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Tanada v Tuvera
G.R. No. L-63915 (146 SCRA 446) April 24, 1985

CITATION: L-63915, April 24, 1985| 136 SCRA 27

Tañada vs. Tuvera

FACTS: Petitioners seek a writ of mandamus in compelling respondent FACTS:

public officials to publish and/ or cause the publication in the Official Petitioners sought a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public
Gazette of various presidential decrees, letter of instructions, general officials to publish, and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of
orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders,
administrative orders.
proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and
administrative orders, invoking the right to be informed on matters of
The general rule in seeking writ of mandamus is that it “would be granted public concern as recognized by the 1973 constitution.

to a private individual only in those cases where he has some private or

particular interest to be subserved, or some particular right to be
protected, independent of that which he holds with the public at large,"
and "it is for the public officers exclusively to apply for the writ when
public rights are to be subserved”.
enforcement.
ISSUE: Whether or not the publication of presidential decrees, letters of
instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of
implementation and administrative orders is necessary before its

The legal capacity of a private citizen was recognized by court to make RULING: Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that “laws shall take effect
the said petition for the reason that the right sought to be enforced by after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the
petitioners herein is a public right recognized by no less than the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided ” The Court has ruled that
fundamental law of the land.
publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in those cases where the
legislation itself does not provide for its effectivity date-for then the date
ISSUE:  Whether publication in the Official Gazette is still required of publication is material for determining its date of effectivity, which is
considering the clause in Article 2 “unless otherwise provided”.
the fifteenth day following its publication-but not when the law itself
provides for the date when it goes into effect. Article 2 does not preclude
HELD: “Unless it is otherwise provided” refers to the date of effectivity the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself
and not with the publication requirement which cannot be omitted as provides for the date of its effectivity.

public needs to be notified for the law to become effective.     The The publication of all presidential issuances “of a public nature” or “of
necessity for the publication in the Official Gazette of all unpublished general applicability” is mandated by law. Obviously, presidential decrees
presidential issuances which are of general application, was affirmed by that provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties for their violation or
the court on April 24, 1985.  This is necessary to provide the general otherwise impose a burden or. the people, such as tax and revenue
public adequate notice of the various laws which regulate actions and measures, fall within this category. Other presidential issuances which
conduct as citizens.  Without this, there would be no basis for Art 3 of apply only to particular persons or class of persons such as
the Civil Code “Ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance administrative and executive orders need not be published on the
therewith”.   
assumption that they have been circularized to all concerned.

Publication is, therefore, mandatory.

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the

Official Gazette all unpublished presidential issuances which are of
general application, and unless so published, they shall have no binding
force and effect.

Roy v. CA
 Respondent contented that CMO 27-2003 was issued without
Facts: The petitioners owned a firewall that had weakened and collapsed
on the tailoring shop owned by the private respondents, causing injuries
and death to Marissa Bernal, a daughter. The RTC ruled that the
petitioners were guilty of gross negligence and awarded damages to
respondents. The petitioners appealed to the CA, but the latter affirmed
the decision of the RTC. A copy of the decision of the CA was received
by the petitioners on August 25, 1987. On September 9, 1987, the last
day of the fifteen-day period to file an appeal, the petitioners asked the
CA to extend the time to file a motion for reconsideration. According to a
previous case, Habaluyas Enterprises, Inc. v. Japzon, the fifteen-day
following the mandate of the Revised Administrative Code on public
participation, prior notice, and publication or registration with University
of the Philippines Law Canter. Respondent also alleged that the
regulation summarily adjudged it to be a feed grade supplier without the
benefit of prior assessment and examination, despite having imported
food grade wheat, it would be subjected to the 7% tariff upon the arrival
of the shipment, forcing to pay 133%. Respondent also claimed that the
equal protection clause of the Constitution was violated and asserted
that the retroactive application of the regulation was confiscatory in
nature.

period  for appealing or for filing a motion for reconsideration cannot be Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss. They alleged that: 1. The
extended. The petitioners contend that the case of Habaluyas could not RTC did not have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case, 2. an
be made binding because it has not been published in the Official action for declaratory relief (Rule 63, Sec.1 “who may file petition”) was
Gazette at the time the CA promulgated its decision.
improper, 3. CMO 27-2003 was internal administrative rule not legislative
in nature, and 4. The claims of respondent were speculative and
ISSUE: Is the ruling on an unpublished case binding?
premature, because the Bureau of Customs had yet to examine
respondent’s products.

RULING: Yes. There is no law requiring the publication of a Supreme RTC held that a petition for declaratory relief was proper remedy,
Court decision for it to be binding and effective. The counsel of the and that respondent was the proper party to file it.

petitioners should be responsible for keeping abreast with Supreme

Court decisions as a lawyer.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CMO 27-2003 of the petitioner met the
requirements for the Revised Administrative Code? Whether or not the
COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS and the DISTRICT COLLECTOR OF content of the CMO 27-2003 met the requirement of the equal protection
THE PORT OF SUBIC (Petitioner) clause of the Constitution?

