tion of important subject area procedures,
the description of these procedures, their pre-
sentation to students and the use of activities
that allow students to integrate the proce-
dures into their own manner of interacting
with the content.
20
Evertson (1980) found that this is precisely
what effective teachers do with procedures
related to social behavior in the classroom.
That is, good teachers describe the proce-
dures (rulcs) they expect studcnts to follow
and then give them explicit practice in the
procedures until they become integrated with
the students' behavior. We suggest that the
same process be followed to teach academic
procedures inherent in specific subject areas.
3. CONTEXTUAL
CON': KNOWLEDGE
Contextuai knowledge is actually a compo-
nent of procedural knowledge but important
enough to be isc'ated as a type of knowledge
in its own right. Recall from the introduc-
tory chaptcr that contcxtual knowledge is
knowledge of when to use a proccdurc and
the ways that contextual or situational vari-
ables affect the procedure. For example, 2+2
represents the procedure of adding two one-
digit numbers. If we represented this prob-
lem in a different format, like that below,
we would be changing the contextual infor-
mation surrounding the procedure:
2
+2
One cannot assume that students who have
learned a procedure in one context will be
able to perform the procedure in what ap-
pears to them to be a different context. A
rather famous study by the Gestalt psycholo-
gist, Max Wcrthermcir, (in Resnick, 1983) is
commonly used to illustrate this point.
Wcrthcrmcir (1945, 1959) reported interview-
ing children who had been taught to find the
area of a parallelogram by dropping a per-
pendicular line and then multiplying the
perpendicular by the base of the parallelo-
gram. The students performed well on this
task as long as the problem was presented in
the standard way as illustrated in the top of
Figure 2.4.
26
Figure 2.4
a. Standard form:
base---)
b. Altered context:
altitude
<---base--)
However, when Werthermeir asked the stu-
dents to find the area of the parallelogram in
a different position (as in the bottom of Fig-
ure 2.4) students reported that the problem
"was not fair" or that they "haven't had that
yet."
To teach contextual know edge in a class-
room setting requires a keen eye on the part
of the teacherspecifically, an eye for which
content knowledge contains important
contextual information. Some content
knowledge by its very nature is mostly con-
textual. For example, teaching students how
to use punctuation correctly is primary con-
textual. Most students readily understand
that a comma signals a pause. They also
readily understand the procedure for using a
comma, placing a small curved line between
two words. However, the context in which
the procedure should be used is difficult for
many students to integrate into their knowl-
edge of commas. The contexts in which com-
mas should be used includes:
between items in a series, whether the
items are words, phrases or clauses
between clauses of compounded sen-
tences
21
after introductory phrases and clauses
at the beginning and end of non-
restrictive clauses
at the beginning and end of appositives.
Once key contextual information has been
identified the teacher should then present the
content in the different contexts. For exam-
ple, mathematical and scientific algorithms
(like the parallelogram algorithm) should be
presented in different formats. Students
should even be encouraged to identify dif-
ferent formats or modes of representation.
The students should then be asked to discuss
how the contexts changed their approach to
the information.
INTEGRATION OF OF DECLARATIVE,
PROCEDURAL AND CONTEXTUAL
KNOWLEDGE
Earlier we made the point that our model of
thinking skills is an integrated one; i.e., the
components do not stand alone. The same is
tree for the elements of the component we
have called "content thinking." The three el-
ements of declarative, procedural and contex-
tual knowledge are quite interactive in the
real world.
One way to illustrate this integration is to
reference the work of general systems theo-
rists. People within that field point out that
with the exception of the thousands of single
concepts (words) in our knowledge base, most
of the "stuff" of nature is actually systemic.
Bertalanffy (1967, 1969) indicates that nature
consists of an array of progressively elabo-
rated systems. His hierarchy includes nine
levels. Boulding (1968) has constructed a
hierarchy of seven levels of systems ranging
from the simplicity of what he calls
"clockworks!! to an overarching perspective
expressed in "transcendent systems." Level
six, for example, is the human level in which
the individual person is the system. Level
seven is the level of social organization. A
great deal of the content of educatio;
particularly at the secondary and college
27
levels, is at these higher system levels. We been recently expanded by research of hu-
believe that it is more appropriate to refer to man intelligence. What is emerging is the
"higher" levels of thinking in terms of the picture of the intelligent person as a "system"
graduated complexity of these systems rather thinkersomeone able to see the complex in-
than the quality of our thinking per se. teractions of systems and subsystems.
Whether it's a farmer, an international fi-
One example will help make the point. In nancier, a high level government official or a
the Midwest and other farming areas of the student in an automobile class who under-
country, agriculture is in crisis. The system stands the relationships between carburetor
is being restructured to make it more diffi- adjustments, air intake, gas consumption and
cult for the family farm to survive. To suc- spark ignition, success in the twenty-first
ceed on a family farm without a second century will depend on what we term
source of income, one must understand the Systemic Thinkingthe integration of all the
complex system that is farming. For exam- content andfunctions we describe in this
ple, the farmer must understand the cost monograph.
structure of agriculture including such things
as the trade off between the costs of labor
and technology. (Several years ago produc-
tivity could be increased best through in-
vestments in technology rather than labor.
Increasing costs of capital investments, how-
ever, have reversed that situation and now,
at least temporarily, productivity can be im-
provet4 more economically through invest-
ments labor rather than technology.) The
farmer must understand financial manage-
ment and be able to understand the conse-
quences of wide swings in interest rates,
rates of inflation and rates of return on
farm assets. He or she must know different
methods of financing debt and be aware of
the potential instability of different sources
of equity capital. The successful farmer
must have an understanding of the effects of
international trade, monetary exchange rates,
national debt and inflation rates on the de-
mand for agricultural products. He or she
must have marketing skills to compensate for
losses from federal price supports and sub-
sidy programs. And, of course, he or she
must possess a detailed knowledge of agricul-
ture production pe,. sesoil quality, fertil-
izer, animal husbandry, and on and on. The
days when you could successfully farm by
just planting in the spring, plowing in the
summer and harvesting in the fall have long
gone. Successful farming requires detailed
knowledge of systems and subsystems in biol-
ogy, finance, etc. Content, procedures and
context are intertwined in a very complex
way.

