William C.

Reagan, Petitioner vs Commission of Internal Revenue

Facts:

The petitioner is a citizen of the United State and an employee of Bendix Radio,
Divison of Bendix Aviation Corporation, which provided technical assistance to the United
States Air Force was assigned at the Clark Air Base Pampanga, honor about July 7, 19. Nine
months, before his tour duty expires, petitioner imported a tax free 1960 Cadillac car which
valued at $6443.83. More than two months after the car was imported, petitioner requested
the Clark Air Base Commander for a permit to sell the car. The request was granted with the
condition that he would sell it to a member of the United States Armed Forces or an
employee of the U.S. Military Bases.

On July 11, 1960, petitioner sold the car to Willie Johnson for $6600, a private in
US Marine Corps, Sangby Point, Cavite as shown by a bill of sale executed at Clark Air Base.
On the same date William Johnson Jr. sold the car to Fred Meneses for P32,000 as evidence
by a deed of sale executed in Manila.

The respondent after deducting the landed cost of the car and the personal
exemption which the petitioner was entitled, fixed as his net income arising from such
transaction the amount of P17912.34 rendering him liable for income tax of P2979.00. After
paying the sum, he sought refund from the respondent claiming that he is exempted. He
filed a case within the Court of Tax Appeals seeking recovery of the sum P2979.00 plus legal
rate of interest.

Issue:

Whether or not the said income tax of P2979.00 was legally collected by respondent from
petitioner.

Ruling:

The Philippine is an independent and sovereign country or state. Its authority

may be exercised over its entire domain. Its laws govern therein and everyone to whom it
applies must submit to its term. It does not prelude from allowing another power to
participate in the exercise of jurisdictional rights over certain portions of its territory. Such
areas sustain their status as native soil and still subject to its authority. Its jurisdiction may
be diminished but it does not disappear.

The Clark Air Base is one of he bases under lease to the American armed forces
by virtue of the Military Bases Agreement which states that a “national of the US serving or
employed in the Philippines in connection with the construction, maintenance, operation, or
defense of the bases and residing in the Philippines only by reason such unemployment is
not to be taxed on his income unless derived in the bases which one clearly derived the Phil.

Therefore the Supreme Court sustained the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals
rendering the petitioner liable of the income tax arising from the sale of his automobile that
have taken place in Clark Air Field which is within our territory to tax.

1
Kuroda vs. Jalandoni

G.R. L-2662, March 26, 1949

Facts:

1. Petitioner Sheginori Kuroda was the former Lt. General of the Japanese Army and
commanding general of the Japanese forces during the occupation (WWII) in the country.
He was tried before the Philippine Military Commission for War Crimes and other atrocities
committed against military and civilians. The military commission was establish under
Executive Order 68.

2. Petitioner assails the validity of EO 68 arguing it is unconstitutional and hence the

military commission did not have the jurisdiction to try him on the following grounds: That
the Philippines is not a signatory to the Hague Convention (War Crimes)

3. Petitioner likewise assails that the US is not a party of interest in the case hence the 2 US
prosecutors cannot practice law in the Philippines.

Issue: Whether or not EO 68 is constitutional thus the military tribunal jurisdiction is valid

HELD:

1. EO 68 is constitutional hence the tribunal has jurisdiction to try Kuroda. EO 68 was

enacted by the President and was in accordance with Sec. 3, Art. 2 of Constitution which
renounces war as an instrument of national policy. Hence it is in accordance with generally
accepted principles of international law including the Hague Convention and Geneva
Convention, and other international jurisprudence established by the UN, including the
principle that all persons (military or civilian) guilty of plan, preparing, waging a war of
aggression and other offenses in violation of laws and customs of war. The Philippines may
not be a signatory to the 2 conventions at that time but the rules and regulations of both
are wholly based on the generally accepted principles of international law. They were
accepted even by the 2 belligerent nations (US and Japan)

2. As to the participation of the 2 US prosecutors in the case, the US is a party of interest

because its country and people have greatly aggrieved by the crimes which petitioner was
being charged of.

3. Moreover, the Phil. Military Commission is a special military tribunal and rules as to
parties and representation are not governed by the rules of court but the provision of this
special law.

2
Tanada vs Angara 272 SCRA 18

Facts:
On April 15, 1994, the Philippine Government represented by its Secretary of the
Department of Trade and Industry signed the Final Act binding the Philippine Government to
submit to its respective competent authorities the WTO (World Trade Organization)
Agreements to seek approval for such. On December 14, 1994, Resolution No. 97 was
adopted by the Philippine Senate to ratify the WTO Agreement.
This is a petition assailing the constitutionality of the WTO agreement as it violates Sec 19,
Article II, providing for the development of a self reliant and independent national economy,
and Sections 10 and 12, Article XII, providing for the “Filipino first” policy.

Issue: Whether or not the Resolution No. 97 ratifying the WTO Agreement is
unconstitutional

Ruling:

The Supreme Court ruled the Resolution No. 97 is not unconstitutional. While the
constitution mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods, services, labor and enterprises, at
the same time, it recognizes the need for business exchange with the rest of the world on
the bases of equality and reciprocity and limits protection of Filipino interests only against
foreign competition and trade practices that are unfair. In other words, the Constitution did
not intend to pursue an isolationalist policy. Furthermore, the constitutional policy of a “self-
reliant and independent national economy” does not necessarily rule out the entry of foreign
investments, goods and services. It contemplates neither “economic seclusion” nor
“mendicancy in the international community.”
The Senate, after deliberation and voting, gave its consent to the WTO Agreement thereby
making it “a part of the law of the land”. The Supreme Court gave due respect to an equal
department in government. It presumes its actions as regular and done in good faith unless
there is convincing proof and persuasive agreements to the contrary. As a result, the
ratification of the WTO Agreement limits or restricts the absoluteness of sovereignty. A
treaty engagement is not a mere obligation but creates a legally binding obligation on the
parties. A state which has contracted valid international obligations is bound to make its
legislations such modifications as may be necessary to ensure the fulfillment of the
obligations undertaken.

