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Handling Paradoxical Tensions through Conventions: The Case of

Performance Appraisal

Article  in  Zeitschrift für Personalforschung · February 2015

DOI: 10.1688/ZfP-2015-01-Kozica

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Arjan Kozica, Julia Brandl*
Handling paradoxical tensions through conventions:
The case of performance appraisal **
In this paper, we investigate how conventions enable organisational actors to cope
with paradoxical tensions in performance appraisal systems. Building on a case study
of a performance appraisal system reform in a public sector organisation, we analyse
how this organisation enabled superiors to take into account both accountability and
professional logic. When new appraisal rules required superiors to rank their employ-
ees according to their qualifications but also to show collegiate solidarity, superiors
negotiated an organisation-wide understanding of the rules that enabled them to ad-
dress both logics simultaneously. The study underlines the importance of collective
understandings for individual responses to paradoxical tensions and reveals how per-
formance appraisal systems can be operated according to different logics.
Key words: performance evaluation, performance appraisal system,
paradox research, convention theory, public sector
(JEL: M122, M51, M45)

___________________________________________________________________
* Dr. Arjan Kozica, Universität der Bundeswehr München, Werner-Heisenbergweg 39,
85577 Neubiberg, Germany. E-mail: arjan.kozica@unibw.de.
Prof. Dr. Julia Brandl, Universität Innsbruck, Institut für Organisation und Lernen /
Human Resource Management, Universitätsstr. 15, 6020 Innsbruck, Austria.
E-mail: julia.brandl@uibk.ac.at.
** We would like to thank the participants from the 27th EGOS Colloquium (2011,
Gothenburg, Sweden) on the topic ‘Organizing the Public Sector’ and the participants
from the Workshop der VHB-Kommission Personal (2013, Hamburg). We received valu-
able comments on earlier drafts of this paper at these conferences.
Artikel eingegangen: 15.9.2014
revidierte Fassung akzeptiert nach doppelt-blindem Begutachtungsverfahren: 7.1.2015.
Zeitschrift für Personalforschung, 29(1), 49-68 DOI 10.1688/ZfP-2015-01-Kozica
ISSN (print) 0179-6437, ISSN (internet) 1862-0000 © Rainer Hampp Verlag, www.Hampp-Verlag.de
50 Arjan Kozica, Julia Brandl: Handling paradoxical tensions through conventions

Introduction
Evaluating employee performance is a key activity within human resource manage-
ment (McKenna, Richardson, & Manroop, 2011), and performance appraisal systems
have become an entrenched instrument in many organisations (Bach, 2009; Zeitz, Mit-
tal, & McAulay, 1999). Research has shown that organisations that adopt performance
appraisal systems in the first place in order to increase their accountability towards ex-
ternal stakeholders trigger tensions between appraisal systems and existing evaluation
measures (Barlow, 1989; Townley, 1997, 1999). These tensions have typically been re-
garded as characteristic for phases of transition from traditional evaluation practices to
formalised performance appraisal systems and therefore limited in duration (Ter Bogt
& Scapens, 2012). Less often recognised is that paradoxical tensions persist as organi-
sations permanently operate in contexts where multiple, contradictory demands pre-
vail (Smith & Lewis, 2011).
Evaluating employee performance becomes a source of enduring tensions, when
organisational actors attempt to employ multiple, contradictory performance measures
simultaneously (Meyer & Gupta, 1994). These tensions are paradoxical when each per-
formance measure seems necessary in isolation, but the measures all together appear
as contradictory and yet are demanded (Smith & Lewis, 2011). Different logics such as
professional or accountability logic are associated with different measures of perfor-
mance. Paradoxical tensions then can become manifest when superiors conducting
formal performance appraisals try to follow different logics simultaneously (Witman,
Smid, Meurs, & Willems, 2010). Such settings require ongoing efforts from organisa-
tional actors in ‘working through paradox’ (Lüscher & Lewis, 2008) or ‘navigating
through paradox’ (Jay, 2013) to bring the organisation into the future. However, even
though researchers have acknowledged the existence of paradoxical tensions in per-
formance appraisal systems (Brignall & Modell, 2000; Thiel & Leeuw, 2002; Meyer &
Gupta, 1994), how organisational actors cope with these tensions is little understood.
The study presented in this paper analyses how superiors in a public sector organ-
isation manage to utilise a performance appraisal system for both differentiating em-
ployees (accountability logic) and promoting comradeship (professional logic). The in-
vestigated organisation has been using performance appraisals for several decades, and
organisational actors accept both logics and acknowledge contradictions between
them. A new rule in the performance appraisal system that was issued shortly before
we started our investigation raised organisational actors’ awareness of contradictions
and triggered a search for a compromise that captures both sides of the paradox.
We use the study results to point out the importance of developing a collective
understanding for organisational actors working through paradox. In order to theorise
this phenomenon, we use insights from French convention theory (Thévenot, 1984;
Boltanski & Thévenot, 2006), a perspective that is receiving increasing attention in the
field of human resource management (HRM) (Brandl & Pernkopf, 2015), and organi-
zational studies (Jagd, 2011; Kozica, Kaiser, & Friesl, 2014). The French convention
school proposes that organisational actors handle uncertainty in coordination by es-
tablishing conventions that impart information on how rules and/or regulations shall
be interpreted. Our findings show how organisational actors develop a convention for
Zeitschrift für Personalforschung, 29(1), 49-48 DOI 10.1688/ZfP-2015-01-Kozica 51