Our understanding of the complex, integrated

way in which we think about systems has
22
28
111111111111111-
REASONING
Figure 3.1
Outside Stimulus
Working
or
World Perception
Short Term
To understand what we mean by reasoning
skills consider Figure 3.1, an adaptation of a
model described by Anderson (1983).
The figure illustrates the recent understand-
ing that our minds utilize two distinct com-
ponents as they interact with the outside
world: a short term, working memory that
has limited storage capacity and a much
larger long term memory. For example, Dyer
(1976) states that it has been conservatively
estimated that long term memory can store
an amount of information equivalent to one
hundred trillion words and that all of us use
but a tiny fraction of this storage capacity.
Short term memory, on the other hand, can
hold only about seven elements at any one
time (Norman, 1969). What we call reasoning
involves three processes:
1. Transferring, the first process, is ac-
tually two subprocesses: the storage
and retrieval of specific knowledge.
Storage deposits information into long
23 29
< Transfer Long Term
< Matching
< Restructuring
Memory
term memory. Retrieval brings the
knowledge back out into short term
memory. Memorization and recall
would be the two common usage words
that reflect these processes.
2. Matching is the process of comparing
information in short term memory with
information in long term memory; later
we will explain how this process works.
3. Restructuring involves the creation
of new knowledge or the modification
of old knowledge.
These processes work together in a unified
way. For example, because our short term
memories are relatively limited, we must ei-
ther find a way of recording our ongoing
experiences (That's why we take notes during
a presentation and why good speakers usually
limit their main ideas to four or five avid
frequently give us mnemonic devices to re-
member what has been said.) or we must
place the new knowledge or information we
are receiving into long term memory as
quickly as possible.
Transferring knowledge to long term memory
requires us to either create or build upon
structured knowledge already in our minds.
Thus, for example, when we want to learn a
new vocabulary word like "mnemonic" we
search our minds for words that are like the
new one"memory," "retention," etc. We
match the new concept with the old concept
to identify ways it is the same or different
and integrate it into our permanent know-
ledge base. In the process, we restructure the
old knowledge base.
We call this integrated process "reasoning"
because it incorporates most of the active
processes we associate with thinking. And,
in fact, most existing "thinking skills" pro-
grams focus on one or more of the processes
just named. We have reserved the word
"thinking," however, to incorporate all of the
elements of our model, most of which have
previously been neglected within formal edu-
cationsuch as pattern recognition, identifi-
cation of different types of declarative
knowledge, etc. We restrict the concept of
"reasoning" only to those elements of the pro-
cess that involve the transfer of knowledge
between long and short term memory through
matching and restructuring.
1. TRANSFERRING
a. Storing
b. Retrieving
Storing and retrieving (memorizing and re-
calling) are combined in our model because
they are both components of the transfer
process and as far as instruction is con-
cerned, there is a great deal of overlap be-
tween them. That is, the instructional tech-
niques which facilitate storage also facilitate
retrieval.
A fairly simple set of steps can be taught to
students which vastly improves their storage
and retrieval capabilities:
24
Step 1. Identify the information you
wish to remember.
Step 2. Use guided imagery to high-
light the information.
Step 3. If the information is part of
a related set of information, use a
memory framework.
Step 1 might seem trivial but it is critical to
the storage and retrieval process. As Lindsay
and Norman (1977) explain, in order to make
sense of the information constantly bombard-
ing us we must pick and choose among the
data. We could not possibly attend to all in-
formation available at any point in time.
Hence, selection of important information is
the first step in efficient processing. If stu-
dents know the importance of patterns, rela-
tionships and concepts, they can use these or-
ganizational structures as the framework for
selection of information. That is, students
can look for key concepts, relationships and
patterns to be stored and retrieved.
Step 2, guided imagery, is a cornerstone of
most memory techniques. Guided imagery
creates a greater number of "cues" than are
usually stored with incoming information.
Early work by Penfield and Perot (1963), pi-
oneer brain surgeons, indicated that we tend
to store all components of experiences in long
term memory. That is, we store the visual,
auditory, kinesthetic, emotional and verbal
attributes of an event or experience there.
These form what Underwood (1969) calls
"attributes" or cues to memory. If these cues
are strong, the experience can be recalled by
bringing one of the cues to consciousness.
This explains why people report that any one
experience can generate a number of remem-
brances. As you read this monograph you
are being bombarded with images, kinesthetic
sensations, sounds, etc. Each of these could
be a cue to a set of experiences stored in
long term memory. If the cue is strong
enough, the experience to which it is at-
tached will be recalled. Consequently, as you
read this chapter an extreme in the tempera-
ture of the room might be s cue to an expe-
rience you had ten years ago.
The purpose of Step 2 in the storage and re-
tric:val process is to artificially strengthen
30
the cues for information via guided imagery.
It involves artificially generating images,
sensations, feelings and verbal information
about a thought. That is, when you use
guided imagery you take a thought and arti-
ficially expand it so that it has all of the
sensory components listed above. For exam-
ple, if students were to use guided imagery
about George Washington they might first
form a strong mental image of Washington on
his horse (image). They might also imagine
they smell the saddle leather and what it
might be like to sit on his horse (sensations).
The students might also verbalize some facts
about George Washington in their
minds"George Washington was the first
President; he was born in . . . ."
information). Finally, the students might try
to conjure up a sense of patriotism (feelings).
Step 3 of the storage and retrieval process is
used only if a student wishes to recall many
different pieces of information. For exam-
ple, if a student has identified sets of infor-
mation for a history test, then Step 3 might
be appropriate. The key to Step 3 is the use
of a memory framework. Memory frame-
works create "locations" in which information
is stored. When students recall the location
they also retrieve the information. A good
metaphor to describe memory frameworks is
that they create mental "slots" into which
students deposit information via guided im-
agery.
One of the simplest memory frameworks to
teach students is the rhyming pegword
method (Miller, et al., 1960) in which stu-
dents first memorize the following jingle:
One is a bun; two is a shoe; three is a
tree; four is a door; five is a hive; six is
sticks; seven is heaven; eight is a gate;
nine is a line; ten is a hen.
A student wanting to deposit information
into one of the slots would use guided im-
agery to make the association between the
"pegword" and the information. To illustrate,
assume n student wanted to put the informa-
tion about George Washington into slot *1.
The student might imagine a large hot dog
bun, the pegword for slot #1, with a diminu-
tive George Washington standing inside. The
I
student would then imagine all elements, de-
scribed above (e.g., the smell of the leather,
the verbal information, etc.). Retrieving the
information (e.g., for a test) would simply
require saying the jingle to recall that the
pegword for slot *1 is the bun. This cue
would then call up the visual images of
George Washington in the giant bun which
would cue the remaining information. There
are many other types of memory frameworks
(e.g., loci or place methods, linking methods,
acronyms) which allow students to create an
almost inexhaustible supply of slots.
Memory frameworks are very useful study
tools and illustrate to students the power of
(verbal their minds. Unfortunately, many classroom
teachers never utilize them because of the
unwarranted educational stigma attached to
"rote learning." However, we believe that
helping students to learn to identify impor-
tant information in material they read and
then store that information efficiently using
memory frameworks is an important part of
the overall development of thinking skills.
2. MATCHING
The essence of matching is to determine how
new information is similar to and different
from old information. We mentioned in
Chapter 1 that there are five basic matching
skills:
a. categorizing
b. reasoning analogically
c. extrapolating
d. evaluating evidence
e. evaluating value.
We will consider each briefly.
a. Categorizing
Categorization is usually done with concepts.
That is, we tend to compare and contrast
concepts and classify them into categories.
The skill of categorization is directly related
to the concept of clustering introduced in
Chapter 2 as a way of facilitating vocabulary
development. One of the best ways to use
categorization in a regular classroom setting
is to utilize semantic feature analysis.
25
31
The theory of semantic features asserts that Step 5. Ask students to add addi-
words are known or comprehended based on tional concepts and features and com-
specific semantic features they possess or do plete the expanded matrix with pluses
not possess. Figure 3.2 illustrates some se- an minuses.
mantic features:
Step 6. As a group, discuss the con-
cepts and their features.
Figure 3.2 An example of this analysis is shown in Fig-
ure 3.3.
D B1 C 2 E
Figure 3.3
cow lad son girl eraser
TOPIC: ANIMALS
bird boy daugh- lass desk
ter furry bark four legs
Larry Karen
dogs + + +
A snakes
birds
horses - +

As described by Marzano, Distefano, Valen-
cia and Hagerty (1986) the words in set A
are all human, animate and two-legged. The
words in B1 and B2 are differentiated by the
fact that all B1 words contain the added se-
mantic feature of male; all B2 words have
the semantic feature female. Words in Set C
do not share a male/female distinction but
they do share a semantic feature which
might be called siblings. Set D words are
animate but gender-neutral. Set E words are
inanimate.
Johnson and Pearson (1984) recommend a six-
step process for using semantic feature anal-
ysis in the classroom.
Step 1. Select a category (animals).
Step 2. List, in a column, concepts
within the category (see Figure 3.3).
Stcp 3. In a row across the top of the
grid, list the attributes or features
shared by some of the concepts (furry,
bark, four legs).
Step 4. Put pluses or minuses beside
each concept under each feature. A
plus indicates that the concept usually
has a given feature.
Semantic feature analysis can be used with
preschoolers as well as college students. It
can be a valuable tool within content area
classrooms. For example, assume that a his-
tory class is beginning a unit of study on at-
tributes of great leaders. Attributes of lead-
ership can be placed on the top of the grid
and the leaders to be studied down the left-
hand side of the matrix. Students can fill in
pluses and minuses in the matrix to indicate
which features are possessed by each leader.
This is illustrated in Figure 3.4.
Figure 3.4
A B C
Napoleon
Hitler
Alexander
the Great
Henry VIII
Key:
A = Flamboyant
B = Egotistical
C = Brilliant Strategist

26 32
 b. Reasoning Analogically
According to Reese Jenkins (Personal Report,
1985), historian and director of the Thomas
Edison papers at Rutgers University, Edison's
genius was in part due to his ability to use
analogical reasoning. For instance, when
writing about the kinetoscope, a forerunner
of the motion picture, Edison is quoted as
saying:
I am experimenting upon an instrument
which does for the eye what the phono-
graph does for the ear. . . . The inven-
tion consists in photographing continu-
ously a series of pictures in a continu-
ous spiral on a cylinder or plate in the
same manner as sound is recorded on
the phonograph.
Within eJucation analogical reasoning refers
to a particular type of reasoning problem
such as "A is to B as C is to D (A:B :: C:D).
According to Sternberg (1977) the process of
analogical reasoning contains four compo-
nents: encoding, inferring, mapping and ap-
plying.
(1) Encoding
Encoding is the identification of the at-
tributes or characteristics of the concepts
within the analogy.
(2) Inferring
Inferring is the identification of the rule
that relates adjacent concepts. For example,
in the analogy feather:bird :: leaf:treethe
relationship between adjacent concepts is
part-to-whole.
(3) Mapping
Mapping is the identification of the relation-
ship between non-adjacent terms. For exam-
ple, in the analogy above, feather and leaf
arc parts; bird and tree are wholes.
(4) Applying
Applying refers to identifying the missing
component in an analogy of the form
feather:bird :: :tree.
27
Sternberg's components can be translated into
a fairly straightforward procedure for solv-
ing analogy problems.
Step 1. Identify characteristics of the
concepts in the first set.
Step 2. Identify possible relationships
between these concepts.
Step 3. Identify which concept in the
first set is most closely related to the
element in the second set.
Step 4. Identify what is missing in
the second set.
The key to analogical reasoning appears to be
Step 2, identifying the relationships between
adjacent concepts. Students will generally be
able to identify some type of relationship.
However, it might not be the one that would
be most commonly identified by other stu-
dents or the one expected by a test maker.
Consequently, students' abilities to solve
formal analogy problems (e.g., those found on
tests) can be greatly improved by teaching
them the common relationships found in
analogy tests. Lewis and Green (1982) in
their study of analog tests identify a num-
ber of relationships students should be ex-
posed to. Those relationships include:
a. Similar concepts: Adjacent concepts
are basically the same or very similar
in meaning:
swim: float :: shout:
a) whisper
b) argue
c) scream*
b. Opposite concepts: Adjacent concepts
have opposite or very dissimilar
meanings:
these: those :: go:
a) proceed
b) run
c) come*
33
c. Class membership: Adjacent concepts c. Extrapolating
share class membership:
Extrapolation is a direct extension of pattern
horse: lion blue: recognition. As was explained in Chapter 2,
pattern recognition helps students identify
a) bird and organize information they read or hear
b) pink* into large chunks. This activity is fairly
c) mood "text bound"it does not force the reader to
go beyond the information actually pre-
d. Class name and class member: One sented. Extrapolation on the other had,
concept is a class name; the other is a forces students to identify how patterns of
class member. information from one source of information
might be similar to patterns from another
April: month :: bee: source. Using he six pattern types men-
tioned in the second chapter (e.g., topic pat-
a) flower terns, generalization patterns, sequence pat-
b) spring terns, process patterns, similarity patterns
c) insect* and dissimilarity patterns) we operationally
define six kinds of extrapolation:
e. Derivation: One concept turns into I. matching the characteristics stated
another: in one topic pattern with characteristics
in another
flower: bud :: butterfly:
2. inaiching the examples of one gen-
a) pollen eralization with the examples of an-
b) wings other
c) caterpillar*
3. matching the sequence of events in
f. Function: One concept performs a one situation with that of another
function on or for another:
4. matching a process ir one situation
teacher: student :: driver: with the process in anot',er

a) golf 5. matching the similarities between

b) speed two patterns from one content area
c) car* with the similarities between patterns
from another content area
g. Quantity or size: concepts are related 6. matching the dissimilarities be-
by quantity or size: tween two patterns from one content
area with the dissimilarities between
mountain: hill :: tiger: two patterns from another content area.
a) jungle To illustrate, assume that students have read
b) housecat* a description in a basal reader about how to
c) lion bake a cake. As part of this process pattern
about cooking students might have identified
the following elements as important to the
In a classroom setting students can be pre- pattern:
sented with analogies from published materi-
als andjor they can be asked to create their Gather the ingredients.
own analogies using concepts from different
content areas. Mix the ingredients.