VS
HYPERMIX FEEDS CORPORATION (Respondent) RULING: No, they did not. The petitioners violated respondents’ right to
due process in the issuance of CMO 27-2003 when they failed to
FACTS: November 7 2003, petitioner Commissioner of Customs issued observe the requirements under the Administrative Code which are:

CMO 27-2003 (Customs Memorandum Order). Under the memorandum,
for tariff purposes, wheat is classified according to: 1. Importer or
consignee, 2. Country of origin, and 3. Port of discharge. Depending on
these factors wheat would be classified as either as food grade or food
feed. The corresponding tariff for food grade wheat was 3%, for food
Sec 3. Filing. (1) Every agency shall file with the University of the
Philippines Law Center three (3) certified copies of every rule adopted by
it. Rules in force on the date of effectively of this Code which are not filed
within three (3) months from that date shall not thereafter be the bases of
any sanction against any party of persons.

feed grade 7%. A month after the issuance of CMO 27-200 respondent Sec 9. Public Participation. - (1) If not otherwise required by law,
filed a petition for declaratory for Relief with the Regional Trial Court of an agency shall, as far as practicable, publish or circulate notices
Las Piñas City.
of proposed rules and afford interested parties the opportunity to
submit their views prior to the adoption of any rule. (2) In the

fixing of rates, no rule or final order shall be valid unless the
proposed rates shall have been published in a newspaper of
general circulation at least 2 weeks before the first hearing
thereon.(3) In case of opposition, the rules on contested cases
shall be observed.
NMSMI and WBLOAI filed Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules
No. CMO 27-2003 did not meet these requirements. For a classification
to be reasonable, it must be shown that  1. it rests on substantial
distinctions; 2. it is germane to the purpose of the law; 3. it is not limited
to existing conditions only; and 4. it applies equally to all members of the
same class. Petitioners violated respondents right to equal protection of
laws when they provided for unreasonable classification in the
application of the regulation. Petitioner Commissioner of Customs went
beyond his powers of delegated authority when the regulation limited the
powers of the customs officer to examine and assess imported articles.
relation thereto, Article 2 of the Civil Code expressly provides: ART. 2.
NMSM v. Military Shrine
DOCTRINE: We agree that the publication must be in full or it is no
publication at all since its purpose is to inform the public of the contents
of the laws.
Official Gazette, the handwritten addendum of President Marcos
FACTS: By virtue of Proclamation 423, Former President Carlos P. Garcia
reserved parcels of land in the Municipalities of Pasig, Taguig,
Paranaque, Province of Rizal and Pasay City for military reservation.
Later on, Former President Marcos issued a proclamation amending
such publication, which excludes certain area of the reserved land.
Again, President Marcos issued Proclamation No. 2476 that further
amended the proclamation that excluded the barangays of Lower
Bicutan, Upper Bicutan and Signal Village and a handwritten addendum
which includes Western Bicutan for the disposition of the area. The
proclamation was published in the Official Gazette without the
handwritten addendum. Demolition of illegal structures existed to prevent
the area from the increasing number of informal settlers. Members of
petitioner Nagkakaisang Maralita ng Sitio Masigasig, Inc. (NMSMI) and
Western Bicutan Lot Owners Association, Inc. (WBLOAI) filed for a
Petition with Commission on Settlement of Land Problems (COSLAP)
praying for the reclassification of the areas they are occupying as is
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already alienable and disposable. COSLAP ruled that the handwritten
addendum of President Marcos was not published thus the areas
occupied by the petitioners are in question alienable and disposable.
 
of Court.
 
ISSUE: Did the handwritten addendum of President Marcos have the
force and effect of law though it was not included in the publication?
 
RULING: NO, the handwritten addendum of President Marcos did not
have the force and effect law since it was not included in the publication.
We agree that the publication must be in full or it is no publication at all
since its purpose is to inform the public of the contents of the laws. In
Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their
publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. This
Code shall take effect one year after such publication. Under the above
provision, the requirement of publication is indispensable to give effect to
the law, unless the law itself has otherwise provided. 
In the case at bar, though Proclamation No. 2476 was published in an
declaring the Western Bicutan as alienable and disposable was not
included.
Therefore, without publication, the handwritten addendum of President
Marcos never had any legal force and effect.
ACAAC v. AZCUNA
A petition for review on Certiorari assailing the ruling of the Court of
Appeals. The case lasted 11 years.
SUMMARY. The petitioners filed an action praying for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order, injunction, and damages against the
respondents, alleging that they have prior vested rights to occupy and
utilize Capayas Island, while also assailing the validity of the subject
ordinance adopted by the respondents that prohibits entry and building
of structures in the disputed property. The case was about the validity of
the subject ordinance as questioned by the petitioners, based on

