[G.R. No. L-12435. November 9, 1917.

THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. REGINO BLANCO, Defendant-Appellant.

Basilio Aromin for Appellant.

Attorney-General Avanceña for Appellee.

SYLLABUS

1. EVIDENCE; MUNICIPAL ORDINANCES; JUDICIAL NOTICE. — Municipal courts and the courts of the justices of the peace may, and
should, take judicial notice of municipal ordinances in force in the municipality in which they sit.

2. ID.; ID.; ID. — Courts of First Instance will not, ordinarily, and in the absence of express statutory authority, take judicial notice of
ordinances of municipal corporations within their jurisdiction; such ordinances on appeal from a judgment of a municipal court or a
court of a justice of the peace, in any case wherein the inferior court took judicial notice thereof.

3. ID.; ID.; ID. — To that end, the Court of First Instance may adopt the findings and conclusions of the justice of the peace touching
the existence of such ordinances, in the absence of affirmative proof that such findings and conclusions are erroneous.

4. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS; ORDINANCES; PROVISIONS OF ADMINISTRATIVE CODE. — The repeal of the Municipal Code by the
enactment of the Administrative Code did not have the effect of repealing or abrogating municipal ordinances enacted under
authority of the provisions of the Municipal Code, it appearing that the power to enact and maintain such ordinances is conferred
upon, and confirmed to, the municipality under the Administrative Code in substantially the same language as that found in the
Municipal Code.

5. ID.; ID.; ID. — Section 3 of the Administrative Code expressly provides that the provisions of that Code incorporating prior laws
shall be deemed to be made in continuation thereof, and to be in the nature of amendments thereto, without prejudice to any right
already accrued.

DECISION

CARSON, J. :

The defendant and appellant was convicted originally in the court of the justice of the peace of the municipality of Castillejos,
Province of Zambales, and fined P25 on a charge of violation of an ordinance of that municipality prohibiting and penalizing the
obstruction of the public highways. On appeal to the Court of First Instance of the Province of Zambales, the accused was again
convicted and fined P25. The case is before us on appeal from the judgment entered in the Court of First Instance.

Having in mind the provisions of Act No. 2677 enacted since this appeal was perfected, expressly authorizing appeals in cases of this
kind, we do not stop to consider the contentions of the parties as to the merely procedural question touching the proper disposition
of this appeal under the law in force prior to the enactment of that statute.

On this appeal counsel relies wholly upon this contentions —

First. That a doubt arises as to whether the ordinance is question was in force at the date of its alleged violation. Section 9 of the
ordinance reads as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

" Esta ordenanza entrara en vigor desde su aprobacion por la honorable Junta Provincial. (This ordinance will take effect from the
date of its approval by the honorable provincial board.)"

Counsel contends that since no affirmative proof was offered in the court below as to the date of approval of the ordinance, the
court had no evidence before it on which to base a finding that the ordinance was in force at the date of its alleged violation.

We have no doubt, however, that a court of a justice of the peace may, and should, take judicial notice of the municipal ordinances
in force in the municipality wherein it sits; and we are furthermore of opinion that in an appeal from a judgment of a court of the
justice of the peace the appellate courts may take judicial notice of municipal ordinances in force in the municipality wherein the
case originated, and to that end may adopt the findings and conclusions of the court of the justice of the peace in that regard as
developed by the record, in the absence of affirmative proof that such findings and conclusions are erroneous. (U.S. v. Herniated, 31
Phil. Rep., 342; Cf. sec. 51, Manila Charter.)

The doctrine is well stated by Judge McQuillin in the following citation from his work on Municipal Corporations, and we are of
opinion that under the judicial system in force in these Islands, the rule which should be adopted is that set forth in the last
paragraph of the citation as the "better view" with regard to the matter dealt therein:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Par. 849. Courts will judicially notice the charter or incorporating act of a municipal corporation without being specially pleaded,
not only when it is declared to be a public statute, but when it is public or general in its nature or purposes. But state courts will not
take judicial notice of ordinances of municipal corporations; hence, as mentioned, they must be pleaded with as much certainty of
description as to their subject-matter as a contract or other private paper.

"Courts of the state take judicial notice of public laws of the state. Ordinances when legally enacted operate throughout the limits of
the city in like manner as public laws operate within the state limits. The city or municipal courts bear the same relation to
ordinances of the city as the state courts do to the public laws of the state. Hence, on principle, the municipal courts may for like
reason take judicial notice of all city ordinances of a general nature, or those having a general obligatory force throughout the city.
And the rule that courts will not take judicial notice of municipal ordinances does not apply to police courts and city courts, which
have jurisdiction of complaints for the enforcement of ordinances, without allegation or proof of their existence.

"Par. 861. While, as we have seen, municipal or city courts will take judicial notice of the ordinances and resolutions passed and in
force within the jurisdiction of the court, without being pleaded and proved, in many jurisdictions it is held, and the weight of
authority seems to be that, on appeal from such courts to a state court the latter will not take judicial notice of ordinances unless
they have been pleaded in the municipal or city court and set out in the record. But the better view appears to be that where an
action for the violation of an ordinance has been commenced in a municipal or police court and the case is appealed, the latter
court, whether state or municipal, will take judicial notice of the incorporation of the city and of the existence or substance of its
ordinances."cralaw virtua1aw library

It has been suggested that the doctrine thus stated should not be followed in this jurisdiction, because our statutes providing for
appeals from municipal courts to Courts of First Instance, contemplate and prescribe trials de novo.

We think that the following citations of authority sufficiently dispose of this contention, having in mind the provisions of our statute
which in both civil and criminal cases authorize the trial de novo of cases appealed to a Court of First Instance to proceed on the
complaint submitted in the court of the justice of the peace or the municipal court wherein the case originated. (Art. 112, Code of
Civ. Proc.)

"Municipal courts, and the circuit courts on trials de novo on appeal from them, will take judicial notice not only of the ordinances of
a city, but of such journals and records of the common council as affect their validity, meaning, and construction, just as state courts
take official notice of the public statutes of the State and the journals of the legislature." (Portland v. Yick, 44 Ore., 439.)

"When the case was taken on appeal from the police court to the district court, it was not only within the power, but it was the duty
of the district court to try the case in the same manner that it should be tried before the police court. The district court was in fact
substituted for the time being for the police court, and whatever the police court could have taken judicial notice of while the case
was in that court, the district court could and should have taken judicial notice of after the removal of the case to the district court."
(Smith v. City of Emporia, 27 Kan., 528, 530.)

"Where an action for the violation of a city ordinance is commercial and prosecuted to conviction and sentence before the police
judge of such city, and the case is then taken by the defendant on appeal to the district court, the district court should, with
reference to such case, take judicial notice of the incorporation of such city, and of the existence and substance of its ordinances."
(City of Solomon v. Hughes, 24 Kan., 154.)

As shedding some light upon the contentions raised by counsel in this connection, we insert here a citation from Dillon on Municipal
Corporations, which, read together with the citations the notes appended by the author, indicates quite clearly the line of reasoning
upon which the courts in the United States have proceeded in cases of this kind:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Mode of pleading ordinances. — The courts, unless they are the courts of the municipality, do not judicially notice the ordinances
of a municipal corporation, unless directed by charter or statute to do so. Therefore, such ordinances, when sought to be enforced
by action, or when set up by the defendant as a protection, should be set out or stated in substance in the pleading. It has been
sometimes decided that it is not sufficient that they be referred to generally by the title or section. It is, however, believed to be
sufficient, in the absence of special legislative provision prescribing the manner of pleading, to set forth the legal substance of that
part of the ordinance alleged to have been violated, it being advisable, for purposes of identification, to refer also to the title, date
and section. The liberal rules of pleading and practice which characterize modern judicial proceedings should extend to, and
doubtless would be held to embrace, suits and prosecutions to enforce the by-laws or ordinances of municipal corporations." (Dillon
on Corporations, sec. 413 (346).)

Second. It is contended further, that the ordinance having been enacted under authority of the provisions of article 39, subsection (j)
of Act No. 82 (The Municipal Code), and that Code having been repealed by the enactment of the Administrative Code, the
ordinance should be deemed to have been abrogated at the same time. It is sufficient answer to this contention to indicate that the
Administrative Code, while it repealed the Municipal Code, conferred upon and confirmed to all duly organized municipalities the
power to enact and maintain ordinances such as that now under consideration, in substantially the same language as that found in
the Municipal Code. (Cf. Administrative Code, sec. 2242, subsets. (e) and (h).

Section 3 of the Administrative Code expressly provides that the provisions of that Code incorporating prior laws shall be deemed to
be made in continuation thereof, and to be in the nature of amendments thereto, without prejudice to any right already accrued.

It follows that the enactment of the Administrative Code did not have the effect of abrogating or repealing a municipal ordinance
enacted and maintained in the exercise of a power confirmed to the municipality by the code itself.

We find no error in the proceedings prejudicial to the rights of the accused; and conclude that the judgment entered in the court
below should be affirmed with the costs of this instance against the appellant. So ordered.

Arellano, C.J., Araullo, and Street, JJ., concur.

Torres, Johnson, and Avanceña, JJ., did not sit in the case.

Separate Opinions

MALCOLM, J., concurring:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

I concur. I am glad to note that this decision has the effect of nullifying the obiter dicta to be found in the United States v. Ong Yec So
([1915] 31 Phil., 202) to the effect that "from the express terms of the statute it is clear that the penalty prescribed in case of
recidivism can be imposed only in those cases wherein there has been a previous conviction under this statute, and that a former
conviction under the old law is not sufficient for that purpose."cralaw virtua1aw library

Just as the Administrative Code is a "continuation" of the Municipal Code, so is the present Opium Law a "continuation" of the
anterior Opium Law.

[G.R. No. L-35133. May 31, 1974.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RAYMUNDO MADERA @ "Mundo", MARIANITO V. ANDRES @ "Totoy",
GENEROSO ANDRES @ "Ross", Defendants-Appellants.

Francisco G. Munsayac, Sr. for appellant Madera.

Apolinar F. Tolentino and Jose C. Vitug for appellant Andres, Et. Al.

Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, Assistant Solicitor General Dominador L. Quiroz and Solicitor Sinfronio I. Ancheta
for Appellee.

DECISION
 FERNANDEZ, J.:

This case is now before Us on appeal of the three appellants from a decision of the Circuit Criminal Court 1 finding them guilty of the
crime of murder, and sentencing them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to jointly and severally indemnify the heirs of
the victim in the amount of P12,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the cost proportionately.

There is no question that at about 2:00 o’clock in the early morning of April 20, 1970, three men barged at the doorstep of the house
of the victim Elino Bana in Sitio Baag, Barrio Bantug, Gabaldon, Nueva Ecija. The gunman, standing on the first rung of the stairs of
the house, fired a volley of shots from a .45 caliber gun at Elino Bana who was then sleeping on the floor of his house near the stairs.
Two gunshot wounds were inflicted on the victim but the fatal one was the one that hit him on the abdominal region. Elino Bana did
not die immediately. He stood up and told his wife to call for his brother Conrado who lives not far away from their house. The
victim’s wife fetched Conrado; but when they returned, the wounded man was no longer at home for he was already brought to the
Municipal Building of Gabaldon. He was carried by his son-in-law, Francisco Viloria, with the assistance of some people. From the
Municipal Building, he was brought to the Nueva Ecija General Hospital, but he died on the way that same day, April 20, 1970.

We affirm the lower court’s finding that the prosecution has proven beyond reasonable doubt that appellant Raymundo Madera
was the one who fired the shots at the victim Elino Bana, one of which was the fatal shot, and that appellants Marianito Andres and
Generoso Andres were with Madera at the time.

Juanito Bana, a son of the victim, testified that he was awakened by the gunfire and saw the appellant Raymundo Madera standing
on the first step of their stairs holding a .45 caliber firearm. He also saw the appellants Marianito Andres and Generoso Andres just
behind the appellant Madera, at a distance of 1 1/2 meters from the stairs. Bernarda Bana, wife of the victim, declared that she saw
Raymundo Madera as the one who shot her husband with a foot-long firearm, and appellants Marianito Andres and Generoso
Andres were then with Madera.

In addition to the testimonies of these two witnesses, the prosecution presented the dying declaration of the victim Elino Bana. The
trip from the house of Elino Bana to the Municipal Building took only about thirty minutes. On the way, they were met by policeman
Ambrosio Feliciano from Gabaldon who was fetched from his house by Barrio Captain Emiliano Jornadal of Bantug to look into the
shooting incident. Upon reaching the Municipal Building Patrolman Feliciano told Elino Bana that he would have to take down his
written statement regarding the shooting incident, and the latter agreed. The latter was then in agony. It was then 3:00 o’clock in
the morning. In said dying declaration, he was asked who shot him and the answer was: Mundo Madera and two others whom he
could not recognize.

The lower court was correct in refusing to give credence to the testimony of Patrolman Feliciano that while they were on their way
to the Municipal Building, Elino Bana told him that he could not identify the persons who shot him. Said policeman has been an
investigator in the police force since 1964. He should have asked Elino Bana while he was giving his dying declaration in the
Municipal Building why he said earlier that he did not know who shot him. But Patrolman Feliciano did not do this. It must be noted
that not only Patrolman Feliciano but also Francisco Viloria, a witness to the dying declaration, testified to its lawful execution.

The fact that Juanito Bana and Bernarda Bana failed to reveal right away the identities of the appellants to the victim himself and to
their relatives Conrado Bana and Francisco Viloria, does not militate against their credibility. There is no evidence on record that
they were asked by their relatives about the identity of the appellants. Had they been asked, they would have readily revealed
appellants’ identities as they did to the Chief of Police and Municipal Mayor of Gabaldon only a few hours after the fateful incident,
during a formal investigation of the case in the Office of the Chief of Police when and where they executed their respective sworn
statements.

In their respective written statements taken on April 20, 1970, subscribed and sworn on the same date before the Mayor of
Gabaldon, Bernardo Bana and Juanito Bana categorically stated that Elino Bana was shot by Raymundo Madera @ Mundo, while
Ross and Totoy Andres were downstairs.

Juanito Bana was then living with his parents. He must he familiar with their house. He testified on direct examination that he slept
in the balcony of their house. On cross examination, he said that he slept inside their house. That does not show any inconsistency in
his testimony, because on further questioning, he said that the balcony referred to by him was inside their house. Yes, he said that
after he heard the shots, he jumped to the ground through the back portion of their house. The falsity of this statement has not
been shown by the defense. The pictures presented by it which apparently show that there was no such opening, can be explained
by the fact that the tall grasses could obscure the back portion of the house where the kitchen door was located.
Juanito Bana admitted that he was gripped with fear when he heard the burst of gunfire. But that would not prove that he failed to
recognize the appellants.

"An excited person may overlook the presence of another whom he would otherwise have observed."cralaw virtua1aw library

"Under some circumstance, however, excitement may whet the attention to a keen edge. . . . In some other cases, it has been
observed, in effect, that the emotion incident to the impending peril may not be the kind of excitement which confuses, but that
which focalizes the faculties to scrutinize the circumstance of the threatened danger in order to avoid it." 2

The appellants asserted in their briefs 3 that "the evidence on record does not show that there was a moon shining in the early
morning of April 20, 1970, at Barrio Bantug, Gabaldon, Nueva Ecija;" that it was then "a moonless night;" hence, Juanito Bana and
Bernarda Bana could not have recognized the appellants. This position is untenable. Why?

The Court can take judicial notice of the "laws of nature" 4 and, under this rule, of the time when the moon rises or sets on a
particular day. 5 This notwithstanding and for certainty, We took it unto Ourselves to get a certification from the Weather Bureau 6
which shows that the moon was bright at the time of the shooting incident. It reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"To whom It May Concern:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"This is to certify that, based on the computations made by this office, the following astronomical data for Gabaldon, Nueva Ecija are
true and correct:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1. that the moon rose at 4:11 P.M. on April 19, 1970 and set the following day, April 20, at 4:27 A.M.;

2. that at 2:00 A.M. on April 20, 1970, the moon was at an altitude of 34 degrees above the western horizon with bearing of South
73 degrees West;

3. and that the moon was illumined 97% at 2:00 A.M. on April 20, 1970, full moon having occurred at 00.21 A.M. on April 22, 1970.

"This certification is issued upon the request of Mr. Estanislao Fernandez, Associate Justice, Supreme Court, Manila.

For the Administrator:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

(Sgd) Simeon V. Inciong

SIMEON V. INCIONG

Chief, Astronomical Division"

It was not necessary for the prosecution to prove motive on the part of the appellants for there is no doubt as to their identities.

It is true that, according to Maximo A. Obra, the forensic chemist of the NBI, appellant Raymundo Madera was found negative in a
paraffin test. But Obra himself admitted that, the paraffin test having been conducted fourteen days after the incident, the test
could have given a negative result even if the appellant had fired a gun fourteen days earlier, because the nitrate deposits on his
hands could have been washed off by washing or could have been removed by perspiration.

The defense of the appellants was alibi. But said defense cannot prevail over the positive identification of the appellants by the
prosecution witnesses. The house of appellant Raymundo Madera is just about 400 meters away from that of the victim Elino Bana.

We need not discuss further the defense of alibi of the appellants Marianito Andres and Generoso Andres because the Solicitor
General recommended their acquittal. And We agree.

The fact that these two appellants were standing behind appellant Madera when the latter fired shots at Elino Bana, did not make
them liable for what Madera did, there being no proof whatsoever of any conspiracy among the three appellants. They were not
armed. They did nothing to help Madera. Their mere passive presence at the scene of the crime did not make them liable either as
co-principals or accomplices. In one of the latest decisions of this Court, penned by Justice Felix Q. Antonio. We
held:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"It is well to recall the settled rule that conspiracy presupposes the existence of a preconceived plan or agreement and in order to
establish the existence of such a circumstance, it is not enough that the persons supposedly engaged or connected with the same he
present when the crime was perpetrated. There must be established a logical relationship between the commission of the crime and
the supposed conspirators, evidencing a clear and more intimate connection between and among the latter, such as by their overt
acts committed in pursuance of a common design. Considering the far-reaching consequences, of criminal conspiracy, the same
degree of proof required for establishing the crime is required to support a finding of its presence that is, it must be shown to exist
as clearly and convincingly as the commission of the offense itself.

"The evidence fails to meet such requirements. To hold him liable, upon the other hand, as an accomplice, it must he shown that he
had knowledge of the criminal intention of the principal, which may be demonstrated by previous or simultaneous acts which
contributes to the commission of the offense as aid thereto whether physical or moral. As aptly stated in People v. Tamayo: ‘It is an
essential condition to the existence of complicity, not only that there should be a relation between the acts done by the principal
and those attributed to the person charged as accomplice, but it is further necessary that the latter, with knowledge of the criminal
intent, should cooperate with the intention of supplying material or moral aid in the execution of the crime in an efficacious way.’ . .
. From our view of the evidence it has not been convincingly established that appellant cooperated in the commission of the offense,
either morally, through advice, encouragement or agreement or materially through external acts indicating a manifest intent of
supplying aid in the perpetration of the crime in an efficacious way. Such circumstances being absent, his mere passive presence at
the scene of the crime certainly does not make him either a co-principal or an accomplice in the commission of the offense." 7

This is good a time as any to emphasize upon those in charge of the prosecution of criminal cases that the prosecutor’s finest hour is
not when he wins a case with the conviction of the accused. His finest hour is still when, overcoming the advocate’s natural
obsession for victory, he stands up before the Court and pleads not for the conviction of the accused but for his acquittal. For
indeed, his noble task is to prosecute only the guilty and to protect the innocent. We, therefore, commend Solicitor General Estelito
P. Mendoza, Assistant Solicitor Dominador L. Quiroz and Solicitor Sinfronio I. Ancheta for having correctly recommended the
acquittal of the appellants Marianito Andres and Generoso Andres.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed with respect to the appellant Raymundo Madera alias "Mundo", with
1/3 of the cost charged against him; and it is hereby reversed as regards appellants Marianito Andres alias "Totoy" and Generoso
Andres alias "Ross", who are hereby acquitted of the crime charged with proportionate costs de oficio. Their immediate release from
confinement is hereby ordered unless they are held for another legal cause.

Zaldivar (Chairman), Fernando, Barredo, Antonio and Aquino, JJ., concur.

[G.R. No. 104235. November 18, 1993.]

SPOUSES CESAR & SUTHIRA ZALAMEA AND LIANA ZALAMEA, Petitioners, v. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND TRANSWORLD
AIRLINES, INC., Respondents.

Sycip, Salazar, Hernandez, Gatmaitan, for Petitioners.

Quisumbing, Torres & Evangelista for private-respondent.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; FOREIGN LAWS, HOW PROVED. — That there was fraud or bad faith on the part of respondent airline
when it did not allow petitioners to board their flight for Los Angeles in spite of confirmed tickets cannot be disputed. The U.S. law
or regulation allegedly authorizing overbooking has never been proved. Foreign laws do not prove themselves nor can the courts
take judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proved. Written law may be evidenced by an official
publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied
with a certificate that such officer has custody. The certificate may be made by a secretary of an embassy or legation, consul general,
consul, vice-consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in
which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; U.S. LAW OR REGULATION AUTHORIZING OVERBOOKING, NOT PROVED BY MERE TESTIMONY OF RESPONDENT’S
AIRLINE CUSTOMER SERVICE AGENT. — Respondent TWA relied solely on the statement of Ms. Gwendolyn Lather, its customer
service agent, in her deposition dated January 27, 1986 that the Code of Federal Regulations of the Civil Aeronautics Board allows
overbooking. Aside from said statement, no official publication of said code was presented as evidence. Thus, respondent court’s
finding that overbooking is specifically allowed by the US Code of Federal Regulations has no basis in fact.

3. CIVIL LAW; APPLICATION OF LAWS; CONTRACT GOVERNED BY LAWS OF PLACE WHERE EXECUTED; CASE AT BAR. — Even if the
claimed U.S. Code of Federal Regulations does exist, the same is not applicable to the case at bar in accordance with the principle of
lex loci contractus which requires that the law of the place where the airline ticket was issued should be applied by the court where
the passengers are residents and nationals of the forum and the ticket is issued in such State by the defendant airline. Since the
tickets were sold and issued in the Philippines, the applicable law in this case would be Philippine law.

4. ID.; DAMAGES; OVERBOOKING AMOUNTS TO BAD FAITH ENTITLING PASSENGERS TO AWARD OF MORAL DAMAGES. — Existing
jurisprudence explicitly states that overbooking amounts to bad faith, entitling the passengers concerned to an award of moral
damages. (Alitalia Airways v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 77011, 187 SCRA 763 [1990]; Korean Airlines Co., Ltd. v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 61418, 154 SCRA 211 [1987])

5. ID.; ID.; BREACH OF CONTRACT OF CARRIAGE AMOUNTS TO BAD FAITH. — In fact, existing jurisprudence abounds with rulings
where the breach of contract of carriage amounts to bad faith. (Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court,
G.R. No. 74442, 153 SCRA 521 [1987]) A contract to transport passengers is quite different in kind and degree from any other
contractual relation. (Zulueta v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., G.R. No. L-28589, 43 SCRA 397 [1972]

6. ID.; ID.; NON-INCORPORATION OF STIPULATIONS ON OVERBOOKING AND IN NOT INFORMING PASSENGERS OF ITS POLICY GIVING
LESS PRIORITY TO DISCOUNTED TICKET, CONSTITUTE BAD FAITH; PASSENGERS ENTITLED TO BOTH MORAL AND EXEMPLARY
DAMAGES; CASE AT BAR. — Even on the assumption that overbooking is allowed, respondent TWA is still guilty of bad faith in not
informing its passengers beforehand that it could breach the contract of carriage even if they have confirmed tickets if there was
overbooking. Respondent TWA should have incorporated stipulations on overbooking on the tickets issued or to properly inform its
passengers about these policies so that the latter would be prepared for such eventuality or would have the choice to ride with
another airline. Moreover, respondent TWA was also guilty of not informing its passengers of its alleged policy of giving less priority
to discounted tickets. It is respondent TWA’s position that the practice of overbooking and the airline system of boarding priorities
are reasonable policies, which when implemented do not amount to bad faith. But the issue raised in this case is not the
reasonableness of said policies but whether or not said policies were incorporated or deemed written on petitioners’ contracts of
carriage. Respondent TWA failed to show that there are provisions to that effect. Neither did it present any argument of substance
to show that petitioners were duly apprised of the overbooked condition of the flight or that there is a hierarchy of boarding
priorities in booking passengers. It is evident that petitioners had the right to rely upon the assurance of respondent TWA, thru its
agent in Manila, then in New York, that their tickets represented confirmed seats without any qualification. The failure of
respondent TWA to so inform them when it could easily have done so thereby enabling respondent to hold on to them as
passengers up to the last minute amounts to bad faith. Evidently, respondent TWA placed its self-interest over the rights of
petitioners under their contracts of carriage. Such conscious disregard of petitioners’ rights makes respondent TWA liable for moral
damages. To deter breach of contracts by respondent TWA in similar fashion in the future, we adjudge respondent TWA liable for
exemplary damages, as well. However, the award for moral and exemplary damages by the trial court is excessive in the light of the
fact that only Suthira and Liana Zalamea were actually "bumped off." An award of P50,000.00 moral damages and another
P50,000.00 exemplary damages would suffice under the circumstances obtaining in the instant case.

7. ID.; ID.; PASSENGER ENTITLED TO REIMBURSEMENT FOR COST OF TICKETS BOUGHT FOR ANOTHER FLIGHT ON ANOTHER AIRLINE;
CASE AT BAR. — The respondent court erred, however, in not ordering the refund of the cost of the American Airlines tickets
purchased and used by petitioners Suthira and Liana. The evidence shows that petitioners Suthira and Liana were constrained to
take the American Airlines flight to Los Angeles not because they "opted not to use their TWA tickets on another TWA flight" but
because respondent TWA could not accommodate them either on the next TWA flight which was also fully booked. The purchase of
the American Airlines tickets by petitioners Suthira and Liana was the consequence of respondent TWA’s unjustifiable breach of its
contracts of carriage with petitioners. In accordance with Article 2201, New Civil Code, respondent TWA should, therefore, be
responsible for all damages which may be reasonably attributed to the non-performance of its obligation. In the previously cited
case of Alitalia Airways v. Court of Appeals, this Court explicitly held that a passenger is entitled to be reimbursed for the cost of the
tickets he had to buy for a flight on another airline. Thus, instead of simply being refunded for the cost of the unused TWA tickets,
petitioners should be awarded the actual cost of their flight from New York to Los Angeles.

8. ID.; ID.; ATTORNEY’S FEES; RECOVERABLE WHERE A PARTY WAS COMPELLED TO LITIGATE TO PROTECT HIS RIGHTS. — The award
to petitioners of attorney’s fees is also justified under Article 2208(2) of the Civil Code which allows recovery when the defendant’s
act or omission has compelled plaintiff to litigate or to incur expenses to protect his interest.
 DECISION

NOCON, J.:

Disgruntled over TransWorld Airlines, Inc.’s refusal to accommodate them in TWA Flight 007 departing from New York to Los
Angeles on June 6, 1984 despite possession of confirmed tickets, petitioners filed an action for damages before the Regional Trial
Court of Makati, Metro Manila, Branch 145. Advocating petitioners’ position, the trial court categorically ruled that respondent
TransWorld Airlines (TWA) breached its contract of carriage with petitioners and that said breach was "characterized by bad faith."
On appeal, however, the appellate court found that while there was a breach of contract on respondent TWA’s part, there was
neither fraud nor bad faith because under the Code of Federal Regulations by the Civil Aeronautics Board of the United States of
America it is allowed to overbook flights.chanrobles law library : red

The factual backdrop of the case is as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Petitioners-spouses Cesar C. Zalamea and Suthira Zalamea, and their daughter, Liana Zalamea, purchased three (3) airline tickets
from the Manila agent of respondent TransWorld Airlines, Inc. for a flight from New York to Los Angeles on June 6, 1984. The tickets
of petitioners-spouses were purchased at a discount of 75% while that of their daughter was a full fare ticket. All three tickets
represented confirmed reservations.

While in New York, on June 4, 1984, petitioners received notice of the reconfirmation of their reservations for said flight. On the
appointed date, however, petitioners checked in at 10:00 a.m., an hour earlier than the scheduled flight at 11:00 a.m. but were
placed on the wait-list because the number of passengers who had checked in before them had already taken all the seats available
on the flight. Liana Zalamea appeared as No. 13 on the wait-list while the two other Zalameas were listed as "No. 34, showing a
party of two." Out of the 42 names on the wait-list, the first 22 names were eventually allowed to board the flight to Los Angeles,
including petitioner Cesar Zalamea. The two others, on the other hand, at No. 34, being ranked lower than 22, were not able to fly.
As it were, those holding full-fare tickets were given first priority among the wait-listed passengers. Mr. Zalamea, who was holding
the full-fare ticket of his daughter, was allowed to board the plane; while his wife and daughter, who presented the discounted
tickets were denied boarding. According to Mr. Zalamea, it was only later when he discovered that he was holding his daughter’s
full-fare ticket.chanrobles law library

Even in the next TWA flight to Los Angeles Mrs. Zalamea and her daughter, could not be accommodated because it was also fully
booked. Thus, they were constrained to book in another flight and purchased two tickets from American Airlines at a cost of Nine
Hundred Eighteen ($918.00) Dollars.

Upon their arrival in the Philippines, petitioners filed an action for damages based on breach of contract of air carriage before the
Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila, Branch 145. As aforesaid, the lower court ruled in favor of petitioners in its decision 1
dated January 9, 1989 the dispositive portion of which states as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the defendant to pay plaintiffs the following amounts:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"(1) US $918.00, or its peso equivalent at the time of payment, representing the price of the tickets bought by Suthira and Liana
Zalamea from American Airlines, to enable them to fly to Los Angeles from New York City;

"(2) US $159.49, or its peso equivalent at the time of payment, representing the price of Suthira Zalamea’s ticket for TWA Flight
007;chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

"(3) Eight Thousand Nine Hundred Thirty-four Pesos and Fifty Centavos (P8,934.50), Philippine Currency, representing the price of
Liana Zalamea’s ticket for TWA Flight 007;

"(4) Two Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (250,000.00), Philippine Currency, as moral damages for all the plaintiffs;

"(5) One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00), Philippine Currency, as and for attorney’s fees; and

"(6) The costs of suit.

"SO ORDERED." 2
On appeal, the respondent Court of Appeals held that moral damages are recoverable in a damage suit predicated upon a breach of
contract of carriage only where there is fraud or bad faith. Since it is a matter of record that overbooking of flights is a common and
accepted practice of airlines in the United States and is specifically allowed under the Code of Federal Regulations by the Civil
Aeronautics Board, no fraud nor bad faith could be imputed on respondent TransWorld Airlines.

Moreover, while respondent TWA was remiss in not informing petitioners that the flight was overbooked and that even a person
with a confirmed reservation may be denied accommodation on an overbooked flight, nevertheless it ruled that such omission or
negligence cannot under the circumstances be considered to be so gross as to amount to bad faith.

Finally, it also held that there was no bad faith in placing petitioners in the wait-list along with forty-eight (48) other passengers
where full-fare first class tickets were given priority over discounted tickets.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

The dispositive portion of the decision of respondent Court of Appeals 3 dated October 25, 1991 states as
follows:red:chanrobles.com.ph

"WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the decision under review is hereby MODIFIED in that the award of moral and exemplary
damages to the plaintiffs is eliminated, and the defendant-appellant is hereby ordered to pay the plaintiffs the following
amounts:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"(1) US$159.49, or its peso equivalent at the time of payment, representing the price of Suthira Zalamea’s ticket for TWA Flight 007;

"(2) US$159.49, or its peso equivalent at the time of payment, representing the price of Cesar Zalamea’s ticket for TWA Flight 007;

"(3) P50,000.00 as and for attorney’s fees.

"(4) The costs of suit.

"SO ORDERED." 4

Not satisfied with the decision, petitioners raised the case on petition for review on certiorari and alleged the following errors
committed by the respondent Court of Appeals, to wit:chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

I.

". . . IN HOLDING THAT THERE WAS NO FRAUD OR BAD FAITH ON THE PART OF RESPONDENT TWA BECAUSE IT HAS A RIGHT TO
OVERBOOK FLIGHTS.

II.

". . . IN ELIMINATING THE AWARD OF EXEMPLARY DAMAGES.

III.

". . . IN NOT ORDERING THE REFUND OF LIANA ZALAMEA’S TWA TICKET AND PAYMENT FOR THE AMERICAN AIRLINES TICKETS." 5

That there was fraud or bad faith on the part of respondent airline when it did not allow petitioners to board their flight for Los
Angeles in spite of confirmed tickets cannot be disputed. The U.S. law or regulation allegedly authorizing overbooking has never
been proved. Foreign laws do not prove themselves nor can the courts take judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be
alleged and proved. 6 Written law may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the
legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied with a certificate that such officer has custody. The certificate may be
made by a secretary of an embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice-consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign
service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office. 7

Respondent TWA relied solely on the statement of Ms. Gwendolyn Lather, its customer service agent, in her deposition dated
January 27, 1986 that the Code of Federal Regulations of the Civil Aeronautics Board allows overbooking. Aside from said statement,
no official publication of said code was presented as evidence. Thus, respondent court’s finding that overbooking is specifically
allowed by the US Code of Federal Regulations has no basis in fact.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

Even if the claimed U.S. Code of Federal Regulations does exist, the same is not applicable to the case at bar in accordance with the
principle of lex loci contractus which requires that the law of the place where the airline ticket was issued should be applied by the
court where the passengers are residents and nationals of the forum and the ticket is issued in such State by the defendant airline. 8
Since the tickets were sold and issued in the Philippines, the applicable law in this case would be Philippine law.

Existing jurisprudence explicitly states that overbooking amounts to bad faith, entitling the passengers concerned to an award of
moral damages. In Alitalia Airways v. Court of Appeals, 9 where passengers with confirmed bookings were refused carriage on the
last minute, this Court held that when an airline issues a ticket to a passenger confirmed on a particular flight, on a certain date, a
contract of carriage arises, and the passenger has every right to expect that he would fly on that flight and on that date. If he does
not, then the carrier opens itself to a suit for breach of contract of carriage. Where an airline had deliberately overbooked, it took
the risk of having to deprive some passengers of their seats in case all of them would show up for check in. For the indignity and
inconvenience of being refused a confirmed seat on the last minute, said passenger is entitled to an award of moral damages.