SECRETARY OF JUSTICE V. LANTION

GR 139465, 17 October 2000

FACTS:

On 13 January 1977, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree 1069
"Prescribing the Procedure for the Extradition of Persons Who Have Committed Crimes in a
Foreign Country". On 13 November 1994, then Secretary of Justice Franklin M. Drilon,
representing the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, signed in Manila the
"Extradition Treaty between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the
Government of the United States of America. The Senate, by way of Resolution 11,
expressed its concurrence in the ratification of the said treaty. It also expressed its

3
concurrence in the Diplomatic Notes correcting Paragraph (5)(a), Article 7 thereof (on the
admissibility of the documents accompanying an extradition request upon certification by
the principal diplomatic or consular officer of the requested state resident in the Requesting
State). On 18 June 1999, the Department of Justice received from the Department of
Foreign Affairs U. S. Note Verbale 0522 containing a request for the extradition of Mark
Jimenez to the United States. Attached to the Note Verbale were the Grand Jury Indictment,
the warrant of arrest issued by the U.S. District Court, Southern District of Florida, and
other supporting documents for said extradition.

Jimenez was charged in the United States for violation of

(a) 18 USC 371 (Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the United States, 2 counts),

(b) 26 USC 7201 (Attempt to evade or defeat tax, 4 counts),

(c) 18 USC 1343 (Fraud by wire, radio, or television, 2 counts),

(d) 18 USC 1001 (False statement or entries, 6 counts), and

(E) 2 USC 441f (Election contributions in name of another; 33 counts).

On the same day, the Secretary issued Department Order 249 designating and authorizing a
panel of attorneys to take charge of and to handle the case.

Pending evaluation of the aforestated extradition documents, Jimenez (on 1 July 1999
requested copies of the official extradition request from the US Government, as well as all
documents and papers submitted therewith, and that he be given ample time to comment
on the request after he shall have received copies of the requested papers. The Secretary
denied the request.

On 6 August 1999, Jimenez filed with the Regional Trial Court a petition against the
Secretary of Justice, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and the Director of the National
Bureau of Investigation,

l for mandamus (to compel the Justice Secretary to furnish Jimenez the extradition
documents, to give him access thereto, and to afford him an opportunity to comment on, or
oppose, the extradition request, and thereafter to evaluate the request impartially, fairly
and objectively);

l certiorari (to set aside the Justice Secretary’s letter dated 13 July 1999); and prohibition
(to restrain the Justice Secretary from considering the extradition request and from filing an
extradition petition in court;

l and to enjoin the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the Director of the NBI from performing
any act directed to the extradition of Jimenez to the United States), with an application for
the issuance of a temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction.

The trial court ruled in favor of Jimenez. The Secretary filed a petition for certiorari before
the Supreme Court.

4
On 18 January 2000, by a vote of 9-6, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition and
ordered the Justice Secretary to furnish Jimenez copies of the,extradition request and its
supporting papers and to grant him a reasonable period within which to file his comment
with supporting evidence.

IN SUMMARY:

The Department of Justice received from the Department of Foreign Affairs a request from
the United States for the extradition of Mark Jimenez to the United States pursuant to PD
No. 1609 prescribing the procedure for extradition of persons who have committed a crime
in a foreign country. Jimenez requested for copies of the request and that he be given
ample time to comment on said request. The petitioners denied the request pursuant to the
RP-US Extradition Treaty.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent’s entitlement to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage
of the proceedings constitute a breach of the legal duties of the Philippine Government
under the RP-US Extradition Treaty.

HELD:

NO. The human rights of person and the rights of the accused guaranteed in the
Constitution should take precedence over treaty rights claimed by a contracting party, the
doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals are confronted with a
situation where there is a conflict between a rule of the international law and the
constitution. Efforts must first be made in order to harmonize the provisions so as to give
effect to both but if the conflict is irreconcilable, the municipal law must be upheld. The fact
that international law has been made part of the law of the land does not pertain to or imply
the primacy of international law over the municipal law in the municipal sphere. In states
where the constitution is the highest law of the land, both statutes and treaties may be
invalidated if they are in conflict with the constitution.

In the case at bar, private respondent does not only face a clear and present danger of loss
of property or employment but of liberty itself, which may eventually lead to his forcible
banishment to a foreign land. The convergence of petitioners favorable action on the
extradition request and the deprivation of private respondents liberty is easily
comprehensible.

We have ruled time and again that this Courts equity jurisdiction, which is aptly described
as "justice outside legality," may be availed of only in the absence of, and never against,
statutory law or judicial pronouncements.The constitutional issue in the case at bar does not

5
even call for "justice outside legality," since private respondents due process rights,
although not guaranteed by statute or by treaty, are protected by constitutional guarantees.
We would not be true to the organic law of the land if we choose strict construction over
guarantees against the deprivation of liberty. That would not be in keeping with the
principles of democracy on which our Constitution is premised.

Thus, Petitioner is ordered to furnish private respondent copies of the extradition request
and its supporting papers and to grant him a reasonable period within which to file his
comment with supporting evidence.

Bayan v. Zamora, G.R. No. 138570, October 10, 2000

FACTS

The Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America entered into an agreement
called the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA). The agreement was treated as a treaty by the
Philippine government and was ratified by then-President Joseph Estrada with the
concurrence of 2/3 of the total membership of the Philippine Senate.

The VFA defines the treatment of U.S. troops and personnel visiting the Philippines. It
provides for the guidelines to govern such visits, and further defines the rights of the U.S.
and the Philippine governments in the matter of criminal jurisdiction, movement of vessel
and aircraft, importation and exportation of equipment, materials and supplies.

Petitioners argued, inter alia, that the VFA violates §25, Article XVIII of the 1987
Constitution, which provides that “foreign military bases, troops, or facilities shall not be
allowed in the Philippines except under a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate . . . and
recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State.”

THE ISSUE

Was the VFA unconstitutional?

RULING

[The Court DISMISSED the consolidated petitions, held that the petitioners did not commit
grave abuse of discretion, and sustained the constitutionality of the VFA.]

NO, the VFA is not unconstitutional.

6
Section 25, Article XVIII disallows foreign military bases, troops, or facilities in the country,
unless the following conditions are sufficiently met, viz: (a) it must be under a treaty; (b)
the treaty must be duly concurred in by the Senate and, when so required by congress,
ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a national referendum; and
(c) recognized as a treaty by the other contracting state.

There is no dispute as to the presence of the first two requisites in the case of the VFA. The
concurrence handed by the Senate through Resolution No. 18 is in accordance with the
provisions of the Constitution . . . the provision in [in §25, Article XVIII] requiring
ratification by a majority of the votes cast in a national referendum being unnecessary since
Congress has not required it.

xxx xxx xxx

This Court is of the firm view that the phrase “recognized as a treaty” means that the other
contracting party accepts or acknowledges the agreement as a treaty. To require the other
contracting state, the United States of America in this case, to submit the VFA to the United
States Senate for concurrence pursuant to its Constitution, is to accord strict meaning to the
phrase.