grounds of adoption without public consultation, publication, and
approval by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan.
before the subject ordinance was passed.
MAIN DOCTRINE. In accordance with the presumption of validity in
favor of an ordinance, their constitutionality or legality should be upheld
in the absence of evidence showing that the procedure prescribed by law
was not observed in their enactment. We also have a right to assume
that officials have done that which the law requires them to do, in the
absence of positive proof to the contrary.
HELD: Yes. Section 56 of the LGC (d) provides that, “if no action has
FACTS: The petitioner, Ramonito O. Acaac, was the founder of the NGO
called PETAL. PETAL built cottages on Capayas Island, which it rented
out to the public and became the source of livelihood of its beneficiaries.
petitioners maintain the subject ordinance cannot be deemed approved
On April 11 and May 20, 2002, respondents Mayor Melquiades D.
Azcuna, Jr. and Building Official Marietes B. Bonalos issued separate
Notices of Illegal Construction against PETAL, ordering it to stop all
illegal activities on the island due to the absence of a building permit.
There was a third and final notice sent on July 8, 2002 but the same
remained unheeded.
of Republic Act No. 7160 or “The Local Government Code” required the
On the same date, the Sangguniang Bayan of Lopez Jaena adopted a
subject ordinance, which prohibited the entry of any entity and the
construction of any structures in the area of Capayas Island which Mayor
Azcuna, Jr, adopted on July 12, 2002. On August 23, 2002, a Notice of
Voluntary Demolition was served upon PETAL directing it to remove the
structures it built since it was a violation of the subject ordinance.
evidence showing that the procedure prescribed by law was not
On October 29, 2002, petitioners filed an action against the respondents
before the RTC alleging that they have prior vested rights to occupy and
utilize Capayas Island, while also assailing the validity of the subject
ordinance on the grounds that it was adopted without public
consultation, it was not published in a newspaper of general circulation,
and it was not approved by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan.
NOTES: SB forwards the approved ordinance to SP within 3 days after
On November 26, 2004, the RTC declared the subject ordinance as
invalid/void on the same grounds that the petitioners laid down.
July 8, 2002 – SB adopted ordinance; July12, 2002 – Azcuna, Jr. adopted
On the contrary, according to the CA, the subject ordinance was deemed
approved 1 upon failure of the SP to declare the same invalid within 30
days. It also gave credence to the respondent that the subject ordinance
1 Section 56 of the Local Government Code
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was posted and published and that public consultations were conducted
The CA denied the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration on March 9,
2009. Thus, the instant petition.
ISSUES: Whether or not the subject ordinance is valid and enforceable
against petitioners
been taken by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan within 30 days after
submission of such an ordinance or resolution, the same shall be
presumed consistent with law and therefore valid.” In this case,
through the mere passage of time. It, however, bears to note that more
than 30 days have already elapsed from the time the subject ordinance
was submitted to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan for review by the
Sangguniang Bayan. Hence, it should be deemed approved and valid
pursuant to Section 56 (d) of the Local Government Code. While Sec. 59
main features of ordinances duly enacted or adopted be published in a
newspaper of general circulation, Petitioners failed to present any
evidence to show that no publication of the subject ordinance was made.
In accordance with the presumption of validity in favor of an ordinance,
their constitutionality or legality should be upheld in the absence of
observed in their enactment. Likewise, petitioners had the burden of
proving their own allegation, which they, however, failed to do. All told,
the Court finds on reversible error committed by the CA in upholding the
validity of the subject ordinance.
approval
ordinance; August 23, 2002 – respondents sent Notice of Voluntary
Demolition to petitioners (more than 30 days after the adoption of
ordinance, no action from SP).
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RTC added that the authority and control over Capayas Island belong to activities of the Government relative to energy exploration, development,
the DENR, but the appellate Court ruled that the Municipality of Lopez utilization, distribution, and conservation

Jaena was vested with sufficient power and authority to pass and adopt Oil Price Stabilization Fund (OPSF) – created under PD 1596 for the
the subject ordinance (Sec 447 in relation to Sec. 16 of the LGC).
purpose of minimizing frequent price changes of crude oil and petroleum

All the courts ruled that PETAL have no proprietary rights over the LOI No. 1431 – directed the utilization of the OPSF to reimburse oil
Capayas island due to absence of building permit and title.
companies the additional costs of importation of crude oil and petroleum

Petitioners had the burden of proving their own allegations.

LOI No. 1441 – mandated the Board of Energy to review and reset prices
We have a right to assume that officials have done that which the law of domestic products every two months to reflect the prevailing prices of
requires them to do, in the absence of positive proof to the contrary.
crude oil and petroleum

EO No. 137 – amended PD 1965, expanding the sources and utilization

of the OPSF

Republic v. Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corp.

The Office of Energy Affairs (now DOE) informed Pilipinas Shell that the
latter’s contributions to the OPSF were insufficient. The OEA Audit
SUMMARY: The OEA informed Pilipinas Shell that the latter’s
contributions to the OPSF were insufficient. As a consequence, a surcharge Taskforce noted an underpayment of 14M. As a consequence, a
was imposed upon Pilipinas Shell. The surcharge was imposed pursuant to a surcharge of 11M was imposed upon Pilipinas Shell. The surcharge was
Department of Finance Circular. Pilipinas Shell challenged this and refused imposed pursuant to a Department of Finance Circular. The Circular is
to pay the surcharges, claiming the payments it made were based on a valid
interpretation of a Department of Finance Order and Department of Energy the contested issuance in the case.

Circular. However, the DOE only reiterated its demand for Pilipinas Shell to The OEA wrote another letter to Pilipinas Shell, advising the latter of its
settle the surcharges due. The Office of the President affirmed the DOE. CA additional underpayment of the foreign exchange risk fee in the amount
reversed, ruling that the Department of Finance Circular was ineffective for of 10M. Additionally, a surcharge of 2M was imposed.

failure to comply with the requirement to file with ONAR. SC affirmed CA.
DOCTRINE: The requirements of publication and filing were put in place
as safeguards against abuses on the part of lawmakers, and as guarantees to
the constitutional right to due process and information on matters of public
concerns, and therefore, require strict compliance. Strict compliance with the
Pilipinas Shell wrote a letter to the OEA, justifying that its calculations for
the transactions (for which DOE claimed underpayment) were based on a
valid interpretation of a Department of Finance Order and a Department
of Energy Circular.

requirements of publication cannot be annulled by a mere allegation that Pilipinas Shell paid the OE the full principal amount, but not the
parties were notified of the existence of the implementing rules. surcharges.

The OEA wrote a letter to Pilipinas Shell, notifying it that it is required to

NOTE: Values are not exact. Also, the case used “Ministry” and pay the OPSF a total of P18M for surcharges on the late payment of
“Department” interchangeably in the case. I stuck with “Department” to foreign exchange risk charges.

avoid confusion. The DOE reiterated its demand for Pilipinas Shell to settle the surcharges
due, else, the DOE would proceed against Pilipinas Shell’s Irrevocable
FACTS:
Standby Letter of Credit to recover its unpaid surcharges.