Similarly, in Korean Airlines Co., Ltd. v. Court of Appeals, 10 where private respondent was not allowed to board the plane because
her seat had already been given to another passenger even before the allowable period for passengers to check in had lapsed
despite the fact that she had a confirmed ticket and she had arrived on time, this Court held that petitioner airline acted in bad faith
in violating private respondent’s rights under their contract of carriage and is therefore liable for the injuries she has sustained as a
result.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

In fact, existing jurisprudence abounds with rulings where the breach of contract of carriage amounts to bad faith. In Pan American
World Airways, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 11 where a would-be passenger had the necessary ticket, baggage claim and
clearance from immigration all clearly and unmistakably showing that she was indeed a confirmed passenger and that she was, in
fact, included in the passenger manifest of said flight, and yet was denied accommodation in said flight, this Court did not hesitate to
affirm the lower court’s finding awarding her damages.

A contract to transport passengers is quite different in kind and degree from any other contractual relation. So ruled this Court in
Zulueta v. Pan American World Airways, Inc. 12 This is so, for a contract of carriage generates a relation attended with public duty —
a duty to provide public service and convenience to its passengers which must be paramount to self-interest or enrichment. Thus, it
was also held that the switch of planes from Lockheed 1011 to a smaller Boeing 707 because there were only 138 confirmed
economy class passengers who could very well be accommodated in the smaller plane, thereby sacrificing the comfort of its first
class passengers for the sake of economy, amounts to bad faith. Such inattention and lack of care for the interest of its passengers
who are entitled to its utmost consideration entitles the passenger to an award of moral damages. 13

Even on the assumption that overbooking is allowed, respondent TWA is still guilty of bad faith in not informing its passengers
beforehand that it could breach the contract of carriage even if they have confirmed tickets if there was overbooking. Respondent
TWA should have incorporated stipulations on overbooking on the tickets issued or to properly inform its passengers about these
policies so that the latter would be prepared for such eventuality or would have the choice to ride with another
airline.chanrobles.com:cralaw:red

Respondent TWA contends that Exhibit I, the detached flight coupon upon which were written the name of the passenger and the
points of origin and destination, contained such a notice. An examination of Exhibit I does not bear this out. At any rate, said exhibit
was not offered for the purpose of showing the existence of a notice of overbooking but to show that Exhibit I was used for Flight
007 in first class of June 11, 1984 from New York to Los Angeles.

Moreover, respondent TWA was also guilty of not informing its passengers of its alleged policy of giving less priority to discounted
tickets. While the petitioners had checked in at the same time, and held confirmed tickets, yet, only one of them was allowed to
board the plane ten minutes before departure time because the full-fare ticket he was holding was given priority over discounted
tickets. The other two petitioners were left behind.

It is respondent TWA’s position that the practice of overbooking and the airline system of boarding priorities are reasonable policies,
which when implemented do not amount to bad faith. But the issue raised in this case is not the reasonableness of said policies but
whether or not said policies were incorporated or deemed written on petitioners’ contracts of carriage. Respondent TWA failed to
show that there are provisions to that effect. Neither did it present any argument of substance to show that petitioners were duly
apprised of the overbooked condition of the flight or that there is a hierarchy of boarding priorities in booking passengers. It is
evident that petitioners had the right to rely upon the assurance of respondent TWA, thru its agent in Manila, then in New York, that
their tickets represented confirmed seats without any qualification. The failure of respondent TWA to so inform them when it could
easily have done so thereby enabling respondent to hold on to them as passengers up to the last minute amounts to bad faith.
Evidently, respondent TWA placed its self-interest over the rights of petitioners under their contracts of carriage. Such conscious
disregard of petitioners’ rights makes respondent TWA liable for moral damages. To deter breach of contracts by respondent TWA in
similar fashion in the future, we adjudge respondent TWA liable for exemplary damages, as well.cralawnad

Petitioners also assail the respondent court’s decision not to require the refund of Liana Zalamea’s ticket because the ticket was
used by her father. On this score, we uphold the respondent court. Petitioners had not shown with certainty that the act of
respondent TWA in allowing Mr. Zalamea to use the ticket of her daughter was due to inadvertence or deliberate act. Petitioners
had also failed to establish that they did not accede to said arrangement. The logical conclusion, therefore, is that both petitioners
and respondent TWA agreed, albeit impliedly, to the course of action taken.

The respondent court erred, however, in not ordering the refund of the cost of the American Airlines tickets purchased and used by
petitioners Suthira and Liana. The evidence shows that petitioners Suthira and Liana were constrained to take the American Airlines
flight to Los Angeles not because they "opted not to use their TWA tickets on another TWA flight" but because respondent TWA
could not accommodate them either on the next TWA flight which was also fully booked. 14 The purchase of the American Airlines
tickets by petitioners Suthira and Liana was the consequence of respondent TWA’s unjustifiable breach of its contracts of carriage
with petitioners. In accordance with Article 2201, New Civil Code, respondent TWA should, therefore, be responsible for all damages
which may be reasonably attributed to the non-performance of its obligation. In the previously cited case of Alitalia Airways v. Court
of Appeals, 15 this Court explicitly held that a passenger is entitled to be reimbursed for the cost of the tickets he had to buy for a
flight on another airline. Thus, instead of simply being refunded for the cost of the unused TWA tickets, petitioners should be
awarded the actual cost of their flight from New York to Los Angeles. On this score, we differ from the trial court’s ruling which
ordered not only the reimbursement of the American Airlines tickets but also the refund of the unused TWA tickets. To require both
prestations would have enabled petitioners to fly from New York to Los Angeles without any fare being paid.chanrobles
virtualawlibrary chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph

The award to petitioners of attorney’s fees is also justified under Article 2208(2) of the Civil Code which allows recovery when the
defendant’s act or omission has compelled plaintiff to litigate or to incur expenses to protect his interest. However, the award for
moral and exemplary damages by the trial court is excessive in the light of the fact that only Suthira and Liana Zalamea were actually
"bumped off." An award of P50,000.00 moral damages and another P50,000.00 exemplary damages would suffice under the
circumstances obtaining in the instant case.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED and the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals is hereby MODIFIED to the extent
of adjudging respondent TransWorld Airlines to pay damages to petitioners in the following amounts, to wit:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library

(1) US$918.00 or its peso equivalent at the time of payment representing the price of the tickets bought by Suthira and Liana
Zalamea from American Airlines, to enable them to fly to Los Angeles from New York City;

(2) P50,000.00 as moral damages;

(3) P50,000.00 as exemplary damages;

(4) P50,000.00 as attorney’s fees; and

(5) Costs of suit.chanrobles virtualawlibrary chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado and Puno, JJ., concur.

A.M. No. RTJ-92-876 September 19, 1994

STATE PROSECUTORS, complainants,

vs.
JUDGE MANUEL T. MURO, Regional Trial Court, Branch 54, Manila, respondent.
PER CURIAM:

In assaying the requisite norms for qualifications and eminence of a magistrate, legal authorities place a premium on how he has
complied with his continuing duty to know the law. A quality thus considered essential to the judicial character is that of "a man of
learning who spends tirelessly the weary hours after midnight acquainting himself with the great body of traditions and the learning
of the law; is profoundly learned in all the learning of the law; and knows how to use that learning." 1

Obviously, it is the primary duty of a judge, which he owes to the public and to the legal profession, to know the very law he is
supposed to apply to a given controversy. He is called upon to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with the statutes and
procedural rules. Party litigants will have great faith in the administration of justice if judges cannot justly be accused of apparent
deficiency in their grasp of the legal principles. For, service in the judiciary means a continuous study and research on the law from
beginning to end. 2

In a letter-complaint 3 dated August 19, 1992, respondent Judge Manuel T. Muro of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch
54, was charged by State Prosecutors Nilo C. Mariano, George C. Dee and Paterno V. Tac-an with ignorance of the law, grave
misconduct and violations of Rules 2.01, 3.01 and 3.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, committed as follows:

1. That on August 13, 1992, respondent judge issued an Order dismissing eleven (11) cases (docketed as Crim.
Cases Nos. 92-101959 to 92- 101969, inclusive) filed by the undersigned complainant prosecutors (members of the
DOJ Panel of Prosecutors) against the accused Mrs. Imelda Romualdez Marcos, for Violation of Central Bank
Foreign Exchange Restrictions, as consolidated in CB Circular No. 960, in relation to the penal provisions of Sec. 34
of R.A. 265, as amended, . . .;

2. That respondent Judge issued his Order solely on the basis of newspaper reports (August 11, 1992 issues of the
Philippine Daily Inquirer and the Daily Globe) concerning the announcement on August 10, 1992 by the President
of the Philippines of the lifting by the government of all foreign exchange restrictions and the arrival at such
decision by the Monetary Board as per statement of Central Bank Governor Jose Cuisia;

3. That claiming that the reported announcement of the Executive Department on the lifting of foreign exchange
restrictions by two newspapers which are reputable and of national circulation had the effect of repealing Central
Bank Circular No. 960, as allegedly supported by Supreme Court decisions . . ., the Court contended that it was
deprived of jurisdiction, and, therefore, motu, prop(r)io had to dismiss all the eleven cases aforementioned "for
not to do so opens this Court to charges of trying cases over which it has no more jurisdiction;"

4. That in dismissing aforecited cases on August 13, 1992 on the basis of a Central Bank Circular or Monetary Board
Resolution which as of date hereof, has not even been officially issued, and basing his Order/decision on a mere
newspaper account of the advance announcement made by the President of the said fact of lifting or liberalizing
foreign exchange controls, respondent judge acted prematurely and in indecent haste, as he had no way of
determining the full intent of the new CB Circular or Monetary Board resolution, and whether the same provided
for exception, as in the case of persons who had pending criminal cases before the courts for violations of Central
Bank Circulars and/or regulations previously issued on the matter;

5. That respondent Judge's arrogant and cavalier posture in taking judicial notice purportedly as a matter of public
knowledge a mere newspaper account that the President had announced the lifting of foreign exchange
restrictions as basis for his assailed order of dismissal is highly irregular, erroneous and misplaced. For the
respondent judge to take judicial notice thereof even before it is officially released by the Central Bank and its full
text published as required by law to be effective shows his precipitate action in utter disregard of the fundamental
precept of due process which the People is also entitled to and exposes his gross ignorance of the law, thereby
tarnishing public confidence in the integrity of the judiciary. How can the Honorable Judge take judicial notice of
something which has not yet come into force and the contents, shape and tenor of which have not yet been
published and ascertained to be the basis of judicial action? The Honorable Judge had miserably failed to
"endeavor diligently to ascertain the facts" in the case at bar contrary to Rule 3.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct
constituting Grave Misconduct;
 6. That respondent Judge did not even ha(ve) the prudence of requiring first the comment of the prosecution on
the effect of aforesaid Central Bank Circular/Monetary Board resolution on the pending cases before dismissing
the same, thereby denying the Government of its right to due process;

7. That the lightning speed with which respondent Judge acted to dismiss the cases may be gleaned from the fact
that such precipitate action was undertaken despite already scheduled continuation of trial dates set in the order
of the court (the prosecution having started presenting its evidence . . .) dated August 11, 1992 to wit: August 31,
September 3, 10, 21, & 23 and October 1, 1992, all at 9:30 o'clock in the morning, in brazen disregard of all notions
of fair play, thereby depriving the Government of its right to be heard, and clearly exposing his bias and partiality;
and

8. That, in fact, the motive of respondent Judge in dismissing the case without even waiting for a motion to quash
filed by the counsel for accused has even placed his dismissal Order suspect.

Pursuant to a resolution of this Court dated September 8, 1992, respondent judge filed his comment, 4 contending, inter alia, that
there was no need to await publication of the Central Bank (CB) circular repealing the existing law on foreign exchange controls for
the simple reason that the public announcement made by the President in several newspapers of general circulation lifting foreign
exchange controls was total, absolute, without qualification, and was immediately effective; that having acted only on the basis of
such announcement, he cannot be blamed for relying on the erroneous statement of the President that the new foreign exchange
rules rendered moot and academic the cases filed against Mrs. Marcos, and which was corrected only on August 17, 1992 but
published in the newspapers on August 18, 1992, and only after respondent judge had issued his order of dismissal dated August 13,
1992; that the President was ill-advised by his advisers and, instead of rescuing the Chief Executive from embarrassment by
assuming responsibility for errors in the latter's announcement, they chose to toss the blame for the consequence of their failures to
respondent judge who merely acted on the basis of the announcements of the President which had become of public knowledge;
that the "saving clause" under CB Circular No. 1353 specifically refers only to pending actions or investigations involving violations of
CB Circular No. 1318, whereas the eleven cases dismissed involved charges for violations of CB Circular No. 960, hence the accused
cannot be tried and convicted under a law different from that under which she was charged; that assuming that respondent judge
erred in issuing the order of dismissal, the proper remedy should have been an appeal therefrom but definitely not an administrative
complaint for his dismissal; that a mistake committed by a judge should not necessarily be imputed as ignorance of the law; and that
a "court can reverse or modify a doctrine but it does not show ignorance of the justices or judges whose decisions were reversed or
modified" because "even doctrines initiated by the Supreme Court are later reversed, so how much more for the lower courts?"

He further argued that no hearing was necessary since the prosecution had nothing to explain because, as he theorized, "What
explanation could have been given? That the President was talking 'through his hat' (to use a colloquialism) and should not be
believed? That I should wait for the publication (as now alleged by complainants), of a still then non-existent CB circular? . . . As it
turned out, CB Circular No. 3153 (sic) does not affect my dismissal order because the said circular's so-called saving clause does not
refer to CB Circular 960 under which the charges in the dismissed cases were based;" that it was discretionary on him to take judicial
notice of the facts which are of public knowledge, pursuant to Section 2 of Rule 129; that the contention of complainants that he
acted prematurely and in indecent haste for basing his order of dismissal on a mere newspaper account is contrary to the wordings
of the newspaper report wherein the President announced the lifting of controls as an accomplished fact, not as an intention to be
effected in the future, because of the use of the present perfect tense or past tense "has lifted," not that he "intends to lift," foreign
exchange controls.

Finally, respondent judge asseverates that complainants who are officers of the Department of Justice, violated Section 6, Rule 140
of the Rules of Court which provides that "proceedings against judges of first instance shall be private and confidential" when they
caused to be published in the newspapers the filing of the present administrative case against him; and he emphasizes the fact that
he had to immediately resolve a simple and pure legal matter in consonance with the admonition of the Supreme Court for speedy
disposition of cases.

In their reply 5 and supplemental reply, 6 complainants aver that although the saving clause under Section 16 of CB Circular No. 1353
made specific reference to CB Circular No. 1318, it will be noted that Section 111 of Circular No. 1318, which contains a saving clause
substantially similar to that of the new circular, in turn refers to and includes Circular No. 960. Hence, whether under Circular No.
1318 or Circular No. 1353, pending cases involving violations of Circular No. 960 are excepted from the coverage thereof. Further, it
is alleged that the precipitate dismissal of the eleven cases, without according the prosecution the opportunity to file a motion to
quash or a comment, or even to show cause why the cases against accused Imelda R. Marcos should not be dismissed, is clearly
reflective of respondent's partiality and bad faith. In effect, respondent judge acted as if he were the advocate of the accused.
On December 9, 1993, this Court issued a resolution referring the complaint to the Office of the Court Administrator for evaluation,
report and recommendation, pursuant to Section 7, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as revised, there being no factual issues involved.
The corresponding report and recommendation, 7 dated February 14, 1994, was submitted by Deputy Court Administrator Juanito A.
Bernad, with the approval of Court Administrator Ernani Cruz-Paño.

The questioned order 8 of respondent judge reads as follows:

These eleven (11) cases are for Violation of Central Bank Foreign Exchange Restrictions as consolidated in CB
Circular No. 960 in relation to the penal provision of Sec. 34 of R.A. 265, as amended.

The accused Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos pleaded not guilty to all these cases; apparently the other accused in some of
these cases, Roberto S. Benedicto, was not arrested and therefore the Court did not acquire jurisdiction over his
person; trial was commenced as against Mrs. Marcos.

His Excellency, the President of the Philippines, announced on August 10, 1992 that the government has lifted all
foreign exchange restrictions and it is also reported that Central Bank Governor Jose Cuisia said that the Monetary
Board arrived at such decision (issue of the Philippine Daily Inquirer, August 11, 1992 and issue of the Daily Globe
of the same date). The Court has to give full confidence and credit to the reported announcement of the Executive
Department, specially from the highest official of that department; the Courts are charged with judicial notice of
matters which are of public knowledge, without introduction of proof, the announcement published in at least the
two newspapers cited above which are reputable and of national circulation.

Per several cases decided by the Supreme Court (People vs. Alcaras, 56 Phil. 520, People vs. Francisco, 56 Phil. 572,
People vs. Pastor, 77 Phil. 1000, People vs. Crisanto Tamayo, 61 Phil. 225), among others, it was held that the
repeal of a penal law without re-enactment extinguishes the right to prosecute or punish the offense committed
under the old law and if the law repealing the prior penal law fails to penalize the acts which constituted the
offense defined and penalized in the repealed law, the repealed law carries with it the deprivation of the courts of
jurisdiction to try, convict and sentence persons charged with violations of the old law prior to its repeal. Under
the aforecited decisions this doctrine applies to special laws and not only to the crimes punishable in the Revised
Penal Code, such as the Import Control Law. The Central Bank Circular No. 960 under which the accused Mrs.
Marcos is charged is considered as a penal law because violation thereof is penalized with specific reference to the
provision of Section 34 of Republic Act 265, which penalizes violations of Central Bank Circular No. 960, produces
the effect cited in the Supreme Court decisions and since according to the decisions that repeal deprives the Court
of jurisdiction, this Court motu proprio dismisses all the eleven (11) cases as a forestated in the caption, for not to
do so opens this Court to charges of trying cases over which it has no more jurisdiction.

This order was subsequently assailed in a petition for certiorari filed with the Court of Appeals, entitled "People of the Philippines vs.
Hon. Manuel T. Muro, Judge, RTC of Manila, Br. 54 and Imelda R. Marcos," docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 29349. When required to file
her comment, private respondent Marcos failed to file any. Likewise, after the appellate court gave due course to the petition,
private respondent was ordered, but again failed despite notice, to file an answer to the petition and to show cause why no writ of
preliminary injunction should issue. Eventually, on April 29, 1993, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision 9 setting aside the order
of August 13, 1992, and reinstating Criminal Cases Nos. 92-101959 to 92-101969.

In finding that respondent judge acted in excess of jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the order of dismissal,
the appellate court held that:

The order was issued motu proprio, i.e., without any motion to dismiss filed by counsel for the accused, without
giving an opportunity for the prosecution to be heard, and solely on the basis of newspaper reports announcing
that the President has lifted all foreign exchange restrictions.

The newspaper report is not the publication required by law in order that the enactment can become effective and
binding. Laws take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette or
in a newspaper of general circulation unless it is otherwise provided (Section 1, Executive Order No. 200). The full
text of CB Circular 1353, series of 1992, entitled "Further Liberalizing Foreign Exchange Regulation" was published
in the August 27, 1992 issue of the Manila Chronicle, the Philippine Star and the Manila Bulletin. Per certification of
the CB Corporate Affairs Office, CB Circular No. 1353 took effect on September 2 . . . .
 Considering that respondent judge admittedly had not seen the official text of CB Circular No. 1353, he was in no
position to rule judiciously on whether CB Circular No. 960, under which the accused Mrs. Marcos is charged, was
already repealed by CB Circular No. 1353. . . .

xxx xxx xxx

A cursory reading of the . . . provision would have readily shown that the repeal of the regulations on non-trade
foreign exchange transactions is not absolute, as there is a provision that with respect to violations of former
regulations that are the subject of pending actions or investigations, they shall be governed by the regulations
existing at the time the cause of action (arose). Thus his conclusion that he has lost jurisdiction over the criminal
cases is precipitate and hasty. Had he awaited the filing of a motion to dismiss by the accused, and given
opportunity for the prosecution to comment/oppose the same, his resolution would have been the result of
deliberation, not speculation.

I. The doctrine of judicial notice rests on the wisdom and discretion of the courts. The power to take judicial notice is to be exercised
by courts with caution; care must be taken that the requisite notoriety exists; and every reasonable doubt on the subject should be
promptly resolved in the negative. 10

Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three material requisites: (1) the matter must be one of common and general
knowledge; (2) it must be well and authoritatively settled and not doubtful or uncertain; and (3) it must be known to be within the
limits of the jurisdiction of the court. 11 The provincial guide in determining what facts may be assumed to be judicially known is that
of notoriety. 12 Hence, it can be said that judicial notice is limited to facts evidenced by public records and facts of general
notoriety. 13

To say that a court will take judicial notice of a fact is merely another way of saying that the usual form of evidence will be dispensed
with if knowledge of the fact can be otherwise acquired. 14 This is because the court assumes that the matter is so notorious that it
will not be disputed. 15 But judicial notice is not judicial knowledge. The mere personal knowledge of the judge is not the judicial
knowledge of the court, and he is not authorized to make his individual knowledge of a fact, not generally or professionally known,
the basis of his action. Judicial cognizance is taken only of those matters which are "commonly" known. 16

Things of "common knowledge," of which courts take judicial notice, may be matters coming to the knowledge of men generally in
the course of the ordinary experiences of life, or they may be matters which are generally accepted by mankind as true and are
capable of ready and unquestioned demonstration. 17 Thus, facts which are universally known, and which may be found in
encyclopedias, dictionaries or other publications, are judicially noticed, provided they are of such universal notoriety and so
generally understood that they may be regarded as forming part of the common knowledge of every person. 18

Respondent judge, in the guise of exercising discretion and on the basis of a mere newspaper account which is sometimes even
referred to as hearsay evidence twice removed, took judicial notice of the supposed lifting of foreign exchange controls, a matter
which was not and cannot be considered of common knowledge or of general notoriety. Worse, he took cognizance of an
administrative regulation which was not yet in force when the order of dismissal was issued. Jurisprudence dictates that judicial
notice cannot be taken of a statute before it becomes effective. 19 The reason is simple. A law which is not yet in force and hence,
still inexistent, cannot be of common knowledge capable of ready and unquestionable demonstration, which is one of the
requirements before a court can take judicial notice of a fact.

Evidently, it was impossible for respondent judge, and it was definitely not proper for him, to have taken cognizance of CB Circular
No. 1353, when the same was not yet in force at the time the improvident order of dismissal was issued.

II. Central Bank Circular No. 1353, which took effect on September 1, 1992, further liberalized the foreign exchange regulations on
receipts and disbursements of residents arising from non-trade and trade transactions. Section 16 thereof provides for a saving
clause, thus:

Sec. 16. Final Provisions of CB Circular No. 1318. - All the provisions in Chapter X of CB Circular No. 1318 insofar as
they are not inconsistent with, or contrary to the provisions of this Circular, shall remain in full force and
effect: Provided, however, that any regulation on non-trade foreign exchange transactions which has been
repealed, amended or modified by this Circular, violations of which are the subject of pending actions or
investigations, shall not be considered repealed insofar as such pending actions or investigations are concerned, it
 being understood that as to such pending actions or investigations, the regulations existing at the time the cause
of action accrued shall govern.

Respondent judge contends that the saving clause refers only to the provisions of Circular No. 1318, whereas the eleven criminal
cases he dismissed involve a violation of CB Circular No. 960. Hence, he insists, Circular No. 960 is deemed repealed by the new
circular and since the former is not covered by the saving clause in the latter, there is no more basis for the charges involved in the
criminal cases which therefore warrant a dismissal of the same. The contention is patently unmeritorious.

Firstly, the second part of the saving clause in Circular No. 1353 explicitly provides that "any regulation on non-trade foreign
transactions which has been repealed, amended or modified by this Circular, violations of which are the subject of pending actions or
investigations, shall not be considered repealed insofar as such pending actions or investigations are concerned, it being understood
that as to such pending actions or investigations, the regulations existing at the time the cause of action accrued shall govern." The
terms of the circular are clear and unambiguous and leave no room for interpretation. In the case at bar, the accused in the eleven
cases had already been arraigned, had pleaded not guilty to the charges of violations of Circular No. 960, and said cases had already
been set for trial when Circular No. 1353 took effect. Consequently, the trial court was and is supposed to proceed with the hearing
of the cases in spite of the existence of Circular No. 1353.

Secondly, had respondent judge only bothered to read a little more carefully the texts of the circulars involved, he would have
readily perceived and known that Circular No. 1318 also contains a substantially similar saving clause as that found in Circular No.
1353, since Section 111 of the former provides:

Sec. 111. Repealing clause. - All existing provisions of Circulars 365, 960 and 1028, including amendments thereto,
with the exception of the second paragraph of Section 68 of Circular 1028, as well as all other existing Central Bank
rules and regulations or parts thereof, which are inconsistent with or contrary to the provisions of this Circular, are
hereby repealed or modified accordingly: Provided, however, that regulations, violations of which are the subject
of pending actions or investigations, shall be considered repealed insofar as such pending actions or investigations
are concerned, it being understood that as to such pending actions or investigations, the regulations existing at the
time the cause of action accrued shall govern.

It unequivocally appears from the section above quoted that although Circular No. 1318 repealed Circular No. 960, the former
specifically excepted from its purview all cases covered by the old regulations which were then pending at the time of the passage of
the new regulations. Thus, any reference made to Circular No. 1318 necessarily involves and affects Circular No. 960.

III. It has been said that next in importance to the duty of rendering a righteous judgment is that of doing it in such a manner as will
beget no suspicion of the fairness and integrity of the judge. 20 This means that a judge should not only render a just, correct and
impartial decision but should do so in such a manner as to be free from any suspicion as to its fairness and impartiality and as to his
integrity. While a judge should possess proficiency in law in order that he can competently construe and enforce the law, it is more
important that he should act and behave in such a manner that the parties before him should have confidence in his impartiality.
Thus, it is not enough that he decides cases without bias and favoritism. Nor is it sufficient that he in fact rids himself of
prepossessions. His actuations should moreover inspire that belief. Like Caesar's wife, a judge must not only be pure but beyond
suspicion. 21

Moreover, it has always heretofore been the rule that in disposing of controverted cases, judges should show their full
understanding of the case, avoid the suspicion of arbitrary conclusion, promote confidence in their intellectual integrity and
contribute useful precedents to the growth of the law. 22 A judge should be mindful that his duty is the application of general law to
particular instances, that ours is a government of laws and not of men, and that he violates his duty as a minister of justice under
such a system if he seeks to do what he may personally consider substantial justice in a particular case and disregards the general
law as he knows it to be binding on him. Such action may have detrimental consequences beyond the immediate controversy. He
should administer his office with due regard to the integrity of the system of the law itself, remembering that he is not a depository
of arbitrary power, but a judge under the sanction of the law. 23 These are immutable principles that go into the very essence of the
task of dispensing justice and we see no reason why they should not be duly considered in the present case.

The assertion of respondent judge that there was no need to await publication of Circular No. 1353 for the reason that the public
announcement made by the President in several newspapers of general circulation lifting foreign exchange controls is total,
absolute, without qualification, and immediately effective, is beyond comprehension. As a judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, respondent is supposed to be well-versed in the elementary legal mandates on the publication of laws before they take
effect. It is inconceivable that respondent should insist on an altogether different and illogical interpretation of an established and
well-entrenched rule if only to suit his own personal opinion and, as it were, to defend his indefensible action. It was not for him to
indulge or even to give the appearance of catering to the at-times human failing of yielding to first impressions. 24 He having done
so, in the face of the foregoing premises, this Court is hard put to believe that he indeed acted in good faith.

IV. This is not a simple case of a misapplication or erroneous interpretation of the law. The very act of respondent judge in
altogether dismissing sua sponte the eleven criminal cases without even a motion to quash having been filed by the accused, and
without at least giving the prosecution the basic opportunity to be heard on the matter by way of a written comment or on oral
argument, is not only a blatant denial of elementary due process to the Government but is palpably indicative of bad faith and
partiality.

The avowed desire of respondent judge to speedily dispose of the cases as early as possible is no license for abuse of judicial power
and discretion, 25 nor does such professed objective, even if true, justify a deprivation of the prosecution's right to be heard and a
violation of its right to due process of
law. 26

The lightning speed, to borrow the words of complainants, with which respondent judge resolved to dismiss the cases without the
benefit of a hearing and without reasonable notice to the prosecution inevitably opened him to suspicion of having acted out of
partiality for the accused. Regardless of how carefully he may have evaluated changes in the factual situation and legal standing of
the cases, as a result of the newspaper report, the fact remains that he gave the prosecution no chance whatsoever to show or
prove that it had strong evidence of the guilt of the accused. To repeat, he thereby effectively deprived the prosecution of its right
to due process. 27 More importantly, notwithstanding the fact that respondent was not sure of the effects and implications of the
President's announcement, as by his own admission he was in doubt whether or not he should dismiss the cases, 28 he nonetheless
deliberately refrained from requiring the prosecution to comment thereon. In a puerile defense of his action, respondent judge can
but rhetorically ask: "What explanation could have been given? That the President was talking 'through his hat' and should not be
believed? That I should wait for the publication of a still then non- existent CB Circular?" The pretended cogency of this ratiocination
cannot stand even the minutest legal scrutiny.

In order that bias may not be imputed to a judge, he should have the patience and circumspection to give the opposing party a
chance to present his evidence even if he thinks that the oppositor's proofs might not be adequate to overthrow the case for the
other party. A display of petulance and impatience in the conduct of the trial is a norm of conduct which is inconsistent with the
"cold neutrality of an impartial judge." 29 At the very least, respondent judge acted injudiciously and with unjustified haste in the
outright dismissal of the eleven cases, and thereby rendered his actuation highly dubious.

V. It bears stressing that the questioned order of respondent judge could have seriously and substantially affected the rights of the
prosecution had the accused invoked the defense of double jeopardy, considering that the dismissal was ordered after arraignment
and without the consent of said accused. This could have spawned legal complications and inevitable delay in the criminal
proceedings, were it not for the holding of the Court of Appeals that respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction. This saved the day for the People since in the absence of jurisdiction, double jeopardy will not set
in. To stress this point, and as a caveat to trial courts against falling into the same judicial error, we reiterate what we have
heretofore declared:

It is settled doctrine that double jeopardy cannot be invoked against this Court's setting aside of the trial court's
judgment of dismissal or acquittal where the prosecution which represents the sovereign people in criminal cases
is denied due process. . . . .

Where the prosecution is deprived of a fair opportunity to prosecute and prove its case, its right to due process is
thereby violated.

The cardinal precept is that where there is a violation of basic constitutional rights, courts are ousted of their
jurisdiction. Thus, the violation of the State's right to due process raises a serious jurisdictional issue . . . which
cannot be glossed over or disregarded at will. Where the denial of the fundamental right of due process is
apparent, a decision rendered in disregard of that right is void for lack of jurisdiction . . . . 30

It is also significant that accused Marcos, despite due notice, never submitted either her comment on or an answer to the petition
for certiorari as required by the Court of Appeals, nor was double jeopardy invoked in her defense. This serves to further underscore
the fact that the order of dismissal was clearly unjustified and erroneous. Furthermore, considering that the accused is a prominent
public figure with a record of influence and power, it is not easy to allay public skepticism and suspicions on how said dismissal order
came to be, to the consequent although undeserved discredit of the entire judiciary.

VI. To hold a judge liable for rendering a manifestly unjust order through inexcusable negligence or ignorance, it must be clearly
shown that although he has acted without malice, he failed to observe in the performance of his duty that diligence, prudence and
care which the law is entitled to exact in the rendering of any public service. Negligence and ignorance are inexcusable if they imply
a manifest injustice which cannot be explained by a reasonable interpretation, and even though there is a misunderstanding or error
of the law applied, it nevertheless results logically and reasonably, and in a very clear and indisputable manner, in the notorious
violation of the legal precept. 31

In the present case, a cursory perusal of the comment filed by respondent judge reveals that no substantial argument has been
advanced in plausible justification of his act. He utterly failed to show any legal, factual, or even equitable justification for the
dismissal of the eleven criminal cases. The explanation given is no explanation at all. The strained and fallacious submissions therein
do not speak well of respondent and cannot but further depreciate his probity as a judge. On this point, it is best that pertinent
unedited excerpts from his comment 32 be quoted by way of graphic illustration and emphasis:

On the alleged ignorance of the law imputed to me, it is said that I issued the Order dismissing the eleven (11)
cases against Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos on the basis of newspaper reports referred to in paragraph 2 of the letter
complaint without awaiting the official publication of the Central Bank Circular. Ordinarily a Central Bank
Circular/Resolution must be published in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation, but the
lifting of "all foreign exchange controls" was announced by the President of the Philippines WITHOUT
QUALIFICATIONS; as published in the Daily Globe, August 11, 1992" the government has lifted ALL foreign
exchange controls," and in the words of the Philippine Daily Inquirer report of the same date "The government
yesterday LIFTED the LAST remaining restrictions on foreign exchange transactions, . . ." (emphasis in both
quotations supplied) not only the President made the announcement but also the Central Bank Governor Jose
Cuisia joined in the announcement by saying that "the Monetary Board arrived at the decision after noting how
the "partial liberalization" initiated early this year worked."

Therefore, because of the ABSOLUTE lifting of ALL restrictions on foreign exchange transactions, there was no
need to await the publication of the repealing circular of the Central Bank. The purpose of requiring publication of
laws and administrative rules affecting the public is to inform the latter as to how they will conduct their affairs
and how they will conform to the laws or the rules. In this particular case, with the total lifting of the controls,
there is no need to await publication. It would have been different if the circular that in effect repealed Central
Bank Circular No. 960, under which the accused was charged in the cases dismissed by me, had provided for
penalties and/or modified the provisions of said Circular No. 960.

The Complainants state that the lifting of controls was not yet in force when I dismissed the cases but it should be
noted that in the report of the two (2) newspapers aforequoted, the President's announcement of the lifting of
controls was stated in the present perfect tense (Globe) or past tense (Inquirer). In other words, it has already
been lifted; the announcement did not say that the government INTENDS to lift all foreign exchange restrictions
but instead says that the government "has LIFTED all foreign exchange controls," and in the other newspaper cited
above, that "The government yesterday lifted the last remaining restrictions on foreign exchange transactions".
The lifting of the last remaining exchange regulations effectively cancelled or repealed Circular No. 960.