28

34
 Put them in the oven.
Put the icing on.
Once they have determined that the basic
pattern is a "process" they can then be asked
to try to identify some other process that is
not about cooking which contains some of
the same elements as the process for baking a
cake.
Students in Detroit might extrapolate this
pattern to building cars. They would then be
asked to show how the process of building
cars has the same components as the process
for baking a cake. Thus students might iden-
tify the following likenesses.
Baking a Cake Making a Car
states that a cognitive ability such as this
develops long after a child has mastered the
rudimews of language processing. However,
Arter (1976) found that instruction in the use
of metaphorical models facilitated the learn-
ing of low ability students.
d. Evaluating Evidence
Evaluating evidence refers to identifying
whether a piece of information has backing
or proof and, if so, how valid the proof is.
Within many thinking skills programs this
skill is called "critical thinking." The skill
desciibed here is based on the work in logic
of Toulmin (1958; Toulmin, Rieke and Janik,
1979). Students can be taught a fairly
straight forward process for evaluating of
logic. As described by M.rzano, et al., (1986)
that process is:

Gathering the Shipping Step 1. Identify an unusual claim. A

ingredients materials (e.g., claim is a statement of fact. An un-
aluminum, usual claim is one that is not self-
rubber) from evident or one you weren't aware of be-
different parts fore. For example, "The sky is some-
of the country times blue" is self-evident. However,
the claim that From an aerodynamic
Mixing the The assembly line perspective, bees should not be able to
ingredients operation fly" is not self-evident.
Putting the cake Using different Step 2: Decide if the claim is in the
in the oven heating processes domain of common knowledge. If it is
(e.g., welding) in then it requires no backing or proof.
the assembly line
Step 3:If the claim is not considered
Putting on the Painting the car common knowledge, is proof presented
icing and putting on for it? If no proof is presented, the
the trim. claim is unsubstantiated.

As long as a students can demonstrate how Step 4: If proof is presented, how

the extrapolated pattern has the same compo-
nents as the initial pattern their answer is
correct. Extrapolation, then, fosters diver-
gent thinking. In fact, it is very similar to
the construction of metaphors. For example,
both metaphor and extrapolation have a topic
(the pattern being extrapolated to a new con-
text) and a vehicle (that context to which the
pattern is being extrapolated). Ortony (1980)
reliable is it?
Step 5: If the proof is unreliable, the
claim is unsubstantiated. If the proof
is reliable, the claim is substantiated.
This process is represented diagrammatically
in Figure 3.4.

29

35
 Figure 3.4 it. Overgeneralizations are common in ev-
eryday speech. For example, an individual
Identify Claim might rush into work in the morning and an-
nounce: "This has been the worst morning of
Is Claim in domain of my life. My car wouldn't start, when it fi-
common knowledge? nally did, I go. stuck in traffic and then got
a ticket!" In fact, the morning was probably
not the worst of his or her life. The over-
Yes No generalization is accepted as a way of drama-
sc tizing the situation. However, in newspaper
Claim needs Is proof articles, media presentations or serious con-
no proof presented? versations, overgeneralizations should be rec-
ognized and identified as unsubstantiated
Yes No claims.
4,
Is proof Claim is (3) Use of Informal Fallacies
reliable? unsubstantiated
Informal fallacies occur quite frequently.
Ye No Common examples include ambiguities,
4' vagueness or part/whole and whole/part er-
Claim is Claim is rors.
substantiated unsubstantiated
Ambiguities occur when a ward or idea is
One of the more difficult parts of the pro- used which can have more than one meaning.
cess is Step 4, determining the reliability of To illustrate, consider the following evimple
proof. Most critical thinking programs at- of ambiguity offered by Stottlemeier (1979;
tempt to teach students the various ways that p. 87):
backing or proof can be unreliable. Below
we will consider three ways. Girls alone are not permitted in th;
pool.
(1) Oversimplification of Cause
Does the sentence mean that girls, as distin-
To illustrate this type of unreliable backing guished from other categories of people (men,
consider the following: women, and boys) are not allowed in the pool
or that single girls unaccompanial by an-
The primary cause of World War I was other are not permitted?
the unrest of the working classes in
Europe. Lipman states that certain types of ambigui-
ties must be tolerated in social interaction.
This statement is not totally incorrect. There Sometimes ambiguities even serve a useful
is some truth to the assertion that the unrest purpose. This is comilonly the case when
of the working class in Europe added to the they are used in poetry. But in everyday dis-
outbreak of World War I. However, it was course they are usually dysfunctional.
not the primary cause of World War I; it was
not even one of the more important causes. Vague words lack clean cutoff points. To
Here the author of this claim has taken a illustrate, consider the following example of-
very complex set of causal relationships (e.g., fered by Stottlemeier (1979; p. 89):
the relationship of World War I to its many
causes) and oversimplified them. Is it cold today?
(2) Overgeneralizing What is cold? Cold to one person might be
warm to another. If you live in San Diego
Overgeneralizing occurs when a generaliza- the concept of cold might be quite different
tion far exceeds the facts which accompany than if you lived in Fairbanks.
30
36
Lipman states that students should be able to
recognize vague words and be able to distin-
guish contexts in which they are unaccept-
able from those in which they are acceptable.
Part/whole and whole/part errors occur when
you assume that if a part of a whole has a
specific feature, then the whole must have
the feature (part/whole error), or, if you as-
sume that if the whole has the feature, then
all the parts must have the feature
(whole/part error). To illustrate consider the
examples below.
Mary's face is beautiful, therefore, she
must have a beautiful nose (whole/part
error).
My car has the best tires made; there-
fore, it is one of the best cars made
(part/whole error).
Students can be taught to evaluate errors of
logic whenever they hear or read information
presented as fact. This means that they
should he mentally asking such questions as:
Are their statements being made which
are out of the realm of common knowl-
edge?
Is there proof or backing for these
claims?
Does the proof or backing contain any
of the common sources of unreliability
(e.g., overshaplification of causal rela-
tionships, overgeneralizing, use of in-
formal fallacies)?
c. Evaluating Value
Evaluation of value is the process of deter-
mining whether information is considered
good, bad or neutral on some accepted scale.
To illustrate, consider the following two
statements:
a) Wood is used to build houses.
b) The Russians pulled out of the 1984
Olympic games.
31
As described by Marzano, et al., (1986) most
people consider the information in the first
statement as neutral; however, many Ameri-
cans consider the information in the second
statement as negative. You can usually tell
if you value something by the emotional re-
action it elicits.
The purpose of evaluating value is to iden-
tify the weight or merit (good, bad, neutral)
placed on information, identify the assump-
tions under which the value weight was as-
signed and identify a set of assumptions that
would yield a different value weight.
An outcome of the evaluation of value pro-
cess is that students recognize the subjectiv-
ity of their own value systems. This is con-
sistent with Paul's conception of "dialectic"
thinking. He states that:
Children can learn to consider it natu-
ral that people differ in their beliefs
and points of view and they can learn
to grasp this not as a quaint peculiarity
of people but as a tool for learning.
They can learn how to learn from oth-
ers, even from their objectives, contrary
perceptions and differing ways of
thinking (Paul, 1984; p.12).
Spiro (1980) has stated that this "attitudinal"
component of thinking is the central aspect
of cognition. It allows one to see the infor-
mation base from which judgments are cre-
ated.
3. RESTRUCTURING
In the introductory chapter we gave a brief
example about how the addition of new in-
formation to existing information in long
term memory restructures the old knowledge
and, in effect, creates new knowledge.
Stated more broadly, all reasoning procedures
mentioned thus far create new knowledge to
a certain extent. However, some of the pro-
cedures mentioned are more focused on that
purpose than others. There are three basic
restructuring procedures that stand alone:
1) elaboration, 2) problem solving and 3) in-
vention.
37
 a. Elaborating
Elaboration involves inferring information
not explicitly stated in information read or
heard. Various categories of inference have
been proposcd by researchers and theorists
(e.g., Bruce and Schmidt, 1974; Warren, et al.,
1979). Within our model three types of in-
ference seem most important: 1) elaboration
of characteristics, 2) elaboration of causes
and consequences and 3) elaboration of au-
thor intention.
(1) Elaboration of Characteristics
As early as 1920, psychologists (e.g., Hull,
1920) were hypothesizing that humans store
characteristics of concepts in long term mem-
ory. That is, in addition to a linguistic label
for a concept we also store the characteristics
of the concept. Every time you read or hear
a word which represents a concept all of the
characteristics of the concept are available to
you. For example, if you read a story about
1 little girl named Mary, all of the character-
istics of little girls come to mind simply by
reading the label "little girl." The author
does not have to explain how little girls act,
how they dress, etc. This comes with the la-
bel.
Teachers can use this principle to structure
questions which help students elaborate on
the concepts they read and hear, thereby
building new information about those con-
cepts. Specifically, a teacher can select con-
cepts and have students elaoorate on unstated
information. There are four types of con-
cepts commonly found in content material:
1) animate creatures, 2) places, 3) things and
4) events. Below is listed the information
usually associated with such concepts:
Animate creatures (e.g,, dog)
Physical dimensions: four-legged, furry
Emotional and psychological state of
being: friendly, vicious ...
Habitual actions: chases cars, chews on
bones ...
32
Out-of-the-ordinary actions: a particu-
lar dog saved someone's life ...
Places (e.g.. Colorado)
Location: in the Rocky Mountains.
Size, shape, terrain: Colorado is a mod-
erately large state that has a square
shape. It is mountainous but it also has
flatlands.
Events that habitually occur there: Col-
orado has a lot of snow in the winter
but very little precipitation in the other
seasons.
Out-of-the-ordinary events or other
characteristics: Colorado has one of the
highest average elevations of any state
in the union.
Things (e.g., The Empire State Building)
Physical dimensions: over 100 stories
tall.
Location: in Manhattan, New York.
Customary use: office building and a
place where tourists go.
Out-of-the-ordinary use or other char-
acteristics: once was the tallest building
in the world.
Events: (e g.. weddings)
Participants: bride, groom, parents.
Goal or reason: unite two people.
Time and duration: 1 or 2 hours on a
weekend.
Location: church, synagogue.
These "frames" for concepts can be used to
structure questions or assignments which re-
quire students to elaborate on concepts read
or heard. To use a simple example, assume
elementary school students had read a story
about a young girl named Jana. The teacher
38
might use the animate creature frame to ask 1. instrumental: using language as
such questions as: away of getting things
What did Jana look like? 2. regulatory: using language as a
means of controlling others
How tall do you think she was?
What did she dress like? 3. expressive: using language to
express feelings, emotions and
What type of personality did she have? opinions
Was she a happy child? Sad? Why? 4. informative: using language to
inform others
What are some things you think Jana
might have normally done on th,:: way imaginative:
to school? 5. using language to
create new ideas
What are some things Jana did that
were very different from what you or 6. heuristic: using language as a
other children normally do? means of finding out new inform-
ation.
At a more advanced level students might be
assigned to research the information in a These categories of intention can be used to
concept frame. For example, if they en- reinforce elaborations. That is, students can
counter the concept "festival" in a social be asked to identify the intention behind in-
studies unit, they might be asked to research formation read or heard and the specific
the participants, location, reasons, etc., for cues which signal the intention behind the
this "event" concept. message.