Pilipinas Shell – corporation engaged in the business of refining oil, Pilipinas Shell filed a Notice of Appeal before the Office of the President.
marketing petroleum, and other related activities
The Office of the President affirmed the conclusion of the of the DOE.
Department of Energy – government agency under the direct control and While it admitted that the implementation of the Department of Finance
supervision of the Office of the President mandated to prepare, integrate, Circular was contingent upon its publication and filing with the ONAR,
coordinate, supervise, and control all plans, programs, projects, and Pilipinas Shell failed to adduce evidence of lack of compliance with such
requirements.

Pilipinas Shell’s Motion for Reconsideration was denied.

Official Gazette or in any newspaper of general circulation. Thus, failure
CA reversed and ruled that the Department of Finance Circular was to comply with the requirements of publication and filing render the
ineffective for failure to comply with the requirement to file with ONAR. Department of Finance Circular ineffective.

Even if the Circular was issued by then Acting Secretary of Finance long National Association of Electricity Consumers for Reforms v.
before the Administrative Code of 1987, Sec. 3 of Chapter 2, Book 7 Energy Regulatory Board – Both the requirements of publication and
thereof specifies that rules already in force on the date of the effectivity filing of administrative issuances intended to enforce existing laws are
of the Administrative Code must be filed within three months from the mandatory for the effectivity of said issuances.

date of the effectivity of the Code, otherwise, such rules cannot be the The Department of Energy insists that the registration of the
basis of any sanction.
Department of Finance Circular with the ONAR is no longer necessary
since Pilipinas Shell knew of its existence, despite its non-registration.
ISSUE: Did the Department of Finance Circular comply with the However, strict compliance with the requirements of publication cannot
requirements for publication and filing? NO
be annulled by a mere allegation that parties were notified of the
existence of the implementing rules. In National Association of Electricity
RATIO: Tañada v. Tuvera – All statutes shall be published as a condition Consumers for Reforms, the Court ruled that the fact that the parties
for their effectivity. Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and participated in the public consultation and submitted their respective
executive orders promulgated by the President in the exercise of comments is not compliance with the rule.

legislative powers whenever delegated by the legislature/ Constitution.
Administrative regulations must also be published if their purpose is to
enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation.
Order which reiterates the power of the Secretary of Finance to
Sec. 3, Chapter 2, Book 7, Administrative Code of 1987 – Rules
in force on the date of effectivity of this Code which are not filed within
three months from the date shall not thereafter be the basis of any
sanction against any party or persons.
ineffectivity of his administrative issuance for non-compliance with the
As per the Tañada ruling, the Department of Finance Circular is
The Department of Energy avers that the Department of Finance
Circular gains its vitality from the subsequent enactment of an Executive
promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to implement the
Executive Order. However, the power of the Secretary of Finance to
promulgate rules and regulations is not under dispute. The issue is the
requisite publication and filing.

one of those issuances which should have been published before

becoming effective since it is intended to enforce PD 1956. The circular RULING: CA affirmed. The Department of Finance Circular is ineffective.
should also comply with the requirement under Sec. 3, Chapter 2, Book
7 of the Administrative Code – filing with the ONAR in the University of
the Philippines Law Center – for rules that are already in force at the time Garcillano v. HoR
the Administrative Code became effective. These requirements of
publication and filing were put in place as safeguards against abuses on FACTS: During the hype of Arroyo administration, a new controversy
the part of lawmakers, and as guarantees to the constitutional right to arises. During the 2007 election the conversation of President Arroyo and
due process and information on matters of public concerns, and the herein petitioner Virgilio Garciliano, COMELEC regional director,
therefore, require strict compliance.
regarding the desire of the president to have a favourable outcome in
Here, the Certifications prove that the Department of Finance terms of his senatoriables. Such conversation was recorded and was
Circular and its amendatory rule have not been filed before said office. played during the house of representative investigation.  Because of such
Moreover, the Department of Energy was unable to controvert Pilipinas turn of events, a petition was filed before the court praying that such
Shell’s allegation that neither of the circulars were published in the

playing of the illegally seized communication was in violation of RA 4200
or the anti-wire tapping law.  Also such petition for injunction prays that
the Senate committee be prevented from further conducting such
investigation for the basic reason that there was no proper publication of
the senate rules, empowering them to make such investigation of the
unlawfully seized documents.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was proper publication of the rules as to
empower the senate to further proceed with their investigation?
support their claim of valid publication through the internet is all the more
HELD: No, the Supreme Court mentioned the following:
electronic document as the functional equivalent of a written document
The Senate cannot be allowed to continue with the conduct of the
questioned legislative inquiry without duly published rules of procedure,
in clear derogation of the constitutional requirement.
internet a medium for publishing laws, rules and regulations.
Section 21, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that "the
Senate or the House of Representatives, or any of its respective
committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with
its duly published rules of procedure." The requisite of publication of the
rules is intended to satisfy the basic requirements of due
process.Publication is indeed imperative, for it will be the height of
injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a
law or rule of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a
constructive one.What constitutes publication is set forth in Article 2 of
the Civil Code, which provides that "laws shall take effect after 15 days
following the completion of their publication either in the Official Gazette,
or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines."
  Such inquiry if allowed without observance of the required publication
Respondents justify their non-observance of the constitutionally
mandated publication by arguing that the rules have never been
amended since 1995 and, despite that, they are published in booklet
form available to anyone for free, and accessible to the public at the
Senate’s internet web page.
propounded.
The Court does not agree. The absence of any amendment to the rules
cannot justify the Senate’s defiance of the clear and unambiguous
language of Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution. The organic law
instructs, without more, that the Senate or its committees may conduct
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inquiries in aid of legislation only in accordance with duly published rules
of procedure, and does not make any distinction whether or not these
rules have undergone amendments or revision. The constitutional
mandate to publish the said rules prevails over any custom, practice or
tradition followed by the Senate.
The invocation by the respondents of the provisions of R.A. No.
8792,otherwise known as the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, to
incorrect. R.A. 8792 considers an electronic data message or an
only for evidentiary purposes.In other words, the law merely recognizes
the admissibility in evidence (for their being the original) of electronic
data messages and/or electronic documents.It does not make the
Given this discussion, the respondent Senate Committees, therefore,
could not, in violation of the Constitution, use its unpublished rules in the
legislative inquiry subject of these consolidated cases. The conduct of
inquiries in aid of legislation by the Senate has to be deferred until it shall
have caused the publication of the rules, because it can do so only "in
accordance with its duly published rules of procedure."
Indeed the inquiry to be conducted by the senate in aid of legislation
cannot proceed for the reason that the rules that they will observe was
not properly published as provided by the Fundamental Law of the land.
will put a person’s life, liberty and property at stake without due process
of law.   Also, the further assertion of the senate that they already
published such rules through their web page, in observance of the RA
8792 or the Electronic Commerce Act was only viewed by the court as
matter of evidence and still does not conforme with what the constitution
In this regard the high court granted the petition for injunction preventing
the senate to conduct such inquiry in aid of legislation.