Well-entrenched is the principle that the words used in the Constitution are to be given
their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed, in which case the
significance thus attached to them prevails. Its language should be understood in the sense
they have in common use.

Moreover, it is inconsequential whether the United States treats the VFA only as an
executive agreement because, under international law, an executive agreement is as
binding as a treaty. To be sure, as long as the VFA possesses the elements of an agreement
under international law, the said agreement is to be taken equally as a treaty.

xxx xxx xxx

The records reveal that the United States Government, through Ambassador Thomas C.
Hubbard, has stated that the United States government has fully committed to living up to
the terms of the VFA. For as long as the United States of America accepts or acknowledges
the VFA as a treaty, and binds itself further to comply with its obligations under the treaty,
there is indeed marked compliance with the mandate of the Constitution.

7
ASYLUM CASE

Colombia v Peru [1950] ICJ 6 (also known as the Asylum Case) is a public international
law case, decided by the International Court of Justice. The ICJ recognised that the scope of
Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice encompassed bi-lateral and
regional international customary norms as well as general customary norms, in much the
same way as it encompasses bilateral and multilateral treaties.[1] The Court also clarified
that for custom to be definitively proven, it must be continuously and uniformly executed.

Facts

The Colombian Ambassador in Lima, Peru allowed Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre, head of
the American People's Revolutionary Alliance sanctuary after his faction lost a one-day civil
war in Peru on 3 October 1949. The Colombian government granted him asylum, but the
Peruvian government refused to grant him safe passage out of Peru.

Colombia maintained that according to the Conventions in force - the Bolivian Agreement of
1911 on Extradition, the Havana Convention of 1928 on Asylum, the Montevideo Convention
of 1933 on Political Asylum[2] - and according to American International Law, they were
entitled to decide if asylum should be granted and their unilateral decision on this was
binding on Peru.[3]

Judgment

Both submissions of Colombia were rejected by the Court. The relevant treaties cited by
Colombia were not ratified by Peru, and it was not found that the custom of Asylum was
uniformly or continuously executed sufficiently to demonstrate that the custom was of a
generally applicable character.In this case,International Court of Justice observed that the
rule invoked should be in accordance with a consent and uniform usage practiced by the
State.

Nicaragua v. United States

Citation. I.C.J. 1984 I.C.J. 39

Brief Fact Summary. Nicaragua (P) brought a suit against the United States (D) on the
ground that the United States (D) was responsible for illegal military and paramilitary
activities in and against Nicaragua. The jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice to
entertain the case as well as the admissibility of Nicaragua’s (P) application to the I.C.J. was
challenged by the United States (D).

Synopsis of Rule of Law. Nicaragua (P) brought a suit against the United States (D) on
the ground that the United States (D) was responsible for illegal military and paramilitary
activities in and against Nicaragua. The jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice to
entertain the case as well as the admissibility of Nicaragua’s (P) application to the I.C.J. was
challenged by the United States (D).

Facts. The United States (D) challenged the jurisdiction of the I.C.J when it was held
responsible for illegal military and paramilitary activities in and against Nicaragua (P) in the
suit the plaintiff brought against the defendant in 1984. Though a declaration accepting the
mandatory jurisdiction of the Court was deposited by the United States (D) in a 1946, it
tried to justify the declaration in a 1984 notification by referring to the 1946 declaration and
stating in part that the declaration “shall not apply to disputes with any Central American

8
State….”
Apart from maintaining the ground that the I.C.J lacked jurisdiction, the States (D) also
argued that Nicaragua (P) failed to deposit a similar declaration to the Court. On the other
hand, Nicaragua (P) based its argument on its reliance on the 1946 declaration made by the
United states (D) due to the fact that it was a “state accepting the same obligation” as the
United States (D) when it filed charges in the I.C.J. against the United States (D). Also, the
plaintiff intent to submit to the compulsory jurisdiction of the I.C.J. was pointed out by the
valid declaration it made in 1929 with the I.C.J’s predecessor, which was the Permanent
Court of International Justice, even though Nicaragua had failed to deposit it with that
court. The admissibility of Nicaragua’s (P) application to the I.C.J. was also challenged by
the United States (D).

Issue. (1) Is the jurisdiction to entertain a dispute between two states, if they both accept
the Court’s jurisdiction, within the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice?
(2) Where no grounds exist to exclude the application of a state, is the application of such a
state to the International Court of Justice admissible?

Held. (1) Yes. The jurisdiction of the Court to entertain a dispute between two states if each
of the States accepted the Court’s jurisdiction is within the jurisdiction of the International
Court of Justice. Even though Nicaragua (P) declaration of 1929 was not deposited with the
Permanent Court, because of the potential effect it had that it would last for many years, it
was valid.
Thus, it maintained its effect when Nicaragua became a party to the Statute of the I.C.J
because the declaration was made unconditionally and was valid for an unlimited period.
The intention of the current drafters of the current Statute was to maintain the greatest
possible continuity between it and the Permanent Court. Thus, when Nicaragua (P) accepted
the Statute, this would have been deemed that the plaintiff had given its consent to the
transfer of its declaration to the I.C.J.

(2) Yes. When no grounds exist to exclude the application of a state, the application of such
a state to the International Court of Justice is admissible. The five grounds upon which the
United States (D) challenged the admissibility of Nicaragua’s (P) application were that the
plaintiff failed because there is no “indispensable parties” rule when it could not bring forth
necessary parties, Nicaragua’s (P) request of the Court to consider the possibility of a threat
to peace which is the exclusive province of the Security Council, failed due to the fact that
I.C.J. can exercise jurisdiction which is concurrent with that of the Security Council, that
the I.C.J. is unable to deal with situations involving ongoing armed conflict and that there is
nothing compelling the I.C.J. to decline to consider one aspect of a dispute just because the
dispute has other aspects due to the fact that the case is incompatible with the Contadora
process to which Nicaragua (P) is a party.

Discussion. Although the questions of jurisdiction and admissibility are primarily based on
the principle that the I.C.J. has only as much power as that agreed to by the parties, these
can be quite complicated. The 1946 declaration of the United States and the 1929
declaration of Nicaragua was the main focus of the case on declaration and each of these
declarations pointed out the respective parties’ intent as it related to the I.C.J’s jurisdiction.