The President, who is the Chief Executive, publicly announced the lifting of all foreign exchange regulations. The
President has within his control directly or indirectly the Central Bank of the Philippines, the Secretary of Finance
being the Chairman of the Monetary Board which decides the policies of the Central Bank.

No official bothered to correct or qualify the President's announcement of August 10, published the following day,
nor made an announcement that the lifting of the controls do not apply to cases already pending, not until August
17 (the fourth day after my Order, and the third day after report of said order was published) and after the
President said on August 17, reported in the INQUIRER's issue of August 18, 1992, that the "new foreign exchange
rules have nullified government cases against Imelda R. Marcos, telling reporters that the charges against the
widow of former President Marcos "have become moot and academic" because of new ruling(s) which allow free
flow of currency in and out of the country" (Note, parenthetically, the reference to "new rules" not to "rules still to
be drafted"). The INQUIRER report continues: "A few hours later, presidential spokeswoman Annabelle Abaya said,
RAMOS (sic) had "corrected himself'." "He had been belatedly advised by the Central Bank Governor Jose Cuisia
 and Justice Secretary Franklin Drilon that the Monetary Board Regulation excluded from its coverage all criminal
cases pending in court and such a position shall stand legal scrutiny', Mrs. Abaya, said."

I will elaborate on two points:

1. If the President was wrong in making the August 10 announcement (published in August 11, 1992, newspapers)
and in the August 17 announcement, SUPRA, and thus I should have relied on the Presidential announcements,
and there is basis to conclude that the President was at the very least ILL-SERVED by his financial and legal
advisers, because no one bothered to advise the President to correct his announcements, not until August 17,
1992, a few hours after the President had made another announcement as to the charges against Imelda Marcos
having been rendered moot and academic. The President has a lot of work to do, and is not, to my knowledge, a
financier, economist, banker or lawyer. It therefore behooved his subalterns to give him timely (not "belated")
advice, and brief him on matters of immediate and far-reaching concerns (such as the lifting of foreign exchange
controls, designed, among others to encourage the entry of foreign investments). Instead of rescuing the Chief
Executive from embarrassment by assuming responsibility for errors in the latter's announcement, these advisers
have chosen to toss the blame for the consequence of their failing to me, who only acted on the basis of
announcements of their Chief, which had become of public knowledge.

xxx xxx xxx

The Court strongly feels that it has every right to assume and expect that respondent judge is possessed with more than ordinary
credentials and qualifications to merit his appointment as a presiding judge in the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial
Region, stationed in the City of Manila itself. It is, accordingly, disheartening and regrettable to note the nature of the arguments
and the kind of logic that respondent judge would want to impose on this Court notwithstanding the manifest lack of cogency
thereof. This calls to mind similar scenarios and how this Court reacted thereto.

In one case, an RTC Judge was administratively charged for acquitting the accused of a violation of CB Circular No. 960 despite the
fact that the accused was apprehended with US$355,349.00 while boarding a plane for Hongkong, erroneously ruling that the State
must first prove criminal intent to violate the law and benefit from the illegal act, and further ordering the return of US$3,000.00 out
of the total amount seized, on the mistaken interpretation that the CB circular exempts such amount from seizure. Respondent
judge therein was ordered dismissed from the government service for gross incompetence and ignorance of the law. 33

Subsequently, the Court dismissed another RTC judge, with forfeiture of retirement benefits, for gross ignorance of the law and for
knowingly rendering an unjust order or judgment when he granted bail to an accused charged with raping an 11-year old girl,
despite the contrary recommendation of the investigating judge, and thereafter granted the motion to dismiss the case allegedly
executed by the complainant. 34

Similarly, an RTC judge who was described by this Court as one "who is ignorant of fairly elementary and quite familiar legal
principles and administrative regulations, has a marked penchant for applying unorthodox, even strange theories and concepts in
the adjudication of controversies, exhibits indifference to and even disdain for due process and the rule of law, applies the law
whimsically, capriciously and oppressively, and displays bias and impartiality," was dismissed from the service with forfeiture of all
retirement benefits and with prejudice to reinstatement in any branch of the government or any of its agencies or
instrumentalities. 35

Still in another administrative case, an RTJ judge was also dismissed by this Court for gross ignorance of the law after she ordered, in
a probate proceeding, the cancellation of the certificates of title issued in the name of the complainant, without affording due
process to the latter and other interested parties. 36

Only recently, an RTC judge who had been reinstated in the service was dismissed after he acquitted all the accused in four criminal
cases for illegal possession of firearms, on the ground that there was no proof of malice or deliberate intent on the part of the
accused to violate the law. The Court found him guilty of gross ignorance of the law, his error of judgment being almost deliberate
and tantamount to knowingly rendering an incorrect and unjust judgment. 37

ACCORDINGLY, on the foregoing premises and considerations, the Court finds respondent Judge Manuel T. Muro guilty of gross
ignorance of the law. He is hereby DISMISSED from the service, such dismissal to carry with it cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of
leave credits and retirement benefits, and disqualification from reemployment in the government service. 38
Respondent is hereby ordered to CEASE and DESIST immediately from rendering any judgment or order, or continuing any judicial
action or proceeding whatsoever, effective upon receipt of this decision.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno, Vitug and Kapunan, JJ.,
concur.

Bidin, is on official leave.

[G.R. No. 119184. July 21, 1997.]

THE HEIRS OF FELICIDAD CANQUE namely: SURVIVING SPOUSE MARCELINO and children MARIANO, LEONILO, PERFECTA,
MEXIQUELA, EMILIO, MARCELINO JR., ALEJANDRO, the Heirs of JESUS and ADRIANO, all surnamed CANQUE, Petitioners, v. COURT
OF APPEALS, THE RURAL BANK OF MATANAO (DAVAO DEL SUR), INC. and/or CONRADO ANTONIO, Respondents.

Leonardo D. Suario for Petitioners.

Goc-Ong & Associates for Private Respondents.

SYNOPSIS

On October 12, 1977, the spouses Canque obtained a loan of P15,000.00 from defendant rural bank secured by a real estate
mortgage over their parcel of land. This loan was duly paid. After the death of the wife, or on March 7, 1990, the husband secured
another loan from defendant rural bank for P25,000.00. This second loan not having been paid, the bank extrajudicially foreclosed
the real estate mortgage and sold the property at the auction sale with the bank as the highest bidder. On September 9, 1983, the
sheriff’s certificate of sale was registered; on October 18, 1985, an affidavit of consolidation of ownership and a deed of absolute
sale were executed, and on December 23, 1995, a new title was issued in the name of the bank. After seven years from the
registration of the certificate of sale, the husband and his children offered to redeem the property but the bank refused. Thus, they
filed a complaint on September 7, 1990 to compel the bank to allow them to repurchase their land.

The trial court allowed the husband and his children to exercise their right of redemption commencing on October 18, 1995, the
date they executed an affidavit of consolidation of ownership and deed of absolute sale. The Court of Appeals, however, ruled that
the right of redemption should be reckoned from September 9, 1983, the date of the registration of the sheriff’s certificate of sale.
Since the complaint was filed only on September 7, 1990, or almost seven (7) years from the registration of the certificate of sale,
the five-year prescriptive period had already prescribed.

The Supreme Court ruled that under the Public Land Act, the petitioners, husband and children, had a period of two (2) years from
September 9, 1983, the date of registration of the Sheriff’s Certificate of Sale, or until September 9, 1985 to exercise their right of
redemption, and an additional period of five (5) years from September 9, 1985 or until September 9, 1990 within which to exercise
their right to repurchase. Petitioners’ right to redeem their land had not expired on September 7, 1990 when they filed the
complaint against the respondent rural bank.

Petition granted and judgment set aside.

SYLLABUS

1. CIVIL LAW; PUBLIC LAND ACT; MORTGAGE OF LAND COVERED BY FREE PATENT; EXTRAJUDICIAL FORECLOSURE; SEVEN (7) YEARS
PERIOD OF REDEMPTION; CASE AT BAR. — This Court reiterates the dictum that the mortgagor of titled real estate acquired under
the Public Land Act but foreclosed by a rural bank, may redeem said property within two (2) years from the registration of the
sheriff’s certificate of sale; and if the said mortgagor fails to exercise such right, he or his heirs may still purchase the land within five
years from the expiration of the two-year redemption period. (Rural Bank of Davao City v. Court of Appeals, 217 SCRA 569 [January
27, 1993]) In the case at bar, the Sheriff’s" "Certificate of Sale was registered on September 9, 1983. Thus, based on the foregoing
dictum, the petitioners, whose land was mortgaged to and foreclosed by a rural bank, had a period of two years or until September
9, 1985 to exercise their right of redemption. And in line with the mandate of Sec. 119 of the Public Land Act, they had an additional
period of five years from the latter date or until September 9, 1990 to exercise their right to repurchase. Thus, the petitioners’ right
to redeem their land had not expired on September 7, 1990 when they filed suit against private respondent to compel the latter to
allow the former to repurchase their land. In sum, we rule that the disposition of the Regional Trial Court allowing the redemption is
correct although for a different reason, and that the Court of Appeals erred in failing to add the two-year redemption period to the
five-year repurchase right granted by the Public Land Act.

2. REMEDIAL LAW; COURTS; ENJOINED TO TAKE COGNIZANCE OF DECISIONS RENDERED BY THE SUPREME COURT. — Clearly, the
Court of Appeals committed a reversible error because it palpably failed to consider in its August 25, 1994 Decision the
aforementioned ruling of the Supreme Court promulgated twenty months earlier on January 27, 1993. Unfortunately, this is not the
first time for this Court to come upon such a slip. Peltan Development v. Court of Appeals ruled that "every court must take
cognizance of decisions this Court has rendered because they are proper subjects of mandatory judicial notice . . . [and] more
importantly form part of the legal system." We stress that members of the bench have a responsibility to know and to apply the
latest holdings of the Supreme Court. The nature of their calling requires no less.

3. ID.; EVIDENCE; FACTUAL FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT, GENERALLY NOT DISTURBED ON APPEAL. — Whether the mortgage
which the Canque spouses contracted with private respondent bank was intended by the parties to be a continuing one, a factual
issue passed upon sub-silencio by the Court of Appeals, had been threshed out by the trial court. The trial court held that the parties
did contemplate a continuing credit arrangement. In this issue, we defer to the well-entrenched doctrine that "factual findings of the
trial court shall not be disturbed on appeal unless the trial court has overlooked or ignored some fact or circumstance of sufficient
weight or significance which, if considered, would alter the situation." After a thorough review of this case, the Court finds both
lower courts did not overlook any such fact or circumstance. Hence, their factual finding as to the parties’ intention in entering into a
real mortgage under a continuing credit/mortgage arrangement is binding upon this Court. In any event, this issue is really academic
in view of our holding on the first question.

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J.:

In deciding this appeal, this Court reiterates the dictum that the mortgagor of titled real estate acquired under the Public Land Act
but foreclosed by a rural bank, may redeem said property within two (2) years from the registration of the sheriff’s certificate of
sale; and if the said mortgagor fails to exercise such right, he or his heirs may still repurchase the land within five years from the
expiration of the two-year redemption period. It also finds occasion to remind lower courts to keep abreast of decisions of this Court
and apply them in resolving identical cases before them.

Statement of the Case

This is a petition for review under Rule 45 seeking annulment of the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals 2 promulgated on August 25,
1994 in CA-G.R. CV No. 39807, reversing the trial court’s 3 decision. 4 The latter tribunal disposed:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the court hereby decrees: amending in part the partial judgment:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library

1.) Allowing the plaintiff to redeem the mortgaged properties by paying the amount of the purchase price with interest thereon at
the rate of one per centum per month up to the date of her deposit of the redemption price and ordering the defendant to accept
payment from the plaintiff;

2.) Dismissing all the claims and counterclaims that the parties may have against each other in connection with this case.

SO ORDERED. "5

The Antecedent Facts

The facts as found by the Respondent Court of Appeals appear undisputed. They are as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Spouses Marcelino Canque and Felicidad Canque were the registered owners of a parcel of land under Original Certificate of Title
No. P-(20559)-3409, of the Register of Deeds of Davao del Sur issued by virtue of Free Patent No. 40336, with an area of 2 hectares,
43 ares, and 58 centares. On May 21, 1976, said spouses sold a portion of the parcel of land to the Iglesia ni Kristo Church to the
extent of 750 square meters. A new Transfer of Title No. T-8730 was issued to said spouses by the Register of Deeds of Davao del
Sur. On October 12, 1977, said spouses obtained a loan of Fifteen Thousand (P15,000.00) from defendant bank secured by a real
estate mortgage over the parcel of land under Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-8730 with an area of 23,608 square meters.

The spouses’ loan of P15,000.00 with the defendant bank was duly paid.

On February 2, 1980, Felicidad Canque passed away. More than a month later, on March 7, 1980, widower Marcelino Canque
obtained by himself, another loan with defendant bank in the amount of P25,000.00 with the same conjugal property under Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-8730 as collateral. The defendant bank allegedly considered this second loan as an extension of the first
loan as the real estate mortgage of the first loan had remained uncancelled, despite the earlier payment of the first loan by the said
spouses.

For failure of Marcelino Canque to pay the second loan, defendant bank extrajudicially foreclosed the real estate mortgage and sold
the property to itself as the highest bidder in a public sale.

On September 9, 1983, the Sheriff’s Certificate of Sale was registered. On October 18, 1985, defendants executed an affidavit of
consolidation of ownership and deed of absolute sale. On December 23, 1985, Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-18357 was issued in
the name of defendant bank by the Register of Deeds of Davao del Sur.

After seven years from the registration of the Sheriff’s Certificate of Sale, plaintiffs Marcelino Canque and his children offered to
redeem the property in question but defendant bank refused. Hence, the complaint filed before the lower court on September 7,
1990.

After hearing on the merits, the lower court first issued a partial judgment on January 8, 1992, the decretal portion of which
reads:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

‘WHEREFORE, partial judgment is hereby rendered:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1. Declaring the real estate mortgage between the plaintiffs and defendants valid; and

2. Allowing the plaintiffs to exercise their right of redemption and/or repurchase pursuant to the provisions of Sec. 119, of
Commonwealth Act 141, otherwise known as the Public Land Act.’

(p 5, Partial Dec.;

p. 74, Orig. Rec.)

On August 24, 1992, the lower court issued the earlier stated amended decision.

Dissatisfied with the verdict of the lower court plaintiffs appealed to the Court [of Appeals].

The principal issue posed in this appeal is whether or not the lower court erred in ruling that plaintiff Mario Canque’s right of
redemption as well as that of the other plaintiffs-appellees, heirs of Felicidad Canque, has not prescribed.

In the case of Achuelo v. IAC, 147 SCRA 434, the Supreme Court reiterated the express provision of law as follows:chanrob1es virtual
1aw library

Section 119 of Commonwealth Act 141 states:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

‘Every reconveyance of land acquired under the free patent homestead provisions, when proper, shall be subject to repurchase by
the applicant, his widow, or legal heirs, within a period of five years from the date of conveyance.’

In the case of Eastman Chemical Industries, Inc. v. C.A., 174 SCRA 619, the Supreme Court made the following
pronouncement:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
‘In the case of Reyes v. Noblejas and Santos (G.R. No. L-23691, November 25, 1967, 21 SCRA 1027 at pp. 1029-1030) the Supreme
Court upheld the contention of the Land Registration Commission, as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

‘. . . Section 6 of Act 3135 should be applied to the present case together with: (1) Sections 30 to 35 of Rule 39 of the Revised Rules
of Court with regard to redemption; (2) Section 27, Rule 39 of the said Rules and Section 71 of Act 496 with regard to the filing
(registration) of the sheriffs certificate of sale; and (3) Section 50 of Act 496, with regard to the registration of the certificate of sale
so as to consider the land conveyed and affected under the Land Registration Act.

and that:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

‘. . . . Section 27, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that the certificate of sale executed by the sheriff in a public auction
sale must be filed (registered) in the Office of the Register of Deeds of the province where the land is situated. This is mandatory
requirement. Failure to register the certificate of sale violates the said provision of law and, construed in relation with Section 50 of
the Land Registration Law (Act 496), shall not take effect as a conveyance or bind the land covered by a torrens title because ‘the act
of registration is the operative act to convey and effect the land.’ So the redemption period, for purposes of determining the time
when a final deed of sale may be executed or issued and the ownership of the registered land consolidated in the purchaser at an
extrajudicial foreclosure sale under Act 3135, should be reckoned from the date of registration of the certificate of sale in the office
of the register of deeds concerned and not from the date of the public auction sale. . . .’ (Emphasis supplied)" 6

The respondent appellate court disagreed with the trial court’s decision, viz:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Clearly, the lower court erred in ruling that plaintiffs-appellees’ redemption period commenced on October 18, 1985, date of
defendants-appellants execution of an affidavit of consolidation of ownership and deed of absolute sale. The correct date to reckon
with the start of the plaintiffs-appellees’ prescriptive period of five years is September 9, 1983, the date of the registration of the
Sheriff’s Certificate of Sale. Plaintiffs-appellees’ instant suit to compel defendants-appellees to allow them to redeem the property
was only filed on September 7, 1990, or almost seven (7) years from the registration of the Sheriff’s certificate of sale, or beyond the
five-year prescriptive period as provided under Sec. 119 of Commonwealth Act 141. Thus, plaintiffs-appellees’ right of redemption
had already prescribed.

All is not lost, however for the plaintiffs-appellees as heirs of Felicidad Canque for the lost right of redemption of the parcel of land
in question only applies to the conjugal share of 50% of plaintiff Marcelino Canque considering that at the time the second loan of
P25,000.00 was entered by said plaintiff with defendant bank, his spouse Felicidad Canque, who had a share of the other 50% of the
conjugal property, had already passed away (Art. 185, New Civil Code). Thus, when plaintiff Mario Canque entered into the said loan
agreement with defendant bank giving the parcel of land in question as security in the form of real estate mortgage, it was only valid
insofar as his 50% of the conjugal property share from the said parcel of land is concerned. Defendant-appellant bank had acquired,
therefore, no right over the other 50% of the conjugal property pertaining to the late Felicidad Canque which share of 50%
automatically passed to her heirs, herein plaintiffs-appellees from the moment of her (Felicidad Canque) death (Art. 777, New Civil
Code)." 7

Hence, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment, the decretal portion of which reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the lower court in Civil Case No. 2688 is hereby REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. A new judgment
is hereby entered by the Court as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1. Plaintiff-appellee Mario Canque’s right of redemption insofar as 50% of the property in question has already prescribed, and
defendant-appellant bank’s title and ownership of the said 50% of the property are declared incontrovertible by the Court (of
Appeals).

2. Declaring the second deed of real estate mortgage over the parcel of land in question insofar as 50% of it is concerned as void as it
pertained to the conjugal share of the late Felicidad Canque which share of 50% should rightfully pass to her heirs, herein Plaintiffs-
Appellees.

3. Ordering the Register of Deeds of the province of Davao Del Sur to cancel Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-18357 and to issue
two new Transfer Certificates of Title, one to plaintiffs-appellees under the name ‘Heirs of Felicidad Canque, and another one to the
Rural Bank of Matanao, Inc. at 50% each of the property in question covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-18357.

4. Dismissing all claims and counterclaims of the parties against each other in this case.
5. No costs.

IT IS SO ORDERED." 8

Not satisfied with the above, petitioner filed this recourse to this Court.

The Issues

Petitioners submit the following assignment of errors:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"I The Court of Appeals committed a serious error of law in holding that the period to repurchase of foreclosed lands issued thru free
patent by Rural Banks is only five (5) years.

II The Court of Appeals erred in not passing upon the issue of whether or not the Real Estate Mortgage is a continuing mortgage so
as to also secure future loans by the husband after the death of the wife." 9

The Court’s Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

First Issue: Prescriptive Period to Repurchase

In Rural Bank of Davao City v. Court of Appeals, 10 this Court through Mr. Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. explicitly and cogently
ruled:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

". . . If the land is mortgaged to a rural bank under R. A. No. 720, as amended, the mortgagor may redeem the property within two
(2) years from the date of foreclosure or from the registration of the sheriff’s certificate of sale at such foreclosure if the property is
not covered or is covered, respectively, by a Torrens title. If the mortgagor fails to exercise such right, he or his heirs may still
repurchase the property within five (5) years from the expiration of the two (2) year redemption period pursuant to Sec. 119 of the
Public Land Act (C.A. No. 141). If the land is mortgaged to parties other than rural banks, the mortgagor may redeem the property
within one (1) year from the registration of the certificate of sale pursuant to Act No. 3135. If he fails to do so, he or his heirs may
repurchase the property within five (5) years from the expiration of the redemption period also pursuant to Sec. 119 of the Public
Land Act."cralaw virtua1aw library

In the case at bar, the Sheriff’s Certificate of Sale was registered on September 9, 1983. Thus, based on the foregoing dictum, the
petitioners, whose land was mortgaged to and foreclosed by a rural bank, had a period of two years or until September 9, 1985 to
exercise their right of redemption. And in line with the mandate of Sec. 119 of the Public Land Act, they had an additional period of
five years from the latter date or until September 9, 1990 to exercise their right to repurchase. Thus, the petitioners’ right to redeem
their land had not expired on September 7, 1990 when they filed suit against private respondent to compel the latter to allow the
former to repurchase their land.chanrobles.com : virtual lawlibrary

Clearly, the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error because it palpably failed to consider in its August 25, 1994 Decision the
aforementioned ruling of the Supreme Court promulgated twenty months earlier on January 27, 1993. Unfortunately, this is not the
first time for this Court to come upon such a slip. Peltan Development v. Court of Appeals 11 ruled that "every court must take
cognizance of decisions this Court has rendered because they are proper subjects of mandatory judicial notice . . . [and] more
importantly form part of the legal system." We stress that members of the bench have a responsibility to know and to apply the
latest holdings of the Supreme Court. The nature of their calling requires no less.

Second Issue: Factual Finding of Continuing Mortgage

Whether the mortgage which the Canque spouses contracted with private respondent bank was intended by the parties to be a
continuing one, a factual issue passed upon sub-silencio by the Court of Appeals, had been threshed out by the trial court. Finding
that the parties did contemplate a continuing credit arrangement, the trial court aptly reasoned:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"If it were not indeed the intention of the parties that (the property) mortgaged shall serve as a continuing security not only for the
first loan of P15,000.00 but also for subsequent loans, the natural thing for the mortgagor to have done under the premises was to
ask for the return of the title covering the property mortgaged to the defendant and consequently ask for the discharge and/or
cancellation of the annotation on the title.

These the plaintiff did not do, as then, it was their intention to avail of subsequent loans from defendants. Besides, the alleged full
payment of the first loan of P15,000.00 was not clearly shown to have caused the discharge and/or cancellation of the real estate
mortgage constituted therefor. The (trial court) believes that the full payment alleged is a situation obtaining in a continuing credit
secured by mortgage whereby the payment on a particular day equalled the amount of the mortgage. In such a situation, the
mortgage is not discharged as long as subsequent loans and/or advancements may be demanded, as plaintiff actually did in this case
by obtaining the second loan of P25,000.00.

The argument of plaintiffs that the surviving spouse, Marcelino Canque cannot mortgage the property to secure the loan of
P25,000.00 because his wife had died and therefore he was not the absolute owner of the mortgaged property, must fall as it was
not convincingly shown that the defendants had knowledge of the wife’s death at the time the loan of P25,000.00 was obtained.

Lastly, it is indeed absurd for the defendant bank, considering the nature of its business, not to require collateral for the loan of
P25,000.00 when it did for the lesser loan of P15,000.00.

The fact is, and this the (trial court) believes, plaintiffs and defendants had agreed to have a continuing credit arrangement secured
by a real estate mortgage. With this arrangement, plaintiffs first secured the loan of P15,000.00 and after liquidation thereof, they
obtained another loan of P25,000.00 with the same property as collateral." 12

In this issue, we "defer to the well-entrenched doctrine that factual findings of the trial court shall not be disturbed on appeal unless
the trial court has overlooked or ignored some fact or circumstance of sufficient weight or significance which, if considered, would
alter the situation.’’ 13 After a thorough review of this case, the Court finds both lower courts did not overlook any such fact or
circumstance. Hence, their factual finding as to the parties’ intention in entering into a real mortgage under a continuing
credit/mortgage arrangement is binding upon this Court. In any event, this issue is really academic in view of our holding on the first
question.

In sum, we rule that the disposition of the Regional Trial Court allowing the redemption is correct although for a different reason,
and that the Court of Appeals erred in failing to add the two-year redemption period to the five-year repurchase right granted by the
Public Land Act.

WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Respondent Court of Appeals
is hereby SET ASIDE. The dispositive portion of the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Digos, Davao del Sur in Civil Case No. 2688
allowing petitioner to redeem the subject property is hereby REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 123096 December 18, 2000

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
MARIO DUMANON y DUMANACAL and RICARDO LABRADOR y SUACILLO, alias "RIC-RIC," accused-appellants.

DECISION

DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:

Accused-appellants Mario Dumanon y Dumanacal (hereafter MARIO) and Ricardo Labrador y Suacillo (hereafter RICARDO) appeal
from the decision1 of the Regional Trial Court of Surigao City, Branch 30, in Criminal Case No. 4247, finding them guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of rape and sentencing them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and to pay the complainant
Anacurita Anib (hereafter ANACURITA) the amount of ₱20,000 as moral damages and the costs of the suit.

On 3 December 1993, Dominga Anib filed a complaint for rape2 against MARIO and RICARDO on behalf of her mentally retarded
daughter ANACURITA before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Tagana-an-Sison, Surigao del Norte. The complaint,
docketed as Criminal Case No. 993, alleged that ANACURITA is a "retardate" and the crime was committed at midnight of 2
December 1993. Submitted in support of the complaint was a medical certificate3 issued by the Surigao Provincial Hospital and the
affidavits4 of Dominga Anib, Eduardo Diaz and Anita Lisondra.
After conducting a preliminary examination, the MCTC found a prima facie case for rape, confirmed the arrest and detention of
MARIO and RICARDO without bail, and required them to submit their counter-affidavits. Instead of filing their counter-affidavits,
MARIO and RICARDO filed a joint motion to dismiss the case on the grounds that the crime of rape cannot be prosecuted de
oficio and the complaint was not signed by the offended party, there being no proof that the latter was incapacitated.

In its resolution5 of 10 January 1994, the MCTC ruled that the complaint was properly filed by the mother of ANACURITA since the
latter is a retarded woman and stated that "by merely looking upon the victim, the Court finds that indeed Anacurita Anib is a
retarded woman." It also found probable cause that MARIO and RICARDO committed the crime charged and forwarded the case to
the Provincial Prosecutor for the filing of the information.

On 24 January 1994, the Provincial Prosecutor’s Office of Surigao del Norte filed with the Regional Trial Court of Surigao del Norte a
complaint6 for rape, bearing the thumb mark of ANACURITA and approved by the Provincial Prosecutor. The complaint, docketed as
Criminal Case No. 4247 and assigned to Branch 30 thereof, alleges as follows:

That on or about the 2nd day of December 1993, at 12:00 o’clock [sic] midnight, more or less, at Barangay Aurora, Tagana-an,
Surigao del Norte, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, said accused with full freedom and intelligence did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously by means of violence and intimidation, and taking advantage of nighttime drag
MISS ANACURITA ANIB y DUMANACAL inside the vacant house of Jaime Batac and have carnal knowledge of herein complainant
against her will.

All contrary to law and with the aggravating circumstances of nighttime and in an uninhabited place.

MARIO and RICARDO sought for a reinvestigation of the case. They questioned the unsigned complaint for rape and alleged that
ANACURITA’s filing of the complaint belied her mental incapacity. Moreover, she never gave a categorical statement that she was
raped. The defense further asserted as hearsay the statement of Dominga Anib and Anita Lisondra in their affidavits that
ANACURITA confessed to them that she was raped. They also assailed the prosecution for its failure to present any eyewitness.
Finally, they maintained that they were deprived of their right to submit their counter-affidavits.

The prosecution opposed the motion for reinvestigation. It claimed that MARIO and RICARDO were actually required but failed to
submit their counter-affidavits. Moreover, since it was already resolved that ANACURITA is a retardate, thus mentally incapacitated,
the law recognizes the right of her mother to file the complaint on her behalf. However, as stated in the decision of the trial court,
MARIO and RICARDO abandoned the motion and instead proceeded with the arraignment wherein they separately entered a plea of
not guilty.7

Trial on the merits started only on 2 June 1994 and was completed on 22 November 1994. In its decision the trial court attributed
the delay "to postponements at the instance of both the prosecution and the defense, especially that the parties, being related,
manifested for a possible settlement of the case." The prosecution presented as witnesses ANACURITA, Dominga Anib, Eduardo
Dizon and Dr. Gregoria Beberino-Comelon.

ANACURITA testified in court seven months after she was raped. She was then thirty-eight years old. According to her she knew
MARIO and RICARDO as they were her friends and townmates. In the early evening of 2 December 1993, she was in the municipal
gymnasium of Tagana-an, Surigao del Norte, watching a parade of gays. At about 11:00 p.m. she left and headed for her home in
barangay Aurora, Tagana-an. As she was walking, she passed by RICARDO who was then sitting on a bench, apparently drunk.
Suddenly, RICARDO blocked her way. She tried to break free but he continued to obstruct her way. Then he pulled her and brought
her to the deserted house of Jaime Batac, which was just about nine meters away from her home. Inside the house, RICARDO
stripped off his clothes and immediately removed her underwear. He then placed his penis inside her vagina. After satisfying his lust,
RICARDO ran away. Then she put on her underwear. After a few minutes, MARIO, who was likewise drunk, entered Jaime’s house,
pulled her down and undressed her. Mario inserted his penis inside her vagina and just like RICARDO ran away after the sexual
intercourse. ANACURITA went home and told her mother what had happened.8

Dominga Anib testified that MARIO and RICARDO are her neighbors and that the former is even her relative. In the evening of 2
December 1993, ANACURITA was out watching a show at the municipal gymnasium. At about midnight she was awakened by her
husband who told her that ANACURITA had not yet arrived. When she turned on the light, she heard the protesting voice of her
daughter coming from the house of Jaime Batac. She went to the house and dragged ANACURITA home. ANACURITA was holding
her underwear and her hair and dress were soiled. She asked ANACURITA if any man did anything to her. ANACURITA told her that
she had just been raped by RICARDO and MARIO inside Jaime’s house. Accompanied by Eduardo Diaz, Dominga immediately
reported the incident to the barangay captain and then later, to the police. On 4 December 1993, Dominga brought ANACURITA to
the Provincial Hospital of Surigao del Norte for examination. The turn of events caused Dominga to suffer shame and
embarrassment.9

According to Eduardo Diaz, he knew MARIO and RICARDO. MARIO is a close friend and relative. He, MARIO and RICARDO and the
Anibs reside along the same street. On 2 December 1993, Eduardo was in the municipal gymnasium to watch a show. He left for
home at 10:00 p.m. Along the way he saw MARIO and RICARDO. When he arrived home, he learned that there was no more
kerosene for the lamps. He went out to buy kerosene and a cigarette at the store next door. He saw MARIO at the store who asked a
cigarette from him. He obliged and then went back home. He wanted to eat; but when he found out that there was no more food,
he decided to request some viand from MARIO. On the road he saw MARIO going inside the house of Jaime Batac. So, he returned
home. Later, he heard the voice of Dominga Anib from her house berating her weeping daughter ANACURITA. He overheard that
ANACURITA came from the house of Jaime Batac, which was near the house of the Anibs. Dominga ordered ANACURITA to stay
upstairs while she went out of their house. It was about midnight.

Dominga saw Eduardo and sought his help. Eduardo accompanied Dominga to the barangay captain, Mr. Jaime Pelarco.10 The latter
looked for RICARDO and MARIO, who were eventually arrested and detained.

Dr. Gregoria Beberino-Comelon physically examined ANACURITA on 4 December 1993 and issued the corresponding medical
certificate.11 She noted a fresh hymenal laceration at 6 o’clock and a hematoma on the thigh. The laceration could have been caused
by an erect male penis while the hematoma was probably inflicted by a fist blow. She also found a vaginal discharge of yellowish and
whitish substance. She had the specimen brought to the laboratory for examination for the presence of sperms. However, she was
not informed of the results of the examination.12

Only MARIO testified for the defense while RICARDO opted not to take the witness stand.

MARIO claimed that he and ANACURITA, his distant cousin, were lovers. On the evening of 2 December 1993 he was also at the
municipal gymnasium to watch a coronation event. At about 10:15 p.m. he decided to go home and along the way, he saw
ANACURITA and they talked by the fence of Jaime Batac’s house. He confessed his love for her and he suggested if it was possible for
them to have sexual intercourse. ANACURITA nodded her head in consent and replied that she had yearned to bear a child at her
age. They talked for ten minutes. ANACURITA invited him inside the abandoned house of Jaime so that they would not be seen by
her mother. Inside Jaime’s house, he asked her again if he could have sexual intercourse with her. She consented. ANACURITA had
no reaction at all during their sexual intimacy. After they were done, he escorted her to her house and then he walked toward his
house. He immediately heard Dominga Anib scold ANACURITA. Dominga demanded to know where she came from and why she
arrived late. In the early morning of the following day the police arrested and detained him.13

After the defense rested its case the trial court required both parties to submit their respective memoranda. The parties waived the
submission thereof.

The trial court rendered its decision of 21 June 1995. It specifically noted therein the trial judge’s personal impression which he
entered in his personal notes that ANACURITA is "a mongoloid (physically) and mentally deficient who has difficulty in understanding
the questions." While conceding that ANACURITA’s narration of how she was sexually abused by the accused-appellants was not
"detailed," it nevertheless concluded that it was "candidly told by one who is mentally deficient." She was "able to show and
convince the Court that she, in fact, was taken advantage of by the two drunken neighbors." It gave full credence to her testimony,
which was supported by the medical findings. It held that MARIO and RICARDO, especially the former, who is her cousin, knew of
ANACURITA’s mental condition. It ruled that "(e)vidently, … Anacurita Anib, in her retarded understanding, was overcome with
shock, fear and, otherwise, intimidated by her two drunken neighbors, who accosted her."

The trial court characterized MARIO’s version as "simply out of this world," and "even assuming that it was what has happened, it
only manifests that the victim is, in fact, abnormal, not capacitated to give a valid consent."