(2) Elaboration of Causes and Consequences

Inferring causes and consequences appears to
be a basic human drive. Johnson-Laird
(1983) identifies causation as one of the basic
"conceptual primitives" that build up more
complex concepts. That is, we attempt to in-
fer causes about our own and others' behav-
ior and subsequent behaviors and attitudes
(Lavelle and Keogh, 1980). This natural ten-
dency can be translated into questioning
techniques. Specifically, teachers may select
statements from reading material and ask
students to elaborate on the causes and con-
sequences of that statement.
(3) Elaboration of Author Intention
The intentions behind communications are
studied within the field of linguistics called
"pragmatics." Theorists in pragmatics, such
as van Dijk (1980), Bruce (1975), Halliday
(1967), and Tough (1976) have attempted to
describe the different intentions that can be
behind a message. Commonly six different
intentions are identified:
b. Problem Solving
Problem solving occurs when an individual
must fill in missing information. This is at
the core of all problems: information neces-
sary to accomplish a goal is missing. Without
the missing information no problem exists.
Problem solving differs from invention, the
next process, in the specificity of the goal.
When you invent, your goal is initially very
general. As a matter of fact, what you end
up with via the inventing process might be
very different from what you initially in-
tended to do. During problem solving the
goal is usually obvious and quite
explicitoften, it is even impbsed on you
(e.g., you need to get to work but your car
won't start). As van Dijk and Kintsch (1983)
state, a problem exists when there is an
explicit goal to be reached. There are
specific operations to be performed to reach
the goal and some component of Ele specific
operations is not know to the problem solver.
In this model we make the distinction be-
tween two types of problems: 1) everyday