IGNORANCE OF THE LAW
CATIPON vs JAPSON
The Facts: Macario Catipon Jr. (Petitioner), though lacking 1.5 units in
Military Science, was allowed to join the graduation ceremonies for B.S.
Criminology students of the Baguio Colleges Foundation, with a
restriction that he must cure the deficiency before he can be considered
a graduate.  He joined the Social Security System in 1985.  In September,
1993, he took the Civil Service Professional Examination (CSPE) on the
belief that the Civil Service Commission still allowed CSPE applicants to
substitute length of service government service for any academic
deficiency they may have, unaware that in January, 1993, the CSC had
issued Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular No. 42, Series of
1991 and Office Memo. No. 63, Series of 1992 which discontinued the
policy.  He took the CSPE tests on October 17, 1993, obtained a rating of
80.52% and was later promoted to Senior Analyst and OIC Branch Head
of the SSS.  He completed his 1.5 units deficiency in Military Science in
1995.
prejudicial to the best interest of the service; and that petitioner did not
In March, 2003, Jerome Japson (respondent) filed a letter-complaint with
the CSC-CAR Regional Director, alleging that Macario made deliberate
false entries in his CSPE application,  by stating therein that he
graduated in 1993, when he actually graduated only in 1995 after
removing his deficiency in Military Science.  As a non-graduate in 1993,
Macario was not qualified to take the CSPE examination, thus  Macario
was charged with Dishonesty, Falsification of Official documents, Grave
Misconduct and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service
by the CSC-CAR after preliminary investigation.  In his Answer, Macario
alleged good faith, lack of malice and honest mistake; he alleged that he
was of the honest belief that length of service may substitute academic
deficiency in taking the CSPE exam.
preserves civil service eligibility.
The CSC-CAR Regional Director, noting that all the entries in the
application form submitted by Macario for the CSPE exam were
typewritten, except for the entries on “Year Graduated”, “School Where
Graduated”, and “Degree Finished” ruled that Macario consciously
drafted the application form and meticulously prepared it before
submitting to the CSC.  But the pre-drafted application form showed
Macario’s confusion as to how the entries should be filled up; in sum, the
CSC-CAR Regional Director noted, Macario had tried to show the real
state of his educational attainment, mitigating his liability, and did not
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show a blatant disregard of an established rule or a clear intent to violate
the law.  Thus, the Regional Director exonerated him on all charges
except as to the charge for Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the
Service, where he was found guilty and penalized with suspension of six
months and one to one year.  Macario appealed to the Civil Service
Commission, after his motion for reconsideration was denied by the
CSC-CAR Regional Director.  To forestall his impending suspension,
Macario filed a Petition for Review to assail the CSC-CAR Regional
Director’s ruling, which the Court of Appeals denied.  It ruled that instead
of filing a Petition for Review directly with the CA, Macario should have
interposed an appeal to the Civil Service Commission pursuant to
Sections 5(A)(1), 43 and 49 of the CSC Uniform Rules on Administrative
Cases; by filing the petition directly with the CA, Macario violated the
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies; the absence of
deliberate intent or willful desire to defy or disregard established rules or
norms in the service does not preclude a finding of guilt for conduct
act with prudence and care, but instead was negligent, in the filling up of
his CSPE application form and in failing to verify beforehand the
requirements for the examination.  Macario elevated the case to the
Supreme Court.  He argues that he filed the petition for review in view of
his imminent suspension, and to prevent serious injury and damage to
him; that he should be completely exonerated from the charges against
him, since conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service must be
accompanied by deliberate intent or a willful desire to defy or disregard
established rules or norms in the service – which is absent in his case;
and that his career service professional eligibility should not be revoked
in the interest of justice and in the spirit of the policy which promotes and
The Issues: Whether or not Macario violated the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies;
Whether or not Macario should be held liable for conduct prejudicial
to the best interest of the service.
The Ruling:
The Court denies the Petition.
 \