The trial court also considered RICARDO’s silence as an admission of the charge against him. The trial court then decreed:

WHEREFORE, this Court finds the accused, MARIO DUMANON Y DUMANACAL and RICARDO LABRADOR Y SUACILLO, alias "Ric-Ric",
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape, defined and penalized in Article 355, of the Revised Penal Code, and metes
out the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua; to indemnify complainant-victim Anacurita Anib the sum of Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00)
Pesos moral damages, jointly and severally, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency; to suffer the accessory penalties,
provided for by law; and, to pay the costs.
On 13 July 1995, MARIO and RICARDO seasonably appealed from the decision, which the Court accepted on 23 September 1995.
However, there was an undue delay in the filing of the Appellants’ Brief, and counsel for accused-appellants had to be fined before
he finally filed the Appellant’s Brief on 19 July 1999.

In their Appellants’ Brief, MARIO and RICARDO allege that:

1. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS OF THE CRIME OF RAPE COMMITTED ON A MENTAL
RETARDATE WHEN THE INFORMATION ACCUSES THEM OF RAPE COMMITTED ON A WOMAN WITH THE USE OF FORCE AND
INTIMIDATION.

2. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE COMPLAINANT IS A MENTAL RETARDATE IN THE ABSENCE OF CLEAR MEDICAL OR
EXPERT EVIDENCE SHOWING SUCH ABNORMAL PHYSICAL AND MENTAL CONDITION.

3. NO FORCE OR INTIMIDATION ATTENDED THE SEX ACT BETWEEN THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS AND THE COMPLAINANT.

MARIO and RICARDO underscore the fact that the complaint filed with the court below alleges that the rape was committed with
the use of force and intimidation and hence they cannot be held guilty of rape committed on a mental retardate since this
circumstance was never alleged in the Complaint. Neither can they be liable for rape committed with the use of force and
intimidation since the same was not sufficiently proven by the evidence for the prosecution.

MARIO and RICARDO emphasize that their conviction was based on the trial court’s conclusion that ANACURITA is a mental
retardate. Such a conclusion has no basis since no medical or expert opinion categorically affirming such condition was offered by
the prosecution. Accordingly, they pray for their acquittal for failure of the prosecution to prove their guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.

In the Appellee’s Brief, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) refutes the errors raised by MARIO and RICARDO. It counters that
the trial court did not convict MARIO and RICARDO of rape of a mental retardate deprived of reason, but of simple rape through
force and intimidation, although not necessarily employed with immense measure but one that was sufficient for the victim not to
resist. The force contemplated by law in the commission of rape is relative, depending on the age, size and strength of the parties.
The only requirement is that force or intimidation be sufficient to consummate the purpose which the accused had in mind.
Intimidation must be viewed in light of the victim’s perception and judgment at the time of the commission of the crime and not by
any hard and fast rule.

The OSG asserts that in this case the trial court found that ANACURITA was mentally deficient, as revealed by its personal notes
quoted in its decision, its forbearance in allowing the prosecution to proceed with leading questions during her direct examination
due to her difficulty in comprehending and responsively answering the questions, and in acknowledging the observation of the
MCTC judge in his Resolution that ANACURITA was different from or less than those of a fully functioning adult. Hence, the degree of
force needed to overwhelm her is less. The force which may not be sufficient for the rape of a normal person, may be more than
enough when employed in the rape of a mentally deficient person, like ANACURITA.

The OSG further asseverates that rape committed against a feeble-minded victim does not require the use of physical force since the
commission of the sexual act constitutes the force itself. There was thus no need to establish that ANACURITA is a mental retardate
since her rape was attendant with force and intimidation. It also points out that the attempt of MARIO and RICARDO to settle the
case was an implied admission of their guilt.

Finally, the OSG seeks an award of civil indemnity to ANACURITA in the amount of ₱50,000 and an increase of the award of moral
damages from ₱20,000 to ₱50,000.

We sustain the conviction of MARIO and RICARDO.

On the issue of whether or not ANACURITA is a retardate, as correctly pointed out by the defense, no expert testimony was offered
to prove that, indeed ANACURITA is a retardate. But, this matter gains importance if, in fact, the trial court’s conviction for rape was
based on a finding that her retardation was of such an extent that she was deprived of reason or that she had mental age of a child
of less than 12 years old. As will be shown later, such is not the situation obtaining in the case at bar, for we agree with the trial
court’s finding that MARIO and RICARDO are guilty of rape by the use of force and intimidation.
It has been held that mental retardation can be proved by evidence other than medical evidence.14 Thus, it is our considered opinion
that for purposes of determining whether ANACURITA is mentally normal or does not have the mental capacity of a normal person,
the personal observation of the trial judge would suffice as a measure of determining the impact on her of the force and
intimidation foisted by MARIO and RICARDO vis-a-vis the legal requirement to prove the commission of the crime of rape.

The original complaint,15 filed with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Tagana-an-Sison, Surigao del Norte by Dominga Anib on behalf
of ANACURITA, alleged that ANACURITA is a retardate. The translation of the affidavit16 of Dominga Anib, which was submitted in
support of the original complaint, alleged that ANACURITA is "not mentally normal." During the preliminary examination Dominga
testified that ANACURITA is mentally retarded.17 The Resolution18 of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Tagana-an-Sison, Surigao del
Norte categorically declared that "by merely looking upon the victim," ANACURITA is indeed a "retarded woman."

The transcript of stenographic notes is also replete with particulars on ANACURITA’s mental condition. When she first testified, the
trial court ordered to "make it on record the physical appearance of the witness [ANACURITA] having [a] hard time in understanding
the question of the interpreter," and that she is "mentally deficient." As she continued with her testimony, it further observed that
she had difficulty answering the questions and, under the circumstances, it allowed leading questions during her direct
examination.19

The appealed decision likewise bears the trial court’s personal impression that ANACURITA "appears to be mongoloid (physically)
and mentally deficient who has difficulty in understanding the questions."20 We often call a person who is suffering from mongolism
as a mongoloid. Mongolism is a condition characterized by a small, anteroposteriorly flattened skull, short, flat-bridged nose,
epicanthus, short-phalanges, and widened space between the first and second digits of hands and feet, with moderate to severe
mental retardation and associated with a chromosomal abnormality.21 It is known as mongolism because its physiognomic features
are suggestive of those normally exhibited by the Mongolian race.22 It is also known as Down’s Syndrome.23 Hence, the courts can
take judicial notice of the appearance and features of those suffering from mongolism and based thereon, conclude that a victim,
like ANACURITA, is a mongoloid.

Having established that ANACURITA is a retardate even in the absence of an expert opinion thereon, we shall now determine if
MARIO and RICARDO were properly charged with rape by means of force and intimidation. A thorough review of the assailed
decision supports the findings and conclusion of the trial court that ANACURITA was indeed raped by means of force and
intimidation. ANACURITA in her testimony declared that while she was on her way home, RICARDO, then drunk, blocked her way,
pulled her toward the uninhabited house of Jaime Batac and once inside the house he undressed her and took off her panty and
inserted his penis into her vagina.24 After he was through, RICARDO ran away. Then later MARIO arrived. MARIO pulled ANACURITA
and also inserted his penis into her vagina.25

The blocking, the holding of the hand, the pulling towards an uninhabited house, the removal of the panty and the fact that both
MARIO and RICARDO were in a state of drunkenness, were enough force and intimidation considering the mental state of
ANACURITA.

The use of force or intimidation was further shown in the cross-examination of ANACURITA by defense counsel, Atty. Medina, thus:

xxx

Q Let’s go to that testimony of yours that Ricardo Labrador grab [sic] you to the house of Jaime Batac, how did Ricardo Labrador
grab you?

A He pulled me.

xxx

Q So you went [sic] to tell the Court that Ric-Ric was just leading you towards the house of Jaime and not dragging you with the used
[sic] of one hand?

A He pulled me, sir.

Q You did not shout when Ric-Ric Labrador was pulling you towards the house of Jaime?
A No, sir.

Q You did not also pulled [sic] back your hand to free it from the hand of Ricardo Labrador?

A No, also sir.

Q There was not even an attempt on your part to free your hand?

A I struggle [sic], sir.

Q How did you attempt to free your hand?

A (Witness indicating her answer by pulling her hand towards the right side of her body reaching as far as his palm as her palm
towards her right side).

Q But you were not able to free your hand?

A I was able to free my hand.

Q So when you succeeded in freeing your hand from the grabs [sic] of Ricardo Labrador you did not make an attempt to run away?

A I was not able to run, it did not occur to my mind.

Q Even if you were able to free your hand from the grab of Ric-Ric still you went with Ric-Ric towards the house of Jaime?

A I try [sic] to run away but he blocked my way.

xxx

Q And when Mario Dumanon arrived, did he say anything to you?

A None.

Q Without talking to you Mario Dumanon removed his pants?

A Yes, sir.

xxx

Q As a matter of fact when he removed your pantie [sic] you did not resist by telling him "not to do that to me"?

A He was also drunk.

Q And when he pulled you to lie down with him because he was already lying down, you did not pushed [sic] him away?

A He was drunk.

Q You could have run away by pushing his hands but you did not, is it not a fact of the situation?

A Yes, sir.

Q Although you knew that you could have run away yet you did not run away?

A The door is too small.

Q Whether the door is small or not yet there is [sic] no attempt on your part to run away?

A No, sir.

Q You did not even shout for help?

A No, sir.26

Furthermore, the hematoma found on the victim’s left thigh as shown by the medical certificate issued by the examining
physician27 is physical evidence of the use of force in the consummation of the beastly act.

It is a settled rule that force in rape is relative, depending on the age, size and strength of the parties. In the same manner,
intimidation must be viewed in the light of the victim’s perception and judgment at the time of the commission of the crime and not
by any hard and fast rule. When the victim is a retardate the force required to overcome her is of a lesser degree than that used
against a normal adult.28 Thus, the degree of force which may not suffice when the victim is a normal person, may be more than
enough when employed against an imbecile.29

With the foregoing disquisition, MARIO and RICARDO were correctly convicted of rape under the first circumstance of Article
335, i.e. by the use of force or intimidation. Once the elements of force and intimidation were properly alleged in the Information
and duly proven during the trial, as in this case, the conviction becomes a matter of course. As correctly assessed by the OSG, the
conviction for rape decreed by the trial court was not based on the fact that ANACURITA is a mental retardate, but on the use of
force and intimidation. The mental retardation of ANACURITA was only a circumstance which the trial court considered in evaluating
the degree and extent of the force and intimidation.1âwphi1

We also take note of the trial court’s pronouncement30 that accused-appellants manifested a possible settlement of the case. The
offer of compromise is an implied admission of guilt pursuant to the second paragraph of Section 27, Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court.31

Finally, as regards the civil aspects in this case, in accordance with current jurisprudence32 we grant the award of ₱50,000 as civil
indemnity for the rape of ANACURITA, and the increase of moral damages from ₱20,000 to ₱50,000 even without proof thereof.33

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Surigao City, Branch 30, finding accused-appellants MARIO DUMANON y
DUMANCAL and RICARDO LABRADOR y SUACILLO, alias "RIC-RIC," guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape, defined and penalized
under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, and sentencing them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua is hereby AFFIRMED,
with the modification that they are further ordered to pay civil indemnity in the amount of ₱50,000 to the complainant ANACURITA
ANIB, and the amount of moral damages awarded to the latter is increased from ₱20,000 to ₱50,000.

Costs against accused-appellants.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 130730. October 19, 2001

HERNANDO GENER, Petitioner, vs. GREGORIO DE LEON and ZENAIDA FAUSTINO, Respondents.

DECISION

DE LEON, JR., J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals dated May 30, 1997 in CA-G.R. SP No. 37346
reversing the Decision 2 dated April 3, 1995 of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 11 in Civil Case No. 370-M-93
which set aside the Decision 3 dated February 19, 1993 of the Municipal Trial Court of Norzagaray, Bulacan in a forcible entry case
filed by respondents spouses Gregorio de Leon and Zenaida Faustino against petitioner Hernando Gener.

The forcible entry case was initiated on April 30, 1990 before the Municipal Trial Court of Norzagaray, Bulacan. The respondents, as
plaintiffs therein, alleged that they are the original claimants and actual possessors in good faith under a bona fide claim of
ownership of a parcel of agricultural land situated at Poblacion, Norzagaray, Bulacan with an area of approximately Four Thousand
Four Hundred Four (4,404) square meters. The said parcel of land and the adjoining lots on the north and south thereof were
originally part of the course or bed of the Angat River which was formerly adjacent thereto and the boundary on the east or north-
east of Lot No. 1050, Cad-350, plan Ap-03-003056, covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 0-1208 (M) of respondent Gregorio de
Leon. 4cräläwvirtualibräry

During the big flood in 1978, the Angat River allegedly changed its course by moving more than one hundred (100) meters far to the
east or north-east, leaving its former course or bed along the eastern or north-eastern boundary of Lot No. 1050 which is elevated
so that the said lot dried up. Then, the respondents extended their occupation and cultivation to this elevated and dried up land,
planting and cultivating thereon coconuts, bananas and vegetables until May 8, 1989 when petitioner allegedly through force, threat
and intimidation, unlawfully entered the property and deprived respondents of the possession thereof, removing the barbed wire
fence placed by respondents on the northern boundary of the land in dispute and transferred it to the eastern boundary. Since
demands to vacate fell on deaf ears and subsequent efforts toward amicably settling the dispute through the Barangay Justice
System proved futile, respondents instituted the complaint for forcible entry against the petitioner. 5cräläwvirtualibräry

Petitioner, as defendant in the ejectment case, denied the material allegations of the complaint. Instead, he alleged that he is the
real owner and lawful and actual possessor of the land in dispute evidenced by a notarized deed of sale executed on October 10,
1988 by Benjamin Joaquin, heir of the previous owner, Proceso Joaquin. Upon acquisition of the land in dispute, he immediately
caused the declaration of the land for taxation purposes in the Office of the Municipal Assessor of Norzagaray, Bulacan and paid
realty taxes thereon. Further, he claimed that the land is a private land which was previously owned by Proceso Joaquin and that the
said fact is admitted and recognized by Gorgonio de Leon, the late father and predecessor-in-interest of respondent Gregorio de
Leon, in an affidavit he executed on November 13, 1961 in which he mentioned Proceso Joaquin as a neighboring landowner in the
east of his land.

Petitioner further averred that it was respondents who forcibly entered his lot in question as evidenced by two (2) criminal cases
which petitioner filed, namely, (a) Criminal Case No. 3998 for malicious mischief against Rosendo Buen and Ignacio Cadungcol alias
Lolong, two (2) alleged helpers of the land of Gregorio de Leon, who allegedly entered the disputed land on October 24, 1988 and
destroyed coconut trees, papaya and langka trees which belonged to petitioner, and (b) Criminal Case No. 4043 against Hugo de
Leon and Rolly de Leon, brothers of Gregorio de Leon, who allegedly entered the disputed land on March 12, 1989 and destroyed
mango trees and other plants belonging to the petitioner Gener. Thus, considering that his occupation of the land in dispute
allegedly started on October 10, 1988, the Municipal Trial Court has no jurisdiction over the action since the forcible entry suit filed
by respondents was filed beyond the one year period. 6cräläwvirtualibräry

Thereafter, trial ensued with Ignacio Cadungol, Teodoro Mendoza, Andres Palad, Balagtas P. San Pedro, Marcelino Samson, Norman
Maclang and respondent Zenaida Faustino testifying for the plaintiffs (respondents herein) in the ejectment case, while petitioner
Gener was the sole witness for his defense. The Municipal Trial Court condensed their respective testimonies in this manner: 7

xxx xxx xxx

For the plaintiffs, Ignacio Cadungol testified that he is a helper, caretaker and overseer of plaintiffs in their lot in Sitio Pulo, Barangay
Tabtab, Norzagaray, Bulacan, for the last twenty (20) years; that the lot he is working on as an overseer is bounded on the western
portion previously by a river, the northern portion by Andres Palad, southern portion by the property of Miguel Sarmiento and on
the eastern portion by Uyong Sison; he does not know a person by the name of Proceso nor Benjamin Joaquin but knows defendant
Hernando Gener as the one who is occupying a neighboring lot having planted his lot with coconut, langka, mango trees and who
has a house in his occupied lot consisting of galvanized iron and hollow blocks, a fact he knew they being neighbors for five (5) years;
the lot of Hernando Gener is fifty (50) meters away from the farm of which he is an overseer; he started occupancy of the lot even
during the lifetime of Gorgonio de Leon, father of Gregorio de Leon, one of the plaintiffs; that the western portion subject matter of
this case prior to the time it submerged was previously occupied by Sendo a relative of Gorgonio de Leon and after the big flood
occasioned by typhoon Dading in 1978 re-surfaced and was continued to be possessed by Gregorio de Leon and is now declared for
taxation purposes in his name but which is now and since 1989 being physically possessed by Hernando Gener and had planted
langka trees which are now four (4) feet in height; that Hernando Gener destroyed the banana trees which he planted by Rolly
Gener running them over with his jeep on the pretext that he would just pass by but had instead caused them to be planted with
banana trees and other improvements which fact he reported to the owner Gregorio de Leon and Zenaida Faustino and for which he
had been scolded.

xxx xxx xxx

Thereafter, in the meanwhile, in the absence of the defendant who is still abroad, the parties through counsels agreed to present
another plaintiffs witness in the person of Teodoro Mendoza, who in brief testified knowing plaintiffs and defendant, the latter
being the husband of his grand-daughter; that he farmed a tomana near the tomana being then farmed by Gorgonio de Leon during
his lifetime even before Pre-War and upon his death, Gregorio de Leon took possession by introducing improvements like coconut
and mango trees; that he saw Hernando Gener in the lot being litigated only in the year 1990.

Likewise for the plaintiffs, Andres Palad, 70 years of age, testified merely to corroborate Teodoro Mendozas testimonies that the De
Leon father and son had long been in occupation of Lot No. 1050 and that Hernando Geners lot is adjacent only to that of Gorgonio
de Leon.

Zenaida Faustino de Leon, plaintiff, testified that she and her husband had actually been in possession of the land subject matter of
this case since she got married to Gregorio de Leon in 1950 as well as their titled lot; that she has a Sketch Plan as surveyed by Delfin
Bumanglag, Geodetic Engineer (Exh. C) where they introduced improvements like banana, coconut trees, kaimito, papaya and langka
trees; that they were informed by their overseer Ignacio Cadungol in Marikina, Metro Manila that Rolly Gener, son of the defendant
and who is even her cousin, destroyed the banana plants and that Rolly Gener would replace them with new ones but claimed
ownership instead and fenced the premises; that the land is declared in their name under Tax Declaration No. 13621 (Exh. K) and
under Property Index No. 020-13-001-04-037 (Exh.I) and had paid taxes therefor (Exh. J)..

Another witness, Balagtas P. San Pedro, Tax Mapper Supervisor of the Provincial Assessors Office, Malolos, Bulacan, testified that
per their record and in accordance with their Sketch Plan (Exh. M) prepared by the Municipal Assessors Office prepared by their
personnel, the property adjoining Lot No. 1050 with an area of 4,404 square meters is owned by plaintiffs Gregorio de Leon and
Zenaida Faustino.

On cross examination, witness admitted that she is not in a position to know who is the actual possessor of the property but issued
that only to determine the tax due and assessment thereon; that she is not involved in the issuance and preparation of the tax
declaration.

Marcelino Samson, Municipal Draftsman of the Municipal Assessors Office and Norma Maclang, Local Assessment Officer IV, Malolos
Bulacan, dwelt mainly on the circumstances that are in amplification of how the tax declaration and sketch plan were prepared.

For his defense, Hernando Gener declared that he did not forcibly enter plaintiffs lot on October 10, 1988 as alleged in the complaint
but it is the plaintiffs who forcibly entered his lot which he bought from Benjamin Joaquin, son of Proceso Joaquin, as evidenced by a
Deed of Sale executed before Judge Filomeno Pascual (Exh. I) after which he cleared (hinawan) and planted mangoes, bananas,
camias and other plants; that the land he bought had not been possessed by Gregorio de Leon and Zenaida Faustino as they are
residing at Santos St., Norzagaray, Bulacan, which is five hundred (500) meters away from the lot he bought. After buying the
property, Ignacio Cadungol together with others entered the property so he filed Criminal Case No. 4043 also before this Court (Exh.
E). Thereafter, he caused the land to be declared under Tax Declaration No. 13400 (Exh. 2) and paid taxes for the same (Exh. 3): that
Tax Declaration No. 1512 (Exh. 5) for Gorgonio de Leon which he secured at the Municipal Assessors Office even showed Proceso
Joaquin, father of Benjamin Joaquin, as boundary owner of the small portion on the east and abutting to that of Agapito Gener and
Sinforosa Torres. For the current year, he had paid taxes under Official Receipt No. 0023591 (Exh. 3-B). That in fact, in the Salaysay
dated November 13, 1961 executed before Atty. Raymundo R. Cruz, (Exh. 8) Gorgonio de Leon, father of the plaintiffs, admitted
Joaquin as one of his boundary owners; that for the filing of this case, he suffered damages and other ordeals of litigation as well as
attorneys fees.

xxx xxx xxx

After weighing the conflicting evidence, the Municipal Trial Court of Norzagaray, Bulacan rendered judgment 8 dated February 19,
1993, the dispositive portion of which reads:

PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendant, ordering:

1. the defendant and/or all persons claiming right under him to vacate the portion described in Tax Declaration No. ARP-4675
and described in the Sketch Plan marked as Exhibit M;

2. the defendant to pay the plaintiffs P1,000.00 as litigation expenses;

3. the defendant to pay plaintiff P2,000.00 as attorneys fees;

All other plaintiffs claim are denied for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

On appeal to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan, on April 3, 1995, the said court rendered a decision reversing the
decision of the Municipal Trial Court of Norzagaray, and thereby dismissed herein respondents complaint for forcible entry. 9 In its
decision, the Regional Trial Court sustained petitioners claim of ownership of the property in dispute by virtue of having bought such
property from the heir of the former owner thereof. The Regional Trial Court also declared that petitioner has been in possession of
the disputed property since October 10, 1988.

Insisting on the validity of their cause, respondents interposed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals which reversed the
decision of the Regional Trial Court and reinstated the decision of the Municipal Trial Court. 10 Petitioners motion for reconsideration
was denied by the Court of Appeals in its Resolution promulgated on September 16, 1997. 11 Hence, the instant petition for review
before this Court anchored on twelve (12) assignment of errors, to wit: 12cräläwvirtualibräry

1. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN NOT DISMISSING THE CASE IN VIEW OF THE
FAILURE OF THE RESPONDENTS TO ALLEGE IN THE COMPLAINT PRIOR POSSESSION OF THE LAND IN QUESTION;

2. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN NOT HOLDING THAT RESPONDENTS COMPLAINT
FOR FORCIBLE ENTRY FILED BEFORE THE MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT OF NORZAGARAY, BULACAN (ANNEX K) WAS FILED BEYOND THE
ONE-YEAR REGLEMENTARY PERIOD.

3. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT DECLARING RESPONDENTS GUILTY OF LACHES ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT
THE CASE WAS FILED WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED PERIOD.

4. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED AN ERROR AMOUNTING TO GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN DISREGARDING
AND/OR MISAPPREHENDING FACTS OF VALUE AND SUBSTANCE WHICH IF CONSIDERED WOULD HAVE ALTERED THE RESULT OF ITS
JUDGMENT, SUCH AS (1) THE FILING OF CRIMINAL COMPLAINT FOR MALICIOUS MISCHIEF AGAINST ROSENDO BUEN AND IGNACION
CADUNGOL FOR HAVING ENTERED THE LAND OWNED AND POSSESSED BY THE PETITIONER AND DESTROYED PLANTS THEREIN ON
OCTOBER 24, 1988 NEGATING RESPONDENTS CLAIM THAT PETITIONER ENTERED THE SAME ON MAY 8, 1989 THROUGH FORCE,
THREAT AND INTIMIDATION; (2) THE ENTRY INTO THE LAND FOR THE SECOND TIME AND DESTRUCTION OF THE BARBED WIRE AND
PLANTS BY HUGO AND ROLLY DE LEON, BROTHERS OF RESPONDENT GREGORIO DE LEON AND IGNACIO CADUNGOL AND OTHERS,
ON MARCH 12, 1989 AT 2:00 OCLOCK P.M.

5. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION DISREGARDING THE JOINT AFFIDAVIT OF ADRIANO
DE GUZMAN, GORGONIO DE LEON, AND GREGORIO SISON DECLARING AND RECOGNIZING PROCESO JOAQUIN AS A BOUNDARY
OWNER ON THE SOUTH ALONG WITH GORGONIO DE LEON, OF THE LAND WHICH ADRIANO DE GUZMAN SOLD TO PETITIONER, AS A
DECLARATION AGAINST INTEREST UNDER SEC. 28 OF RULE 130 OF THE RULES OF COURT AND BINDING UPON RESPONDENTS AS
ADMISSION BY PRIVIES UNDER SEC. 31 OF THE SAME RULE.

6. THAT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN HOLDING THAT IT WAS UNCLEAR
WHETHER THE DISPUTED PROPERTY FORMED PART OF THE PURCHASE PACKAGE, MEANING THE SALE OF ADRIANO DE GUZMANS
LAND TO PETITIONER HERNANDO GENER, WHICH FINDING IS OBVIOUSLY GROUNDED ENTIRELY ON SPECULATION, SURMISES AND
CONJECTURES NECESSITATING THE EXERCISE OF THE POWER OF REVIEW BY THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT.

7. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN FINDING THAT PETITIONER WAS NOT THE
INITIAL OCCUPANT OF THE CONTESTED LOT, THE SAME BEING THEN IN THE POSSESSION OF PETITIONERS (NOW RESPONDENTS)
WHOSE PRESENCE THEREAT DATES BACK TO 1978, WITHOUT CITATION OF SPECIFIC EVIDENCE ON WHICH THEY ARE BASED. AGAIN,
SAID FINDING IS BASED ON CONJECTURES AND SURMISES.

8. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN FINDING THAT PETITIONER FORCIBLY EXCLUDED
RESPONDENTS FROM THE LOT IN QUESTION WITH THE OUSTING FORCE COMING IN THE FORM OF MAN AND MACHINE.
PETITIONERS SON ROLLY GENER AND HIS RAMMING JEEP, WHICH FINDING IS NOT SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.

9. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AGAIN ERRED IN GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN FINDING THAT THE REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT OF BULACAN, BRANCH 11 TREATED THIS CASE AS AN ACCION PUBLICIANA TO DETERMINE WHO BETWEEN THE PARTIES HAD
THE BETTER RIGHT TO POSSESSION WHICH HOLDING IS ERRONEOUS AS THE RTC OF BULACAN MERELY HELD THAT PETITIONER HAD
SHOWN BY CLEAR AND CONCRETE EVIDENCE THAT HE IS IN POSSESSION OF THE DISPUTED PROPERTY SINCE OCTOBER 10, 1988.

10. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN DISREGARDING THE OVERWHELMING
EVIDENCE SHOWING PREPONDERANTLY THAT PETITIONER DID IN FACT AND IN TRUTH START OCCUPYING THE LOT IN QUESTION ON
OCTOBER 10, 1988 BY ENCLOSING IT WITH BARBED WIRE AND PLANTING THE SAME TO COCONUTS, MANGOES, LANGKA, BANANAS,
ETC.

11. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN REVERSING THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT OF BULACAN DATED APRIL 3, 1995, AND UPHOLDING THE QUESTIONABLE DECISION RENDERED ON FEBRUARY 19,
1993 BY THE MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT PRESIDED BY JUDGE BASA.

12. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT OF NORZAGARAY, BULACAN
SHOULD HAVE TAKEN JUDICIAL NOTICE OF THE PENDENCY OF CRIMINAL CASE NUMBER 3998 FOR MALICIOUS MISCHIEF AGAINST
ROSENDO BUEN AND IGNACIO CADUNGOL FILED BY P/SGT. JOSE S. SISON, OFFICER-IN-CHARGE OF THE NORZAGARAY POLICE
STATION FOR ENTERING THE LOT IN QUESTION ON OCTOBER 24, 1988 AT 9:00 P.M. AND DESTROYED THE BARBED WIRE FENCE AND
SOME OF THE PLANTS BELONGING TO PETITIONER HERNANDO P. GENER (EXHIBIT 6).

All the foregoing issues raised by the petitioner essentially question the factual findings of the appellate court as appearing in its
assailed decision, contending that such findings do not have any factual moorings. He avers that the appellate court disregarded
evidence showing his prior possession of the disputed property which negate the alleged cause of action of the respondents for
petitioners ejectment.

In petitions for review on certiorari, the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in cases brought before it from the Court of Appeals is
limited to reviewing questions of law. 13 For a question to be one of law, it must involve no examination of the probative value of the
evidence presented by the litigants or any of them. 14 Thus, the findings of fact of the appellate court are generally conclusive on this
Court which is not a trier of facts. Although if said factual findings do not conform to the evidence on record, this Court will not
hesitate to review and reverse the factual findings of the lower courts. 15 In the instant case, we find sufficient basis to deviate from
the rule since the extant evidence and prevailing law support a finding different from the conclusion of the appellate court.

It bears stress that in ejectment cases, the only issue for resolution is who is entitled to the physical or material possession of the
property involved, independent of any claim of ownership set forth by any of the party-litigants. Anyone of them who can prove
prior possession de facto may recover such possession even from the owner himself. 16 Ejectment does not depend on title for relief;
the criterion is the right to possession. 17 Thus, priority in time should be the pivotal point in resolving the issue of possession.

Section 1, Rule 70 of the Revised Rules of Court 18 requires that in actions for forcible entry the plaintiff is allegedly deprived of the
possession of land or building by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth and that the action shall be filed within one year
from the time of such unlawful deprivation of possession. This requirement implies that the possession of the disputed land by the
defendant is unlawful from the beginning as he acquired possession thereof by unlawful means. The plaintiff must allege and prove
that he was in prior physical possession of the property in litigation until he was deprived thereof by the defendant. The one year
period within which to bring an action for forcible entry is generally counted from the date of actual entry by the defendant on the
land. 19cräläwvirtualibräry

To support their allegation of prior possession, herein respondents, as plaintiffs in the ejectment case, primarily relied upon the
testimonies of Ignacio Cadungol, Teodoro Mendoza, Andres Palad, Balagtas P. San Pedro, Marcelino Samson, Norman Maclang and
respondent Zenaida Faustino. The appellate court made much of the testimony that it was petitioner who forcibly excluded
respondents from possession of the land on May 8, 1989. In the words of the appellate court, the ousting force came in the form of
man and machine: [petitioners] son Rolly Gener and his ramming jeep.

However, the Municipal Trial Court and Court of Appeals totally overlooked the fact that while petitioner was his own sole witness,
his testimony of prior possession was substantiated by several documentary evidence, 20 which were quite damaging to the
existence of respondents alleged cause of action for forcible entry. This Court noted that there were two (2) incidents that occurred
on October 24, 1988 and March 12, 1989 which resulted in the institution by herein petitioner of criminal complaints for malicious
mischief.

These two (2) incidents, are the subject of: (a) Criminal Case No. 3998 for malicious mischief against Rosendo Buen and Ignacio
Cadungol alias Lolong, two (2) alleged helpers of the land of respondent Gregorio de Leon, who allegedly entered the disputed land
on October 24, 1988 and destroyed coconut trees, papaya and langka trees which allegedly belonged to the petitioner, and (b)
Criminal Case No. 4043 against Hugo de Leon and Rolly de Leon, brothers of respondent Gregorio de Leon, who allegedly entered
the disputed land on March 12, 1989 and destroyed mango trees and other plants which allegedly belonged to the petitioner. These
twin incidents, evidenced by Sinumpaang Salaysay and Complaint 21 show that prior to May 8, 1989, the alleged date of forcible
entry of petitioner, petitioner was already in possession of the disputed land.

As against the mere testimonial evidence relied upon by respondents that they were forcibly ejected from the land by petitioner on
May 8, 1989, the documentary evidence of petitioners prior possession, more particularly the evidence of the two (2) incidents of
October 24, 1988 and March 12, 1989, must prevail. Oral testimony, depending as it does exclusively on human memory, is not as
reliable as written or documentary evidence, 22 especially when said documentary evidence is not opposed. As Judge Limkin of
Georgia once said, I would rather trust the smallest slip of paper for truth than the strongest and most retentive memory ever
bestowed on mortal man. 23cräläwvirtualibräry

The Municipal Trial Court of Norzagaray should have taken judicial notice of the said criminal cases involving the subject parcel of
land and pending in its docket. While, as a general rule, courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of the contents of the
records of other cases, even when such cases have been tried or are pending in the same court, and notwithstanding the fact that
both cases may have been tried or are actually pending before the same judge, 24 this rule is subject to the exception that "in the
absence of objection and as a matter of convenience to all parties, a court may properly treat all or any part of the original record of
the case filed in its archives as read into the records of a case pending before it, when with the knowledge of the opposing party,
reference is made to it, by name and number or in some other manner by which it is sufficiently designated." 25 Respondents did not
impugn nor object to the evidence of petitioner on the existence of the said criminal cases of malicious mischief that sprung from
the alleged forcible entry of petitioners alleged property. Thus, the said Municipal Trial Court should have taken judicial notice of
these facts in resolving the issue of prior possession.

In view of the evidence on the possession of petitioner prior to May 8, 1989, as shown by the incidents on October 24, 1988 and
March 12, 1989, the cause of action of respondents for forcible entry against the petitioner has already prescribed when they filed
the complaint for ejectment on April 30, 1990. Because forcible entry cases must be filed within one year from the date of actual
entry on the land. 26 Forcible entry is a quieting process and the one year time bar to the ejectment suit is in pursuance of the
summary nature of the action. 27 After the lapse of the one year period, the remedies of the party dispossessed of a parcel of land is
to file either an accion publiciana which is a plenary action to recover the right of possession or an accion reinvindicatoria which is an
action to recover ownership as well as for the recovery of possession. 28 Consequently, since respondents cause of action for forcible
entry has prescribed, the Municipal Trial Court was without jurisdiction to hear and decide the subject ejectment case.

In view of the conclusions we have thus reached, it is unnecessary to pass upon the other issues raised in the petition.