handling the appraisal regulation that allows them to take into account the accounta-
bility logic and the professional logic simultaneously.
This article seeks to contribute to the literature in two ways. First, by showing
how organisational actors establish a convention for handling both sides of the para-
dox, the study underlines the need for focusing on the co-evolution of organisational
and individual levels in managing paradox that has recently been suggested in paradox
literature (Jarzabkowski, Lê, & Van de Ven, 2013). In particular, we stress how collec-
tive understandings of paradoxical tensions reduce uncertainty and facilitate problem
solving at the individual level (in our case: conduct employee appraisals in a way that
contradictory logics are addressed). Second, the study extends current conceptions of
performance appraisal systems and logics. By displaying how a convention for ap-
praisals incorporates both the accountability and the professional logic, we point out
that performance appraisals do not ‘have’ a specific rationality, as prior research on
the adoption of such systems suggested (e.g. Townley, 1997, 1999; Maier & Brandl,
2008). Instead, the logic(s) for interpreting appraisal systems depend on the conven-
tion in place. Therefore, appraisal systems do not oppose professional logic, as previ-
ous research suggests, but actors apply rules so that contradictory logics are addressed.
We begin by reviewing the state of research on tensions in performance appraisal
systems and introduce the convention perspective as our theoretical lens. Following
our method description, we present how our case organisation BAND (the pseudo-
nym for our organisation) issued a performance appraisal reform that required organi-
sational actors to establish a new convention, entailing a compromise between contra-
dictory logics. By focusing on a specific rule of this reform process (the ‘20/80-rule’),
we show what the convention looks like and how the new convention is established.
The article concludes with reflections on lessons from this case study for HRM and
broader paradox research.
Conceptual background
Performance appraisal systems
Performance appraisal systems are ‘formal methods of planning and evaluating em-
ployee performance that involve employee interviewing (typically annually) to discuss
work goals or behavioral standards and individual’s achievement in terms of them
(Boxall & Purcell, 2011, p. 216). They include several actors such as HR professionals,
superiors and employees and activities such as issuing a regulation (e.g. clarifying re-
sponsibilities, setting standards and templates for evaluation), actually evaluating em-
ployee performance and utilising the outcomes of the appraisals. Following prescrip-
tive management literature and managerial practice, performance criteria are employ-
ees’ achievements of objectives and behavioural aspects (such as leadership and prob-
lem solving) (Bach, 2009). With the behavioural component, performance appraisals
integrate qualitative data about employee behaviour rather than focusing solely on
quantitative performance measures such as revenues, quality indexes and so on (Bour-
guignon, 2004). Superiors are hence increasingly challenged to evaluate the accom-
plishments of their subordinates by their own observations, which is an emotionally
stressfull activity (Smith, Harrington, & Houghton, 2000).
52 Arjan Kozica, Julia Brandl: Handling paradoxical tensions through conventions

Functional HRM research claims learning and development and/or enabling

promotion and placement (Randell, 1989; Lyons & Callahan, 1996) as objectives of
performance appraisal systems. This research distinguishes judgmental and develop-
mental performance appraisal systems. Critical HRM research, in contrast, emphasises
that performance appraisal systems exercise power in organisations and control em-
ployees (Bach, 2009, pp. 305–306). Irrespective of the perspective taken, performance
appraisal systems are a means for resource allocation and for distributing social goods
(Bourguignon & Chiapello, 2005).
Theoretical perspectives for studying tensions in performance appraisal
systems
In order to position our own study, we outline three major ways of conceptualising
tensions in performance evaluation in current HRM research. Research on perfor-
mance evaluation, and within this line of theorising, research on performance apprais-
al systems (as the main HR instrument for evaluating employee performance), is dom-
inated by functionalist approaches (McKenna et al., 2011) – as is HRM research gen-
erally (Keegan & Boselie, 2006). A functionalist perspective tends to view perfor-
mance appraisal systems as instruments for better managing employee performance.
Seen from this perspective, performance appraisal systems are appropriate mecha-
nisms for making systematic judgments about employee achievements, and for ena-
bling managers to make decisions on staffing, training and rewarding employees
(Tichy, Fombrun, & Devanna, 1982). Either a single measure or closely related
measures for performance are assumed (Meyer & Gupta, 1994). If different measures
are evident, capable managers are required to select consistent measures in order to
prevent dissent. Such a one-dimensional view of performance does not require an
analysis of tensions. Consequentially, research from the functionalist perspective tends
to downplay tensions. If tensions are mentioned, the research stresses the divergent in-
terests of appraisees and appraisers and the political processes that accompany per-
formance evaluation (Wilson, 2002). Possible results are ‘red-taping’, that is, appraised
employees focus their attention solely on those activities that meet the performance
criteria (Ter Bogt & Scapens, 2012). Tensions that arise from these causes are seen as
resolvable (e.g. Azzone & Palermo, 2011; Levy & Williams, 2004), or at least as reliev-
able through, for instance, ‘clearer structures’ (Wilson 2002, p. 628) of the perfor-
mance appraisal system.
In contrast, non-functionalist perspectives on performance evaluation (McKenna
et al., 2011, for an overview) anticipate that multiple and inconsistent performance
measures co-exist in organisations. This puts tensions within performance evaluation
into the foreground. There are two major versions of the nature of these tensions.
The first version regards performance appraisal systems as manifestations of a specific
managerial rationality that links objective knowledge about performance to rewards
(Townley, 1993, p. 230), thereby promoting accountability of organisations. Perfor-
mance appraisal systems are a means of justifying personnel decisions towards exter-
nal audiences (e.g. Siebold, 2001, p. 151). The introduction of performance appraisals
in public organisations especially has been analysed in this respect. In the public sec-
tor, performance appraisals are one element in the overarching trend of new public
Zeitschrift für Personalforschung, 29(1), 49-48 DOI 10.1688/ZfP-2015-01-Kozica 53