Our fundamental law, particularly Sections 2 (1) and 3 of Article DC-B, before it on petition for review. And under Section 43, “decisions of
state that –
heads of departments, agencies, provinces, cities, municipalities and
Section 2. (1) The civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, other instrumentalities imposing a penalty exceeding thirty days
instrumentalities and agencies of the Government, including suspension or fine in an amount exceeding thirty days salary, may be
government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters.
appealed to the Commission Proper within a period of fifteen days from
Section 3. The Civil Service Commission, as the central personnel receipt thereof.”2  “Commission Proper” refers to the Civil Service
agency of the Government, shall establish a career service and adopt Commission-Central Office.3 

measures to promote morale, efficiency, integrity, responsiveness, It is only the decision of the Commission Proper that may be brought to
progressiveness, and courtesy in the civil service. It shall strengthen the the CA on petition for review, under Section 50 of MC 19, which provides
merit and rewards system, integrate all human resources development thus:

programs for all levels and ranks, and institutionalize a management Section 50. Petition for Review with the Court of Appeals. – A party may
climate conducive to public accountability. It shall submit to the elevate a decision of the Commission before the Court of Appeals by
President and the Congress an annual report on its personnel programs.
way of a petition for review under Rule 43 of the 1997 Revised Rules of
Thus, “the CSC, as the central personnel agency of the Government, has Court.4 

jurisdiction over disputes involving the removal and separation of all Thus, we agree with the CA’s conclusion that in filing his petition for
employees of government branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities and review directly with it from the CSC-CAR Regional Director, petitioner
agencies, including government-owned or controlled corporations with failed to observe the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies.
original charters. Simply put, it is the sole arbiter of controversies relating As correctly stated by the appellate court, non-exhaustion of
to the civil service.”1 
administrative remedies renders petitioner’s CA petition premature and
In line with the above provisions of the Constitution and its mandate as thus dismissible.

the central personnel agency of government and sole arbiter of The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies requires that
controversies relating to the civil service, the CSC adopted Memorandum “before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, he or she
Circular No. 19, series of 1999 (MC 19), or the Revised Uniform Rules on should have availed himself or herself of all the means of administrative
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, which the CA cited as the basis processes afforded him or her. Hence, if resort to a remedy within the
for its pronouncement. Section 4 thereof provides:
administrative machinery can still be made by giving the administrative
Section 4. Jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission. — The Civil officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes
Service Commission shall hear and decide administrative cases within his or her jurisdiction, then such remedy should be exhausted first
instituted by, or brought before it, directly or on appeal, including before the court’s judicial power can be sought. The premature
contested appointments, and shall review decisions and actions of its invocation of the intervention of the court is fatal to one’s cause of action.
offices and of the agencies attached to it.
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is based on
Except as otherwise provided by the Constitution or by law, the Civil practical and legal reasons. The availment of administrative remedy
Service Commission shall have the final authority to pass upon the entails lesser expenses and provides for a speedier disposition of
removal, separation and suspension of all officers and employees in the controversies. Furthermore, the courts of justice, for reasons of comity
civil service and upon all matters relating to the conduct, discipline and and convenience, will shy away from a dispute until the system of
efficiency of such officers and employees.
administrative redress has been completed and complied with, so as to
As pointed out by the CA, pursuant to Section 5(A)(1) of MC 19, the Civil give the administrative agency concerned every opportunity to correct its
Service Commission Proper, or Commission Proper, shall have error and dispose of the case.”5  Indeed, the administrative agency
jurisdiction over decisions of Civil Service Regional Offices brought

concerned – in this case the Commission Proper – is in the “best position
to correct any previous error committed in its forum.”6 
who allegedly did not inform him of the pertinent rules contained in Civil
The CA is further justified in refusing to take cognizance of the petition
for review, as “[t]he doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not warrant a
court to arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve a controversy the
jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an administrative body of
special competence.”7  When petitioner’s recourse lies in an appeal to
the Commission Proper in accordance with the procedure prescribed in
MC 19, the CA may not be faulted for refusing to acknowledge petitioner
before it.
that the latter was authorized to give information regarding the
We likewise affirm the CA’s pronouncement that petitioner was negligent
in filling up his CSPE application form and in failing to verify beforehand
the specific requirements for the CSPE examination. Petitioner’s claim of
good faith and absence of deliberate intent or willful desire to defy or
disregard the rules relative to the CSPE is not a defense as to exonerate
him from the charge of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service; under our legal system, ignorance of the law excuses no one
from compliance therewith.8  Moreover, petitioner – as mere applicant for
acceptance into the professional service through the CSPE – cannot
expect to be served on a silver platter; the obligation to know what is
required for the examination falls on him, and not the CSC or his
colleagues in office. As aptly ruled by the appellate court:
official functions. Under our civil service laws, there is no concrete
In Bacaya9  v. Ramos, the Supreme Court found respondent judge guilty
of both negligence and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service when he issued an arrest warrant despite the deletion of the
penalty of imprisonment imposed on an accused in a particular criminal
case. Respondent judge in the said case claimed that the issuance of the
warrant was a mistake, done in good faith and that it has been a practice
in his office for the Clerk of Court to study motions and that he would
simply sign the prepared order. The Supreme Court rejected his defense
and stated that negligence is the failure to observe such care as a
reasonably prudent and careful person would use under ordinary
circumstances. An act of the will is necessary&r deliberate intent to exist;
such is not necessary in an act of negligence.
avoid her private contractual obligations; a Government Service
Here, petitioner failed to verify the requirements before filing his
application to take the CSPE exam. He simply relied on his prior
knowledge of the rules, particularly, that he could substitute his
deficiency in Military Science with the length of his government service.
\
He cannot lay blame on the personnel head of the SSS-Bangued, Abra,
Service Memorandum Circular No. 42, Series of 1991. For, [if] he were
truly a reasonably prudent and careful person, petitioner himself should
have verified from the CSC the requirements imposed on prospective
examinees. In so doing, he would certainly have been informed of the
new CSC policy disallowing substitution of one’s length of government
service for academic deficiencies. Neither should petitioner have relied
on an unnamed Civil Service employee’s advice since it was not shown
examination nor that said employee was competent and capable of
giving correct information. His failure to verify the actual CSPE
requirements which a reasonably prudent and careful person would have
done constitutes negligence. Though his failure was not a deliberate act
of the will, such is not necessary in an act of negligence and, as in
Bacaya, negligence is not inconsistent with a finding of guilt for conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service.10 
The corresponding penalty for conduct prejudicial to the best interest of
the service may be imposed upon an erring public officer as long as the
questioned act or conduct taints the image and integrity of the office;
and the act need not be related to or connected with the public officer’s
description of what specific acts constitute conduct prejudicial to the
best interest of the service, but the following acts or omissions have
been treated as such: misappropriation of public funds; abandonment of
office; failure to report back to work without prior notice; failure to
safekeep public records and property; making false entries in public
documents; falsification of court orders; a judge’s act of brandishing a
gun, and threatening the complainants during a traffic altercation; a court
interpreter’s participation in the execution of a document conveying
complainant’s property which resulted in a quarrel in the latter’s family;
selling fake Unified Vehicular Volume Program exemption cards to his
officemates during office hours; a CA employee’s forging of receipts to
Insurance System (GSIS) employee’s act of repeatedly changing his IP
address, which caused network problems within his office and allowed
him to gain access to the entire GSIS network, thus putting the system in
a vulnerable state of security;11  a public prosecutor’s act of signing a