WHEREFORE , the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The challenged Decision of the Court of Appeals dated May 30, 1997 in CA-
G.R. SP No. 37346 is REVERSEDandSETASIDE. The complaint for forcible entry is DISMISSEDwithout prejudice to the filing of the
appropriate action in the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. NO. 145169 : May 13, 2004]

SIENA REALTY CORPORATION, as represented by LYDIA CO HAO and LILIBETH MANLUGON, Petitioner, v. HON. LOLITA GAL-LANG,
as Presiding Judge of the RTC of Manila, Branch 44; ANITA CO NG in trust for ROCKEFELLER NG; and the COURT OF APPEALS,
SPECIAL 13TH DIVISION, Respondents.

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Challenged via Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court is the September 13, 2000
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 59096, Siena Realty Corporation, as represented by Lydia Co Hao and Lilibeth
Manlugon v. Hon. Lolita O. Gal-lang, as Presiding Judge of Br. 44 of the RTC of Manila, and Anita Co Ng in trust for Rockefeller Ng.

Since the petition attributes grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Court of Appeals in the issuance of subject resolution, what
should have been filed was one for certiorari under Rule 65.On this score alone, the petition must be denied due course.
But even if technicality were set aside, just the same the petition fails.

Petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals on June 7, 2000 or allegedly on the 60th day from their receipt of
the March 23, 2000 Order of Branch 44 of the Manila Regional Trial Court denying their motion for Reconsideration of said courts
Order dismissing, on motion of private respondent, their complaint.

The Court of Appeals, by Resolution1 of June 20, 2000, dismissed petitioners Petition for Certiorari, however, for being filed out of
time, it holding that:chanroblesvirtua1awlibrary

Per records, it appears that petitioners had only until May 29, 2000 within which to file the Petition for Certiorari considering the
following:chanroblesvirtua1awlibrary

1.Petitioners received a copy of the October 20, 1999 Order denying their [counsels] Notice of Withdrawal [and likewise denying
petitioners Motion for Reconsideration of the Order dismissing their complaint] on November 8, 1999;chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

2.Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the October 20, 1999 Order on November 17, 1999; and that

3.Petitioners received a copy of the March 23, 2000 Order denying their motion for reconsideration on April 8, 2000.

The instant petition was filed on June 7, 2000 or nine (9) days late.

Thus, for being belatedly filed, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.

Petitioners thereupon filed (on July 10, 2000) a motion for reconsideration2 of the above-said June 20, 2000 Order of the appellate
court.

In the meantime, this Court issued in A.M. No. 00-2-03-SC (Reglamentary Period to File Petitions for Certiorari and Petition for
Review on Certiorari) a Resolution dated August 1, 2000 approving the amendment to the following provision of Section 4, Rule 65 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure:chanroblesvirtua1awlibrary

SECTION 4. Where petition filed. The petition may be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order,
resolution sought to be assailed in the Supreme Court or, if it relates to the acts or omissions of a lower court or of a corporation,
board, officer or person, in the Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the Supreme Court.
It may also be filed in the Court of Appeals whether or not the same is in aid of its jurisdiction. If it involves the acts or omissions of a
quasi-judicial agency, and unless otherwise provided by law or these Rules, the petition shall be filed in and cognizable only by the
Court of Appeals.

If the petitioner had filed a motion for new trial or reconsideration after notice of said judgment, order or resolution, the period
herein fixed shall be interrupted. If the motion is denied, the aggrieved party may file the petition within the remaining period,
but which shall not be less than five (5) days in any event, reckoned from notice of such denial. No extension of time shall be
granted except for the most compelling reason and in no case to exceed fifteen (15) days. (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)cralawlibrary

The amendment to Sec. 4, Rule 65, which took effect on September 1, 2000, reads:chanroblesvirtua1awlibrary

SECTION 4. When and where petition filed. The petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment,
order or resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such motion is required or not, the
sixty (60) day period shall be counted from notice of the denial of the said motion.

The petition shall be filed in the Supreme Court or, if it relates to the acts or omissions of a lower court or of a corporation, board,
officer or person, in the Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the Supreme Court. It may
also be filed in the Court of Appeals whether or not the same is in the aid of its appellate jurisdiction, or in the Sandiganbayan if it is
in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. If it involves the acts or omissions of a quasi-judicial agency, unless otherwise provided by law or
these rules, the petition shall be filed in and cognizable only by the Court of Appeals.
No extension of time to file the petition shall be granted except for compelling reason and in no case exceeding fifteen (15) days.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)cralawlibrary

The Court of Appeals, acting on petitioners Motion for Reconsideration of its Order of June 20, 2000, denied, by Resolution of
September 13, 2000,3 said motion in this wise:

xxx

From the argument espoused by petitioners counsel, it appears that he overlooked the provision of second paragraph of Sec. 4, Rule
65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure as amended per Supreme Court Circular dated July 21, 1998, which provides as
follows:chanroblesvirtua1awlibrary

If the petitioner had filed a motion for new trial or reconsideration after notice of said judgment, order or resolution, the period
herein fixed shall be interrupted. If the motion is denied, the aggrieved party may file the petition within the remaining period, but
which shall not be less than five (5) days in any event, reckoned from notice of such denial. No extension of time shall be granted
except for the most compelling reason and in no case to exceed fifteen (15) days.

Verily, the sixty (60) day period within which to file a Petition for Certiorari is not counted from the date of the receipt of the denial
of Motion for Reconsideration, but from the date of the receipt of the questioned order or decision, except that such 60-day period
is interrupted upon the filing of a Motion for Reconsideration.

WHEREFORE, for reason above-stated, the instant motion is DENIED. Consequently, the present Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED
with finality. (Underscoring supplied)cralawlibrary

Hence, the petition at bar, petitioners challenging the September 13, 2000 Resolution of the appellant court as having been

.. . ISSUED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AS IT WAS MADE WITHOUT TAKING PRIOR JUDICIAL NOTICE OF SUPREME COURT
A.M. NO. 00-2 - 03 SC WHICH RESOLUTION TOOK EFFECT ON SEPTEMBER 1, 2000, AND WHICH AMENDED THE SECOND PARAGRAPH
OF SECTION 4, RULE 65 OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.4 (Underscoring supplied)cralawlibrary

Petitioners argument is well-taken.

Section 1, Rule 129 of the Rules on Evidence reads:chanroblesvirtua1awlibrary

SECTION 1. Judicial notice, when mandatory. A court shall take judicial notice, without the introduction of evidence, of the
existence and territorial extent of states, their political history, forms of government and symbols of nationality, the law of nations,
the admiralty and maritime courts of the world and their seals, the political constitution and history of the Philippines, the official
acts of the legislative, executive and judicial departmentsof the Philippines, the laws of nature, the measure of time, and the
geographical divisions. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)cralawlibrary

Even if petitioner did not raise or allege the amendment in their motion for reconsideration before it, the Court of Appeals should
have taken mandatory judicial notice of this Courts resolution in A.M. Matter No. 00-02-03 SC. The resolution didnot have to specify
that it had retroactive effect as it pertains to a procedural matter. Contrary to private respondents allegation that the matter was no
longer pending and undetermined, the issue of whether the Petition for Certiorari was timely filed was still pending reconsideration
when the amendment took effect on September 1, 2000, hence, covered by the its retroactive application.

The amendatory rule in their favor notwithstanding, petitioners petition fails as stated early on. The order of the trial court granting
private respondents Motion to Dismiss the complaint was a final, not interlocutory, order and as such, it was subject to appeal,5 not
a Petition for Certiorari. At the time petitioners filed before the appellate court their Petition for Certiorari on the 60th day following
their receipt of the October 20, 1999 Order of the trial court denying their Motion for Reconsideration of its dismissal order, the said
October 20, 1999 Order had become final and executory after the 15th day following petitioners receipt thereof.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is, in light of the foregoing discussions, hereby DENIED.

SO ORDERED.
Vitug, (Chairman), Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Corona, JJ., concur.

[G.R. NO. 174672 : April 16, 2008]

MACTAN-CEBU INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY (MCIAA), Petitioner, v. HEIRS OF MARCELINA L. SERO, SUPREMO S.
ANCAJAS, MAXIMA S. ANCAJAS-NUÑEZ, HRS. OF JULIAN L. ANCAJAS, AGRIPINO ANCAJAS, MARIA ORBISO, MIGUELA ANCAJAS,
INESIA ANCAJAS, PACENCIA ANCAJAS, CLAUDIA DOBLE, HEIRS OF ERACLEO S. ANCAJAS, MARCIANO ANCAJAS, LUCIA ANCAJAS,
HEIRS OF ANASTACIO S. ANCAJAS, MARIA A. AMAMANGPANG, JOSE S. ANCAJAS, AMADO S. ANCAJAS,HEIRS OF PORCESO S.
ANCAJAS, CRISOLOGO ANCAJAS,HEIRS OF SILVESTRA ANCAJAS, ANICETO A. INVENTO, ENRIQUIETA I. GIER, NORMA PACHO,
EDGARDO A. INVENTO, PROCOLO A. INVENTO, ESTRELLA I. MAGLASANG, HEIRS OF GERMOGENA S. ANCAJAS, NENITA ANCAJAS-
OSTIA, PAULA A. AMADEO, NEMESIO A. AMADEO, PASTORA A. RUSTIA, CONCEPCION A. ORBISO, BALBINA A.
AMADEO,ANASTACIA A. AMADEO, RUFINO AMADEO, VALERIANO AMADEO, HERMOGENIS AMADEO, PEDRO AMADEO, OPING
AMADEO,HEIRS OF CRESENCIA AMADEO, EDITHO A. SERTEMO, HEIRS OF DEMETRIO L. SERO, AURELIA L. SERO, MONICA S. YUBAL,
HEIRS OF SOLEDAD SERO-VILLACSE, PAQUITA S. VILLACSE, CONCEPCION VILLARIN, JOSE S. OSTIA, HEIRS OF BASILISA S. SERO,
HEIRS OF TOMAS S. CUNA, FERNANDO CUNA, HEIRS OF MARGARITO S. CUNA, LEONARDO CUNA, CONSOLACION CUNA, SALOME
CUNA, HEIRS OF PEREGRINA SERO CUNA, CARMEN CUNA, HEIRS OF ALEJANDRO SERO CUNA, LETICIA CUNA, HEIRS OF SENANDO
SERO CUNA, SONIA CUNA, ANTONIO S. CUNA, COLOMBA SERO CUNA, All represented by their attorney-in-fact - ANECITO
INVENTO, Respondents.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This petition assails the May 12, 2006 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 73159, which reversed the June 14, 2001
and August 10, 2001 Orders of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 8, in Civil Case No. CEB-24012. Also assailed is the
September 12, 2006 Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration.

The facts of the case are as follows:

On July 6, 1999, respondents, through their attorney-in-fact Anecito Invento, filed a complaint against several defendants for
recovery of ownership and declaration of nullity of several Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs), four of which are registered in the
names of the petitioner Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority (MCIAA) and the Republic. They alleged that the subject
properties were owned by their predecessor Ysabel Limbaga, but the Original Certificates of Title were lost during the Second World
War. Respondents alleged that the mother of therein defendants Ricardo Inocian, Emilia I. Bacalla, Olympia I. Esteves and Restituta I.
Montana pretended to be "Isabel Limbaga" and fraudulently succeeded in reconstituting the titles over the subject properties to her
name and in selling some of them to the other defendants.2

It will be recalled that the subject properties were acquired by the Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA) through expropriation
proceedings for the expansion and improvement of the Lahug Airport,3 which was granted by the Court of First Instance (CFI) of
Cebu City, Branch 3, in Civil Case No. R-1881, on December 29, 1961. Subsequently, however, Lahug airport was ordered closed on
November 29, 1989,4 and all its functions and operations were transferred to petitioner MCIAA5 after its creation in 1990 pursuant
to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6958, otherwise known as the Charter of the Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority.

In its Answer, petitioner denied the allegations in the complaint and by way of special and affirmative defenses moved for the
dismissal of the complaint. Likewise, defendants Ricardo Inocian, Haide Sun and spouses Victor Arcinas and Marilyn Dueñas filed
their separate motions to dismiss.

On June 14, 2001, the RTC dismissed the complaint on the grounds that the respondents had no cause of action, and that the action
was barred by prescription and laches.6 Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied; hence, they filed an
appeal with the Court of Appeals which reversed the Orders of the RTC. The appellate court held that the complaint alleged
"ultimate facts" constituting respondents' cause of action; that the respondents cannot be faulted for not including therein
"evidentiary facts," thus causing confusion or doubt as to the existence of a cause of action; and assuming the complaint lacked
some definitive statements, the proper remedy for the petitioner and other defendants should have been a motion for bill of
particulars, not a motion to dismiss. Further, the determination of whether respondents have a right to recover the ownership of the
subject properties, or whether their action is barred by prescription or laches requires evidentiary proof which can be threshed out,
not in a motion to dismiss, but in a full-blown trial.7 The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the assailed orders dated 14 June 2001 and 10 August 2001, both issued by the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City,
Branch 8 in Civil Case No. CEB-24012, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, we REMAND the case to the court a quo for
further proceedings. We are also directing the RTC of Cebu City, Branch 8 to REINSTATE the case, and to conduct a TRIAL ON THE
MERITS and thereafter render a decision.

SO ORDERED.8

Petitioner moved for reconsideration, however, it was denied in a Resolution dated September 12, 2006.9 Hence, this Petition for
Review based on the following grounds:

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT RESPONDENTS HAVE A CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST PETITIONER IN CIVIL
CASE NO. CEB-24012.

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT AFFIRMING THE LOWER COURT'S FINDING THAT RESPONDENTS ARE GUILTY OF
LACHES AND THAT THEIR CAUSE OF ACTION, IF ANY, HAS PRESCRIBED.10

Respondents argue that the properties which were expropriated in connection with the operation of the Lahug Airport should be
reconveyed to the real owners considering that the purpose for which the properties were expropriated is no longer relevant in view
of the closure of the Lahug Airport.11

A cause of action is an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal right of the other. Its elements are the following: (1) the
legal right of plaintiff; (2) the correlative obligation of the defendant, and (3) the act or omission of the defendant in violation of said
legal right.12 The existence of a cause of action is determined by the allegations in the complaint.13 Thus, in the resolution of a
motion to dismiss based on failure to state a cause of action, only the facts alleged in the complaint must be considered. The test in
cases like these is whether a court can render a valid judgment on the complaint based upon the facts alleged and pursuant to the
prayer therein. Hence, it has been held that a motion to dismiss generally partakes of the nature of a demurrer which hypothetically
admits the truth of the factual allegations made in a complaint.14

However, while a trial court focuses on the factual allegations in a complaint, it cannot disregard statutes and decisions material and
relevant to the proper appreciation of the questions before it. In resolving a motion to dismiss, every court must take judicial notice
of decisions this Court has rendered as provided by Section 1 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court,15 to wit:

SECTION 1. Judicial notice, when mandatory. - A court shall take judicial notice, without the introduction of evidence, of the
existence and territorial extent of states, their political history, forms of government and symbols of nationality, the law of nations,
the admiralty and maritime courts of the world and their seals, the political constitution and history of the Philippines, the official
acts of the legislative, executive and judicial departments of the Philippines, laws of nature, the measure of time, and the
geographical divisions.

In reversing the Orders of the RTC, the Court of Appeals failed to consider the decision of this Court in Mactan-Cebu International
Airport v. Court of Appeals,16 rendered on November 27, 2000, which settled the issue of whether the properties expropriated under
Civil Case No. R-1881 will be reconveyed to the original owners if the purpose for which it was expropriated is ended or abandoned
or if the property was to be used other than the expansion or improvement of the Lahug airport.

In said case, the Court held that the terms of the judgment in Civil Case No. R-1881 were clear and unequivocal. It granted title over
the expropriated land to the Republic of the Philippines in fee simple without any condition that it would be returned to the owners
or that the owners had a right to repurchase the same if the purpose for which it was expropriated is ended or abandoned or if the
property was to be used other than as the Lahug airport.17 When land has been acquired for public use in fee simple,
unconditionally, either by the exercise of eminent domain or by purchase, the former owner retains no rights in the land, and the
public use may be abandoned, or the land may be devoted to a different use, without any impairment of the estate or title acquired,
or any reversion to the former owner.18

Had the appellate court considered the import of the ruling in Mactan-Cebu International Airport v. Court of Appeals, it would have
found that respondents can invoke no right against the petitioner since the subject lands were acquired by the State in fee simple.
Thus, the first element of a cause of action, i.e., plaintiff's legal right, is not present in the instant case.

We are not unaware of the ruling in Heirs of Timoteo Moreno v. Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority,19 concerning still
another set of owners of lands which were declared expropriated in the judgment in Civil Case No. R-1881, but were ordered by the
Court to be reconveyed to their previous owners because there was preponderant proof of the existence of the right of repurchase.
However, we qualified our Decision in that case, thus:

We adhere to the principles enunciated in Fery and in Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority, and do not overrule them.
Nonetheless the weight of their import, particularly our ruling as regards the properties of respondent Chiongbian in Mactan-Cebu
International Airport Authority, must be commensurate to the facts that were established therein as distinguished from those extant
in the case at bar. Chiongbian put forth inadmissible and inconclusive evidence, while in the instant case we have preponderant
proof as found by the trial court of the existence of the right of repurchase in favor of petitioners.20 (Emphasis provided)

Thus, the determination of the rights and obligations of landowners whose properties were expropriated but the public purpose for
which eminent domain was exercised no longer subsist, must rest on the character by which the titles thereof were acquired by the
government. If the land is expropriated for a particular purpose with the condition that it will be returned to its former owner once
that purpose is ended or abandoned, then the property shall be reconveyed to its former owner when the purpose is terminated or
abandoned. If, on the contrary, the decree of expropriation gives to the entity a fee simple title, as in this case, then the land
becomes the absolute property of the expropriator. Non-use of the property for the purpose by which it was acquired does not have
the effect of defeating the title acquired in the expropriation proceedings.21

Even assuming that respondents have a right to the subject properties being the heirs of the alleged real owner Ysabel Limbaga, they
still do not have a cause of action against the petitioner because such right has been foreclosed by prescription, if not by laches.
Respondents failed to take the necessary steps within a reasonable period to recover the properties from the parties who caused
the alleged fraudulent reconstitution of titles.

Respondents' action in the court below is one for reconveyance based on fraud committed by Isabel Limbaga in reconstituting the
titles to her name. It was filed on July 6, 1999, or 38 years after the trial court in Civil Case No. R-1881 granted the expropriation, or
even longer if we reckon from the time of the fraudulent reconstitution of titles, which date is not stated in the complaint but
presumably before the complaint for expropriation was filed by CAA on April 16, 1952.22

An action for reconveyance is a legal remedy granted to a landowner whose property has been wrongfully or erroneously registered
in another's name.23 However, such action must be filed within 10 years from the issuance of the title since the issuance operates as
a constructive notice.24 Thus, the cause of action which respondents may have against the petitioner is definitely barred by
prescription.

Rule 9, Section 1 of the Rules of Court provides that when it appears from the pleadings or the evidence on record that the action is
already barred by statute of limitations, the court shall dismiss the claim. Further, contrary to respondents' claim that a complaint
may not be dismissed based on prescription without trial, an allegation of prescription can effectively be used in a motion to dismiss
when the complaint on its face shows that indeed the action has prescribed25 at the time it was filed.

Thus, in Gicano v. Gegato:26

We have ruled that trial courts have authority and discretion to dismiss an action on the ground of prescription when the parties'
pleadings or other facts on record show it to be indeed time-barred; and it may do so on the basis of a motion to dismiss, or an
answer which sets up such ground as an affirmative defense; or even if the ground is alleged after judgment on the merits, as in a
motion for reconsideration; or even if the defense has not been asserted at all, as where no statement thereof is found in the
pleadings, or where a defendant has been declared in default. What is essential only, to repeat, is that the facts demonstrating the
lapse of the prescriptive period, be otherwise sufficiently and satisfactorily apparent on the record: either in the averments of the
plaintiffs complaint, or otherwise established by the evidence.27 (Citations omitted) chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

In the instant case, although the complaint did not state the date when the alleged fraud in the reconstitution of titles was
perpetuated, it is however clear from the allegations in the complaint that the properties sought to be recovered were acquired by
the petitioner in Civil Case No. R-1881 which was granted by the trial court on December 29, 1961. Clearly, the filing of the action in
1999 is way beyond the ten 10 year prescriptive period.

Further, while it is by express provision of law that no title to registered land in derogation of that of the registered owner shall be
acquired by prescription or adverse possession, it is likewise an enshrined rule that even a registered owner may be barred from
recovering possession of property by virtue of laches.28 The negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time
warrants a presumption that the party entitled to assert it had either abandoned it or declined to assert it also casts doubt on the
validity of the claim of ownership. Such neglect to assert a right taken in conjunction with the lapse of time, more or less great, and
other circumstances causing prejudice to the adverse party, operates as a bar in a court of equity.29

Respondents' inaction for a period of 38 years to vindicate their alleged rights had converted their claim into a stale demand. The
allegation that petitioner employed threat or intimidation is an afterthought belatedly raised only in the Court of Appeals. As such it
deserves scant attention.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition for Review is GRANTED. The May 12, 2006 Decision and September 12, 2006
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 73159 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Orders of the Regional Trial Court of
Cebu City, Branch 8 dated June 14, 2001 and August 10, 2001 in Civil Case No. CEB-24012, dismissing respondent's complaint for
reconveyance on grounds of lack of cause of action, prescription and laches and denying the motion for reconsideration,
respectively, are REINSTATED and AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 178830 July 14, 2008

ROLEX SUPLICO, Petitioner,

vs.
NATIONAL ECONOMIC AND DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, represented by NEDA SECRETARY ROMULO L. NERI, and the NEDA-
INVESTMENT COORDINATION COMMITTEE, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS (DOTC), represented
by DOTC SECRETARY LEANDRO MENDOZA, including the COMMISSION ON INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS
TECHNOLOGY, headed by its Chairman, RAMON P. SALES, THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS OFFICE, BIDS AND AWARDS FOR
INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY (ICT), headed by DOTC ASSISTANT SECRETARY ELMER A. SONEJA as
Chairman, and the TECHNICAL WORKING GROUP FOR ICT, AND DOTC ASSISTANT SECRETARY LORENZO FORMOSO, AND ALL
OTHER OPERATING UNITS OF THE DOTC FOR INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY, and ZTE CORPORATION,
AMSTERDAM HOLDINGS, INC., AND ALL PERSONS ACTING IN THEIR BEHALF, Respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

G.R. No. 179317

AMSTERDAM HOLDINGS, INC., and NATHANIEL SAUZ, Petitioners,

vs.
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS, SECRETARY LEANDRO MENDOZA, COMMISSION ON
INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY, and ASSISTANT SECRETARY LORENZO FORMOSO III, Respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

G.R. No. 179613

GALELEO P. ANGELES, VICENTE C. ANGELES, JOB FLORANTE L. CASTILLO, TRINI ANNE G. NIEVA, ROY ALLAN T. ARELLANO, CARLO
MAGNO M. REONAL, ETHEL B. REGADIO, RAENAN B. MALIG, AND VINALYN M. POTOT, TOGETHER WITH LAWYERS AND
ADVOCATES FOR ACCOUNTABILITY, TRANSPARENCY, INTEGRITY AND GOOD GOVERNANCE (LATIGO), Petitioners,
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS (DOTC), represented by DOTC SECRETARY LEANDRO MENDOZA,
and ZHONG XING EQUIPMENT (ZTE) COMPANY, LTD., AND ANY AND ALL PERSONS ACTING ON THEIR BEHALF, Respondents.

RESOLUTION

REYES, R.T., J.:

Under consideration is the Manifestation and Motion1 dated October 26, 2007 of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) which
states:
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) respectfully avers that in an Indorsement dated October 24, 2007, the Legal Service of the
Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC) has informed it of the Philippine Government’s decision not to continue
with the ZTE National Broadband Network Project (see attachment2). That said, there is no more justiciable controversy for this
Honorable Court to resolve. WHEREFORE, public respondents respectfully pray that the present petitions be DISMISSED.

On November 13, 2007, the Court noted the OSG’s manifestation and motion and required petitioners in G.R. Nos. 178830, 179317,
and 179613 to comment.

On December 6, 2007, Rolex Suplico, petitioner in G.R. No. 178830, filed his Consolidated Reply and Opposition,3 opposing the
aforequoted OSG Manifestation and Motion, arguing that:

66. Aside from the fact that the Notes of the Meeting Between President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and Chinese President
Hu Jintao held 2 October 2007 were not attached to the 26 October 2007 Manifestation and Motion – thus depriving
petitioners of the opportunity to comment thereon – a mere verbally requested 1st Indorsement is not sufficient basis for
the conclusion that the ZTE-DOTC NBN deal has been permanently scrapped.

67. Suffice to state, said 1st Indorsement is glaringly self-serving, especially without the Notes of the Meeting Between
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and Chinese President Hu Jintao to support its allegations or other proof of the
supposed decision to cancel the ZTE-DOTC NBN deal. Public respondents can certainly do better than that.4

Petitioner Suplico further argues that:

79. Assuming arguendo that some aspects of the present Petition have been rendered moot (which is vehemently denied),
this Honorable Court, consistent with well-entrenched jurisprudence, may still take cognizance thereof.5

Petitioner Suplico cites this Court’s rulings in Gonzales v. Chavez,6 Rufino v. Endriga,7 and Alunan III v. Mirasol8 that despite their
mootness, the Court nevertheless took cognizance of these cases and ruled on the merits due to the Court’s symbolic function of
educating the bench and the bar by formulating guiding and controlling principles, precepts, doctrines, and rules.

On January 31, 2008, Amsterdam Holdings, Inc. (AHI) and Nathaniel Sauz, petitioners in G.R. No. 179317, also filed their comment
expressing their sentiments, thus:

3. First of all, the present administration has never been known for candor. The present administration has a very nasty
habit of not keeping its word. It says one thing, but does another.

4. This being the case, herein petitioners are unable to bring themselves to feel even a bit reassured that the government,
in the event that the above-captioned cases are dismissed, will not backtrack, re-transact, or even resurrect the now
infamous NBN-ZTE transaction. This is especially relevant since what was attached to the OSG’s Manifestation and Motion
was a mere one (1) page written communication sent by the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC) to
the OSG, allegedly relaying that the Philippine Government has decided not to continue with the NBN project "x x x due to
several reasons and constraints."

Petitioners AHI and Sauz further contend that because of the transcendental importance of the issues raised in the petition, which
among others, included the President’s use of the power to borrow, i.e., to enter into foreign loan agreements, this Court should
take cognizance of this case despite its apparent mootness.

On January 15, 2008, the Court required the OSG to file respondents’ reply to petitioners’ comments on its manifestation and
motion.

On April 18, 2008, the OSG filed respondents’ reply, reiterating their position that for a court to exercise its power of adjudication,
there must be an actual case or controversy – one which involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims
susceptible of judicial resolution; the case must not be moot or academic or based on extra-legal or other similar considerations not
cognizable by a court of justice.9
Respondents also insist that there is no perfected contract in this case that would prejudice the government or public interest.
Explaining the nature of the NBN Project as an executive agreement, respondents stress that it remained in the negotiation stage.
The conditions precedent10 for the agreement to become effective have not yet been complied with.

Respondents further oppose petitioners’ claim of the right to information, which they contend is not an absolute right. They contend
that the matters raised concern executive policy, a political question which the judicial branch of government would generally
hesitate to pass upon.

On July 2, 2008, the OSG filed a Supplemental Manifestation and Motion. Appended to it is the Highlights from the Notes of Meeting
between President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and Chinese President Hu Jintao, held in XI Jiao Guesthouse, Shanghai, China, on
October 2, 2007. In the Notes of Meeting, the Philippine Government conveyed its decision not to continue with the ZTE National
Broadband Network Project due to several constraints. The same Notes likewise contained President Hu Jintao’s expression of
understanding of the Philippine Government decision.

We resolve to grant the motion.

Firstly, the Court notes the triple petitions to be for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, with application for the issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Preliminary Injunction. The individual prayers in each of the three (3) consolidated
petitions are:

G.R. No. 178830

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court:

1. Upon the filing of this Petition, pursuant to the second paragraph of Rule 58, Section 5 of the Rules of Court, issue
forthwith an ex parte temporary restraining order enjoining respondents, their subordinates, agents, representatives and
any and all persons acting on their behalf from pursuing, entering into indebtedness, disbursing funds, and implementing
the ZTE-DOTC Broadband Deal;

2. Compel respondents, upon Writ of Mandamus, to forthwith produce and furnish petitioner or his undersigned counsel a
certified true copy of the contract or agreement covering the NBN project as agreed upon with ZTE Corporation;

3. Schedule Oral Arguments in the present case pursuant to Rule 49 in relation to Section 2, Rule 56 of the revised Rules of
Court; and,

4. Annul and set aside the award of the ZTE-DOTC Broadband Deal, and compel public respondents to forthwith comply
with pertinent provisions of law regarding procurement of government ICT contracts and public bidding for the NBN
contract.11 (Emphasis supplied)

G.R. No. 179317

WHEREFORE, petitioners Amsterdam Holdings, Inc., and Nathaniel Sauz respectfully pray as follows:

A. upon the filing of this Petition for Mandamus and conditioned upon the posting of a bond in such amount as the
Honorable Court may fix, a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction be issued directing the
Department of Transportation and Communication, the Commission on Information and Communications Technology, all
other government agencies and instrumentalities, their officers, employees, and/or other persons acting for and on their
behalf to desist during the pendency of the instant Petition for Mandamus from entering into any other agreements and
from commencing with any kind, sort, or specie of activity in connection with the National Broadband Network Project;

B. the instant Petition for Mandamus be given due course; and,

C. after due consideration of all relevant issues, judgment be rendered directing respondents to allow herein petitioners
access to all agreements entered into with the Government of China, the ZTE Corporation, and/or other entities,
government instrumentalities, and/or individuals with regard to the National Broadband Network Project.12 (Emphasis
supplied)
 G.R. No. 179613

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court to:

1. Compel respondents, upon Writ of Mandamus, to forthwith produce and furnish petitioner or his undersigned counsel a
certified true copy of the contract or agreement covering the NBN project as agreed upon with ZTE Corporation;

2. Schedule Oral Arguments in the present case pursuant to Rule 49 in relation to Section 2, Rule 56 of the Revised Rules of
Court;

3. Annul and set aside the award of the contract for the national broadband network to respondent ZTE Corporation, upon
the ground that said contract, as well as the procedures resorted to preparatory to the execution thereof, is contrary to the
Constitution, to law and to public policy;

4. Compel public respondent to forthwith comply with pertinent provisions of law regarding procurement of government
infrastructure projects, including public bidding for said contract to undertake the construction of the national broadband
network.13 (Emphasis supplied)

On September 11, 2007, the Court issued a TRO14 in G.R. No. 178830, enjoining the parties from "pursuing, entering into
indebtedness, disbursing funds, and implementing the ZTE-DOTC Broadband Deal and Project" as prayed for. Pertinent parts of the
said Order read:

WHEREAS, the Supreme Court, on 11 September 2007, adopted a resolution in the above-entitled case, to wit:

"G.R. No. 178830 (Rolex Suplico vs. National Economic and Development Authority, represented by NEDA Secretary Romulo L. Neri,
and the NEDA Investment Coordination Committee, Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC), represented by
DOTC Secretary Leandro Mendoza, including the Commission on Information and Communications Technology, headed by its
Chairman, Ramon P. Sales, The Telecommunications Office, Bids and Awards for Information and Communications Technology
Committee (ICT), headed by DOTC Assistant Secretary Elmer A. Soneja as Chairman, and The Technical Working Group for ICT, and
DOTC Assistant Secretary Lorenzo Formoso, and All Other Operating Units of the DOTC for Information and Communications
Technology, and ZTE Corporation, Amsterdam Holdings, Inc., and ARESCOM, Inc.—Acting on the instant petition with prayer for
temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction, the Court Resolved, without giving due course to the petition, to

xxxx

(d) Issue a TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER, effective immediately and continuing until further orders from this Court, enjoining
the (i) National Economic and Development Authority, (ii) NEDA-Investment Coordination Committee, (iii) Department of
Transportation and Communications, Commission on Information and Communications Technology, (iv) Telecommunications Office,
Bids and Awards for Information and Communications Technology Committee (ICT), (v) Technical Working Group for ICT, and all
other Operating Units of the DOTC for Information and Communications Technology, (vi) ZTE Corporation; (vii) Amsterdam Holdings,
Inc., and (viii) ARESCOM, Inc., and any and all persons acting on their behalf from ‘pursuing, entering into indebtedness, disbursing
funds, and implementing the ZTE-DOTC Broadband Deal and Project’ as prayed for."

NOW THEREFORE, effective immediately and continuing until further orders from this Court, You, Respondents (i) National Economic
and Development Authority, (ii) NEDA-Investment Coordination Committee, (iii) Department of Transportation and
Communications, Commission on Information and Communications Technology, (iv) Telecommunications Office, Bids and Awards
for Information and Communications Technology Committee (ICT), (v) Technical Working Group for ICT, and all other Operating
Units of the DOTC for Information and Communications Technology, (vi) ZTE Corporation; (vii) Amsterdam Holdings, Inc., and (viii)
ARESCOM, Inc., and any and all persons acting on their behalf are hereby ENJOINED from "pursuing, entering into indebtedness,
disbursing funds, and implementing the ZTE-DOTC Broadband Deal and Project" as prayed for.15 (Emphasis supplied.)

Petitioners in G.R. Nos. 178830 and 179613 pray that they be furnished certified true copies of the "contract or agreement covering
the NBN project as agreed upon with ZTE Corporation." It appears that during one of the Senate hearings on the NBN project, copies
of the supply contract16 were readily made available to petitioners.17 Evidently, the said prayer has been complied with and is, thus,
mooted.
When President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, acting in her official capacity during the meeting held on October 2, 2007 in China,
informed China’s President Hu Jintao that the Philippine Government had decided not to continue with the ZTE-National Broadband
Network (ZTE-NBN) Project due to several reasons and constraints, there is no doubt that all the other principal prayers in the three
petitions (to annul, set aside, and enjoin the implementation of the ZTE-NBN Project) had also become moot.

Contrary to petitioners’ contentions that these declarations made by officials belonging to the executive branch on the Philippine
Government’s decision not to continue with the ZTE-NBN Project are self-serving, hence, inadmissible, the Court has no alternative
but to take judicial notice of this official act of the President of the Philippines.