33
problems, and 2) academic problems. Every-
day problems arc like the example above
(e.g., your car won't start). Academic prob-
lems an- like those encountered in a math
class or science class (e.g., solving simultane-
ous linear equations, determining the effect
of mixing two chemicals). Obviously aca-
demic problems arc very restricted in con-
tent, whereas everyday problems oan relate to
such diverse topics as coming up with the
money to go on a vacation, threading a nee-
dle or mowing the lawn before it rains. An-
other major difference between the two types
of problems is the freedom of choice relative
to the goal. With everyday problems there is
always the possibility of rejecting the initial
goal. For example, an individual might ini-
tially have the goal of mowing the lawn.
Clouds gather overhead and the situation be-
comes problematic (e.g,. "How can I get the
lawn done before it starts to rain?"). The in-
dividual has the option to ignore the initial
goal of mowing the lawn and watch televi-
sion instead. With academic problems, the
student usually does not have such freedom.
Regardless of the type of problem (everyday
or academic) good problem solvers attack
problems systematically rather than in a
haphazard fashion (Covington, 1985; Brans-
ford, Nitsch and Franks, 1977). This implies
that students should be provided with an ini-
tial framework with which to attack pi-et:-
1=s. The initial framework should not be
prescriptive in nature. That is, the problem
solving framework should be presented to
students as a starting place from which they
can develop their own problem solving plans
of attack.
( I ) Everyday Problems
Below is a general problem solving frame-
work for everyday problems:
Step When a problem arises, stop
1.
whatever you are doing and try to af-
firm the following beliefs:
The problem probably has a
number of solutions and you
will surely find one or more
of them.
34
If you look for it, help will
be available.
You are perfectly capable of
taking cart of the problem.
Step 2. Begin talking to yourself about
the problem. Verbalize the thoughts
you are having; i.e., think aloud about
the problem.
Step 3. Start looking for what is miss-
ing and identify possible solutions.
Step 4. For each solution identify the
tools you will need or things you might
have to have to attempt the solution, or
the actions you will have to take.
Step 5. Determine how accessible the
tools for each solution are.
Step 6. Identify the solutior.Zs) you
think has the highest probability of 4
working and assess the risk factor asso-
ciated with each solution.
Step 7.. Try out the solution that you
feel has the highest probability of suc-
cess and that fits your comfort level of
risk.
Step 8. If your solutions don't work,
clear your mind and be willing to sec
the problem in a totally different way.
Then gi back to step 3. Keep doing
steps 3 through 7 until you solve the
problem.
Step 9. If no solution can be found,
"revalue" what you were trying to ac-
complish. Look for a more basic goal
that can be accomplished even though
the one at hand cannot.
There are a few aspects of this problem solv-
ing framework that should be highlighted.
Step 1 deals- with attitudes that appear to aid
problem solving. In general, good problem
solvers have confidence in their ability to
solve a problem. That is, they think about
themselves a certain way when they solve
problems (Weiner, 1983). Step 1 helps stu-
dents become aware of their beliefs about
40
--.......1,-,,,,.
themselves as problems solvers and reinforce
those beliefs which aid in problem solving.
Step 2 reinforces a common technique used
by good problem solversthinking aloud.
(Rowe, 1985) Technically, this is called ver-
bal mediationthe act of talking to yourself
to help define and solve a problem.
Steps 3, 4 and 5 deal with identifying what
is technically called the "problem space"the
parameters of the problemwhat you know
and don't know about the problem.
Steps 6 and 7 deal with the inherent threat to
self-worth imposed by problems (Covington,
1985). Abraham Maslow once stated that we
tend to stay away from those situations
which threaten how we perceive ourselves.
Covington states that learning how to deal
with the inherent risk in problem solving is a
valuable tool for the strategic thinking neces-
sary to solve problems. Steps 6 and 7 help
students accomplish this.
Step 8 is meant to help students generate dif-
ferent types of solutions when the cues they
have already tried don't work. DeBono
(1985) refers to this as "lateral thinking" and
asserts that is an important element of prob-
lem solving.
Finally, Step 9 helps students adjust their ex-
pectations and energies when a goal cannot
be accomplished.
(2) Academic Problems
For academic problems students should b,;
given a task-specific problem solving frame-
work. Polya (1957) developed a framework
for academic problem solving which current
research (e.g., Polson and Jeffries, 1985)
seems to validate. Basically, that framework
has four components: 1) understand the
problem, 2) design a plan, 3) carry out the
plan and 4) look back to see what worked.
Understanding the problems involves identi-
fying what is given, what is unknown and
the operations you can perform on the givens
to solve what is unknown. This is perhaps
the most difficult part of problem solving
because there are so many types of possible
35
unknowns. To illustrate, consider the follow-
ing four types of problems:
1. A train can travel 10 miles in 4
minutes. How far will it travel in 14
minutes?
2. An airplane leaves location A for
location B traveling at 200 miles per
hour. 2500 miles away at the same time
a plane leaves location B for location A
traveling at 300 miles per hour. At
what point will the planes intersect?
3. You are to build a vehicle which is
capable of carrying a person weighing
no less than 150 pounds for a distance
of 100 feet over solid ground., This ve-
hicle is not to have wheels. A wheel is
defined as any standard wheel or caster
or any construction in part with a cir-
cular piece of material.
4. A man was found in his locked
room on the floor. Next to him was a
pool of water and a pool of blood
somewhat mixed together. There was
also a note indicating that the man had
committed suicide. How did he kill
himself?
In problem 1 the missing information is a
simple formula (rate x time = distance). If a
student knows that formula, no problem ex-
ists; she or he simply plugs in the formula
and works out the answer. In problem 2 the
same formula is invalid. Assume that a stu-
dent trying to solve this problem knows that
formula. There is still something miss-
inghow the "distance" part of the formula
will interact for two sets of data. Problem 3
has a different type of unknownsthe way
that a set of constraints will affect a com-
mon process (e.g., building a vehicle). This
type of problem is given to elementary school
students in the competition entitled
"Olympics of the Mind" (Gourley and
Micklus, 1982). Finally, problem 4 has a to-
tally different type of unknownpossible
murder weapons not commonly used. (The
answer is, by the way, "He was stabbed with
an icicle.")
The point here is that step 1 in the academic
problem solving framework is very difficult
41
 because of the many types of unknowns that
can exist for problems. In fact, van Dijk and
Kintsch (1983) identify five or six different
types of unknowns for a simple mathematics
story problem. That is, there are different
types of unknowns for different wordings of
the problem. What this implies is that teach-
ers should carefully identify the types of
unknowns for problems that are presented to
students, and present problems in groups
with similar types of unknowns. In this way
students will gradually learn the types of
unknowns found in academic problems and
be able to use that knowledge in future aca-
demic problem solving situations.
Step 2, designing a plan, is fairly straight-
forward. Here the student asks "How am I
going to find out what is unknown?" Re-
search indicates strategies that can be used to
answer this question. One strategy is called
decompositionbreaking a problem down
into smaller parts and solving each part. A
student might do this with problems like 2
and 3 above, where there are a lot of pieces
and a lot is unknown. Another strategy is to
identify previously solved problems that are
similar to the current problem. This is some-
times called "solution by analogy." Another
strategy is called "generate and test." Here
students generally guess as to what will work
in identifying the unknowns. They then test
their hypothesis. There are other common
strategies used to identify the unknowns in a
problem (e.g., solution by contradiction,
working backwards or "backward mapping").
The generalization to be made here is that
students should be taught a number of
strategies and given enough practice so that
they can identify those that work best for
them.
Step 3 and 4 usually involve such strategies
as summarizing what has been done, elimi-
nating those things you know don't work and
selecting an alternative. If steps 3 and 4 are
carried out, students have the possibility of
experiencing sudden flashes of insight rela-
tive to the problems (Rowe, 1985).
Teaching academic problems solving, then,
involves giving students a general problem
solving framework to follow. It also requires
the tea .-,her to identity:
36
what types of unknowns students will
encounter in problems
what types of information students will
be provided in problem situations
what types of strategies will work best
for specific content area problems.
Finally, teaching academic problem solving
involves presenting students with highly
structured practice problems and then dis-
cussing how the problems can be solved (not
just the answers to the problems) so that stu-
dents can, over time, develop their own
frimeworks for solving academic problems.
c. Inventing
Invention is the process of creating new in-
formation or products. It is usually thought
of as a process involving written language.
Without a doubt, composing in written form
is a premier thinking skill. For example,
Nickerson (1984) identifies writing as one, if
not the key procedure for enhancing think-
ing skills: "Writing is viewed not only as a
medium of thought but also as a vehicle for
developing it" (p. 33). The constructive na-
ture of writing (its generation of new cogni-
tive structures) has been well documented.
For example, Flower and Hayes (1980) assert
that writing is a generative process which
creates new ideas for the writer.
We use the word invention to refer to the
generation of new information or products in
any form. Building a Rube Goldberg ma-
chine is invention (a drawing, a machine, a
piece of music are all inventions). Invention
occurs when you begin with a general goal of
creating something and then follow the goal
through to completion. There are three parts
to the invention process: incubation and dis-
covery, construction, and revising and polish-
ing.
(a) Incubation and discovery
The incubation and discovery phase occurs
when the idea is conceived and initially
42
shaped. Flower and Hayes (1980) state that
during incubation and discovery we primar-
ily use non-linguistic information. That is,
prior to actually beginning a project, the in-
ventor must deal with information in a
prelinguistic form. The ability to do this is a
component of creativity.
According to Lewis and Greene (1982), Ein-
stein was capable of using "wordless thought"
to conceptualize complex physical properties.
He is reported to have said, "When I exam-
ined myself and my methods of thought I
came to the conclusion that the gift of fan-
tasy has meant more to me than my talent
for absorbing positive knowledge" (in Lewis
and Greene, 1982; p. 24).
Apparently Einstein had perfected the tech-
nique of wordless thinking to such a high
level that he preferred to perform experi-
ments in his mind. Lewis and Greene refer
to these as "thought experiinents." About
Einstein's thought experiments they say:
In the early 1900's Einstein performed
a thought experiment that was to shake
the world of physics to its foundations.
He had begun to realize that Newton's
theory of gravitation, until then the
unchallenged dogma, was seriously
flawed. To explore the concept he pic-
tured himself as the passenger in an el-
evator hurtling through the farthest
reaches of space at a speed faster than
light. He then visualized a slot opening
on one side of the elevator cage so that
a beam of light was projected onto the
opposite wall. This enabled him to re-
alize that if the elevator were moving
with sufficient velocity, it would travel
a finite distance in the time required
for the beam to pass across the cage so
that an observer in the cage would see
the light beam as curved (p. 24).
Lewis and Greene recommend the following
steps for developing wordless thinking ability
in students.
Step 1. Have students learn how to
attain a state of relaxation. They
should loosen any tight clothing, sit in
a relaxed position and keep their
breathing regular.
37
Step 2. Next, students should open
their minds to images of all kinds. At
first they should make no attempt to
exert any control over their images.
However, they should attempt to create
detail in their images; they should see
shapes and details in color and enhance
the images by adding sounds and scents.
Step 3. Once they have obtained a
basic ability to create images they
should practice "holding" a particular
image for an extended period. At first
this will be very difficult, because the
mind will want to jump to associated
images.
Step 4. Step 3 should be continued
until students have a sense of control
over their ability to image things.
(b) Construction
The second phase of the inventing process is
construction. Here students begin to develop
a physical or linguistic representation of
what they created or discovered during the
incubation and discovery phase. If they are
composing a written product (e.g., an essay)
they might begin to write down ideas. At
first they might make a very rough outline
and then fill in some sentences and para-
graphs. They would keep adding to and
deleting from what they had written until
their basic idea had gone from a skeleton to
an unpolished creature with some meat on its
bones. If students were creating a machine
of some type, the construction phase might
involve making and testing prototypes of the
machine. The overall intent of the construc-
tion phase of inventing is to produce a rough
approximation of the productone that has
all necessary components but is not yet the
final form.
(c) Revising and Polishing
The revising and polishing phase is actually
a set of phases. The inventor keeps going
over his/her product adding to and deleting
with more and more attention to detail. Af-
ter this phase is completed the inventor has a
fully developed product.
43
NIMENIMENOW----
LEARNING-TO-LEARN
The learning-to-learn skills are those which
facilitate learning of all types. The assump-
tion underlying these learning-to-learn skills
is that learning within a classroom setting is
a function of generalized competencies that
are used in all learning situationsnot just
those related to school. If students are
taught these generalized competencies they
can use them in any situationschool related
and non-school related.
To some extent every student has become
proficient learning at something. And, as
they become proficient, they at least intu-
itively learned to learn. As a reFult, it might
be that students do not have to learn these
skills at all. Instead, they may simply need
to learn to consciously control these skills
and be responsible for using them in school.
There are four general competencies in the
learning-to-learn area:
I. Attrtnding
2. Goal setting
3. Monitoring attitudes
4. Self-evaluating.
38
We will consider each area separately and
then consider how they might be combined
into an instructional framework.
1. ATTENDING
Cognitive psychologists identify two types of
attention: automatic and voluntary (Luria,
1973). Automatic attention is reflexivea
stimulus to a response. Automatic attention
occurs when some novel situation enters into
an individual's awareness. For example, if a
young child hears a loud noise he or she will
turn the eyes and head toward the noise.
Voluntary attention occurs when an individ-
ual willfully shifts the general background
of attention. For example, when driving at
night in an open convertible you might vol-
untarily turn your attention to the stars At
this point new information becomes available
to you because the backdrop of perception
has changed. You begin to notice things
about the sky of which you were previously
unaware. Under voluntary attention there is
an awareness of the context or frame being
used to process information and a consequent
higher level of control of the information. It
is the increase in frequency of voluntary at-
tention within the classroom that is of educa-
tional relevance. For convenience we refer
to that ability here as controlling attention.
Operationally, controlling attention can be
described as a process with four components:
44
 1. being aware of your level of
attention at a given moment
2. being aware of the level of
attention required for the task at
hand
3. comparing your level of attention
with that required for the task
4. adjusting your level of attention
if necessary.
Important to the utilization of this process is
an understanding of the critical attributes of
attention. In this model we have identified
two critical attributes which should be
taught and reinforced with students: 1) the
physical characteristics of attending and 2)
the "bracketing" of spurious thoughts.
a. Physical Characteristics of Attending
The act of attending has some phy3ical char-
acteristics (Harman, 1969; Luria, 1973). With
very young children the physical characteris-
tics involve sitting-up straight, widening of
the eyes and deep breathing. These physical
actions have the effect of increasing the en-
ergy level for a task. With older students en-
ergy level can be increased without necessar-
ily exhibiting these secondary characteristics
of attending. What we suggest is that as a
preparation for teaching the attention control
process described above, students should be
asked to explore and identify the physical at-
tributes of attending. When they are not at-
tending but wish to increase their level of at-
tention, they then can voluntarily generate
the physical characteristics.
b. Bracketing
The second critical attribute of attending is
bracketing. Bracketing is a concept with
philosophical roots. The working principle
behind bracketing is that sometimes it is
beneficial to put certain ideas "on the back
burner" and think about them at a later date.
This is a skill that has been reportedly used
39
by many of society's great minds. Bertrand
Russell (1971), for example, used the concept.
In a classroom situation bracketing can be
used to set aside important thoughts that are
unrelated to the topic of instruction. For ex-
ample, a student in a reading class might be-
come aware that he or she is thinking about
the quiz in the upcoming math class and not
about the reading lesson. Although the math
quiz is certainly important, thinking about it
during reading does little for the student's
performance in reading or math. Hence the
student would bracket or consciously put
aside his or her thoughts about the math quiz
and return attention to them after the read-
ing lesson.
Once students are aware of the critical at-
tributes of attending they can then utilize
the attention control process. Initially this
will be teacher directed. That is, during
class the teacher will request that students
use the attention control process when stu-
dent engagement slackens. However, over
time students themselves should begin to ini-
tiate attention control. They might use it
when they are tired or when they are in a
situation that does not contain much intrinsic
interest for them.
2. SETTING GOALS
Over forty years ago Sears (1940) found that
successful students tended to set explicit
goals. More recently Brophy (1982) found
that successful students set increasingly more
difficult goals. That is, they use goal setting
as a way of challenging themselves. Bandura
and Schuck (1981) found that goal setting
should be proximal (short-term) rather than
distal (long-term) for optimum results.
A review of the current programs which
teach goal setting (e.g., Tiece, 1976) indicates
that there are some general guidelines for
setting effective goals. Those guidelines
might be described to students in this way:
Step I. Start with short term goals:
Most people find it difficult, especially
in the beginning, to stay committed to
long term goals. It is better to begin
45
 with short term goals, or if you do have
a long term goal, to break it down into
a series of short term goals.
Step 2. Make your goals concrete: The
most useful goals appear to be the more
concrete goals. Some goals are easy to
make concrete (e.g., "I want $1,000").
Fortuntely, most abstract goals can be
turned into concrete goais with a little
bit of thought.
Abstract Goal Concrete Goal
Having more Laughing with my fun
fun at home family at least once
per night about some-
thing that happens
at home.
Feeling better Each day writing
about myself down at least three
things I did that were
accomplishments.
Step 3. Allow yourself to fail. Some-
times you set a goal and don't accom-
plish it. Other times you set a goal but
change it. Both of these are appropri-
ate actions to goal setting. Goals
ihould be tools to help in life, not rules
that constrain. If a goal is not of in-
terest anymore, it should be changed or
dropped.
Once students have a grasp of the basics of
goal setting, they can be given the following
process to use:
State your goal in written form.
Identify a time frame in which you
plan to accomplish your goal.
Daily imagine yourself accomplishing
the goal.
Periodically identify the next steps to
take to accomplish the goal.
Occasionally review your goal to see if
you should change it.
toward the goal. Technically, these mental
attitudes are called "executive principles" or
"executive thoughts." For %.1cample, the atti-
tude that "I should always be fair in my
dealings with other people" would be an ex-
ecutive principle governing many behaviors.
These principles are so important to human
behavior that some theorists have hypothe-
sized that there is a special type of memory
which houses them called "executive memory"
(e.g., Sternberg, 1984; Gardner, 1933).
As described by Marzano et al (1986), there
are three types of executive attitudes which
appear to be useful to consider when dealing
with difficult tasks: general attitudes about
work, attitudes that stimulate exploration
and attitudes that broaden preception.
a. General Attitudes
about Work
Research indicates that people who are
highly successful at accomplishing goals have
some special attitudes about work. For ex-
ample, in the area of problem solving Whim-
bey (1980) found that good problem solvers
exhibited these characteristics:
a commitment to persistent, systematic
analysis of problems
a concern for accuracy
the patience to employ a step-by-step
process
an avoidance of wild guessing
a determination to become actively in-
volved with the problem.
Similar findings to Whimbey's have been re-
ported by Sternberg (1984), Chi et al. (1982)
and Larkin (1981). If we summarize the re-
search, three basic attitudes about work
emerge:

