Viewing cable 09PARIS762, EUR A/S GORDON’S JUNE 3 MEETING WITH FRENCH NSA

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Reference IDCreatedReleasedClassificationOrigin09PARIS7622009-06-08 16:042010-
11-30 23:11SECRET//NOFORNEmbassy ParisVZCZCXRO3385

OO RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV

DE RUEHFR #0762/01 1591642
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 081642Z JUN 09
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6409
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 000762

NOFORN
SIPDIS

EO 12958 DECL: 06/07/2024

TAGS PGOV, PREL, FR
SUBJECT: EUR A/S GORDON’S JUNE 3 MEETING WITH FRENCH NSA
LEVITTE

Classified By: Charg d’Affaires Mark A. Pekala, reasons 1.4 (b) and
(d) .

¶1. (S/NF) Summary: In a June 3 meeting with A/S Gordon, French NSA-
equivalent Jean-David Levitte previewed the agenda for the POTUS-
President Sarkozy bilat at Normandy. He noted that Sarkozy hoped to
use the occasion to announce the appointments of two French general
officers to high-level NATO positions. On Russia, Levitte expressed
concern that Moscow was trying to whittle away at the commitments it
made during the Georgia crisis, especially the presence of
international monitors. He noted that Russia was “testing” the
Europeans through manufactured crises (e.g., the natural gas crisis)
as it tried to reassert control over its traditional sphere of
influence. “We need to tell them to be careful, because your behavior
risks changing the relationship (between Russia and the West),” said
Levitte. Gordon observed that while it was comparatively easy for the
U.S. and France to maintain a united front in dealing with Russia,
the same was not true for all of our European partners. Levitte
agreed, adding that the Germans were somewhat divided over how to
respond to President Medvedev’s proposals. He emphasized that Russia
should pay a political price if it refuses to allow international
observers to remain in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Turning to
Nagorno-Karabakh, Levitte said there was an opportunity to improve
the situation, which in turn might facilitate improvement in Turkish-
Armenian relations. On Iran, Levitte noted that the French would pass
two messages to Iranian FM Mottaki, who was due in Paris later that
same day: First, that things “will end badly” if Iran presses forward
with its nuclear program; second, that Iran faces “a historic
opportunity” with the U.S. that it must not miss. End summary.

Participants
------------

¶2. (S/NF) Jean-David Levitte was accompanied by Damien Loras, French

Presidency Adviser for the Americas. EUR A/S Gordon was accompanied
by CDA Pekala and Poloff (notetaker).

POTUS-Sarkozy Bilat
-------------------

¶3. (S/NF) Levitte began by explaining the French decision not to

invite the Germans to the June 6 D-Day commemoration. “It’s my
fault,” said Levitte, who said that President Sarkozy had initially
been keen to invite German Chancellor Merkel to participate. “I
pointed out to the President that if Merkel came, then Sarkozy would
be obligated to invite the heads of state of Italy, Poland, and the
Czech Republic as well.” Moreover, all of those leaders would have to
be given an opportunity to speak as well, which would lengthen an
already long ceremony. The cases of the UK and Canada were
exceptional, he added, because both Gordon Brown and Stephen Harper
were in such political trouble at home that the survival of their
governments was at stake.

¶4. (S/NF) As for the substance of the POTUS-Sarkozy bilat, Levitte

previewed the proposed agenda: Iran, the Middle East peace process,
Afghanistan/Pakistan, Russia and its neighbors, and finally a broad
discussion of economic issues under the rubric of the G-20 (e.g., the
economic crisis, regulation, preparation for the next G-8 meeting,
the price of gasoline, and climate issues). Levitte stressed that
Sarkozy hoped to announce (preferably in person to the press, but
possibly through a written bulletin) on June 3 the names of the two
French general officers -- the chiefs of staff of the French Air
Force and Navy -- receiving high level NATO commands in Norfolk and
Lisbon.
Russia/Georgia
--------------

¶5. (S/NF) Turning to relations with Russia, Levitte suggested that

Moscow misconstrued U.S. policy on Georgia. Russian officials seemed
to interpret U.S. efforts at improving the atmosphere for talks as a
license to walk away from commitments that Sarkozy had extracted from
Russia at the height of the Georgia crisis. In specific, Russian
obstructionism indicates Moscow’s opposition to the presence of
international monitors in Georgia and the breakaway territories.
While Levitte conceded that Western relations with Russia should not
hinge solely on the Georgian question, he nevertheless pointed to the
continued need for a firm, united Western front. He noted that Russia
was “testing” the Europeans through manufactured crises (e.g., the
natural gas crisis) as it tried to reassert control over its
traditional sphere of influence. “We need to tell them to be careful,
PARIS 00000762 002 OF 003
because your behavior risks changing the relationship (between Russia
and the West),” said Levitte. Gordon agreed that U.S./EU could not
afford to be naive in engaging with Russia, and stressed the need for
the U.S. and Europe to draw the same red lines in dealing with
Moscow. He observed that while it was comparatively easy for the U.S.
and France to maintain a united front, the same was not true for all
of our European partners. Levitte concurred. He added that the
Germans were somewhat divided over how to respond to President
Medvedev’s proposals. Alluding to the differences between FM
Steinmeier and Chancellor Merkel, Levitte said: “It’s as if they have
two foreign policies.” He emphasized that Russia should pay a
political price if it refuses to allow international observers (e.g.,
UNOMIG and OSCE) to remain present in Abkhazia and South Ossetia:
namely, increased Western assistance to Georgia.