Section 1, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court provides:

SECTION 1. Judicial Notice, when mandatory. – A court shall take judicial notice, without introduction of evidence, of the existence
and territorial extent of states, their political history, forms of government and symbols of nationality, the law of nations, the
admiralty and maritime courts of the world and their seals, the political constitution and history of the Philippines, the official acts of
the legislative, executive and judicial departments of the Philippines, the laws of nature, the measure of time, and the geographical
divisions. (Emphasis supplied)

Under the rules, it is mandatory and the Court has no alternative but to take judicial notice of the official acts of the President of the
Philippines, who heads the executive branch of our government. It is further provided in the above-quoted rule that the court shall
take judicial notice of the foregoing facts without introduction of evidence. Since we consider the act of cancellation by President
Macapagal-Arroyo of the proposed ZTE-NBN Project during the meeting of October 2, 2007 with the Chinese President in China as an
official act of the executive department, the Court must take judicial notice of such official act without need of evidence.

In David v. Macapagal-Arroyo,18 We took judicial notice of the announcement by the Office of the President banning all rallies and
canceling all permits for public assemblies following the issuance of Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 and General Order No. 5.

In Estrada v. Desierto,19 the Court also resorted to judicial notice in resolving the factual ingredient of the petition.

Moreover, under Section 2, paragraph (m) of Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, the official duty of the executive officials20 of informing
this Court of the government’s decision not to continue with the ZTE-NBN Project is also presumed to have been regularly
performed, absent proof to the contrary. Other than petitioner AHI’s unsavory insinuation in its comment, the Court finds no factual
or legal basis to disregard this disputable presumption in the present instance.

Concomitant to its fundamental task as the ultimate citadel of justice and legitimacy is the judiciary’s role of strengthening political
stability indispensable to progress and national development. Pontificating on issues which no longer legitimately constitute an
actual case or controversy will do more harm than good to the nation as a whole. Wise exercise of judicial discretion militates
against resolving the academic issues, as petitioners want this Court to do. This is especially true where, as will be further discussed,
the legal issues raised cannot be resolved without previously establishing the factual basis or antecedents.

Judicial power presupposes actual controversies, the very antithesis of mootness. In the absence of actual justiciable controversies
or disputes, the Court generally opts to refrain from deciding moot issues. Where there is no more live subject of controversy, the
Court ceases to have a reason to render any ruling or make any pronouncement.

Kapag wala nang buhay na kaso, wala nang dahilan para magdesisyon ang Husgado.

In Republic Telecommunications Holdings, Inc. v. Santiago,21 the lone issue tackled by the Court of Appeals (CA) was whether the
Securities Investigation and Clearing Department (SICD) and Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) en banc committed
reversible error in issuing and upholding, respectively, the writ of preliminary injunction. The writ enjoined the execution of the
questioned agreements between Qualcomm, Inc. and Republic Telecommunications Holdings, Inc. (RETELCOM). The implementation
of the agreements was restrained through the assailed orders of the SICD and the SEC en banc which, however, were nullified by the
CA decision. Thus, RETELCOM elevated the matter to this Court praying for the reinstatement of the writ of preliminary injunction of
the SICD and the SEC en banc. However, before the matter was finally resolved, Qualcomm, Inc. withdrew from the negotiating
table. Its withdrawal had thwarted the execution and enforcement of the contracts. Thus, the resolution of whether the
implementation of said agreements should be enjoined became no longer necessary.

Equally applicable to the present case is the Court ruling in the above-cited Republic Telecommunications. There We held, thus:
Indeed, the instant petition, insofar as it assails the Court of Appeals’ Decision nullifying the orders of the SEC en banc and the SICD,
has been rendered moot and academic. To rule, one way or the other, on the correctness of the questioned orders of the SEC en
banc and the SICD will be indulging in a theoretical exercise that has no practical worth in view of the supervening event.

The rule is well-settled that for a court to exercise its power of adjudication, there must be an actual case or controversy – one
which involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial resolution; the case must not be
moot or academic or based on extra-legal or other similar considerations not cognizable by a court of justice. Where the issue has
become moot and academic, there is no justiciable controversy, and an adjudication thereon would be of no practical use or value as
courts do not sit to adjudicate mere academic questions to satisfy scholarly interest, however intellectually challenging.

In the ultimate analysis, petitioners are seeking the reinstatement of the writ of injunction to prevent the concerned parties from
pushing through with transactions with Qualcomm, Inc. Given that Qualcomm, Inc. is no longer interested in pursuing the contracts,
there is no actual substantial relief to which petitioners would be entitled and which would be negated by the dismissal of the
petition.

The Court likewise finds it unnecessary to rule whether the assailed Court of Appeals’ Decision had the effect of overruling the
Court’s Resolution dated 29 January 1999, which set aside the TRO issued by the appellate court.

A ruling on the matter practically partakes of a mere advisory opinion, which falls beyond the realm of judicial review. The exercise
of the power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and controversies. Courts have no authority to pass upon issues through
advisory opinions or to resolve hypothetical or feigned problems.

While there were occasions when the Court passed upon issues although supervening events had rendered those petitions moot
and academic, the instant case does not fall under the exceptional cases. In those cases, the Court was persuaded to resolve moot
and academic issues to formulate guiding and controlling constitutional principles, precepts, doctrines or rules for future guidance of
both bench and bar.

In the case at bar, the resolution of whether a writ of preliminary injunction may be issued to prevent the implementation of the
assailed contracts calls for an appraisal of factual considerations which are peculiar only to the transactions and parties involved in
this controversy. Except for the determination of whether petitioners are entitled to a writ of preliminary injunction which is now
moot, the issues raised in this petition do not call for a clarification of any constitutional principle or the interpretation of any
statutory provision.22

Secondly, even assuming that the Court will choose to disregard the foregoing considerations and brush aside mootness, the Court
cannot completely rule on the merits of the case because the resolution of the three petitions involves settling factual issues which
definitely requires reception of evidence. There is not an iota of doubt that this may not be done by this Court in the first instance
because, as has been stated often enough, this Court is not a trier of facts.

Ang pagpapasiya sa tatlong petisyon ay nangangailangan ng paglilitis na hindi gawain ng Hukumang ito.

Respondent ZTE, in its Comment in G.R. No. 178830,23 correctly pointed out that since petitioner Suplico filed his petition directly
with this Court, without prior factual findings made by any lower court, a determination of pertinent and relevant facts is needed.
ZTE enumerated some of these factual issues, to wit:

(1) Whether an executive agreement has been reached between the Philippine and Chinese governments over the NBN
Project;

(2) Whether the ZTE Supply Contract was entered into by the Republic of the Philippines, through the DOTC, and ZTE
International pursuant to, and as an integral part of, the executive agreement;

(3) Whether a loan agreement for the NBN Project has actually been executed;

(4) Whether the Philippine government required that the NBN Project be completed under a Build-Operate-and-Transfer
Scheme;

(5) Whether the AHI proposal complied with the requirements for an unsolicited proposal under the BOT Law;
 (6) Whether the Philippine government has actually earmarked public finds for disbursement under the ZTE Supply
Contract; and

(7) Whether the coverage of the NBN Project to be supplied under the ZTE Supply Contract is more extensive than that
under the AHI proposal or such other proposal submitted therefor.24

Definitely, some very specific reliefs prayed for in both G.R. Nos. 178830 and 179613 require prior determination of facts before
pertinent legal issues could be resolved and specific reliefs granted.

In G.R. No. 178830, petitioner seeks to annul and set aside the award of the ZTE-DOTC Broadband Deal and compel public
respondents to forthwith comply with pertinent provisions of law regarding procurement of government ICT contracts and public
bidding for the NBN contract.

In G.R. No. 179613, petitioners also pray that the Court annul and set aside the award of the contract for the national broadband
network to respondent ZTE Corporation, upon the ground that said contract, as well as the procedures resorted to preparatory to
the execution thereof, is contrary to the Constitution, to law and to public policy. They also ask the Court to compel public
respondent to forthwith comply with pertinent provisions of law regarding procurement of government infrastructure projects,
including public bidding for said contract to undertake the construction of the national broadband network.

It is simply impossible for this Court "to annul and set aside the award of the ZTE-DOTC Broadband Deal" without any evidence to
support a prior factual finding pointing to any violation of law that could lead to such annulment order. For sure, the Supreme Court
is not the proper venue for this factual matter to be threshed out.

Thirdly, petitioner Suplico in G.R. No. 178830 prayed that this Court order "public respondents to forthwith comply with pertinent
provisions of law regarding procurement of government ICT contracts and public bidding for the NBN contract."25 It would be too
presumptuous on the part of the Court to summarily compel public respondents to comply with pertinent provisions of law
regarding procurement of government infrastructure projects without any factual basis or prior determination of very particular
violations committed by specific government officials of the executive branch. For the Court to do so would amount to a breach of
the norms of comity among co-equal branches of government. A perceived error cannot be corrected by committing another error.
Without proper evidence, the Court cannot just presume that the executive did not comply with procurement laws. Should the
Court allow itself to fall into this trap, it would plainly commit grave error itself.

Magiging kapangahasan sa Hukumang ito na pilitin ang mga pinipetisyon na tumalima sa batas sa pangongontrata ng pamahalaan
kung wala pang pagtitiyak o angkop na ebidensiya ng nagawang paglabag dito.

Let it be clarified that the Senate investigation in aid of legislation cannot be the basis of Our decision which requires
a judicial finding of facts.

Justice Antonio T. Carpio takes the view that the National Broadband Network Project should be declared null and void. The
foregoing threefold reasons would suffice to address the concern of Our esteemed colleague.

The Court is, therefore, constrained to dismiss the petitions and deny them due course because of mootness and because their
resolution requires reception of evidence which cannot be done in an original petition brought before the Supreme Court.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED. The Temporary Restraining Order issued on September 11, 2007 is DISSOLVED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 171406 April 4, 2011

ASIAN TERMINALS, INC., Petitioner,

vs.
MALAYAN INSURANCE, CO., INC., Respondent.

DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:

Once the insurer pays the insured, equity demands reimbursement as no one should benefit at the expense of another.

This Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assails the July 14, 2005 Decision2 and the February 14,
2006 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA G.R. CV No. 61798.

Factual Antecedents

On November 14, 1995, Shandong Weifang Soda Ash Plant shipped on board the vessel MV "Jinlian I" 60,000 plastic bags of soda ash
dense (each bag weighing 50 kilograms) from China to Manila.4 The shipment, with an invoice value of US$456,000.00, was insured
with respondent Malayan Insurance Company, Inc. under Marine Risk Note No. RN-0001-21430, and covered by a Bill of Lading
issued by Tianjin Navigation Company with Philippine Banking Corporation as the consignee and Chemphil Albright and Wilson
Corporation as the notify party.5

On November 21, 1995, upon arrival of the vessel at Pier 9, South Harbor, Manila,6 the stevedores of petitioner Asian Terminals, Inc.,
a duly registered domestic corporation engaged in providing arrastre and stevedoring services,7 unloaded the 60,000 bags of soda
ash dense from the vessel and brought them to the open storage area of petitioner for temporary storage and safekeeping, pending
clearance from the Bureau of Customs and delivery to the consignee.8 When the unloading of the bags was completed on November
28, 1995, 2,702 bags were found to be in bad order condition.9

On November 29, 1995, the stevedores of petitioner began loading the bags in the trucks of MEC Customs Brokerage for transport
and delivery to the consignee.10 On December 28, 1995, after all the bags were unloaded in the warehouses of the consignee, a total
of 2,881 bags were in bad order condition due to spillage, caking, and hardening of the contents.11

On April 19, 1996, respondent, as insurer, paid the value of the lost/ damaged cargoes to the consignee in the amount of
₱643,600.25.12

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

On November 20, 1996, respondent, as subrogee of the consignee, filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 35, a
Complaint13 for damages against petitioner, the shipper Inchcape Shipping Services, and the cargo broker MEC Customs Brokerage.14

After the filing of the Answers,15 trial ensued.

On June 26, 1998, the RTC rendered a Decision16 finding petitioner liable for the damage/loss sustained by the shipment but
absolving the other defendants. The RTC found that the proximate cause of the damage/loss was the negligence of petitioner’s
stevedores who handled the unloading of the cargoes from the vessel.17 The RTC emphasized that despite the admonitions of
Marine Cargo Surveyors Edgar Liceralde and Redentor Antonio not to use steel hooks in retrieving and picking-up the bags,
petitioner’s stevedores continued to use such tools, which pierced the bags and caused the spillage.18 The RTC, thus, ruled that
petitioner, as employer, is liable for the acts and omissions of its stevedores under Articles 217619 and 2180 paragraph (4)20 of the
Civil Code.21 Hence, the dispositive portion of the Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered ordering defendant Asian Terminal, Inc. to pay plaintiff Malayan Insurance Company, Inc. the
sum of ₱643,600.25 plus interest thereon at legal rate computed from November 20, 1996, the date the Complaint was filed, until
the principal obligation is fully paid, and the costs.

The complaint of the plaintiff against defendants Inchcape Shipping Services and MEC Customs Brokerage, and the counterclaims of
said defendants against the plaintiff are dismissed.

SO ORDERED.22

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Aggrieved, petitioner appealed23 to the CA but the appeal was denied. In its July 14, 2005 Decision, the CA agreed with the RTC that
the damage/loss was caused by the negligence of petitioner’s stevedores in handling and storing the subject shipment.24 The CA
likewise rejected petitioner’s assertion that it received the subject shipment in bad order condition as this was belied by Marine
Cargo Surveyors Redentor Antonio and Edgar Liceralde, who both testified that the actual counting of bad order bags was done only
after all the bags were unloaded from the vessel and that the Turn Over Survey of Bad Order Cargoes (TOSBOC) upon which
petitioner anchors its defense was prepared only on November 28, 1995 or after the unloading of the bags was completed.25 Thus,
the CA disposed of the appeal as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated June 26, 1998 of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 35, in Civil Case No. 96-80945 is hereby AFFIRMED in all respects.

SO ORDERED.26

Petitioner moved for reconsideration27 but the CA denied the same in a Resolution28 dated February 14, 2006 for lack of merit.

Issues

Hence, the present recourse, petitioner contending that:

1. RESPONDENT-INSURER IS NOT ENTITLED TO THE RELIEF GRANTED AS IT FAILED TO ESTABLISH ITS CAUSE OF ACTION
AGAINST HEREIN PETITIONER SINCE, AS THE ALLEGED SUBROGEE, IT NEVER PRESENTED ANY VALID, EXISTING,
ENFORCEABLE INSURANCE POLICY OR ANY COPY THEREOF IN COURT.

2. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT OVERLOOKED THE FACT THAT THE TOSBOC & RESBOC WERE
ADOPTED AS COMMON EXHIBITS BY BOTH PETITIONER AND RESPONDENT.

3. CONTRARY TO TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE ON RECORD, VARIOUS DOCUMENTATIONS WOULD POINT TO THE VESSEL’S
LIABILITY AS THERE IS, IN THIS INSTANT CASE, AN OVERWHELMING DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE TO PROVE THAT THE
DAMAGE IN QUESTION WERE SUSTAINED WHEN THE SHIPMENT WAS IN THE CUSTODY OF THE VESSEL.

4. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT ADJUDGED HEREIN DEFENDANT LIABLE DUE TO [THE] FACT THAT
THE TURN OVER SURVEY OF BAD ORDER CARGOES (TOSBOC) WAS PREPARED ONLY AFTER THE COMPLETION OF THE
DISCHARGING OPERATIONS OR ON NOVEMBER 28, 1995. THUS, CONCLUDING THAT DAMAGE TO THE CARGOES WAS DUE
TO THE IMPROPER HANDLING THEREOF BY ATI STEVEDORES.

5. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT TAKING JUDICIAL NOTICE OF THE CONTRACT FOR CARGO HANDLING
SERVICES BETWEEN PPA AND ATI AND APPLYING THE PERTINENT PROVISIONS THEREOF AS REGARDS ATI’S LIABILITY.29

In sum, the issues are: (1) whether the non-presentation of the insurance contract or policy is fatal to respondent’s cause of
action; (2) whether the proximate cause of the damage/loss to the shipment was the negligence of petitioner’s stevedores;
and (3) whether the court can take judicial notice of the Management Contract between petitioner and the Philippine Ports
Authority (PPA) in determining petitioner’s liability.

Petitioner’s Arguments

Petitioner contends that respondent has no cause of action because it failed to present the insurance contract or policy covering the
subject shipment.30 Petitioner argues that the Subrogation Receipt presented by respondent is not sufficient to prove that the
subject shipment was insured and that respondent was validly subrogated to the rights of the consignee.31 Thus, petitioner submits
that without proof of a valid subrogation, respondent is not entitled to any reimbursement.32

Petitioner likewise puts in issue the finding of the RTC, which was affirmed by the CA, that the proximate cause of the damage/loss
to the shipment was the negligence of petitioner’s stevedores.33 Petitioner avers that such finding is contrary to the documentary
evidence, i.e., the TOSBOC, the Request for Bad Order Survey (RESBOC) and the Report of Survey.34 According to petitioner, these
documents prove that it received the subject shipment in bad order condition and that no additional damage was sustained by the
subject shipment under its custody.35 Petitioner asserts that although the TOSBOC was prepared only after all the bags were
unloaded by petitioner’s stevedores, this does not mean that the damage/loss was caused by its stevedores.36
Petitioner also claims that the amount of damages should not be more than ₱5,000.00, pursuant to its Management Contract for
cargo handling services with the PPA.37 Petitioner contends that the CA should have taken judicial notice of the said contract since it
is an official act of an executive department subject to judicial cognizance.38

Respondent’s Arguments

Respondent, on the other hand, argues that the non-presentation of the insurance contract or policy was not raised in the trial
court. Thus, it cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.39 Respondent likewise contends that under prevailing jurisprudence,
presentation of the insurance policy is not indispensable.40 Moreover, with or without the insurance contract or policy, respondent
claims that it should be allowed to recover under Article 123641 of the Civil Code.42 Respondent further avers that "the right of
subrogation has its roots in equity - it is designed to promote and to accomplish justice and is the mode which equity adopts to
compel the ultimate payment of a debt by one who in justice, equity and good conscience ought to pay."43

Respondent likewise maintains that the RTC and the CA correctly found that the damage/loss sustained by the subject shipment was
caused by the negligent acts of petitioner’s stevedores.44 Such factual findings of the RTC, affirmed by the CA, are conclusive and
should no longer be disturbed.45 In fact, under Section 146 of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only questions of law may be raised in a
petition for review on certiorari.47

As to the Management Contract for cargo handling services, respondent contends that this is outside the operation of judicial
notice.48 And even if it is not, petitioner’s liability cannot be limited by it since it is a contract of adhesion.49

Our Ruling

The petition is bereft of merit.

Non-presentation of the insurance contract or policy is not fatal in the instant case

Petitioner claims that respondent’s non-presentation of the insurance contract or policy between the respondent and the consignee
is fatal to its cause of action.

We do not agree.

First of all, this was never raised as an issue before the RTC. In fact, it is not among the issues agreed upon by the parties to be
resolved during the pre-trial.50 As we have said, "the determination of issues during the pre-trial conference bars the consideration
of other questions, whether during trial or on appeal."51 Thus, "[t]he parties must disclose during pre-trial all issues they intend to
raise during the trial, except those involving privileged or impeaching matters. x x x The basis of the rule is simple. Petitioners are
bound by the delimitation of the issues during the pre-trial because they themselves agreed to the same."52

Neither was this issue raised on appeal.53 Basic is the rule that "issues or grounds not raised below cannot be resolved on review by
the Supreme Court, for to allow the parties to raise new issues is antithetical to the sporting idea of fair play, justice and due
process."54

Besides, non-presentation of the insurance contract or policy is not

necessarily fatal.55 In Delsan Transport Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,56 we ruled that:

Anent the second issue, it is our view and so hold that the presentation in evidence of the marine insurance policy is not
indispensable in this case before the insurer may recover from the common carrier the insured value of the lost cargo in the exercise
of its subrogatory right. The subrogation receipt, by itself, is sufficient to establish not only the relationship of herein private
respondent as insurer and Caltex, as the assured shipper of the lost cargo of industrial fuel oil, but also the amount paid to settle the
insurance claim. The right of subrogation accrues simply upon payment by the insurance company of the insurance claim.

The presentation of the insurance policy was necessary in the case of Home Insurance Corporation v. CA (a case cited by petitioner)
because the shipment therein (hydraulic engines) passed through several stages with different parties involved in each stage. First,
from the shipper to the port of departure; second, from the port of departure to the M/S Oriental Statesman; third, from the M/S
Oriental Statesman to the M/S Pacific Conveyor; fourth, from the M/S Pacific Conveyor to the port of arrival; fifth, from the port of
arrival to the arrastre operator; sixth, from the arrastre operator to the hauler, Mabuhay Brokerage Co., Inc. (private respondent
therein); and lastly, from the hauler to the consignee. We emphasized in that case that in the absence of proof of stipulations to the
contrary, the hauler can be liable only for any damage that occurred from the time it received the cargo until it finally delivered it to
the consignee. Ordinarily, it cannot be held responsible for the handling of the cargo before it actually received it. The insurance
contract, which was not presented in evidence in that case would have indicated the scope of the insurer’s liability, if any, since no
evidence was adduced indicating at what stage in the handling process the damage to the cargo was sustained.57 (Emphasis
supplied.)

In International Container Terminal Services, Inc. v. FGU Insurance Corporation,58 we used the same line of reasoning in upholding
the Decision of the CA finding the arrastre contractor liable for the lost shipment despite the failure of the insurance company to
offer in evidence the insurance contract or policy. We explained:

Indeed, jurisprudence has it that the marine insurance policy needs to be presented in evidence before the trial court or even
belatedly before the appellate court. In Malayan Insurance Co., Inc. v. Regis Brokerage Corp., the Court stated that the presentation
of the marine insurance policy was necessary, as the issues raised therein arose from the very existence of an insurance contract
between Malayan Insurance and its consignee, ABB Koppel, even prior to the loss of the shipment. In Wallem Philippines Shipping,
Inc. v. Prudential Guarantee and Assurance, Inc., the Court ruled that the insurance contract must be presented in evidence in order
to determine the extent of the coverage. This was also the ruling of the Court in Home Insurance Corporation v. Court of Appeals.

However, as in every general rule, there are admitted exceptions. In Delsan Transport Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, the Court
stated that the presentation of the insurance policy was not fatal because the loss of the cargo undoubtedly occurred while on
board the petitioner’s vessel, unlike in Home Insurance in which the cargo passed through several stages with different parties and it
could not be determined when the damage to the cargo occurred, such that the insurer should be liable for it.

As in Delsan, there is no doubt that the loss of the cargo in the present case occurred while in petitioner’s custody. Moreover, there
is no issue as regards the provisions of Marine Open Policy No. MOP-12763, such that the presentation of the contract itself is
necessary for perusal, not to mention that its existence was already admitted by petitioner in open court. And even though it was
not offered in evidence, it still can be considered by the court as long as they have been properly identified by testimony duly
recorded and they have themselves been incorporated in the records of the case.59

Similarly, in this case, the presentation of the insurance contract or policy was not necessary. Although petitioner objected to the
admission of the Subrogation Receipt in its Comment to respondent’s formal offer of evidence on the ground that respondent failed
to present the insurance contract or policy,60 a perusal of petitioner’s Answer61 and Pre-Trial Brief62 shows that petitioner never
questioned respondent’s right to subrogation, nor did it dispute the coverage of the insurance contract or policy. Since there was no
issue regarding the validity of the insurance contract or policy, or any provision thereof, respondent had no reason to present the
insurance contract or policy as evidence during the trial.

Factual findings of the CA, affirming the RTC, are conclusive and binding

Petitioner’s attempt to absolve itself from liability must likewise fail.

Only questions of law are allowed in petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Thus, it is not our duty "to
review, examine, and evaluate or weigh all over again the probative value of the evidence presented,"63 especially where the
findings of both the trial court and the appellate court coincide on the matter.64 As we have often said, factual findings of the CA
affirming those of the RTC are conclusive and binding, except in the following cases: "(1) when the inference made is manifestly
mistaken, absurd or impossible; (2) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (3) when the findings are grounded entirely on
speculations, surmises or conjectures; (4) when the judgment of the [CA] is based on misapprehension of facts; (5) when the [CA], in
making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee;
(6) when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (7) when the [CA]
manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties and which, if properly considered, would justify a different
conclusion; and (8) when the findings of fact of the [CA] are premised on the absence of evidence and are contradicted by the
evidence on record."65 None of these are availing in the present case.

Both the RTC and the CA found the negligence of petitioner’s stevedores to be the proximate cause of the damage/loss to the
shipment. In disregarding the contention of petitioner that such finding is contrary to the documentary evidence, the CA had this to
say:
ATI, however, contends that the finding of the trial court was contrary to the documentary evidence of record, particularly, the Turn
Over Survey of Bad Order Cargoes dated November 28, 1995, which was executed prior to the turn-over of the cargo by the carrier
to the arrastre operator ATI, and which showed that the shipment already contained 2,702 damaged bags.

We are not persuaded.

Contrary to ATI’s assertion, witness Redentor Antonio, marine cargo surveyor of Inchcape for the vessel Jinlian I which arrived on
November 21, 1995 and up to completion of discharging on November 28, 1995, testified that it was only after all the bags were
unloaded from the vessel that the actual counting of bad order bags was made, thus:

xxxx

The above testimony of Redentor Antonio was corroborated by Edgar Liceralde, marine cargo surveyor connected with SMS
Average Surveyors and Adjusters, Inc., the company requested by consignee Chemphil Albright and Wilson Corporation to provide
superintendence, report the condition and determine the final outturn of quantity/weight of the subject shipment. x x x

xxxx

Defendant-appellant ATI, for its part, presented its claim officer as witness who testified that a survey was conducted by the
shipping company and ATI before the shipment was turned over to the possession of ATI and that the Turn Over Survey of Bad Order
Cargoes was prepared by ATI’s Bad Order (BO) Inspector.

Considering that the shipment arrived on November 21, 1998 and the unloading operation commenced on said date and was
completed on November 26, 1998, while the Turn Over Survey of Bad Order Cargoes, reflecting a figure of 2,702 damaged bags,
was prepared and signed on November 28, 1998 by ATI’s BO Inspector and co-signed by a representative of the shipping
company, the trial court’s finding that the damage to the cargoes was due to the improper handling thereof by ATI’s stevedores
cannot be said to be without substantial support from the records.

We thus see no cogent reason to depart from the ruling of the trial court that ATI should be made liable for the 2,702 bags of
damaged shipment. Needless to state, it is hornbook doctrine that the assessment of witnesses and their testimonies is a matter
best undertaken by the trial court, which had the opportunity to observe the demeanor, conduct or attitude of the witnesses. The
findings of the trial court on this point are accorded great respect and will not be reversed on appeal, unless it overlooked
substantial facts and circumstances which, if considered, would materially affect the result of the case.

We also find ATI liable for the additional 179 damaged bags discovered upon delivery of the shipment at the consignee’s warehouse
in Pasig. The final Report of Survey executed by SMS Average Surveyors & Adjusters, Inc., and independent surveyor hired by the
consignee, shows that the subject shipment incurred a total of 2881 damaged bags.

The Report states that the withdrawal and delivery of the shipment took about ninety-five (95) trips from November 29, 1995 to
December 28, 1995 and it was upon completion of the delivery to consignee’s warehouse where the final count of 2881 damaged
bags was made. The damage consisted of torn/bad order condition of the bags due to spillages and caked/hardened portions.

We agree with the trial court that the damage to the shipment was caused by the negligence of ATI’s stevedores and for which ATI is
liable under Articles 2180 and 2176 of the Civil Code. The proximate cause of the damage (i.e., torn bags, spillage of contents and
caked/hardened portions of the contents) was the improper handling of the cargoes by ATI’s stevedores, x x x

xxxx

ATI has not satisfactorily rebutted plaintiff-appellee’s evidence on the negligence of ATI’s stevedores in the handling and safekeeping
of the cargoes. x x x

xxxx

We find no reason to disagree with the trial court’s conclusion. Indeed, from the nature of the [damage] caused to the shipment,
i.e., torn bags, spillage of contents and hardened or caked portions of the contents, it is not difficult to see that the damage caused
was due to the negligence of ATI’s stevedores who used steel hooks to retrieve the bags from the higher portions of the piles
thereby piercing the bags and spilling their contents, and who piled the bags in the open storage area of ATI with insufficient cover
thereby exposing them to the elements and [causing] the contents to cake or harden.66

Clearly, the finding of negligence on the part of petitioner’s stevedores is supported by both testimonial and documentary evidence.
Hence, we see no reason to disturb the same.

Judicial notice does not apply

Finally, petitioner implores us to take judicial notice of Section 7.01,67 Article VII of the Management Contract for cargo handling
services it entered with the PPA, which limits petitioner’s liability to ₱5,000.00 per package.

Unfortunately for the petitioner, it cannot avail of judicial notice.

Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court provide that:

SECTION 1. Judicial notice, when mandatory. — A court shall take judicial notice, without the introduction of evidence, of the
existence and territorial extent of states, their political history, forms of government and symbols of nationality, the law of nations,
the admiralty and maritime courts of the world and their seals, the political constitution and history of the Philippines, the official
acts of the legislative, executive and judicial departments of the Philippines, the laws of nature, the measure of time, and the
geographical divisions.1avvphi1

SEC. 2. Judicial notice, when discretionary. — A court may take judicial notice of matters which are of public knowledge, or are
capable of unquestionable demonstration or ought to be known to judges because of their judicial functions.

The Management Contract entered into by petitioner and the PPA is clearly not among the matters which the courts can take
judicial notice of. It cannot be considered an official act of the executive department. The PPA, which was created by virtue of
Presidential Decree No. 857, as amended,68 is a government-owned and controlled corporation in charge of administering the ports
in the country.69 Obviously, the PPA was only performing a proprietary function when it entered into a Management Contract with
petitioner. As such, judicial notice cannot be applied.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The assailed July 14, 2005 Decision and the February 14, 2006 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 61798 are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 152375 December 16, 2011

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (FOURTH DIVISION), JOSE L. AFRICA (substituted by his heirs), MANUEL H. NIETO, JR., FERDINAND E. MARCOS
(substituted by his heirs), IMELDA R. MARCOS, FERDINAND R. MARCOS, JR., JUAN PONCE ENRILE, and POTENCIANO ILUSORIO
(substituted by his heirs), Respondents.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

Before us is the petition for certiorari1 filed by the Republic of the Philippines (petitioner) to set aside the February 7, 2002 resolution
(2002 resolution)2 of the Sandiganbayan3 denying the petitioner’s Motion to Admit Supplemental Offer of Evidence (Re: Deposition of
Maurice V. Bane) (3rd motion).

THE ANTECEDENTS

On July 22, 1987, the petitioner Republic of the Philippines, through the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), filed
a complaint (docketed as Civil Case No. 0009) against Jose L. Africa, Manuel H. Nieto, Jr., Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos,
Ferdinand R. Marcos, Jr., Juan Ponce Enrile, and Potenciano Ilusorio (collectively, the respondents) for reconveyance, reversion,
accounting, restitution, and damages before the Sandiganbayan. The petitioner alleged, inter alia, that the respondents illegally
manipulated the purchase of the major shareholdings of Cable and Wireless Limited in Eastern Telecommunications Philippines, Inc.
(ETPI), which shareholdings respondents Jose Africa and Manuel Nieto, Jr. held for themselves and, through their holdings and the
corporations they organized, beneficially for respondents Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos.4

Civil Case No. 0009 is the main case subject of the present petition. Victor Africa (Africa), son of the late Jose L. Africa, was not
impleaded in and so is plainly not a party to Civil Case No. 0009.5

Civil Case No. 0009 spawned numerous incidental cases,6 among them, Civil Case No. 0130.7 The present respondents were not
made parties either in Civil Case No. 0130.

I. Civil Case No. 0130

In the August 7, 1991 PCGG-conducted ETPI stockholders meeting, a PCGG-controlled board of directors was elected. Later, the
registered ETPI stockholders convened a special stockholders meeting wherein another set of board of directors was elected. As a
result, two sets of ETPI board and officers were elected.8

Thereafter, Africa, as an ETPI stockholder, filed a petition for certiorari, with prayer for a temporary restraining order/preliminary
injunction with the Sandiganbayan (docketed as Civil Case No. 0130), seeking to nullify the August 5, 1991 and August 9, 1991 Orders
of the PCGG. These Orders directed Africa:

[T]o account for his sequestered shares in ETPI and to cease and desist from exercising voting rights on the sequestered shares in the
special stockholders’ meeting to be held on August 12, 1991, from representing himself as a director, officer, employee or agent of
ETPI, and from participating, directly or indirectly[,] in the management of ETPI.9

During the pendency of Africa’s petition, Civil Case No. 0130, Africa filed a motion with the Sandiganbayan, alleging that since
January 29, 1988 the PCGG had been "illegally ‘exercising’ the rights of stockholders of ETPI,"10 especially in the election of the
members of the board of directors. Africa prayed for the issuance of an order for the "calling and holding of [ETPI] annual
stockholders meeting for 1992 under the [c]ourt’s control and supervision and prescribed guidelines."11

In its November 13, 1992 resolution, the Sandiganbayan favored Africa’s motion in this wise:

WHEREFORE, it is ordered that an annual stockholders meeting of the [ETPI], for 1992 be held on Friday, November 27, 1992, at 2:00
o’clock in the afternoon, at the ETPI Board Room, Telecoms Plaza, 7th Floor, 316 Gil J. Puyat Avenue, Makati, Metro Manila. x x x The
stockholders meeting shall be conducted under the supervision and control of this Court, through Mr. Justice Sabino R. de Leon, Jr.
[O]nly the registered owners, their duly authorized representatives or their proxies may vote their corresponding shares.

The following minimum safeguards must be set in place and carefully maintained until final judicial resolution of the question of
whether or not the sequestered shares of stock (or in a proper case the underlying assets of the corporation concerned) constitute
ill-gotten wealth[.]12

The PCGG assailed this resolution before this Court via a petition for certiorari docketed as G.R. No. 10778913 (PCGG’s petition),
imputing grave abuse of discretion on the Sandiganbayan for holding, inter alia, that the registered stockholders of ETPI had the
right to vote.14 In our November 26, 1992 Resolution, we enjoined the Sandiganbayan from implementing its assailed resolution.