a willingness to be actively involved in

a task
3. MONITORING
MONITORING ATTITUDES
a commitment to persistence
Once a goal is set an individual will gener-
ally monitor his or her progress and 2 ttitudes a sensitivity to feedback.

40
46
Individuals who are highly efficient at ac-
complishing tasks operate from these princi-
ples. They have an ability to get deeply in-
volved in a task; they have a strong commit-
mcnt to precision and accuracy when en-
gaged in tasks, and they are sensitive to how
well the task is going and make corrections
or try something different if necessary.
b. Attitudes That Stimulate
Exploration
It is believed by some theorists that at an
unconscious level human beings are fearful
that circumstances work against the accom-
plishment of goals. For example, in a paper
entitled "On the Need to Know and the Fear
of Knowing," Abraham Maslow pointed out
that humans are taught culturally not to trust
themselves or the inherent order of life.
This is consistent with research findings in
student motivation (e.g., Harter, 1980, 1983).
Specifically, it has been found that a key
factor in motivation to complete a task is a
student's trust that circumstances will not
necessarily work against the completion of
the task. It appears, then, that the control-
ling principles relevant to academic success
might be:
A belief that life is trustable. That is,
circumstances do not automatically
work against the accomplishment of a
goal.
Research suggests that people who operate
from this controlling principle are willing to
engage in a wider range of behavior than
those who operate from its negative counter-
part (e.g., life is not trustable). It has also
been found that a willingness to engage in
many and varied activities is a major factor
in problem solving (Whimbey, 1984), creativ-
ity (Perkins, 1980) and productivity (Fromm,
1968).
c. Attitudes That Broaden
Perception
One of the more powerful scientific realiza-
tions in the past few decades has been that
perception is fundamentally subjective in na-
ture. That is, we perceive only what we ex-
41
pect to perceive. Frank Smith (1978) drama-
tizes this by saying:
What we have in our heads is a theory
of what the world is like, a theory that
is the basis of all our perceptions and
understanding of the world, the root of
all learning, the source of all hopes and
fears, motives and expectancies, reason-
ing and creativity. And this theory is
all we have. If we can make sense of
the world at all, it is by interpreting
our interactions with the world in the
light of our theory. The theory is our
shield against bewilderment (p. 57).
In isolation this assertion implies a determin-
istic view of human cognition. If we per-
ceive only what we expect to perceive, we
are stuck in a perceptual "programming loop."
However, along with science's realization
that perception is subjective is the parallel
hypothesis that human beings have the power
to shift perceptions at will. That is, we can
choose to see things in a different way. This
concept of voluntary paradigm shifting has
affected a wide range of human endeavors
from theory and practice in research (Skrtic,
1983; Schwartz and Ogilvy, 1979) to economic
theory (Henderson, 1985) and to human pro-
ductivity (Bodek, 1984-1985). Another way
of saying this is that individuals who know
that their perceptions are subjective and can
voluntarily shift them have a very powerful
tool which can be used for school-related and
non-school-related tasks. We. might say, then,
that two attitudes which exert a high level of
contra,: over cognition and behavior are:
a belief that perceptions are subjective
and are generated from a specific point
of view
a belief that one's point of view is con-
trollable along with a willingness to
change a given point of view.
How do you introduce to students the con-
cept of monitoring attitudes? The first step
is to discuss with them the fact that attitudes
affect behavior and the possibility that atti-
tudes can be controlled and changed.
47
The second step is to make students aware of
some of the basic attitudes discussed above.
This can be done through discussion and/or
by reading books, short stories and plays that
seem to emphasize these attitudes. For ex-
ample, Carol Snyder's Memo: To Myself When
I Have A Teenage Daughter (1983) is about a
thirteen-year-old girl name Karen who isn't
ready for love affairs but is going through
those painful formative years convinced that
her mother doesn't understand her. However,
her mother gives her a diary that she began
when she was thirteen. This totally shifts
Karen's perception of her mother. Suddenly,
Mom becomes a human being. This dramatic
turn around in Karen's perceptions of her
mother can be used to introduce the concept
that perceptions emanate from specific points
of view and that you can change your point
of view and your perceptions.
Once basic attitudes have been presented to
the students, the next step is to help them
identify their own thinking relative to the
attitudes. Which attitudes do they already
operate from? How do these attitudes affect
thcir lives? This might be done in an exper-
imental fashion. Students can be asked to
keep a journal for a few days. Every time
they become aware of one of the attitudes in
thcir own lives they can record their thought
and describe how the attitude shapes their
bch avior.
Finally, studcnts can try to develop new atti-
tudcs about their ability to be successful.
For example, students might practice saying
the following affirmation:
I can trust that when I try to do some-
thing, things will generally go well.
4. SELF-EVALUATING
During the attainment of and upon comple-
tion of a goal, effective learners commonly
engage in self-evaluation techniques in which
they identify what is working and what is
not working relative to the goal. When goals
are long term this is best accomplished by
setting "milestones"small goals which are
indications that the larger goal is being ac-
42
complished. These milestones represent
"checkpoints" along they way.
Another useful self-evaluation technique rel-
ative to long-term goals is action planning.
A simplified version of action planning
might be:
Step 1. Identify actions you believe
should be taken to accomplish the goal.
Step 2. Prioritize those a^. %Ins.
Step 3. Keep moving though your
list of prioritized actions with an em-
phasis on always doing something rela-
tive to your goal.
Step 4. Periodically stop working and
reassess your action plan. Are there
any actions you have listed which you
now believe are irrelevant to your goal?
Cross those off your list. Are there any
actions important to the accomplish-
ment of your goal which you have not
listed? Add these to your list.
Whereas the techniques described above are
fairly concrete, self-evaluation can be quite
difficult if goals and tasks are primarily
cognitive. That is, for goals which require
complex mental operations there is very little
external evidence to indicate how the task is
progressing. To overcome this inherent dif-
ficulty with mental tasks, student3 can be
asked to "think aloud" as they engage in the
task. Recall that we introduced thinking
aloud (verbal mediation) in the third chapter
in the discussion of problem solving. As
Whimbey and Lochhead (1980) state, thinking
aloud is a very powerful self-evaluation tool:
"If both students and experts vocalize their
thoughts as they work through complex ideas
and relationships, the steps that they take are
open to view and their activities can be ob-
served and communicated" (p. 24).
Thinking aloud as a self-evaluation tech-
nique has been successfully used in mathe-
matics and science-related tasks (e.g.,
Lochhead, 1985) as well as with language arts
related cognitive tasks (e.g., Scardamalia and
Berietcr, 1983). In the "paired problem solv-
ing approach" (Lockhead, 1985) students are
48
 encouraged to work in pairs with one student
acting as the listener and the other as the
"doer." The listener has two major tasks:
to constantly check accuracy for the doer
and 2) to demand constant vocalization from
the doer. After students have received prac-
tice as listeners and doers they switch roles.
Over time the process of monitoring how
well a task is progressing becomes second na-
ture and students no longer need the aid of a
"listener." Rather, they incorporate self-eval-
uation into their standard operating proce-
dures when they engage in complex tasks.
THE ACTIVITY FRAMEWORK
The four generalized learning-to-learn com-
petencies described above can be presented to
students in isolation or they can be combined
into what we call the "activity framework."
It is presented in Figure 4.1:
Figure 4.1
ACTIVITY FRAMEWORK
1. Refocusing Phase: Relax and end
whatever previous activity you were
engaged in.
2. Awareness Phase:
a. Notice your level of distraction
(e.g,, how much are you attending
to thoughts unrelated to this
class?).
b. Notice your attitude toward the
class (e.g., do you believe the class
is valuable or not valuable? Do
you believe the class is interesting
or boring?).
c. Notice your attitude toward
working (e.g., are you committed
to being involved in the class or
do you want to coast?).
d. Notice your attitude toward their
ability (e.g., do you have a sense
of power about your ability to
perform well in this class or do
you have a sense of sinking?).
3. Responsibility Phase:
a. Hold-off or "bracket" any
thoughts unrelated to assigned
1) class work.
b. Generate interest and value for
the assigned class work.
c. Commit to being involved and
exerting necessary effort.
d. Take a stand that you can do
well.
4. Goal Setting Phase:
a. Set some specific goals for the
class.
b. Integrate the teacher's goals with
your own.
5.
Task Engagement Phase:
a. Be aware of whether you are
getting closer to or further away
from your stated goals.
b. Make any corrections necessary in
your own behavior or seek help to
further the attainment of your
goals.
6. Task Completion Phase:
a. Determine if your goals were
accomplished.
b. Evaluate what worked and what
did not work relative to your
goal.
The activity framework is intended as a
"casing" or context for all content area in-
struction. For example, classes can begin
with phases 1-4. Students can be asked to
end whatever activity they were previously
engaged in (Phase 1). If they are particu-
larly distracted, they can be led through
some basic relaxing activities to help clear
their minds and focus on the upcoming tasks
for class. They can then be given a few
minutes to become aware of basic attitudes
which will affect their performance (Phase
2). Once students become aware of the atti-
tudes they have brought to class they should
be requested to take responsibility for gener-
ating some attitudes that will be particularly
43
49
useful to them ir. performing well within the
class (Phase 3).
Usually Phases 1-3 will take only a few min-
utes at the beginning of class. However, the
time spent is well worth it because students
will likely be more highly engaged and suc-
cessful. Sometimes the teacher may want to
expand the time used for phases 1-3. This
might involve a prolonged relaxing activity
or a prolonged time when students discuss
thoughts they would like to bracket but are
experiencing a difficult time with. In a sim-
ilar fashion teachers and students might en-
gage in a prolonged discussion of how their
attitudes are affecting their performance.
Phase 4 can also be quite short or extended.
In its brief form students would be asked to
write a few academic goals they wish to ac-
complish during class. They would also be
asked to incorporate the teacher's goals into
their own. During the extended version of
Phase 4, students might review long-term
goals they have set, make entries in their
journals relative to how well the goal setting
process is working for them or engage in
some action planning relative to specific
goals.
During Phase 5 students and teacher engage
in standard content area activities. As a
matter of fact, most of the instructional
models currently within use (e.g., Hunter,
1984; Rosenshine, 1979) fit neatly into phase
To illustrate, consider the seven
5.
Hunter model:
Step 1. Provide students with a men-
tal set (anticipatory set) for the infor-
mation to be learners.
Step 2. Identify the objective and
purpose of the upcoming lesson.
Step 3. Provide new input to students.
Step 4. Model new knowledge or new
procedures for students.
Step 5. Check for understanding.
Step 6. Provide guided practice.
Step 7. Provide independent practice.
With the exception of Step 2, this process fits
nicely in Phase 5 of the Activity Framework
(Hunter's Step 2 would be redundant with
Phase 4 of the Activity Framework). Within
Phase 5 students would generally be involved
in what we have called "content thinking."
Our description of content thinking in the
second chapter, then, should add clarity to
Hunter's suggested instructional sequence.
That is, teachers could define whether they
want to introduce (Step 3) new declarative
knowledge (e.g., a new concept, a relationship
or a pattern of information), new procedural
knowledge (e.g., teach students how to "do
something" new like read a bar graph) or new
contextual knowledge (e.g., teach students a
new situation in which a known procedure
could be used). This step would be followed
by some form of modeling, checking for
understanding, guided and independent prac-
tice activities.
Finally, classes would end with phase 6.
Here students and teachers would review to
see if they had accomplished their stated
goals. If so, they would try to identity what
worked best for them. If goals were not ac-
complished, they would try to identify what
did not work well.
Over time the activity framework will be-
come something students use in all
activitiesin and out of school. If we can
believe current research and theory, such a
practice will make them more powerful and
independent learners.
stet.
44
RESTRUCTURING ISSUES
The introductory chapter suggested that the
teaching of thinking will require some shifts
in current educational practices. These
changes have been described as restructuring
issues and have been discussed in depth by
Arredondo and Marzano (1985). Some educa-
tional theorists believe that without instruc-
tional changes education will :cntinue to
function primarily as a soci::,:cono:nic sorting
mechanism in society.