management (Hood, 1994; Heckman, Heinrich, & Smith, 1997). Both efficiency and
effectiveness, and justification of personal decisions towards external (and internal)
audiences are associated with the idea of being accountable (Moynihan, 2008). Per-
formance appraisals are thus based on an accountability logic, which has increasingly
permeated the public sector (for an overview of logics in performance appraisal sys-
tems, see Pollitt, 2013).
Especially in public sector organisations, appraisal systems are seen as incon-
sistent with existing logics for evaluating employees, however. These logics can be
based on tradition, membership or integration into social institutions (Townley,
1999, p. 293). Whereas the accountability logic is assumed to be a general trend, the
logics that confront the accountability logic are more specific to sectors and/or pro-
fessional groups. In hospitals, for instance, professional logics are associated with
caring (e.g. Dunn & Jones, 2010), and in public authorities with legalistic–
bureaucratic identities (Meyer & Hammerschmid, 2006). In these logics, collegial
loyalty is the relevant evaluation criterion (Teelken, 2008; Witman et al., 2010, p.
489). Therefore, formal appraisal systems have the potential to question existing de-
cisions on staffing, training and rewarding employees (Townley, 1997). As institu-
tional pressure drives organisations to adopt formal appraisal systems (Modell,
2001), organisational actors’ ‘practical reasoning’ confronts the rationality represent-
ed by the performance appraisal system (Townley, 1999). Tensions manifest in con-
flicts of proponents and opponents who struggle over the appropriate logic (Town-
ley, 1997). In this reasoning, tensions disappear over time as appraisal system oppo-
nents lose influence and new performance measures become ‘natural’ in the organi-
sation (Maier & Brandl, 2008).
The second version stresses that tensions endure (Besharov & Smith, 2014). It
underlines the paradoxical nature of tensions in performance appraisals by arguing
that organisations operate in settings where multiple, inconsistent demands of per-
formance evaluation persist. For instance, in public sector organisations perfor-
mance evaluation increasingly requires external accountability, internal accountabil-
ity and efficiency (Moynihan, 2008, p. 53; Brignall & Modell, 2000). While each per-
formance measure is needed, the measures all together appear contradictory. Meyer
and Gupta (1994) suggest that organisations may achieve positive outcomes (such as
coordination and control, motivation and incentive alignment) when they combine
multiple and apparently inconsistent performance measures in a disorderly fashion
(p. 317). In addressing different sides of the paradox, tensions persist but remain la-
tent. In contrast, a focus on one performance measure and neglect of other measures
results in unintended consequences such as critique of the existing performance ap-
praisal system and its breakdown (Meyer & Gupta, 1994; Thiel & Leeuw, 2002;
Bourguignon & Chiapello, 2005). Broader paradox research supports these consid-
erations by explaining how neglect of paradoxical tensions spurs a vicious cycle
(Smith & Lewis, 2011). A vicious cycle is just one possibility, though. Only scarce
research exists that analyses how actors in performance appraisal systems cope with
persistent and paradoxical interwoven institutional demands. Witman et al. (2010)
analysed leadership in a university hospital and discuss how doctors with managerial
responsibilities cope with both a professional logic and a managerial logic. In this
54 Arjan Kozica, Julia Brandl: Handling paradoxical tensions through conventions