9
VINUYA VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

G.R. No. 162230, 28 April 2010

FACTS

Petitioners narrate that during the Second World War, the Japanese army attacked villages
and systematically raped the women as part of the destruction of the village. As a result of
the actions of their Japanese tormentors, the petitioners have spent their lives in misery,
having endured physical injuries, pain and disability, and mental emotional suffering.
Petitioners claim that since 1998, they have approached the Executive Department through
the DOJ, DFA and OSG, requesting assistance in filing a claim against the Japanese officials
and military officers who ordered the establishment of the “comfort women stations in the
Philippines. However, said officials declined to assist the petitioners, and took the position
that the individual claims for compensation have already been fully satisfied by Japan’s
compliance with the Peace Treaty between the Philippines and Japan. Petitioners also
argued that the comfort women system constituted a crime against humanity, sexual
slavery, and torture. They alleged that the prohibition against these international crimes is
jus cogens norms from which no derogation is possible, as such, the Philippine government
is in breach of its legal obligation not to afford impunity for crimes against humanity.

ISSUE

Whether the Executive Department committed grave abuse of discretion in not espousing
petitioner’s claims for official apology and other forms of reparations against Japan.

RULING

No. The question whether the government should espouse claims of its nationals against a
foreign government is a foreign relations matter, the authority for which is demonstrably
committed by our Constitution not to the courts but to the political branches. In this case,
the Executive Department has determined that taking up petitioners’ cause would be
inimical to our country’s foreign policy interests, and could disrupt our relations with Japan,
thereby creating serious implications for stability in this region. For the Court to overturn
the Executive Departments determination would mean an assessment of the foreign policy
judgments by a coordinate political branch to which authority to make that judgment has
been constitutionally committed. In the international sphere, traditionally, the only means
available for individuals to bring a claim within the international legal system has been when
the individual is able to persuade a government to bring a claim on the individuals behalf.
Even then, it is not the individuals rights that are being asserted, but rather, the states own
rights. The State, therefore, is the sole judge to decide whether its protection will be
granted, to what extent it is granted, and when will it cease.

The Court fully agree that rape, sexual slavery, torture, and sexual violence
are morally reprehensible as well as legally prohibited under contemporary international
law. However, it does not automatically imply that the Philippines is under a non-derogable
obligation to prosecute international crimes. Absent the consent of the states, an applicable

10
treaty regime, or a directive by the Security Council, there is no non-derogable duty to
institute proceedings against Japan. Even the invocation of jus cogens norms and erga
omnes obligations will not alter this analysis. Even if we sidestep the question of
whether jus cogens norms existed in 1951, petitioners have not deigned to show that the
crimes committed by the Japanese army violated jus cogens prohibitions at the time the
Treaty of Peace was signed, or that the duty to prosecute perpetrators of international
crimes is an erga omnes obligation or has attained the status of jus cogens.

MAGALLONA v. ERMITA, G.R. 187167, August 16, 2011

Facts:

In 1961, Congress passed R.A. 3046 demarcating the maritime baselines of the Philippines
as an Archepelagic State pursuant to UNCLOS I of 9158, codifying the sovereignty of State
parties over their territorial sea. Then in 1968, it was amended by R.A. 5446, correcting
some errors in R.A. 3046 reserving the drawing of baselines around Sabah.

In 2009, it was again amended by R.A. 9522, to be compliant with the UNCLOS III of 1984.
The requirements complied with are: to shorten one baseline, to optimize the location of
some basepoints and classify KIG and Scarborough Shoal as ‘regime of islands’.

Petitioner now assails the constitutionality of the law for three main reasons:

1. it reduces the Philippine maritime territory under Article 1;

2. it opens the country’s waters to innocent and sea lanes passages hence undermining our
sovereignty and security; and

3. treating KIG and Scarborough as ‘regime of islands’ would weaken our claim over those
territories.

Issue: Whether R.A. 9522 is constitutional?

Ruling:

1. UNCLOS III has nothing to do with acquisition or loss of territory. it is just a codified
norm that regulates conduct of States. On the other hand, RA 9522 is a baseline law to
mark out basepoints along coasts, serving as geographic starting points to measure. it
merely notices the international community of the scope of our maritime space.

2. If passages is the issue, domestically, the legislature can enact legislation designating
routes within the archipelagic waters to regulate innocent and sea lanes passages. but in
the absence of such, international law norms operate.

the fact that for archipelagic states, their waters are subject to both passages does not
place them in lesser footing vis a vis continental coastal states. Moreover, RIOP is a
customary international law, no modern state can invoke its sovereignty to forbid such
passage.

3. On the KIG issue, RA 9522 merely followed the basepoints mapped by RA 3046 and in
fact, it increased the Phils.’ total maritime space. Moreover, the itself commits the Phils.’
continues claim of sovereignty and jurisdiction over KIG.

If not, it would be a breach to 2 provisions of the UNCLOS III:

11
Art. 47 (3): ‘drawing of basepoints shall not depart to any appreciable extent from the
general configuration of the archipelago’.

Art 47 (2): the length of baselines shall not exceed 100 mm.

KIG and SS are far from our baselines, if we draw to include them, we’ll breach the rules:
that it should follow the natural configuration of the archipelago.

G.R. No. 190582 April 8, 2010

ANG LADLAD LGBT PARTY vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

Facts:
Comelec refused to recognize Ang Ladlad LGBT Party, an organization composed of men and
women who identify themselves as lesbians, gays, bisexuals, or trans-gendered individuals
(LGBTs),as a party list based on moral grounds. In the elevation of the case to the Supreme
Court, Comelec alleged that petitioner made misrepresentation in their application.

Issue:
Whether or not Ang Ladlad LGBT Party qualifies for registration as party-list.

Ruling:
Ang Ladlad LGBT Party’s application for registration should be granted.

Comelec’s citation of the Bible and the Koran in denying petitioner’s application was a violation
of the non-establishment clause laid down in Article 3 section 5 of the Constitution. The
proscription by law relative to acts against morality must be for a secular purpose (that is,
the conduct prohibited or sought to be repressed is “detrimental or dangerous to those
conditions upon which depend the existence and progress of human society"), rather than out
of religious conformity. The Comelec failed to substantiate their allegation that allowing
registration to Ladlad would be detrimental to society.