motion to dismiss that was not prepared by him, but by a judge;12  and a
teacher’s act of directly selling a book to her students in violation of the
Code of Ethics for Professional Teachers.13  In petitioner’s case, his act of
making false entries in his CSPE application undoubtedly constitutes
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service; the absence of a
willful or deliberate intent to falsify or make dishonest entries in his
application is immaterial, for conduct grossly prejudicial to the best
interest of the service “may or may not be characterized by corruption or
a willful intent to violate the law or to disregard established rules.”14 
he opted for the first remedy.
Finally, the Court cannot consider petitioner’s plea that “in the interest of
justice and in the spirit of the policy which promotes and preserves civil
service eligibility,” his career service professional eligibility should not be
revoked. The act of using a fake or spurious civil service eligibility for
one’s benefit not only amounts to violation of the civil service
examinations or CSPE; it also results in prejudice to the government and
the public in general. It is a transgression of the law which has no place
in the public service.15  “Assumption of public office is impressed with the
paramount public interest that requires the highest standards of ethical
conduct. A person aspiring for public office must observe honesty,
candor, and faithful compliance with the law. Nothing less is expected.”16 
Civil Code.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The December 11, 2009 Decision
and March 17, 2010 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 94426 are AFFIRMED.
prohibitory laws. This may be deduced from the language of the
SO ORDERED.
provision, which, notwithstanding a person’s ignorance, does not excuse
D.M. Consuji v. CA
FACTS: Jose Juego, a construction worker of D. M. Consunji, Inc., fell 14
floors from the Renaissance Tower, Pasig City to his death. He was
crushed to death when the [p]latform he was then on board and
performing work, fell. And the falling of the [p]latform was due to the
removal or getting loose of the pin which was merely inserted to the
connecting points of the chain block and [p]latform but without a safety
lock.Jose Juego’s widow, Maria, filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Pasig a complaint for damages against the deceased’s employer, D.M.
Consunji, Inc.
The employer raised, among other defenses, the widow’s prior availment
of the benefits from the State Insurance Fund. The employer argued that
\
in Floresca, the claimants may invoke either the Workmen’s
Compensation Act or the provisions of the Civil Code, subject to the
consequence that the choice of one remedy will exclude the other and
that the acceptance of compensation under the remedy chosen will
preclude a claim for additional benefits under the other remedy. The
exception is where a claimant who has already been paid under the
Workmen’s Compensation Act may still sue for damages under the Civil
Code on the basis of supervening facts or developments occurring after
Petitioner, argues that under Article 3 of the Civil Code, ignorance of the
law excuses no one from compliance therewith. As judicial decisions
applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution form part of the
Philippine legal system (Article 8, Civil Code), private respondent cannot
claim ignorance of this Court’s ruling in Floresca allowing a choice of
remedies.
ISSUE: Whether the private respondent is already barred from
claiming damages under the Civil Code pursuant to Article 3 of the
HELD:  No.  The application of Article 3 is limited to mandatory and
his or her compliance with the laws. The rule in Floresca allowing private
respondent a choice of remedies is neither mandatory nor prohibitory.
Accordingly, her ignorance thereof cannot be held against her.
In any event, there is no proof that private respondent knew that her
husband died in the elevator crash when on November 15, 1990 she
accomplished her application for benefits from the ECC. The police
investigation report is dated November 25, 1990, 10 days after the
accomplishment of the form. Petitioner filed the application in her behalf
on November 27, 1990.
There is also no showing that private respondent knew of the remedies
available to her when the claim before the ECC was filed.
 \

RETROACTIVITY OF LAW
Heirs of Simon v. Chan
FACTS: On July 11, 1997, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila
filed in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila (MeTC) an information
charging the late Eduardo Simon (Simon) with a violation of BP 22,
This is clear from Rule 111 of the Rules of Court which relevantly
provides:  "The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22
shall be deemed to include the corresponding civil action. No reservation
to file such civil action separately shall be allowed." 

docketed as Criminal Case No. 275381 entitled People v. Eduardo

Simon. 
Supreme Court Circular 57-97 also provides that: "1. The criminal action
for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to necessarily
More than three years later, or on August 3, 2000, respondent Elvin Chan include the corresponding civil action, and no reservation to file such civil
commenced in the MeTC in Pasay City a civil action for the collection of action separately shall be allowed or recognized."