For example, socioeconomic sociologist
Persell (1977) in Education and Inequality:
The Roots and Stratificat:on in America's
Schools, documents the exten, to which public
schools sort and classify students. Persell
states that "in today's America, the institu-
tion of education is called upon to maintain,
reproduce, and legitimize the inequalities of
society" (p. 30). Arredondo and Marzano
(1985) state that if we continue to produce
large numbers of under-educated young peo-
ple from the public schools, a growing public
concern and discontent will be the inevitable
result.
There are a number of indication., th.it we
are producing large numbers of under-edu-
cated youth. For example, the present high
school dropout statistics indicate that approx-
imately 25°k of the nation's population be-
tween the ages of 14-18 years are no longer
enrolled in school. Estimates of the size of
this out-of-school population run as high as
40% in some larger cities where the largest
percentage of these youths are members of
45
minority groups. For example, in New York
City, 50% of all high school age blacks and
Hispanics have left school. Of these 40,000
teenagers, only 9,000 will find jobs that
match their skill levels.
Of equal concern are the accusations that
large numbers of high school graduates leav-
ing school today are functionally illiterate,
,unprepared for any existing job and lacking
in the knowledge or skills needed to be a
productive member of society. If this
situation is true, public school systems are
the obvious starting point for the remedia-
tion of this situation.
Of even greater concern is tip.. fact that
schools historically have been asked to pre-
pare students for working in the production
sectors of our societymanufacturing, trans-
portation and food-production industries.
Jobs in these areas did not require a high de-
gtce of academic skill. Today there are
fewer of these jobs in our society. Instead,
we have more jobs that involve much higher
levels of abstrr...t thought. Insurance agents,
people in finance, farmers, real estate agents
and many others are required to work with
complex information, make complex decisions
and upgrade their knowledge and skills on a
regular basis. Schools must be more success-
ful than they have had to be in past to pre-
pare students for life in the twenty-first cen-
tury.
51
Our society's success in competing with other
nations also depends on an increase in
productivity. That increase will not occur if
we do not learn to think more effectively.
A basic assumption of this monograph is that
the teaching of thinking skills is one of the
most powerful mechanisms for endii.g the
sorting function of public education and im-
proving student competency and productiv-
ity. The small percentage of students now
leaving school with the thinking skills
necessary for success in the present and
future society are abie to do so because many
of them have acquired these skills either
outside of school or as an indirect result of
classroom instruction. For example, most of
those students who do learn the thinking
skills defined in this monograph develop
them because of their backgrounds or out-of-
classroom experiences.
Students from higher level socioeconomic
backgrounds have many out-of-school oppor-
tunities to learn these skills; students with
lower socioeconomic backgrounds have less
of an opportunity to develop them. For ex-
ample, extracurricular activities also provide
settings in which some of these skills, partic-
ularly the learning-to-learn skills, are ac-
quired; these activities are more frequently
engaged in higher socioeconomic students
than those from lower socioeconomic back-
grounds.
As school systems identify the thinking skills
that ought to be taught, place them in the
curriculum, teach these skills, and then test
for specific skill development, all students
will have the direct opportunity to acquire
the competencies necessary in the informa-
tion age. Such a change would have a con-
comitant impact on the fabric of public
schools. Below, we will consider a few re-
structuring issues we believe are necessary
for the systematic teaching of thinking skills.
Specifically, we will consider how each of
the three thinking skill areas (content think-
ing, reasoning and learning-to-learn) necessi-
tates fundamental changes in schools. We
will also consider necessary changes in test-
ing and evaluation and the integration of in-
struction.
46
RESTRUCTURING ISSUES RELATED TO
THE TEACHING OF CONTENT
THINKING SKILLS
The content thinking skills presented in this
monograph suggest a number of restructuring
issues. Fir is the need to have teachers be-
come aware of and explicitly teach declara-
tive, procedural and contextual knowledge in
each subject area. This is not a new sugges-
tion. As mentioned earlier, it was Becker's
(1977) recommendation, after a thorough
analysis of the research on various interven-
tions for the educationally disadvantaged,
that systematic instruction in the basic con-
cepts should be an educational priority.
Becker specifically asserted that the educa-
tionally disadvantaged would benefit as well
as all other students:
By the use of carefully structured pro-
grams to boost vocabulary competency
for low performing children in the
early grades, the number of children in
the lower end of this range can be re-
duced. By structuring school programs
to teach basic operations in the various
areas of knowledge using basic words,
the advanced children would not neces-
sarily be held back (p. 539).
Content area curriculum should be restruc-
tured so as to make salient those concepts
that are crucial to the subject area. This im-
plies a rethinking and restructuring of most
existing courses.
A second issue has to do with the manner in
which we teach these concepts. We believe
instruction should be consistent with the way
students naturally learn concepts. The adop-
tion of such a recommendation would involve
another major restructuringthe restructur-
ing of our models for instruction.
In Chapter 2 we mentioned the growing body
of research which suggests that knowledge is
developed and stored in two primary forms:
imagery and verbal. Kaufman (in Sheikh,
1983) states that these are the two primary
forms of thinking. Yet within formal educa-
tion there is a lack of attention to and even
52
a distrust of the nonverbal aspects of cogni-
tion in spite of the growing evidence to sup-
port its central role in information process-
ing. We believe that to teach thinking effec-
tively teachers will need to highlight and
model the nonverbal aspects of learning. Our
curriculum and instruction models must not
approach everything in a linguistic way. We
must operationalize the belief that many
problems and a great deal of thinking in-
volves experiences and skills that go beyond
the rote learning of dictionary-like defini-
tions of words and concepts. Again, restruc-
turing of our current instructional models
will be necessary to accomplish this.
The introduction of "relationship identifica-
tion" and "pattern recognition" into the cur-
riculum suggests another restructuring issue:
the conscious introduction of organizational
patterns into textbooks and oral presenta-
tions. For example, the more that complex
organization patterns and relationships are
made salient in written material and oral
presentations, the easier information is .to
process and retrieve. Most textbooks and
many class presentations, however, do not
clearly use such organizational patterns. As
a. result, students have to provide these pat-
terns for themselves. As mentioned previ-
ously, better students look for or create these
patterns as a basic comprehension strategy
while less successful learners do not appear
to have this meta-cognitive awareness. Con-
sequently, it is the job of the teacher to pro-
vide organizational patterns students can use
to organize textbook and lecture material.
Finally, classroom instruction needs to be re-
structured to create a balance between the
teaching of declarative knowledge (e.g., facts)
and the teaching of procedural and contex-
tual knowledge. It is not a matter of choos-
ing between the domains but making sure
that we include all of them. That will be
difficult for many teachers unless they are
given strong support in learning how to teach
procedures and context.
RESTRUCTURING ISSUES RELATED TO
THE TEACHING OF REASONING SKILLS
In their review of the research on instruction
related to the teaching of reading, Pearson
47
and Tierney (1983) state that current in-
structional practice most commonly has the
following characteristics:
use of many practice materials
little explanation of cognitive tasks
little interaction with students about
the nature of specific tasks
emphasis on one correct answer to the
extent of supplying the answers for
students if they exhibit problems with
or confusion over a task.
Pearson and Tierney imply that this is a gen-
eral model commonly used in all content ar-
eas at all grade levels. If this is true, it can
be said that current instructional practice
does not conform to what appears to be nec-
essary for effective teaching and learning of
basic cognitive abilities. What is needed is
an instiuctional style that places the teacher
in the role of a filter between the students
and the assigned academic tasks. This role
would be consistent with Fuerstein et al.'s
(1985) assertion that cognitive abilities are
learned most effectively during "mediated
learning experiences." Direct instruction in
reasoning using this perspective would place
the teacher in the role of helping students
learn how to store, retrieve, match or build
new information. The teacher would become
much more process oriented, helping students
think and verbalize about the thinking activ-
ities that a lesson called on them to apply.
RESTRUCTURING ISSUES RELATED
TO THE TEACHING OF
LEARNING-TO-LEARN SKILLS
The direct teaching of learning-to-learn
strategies represents a major restructuring
from the current instructional models that
focus responsibility for learning on the
teacher rather than the student. Basically, an
emphasis on learning-to-learn strategies
would convey the message that students must
take an active role in the learning process.
Baird and White (1982) contend that only
53
 minor improvements will be made within ed-
ucation unless there is a fundamental shift
from teacher to student responsibility for
learning. We believe that can only be ac-
complished by helping students learn how to
focus their attention, set goals and monitor
their own attitudes and progress.
I' appears that many of the individuals con-
sidered successful in today's technological so-
ciety are aware of the learning-to-learn skills
and systematically use them. For example,
Peters and Waterman (1982) cite examples of
top executives cultivating such meta- cogni-
tive strategies as goal setting, monitoring
feedback, and cognitive restructuring. Not
surprisingly, there are many powerful train-
ing programs within business and industry
(e.g., Tiece, 1976) which use adaptations of
the learning-to-learn process presented here.
However, within mainstream education few
components are systematically taught even
though there has been a long standing man-
date from the research community that such
meta-cognitive awareness should be taught as
a part of the formal education process. For
example, McCombs (1984) asserts that this
area holds the promise of unlocking a door
for "those students whose deficiencies pre-
clude them from enjoying the positive bene
fits of learning and self-development" (p.
216).
TESTING AND
AND EVALUATION ISSUES
INVOLVED IN THE TEACHING OF
THINKING SKILLS
One key to the success or failure of teaching
thinking in schools will be found in the re-
structuring of testing and evaluation. Doyle
(1983) states that accountability drives the
academic tasks presented to students. Stu-
dents tend to take seriously only those tasks
for which they are held accountable (Carter
and Doyle, 1982; King, 1980; Winne and
Marx, 1982). We believe that teachers have
this same sensitivity. As a result, current
models of testing and evaluation must be re-
vised to include an explicit focus on thinking
skills.
48
Such a focus would require that the areas de-
scribed in this model should be academically
assessed. The difficulty is that many of the
competencies described above cannot be as-
sessed using traditional formats sucn as mul-
tiple choice questions. Furthermore, some
competencies we have described here have no
"correct answer" to use as a criterion (e.g.,
evaluation of value). Consequently, the in-
clusion of many of the components of this
model would necessitate a shift in the scope
and practice of assessment. Specifically, as-
sessment would have to involve data gather.
ing techniques commonly associated with
qualitative research (e.g., Miles and Huber-
man, 1984). We believe that without such a
shift, formal education will remain en-
trenched in current testing practices which
commonly are discriminatory against certain
socioeconomic groups.
RESTRUCTURING ISSUES INHERENT
IN THE UNITARY NATURE
OF INSTRUCTION
We have entitled the approach to teaching
described in this monograph as a "unitary
approach." This is because in developing the
model we have made an assumption that all
components (e.g., content thinking, reasoning
and learning-to-learn) must be an integrated
part of all content and instruction. The
learning-to-learn skills represent the frame-
work for content teaching. To ignore these
skills is to ignore the context in which learn-
ing occurs. All too often elegantly structured
lessons are wasted because students have not
generated the necessary energy, effort and
interest to engage in the lesson.
Given that students have accepted responsi-
bility for their involvement in the learning
process, the unitary model implies that class-
room content must be viewed as the balanced
presentation of three types of information:
I) declarative, 2) procedural, and 3) contex-
tual. The omission or overemphasis of any
one type of information will create gaps in
learning that threaten students understanding
of the totality of the content.
54
Finally, when presenting content area mate-
rial, teachers must mediate the learning pro-
cess by modeling and reinforcing the reason-
ing skills necessary to process content and
expand on content.