The LGBT community is not exempted from the exercise of its constitutionally vested rights
on the basis of their sexual orientation. Laws of general application should apply with equal
force to LGBTs, and they deserve to participate in the party-list system on the same basis as
other marginalized and under-represented sectors. Discrimination based on sexual orientation
is not tolerated ---not by our own laws nor by any international laws to which we adhere.

The Paquete Habana

Citation. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 20 S. Ct. 290, 44 L. Ed. 320, 1900 U.S. LEXIS
1714 (U.S. Jan. 8, 1900)

Brief Fact Summary. The argument of the fishermen whose vessels was seized by the U.S
(P) officials was that international law exempted coastal fishermen from capture as prizes of
war.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. The argument of the fishermen whose vessels was seized by the
U.S (P) officials was that international law exempted coastal fishermen from capture as prizes
of war.

Facts. This appeal of a district court decree, which condemned two fishing vessels and their
cargoes as prizes of war, was brought by the owners (D) of two separate fishing vessels. Each

12
of the vessel running in and out of Havana and sailing under the Spanish flag was a fishing
smack which regularly engaged in fishing on the coast of Cuba. Inside the vessels were fresh
fish which the crew had caught.
The owners of the vessels were not aware of the existence of a war until they were stopped
by U.S. (P) squadron. No incriminating material like arms were found on the fishermen and
they did not make any attempt to run the blockade after learning of its existence not did they
resist their arrest. When the owners (D) appealed, they argued that both customary
international law and writings of leading international scholars recognized an exemption from
seizure at wartime of coastal fishing vessels.

Issue. Are coastal fishing vessels with their cargoes and crews excluded from prizes of war?

Held. (Gray, J.). Yes. Coastal fishing vessels with their cargoes and crews are excluded from
prizes of war. The doctrine that exempts coastal fishermen with their vessels and crews from
capture as prizes of war has been known by the U.S. (P) from the time of the War of
Independence and has been recognized explicitly by the French and British governments. It
is an established rule of international law that coastal fishing vessels with their equipment
and supplies, cargoes and crews, unarmed and honestly pursuing their peaceful calling of
catching and bringing in fish are exempt from capture as prizes of war. Reversed.

Discussion. Chief Justice Fuller who had a dissenting opinion which was not published in this
casebook argued that the captured vessels were of such a size and range as to not fall within
the exemption. He further argued that the exemption in any case had not become a customary
rule of international law, but was only an act of grace that had not been authorized by the
President.

NORTH SEA CONTINENTAL SHELF CASE

Germany v Denmark and the Netherlands [1969] ICJ 1 (also known as The North Sea
Continental Shelf cases) were a series of disputes that came to the International Court of
Justice in 1969. They involved agreements among Denmark, Germany, and the Netherlands
regarding the "delimitation" of areas—rich in oil and gas—of the continental shelf in
the North Sea.

Germany's North Sea coast is concave, while the Netherlands' and Denmark's coasts are
convex. If the delimitation had been determined by the equidistance rule ("drawing a line
each point of which is equally distant from each shore"), Germany would have received a
smaller portion of the resource-rich shelf relative to the two other states. Thus Germany
argued that the length of the coastlines be used to determine the delimitation. [1] Germany
wanted the ICJ to apportion the Continental Shelf to the proportion of the size of the state's
adjacent land, which Germany found to be 'a just and equitable share', and not by the rule
of equidistance.
Relevant is that Denmark and The Netherlands, having ratified the 1958 Geneva Continental
Shelf Convention, whereas the Federal Republic of Germany did not, wished that Article 6,
p. 2 (equidistance principle) were to be applied.
Article 6

1. Where the same continental shelf is adjacent to the territories of two or more States
whose coasts are opposite each other, the boundary of the continental shelf
appertaining to such States shall be determined by agreement between them. In the

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 absence of agreement, and unless another boundary line is justified by special
circumstances, the boundary is the median line, every point of which is equidistant
from the nearest points of the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea
of each State is measured.
2. Where the same continental shelf is adjacent to the territories of two adjacent
States, the boundary of the continental shelf shall be determined by agreement
between them. In the absence of agreement, and unless another boundary line is
justified by special circumstances, the boundary shall be determined by application
of the principle of equidistance from the nearest points of the baselines from which
the breadth of the territorial sea of each State is measured.
3. In delimiting the boundaries of the continental shelf, any lines which are drawn in
accordance with the principles set out in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this article should be
defined with reference to charts and geographical features as they exist at a
particular date, and reference should be made to fixed permanent identifiable points
on the land.

Judgment An important question the Court answered was if the equidistance principle was,
at the date of the ruling, a customary international law binding on all States. The Court
argued that it is indeed possible for Conventions, while only contractual in origin, to pass
into the corpus of international law, and thus become binding for countries which have
never become parties to the Convention. However, the Court notes that 'this result is not
lightly to be regarded as having been attained' (para 71). For the aforegoing to happen, it
would first be necessary that the provision should be of a fundamentally norm creating
character, i.e. a general rule of law. In casu, the obligation of the equidistance method
came second, after the primary obligation to effect delimitation by agreement. The court
decides this is an unusual preface for it to be a general rule of law. Furthermore, the Court
took in notion that the scope and meaning relating to the equidistance as embodied in
Article 6 remained unclear. In para 74, the Court argues that while the passage of any
considerable period of time is not a requirement, it is an indispensable requirement that
within the period in question State practice should have been both extensive and virtually
uniform in the sense of the provision invoked.
Moreover, as stated in para 77, the practice must also, as a subjective element, stem from
a notion of opinio juris sive necessitatis. In other words, the States concerned must feel
they are conforming to what amounts to a legal obligation.
The Court ultimately urged the parties to "abat[e] the effects of an incidental special feature
[Germany's concave coast] from which an unjustifiable difference of treatment could result."
In subsequent negotiations, the states granted to Germany most of the additional shelf it
sought.[2] The cases are viewed as an example of "equity praeter legem"—that is, equity
"beyond the law"—when a judge supplements the law with equitable rules necessary to
decide the case at hand.[3]

History as a Legal Argument – The Naulilaa Case (1928)

The question about the historical relation between international law and colonialism (and its
legacy) has grown in relevance over the last twenty-odd years. Critical scholars speak of
international law’s “complete complicity with the colonial project” – meaning the exploitation
and domination of the global south. They point to the ‘dark side’ of the promises of ‘order’,
‘equality’, and ‘(world) peace’ inherent in the enlightened idea of the ius gentium europaeum.