public organization performance appraisals had been introduced about 10 years be-
fore the study took place. Yet the paper does not show the struggles of introducing
the appraisals but rather argues that doctors with managerial responsibilities are able
to handle both logics. One way of coping with both logics is that when they are per-
forming appraisals, “they shape this management instrument, as much as possible,
after the logic of their own world” (Witman et al., 2010, p. 490). However, this re-
search lacks deeper insights into how conflicting logics are aligned in performance
appraisal systems. And in line with recent research about conflicting values in public
organisations (de Graaf, Huberts, & Smulders, 2014) it is assumed that actors find
solutions to conflicts individually. It is unlikely that this explains the full story due to
the coordination needs of operating performance appraisal systems (see e.g. Stiles,
Trevor, Farndale, Morris, Paauwe, Stahl, & Wright, 2015).
Meyer and Gupta assert that organisations have choices for how to manage in-
consistent performance measures and that these choices may involve ‘the highest
levels of the organisations’ (1994, p. 363). Understanding how these choices are
managed so that organisations integrate inconsistent measures in a performance ap-
praisal system is the purpose of our analysis and our case is perfectly suited for this
purpose as it features a setting where actors broadly accept that they need to meet
different, inconsistent demands of the performance appraisal system simultaneously.
Paradoxical tensions and convention theory
Convention theory forms our analytical lens for how organisations develop ‘solu-
tions’ for paradoxically interwoven competing demands. Convention theory shares
an interest with paradox research in explaining how organisational actors cope with
incompatible but nonetheless paradoxically interwoven and persistent demands
(Thévenot, 2001a; Jagd, 2011). Three assumptions of convention theory are im-
portant within the intersection of convention theory and paradox research. First,
convention theory underlines the fact that organisations generally are compromises
between incompatible logics (Thévenot, 2001a, p. 405). This implies that tensions
are pervasive. Asserting that rules are generally ambivalent and organisational actors
can interpret them in different ways (Reynaud, 2005), performance evaluation prac-
tices can become compromising devices, that is, they represent contradictory logics
simultaneously (Bourguignon & Chiapello, 2005).
Second, the convention theory assumes that compromises between paradoxically
interwoven logics are embedded in conventions (Thévenot, 2001b). Conventions are
social heuristics (Beamish & Biggart, 2010) that facilitate coordinated activities
(Gomez & Jones, 2000; Thévenot, 1984). They serve as interpretative schemes by
which actors interpret rules and how they could be put into practice. Such a view
stresses the existence of shared cognitions in organisations (Hutchins, 1995) rather
than the socialisation of organisation members into particular logics (Pache & Santos,
2013). As convention theory argues, organisations embed solutions for paradoxes that
arise between institutional logics in specific conventions that include information
about how to align the competing sides of the paradox. Even though paradoxical ten-
sions exist, the conventions then allows effective coordination and problem solving in
the organisation (such as, in our case, staff promotion decisions). Third, conventions
Zeitschrift für Personalforschung, 29(1), 49-48 DOI 10.1688/ZfP-2015-01-Kozica 55

are not simply ‘found’ in organisations, but require time and effort to get established.
Establishing conventions is a collective activity and involves engagement from all or-
ganisational members. A range of activities like raising critiques, negotiating, creating
written documents and adapting technical devices (such as computer programmes)
can all be regarded as operations that nourish the establishment of a convention (Thé-
venot, 1984). Although the involved actors may see these activities as useless, they are
rewarding in the long run since the convention implies a collective understanding of
the paradoxical tensions that reduces individual uncertainty in rule interpretation and
use.
In contrast to interpretations of convention theory that emphasise the actors’
agency, we highlight the importance of a collective understanding of paradox for
grasping how individual actors cope with competing demands. In doing so, we use
convention theory for illuminating how actors are ‘working through’ paradox to find
solutions to paradoxical tensions (Lüscher & Lewis, 2008). From this analytical lens
we derive the following questions for our case analysis:
1. How does the convention enable the organisation to manage dual demands of
performance appraisal systems?
2. What efforts does it take to establish the convention in the organisation?
Research setting and method
To answer the research question, we used as a qualitative single case study a large pub-
lic administration which had issued a new regulation about its performance appraisal
system just before our research took place. In what follows, we depict the setting of
our study and then the methodology.
BAND and its performance appraisal system
BAND, the public organisation in our empirical case study, is a governmental organ-
isation ruled by a ministry. It has over 10,000 members (civil servants and public
sector workers). Personnel management is located in several different parts of the
organisation. Hierarchically, the highest office of personnel management is a special
department at the ministry, and is responsible for central affairs, social affairs and
personnel (ASP). ASP is directly superior to the HR Division, which is the highest
authority for personnel management at BAND. The HR Division shares responsibil-
ity with ASP for the principles of personnel management and for the most im-
portant operative decisions. At the operative levels of BAND, personnel manage-
ment is carried out through first line managers (superiors) such as team leaders or
department chiefs. A small staff of HRM professionals (HR staff) assists superiors,
mainly with administrative tasks and by delivering specific knowledge. Figure 1 de-
picts the structure of personnel management at BAND.
As with all public organisations in Germany, BAND operates under the Ger-
man public service code (Bundesbeamtengesetz). This law requires organisations to hire
and promote those candidates with the highest ‘aptitude’, ‘qualification’ and ‘profes-
sional achievement’ (BBG § 9, our translation). Although it is widely accepted that er-
rors occur even in the most sophisticated performance appraisal, BAND takes for
granted that performance appraisals are an appropriate tool for personnel decisions.
56 Arjan Kozica, Julia Brandl: Handling paradoxical tensions through conventions

BAND has been using performance appraisal systems since its foundation shortly
after World War II. BAND’s performance appraisal system is defined by the ‘Central
Regulation for Performance Appraisals’ (CRPA) and several implementing provisions.
Figure 1: The structure of personnel management at BAND