In the meantime, in an April 12, 1993 resolution, the Sandiganbayan ordered the consolidation of Civil Case No. 0130, among others,
with Civil Case No. 0009, with the latter as the main case and the former merely an incident.15

During the pendency of PCGG’s petition (G.R. No. 107789), the PCGG filed with this Court a "Very Urgent Petition for Authority to
Hold Special Stockholders’ Meeting for [the] Sole Purpose of Increasing [ETPI’s] Authorized Capital Stock" (Urgent Petition). In our
May 7, 1996 Resolution, we referred this Urgent Petition to the Sandiganbayan for reception of evidence and immediate
resolution.16 The Sandiganbayan included the Urgent Petition in Civil Case No. 0130.17

In the proceedings to resolve the Urgent Petition, the testimony of Mr. Maurice V. Bane (former director and treasurer-in-trust of
ETPI) was taken– at the petitioner’s instance and after serving notice of the deposition-taking on the respondents18 – on October 23
and 24, 1996 by way of deposition upon oral examination (Bane deposition) before Consul General Ernesto Castro of the Philippine
Embassy in London, England.

Invoking Section 1, Rule 24 (of the old Rules of Court), purportedly allowing the petitioner to depose Bane without leave of court,
i.e., as a matter of right after the defendants have filed their answer, the notice stated that "[t]he purpose of the deposition is for
[Bane] to identify and testify on the facts set forth in his affidavit19 x x x so as to prove the ownership issue in favor of [the
petitioner] and/or establish the prima facie factual foundation for sequestration of [ETPI’s] Class A stock in support of the [Urgent
Petition]."20 The notice also states that the petitioner shall use the Bane deposition "in evidence… in the main case of Civil Case No.
0009."21 On the scheduled deposition date, only Africa was present and he cross-examined Bane.

On December 13, 1996, the Sandiganbayan resolved the Urgent Petition by granting authority to the PCGG (i) "to cause the holding
of a special stockholders’ meeting of ETPI for the sole purpose of increasing ETPI’s authorized capital stock" and (ii) "to vote therein
the sequestered Class ‘A’ shares of stock."22 Thus, a special stockholders meeting was held, as previously scheduled, on March 17,
1997 and the increase in ETPI’s authorized capital stock was "unanimously approved."23 From this ruling, Africa went to this
Court via a petition for certiorari24 docketed as G.R. No. 147214 (Africa’s petition).

We jointly resolved the PCGG’s and Africa’s petitions, and ruled:

This Court notes that, like in Africa’s motion to hold a stockholders meeting (to elect a board of directors), the Sandiganbayan, in the
PCGG’s petition to hold a stockholders meeting (to amend the articles of incorporation to increase the authorized capital stock),
again failed to apply the two-tiered test. On such determination hinges the validity of the votes cast by the PCGG in the stockholders
meeting of March 17, 1997. This lapse by the Sandiganbayan leaves this Court with no other choice but to remand these questions
to it for proper determination.

xxxx

WHEREFORE, this Court Resolved to REFER the petitions at bar to the Sandiganbayan for reception of evidence to determine
whether there is a prima facie evidence showing that the sequestered shares in question are ill-gotten and there is an imminent
danger of dissipation to entitle the PCGG to vote them in a stockholders meeting to elect the ETPI Board of Directors and to amend
the ETPI Articles of Incorporation for the sole purpose of increasing the authorized capital stock of ETPI.

The Sandiganbayan shall render a decision thereon within sixty (60) days from receipt of this Resolution and in conformity herewith.

II. Civil Case No. 0009

Although Civil Case No. 0009 was filed on July 22, 1987, it was only on November 29, 1996 and March 17, 1997 that the first pre-trial
conference was scheduled and concluded.25

In its Pre-Trial Brief26 dated August 30, 1996, the petitioner offered to present the following witnesses:

WITNESSES TO BE PRESENTED AND A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THEIR TESTIMONIES

(1) Maurice V. Bane – representative of Cable and Wireless Limited (C & W) at the time ETPI was organized.

xxxx

(2) Mr. Manuel H. Nieto – x x x

(3) Ms. Evelyn Singson – x x x

(4) Mr. Severino P. Buan, Jr. – x x x

(5) Mr. Apolinario K. Medina - x x x

(6) Mr. Potenciano A. Roque – x x x

(7) Caesar Parlade - x x x

IIa. Motion to Admit the Bane Deposition

At the trial of Civil Case No. 0009, the petitioner filed a Motion27 (1st motion), stating that –

1. In the hearings of the incidents of [Civil Case No. 0009], i.e., Civil Case Nos. 0048, 0050, 0130, 014628 the following
witnesses were presented therein:

a. Cesar O.V. Parlade

b. Maurice Bane

c. Evelyn Singson

d. Leonorio Martinez

e. Ricardo Castro; and

f. Rolando Gapud

2. [The petitioner] wishes to adopt in [Civil Case No. 0009] their testimonies and the documentary exhibits presented and
identified by them, since their testimonies and the said documentary exhibits are very relevant to prove the case of the
[petitioner] in [Civil Case No. 0009].

3. The adverse parties in the aforementioned incidents had the opportunity to cross-examine them.

The respondents filed their respective Oppositions to the 1st motion;29 in turn, the petitioner filed a Common Reply30 to these
Oppositions.

On April 1, 1998, the Sandiganbayan31 promulgated a resolution32 (1998 resolution) denying the petitioner’s 1st motion, as follows:

Wherefore, the [petitioner’s] Motion x x x is –

1. partly denied insofar as [the petitioner] prays therein to adopt the testimonies on oral deposition of Maurice V. Bane and
Rolando Gapud as part of its evidence in Civil Case No. 0009 for the reason that said deponents according to the
[petitioner] are not available for cross-examination in this Court by the [respondents]. (emphasis added)

2. partly Granted, in the interest of speedy disposition of this long pending case, insofar as plaintiff prays therein to adopt
certain/particular testimonies of Cesar O. Parlade, Evelyn Singson, Leoncio Martinez, and Ricardo Castro and documentary
exhibits which said witnesses have identified in incident Civil Case Nos. xxx 0130 xxx, subject to the following conditions :

1. xxx

2. xxx

3. That the said witnesses be presented in this Court so that they can be cross-examined on their particular
testimonies in incident Civil Cases xxx [by the respondents].

IIb. Urgent Motion and/or Request for Judicial Notice

The petitioner did not in any way question the 1998 resolution, and instead made its Formal Offer of Evidence on December 14,
1999.33 Significantly, the Bane deposition was not included as part of its offered exhibits. Rectifying the omission, the petitioner filed
an Urgent Motion and/or Request for Judicial Notice34 (2nd motion) dated February 21, 2000, with the alternative prayer that:

1. An order forthwith be issued re-opening the plaintiff’s case and setting the same for trial any day in April 2000 for the
sole purpose of introducing additional evidence and limited only to the marking and offering of the [Bane deposition] which
already forms part of the records and used in Civil Case No. 0130 x x x;
 2. In the alternative, x x x the [Sandiganbayan] to take judicial notice of the facts established by the [Bane deposition],
together with the marked exhibits appended thereto. [emphasis ours]

On August 21, 2000, the Sandiganbayan promulgated a resolution35 (2000 resolution) denying the petitioner’s 2nd motion:

Judicial notice is found under Rule 129 which is titled "What Need Not Be Proved." Apparently, this provision refers to the Court’s
duty to consider admissions made by the parties in the pleadings, or in the course of the trial or other proceedings in resolving cases
before it. The duty of the Court is mandatory and in those cases where it is discretionary, the initiative is upon the Court. Such being
the case, the Court finds the Urgent Motion and/or Request for Judicial Notice as something which need not be acted upon as the
same is considered redundant.

On the matter of the [Bane deposition], [its] admission is done through the ordinary formal offer of exhibits wherein the defendant
is given ample opportunity to raise objection on grounds provided by law. Definitely, it is not under Article (sic) 129 on judicial
notice. [Emphasis ours]

On November 6, 2000 and on several dates thereafter, the respondents separately filed their respective demurrers to evidence.36 On
the other hand, the petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the 2000 resolution, but was rebuffed by the Sandiganbayan in its
April 3, 2001 resolution37 (2001 resolution).

IIc. Motion to Admit Supplemental Offer of

Evidence (Re: Deposition of Maurice Bane)

On November 16, 2001, the petitioner filed its 3rd Motion, seeking once more the admission of the Bane deposition.38 On February
7, 2002 (pending resolution of the respondents’ demurrers to evidence),39 the Sandiganbayan promulgated the assailed 2002
resolution,40 denying the petitioner’s 3rd motion. The Sandiganbayan ruled:

But in the court’s view, it is not really a question of whether or not plaintiff has already rested its case as to obviate the further
presentation of evidence. It is not even a question of whether the non-appearing defendants are deemed to have waived their right
to cross-examine Bane as to qualify the admission of the deposition sans such cross-examination. Indeed, We do not see any need to
dwell on these matters in view of this Court’s Resolution rendered on April 1, 1998 which already denied the introduction in
evidence of Bane’s deposition and which has become final in view of plaintiff’s failure to file any motion for reconsideration or
appeal within the 15-day reglementary period. Rightly or wrongly, the resolution stands and for this court to grant plaintiff’s motion
at this point in time would in effect sanction plaintiff’s disregard for the rules of procedure. Plaintiff has slept on its rights for almost
two years and it was only in February of 2000 that it sought to rectify its ineptitude by filing a motion to reopen its case as to enable
it to introduce and offer Bane’s deposition as additional evidence, or in the alternative for the court to take judicial notice of the
allegations of the deposition. But how can such a motion be granted when it has been resolved as early as 1998 that the deposition
is inadmissible. Without plaintiff having moved for reconsideration within the reglementary period, the resolution has attained
finality and its effect cannot be undone by the simple expedient of filing a motion, which though purporting to be a novel motion,
is in reality a motion for reconsideration of this court’s 1998 ruling. [emphases ours]

The resolution triggered the filing of the present petition.

THE PETITION

The petitioner filed the present petition claiming that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion:

I.

x x x IN HOLDING THAT ITS INTERLOCUTORY ORDER IN 1998 HAD BECOME FINAL.

II.

x x x IN x x x REFUSING TO ADMIT THE BANE DEPOSITION –WHICH WAS ALREADY ADMITTED AS EVIDENCE IN AN
INCIDENT CASE (CIVIL CASE NO. 0130) – AS PART OF PETITIONER’S EVIDENCE IN THE MAIN x x x CASE (CIVIL CASE NO.
0009).
 III.

x x x IN REFUSING TO ADMIT A HIGHLY RELEVANT AND IMPORTANT PIECE OF EVIDENCE FOR THE PETITIONER ON THE
BASIS OF FLIMSY AND TENUOUS TECHNICAL GROUNDS.

The petitioner41 argues that the 1998 resolution of the Sandiganbayan is merely an interlocutory order; thus, the petitioner’s failure
to question this 1998 resolution could not have given it a character of "finality" so long as the main case remains pending.42 On this
basis, the petitioner concludes that the Sandiganbayan’s denial of its 3rd motion was plainly tainted with grave abuse of discretion.

On the issue of the Sandiganbayan’s refusal (in its 2002 resolution) either to take judicial notice of or to admit the Bane deposition
as part of its evidence, the petitioner asserts that Civil Case No. 0130 (where the Bane deposition was originally taken, introduced
and admitted in evidence) is but a "child" of the "parent" case, Civil Case No. 0009; under this relationship, evidence offered and
admitted in any of the "children" cases should be considered as evidence in the "parent" case.

Lastly, the petitioner claims that given the crucial importance of the Bane deposition, the Sandiganbayan should not have denied its
admission on "flimsy grounds," considering that:

1. It was also already stated in the notice (of the taking of the Bane deposition) that it would be used as evidence in Civil
Case No. 0009. Notices having been duly served on all the parties concerned, they must accordingly be deemed to
have waived their right to cross-examine the witness when they failed to show up.

2. The Bane deposition was a very vital cog in the case of the petitioner relative to its allegation that the respondents’
interest in ETPI and related firms properly belongs to the government.

3. The non-inclusion of the Bane deposition in the petitioner’s formal offer of evidence was obviously excusable considering
the period that had lapsed from the time the case was filed and the voluminous records that the present case has
generated.43

THE RESPONDENTS’ COMMENTS

and THE PETITIONER’S REPLY

In the respondents’ Comments44 (filed in compliance with our Resolution of April 10, 200245 ), they claim that the present petition
was filed out of time - i.e., beyond the 60-day reglementary period prescribed under Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.46 This
assertion proceeds from the view that the petitioner’s 3rd motion, being a mere rehash of similar motions earlier filed by the
petitioner, likewise simply assails the Sandiganbayan’s 1998 resolution. Along the same line, they posit that the petitioner’s 3rd
motion actually partakes of a proscribed third motion for reconsideration of the Sandiganbayan’s 1998 resolution.47 They likewise
assert, on the assumption that the 1998 resolution is interlocutory in character, that the petitioner’s failure to contest the resolution
by way of certiorari within the proper period gave the 1998 resolution a character of "finality."

The respondents further claim that after a party has rested its case, the admission of a supplemental offer of evidence requires the
reopening of the case at the discretion of the trial court; the Sandiganbayan simply exercised its sound discretion in refusing to
reopen the case since the evidence sought to be admitted was "within the knowledge of the [petitioner] and available to [it] before
[it] rested its case."48 The respondents also advert to the belated filing of the petitioner’s 3rd motion – i.e., after the respondents
had filed their respective demurrers to evidence.

On the petitioner’s claim of waiver, the respondents assert that they have not waived their right to cross-examine the deponent; the
Sandiganbayan recognized this right in its 1998 resolution and the petitioner never questioned this recognition. They also assert that
the allegations in the Bane deposition cannot be a proper subject of judicial notice under Rule 129 of the Rules of Court. The
respondents lastly submit that the Bane deposition is inadmissible in evidence because the petitioner failed to comply with the
requisites for admission under Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.

In its Reply,49 the petitioner defends the timeliness of the present petition by arguing that a party may opt to wait out and collect a
pattern of questionable acts before resorting to the extraordinary remedy of certiorari. The petitioner stresses that it filed the 3rd
motion precisely because of the Sandiganbayan’s 2000 resolution, which held that the admission of the Bane deposition should be
done through the ordinary formal offer of evidence. Thus, the Sandiganbayan seriously erred in considering the petitioner’s 3rd
motion as a proscribed motion for reconsideration. The petitioner generally submits that the dictates of substantial justice should
have guided the Sandiganbayan to rule otherwise.
The petitioner also clarifies that it has not yet rested its case although it has filed a formal offer of evidence. A party normally rests
his case only after the admission of the pieces of evidence he formally offered; before then, he still has the opportunity to present
further evidence to substantiate his theory of the case should the court reject any piece of the offered evidence.50

The petitioner further maintains that the mere reasonable opportunity to cross-examine the deponent is sufficient for the admission
of the Bane deposition considering that the deponent is not an ordinary witness who can be easily summoned by our courts in light
of his foreign residence, his citizenship, and his advanced age. The petitioner asserts that Rule 24 (now Rule 23), and not Section 47,
Rule 130, of the Rules of Court should apply to the present case, as explicitly stated in the notice of the deposition-taking.

To date, respondents Imelda Marcos and the heirs of Potenciano Ilusorio have yet to file their respective comments on the petition.
Given the time that had lapsed since we required their comments, we resolve to dispense with the filing of these comments and to
consider this petition submitted for decision.

THE ISSUES

On the basis of the pleadings, we summarize the pivotal issues for our resolution, as follows:

1. Whether the petition was filed within the required period.

2. Whether the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion –

i. In holding that the 1998 resolution has already attained finality;

ii. In holding that the petitioner’s 3rd motion partakes of a prohibited motion for reconsideration;

iii. In refusing to re-open the case given the critical importance of the Bane deposition to the petitioner’s cause;
and

iv. In refusing to admit the Bane deposition notwithstanding the prior consolidation of Civil Case No. 0009 and Civil
Case No. 0130.

3. Whether the Bane deposition is admissible under -

i. Rule 23, Section 4, par. (c) alone or in relation to Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court; and

ii. The principle of judicial notice.

THE COURT’S RULING

We deny the petition for lack of merit.

I. Preliminary Considerations

I (a). The interlocutory nature of the Sandiganbayan’s 1998 resolution.

In determining the appropriate remedy or remedies available, a party aggrieved by a court order, resolution or decision must first
correctly identify the nature of the order, resolution or decision he intends to assail.51 In this case, we must preliminarily determine
whether the 1998 resolution is "final" or "interlocutory" in nature.

Case law has conveniently demarcated the line between a final judgment or order and an interlocutory one on the basis of the
disposition made.52 A judgment or order is considered final if the order disposes of the action or proceeding completely, or
terminates a particular stage of the same action; in such case, the remedy available to an aggrieved party is appeal. If the order or
resolution, however, merely resolves incidental matters and leaves something more to be done to resolve the merits of the case, the
order is interlocutory53 and the aggrieved party’s remedy is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. Jurisprudence pointedly holds
that:
As distinguished from a final order which disposes of the subject matter in its entirety or terminates a particular proceeding or
action, leaving nothing else to be done but to enforce by execution what has been determined by the court, an interlocutory order
does not dispose of a case completely, but leaves something more to be adjudicated upon. The term "final" judgment or order
signifies a judgment or an order which disposes of the case as to all the parties, reserving no further questions or directions for
future determination.

On the other hand, a court order is merely interlocutory in character if it leaves substantial proceedings yet to be had in connection
with the controversy. It does not end the task of the court in adjudicating the parties’ contentions and determining their rights and
liabilities as against each other. In this sense, it is basically provisional in its application.54 (emphasis supplied)

Under these guidelines, we agree with the petitioner that the 1998 resolution is interlocutory. The Sandiganbayan’s denial of the
petitioner’s 1st motion through the 1998 Resolution came at a time when the petitioner had not even concluded the presentation of
its evidence. Plainly, the denial of the motion did not resolve the merits of the case, as something still had to be done to achieve this
end.

We clarify, too, that an interlocutory order remains under the control of the court until the case is finally resolved on the merits. The
court may therefore modify or rescind the order upon sufficient grounds shown at any time before final judgment.55 In this light, the
Sandiganbayan’s 1998 resolution – which merely denied the adoption of the Bane deposition as part of the evidence in Civil Case No.
0009 – could not have attained finality (in the manner that a decision or final order resolving the case on the merits does) despite
the petitioner’s failure to move for its reconsideration or to appeal.56

I (b). The 3rd motion was not prohibited by the Rules.

We also agree with the petitioner that its 3rd motion cannot be considered as a proscribed third (actually second) motion for
reconsideration of the Sandiganbayan’s 1998 resolution. As Section 5, Rule 37 of the Rules of Court clearly provides, the proscription
against a second motion for reconsideration is directed against "a judgment or final order." Although a second motion for
reconsideration of an interlocutory order can be denied on the ground that it is a mere "rehash" of the arguments already passed
upon and resolved by the court, it cannot be rejected on the ground that it is forbidden by the law or by the rules as a prohibited
motion.57

I (c). The 1998 resolution was not ripe for a petition for certiorari.

Under Section 1, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, an aggrieved party may appeal from a judgment or final order which completely
disposes of a case or from an order that the Rules of Court declares to be appealable. While this provision prohibits an appeal from
an interlocutory order, the aggrieved party is afforded the chance to question an interlocutory order through a special civil action
of certiorari under Rule 65; the petition must be filed within sixty days from notice of the assailed judgment, order, resolution, or
denial of a motion for reconsideration.

On the premise that the 1998 resolution is interlocutory in nature, the respondents insist that the 60-day period for filing a petition
for certiorari should be reckoned from the petitioner’s notice of the Sandiganbayan’s 1998 resolution. They argue that since this
ruling had long been rendered by the court, the petitioner’s subsequent filing of similar motions was actually a devious attempt to
resuscitate the long-denied admission of the Bane deposition.

We do not find the respondents’ submission meritorious. While the 1998 resolution is an interlocutory order, as correctly argued by
the petitioner and impliedly conceded by the respondents, the claim that the 1998 resolution should have been immediately
questioned by the petitioner on certiorari is not totally correct as a petition for certiorari is not grounded solely on the issuance of a
disputed interlocutory ruling.58 For a petition for certiorari to prosper, Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court requires, among
others, that neither an appeal nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law is available to the aggrieved
party. As a matter of exception, the writ of certiorari may issue notwithstanding the existence of an available alternative remedy, if
such remedy is inadequate or insufficient in relieving the aggrieved party of the injurious effects of the order complained of.59

We note that at the time of its 1st motion in Civil Case No. 0009, the petitioner had not yet concluded the presentation of its
evidence, much less made any formal offer of evidence. At this stage of the case, the prematurity of using the extraordinary remedy
of certiorari to question the admission of the Bane deposition is obvious. After the denial of the 1st motion, the plain remedy
available to the petitioner was to move for a reconsideration to assert and even clarify its position on the admission of the Bane
deposition. The petitioner could introduce60 anew the Bane deposition and include this as evidence in its formal offer61 – as the
petitioner presumably did in Civil Case No. 0130.
Thus, at that point, the case was not yet ripe for the filing of a petition for certiorari, and the denial of the 1st motion could not have
been the reckoning point for the period of filing such a petition.

II. The Sandiganbayan’s ruling on the finality of its 1998 resolution was legally erroneous but did not constitute grave abuse of
discretion

In light of the above discussions and conclusions, the Sandiganbayan undoubtedly erred on a question of law in its ruling, but this
legal error did not necessarily amount to a grave abuse of discretion in the absence of a clear showing that its action was a
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment affecting its exercise of jurisdiction.62 Without this showing, the Sandiganbayan’s
erroneous legal conclusion was only an error of judgment, or, at best, an abuse of discretion but not a grave one. For this reason
alone, the petition should be dismissed.

Despite this conclusion, however, we opt not to immediately dismiss the petition in light of the unique circumstances of this case
where the petitioner cannot entirely be faulted for not availing of the remedy at the opportune time, and where the case, by its
nature, is undoubtedly endowed with public interest and has become a matter of public concern.63 In other words, we opt to resolve
the petition on the merits to lay the issues raised to rest and to avoid their recurrence in the course of completely resolving the
merits of Civil Case No. 0009.

Although the word "rested" nowhere appears in the Rules of Court, ordinary court procedure has inferred it from an overview of
trial sequence under Section 5, Rule 30 (which capsulizes the order of presentation of a

party’s evidence during trial), read in relation to Rule 18 on Pre-Trial,64 both of the Rules of Court. Under Section 5, Rule 30, after a
party has adduced his direct evidence in the course of discharging the burden of proof,65 he is considered to have rested his case,
and is thereafter allowed to offer rebutting evidence only.66 Whether a party has rested his case in some measure depends on his
manifestation in court on whether he has concluded his presentation of evidence.67

In its second and third motions, respectively, the petitioner expressly admitted that "due to oversight, [the petitioner] closed and
rested its case";68 and that it "had terminated the presentation of its evidence in x x x Civil Case No. 0009."69 In the face of these
categorical judicial admissions,70 the petitioner cannot suddenly make an about-face and insist on the introduction of evidence out
of the usual order. Contrary to the petitioner’s assertion, the resting of its case could not have been conditioned on the admission of
the evidence it formally offered. To begin with, the Bane deposition, which is the lone piece of evidence subject of this present
petition, was not among the pieces of evidence included in its formal offer of evidence and thus could not have been admitted or
rejected by the trial court.

The Court observes with interest that it was only in this present petition for certiorari that the petitioner had firmly denied having
rested its case.71 Before then, the petitioner never found it appropriate to question on certiorari the Sandiganbayan’s denial of its
2nd motion which prayed, inter alia, for the reopening of the case. This is a fatal defect in the petitioner’s case.

Although the denial of the petitioner’s first motion did not necessitate an immediate recourse to the corrective writ of certiorari, the
denial of the 2nd motion dictated a different course of action. The petitioner’s non-observance of the proper procedure for the
admission of the Bane deposition, while seemingly innocuous, carried fatal implications for its case. Having been rebuffed on its first
attempt to have the Bane deposition adopted in Civil Case No. 0009, and without seeking reconsideration of the denial, the
petitioner presented its other pieces of evidence and eventually rested its case. This time, the petitioner forgot about the Bane
deposition and so failed to include that piece of evidence in its formal offer of evidence.

More than two years later, the petitioner again tried to squeeze in the Bane deposition into its case. In resolving the petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration of the Sandiganbayan’s 2000 resolution, the Sandiganbayan held that the Bane deposition has "become
part and parcel" of Civil Case No. 0009. This pronouncement has obscured the real status of the Bane deposition as evidence
(considering that, earlier, the Sandiganbayan already denied the petitioner’s attempt to adopt the Bane deposition as evidence in
Civil Case No. 0009 for the deponent cannot be cross-examined in court). Nevertheless, the Sandiganbayan ultimately denied the
petitioner’s motion to reopen the case. Having judicially admitted the resting of its case, the petitioner should have already
questioned the denial of its 2nd motion by way of certiorari, since the denial of its attempt to reopen the case effectively foreclosed
all avenues available to it for the consideration of the Bane deposition. Instead of doing so, however, the petitioner allowed the 60-
day reglementary period, under Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, to lapse, and proceeded to file its 3rd motion.

Significantly, the petitioner changed its legal position in its 3rd motion by denying having rested its case and insisting on the
introduction of the Bane deposition. Rebuffed once more, the petitioner filed the present petition, inviting our attention to the
Sandiganbayan’s resolutions,72 which allegedly gave it "mixed signals."73 By pointing to these resolutions, ironically, even the
petitioner impliedly recognized that they were then already ripe for review on certiorari. What the petitioner should have realized
was that its 2nd motion unequivocally aimed to reopen the case for the introduction of further evidence consisting of the Bane
deposition. Having been ultimately denied by the court, the petitioner could not have been prevented from taking the proper
remedy notwithstanding any perceived ambiguity in the resolutions.

On the other end, though, there was nothing intrinsically objectionable in the petitioner’s motion to reopen its case before the court
ruled on its formal offer of evidence. The Rules of Court does not prohibit a party from requesting the court to allow it to present
additional evidence even after it has rested its case. Any such opportunity, however, for the ultimate purpose of the admission of
additional evidence is already addressed to the sound discretion of the court. It is from the prism of the exercise of this discretion
that the Sandiganbayan’s refusal to reopen the case (for the purpose of introducing, "marking and offering" additional evidence)
should be viewed. We can declare this Sandiganbayan action invalid if it had acted with grave abuse of discretion.

III. The Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in ultimately refusing to reopen the case for the purpose of introducing and
admitting in evidence the Bane deposition

The basis for a motion to reopen a case to introduce further evidence is Section 5, Rule 30 of the Rules of Court, which reads:

Sec. 5. Order of trial. – Subject to the provisions of section 2 of Rule 31, and unless the court for special reasons otherwise directs,
the trial shall be limited to the issues stated in the pre-trial order and shall proceed as follows:

xxxx

(f) The parties may then respectively adduce rebutting evidence only, unless the court, for good reasons and in the furtherance of
justice, permits them to adduce evidence upon their original case[.] [emphases ours]

Under this rule, a party who has the burden of proof must introduce, at the first instance, all the evidence he relies upon74 and such
evidence cannot be given piecemeal.75 The obvious rationale of the requirement is to avoid injurious surprises to the other party and
the consequent delay in the administration of justice.76

A party’s declaration of the completion of the presentation of his evidence prevents him from introducing further evidence;77 but
where the evidence is rebuttal in character, whose necessity, for instance, arose from the shifting of the burden of evidence from
one party to the other;78 or where the evidence sought to be presented is in the nature of newly discovered evidence,79 the party’s
right to introduce further evidence must be recognized. Otherwise, the aggrieved party may avail of the remedy of certiorari.

Largely, the exercise of the court’s discretion80 under the exception of Section 5(f), Rule 30 of the Rules of Court depends on
the attendant facts – i.e., on whether the evidence would qualify as a "good reason" and be in furtherance of "the interest of
justice." For a reviewing court to properly interfere with the lower court’s exercise of discretion, the petitioner must show that the
lower court’s action was attended by grave abuse of discretion. Settled jurisprudence has defined this term as the capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment, equivalent to lack of jurisdiction; or, the exercise of power in an arbitrary manner by reason of
passion, prejudice, or personal hostility, so patent or so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty, to a virtual refusal to
perform the mandated duty, or to act at all in contemplation of the law.81 Grave abuse of discretion goes beyond the bare and
unsupported imputation of caprice, whimsicality or arbitrariness, and beyond allegations that merely constitute errors of
judgment82 or mere abuse of discretion.83

In Lopez v. Liboro,84 we had occasion to make the following pronouncement:

After the parties have produced their respective direct proofs, they are allowed to offer rebutting evidence only, but, it has been
held, the court, for good reasons, in the furtherance of justice, may permit them to offer evidence upon their original case, and its
ruling will not be disturbed in the appellate court where no abuse of discretion appears. So, generally, additional evidence is
allowed when it is newly discovered, or where it has been omitted through inadvertence or mistake, or where the purpose of the
evidence is to correct evidence previously offered. The omission to present evidence on the testator's knowledge of Spanish had not
been deliberate. It was due to a misapprehension or oversight. (citations omitted; emphases ours)

Likewise, in Director of Lands v. Roman Archbishop of Manila,85 we ruled:

The strict rule is that the plaintiff must try his case out when he commences. Nevertheless, a relaxation of the rule is permitted in
the sound discretion of the court. "The proper rule for the exercise of this discretion," it has been said by an eminent author, "is,
that material testimony should not be excluded because offered by the plaintiff after the defendant has rested, although not in
rebuttal, unless it has been kept back by a trick, and for the purpose of deceiving the defendant and affecting his case
injuriously."

These principles find their echo in Philippine remedial law. While the general rule is rightly recognized, the Code of Civil Procedure
authorizes the judge "for special reasons," to change the order of the trial, and "for good reason, in the furtherance of justice," to
permit the parties "to offer evidence upon their original case." These exceptions are made stronger when one considers the
character of registration proceedings and the fact that where so many parties are involved, and action is taken quickly and abruptly,
conformity with precise legal rules should not always be expected. Even at the risk of violating legal formulæ, an opportunity
should be given to parties to submit additional corroborative evidence in support of their claims of title, if the ends of justice so
require. (emphases ours)

In his commentaries, Chief Justice Moran had this to say:

However, the court for good reasons, may, in the furtherance of justice, permit the parties to offer evidence upon their original case,
and its ruling will not be disturbed where no abuse of discretion appears, Generally, additional evidence is allowed when x x x; but it
may be properly disallowed where it was withheld deliberately and without justification.86

The weight of the exception is also recognized in foreign jurisprudence.87

Under these guidelines, we hold that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in refusing to reopen the case. Instead of
squarely ruling on the petitioner’s 2nd motion to avoid any uncertainty on the evidentiary status of the Bane deposition, the
Sandiganbayan’s action actually left the petitioner’s concern in limbo by considering the petitioner’s motion "redundant." This is
tantamount to a refusal to undertake a positive duty as mandated by the circumstances and is equivalent to an act outside the
contemplation of law.

It has not escaped our notice that at the time the petitioner moved to re-open its case, the respondents had not yet even presented
their evidence in chief. The respondents, therefore, would not have been prejudiced by allowing the petitioner’s introduction of the
Bane deposition, which was concededly omitted "through oversight."88 The higher interest of substantial justice, of course, is
another consideration that cannot be taken lightly.89

In light of these circumstances, the Sandiganbayan should not have perfunctorily applied Section 5, Rule 30 of the Rules of Court on
the petitioner’s request to reopen the case for the submission of the Bane deposition.

On the basis of this conclusion, a remand of this case should follow as a matter of course. The state of the parties’ submissions and
the delay that has already attended this aspect of Civil Case No. 0009, however, dictate against this obvious course of action. At this
point, the parties have more than extensively argued for or against the admission of the Bane deposition. Civil Case No. 0009 is a 25-
year old sequestration case that is now crying out for complete resolution. Admissibility, too, is an issue that would have again been
raised on remand and would surely stare us in the face after remand.90 We are thus left with no choice but to resolve the issue of
admissibility of the Bane deposition here and now.

IV. The admissibility of the Bane deposition

IV (a). The consolidation of Civil Case No. 0009 and Civil Case No. 0130 did not dispense with the usual requisites of admissibility

In support of its 3rd motion, the petitioner argues that the Bane deposition can be admitted in evidence without observing the
provisions of Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.91 The petitioner claims that in light of the prior consolidation of Civil Case
No. 0009 and Civil Case No. 0130, among others,92 the "former case or proceeding" that Section 47, Rule 130 speaks of no longer
exists.

Rule 31 of the old Rules of Court93 – the rule in effect at the time Civil Case Nos. 0009 and 0130 were consolidated – provided that:

Rule 31
Consolidation or Severance
Section 1. Consolidation. – When actions involving a common question of law or fact are pending before the court, it may order a
joint hearing or trial of any or all the matters in issue in the actions; it may order all the actions consolidated; and it may make such
orders concerning proceedings therein as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay.94 (emphases ours)

Consolidation is a procedural device granted to the court as an aid in deciding how cases in its docket are to be tried so that the
business of the court may be dispatched expeditiously and with economy while providing justice to the parties. To promote this end,
the rule permits the consolidation and a single trial of several cases in the court’s docket, or the consolidation of issues within those
cases.95

A reading of Rule 31 of the Rules of Court easily lends itself to two observations. First, Rule 31 is completely silent on the effect/s of
consolidation on the cases consolidated; on the parties and the causes of action involved; and on the evidence presented in the
consolidated cases. Second, while Rule 31 gives the court the discretion either to order a joint hearing or trial, or to order the actions
consolidated, jurisprudence will show that the term "consolidation" is used generically and even synonymously with joint hearing or
trial of several causes.96 In fact, the title "consolidation" of Rule 31 covers all the different senses of consolidation, as discussed
below.

These observations are not without practical reason. Considering that consolidation is basically a function given to the court, the
latter is in the best position to determine for itself (given the nature of the cases, the complexity of the issues involved, the parties
affected, and the court’s capability and resources vis-à-vis all the official business pending before it, among other things) what
"consolidation" will bring, bearing in mind the rights of the parties appearing before it.

To disregard the kind of consolidation effected by the Sandiganbayan on the simple and convenient premise that the deposition-
taking took place after the Sandiganbayan ordered the consolidation is to beg the question. It is precisely the silence of our Rules of
Procedure and the dearth of applicable case law on the effect of "consolidation" that strongly compel this Court to determine the
kind of "consolidation" effected to directly resolve the very issue of admissibility in this case.