It is important to point out that nineteenth-century contemporaries were already well aware
of the relation between international law and colonialism but they did not look at it from a

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moral perspective. For some the connection between international law and the colonial
undertakings of their time was at the heart of the legal development of the international order.
Political Scientist Jesse S. Reeves reminded his readers in 1909: “Protectorates, spheres of
influence, hinterlands, the position of savage and semi-civilized tribes, nominal and effective
possession, territorial lease” – all these terms and the attempts to define them grew out of
the academic and political discussions that began not later than 1884/85, when the Berlin
Conference, which was concerned with the legal principles of the colonization of the Congo
region, was held.

If (public) international law is also about the avoidance (and regulation) of disputes between
states, the terminology used by Reeves is a frank reminder that European governments had
for centuries been in constant disagreement about the precise definition and delimitation of
these “protectorates”, “semi-civilized tribes” etc. The ius gentium europaeum in an extra-
European context was thus not only about the denigration of “uncivilized nations” and the
denial of the advantages of sovereignty to them, but also about the (attempted) exclusion of
European competitors from the colonial realms. A quick glance at the Reports of International
Arbitration Awards (RIAA) should convince anyone of the legal, but most of all
the factual complexities that led to numerous European interstate disputes about colonial
territories and their inhabitants.

One of the better-known of these European colonial disputes is the so-called Naulilaa-affair.
The factual and procedural backgrounds of the Portuguese-German border war in the colony
of Angola in late 1914 have frequently been summarized in various handbooks of international
law. In 1914 three German officers were killed in the Angolan fortress of Naulila. Subsequently
German colonial troops from neighbouring German Southwest Africa (GSWA) attacked and
destroyed six Portuguese border fortresses inside Angola in what they described as “reprisal”.
If we look at the Naulilaa-case from 1928, we will notice that the text of the award is almost
entirely concerned with factual consideration about what had happened in the Angolan
fortress of Naulila (Naulilaa is a misspelling that occurred in the award of 1928 and that was
accepted henceforth in all international treatises and awards). Faced with Portuguese claims
for damages against Germany after World War I, the three Swiss arbitrators in their ‘wie es
eigentlich gewesen-approach’ weighted the plausibility of the presentations, evidences, and
explanations given to them by the disputing parties in four legal memoranda, over twenty
hearings of eye witnesses in Africa and Europe and the pleadings of the Portuguese and
German national representatives. The transcripts add up to several thousand pages. Many of
the Portuguese statements show a marked tendency to focus on the big picture, that is, on
German expansionism in Africa and around the world since 1870. What I take to be of
particular relevance for legal historical research is the following: During the arbitration
procedure, while trying to expose the causes of the dispute (or refuting the adversary’s
position), the national representatives basically acted as historians. Naturally, the lawyers
had clear aims when they accused the other party of wrong-doing by referring to certain
“events” in the past (while not mentioning others) to further their legal argument. If the
arbitration case was—in a way—a continuation of the war by other means, then history – not
law – became its foremost weapon. This, however, meant that ‘the past’ was seen through
the necessities of ‘the present’ in order to support an argument and win the case. This actually
was a well-proven ‘legal’ tactic especially for Portugal. The Portuguese government had
previously won several arbitration cases over colonial territories (Bolama 1870, Delagoa
Bay 1875) in which historical claims to the territories played a decisive role. In these disputes
the legal, that is, the dogmatic, underpinnings were quite thin so that these ‘legal’ debates
were in fact of ‘historical’ nature. I argue that if we look at these cases today, our
interpretation should be guided by this insight. As legal historian Martti Koskenniemi rightfully
underlines: “[M]ethodological concerns” for dealing with the past could not be expected. In

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the inter-war era, this was certainly a permissible strategy of ‘using’ history, since, “[f]rom
the outset, [international law’s] self-understanding was historically informed.”

In my book I am arguing that the ‘constructive’ character of the international legal order
becomes more evident by looking at the history of individual cases that are nowadays seen
as landmark cases in public international law (cases like Caroline, Alabama
Claims, Naulilaa, Corfu Channel, which are familiar to all students of international law) than
by the all too common and narrow focus on the resulting awards. These awards are way too
often condensed to a few ‘bullet points’. The Naulilaa-case is usually connected with the
requirements of a lawful (forceful) reprisal: 1) A prior act contrary to international law; 2) an
unsatisfied demand for reparation to the alleged wrongdoer; 3) the proportionality of the
reprisal. The arbitrators held that these requirements were not met by Germany when it
attacked the Portuguese fortresses in 1914.

Aside from the results of the arbitration, we should ask: Why were certain historical ‘facts’
taken into consideration by the arbitrators and others not? What was accepted as ‘a fact’ of
history and what was not? For instance, would the outcome of the arbitration have been
different if the disputed and unclear course of the Luso-German border along the Cunene
River had been taken into consideration? Why were German attempts to contact the Angolan
authorities deemed insufficient? The award does not give reasons for these decisions. Finally:
What role did the historical colonial context play? In their award, the arbitrators abstained
from using any notion of the colonies as a lawless space or a ‘laboratory’ that would have
exotizingly justified the use of relentless violence (against Europeans). The award in fact
underlined that the norms of international law were ‘universal’ and consequently binding for
governments even in the colonies. The fact that the case arose out of a ‘colonial dispute’ did
not hinder it from developing into a landmark case in international law. Also, it was of no
relevance that the dispute had taken place in Africa between GSWA and Angola – and not, for
example, between Germany and Belgium.

By asking these questions about the historical ‘why’ and ‘how’ of the legal procedures
researchers get beyond the mere bullet points of the interstate arbitration awards. Archival
findings can bring to the fore and make us aware of the pitfalls of historical ‘facts’. More
historical research is needed to open the black box and shed light on how ‘history’ has been
transformed by lawyers into ‘international law’.

AIR SVS. AGREEMENT CASE (France v United States)

FACTS:

The parties, through a 1946 bilateral Agreement, provided for civil air flights between
France and the US. Pan American Airlines later on announced its resumption of a west coast
London-Paris service, but with a change of gauge in London. France and US are in
disagreement regarding the change of gauge, thus this case for arbitration.