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Performance appraisal systems assemble many people with different organisational

roles, competencies and responsibilities. Based on their position in the organisation
they enact regulations and implement provisions (e.g. ASP), conduct performance ap-
praisals (superiors) or distribute social goods (HR Division). The information which is
codified in conducted performance appraisals is relevant for personnel decisions such
as promotions, personnel placements, and the selection of civil servants who are able
to graduate from middle-level to upper-level. The HR Division is responsible for such
decisions. Table 1 lists the personnel who take part in the performance appraisal sys-
tem.
In the years 1987 and 1998, the CRPA was changed substantially, leading to an
ever more sophisticated performance appraisal system. Basically, superiors appraise
civil servants from a specific pay grade every two years. ASP is responsible for devel-
oping the CRPA regulation, which is officially enacted by the undersecretary of the
ministry. The HR Division develops most implementing provisions. Further, organisa-
tional subunits are allowed to enact implementation provisions for their scope of re-
sponsibility.
Zeitschrift für Personalforschung, 29(1), 49-48 DOI 10.1688/ZfP-2015-01-Kozica 57

Table 1: Task division in the performance appraisal system at BAND

Organisational units of BAND
Ministry/ASP
(Ministry and the special department
for central affairs, social affairs and
personnel)
HR Division
HR staff in subordinate units
Superiors (Team leaders, etc.)
HR staff (related to superiors)
Tasks in the performance appraisal system
ƒ Enactment of general regulations and implementation requirements
ƒ Leading of subordinate units, especially the HR Division
ƒ Enactment of implementation regulations
ƒ Moderation of the performance appraisal process (e.g. timeline, different
conferences for reconciliation of results)
ƒ Control of accuracy and completeness of performance appraisals
ƒ Distribution of social goods based upon the performance appraisals
ƒ Moderation of the performance appraisal process within their area of re-
sponsibility and within the superior regulations (e.g. timeline, conferences
for reconciliation of results)
ƒ Control of accuracy and completeness of performance appraisals
ƒ Appraisal of their subordinates, especially the accomplishment of their
performance appraisals
ƒ Assisting superiors
ƒ Moderation of the performance appraisal process within their organisa-
tional unit (e.g. timeline, different conferences for reconciliation of results)
and within superior regulations

Comment: Pseudonyms are in italics (e.g. HR Division) whereas formal descriptions (e.g. HR staff) are in roman type.

Change in the performance appraisal system

The most recent change in regulations took place in 2008. The reason for this reform
was that people engaged in the old performance appraisal system (used until 2008) in-
creasingly experienced dysfunctions. One of the main problems was that too many
appraised civil servants earned high scores in their performance appraisal, making it
difficult for personnel managers in the HR Division to select the best from the good (a
well-known phenomenon of evaluating performance; see Meyer & Gupta, 1994; Thiel
& Leeuw, 2002). This can be illustrated by the following statement from our inter-
views:
The old systems had no power anymore because too many civil servants received a 6.8
[with an absolute best average of 7 out of 16 items, comment added by the authors]. A
comparison was no longer possible; therefore something new had to be created.
Although the HR Division was still able to identify candidates for personnel decisions
(it never stopped doing so), BAND faced difficulties in legitimising its decisions. This
raised a problem and in tackling this problem, BAND decided to establish ‘clearer
structures’ (Wilson, 2002, p. 628). ASP introduced a new central regulation for the
performance appraisal system (CRPA). The new CRPA contained several new rules.
In our study, we focus on the ‘20/80’ rule, because this rule caused the most uncer-
tainty and intense critiques (as we found in our interviews). This rule is described be-
low.
x Performance appraisals are conducted within defined reference groups of ap-
praisees (e.g. following their ranks). In these reference groups, however, there are
58 Arjan Kozica, Julia Brandl: Handling paradoxical tensions through conventions

often subordinates of different superiors. Superiors hence have to coordinate the