the principal amount of P336,000.00, coupled with an application for a

writ of preliminary attachment (docketed as Civil Case No. 915-00).
Co v. CA & PEOPLE
FACTS:  Petitioner Albino Co delivered to the salvaging firm on
On August 9, 2000, the MeTC in Pasay City issued a writ of preliminary September 1, 1983 a check drawn against the Associated Citizens'
attachment, which was implemented on August 17, 2000 through the Bank, postdated November 30, 1983 in the sum of P361,528.00. 1 The
sheriff attaching a Nissan vehicle of Simon.
check was deposited on January 3, 1984. It was dishonored two days
later, the tersely-stated reason given by the bank being: "CLOSED
On August 17, 2000, Simon filed an urgent motion to dismiss with ACCOUNT." A criminal complaint for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang
application to charge plaintiffs attachment bond for damages
22 2 was filed by the salvage company against Albino Co with the
Regional Trial Court of Pasay City. The case eventuated in Co's
On August 29, 2000, Chan opposed Simons urgent motion to dismiss conviction of the crime charged.

with application to charge plaintiffs attachment bond for damages, 

He argued on appeal that at the time of the issuance of the check on

On October 23, 2000, the MeTC in Pasay City granted Simon the urgent
motion to dismiss with application to charge plaintiffs attachment bond
for damages. The MTC cites the grounds of litis pendentia and that the
case for sum of money is one based on fraud and hence falling under
Article 33 of the Civil Code, still prior reservation is required
Circular of the Ministry of Justice.
September 1, 1983, some four (4) years prior to the promulgation of the
judgment in Que v. People on September 21, 1987, the delivery of a
"rubber" or "bouncing" check as guarantee for an obligation was not
considered a punishable offense, an official pronouncement made in a

Chans motion for reconsideration was denied as well as his appeal with ISSUE: whether the decision issued by the Court be applied
the RTC. On the CA, Chan's appeal was granted. 
retroactively to the prejudice of the accused.

ISSUE: Whether or not Chan's civil action to recover the amount of the HELD:  No.  Pursuant to Article 8 of the Civil Code "judicial decisions
unfunded check (Civil Case No. 915-00) was an independent civil action.
applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of
the legal system of the Philippines." But while our decisions form part of
RULING: NO. There is no independent civil action to recover the civil the law of the land, they are also subject to Article 4 of the Civil Code
liability arising from the issuance of an unfunded check prohibited and which provides that "laws shall have no retroactive effect unless the
punished under Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (BP 22).
contrary is provided." This is expressed in the familiar legal maxim lex
 \

prospicit, non respicit, the law looks forward not backward. The rationale
against retroactivity is easy to perceive. The retroactive application of a
law usually divests rights that have already become vested or impairs the
obligations of contract and hence, is unconstitutional
From 1987, however, until the passage of the death penalty law or on
The weight of authority is decidedly in favor of the proposition that the
Court's decision of September 21, 1987 in Que v. People, 154 SCRA 160
(1987) 14 that a check issued merely to guarantee the performance of an
obligation is nevertheless covered by B.P. Blg. 22 — should not be given
retrospective effect to the prejudice of the petitioner and other persons
situated, who relied on the official opinion of the Minister of Justice that
such a check did not fall within the scope of B.P. Blg. 22.
convict is serving the same.
HELD: No. The Supreme Court ruled that before the 1987 Constitution,
death penalty as a capital punishment could be imposed on certain
heinous crimes like robbery with rape (Article 294, Revised Penal Code).
January 1, 1994, the imposition of death penalty was suspended. In the
case of the three convicts, an issue came up regarding the imposition of
death penalty. Although the time of the effectivity of the 1987
Constitution the present case was still its trial stage.
According to Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code, the penal laws shall
have a retroactive effect only insofar as they favor a person guilty of a
felony who is not a habitual criminal, although at the time of the
publication of such a law a final sentence has been pronounced and the

People v. Patalin
FACTS: Accused-appellants Alex Mijaque and Alfonso Patalin, Jr, were
charged before Branch 25 of the Regional Trial Court of the 6th Judicial
Region stationed in Iloilo City, with the crime of robbery. The Amended
information was dated October 11, 1985.
The abolition of the death penalty benefits herein accused by virtue of Art
22 of the RPC which provides that penal laws shall have retroactive
effect insofar as they favor the person guilty of the felony who is not a
habitual criminal. Hence, they are subject to a reduction of penalty from
death to reclusion perpetua. A subsequent statute cannot be applied
retroactively as to impair a right that accrued under the old law.

In a Second Amended Information also dated October 11, 1985 and Summary v. Sps. Damaso
docketed as Criminal Case No. 18305, accused-appellants Alex Mijaque,
Alfonso Patalin, Jr., and Nestor Ras were charged before the same court
with the crime of robbery with multiple rape.

They were convicted of robbery with multiple rape committed in the

evening of August 11, 1984 against the Aliman family. They were meted
the death penalty. At the time the crimes were committed in 1984,
robbery with rape was punishable by death, however, by virtue of the
ratification of the 1987 Constitution, the death penalty was abolished and
all death penalties already imposed were reduced to reclusion perpetua.
In 1987, when the 1987 Constitution suspended the imposition of the
death penalty, the trial has not yet been finished, hence, it was overtaken
by the Death Penalty Law effective January 1, 1994. Appellants now
opposed that the trial court erred in imposing the death penalty as the
same was suspended upon ratification of the constitution.

ISSUE: Whether or not the death penalty can be imposed upon the
accused.