PETITIONER France: Argues that this change of gauge was contrary to the 1946
Agreement, which prohibited changes of gauge within the territory of the two parties.
France then agreed and signed a compromise after the US proposed that the dispute be
referred to an arbitration

RESPONDENT Pan American still continued to operate the service despite the objections
of France. However, passengers were not allowed to disembark on Paris. Due to this, Pan
American suspended its flights. Thus, as a countermeasure, and contrary to the 1946

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Agreement, issued an order under its C.A.B. Economic Regulations prohibiting flights by
French designated carriers to the US west coast from Paris via Montreal. This is to remain
effective until the French ban on Pan American flights is lifted. However, the ban was not
implemented because of the signing of the compromise.

ISSUE:

Whether or not in international law, the US was entitled to take the action that it took
immediately prior to the signing of the compromise.

HELD:

If in one State’s view, if one State is seen to be in violation of an international obligation,

the former is entitled, within the limits set by the general rules of international law
pertaining to the use of armed force, to affirm its rights through “counter-measures”
Counter-measures aim to restore equality between parties and to encourage them to
continue negotiations with mutual desire to reach and acceptable solution, and should be
used with a spirit of great moderation and be accompanied by a genuine effort at resolving
the dispute. Even if arbitration under Article X of the Agreement is set in motion unilaterally,
implementation may take time, and during this period [i.e. before a compromise is
concluded], counter-measures are not excluded; a State resorting to such measures,
however, must do everything in its power to expedite the arbitration. This is exactly what
the Government of the United States has done.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION:

THE ARBITRAL TRIBUNAL DECIDES, unanimously, that the answer to be given … is that,
under the circumstances in question, the Government of the United States had the right to
undertake the action that it undertook under Part 213 of the Economic Regulations of the
C.A.B.

ANGLO-NORWEGIAN FISHERIES CASE, ICJ REPORTS 1951

Since 1911 British trawlers had been seized and condemned for violating measures taken by
the Norwegian government specifying the limits within which fishing was prohibited to
foreigners. In 1935, a decree was adopted establishing the lines of delimitation of the
Norwegian fisheries zone.

On 24th September 1949 the government of the United Kingdom filed the registry of the
international court of justice an application instituting proceedings against Norway. The
subject of the proceeding was the validity, under international law, of the lines of
delimitation of the Norwegian fisheries zone as set forth in a Decree of 12th July 1935.

The application referred to the declaration by which the united Kingdom and Norway had
accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice in accordance with
article 36 (2) of its statute.

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The parties involved in this case were Norway and the United Kingdom, of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland. The implementation of the Royal Norwegian Decree of the 1935 was met
with resistance from the United Kingdom. The decree covers the drawing of straight lines,
called “baselines” 4 miles deep into the sea. This 4 miles area is reserved fishing exclusive
for Norwegian nationals. Under article 36(2) both UK and Norway were willing to accept the
jurisdiction of the ICJ on this case and with no appeal. The issues that constitute the case
were submitted to the court and the arguments presented by both countries. The issues
claims the court to: declare the principles of international law applicable in defining the
baselines by reference to which Norwegian government was entitled to delimit a fisheries
zone and exclusively reserved to its nationals; and to define the said “base lines” in the light
of the arguments of the parties in order to avoid further legal difference; and secondly to
award damages to the government of the United Kingdom in respect of all interferences by
the Norwegian authorities with British fishing vessels outside the fisheries zone, which in
accordance with ICJ’s decision, the Norwegian government may be entitled to reserve for its
nationals.

The United Kingdom argued that;

 Norway could only draw straight lines across bays

 The length of lines drawn on the formations of the Skaergaard fjord must not exceed
10 nautical miles( the 10 Mile rule)
 That certain lines did not follow the general direction of the coast or did not follow it
sufficiently , or they did not respect certain connection of sea and land separating
them
 That the Norwegian system of delimitation was unknown to the British and lack the
notoriety to provide the basis of historic title enforcement upon opposable to by the
United Kingdom

The Kingdom of Norway argued;

 That the base lines had to be drawn in such a way as to respect the general direction
of the coast and in a reasonable manner.

The case was submitted to the International Court of Justice by the government of the
United Kingdom. The government of United Kingdom wants the ICJ to declare the validity of
the base lines under international law and receive compensation for damages caused by
Norwegian authorities as to the seizures of British Fishing vessels.

The judgment of the court first examines the applicability of the principles put forward by
the government of the UK, then the Norwegian system, and finally the conformity of that
system with international law. The first principle put forward by the UK is that the baselines
must be low water mark, this indeed is the criterion generally adopted my most states and
but differ as to its application. (Johnson 154). The court considered the methods of drawing
the lines but, the court rejected the “trace Parallele” which consists of drawing the outer
limits of the belt following the coast and all its sinuosity. The court also rejected the “courbe
tangent” (arcs of a circle) and it is not obligatory under international law to use these
methods of drawing the lines. The court also paid particular attention to the geographical
aspect of the case. The geographical realities and historic control of the Norwegian coast
inevitably contributed to the final decision by the ICJ. The coast of Norway is too indented
and is an exception under international law from the 3 miles territorial waters rule. The
fjords, Sunds along the coastline which have the characteristic of a bay or legal straits
should be considered Norwegian for historical reasons that the territorial sea should be

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measured from the line of low water mark. So it was agreed on the outset of both parties
and the court that Norway had the right to claim a 4 mile belt of territorial sea. The court
concluded that it was the outer line of the Skaergaard that must be taken into account in
admitting the belt of the Norwegian territorial waters. (Johnson 154- 158). “There is one
consideration not to be overlooked, the scope of which extends beyond geographical
factors. That of certain economic interests peculiar to a region, the reality and importance of
which are clearly evidenced by a long usage” (Johnson 160)

The law relied upon mainly international Law of the sea; how far a state can modify its
territorial waters and its control over it, exclusively reserving fishing for its nationals. In this
case, rules that are practiced for instance how long a baseline should be. Only a 10 mile
long straight line is allowed and this has been the practice by most states however it is
different in the case of Norway because of Norway’s geographic indentation, islands and
islets.

The international customary law has been a law of reference in the court arguments. Judge
Read from Canada asserts that Customary international law does not recognize the rule
according to which belts of territorial waters of coastal states is to be measured. More so
public international law has been relied upon in this case. It regulates relation between
states; the United Kingdom and Norway.

Maritime Law

Coastline Rule

The judgment was rendered in favor of Norway on the 18th December 1951. By 10 votes to
2 the court held that the method employed in the delimitation of the fisheries zone by the
Royal Norwegian decree of the 12th July 1935 is not contrary to international law. By 8
votes to 4 votes the court also held that the base lines fixed by this decree in application are
not contrary to international law. However there are separate opinions and dissenting
opinions from the judges in the court.