performance appraisal ratings of their subordinates with other superiors. Refer-
ence groups are governed and coordinated by, for instance, HR staff in a regional
division (i.e. on a ‘middle’ hierarchical level).
x Superiors are rigorously forced to rank the appraised civil servants of a reference
group in a sequential order (that means into the best, the second best, etc. down
to the ‘worst’).
x Superiors have to separate a group of top performers. The top 20 per cent are al-
lowed to have an arithmetical average score of 7.5 (with the best score being 9)
and the other 80 per cent must have an average score of 5.5.
The difference between the old and new regulation is best described by the following
statement of one of the interviewees:
However, in the old system there has been the opportunity for appraising superiors (…)
How can I describe this? (…) I was in the function of a group leader. As a group leader, I
have written appraisals for my superior [who was responsible for the appraisals of the civ-
il servants, comment added by the authors]. When I told my superior that I have two high-
performance team members, I was able to assess them both notably positively. Now
when I have two high-performance team members, I have to tell one of them, ‘You are
worse, therefore you are assessed as downgraded’.
It was against this background that we conducted our case study, of which the mytho-
logical aspects are explained in the next section.
Method
Our initial research purpose was to investigate tensions and contradictions that HR
professionals and superiors face when actively engaged in HR work and to analyse
how they cope with these tensions. A qualitative single case study was used because it
allows the dynamics of a specific setting to be captured and new theoretical insights
from in-depth understanding to be derived (Eisenhardt, 1989). At the beginning we
did not expect our research site to have a current theme to be relevant to the HR
work that was receiving unwarranted attention throughout the organisation. However,
we conducted the study during the period when the first rounds of performance eval-
uations were being carried out following the change in the main regulation of the per-
formance appraisal system. We found BAND to be in turmoil and recognised that or-
ganisational members were actively engaged in interpreting the new regulation and in
negotiating a shared understanding of how to apply the rules in practice (Hallett, 2010;
Stiles et al., 2015). This was a perfect opportunity for studying paradoxical tensions
because ‘change spurs new opportunities for sensemaking as actors grapple with con-
flicting short- and long-term needs (…) and with competing yet coexisting roles and
emotions’ (Smith & Lewis, 2011, p. 390). Hence we decided to focus on the change in
the performance appraisal system and the tensions that are associated with this
change.
Our primary data set consists of 30 interviews (approximately 30–60 minutes
long). Interviews were digitally recorded and transcribed into the German language.
For our paper at hand, we translated the quoted sections into English. The interviews
cover different aspects of the performance appraisal system, since our aim was to in-
Zeitschrift für Personalforschung, 29(1), 49-48 DOI 10.1688/ZfP-2015-01-Kozica 59

terview people with different roles in HR work. More precisely, the data set comprises
13 interviews with HR experts from the central HR of the organisation (HR division
and ASP), 11 with front-line superiors who are responsible for appraising employees
and six with local HR staff that support superiors by conducing performance apprais-
als. We had a double-tracked sampling strategy. For interviews with actors from cen-
tral HR department, we contacted the department head of the HR Division with a let-
ter in which we revealed our research purpose and asked for an interview. We were
then able to interview him and his deputy. Based on this access to the field we were
able to identify nine further HR professionals from the HR Division. For interviews
with superiors and local HR staff we contacted superiors that we personally knew
from prior contacts. For further contacts we used a snowballing technique. Since
BAND is a large organisation that has different structural parts and physical locations,
we deliberately gathered interview data with superiors from four organisationally and
locally dispersed departments. This ensured that our findings were consistent over dif-
ferent parts of the organisation.
Interviewing was based on episodic interviewing (Flick, 2000). This method is de-
signed to activate respondents to select relevant situations within a domain and to de-
scribe the objects, terms and conditions that make these situations relevant to them. It
permitted us to obtain insights into how respondents experienced tensions and how
they coped with these tensions. In each interview, respondents were asked similar
questions, for example, if you look back, what were your most recent experiences with
the performance appraisal in this organisation? How do these experiences differ from
your former experiences? Do you recall a situation where you had a positive [negative]
experience with the performance appraisal in this organisation? The issues raised in
these questions were elaborated by questions for illustrations and specifications. In the
analysis, we were especially interested in the substance of the convention and how or-
ganisational members established it.
Our data set further comprises documents collected with the specific purpose of
analysing the performance appraisal system. These data consist of internal documents
such as the regulations on the new and old performance appraisal systems and on selec-
tion and promotion, implementing provisions from ASP, PowerPoint presentations that
have been presented by HR professionals from HR division and information leaflets
about the new performance appraisal system. Material from the local labour union that
engages with the new system supplements the material. The additional material consists
of 36 documents (totalling 691 pages) and they cover a timeline from 1996 to 2013.
Our analysis started with inductively coding the interviews (using an Excel file),
thereby clustering topics thematically, in order to reveal the patterns of which tensions
actors experience and how they cope practically with them. We then analysed the or-
ganised material (condensed content of the interviews and documents) and recon-
structed the new and old system, associated meanings with the system (especially the
different logics) and the way in which the organisation coped with the rule change.
Findings
In the case study, we have been mainly interested in how actors cope with dual, para-
doxically interwoven demands in performance appraisal systems. In the presentation
60 Arjan Kozica, Julia Brandl: Handling paradoxical tensions through conventions

of our findings, we first explain the contradictory logics and the actors’ efforts in es-
tablishing a convention for addressing both sides of the paradox. Then, we portray the
‘solution’ for handling these logics.
Accountability vs. professional logic at BAND
Superiors accept the accountability logic as well as the professional logic. Table 2 con-
trasts the logics alongside some key characteristics.
Table 2: Accountability and professional logic: Concepts and illustrative data
Charac- Accounta- Illustrative data Professional
teristic bility logic logic
Source General German public service code (Bun- Specific ‘The solidarity at BAND rests on comradeship. It
of legiti- public ser- desbeamtengesetz) explicitly deter- public ser- binds all members of BAND, to respect the digni-
macy vice code mines that German public organisa- vice code ty, honour, and the rights of colleagues and to
tions have to hire or promote those for BAND assist them in distress’.
candidates that have most ‘aptitude,
qualification and professional achieve-
ment’ (BBG § 9, our translation).