¶6. (S/NF) Levitte returned to the question of international

observers, saying that the West should push Russia hard in New York
and Geneva to let the observers stay. “They (the Russians) will
accept it if we stay strong,” Levitte noted, adding that the Russians
must understand that they will pay a price for changing the status
quo.

¶7. (S/NF) On NATO expansion, Levitte and Gordon discussed the

relative merits of giving Membership Action Plans (MAP) to other
Balkan countries but not to Georgia and Ukraine. Levitte suggested
that the Russians would see such a policy as “a gift,” yet he agreed
that NATO needed to decide whether to continue with MAP for Ukraine
and Georgia or find an alternative mechanism. Levitte proposed
eliminating the MAP program altogether, as “each country arrives at
membership through its own unique path anyway.”
Nagorno-Karabakh
----------------

¶8. (S/NF) Levitte said he saw a historic opportunity to make

progress on Nagorno-Karabakh and -- although the two are not formally
linked -- relations between Turkey and Armenia. Gordon agreed that
progress between the latter two was unlikely without movement on
Nagorno-Karabakh, a reality the Armenians understood but had
difficulty accepting. Levitte suggested that the U.S. and France
remain in contact on this issue, with an eye toward a possible
meeting on the margins of the informal ministerial at Corfu. On the
question of Turkey’s admission to the EU, Levitte said that the Turks
themselves had signaled that the important thing was for the process
to continue. Levitte said the French fully agreed, since the EU
membership criteria served as an engine for modernizing Turkey.

Iran
----

¶9. (S/NF) As for the June 3 visit of Iranian FM Mottaki to Paris,

Levitte said that Mottaki would be received at the Elysee later that
same afternoon. Levitte portrayed Mottaki’s visit as the result of
Iranian in-fighting after Iranian President Ahmadinejad took umbrage
that Ali Akbar Velayati, Supreme Leader Khamenei’s diplomatic
advisor, had been received in the past by Sarkozy. He noted that the
French had already postponed Mottaki’s visit once as a result of
Ahmadinejad’s anti-Semitic rant at the Durban II conference in
Geneva, which had prompted the French Ambassador and other EU
representatives to walk out of the session in protest. Levitte
predicted that Mottaki would have nothing meaningful to say, whereas
the French would deliver two messages to the Iranians: First, that
things “will end badly” if Iran presses forward with its nuclear
program; second, that Iran faces “a historic opportunity” with the
U.S. that it must not miss. Levitte pledged that France would “remain
the toughest” U.S. ally when it came to imposing sanctions on Iran,
adding that the French had no illusions about how difficult it would
be to get the Russians and Chinese to support tougher measures. He
suggested that October would be the time to begin drumming up
international support for new sanctions, and acknowledged that the
Russians would likely try to extract concessions from the West on
Georgia and missile defense in exchange.

Cuba/GTMO
---------

¶10. (S/NF) Levitte said that the new Administration’s policy on Cuba
was great. “How can we help?” asked Levitte, who noted that Sarkozy
would travel to the Caribbean in late June. He added that former
French Culture Minister Jack Lang was serving as Sarkozy’s point man
on Cuba, and met with Raul Castro during a recent visit to Havana.
“Your open-handed
PARIS 00000762 003 OF 003
policy is producing some interesting movement inside (the regime),”
Levitte summarized.

¶11. (S/NF) Turning to the fate of the Guantanamo (GTMO) detainees,

Levitte said that France’s acceptance of a first GTMO returnee was
not intended to be a one time gesture. To the contrary, the French
saw it as the beginning of a process, and they were currently
evaluating other candidates as well. However, France would not accept
any detainees who posed a threat to French security and would only
consider taking those with a legitimate tie to France. Levitte noted
that Congressional opposition to the President’s plan to close GTMO
had given French authorities less room for maneuver on this subject,
as the French public wondered why France should accept detainees who
were too dangerous to be transferred to the United States.

¶12. (U) This cable has been cleared by EUR A/S Philip H. Gordon.
PEKALA