Judge Hackworth declared that he concurred with the operative part of the judgment
because he considered that the Norwegian government had proved the existence of historic
title of the disputed areas of water.

Judge Alvarez from Chile relied on the evolving principles of the law of nations applicable to
the law of the sea.

 States have the right to modify the extent of the of their territorial sea
 Any state directly concerned may object to another state’s decision as to the extent
of its territorial sea
 International status of bays and straits must be determined by the coastal state
directly concerned with due regard to the general interest and
 Historic rights and concept of prescription in international law.

Judge Hsu Mo from china opinions diverge from the court’s with regards to conformity with
principles of international law to the straight lines drawn by the Decree of 1935. He allowed
possibility in certain circumstances, for instance, belt measured at low tide, Norway’s
geographic and historic conditions. But drawing the straight lines as of the 1935 degree is a
moving away from the practice of the general rule. (Johnson 171)

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The dissenting opinions from judge McNair rested upon few rules of law of international
waters. Though there are exceptions, in case of bays, the normal procedure to calculate
territorial waters in from the land, a line which follows the coastline. Judge McNair rejected
the argument upon which Norway based its decree including:

 Protecting Norway’s economic and other social interests

 The UK should not be precluded from objecting the Norwegian system embodied in
the Decree because previous acquiescence in the system and
 An historic title allowing the state to acquire waters that would otherwise have the
status of deep sea. Judge McNair concluded that the 1935 decree is not compatible
with international law.(Johnson173)

Furthermore, Judge Read from Canada was unable to concur with parts of the judgment.
Read rejected justification by Norway for enlarging her maritime domain and seizing and
condemning foreign ships (Johnson 173);

 Sovereignty of the coastal state is not the basis for Norway to claim 4 mile belt from
straight base lines
 Customary international law does not recognize the rule according to which belts of
territorial waters of coastal states is to be measured.
 Norwegian system cannot be compatible with international law.

Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company Ltd, (Belgium v. Spain)

Citation. I.C.J. 1970 I.C.J. 3.

Brief Fact Summary. Belgium (P) claimed Spain (D) should be held accountable for the
injury to a Canadian corporation operating in Spain.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. A state assumes an obligation concerning the treatment of

foreign investments based on general international law, once the state admits foreign
investments or foreign nationals into its territory.

Facts. On behalf of Belgian nationals (P) who had invested in a Canadian corporation,
Belgium (P) sued Spain (D) on the premise that Spain (D) was responsible for acts in
violation of international law that had caused injury to the Canadian corporation and its
Belgian shareholders (P).

Issue. Does a state assumes an obligation concerning the treatment of foreign investments
based on general international law, once the state admits foreign investments or foreign
nationals into its territory?

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Held. Yes. A state assumes an obligation concerning the treatment of foreign investments
based on general international law, once the state admits foreign investments or foreign
nationals into its territory. It is highly imperative to draw a distinction between those
obligations of a state toward the international community as a whole and those arising from
the field of diplomatic protection. It is only the party to whom an international obligation is
due can bring a claim if a breach of an obligation that is the subject of diplomatic protection
occurs.

Discussion. The basic right of all human persons was mentioned by the Court to be
protected against slavery and racial discrimination as deriving from basic general
international law. Such rights may derive from international instruments of a universal or
quasi-universal character. Such obligations are obligations erga omnes, that is, all states
have a legal interest in their protection.

Government of Hongkong v. Olalia, 521 SCRA 470 (2007)

Facts

Private respondent Muñoz was charged before Hong Kong Court. Warrants of arrest were
issued and by virtue of a final decree the validity of the Order of Arrest was upheld. The
petitioner Hong Kong Administrative Region filed a petition for the extradition of the private
respondent. In the same case, a petition for bail was filed by the private respondent.

The petition for bail was denied by reason that there was no Philippine law granting the
same in extradition cases and that the respondent was a high “flight risk”. Private
respondent filed a motion for reconsideration and was granted by the respondent judge
subject to the following conditions:

1. Bail is set at Php750,000.00 in cash with the condition that accused hereby undertakes
that he will appear and answer the issues raised in these proceedings and will at all times
hold himself amenable to orders and processes of this Court, will further appear for
judgment. If accused fails in this undertaking, the cash bond will be forfeited in favor of the
government;

2. Accused must surrender his valid passport to this Court;

3. The Department of Justice is given immediate notice and discretion of filing its own
motion for hold departure order before this Court even in extradition proceeding; and

4. Accused is required to report to the government prosecutors handling this case or if they
so desire to the nearest office, at any time and day of the week; and if they further desire,
manifest before this Court to require that all the assets of accused, real and personal, be
filed with this Court soonest, with the condition that if the accused flees from his
undertaking, said assets be forfeited in favor of the government and that the corresponding
lien/annotation be noted therein accordingly.

Petitioner filed a motion to vacate the said order but was denied by the respondent judge.
Hence, this instant petition.

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Issue

WON a potential extraditee is entitled to post bail

Ruling

A potential extraditee is entitled to bail.

Ratio Decidendi

Petitioner alleged that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction in admitting private respondent to bail; that there is nothing in the
Constitution or statutory law providing that a potential extraditee has a right to bail, the
right being limited solely to criminal proceedings.

On the other hand, private respondent maintained that the right to bail guaranteed under
the Bill of Rights extends to a prospective extraditee; and that extradition is a harsh process
resulting in a prolonged deprivation of one’s liberty.

In this case, the Court reviewed what was held in Government of United States of America
v. Hon. Guillermo G. Purganan, Presiding Judge, RTC of Manila, Branch 42, and Mark B.
Jimenez, a.k.a. Mario Batacan Crespo GR No. 153675 April 2007, that the constitutional
provision on bail does not apply to extradition proceedings, the same being available only in
criminal proceedings. The Court took cognizance of the following trends in international law:

(1) the growing importance of the individual person in public international;

(2) the higher value now being given to human rights;

(3) the corresponding duty of countries to observe these universal human rights in fulfilling
their treaty obligations; and

(4) the duty of this Court to balance the rights of the individual under our fundamental law,
on one hand, and the law on extradition, on the other.

In light of the recent developments in international law, where emphasis is given to the
worth of the individual and the sanctity of human rights, the Court departed from the ruling
in Purganan, and held that an extraditee may be allowed to post bail.

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