Basis of Technical ‘As the boss, you have to be straight- Emotional ‘However, as the boss, I get into trouble, I have to
superior and distant forward and you have to explain exact- identifica- explain that exactly. And I have – when I inform
employ- (‘means- ly. On the other hand, I have the ad- tion number 17, 18, 19 about their performance ap-
ee rela- end’ rela- vantage (there is an advantage) that praisal – a huge emotional problem’
tionship tionship) the good ones, the number 1, 2, 3 are ‘There are only a few superiors who have the
at least seen as what they are: the best nerve to say, “You are bad, I appraise you badly”.
three people’. So everybody was judged to be around 6.0. Eve-
‘I would like to differentiate between the ryone was told that this is a top-level rating that
mental side and the more technical they received. However, in fact, this was a bad
side’ (of the performance appraisal sys- rating.”
tem) ‘Most evaluating superiors struggle – in my opin-
ion – with the challenge to directly communicate,
they are poor’
‘I, as an evaluator, have difficulties in breaking the
news to my comrades’.

Assump- Resources ‘… there are people that are better Human be- ‘But those who are victims of the system, and the
tions with distinct qualified in this and that area. There- ings (com- system has many victims, they are no longer
about value (ob- fore one must indeed be more open rades) with motivated’.
employ- jective and transparent and call a spade a feelings
ees knowledge) spade’. and needs

‘From the perspective of HR the new

system is perfectly applicable. Why?
Different to the old system it again al-
lows to differentiate’.

Role Private ‘Because, not everyone can be equally
model sector good, you have to arrange them in a
juxtaposition according to their apti-
tude, qualification and professional
achievement’.
‘Because I always say that with per-
formance appraisals I intend: Identify-
ing top staff members that I can pro-
moted and the crowd is the crowd.
That’s the same in every business cor-
poration’.
Friendly ‘And anyway, I perceive the collaboration with the
community front-line managers as very comfortable, even
comradely, because we are all in the same boat,
actually’.
‘I would imagine that those at ASP, who elaborat-
ed the system and who are responsible for it, they
should think about, if they would like to continue
or if they want to reduce the pressure’.

‘According to our aptitude and qualifi-

cation we are to be appointed and em-
ployed. According to that we give our
best, in the same way everyone in
business gives his best’.
Zeitschrift für Personalforschung, 29(1), 49-48 DOI 10.1688/ZfP-2015-01-Kozica 61

Professional logic involves the idea of being a good comrade and colleague as well as
supporting and caring for each other. Superiors explained frankly in the interviews
how they were able to realise professional logic: by rating most of their appraised civil
servants numerically with high scores, it was partially possible to disguise (relatively)
bad performance ratings so that avoiding differentiation was possible. This is due to
the average scores of all performance appraisals at BAND not being transparent.
Overall, scores have inflated over the years. In some occupational groups and pay lev-
els (e.g. technical middle-level civil servants), the average score of the 16 appraisal
items was 6.4 on a 7.0 rating scale (!) for outstanding performance. Hence, even a
score of 6.3 was beyond the average and not a good performance appraisal rating.
This, however, has often not been recognised by appraisees who receive performance
appraisals beyond the average scores. One reason for this was that average scores in-
creased every year and, to put it simply, a 6.3 on a scale of up to 7.0 sounds good. Es-
sentially, the old performance appraisal system allowed superiors to disguise perfor-
mance ratings and to avoid the impression of being an evaluator. Our interviewees de-
scribed this, for instance, as follows:
There are only a few superiors who have the nerve to say, “You are bad, I appraise you
badly”. So everybody was judged to be around 6.0. Everyone was told that this is a top level
rating that they received. However, in fact, this was a bad rating.
This juxtaposition (…) always existed. However, it wasn't openly communicated. Then
there was the difference between 6.07 and 6.08, deciding who will become an upper-level civil
servant and who not. But everyone had the feeling that he was judged well, the superior was
out of the woods, and said, “I did all sorts of things for you.”
Even when superiors appraised civil servants in accordance with their (perceived)
bad performance, they were not forced to communicate this in a face-to-face dialogue.
Although the consequences for the appraised organisational member were the same
(e.g. no promotion), the interpersonal relationship between a superior and their ap-
praised civil servant was not negatively affected. The old performance appraisal sys-
tem, as it was practised, thus enabled superiors to follow the professional logic of be-
ing a good comrade while supporting accountability.
The new regulation, however, underscored the accountability logic of perfor-
mance evaluation (which was already present in the previous appraisal system). Rank-
ings have to be communicated and scores have to follow strict rules. The 80/20 rule
forces superiors to measure individual performance and compare achievements in or-
der to differentiate individual achievements. A performance appraisal is consistent
with the accountability logic when it has an unequivocal output: This is the best one, this
is the second best…! By establishing average scores with a compulsory distribution over
the performance rating scale, the new performance appraisal system limited space for
good performance appraisals. Simply put, every good rating has its bad counterpart.
As a brief illustration: a superior has 10 civil servants to appraise, the best two (20 per
cent) are allowed to have an average score of about 7.5. This could be matched by giv-
ing them both a 7.5 or by giving them an 8 and a 7. This allows personnel managers –
in our case those in the HR Division – to base their placement and promotion deci-
sions on the outcome of the appraisal system and to justify this decision by referring
to the ‘objective’ knowledge of individual performance.
62 Arjan Kozica, Julia Brandl: Handling paradoxical tensions through conventions