All three components of the unitary model

are "basic." All three are needez! to restruc-
ture instruction so as to halt and reverse the
sorting function of the current educational
system.

Training programs based on the conceptual framework for

thinking skills presented in this monograph are available from
the Mid-continent Regional Educational Laboratory.

49 55
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C6 62
 THE THINKING SKILLS

I. CONTENT THINKING
Acquiring Declarative Knowledge
1. Attaining concepts: learning and relating new concepts to those already known.
2. Identifying relationships: establishing relationships between and among ideas.
3. Recognizing patterns: organizing blocks of information in meaningful ways.
Acquiring Procedural Knowledge
4. Proceduralizing: breaking a complex process into its component parts.
Acquiring Contextual Knowledge
5. Recognizing context: determining situations in which specific information and
skills should and should not be used.
II. REASONING
Transferring
1. Storing and retrieving: enhancing information for easy retrieval.
2. Memory frameworks: storing large sets of information in long-term memory.
Matching
3. Categorizing: organizing concepts into meaningful groups.
4. Reasoning analogically: recognizing the relationship between two concepts and
identifying another set of concepts with a similar relationship.
5. Extrapolating: matching the pattern of information from one context to another.
6. Evaluating evidence: deciding whether information follows the rules of logic.
7. Evaluating value: deciding how information matches with internalized values.
Restructuring
8. Elaborating: expanding information by identifying unstated characteristics,
causes, purposes and backgrounds.
9. Problem solving: identifying missing information in goal-driven situations.
10. Inventing: conceiving of and developing products in a polished state.
III. LEARNING-TO-LEARN
1. Attending: monitoring attention and raising it when necessary.
2. Setting goals: setting explicit short-term and long-term learning goals and
developing strategies to meet those goals.
3. Monitoring attitudes: identifying attitudes toward learning/school and
fostering those which facilitate academic success.
4. Self-evaluating: monitoring progress toward goals and making adjustments in
behavior if necessary.

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NicREL McREL
12500 E. lliff Ave. Suite 201 4709 Belleview Ave.
Aurora, Colorado 80014 Kansas City, Missouri 64112
(303) 337-0990 (816) 756-2401

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