In the context of legal procedure, the term "consolidation" is used in three different senses:97

(1) Where all except one of several actions are stayed until one is tried, in which case the judgment in the one trial is
conclusive as to the others. This is not actually consolidation but is referred to as such. (quasi-consolidation)98

(2) Where several actions are combined into one, lose their separate identity, and become a single action in which a single
judgment is rendered. This is illustrated by a situation where several actions are pending between the same parties stating
claims which might have been set out originally in one complaint. (actual consolidation)99

(3) Where several actions are ordered to be tried together but each retains its separate character and requires the entry of
a separate judgment. This type of consolidation does not merge the suits into a single action, or cause the parties to one
action to be parties to the other. (consolidation for trial)100

Considering that the Sandiganbayan’s order101 to consolidate several incident cases does not at all provide a hint on the extent of
the court’s exercise of its discretion as to the effects of the consolidation it ordered – in view of the function of this procedural
device to principally aid the court itself in dealing with its official business – we are compelled to look deeper into the voluminous
records of the proceedings conducted below. We note that there is nothing that would even suggest that the Sandiganbayan in fact
intended a merger of causes of action, parties and evidence.102 To be sure, there would have been no need for a motion to adopt
(which did not remain unopposed) the testimonies in the incident cases had a merger actually resulted from the order of
consolidation, for in that case, the Sandiganbayan can already take judicial notice of the same.

Significantly, even the petitioner itself viewed consolidation, at most, to be merely a consolidation for trial.103 Accordingly, despite
the consolidation in 1993, the petitioner acceded to the Sandiganbayan’s 1998 Resolution (which denied the petitioner’s 1st Motion
on the ground that the witnesses, whose testimony in the incident cases is sought to be adopted, "are not available for cross-
examination in" the Sandiganbayan) by presenting these other witnesses again in the main case, so that the respondents can cross-
examine them.

These considerations run counter to the conclusion that the Sandiganbayan’s order of consolidation had actually resulted in the
complete merger of the incident cases with the main case, in the sense of actual consolidation, and that the parties in these
consolidated cases had (at least constructively) been aware of and had allowed actual consolidation without objection.104
Considering, too, that the consolidated actions were originally independent of one another and the fact that in the present case the
party respondents to Civil Case No. 0009 (an action for reconveyance, accounting, restitution and damages) are not parties to Civil
Case No. 0130 (a special civil action filed by an ETPI stockholder involving a corporate squabble within ETPI), the conclusion that the
Sandiganbayan in fact intended an actual consolidation and, together with the parties affected,105 acted towards that end - where
the actions become fused and unidentifiable from one another and where the evidence appreciated in one action is also appreciated
in another action – must find support in the proceedings held below. This is particularly true in a case with the magnitude and
complexity of the present case. Otherwise, to impose upon the respondents the effects of an actual consolidation (which find no
clear support in the provisions of the Rules of Court, jurisprudence,106 and even in the proceedings before the Sandiganbayan itself
and despite the aforementioned considerations) results in an outright deprivation of the petitioner’s right to due process. We reach
this conclusion especially where the evidence sought to be admitted is not simply a testimony taken in one of the several cases, but
a deposition upon oral examination taken in another jurisdiction and whose admission is governed by specific provisions on our rules
on evidence.

We stress on this point, too, that while the Sandiganbayan ordered the consolidation in 1993 (that is, before the deposition was
taken), neither does the Pre-Trial Order107 issued by the Sandiganbayan in 1997 in Civil Case No. 0009 contain any reference, formal
or substantive, to Civil Case No. 0130.108 Interestingly, in its Pre-Trial Brief dated August 30, 1996,109 the petitioner even made a
representation to present Bane as one of its witnesses.

IV (b). Use of deposition under Section 4, Rule 23 and as a former testimony under Section 47, Rule 130

Since the present consolidation did not affect Civil Case No. 0130 as an original, albeit incidental, case, the admissibility of the Bane
deposition cannot avoid being measured against the requirements of Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court – the rule on the
admissibility of testimonies or deposition taken in a different proceeding. In this regard, the petitioner argues that Section 4, Rule 23
of the Rules of Court (then Rule 24)110 must, at any rate, prevail over Section 47, Rule 130111 of the same Rules.

At the outset, we note that when the petitioner’s motion to adopt the testimonies taken in the incident cases drew individual
oppositions from the respondents, the petitioner represented to the Sandiganbayan its willingness to comply with the provisions of
Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court,112 and, in fact, again presented some of the witnesses. The petitioner’s about-face two
years thereafter even contributed to the Sandiganbayan’s own inconsistency on how to treat the Bane deposition, in particular, as
evidence.

Section 4, Rule 23 of the Rules of Court on "Deposition Pending Action" (deposition de bene esse) provides for the circumstances
when depositions may be used in the trial, or at the hearing of a motion or an interlocutory proceeding.

SEC. 4. Use of depositions. — At the trial or upon the hearing of a motion or an interlocutory proceeding, any part or all of a
deposition, so far as admissible under the rules of evidence, may be used against any party who was present or represented at the
taking of the deposition or who had due notice thereof, in accordance with any one of the following provisions:

xxxx

(c) The deposition of a witness, whether or not a party, may be used by any party for any purpose if the court finds: (1) that the
witness is dead; or (2) that the witness resides at a distance more than one hundred (100) kilometers from the place of trial or
hearing, or is out of the Philippines, unless it appears that his absence was procured by the party offering the deposition; or (3) that
the witness is unable to attend or testify because of age, sickness, infirmity, or imprisonment; or (4) that the party offering the
deposition has been unable to procure the attendance of the witness by subpoena; or (5) upon application and notice, that such
exceptional circumstances exist as to make it desirable, in the interest of justice and with due regard to the importance of
presenting the testimony of witnesses orally in open court, to allow the deposition to be used[.] [emphasis ours]

On the other hand, Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 47. Testimony or deposition at a former proceeding. – The testimony or deposition of a witness deceased or unable to testify,
given in a former case or proceeding, judicial or administrative, involving the same parties and subject matter, may be given in
evidence against the adverse party who had the opportunity to cross-examine him.

A plain reading of Rule 23 of the Rules of Court readily rejects the petitioner’s position that the Bane deposition can be admitted into
evidence without observing the requirements of Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
Before a party can make use of the deposition taken at the trial of a pending action, Section 4, Rule 23 of the Rules of Court does not
only require due observance of its sub-paragraphs (a) to (d); it also requires, as a condition for admissibility, compliance with "the
rules on evidence." Thus, even Section 4, Rule 23 of the Rules of Court makes an implied reference to Section 47, Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court before the deposition may be used in evidence. By reading Rule 23 in isolation, the petitioner failed to recognize that
the principle conceding admissibility to a deposition under Rule 23 should be consistent with the rules on evidence under Section 47,
Rule 130.113 In determining the admissibility of the Bane deposition, therefore, reliance cannot be given on one provision to the
exclusion of the other; both provisions must be considered. This is particularly true in this case where the evidence in the prior
proceeding does not simply refer to a witness’ testimony in open court but to a deposition taken under another and farther
jurisdiction.

A common thread that runs from Section 4, Rule 23 of the Rules of Court and Section 47, Rule 130 of the same Rules is their mutual
reference to depositions.

A deposition is chiefly a mode of discovery whose primary function is to supplement the pleadings for the purpose of disclosing the
real points of dispute between the parties and affording an adequate factual basis during the preparation for trial.114 Since
depositions are principally made available to the parties as a means of informing themselves of all the relevant facts, depositions are
not meant as substitute for the actual testimony in open court of a party or witness. Generally, the deponent must be presented for
oral examination in open court at the trial or hearing. This is a requirement of the rules on evidence under Section 1, Rule 132 of the
Rules of Court.115

Examination to be done in open court. — The examination of witnesses presented in a trial or hearing shall be done in open court,
and under oath or affirmation. Unless the witness is incapacitated to speak, or the question calls for a different mode of answer, the
answers of the witness shall be given orally.

Indeed, any deposition offered to prove the facts set forth therein, in lieu of the actual oral testimony of the deponent in open court,
may be opposed by the adverse party and excluded under the hearsay rule – i.e., that the adverse party had or has no opportunity
to cross-examine the deponent at the time that his testimony is offered. That opportunity for cross-examination was afforded during
the taking of the deposition alone is no argument, as the opportunity for cross-examination must normally be accorded a party at
the time that the testimonial evidence is actually presented against him during the trial or hearing of a case.116 However, under
certain conditions and for certain limited purposes laid down in Section 4, Rule 23 of the Rules of Court, the deposition may be used
without the deponent being actually called to the witness stand.117

Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court is an entirely different provision. While a former testimony or deposition appears under
the Exceptions to the Hearsay Rule, the classification of former testimony or deposition as an admissible hearsay is not universally
conceded.118 A fundamental characteristic of hearsay evidence is the adverse party’s lack of opportunity to cross-examine the out-
of-court declarant. However, Section 47, Rule 130 explicitly requires, inter alia, for the admissibility of a former testimony or
deposition that the adverse party must have had an opportunity to cross-examine the witness or the deponent in the prior
proceeding.

This opportunity to cross-examine though is not the ordinary cross-examination119 afforded an adverse party in usual trials regarding
"matters stated in the direct examination or connected therewith." Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court contemplates a
different kind of cross-examination, whether actual or a mere opportunity, whose adequacy depends on the requisite identity of
issues in the former case or proceeding and in the present case where the former testimony or deposition is sought to be
introduced.

Section 47, Rule 130 requires that the issues involved in both cases must, at least, be substantially the same; otherwise, there is no
basis in saying that the former statement was - or would have been - sufficiently tested by cross-examination or by an opportunity to
do so.120 (The requirement of similarity though does not mean that all the issues in the two proceedings should be the
same.121 Although some issues may not be the same in the two actions, the admissibility of a former testimony on an issue which is
similar in both actions cannot be questioned.122 )

These considerations, among others, make Section 47, Rule 130 a distinct rule on evidence and therefore should not be confused
with the general provisions on deposition under Rule 23 of the Rules of Court. In other words, even if the petitioner complies with
Rule 23 of the Rules of Court on the use of depositions, the observance of Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court cannot simply
be avoided or disregarded.
Undisputably, the Sandiganbayan relied on the Bane deposition, taken in Civil Case No. 0130, for purposes of this very same case.
Thus, what the petitioner established and what the Sandiganbayan found, for purposes of using the Bane deposition, refer only to
the circumstances laid down under Section 4(c), Rule 23 of the Rules of Court, not necessarily to those of Section 47, Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court, as a distinct rule on evidence that imposes further requirements in the use of depositions in a different case or
proceeding. In other words, the prior use of the deposition under Section 4(c), Rule 23 cannot be taken as compliance with Section
47, Rule 130 which considers the same deposition as hearsay, unless the requisites for its admission under this rule are observed.
The aching question is whether the petitioner complied with the latter rule.

Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court lays down the following requisites for the admission of a testimony or deposition given at
a former case or proceeding.

1. The testimony or deposition of a witness deceased or otherwise unable to testify;

2. The testimony was given in a former case or proceeding, judicial or administrative;

3. Involving the same parties;

4. Relating to the same matter;

5. The adverse party having had the opportunity to cross-examine him.123

The reasons for the admissibility of testimony or deposition taken at a former trial or proceeding are the necessity for the testimony
and its trustworthiness.124 However, before the former testimony or deposition can be introduced in evidence, the proponent must
first lay the proper predicate therefor,125 i.e., the party must establish the basis for the admission of the Bane deposition in the realm
of admissible evidence. This basis is the prior issue that we must now examine and resolve.

IV (c). Unavailability of witness

For the admission of a former testimony or deposition, Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court simply requires, inter alia, that the
witness or deponent be "deceased or unable to testify." On the other hand, in using a deposition that was taken during the
pendency of an action, Section 4, Rule 23 of the Rules of Court provides several grounds that will justify dispensing with the actual
testimony of the deponent in open court and specifies, inter alia, the circumstances of the deponent’s inability to attend or testify,
as follows:

(3) that the witness is unable to attend or testify because of age, sickness, infirmity, or imprisonment[.] [emphases ours]126

The phrase "unable to testify" appearing in both Rule 23 and Rule 130 of the Rules of Court refers to a physical inability to appear at
the witness stand and to give a testimony.127 Hence notwithstanding the deletion of the phrase "out of the Philippines," which
previously appeared in Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, absence from jurisdiction128 - the petitioner’s excuse for the non-
presentation of Bane in open court - may still constitute inability to testify under the same rule. This is not to say, however, that
resort to deposition on this instance of unavailability will always be upheld. Where the deposition is taken not for discovery
purposes, but to accommodate the deponent, then the deposition should be rejected in evidence.129

Although the testimony of a witness has been given in the course of a former proceeding between the parties to a case on trial, this
testimony alone is not a ground for its admission in evidence. The witness himself, if available, must be produced in court as if he
were testifying de novo since his testimony given at the former trial is mere hearsay.130 The deposition of a witness, otherwise
available, is also inadmissible for the same reason.

Indeed, the Sandiganbayan’s reliance on the Bane deposition in the other case (Civil Case No. 0130) is an argument in favor of the
requisite unavailability of the witness. For purposes of the present case (Civil Case No. 0009), however, the Sandiganbayan would
have no basis to presume, and neither can or should we, that the previous condition, which previously allowed the use of the
deposition, remains and would thereby justify the use of the same deposition in another case or proceeding, even if the other case
or proceeding is before the same court. Since the basis for the admission of the Bane deposition, in principle, being necessity,131 the
burden of establishing its existence rests on the party who seeks the admission of the evidence. This burden cannot be supplanted
by assuming the continuity of the previous condition or conditions in light of the general rule against the non-presentation of the
deponent in court.132
IV (d). The requirement of opportunity of the adverse party to cross-examine; identity of parties; and identity of subject matter

The function of cross-examination is to test the truthfulness of the statements of a witness made on direct examination.133 The
opportunity of cross-examination has been regarded as an essential safeguard of the accuracy and completeness of a testimony. In
civil cases, the right of cross-examination is absolute, and is not a mere privilege of the party against whom a witness may be
called.134 This right is available, of course, at the taking of depositions, as well as on the examination of witnesses at the trial. The
principal justification for the general exclusion of hearsay statements and for the admission, as an exception to the hearsay rule, of
reported testimony taken at a former hearing where the present adversary was afforded the opportunity to cross-examine, is based
on the premise that the opportunity of cross-examination is an essential safeguard135 against falsehoods and frauds.

In resolving the question of whether the requirement of opportunity to cross-examine has been satisfied, we have to consider first
the required identity of parties as the present opponent to the admission of the Bane deposition to whom the opportunity to cross-
examine the deponent is imputed may not after all be the same "adverse party" who actually had such opportunity.

To render the testimony of a witness admissible at a later trial or action, the parties to the first proceeding must be the same as the
parties to the later proceeding. Physical identity, however, is not required; substantial identity136 or identity of interests137 suffices,
as where the subsequent proceeding is between persons who represent the parties to the prior proceeding by privity in law, in
blood, or in estate. The term "privity" denotes mutual or successive relationships to the same rights of property.138

In the present case, the petitioner failed to impute, much less establish, the identity of interest or privity between the then
opponent, Africa, and the present opponents, the respondents. While Africa is the son of the late respondent Jose Africa, at most,
the deposition should be admissible only against him as an ETPI stockholder who filed the certiorari petition docketed as Civil Case
No. 0130 (and, unavoidably, as successor-in-interest of the late respondent Jose Africa). While Africa and the respondents are all
ETPI stockholders, this commonality does not establish at all any privity between them for purposes of binding the latter to the acts
or omissions of the former respecting the cross-examination of the deponent. The sequestration of their shares does not result in
the integration of their rights and obligations as stockholders which remain distinct and personal to them, vis-a-vis other
stockholders.139

IV (d1). The respondents’ notice of taking of Bane deposition is insufficient evidence of waiver

The petitioner staunchly asserts that the respondents have waived their right to cross-examine the deponent for their failure to
appear at the deposition-taking despite individual notices previously sent to them.140

In its first Notice to Take Oral Deposition of Mr. Maurice V. Bane dated August 30, 1996,141 the petitioner originally intended to
depose Mr. Bane on September 25-26 1996. Because it failed to specify in the notice the purpose for taking Mr. Bane’s deposition,
the petitioner sent a Second Amended Notice to Take Deposition of Mr. Maurice V. Bane Upon Oral Examination where it likewise
moved the scheduled deposition-taking to October 23-26, 1996.

The records show that Africa moved several times for protective orders against the intended deposition of Maurice Bane.142 On the
other hand, among the respondents, only respondent Enrile appears to have filed an Opposition143 to the petitioner’s first notice,
where he squarely raised the issue of reasonability of the petitioner’s nineteen-day first notice. While the Sandiganbayan denied
Africa’s motion for protective orders,144 it strikes us that no ruling was ever handed down on respondent Enrile’s Opposition.145

It must be emphasized that even under Rule 23, the admission of the deposition upon oral examination is not simply based on the
fact of prior notice on the individual sought to be bound thereby. In Northwest Airlines v. Cruz, 146 we ruled that -

The provision explicitly vesting in the court the power to order that the deposition shall not be taken connotes the authority to
exercise discretion on the matter. However, the discretion conferred by law is not unlimited. It must be exercised, not arbitrarily or
oppressively, but in a reasonable manner and in consonance with the spirit of he law. The courts should always see to it that the
safeguards for the protection of the parties and deponents are firmly maintained. As aptly stated by Chief Justice Moran:

. . . . (T)his provision affords the adverse party, as well as the deponent, sufficient protection against abuses that may be committed
by a party in the exercise of his unlimited right to discovery. As a writer said: "Any discovery involves a prying into another person's
affairs — prying that is quite justified if it is to be a legitimate aid to litigation, but not justified if it is not to be such an aid." For this
reason, courts are given ample powers to forbid discovery which is intended not as an aid to litigation, but merely to annoy,
embarrass or oppress either the deponent or the adverse party, or both. (emphasis ours)
In the present case, not only did the Sandiganbayan fail to rule on respondent Enrile’s Opposition (which is equally applicable to his
co-respondents), it also failed to provide even the bare minimum "safeguards for the protection of," (more so) non-parties,147 and to
ensure that these safeguards are firmly maintained. Instead, the Sandiganbayan simply bought the petitioner’s assertion (that the
taking of Bane deposition is a matter of right) and treated the lingering concerns – e.g., reasonability of the notice; and the non-
party status of the respondents in Civil Case No. 0130 - at whose incident (docketed as G.R. No. 107789) the Bane deposition was
taken - rather perfunctorily to the prejudice of the respondents.

In conjunction with the order of consolidation, the petitioner’s reliance on the prior notice on the respondents, as adequate
opportunity for cross-examination, cannot override the non-party status of the respondents in Civil Case No. 0130 – the effect of
consolidation being merely for trial. As non-parties, they cannot be bound by proceedings in that case. Specifically, they cannot be
bound by the taking of the Bane deposition without the consequent impairment of their right of cross-examination.148 Opportunity
for cross-examination, too, even assuming its presence, cannot be singled out as basis for the admissibility of a former testimony or
deposition since such admissibility is also anchored on the requisite identity of parties. To reiterate, although the Sandiganbayan
considered the Bane deposition in resolving Civil Case No. 0130, its action was premised on Africa’s status as a party in that case
where the Bane deposition was taken.

Corollarily, the idea of privity also permeates Rule 23 of the Rules of Court through its Section 5 which provides:

Effect of substitution of parties. — Substitution of parties does not affect the right to use depositions previously taken; and, when
an action has been dismissed and another action involving the same subject is afterward brought between the same parties or their
representatives or successors in interest, all depositions lawfully taken and duly filed in the former action may be used in the latter as
if originally taken therefor. [italics and underscoring ours]

In light of these considerations, we reject the petitioner’s claim that the respondents waived their right to cross-examination when
they failed to attend the taking of the Bane deposition. Incidentally, the respondents’ vigorous insistence on their right to cross-
examine the deponent speaks loudly that they never intended any waiver of this right.

Interestingly, the petitioner’s notice of the deposition-taking relied on Rule 23 of the Rules of Court. Section 15 of this rule reads:

Deposition upon oral examination; notice; time and place. — A party desiring to take the deposition of any person upon oral
examination shall give reasonable notice in writing to every other party to the action. The notice shall state the time and place for
taking the deposition and the name and address of each person to be examined, if known, and if the name is not known, a general
description sufficient to identify him or the particular class or group to which he belongs. On motion of any party upon whom the
notice is served, the court may for cause shown enlarge or shorten the time.

Under this provision, we do not believe that the petitioner could reasonably expect that the individual notices it sent to the
respondents would be sufficient to bind them to the conduct of the then opponent’s (Africa’s) cross-examination since, to begin
with, they were not even parties to the action. Additionally, we observe that in the notice of the deposition taking, conspicuously
absent was any indication sufficient to forewarn the notified persons that their inexcusable failure to appear at the deposition taking
would amount to a waiver of their right of cross-examination, without prejudice to the right of the respondents to raise their
objections at the appropriate time.149 We would be treading on dangerous grounds indeed were we to hold that one not a party to
an action, and neither in privity nor in substantial identity of interest with any of the parties in the same action, can be bound by
the action or omission of the latter, by the mere expedient of a notice. Thus, we cannot simply deduce a resultant waiver from the
respondents’ mere failure to attend the deposition-taking despite notice sent by the petitioner.

Lastly, we see no reason why the Bane deposition could not have been taken earlier in Civil Case No. 0009 – the principal
action where it was sought to be introduced – while Bane was still here in the Philippines. We note in this regard that the Philippines
was no longer under the Marcos administration and had returned to normal democratic processes when Civil Case No. 0009 was
filed. In fact, the petitioner’s notice itself states that the "purpose of the deposition is for Mr. Maurice Bane to identify and testify on
the facts set forth in his Affidavit," which Mr. Bane had long executed in 1991 in Makati, Metro Manila.150 Clearly, a deposition could
then have been taken - without compromising the respondents’ right to cross-examine a witness against them - considering that the
principal purpose of the deposition is chiefly a mode of discovery. These, to our mind, are avoidable omissions that, when added to
the deficient handling of the present matter, add up to the gross deficiencies of the petitioner in the handling of Civil Case No. 0009.

After failing to take Bane’s deposition in 1991 and in view of the peculiar circumstances of this case, the least that the petitioner
could have done was to move for the taking of the Bane deposition and proceed with the deposition immediately upon securing a
favorable ruling thereon. On that occasion, where the respondents would have a chance to be heard, the respondents cannot avoid
a resultant waiver of their right of cross-examination if they still fail to appear at the deposition-taking. Fundamental fairness
dictates this course of action. It must be stressed that not only were the respondents non-parties to Civil Case No. 0130, they
likewise have no interest in Africa’s certiorari petition asserting his right as an ETPI stockholder.

Setting aside the petitioner’s flip-flopping on its own representations,151 this Court can only express dismay on why the petitioner
had to let Bane leave the Philippines before taking his deposition despite having knowledge already of the substance of what he
would testify on. Considering that the testimony of Bane is allegedly a "vital cog" in the petitioner’s case against the respondents,
the Court is left to wonder why the petitioner had to take the deposition in an incident case (instead of the main case) at a time
when it became the technical right of the petitioner to do so.

V. The petitioner cannot rely on principle of judicial notice

The petitioner also claims that since the Bane deposition had already been previously introduced and admitted in Civil Case No.
0130, then the Sandiganbayan should have taken judicial notice of the Bane deposition as part of its evidence.

Judicial notice is the cognizance of certain facts that judges may properly take and act on without proof because these facts are
already known to them.152 Put differently, it is the assumption by a court of a fact without need of further traditional evidentiary
support. The principle is based on convenience and expediency in securing and introducing evidence on matters which are not
ordinarily capable of dispute and are not bona fide disputed.153

The foundation for judicial notice may be traced to the civil and canon law maxim, manifesta (or notoria) non indigent
probatione.154 The taking of judicial notice means that the court will dispense with the traditional form of presentation of evidence.
In so doing, the court assumes that the matter is so notorious that it would not be disputed.

The concept of judicial notice is embodied in Rule 129 of the Revised Rules on Evidence. Rule 129 either requires the court to take
judicial notice, inter alia, of "the official acts of the x x x judicial departments of the Philippines,"155 or gives the court the discretion
to take judicial notice of matters "ought to be known to judges because of their judicial functions."156 On the other hand, a party-
litigant may ask the court to take judicial notice of any matter and the court may allow the parties to be heard on the propriety of
taking judicial notice of the matter involved.157 In the present case, after the petitioner filed its Urgent Motion and/or Request for
Judicial Notice, the respondents were also heard through their corresponding oppositions.

In adjudicating a case on trial, generally, courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of the contents of the records of other
cases, even when such cases have been tried or are pending in the same court, and notwithstanding that both cases may have been
tried or are actually pending before the same judge.158 This rule though admits of exceptions.

As a matter of convenience to all the parties, a court may properly treat all or any part of the original record of a case filed in its
archives as read into the record of a case pending before it, when, with the knowledge of, and absent an objection from, the
adverse party, reference is made to it for that purpose, by name and number or in some other manner by which it is sufficiently
designated; or when the original record of the former case or any part of it, is actually withdrawn from the archives at the court's
direction, at the request or with the consent of the parties, and admitted as a part of the record of the case then pending.159

Courts must also take judicial notice of the records of another case or cases, where sufficient basis exists in the records of the case
before it, warranting the dismissal of the latter case.160

The issue before us does not involve the applicability of the rule on mandatory taking of judicial notice; neither is the applicability of
the rule on discretionary taking of judicial notice seriously pursued. Rather, the petitioner approaches the concept of judicial notice
from a genealogical perspective of treating whatever evidence offered in any of the "children" cases – Civil Case 0130 – as evidence
in the "parent" case – Civil Case 0009 - or "of the whole family of cases."161 To the petitioner, the supposed relationship of these
cases warrants the taking of judicial notice.

We strongly disagree. First, the supporting cases162 the petitioner cited are inapplicable either because these cases involve only a
single proceeding or an exception to the rule, which proscribes the courts from taking judicial notice of the contents of the records
of other cases.163 Second, the petitioner’s proposition is obviously obnoxious to a system of orderly procedure. The petitioner itself
admits that the present case has generated a lot of cases, which, in all likelihood, involve issues of varying complexity. If we follow
the logic of the petitioner’s argument, we would be espousing judicial confusion by indiscriminately allowing the admission of
evidence in one case, which was presumably found competent and relevant in another case, simply based on the supposed lineage
of the cases. It is the duty of the petitioner, as a party-litigant, to properly lay before the court the evidence it relies upon in support
of the relief it seeks, instead of imposing that same duty on the court. We invite the petitioner’s attention to our prefatory
pronouncement in Lopez v. Sandiganbayan:164

Down the oft-trodden path in our judicial system, by common sense, tradition and the law, the Judge in trying a case sees only with
judicial eyes as he ought to know nothing about the facts of the case, except those which have been adduced judicially in evidence.
Thus, when the case is up for trial, the judicial head is empty as to facts involved and it is incumbent upon the litigants to the action
to establish by evidence the facts upon which they rely. (emphasis ours)

We therefore refuse, in the strongest terms, to entertain the petitioner’s argument that we should take judicial notice of the Bane
deposition.

VI. Summation

To recapitulate, we hold that: (1) the Sandiganbayan’s denial of the petitioner’s 3rd motion – the Motion to Admit Supplemental
Offer of Evidence (Re: Deposition of Maurice Bane) – was a legal error that did not amount to grave abuse of discretion; (2) the
Sandiganbayan’s refusal to reopen the case at the petitioner’s instance was tainted with grave abuse of discretion; and (3)
notwithstanding the grave abuse of discretion, the petition must ultimately fail as the Bane deposition is not admissible under the
rules of evidence.165

VII. Refutation of Justice Carpio’s Last Minute Modified Dissent

At the last minute, Justice Carpio circulated a modified dissent, quoting the Bane deposition. His covering note states:

I have revised my dissenting opinion to include the Bane deposition so that the Court and the public will understand what the Bane
deposition is all about. (underlining added)

In light of this thrust, a discussion refuting the modified dissent is in order.

First: Contents of the Bane deposition not an Issue. The dissent perfectly identified what is at issue in this case – i.e.,
the admissibility of the Bane deposition. Admissibility is concerned with the competence and relevance166 of the evidence, whose
admission is sought. While the dissent quoted at length the Bane deposition, it may not be amiss to point out that the relevance of
the Bane deposition (or, to adopt the dissent’s characterization, whether "Maurice V. Bane is a vital witness") is not an issue here
unless it can be established first that the Bane deposition is a competent evidence.

Second: Misrepresentation of Cited Authority. The dissent insists that "in Philippine Jurisprudence, the consolidation of cases merges
the different actions into one and the rights of the parties are adjudicated in a single judgment," citing Vicente J. Francisco. In our
discussion on consolidation, we footnoted the following in response to the dissent’s position, which we will restate here for
emphasis:

In the 1966 edition of Vicente J. Francisco’s Revised Rules of Court, Francisco wrote:

The effect of consolidation of actions is to unite and merge all of the different actions consolidated into a single action, in the same
manner as if the different causes of actions involved had originally been joined in a single action, and the order of consolidation, if
made by a court of competent jurisdiction, is binding upon all the parties to the different actions until it is vacated or set aside. After
the consolidation there can be no further proceedings in the separate actions, which are by virtue of the consolidation discontinued
and superseded by a single action, which should be entitled in such manner as the court may direct, and all subsequent proceedings
therein be conducted and the rights of the parties adjudicated in a single action (1 C.J.S., 113, pp. 1371-1372).

At the very beginning of the discussion on consolidation of actions in the Corpus Juris Secundum, the following caveat appears:

The term consolidation is used in three different senses. First, where several actions are combined into one and lose their separate
identity and become a single action in which a single judgment is rendered; second, where all except one of several actions are
stayed until one is tried, in which case the judgment in the one is conclusive as to the others; third, where several actions are
ordered to be tried together but each retains its separate character and requires the entry of a separate judgment. The failure to
distinguish between these methods of procedure, which are entirely distinct, the two latter, strictly speaking, not being
consolidation, a fact which has not always been noted, has caused some confusion and conflict in the cases. (1 C.J.S., 107, pp. 1341-
1342) (Emphasis added).

In defining the term "consolidation of actions," Francisco provided a colatilla that the term "consolidation" is used in three different
senses, citing 1 C.J.S. 1341 and 1 Am. Jur. 477 (Francisco, Revised Rules of Court, p. 348).

From the foregoing, it is clear that the dissent appears to have quoted Francisco’s statement out of context. As it is, the issue of the
effect of consolidation on evidence is at most an unsettled matter that requires the approach we did in the majority’s discussion on
consolidation.167

Third: Misappreciation of the Purpose of Consolidation. The dissent then turns to the purpose of consolidation – to "expeditiously
settle the interwoven issues involved in the consolidated cases" and "the simplification of the proceedings." It argues that this can
only be achieved if the repetition of the same evidence is dispensed with.

It is unfortunate that the dissent refuses to recognize the fact that since consolidation is primarily addressed to the court concerned
to aid it in dispatching its official business, it would be in keeping with the orderly trial procedure if the court should have a say on
what consolidation would actually bring168 (especially where several cases are involved which have become relatively complex). In
the present case, there is nothing in the proceedings below that would suggest that the Sandiganbayan or the parties themselves
(the petitioner and the respondents) had in mind a consolidation beyond joint hearing or trial. Why should this Court – which is not a
trial court – impose a purported effect that has no factual or legal grounds?

Fourth: The Due Process Consideration. The dissent argues that even if the consolidation only resulted in a joint hearing or trial, the
"respondents are still bound by the Bane deposition considering that they were given notice of the deposition-taking." The issue
here boils down to one of due process – the fundamental reason why a hearsay statement (not subjected to the rigor of cross-
examination) is generally excluded in the realm of admissible evidence – especially when read in light of the general rule that
depositions are not meant as substitute for the actual testimony, in open court, of a party or witness.

Respondent Enrile had a pending Opposition to the notice of deposition-taking (questioning the reasonableness thereof – an issue
applicable to the rest of the respondents) which the Sandiganbayan failed to rule on. To make the Sandiganbayan’s omission worse,
the Sandiganbayan blindly relied on the petitioner’s assertion that the deposition-taking was a matter of right and, thus, failed to
address the consequences and/or issues that may arise from the apparently innocuous statement of the petitioner (that it intends to
use the Bane deposition in Civil Case No. 0009, where only the respondents, and not Africa, are the parties).169 There is simply the
absence of "due" in due process.

Fifth: Misstatement of the Sandiganbayan’s Action. The dissent repeatedly misstates that the Sandiganbayan "granted" the request
for the deposition-taking. For emphasis, the Sandiganbayan did not "grant" the request since the petitioner staunchly asserted that
the deposition-taking was a matter of right. No one can deny the complexity of the issues that these consolidated cases have
reached. Considering the consolidation of cases of this nature, the most minimum of fairness demands upon the petitioner to move
for the taking of the Bane deposition and for the Sandiganbayan to make a ruling thereon (including the opposition filed by
respondent Enrile which equally applies to his co-respondents). The burgeoning omission and failures that have prevailed in this case
cannot be cured by this Court without itself being guilty of violating the constitutional guarantee of due process.

Sixth: Issues Posed and Resolved Go Beyond Technicalities. The above conclusions, contrary to the petitioner’s claim, are not only
matters of technicality. Admittedly, rules of procedure involve technicality, to which we have applied the liberality that technical
rules deserve. But the resolution of the issues raised goes beyond pure or mere technicalities as the preceding discussions show.
They involve issues of due process and basic unfairness to the respondents, particularly to respondent Enrile, who is portrayed in the
Bane deposition to be acting in behalf of the Marcoses so that these shares should be deemed to be those of the Marcoses. They
involved, too, principles upon which our rules of procedure are founded and which we cannot disregard without flirting with the
violation of guaranteed substantive rights and without risking the disorder that these rules have sought to avert in the course of
their evolution.In the Court En Banc deliberations of December 6, 2011, the Court failed to arrive at a conclusive decision because of
a tie vote (7-7, with one Justice taking no part). The same vote resulted in the re-voting of December 13, 2011. In this light, the
ponencia is deemed sustained.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DISMISS the petition for lack of merit. No costs.

SO ORDERED.