Establishing a convention for handling paradoxical tensions after the rule

change
About one year after the new regulation, CRPA initiated the first systematic round of
performance appraisals. In this first round, superiors had to appraise their middle-level
civil servants (simultaneously at every part of BAND). Due to the fact that the previ-
ous way of conducting performance appraisals was no longer amenable, a critical situ-
ation for superiors emerged. Since the rule challenged the existing convention, the
question of how to put the new regulation into practice arose amongst HR staff and
superiors. Organisational actors realised this, as we can see in the following statement
from one of our interviewees:
Indeed, it is said that you are to abide by the regulation, but you have to learn that in time.
Truly, the regulation is one side of the story, but how to put the regulation into practice
(…)? Certainly, you have to work with the regulation, but experience shows you which
opportunities you have.
Putting the regulation into practice was an inter-individual effort rather than an indi-
vidual one. Performance appraisal systems in organisations integrate different people
within the organisation (here, superiors, HR staff members and personnel managers in
the HR Division). All of these organisational members (despite being located in differ-
ent areas of the organisation) had to make an effort to establish shared understanding
about how to align the competing demands with the new regulation.
What happened at BAND in this phase? Superiors evaluated the new regulation,
identified problems with the rules and formulated criticisms in daily talks, meetings,
written statements and complaints. In other words, the organisation was in turmoil
(Hallett, 2010). Superiors criticised the new system for, for instance, increasing bu-
reaucracy, lowering practicability and creating the need to coordinate with other supe-
riors when appraisees were in the same reference group. The following statements
from our interviewees illuminate the uncertainty and frustrations with the regulation
during this time:
but if you read it more closely, many things do not match with reality. And I think there
are many people in the superior units who kid themselves about how it is put into prac-
tice.
BAND recognised these criticisms and organised several ‘round tables’, workshops
and conferences. Furthermore, the handling of the new performance appraisal system
was a topic at the highest hierarchical level beneath the ministry itself. These venues
were used for articulating criticisms and discussing possible solutions. The HR Division
made some minor adaptations of the formal regulations by issuing new implementing
provisions in order to absorb criticism.
The negotiated results were anchored in a shared understanding of how to con-
duct performance appraisals and in written documents (implementation provisions
and reports). From this, a convention resulted in which artefacts (e.g. written docu-
ments) and shared understandings frame individual actions (here, carrying out per-
formance appraisals). Thereby, the activities of the organizational members contribut-
ed towards establishing a convention that addressed the tension of accountability logic
and professional logic.
Zeitschrift für Personalforschung, 29(1), 49-48 DOI 10.1688/ZfP-2015-01-Kozica 63

The ‘pawn sacrifice’: Solving paradoxical tensions

Following the abstract idea of a performance appraisal system, personnel decisions
such as promotion should be based solely on individual performance. Superiors, how-
ever, feel responsible for supporting ‘their’ civil servants in achieving, for instance,
promotion. This requires performance appraisal outcomes, which are ‘good’ enough
(in comparison to others). Since the 80/20 rule limits the number of good perfor-
mance appraisals, superiors established a new mechanism for realising comradeship:
the ‘pawn sacrifice’. By conducting performance appraisals, superiors tried to identify
civil servants who were currently not dependent on a good performance appraisal
outcome, independent from their individual performance. By giving lower ranks to these
civil servants, superiors are able to score other civil servants higher and support their
careers. The following quotation illustrates this argument:
You try to bend the system (…).Well, who has not had a turn for career advancement?
That is, a middle-level civil servant, 28 years old, newly awarded his civil service status,
will become an upper-level civil servant in ? years at the earliest. He doesn't need a 7.5
right now. I will explain that to him and say: Hey, you get a 4.0 right now and you have
the chance in the next 12 years / six benchmarks, to build yourself up (...). The second
group age group 60, they are indeed judged, but they won't be included in the selection to
higher levels. That means they still are what they are, and they know “If I am not upper-
level right now, I won't become one in the future”. Then I say to these colleagues (...) you
won't be included; there is no selection process for you. This is the second group that gets
a rating 4.0. Sure, they are wondering, “Didn't I achieve anything so far?”
The ‘pawn sacrifice’ enables superiors to address both the professional and the ac-
countability logic. The accountability logic of the performance appraisal system is gen-
erally accepted, but superiors simultaneously strive to support ‘their’ subordinates be-
cause of a sense of comradeship and feelings of care (professional logic). Thereby,
they counteract the basic idea of the performance appraisal system, but are able to ad-
dress different sides of the paradox between accountability and professional logic. Al-
beit against the official regulation, it is now an accepted mechanism used to conduct
performance appraisals for BAND, as the following interview statement illustrates:
Quota man! Although this is not written in the regulation, it is logical that I use this
mechanism, ultimately for complying with the standards (sic!). And for meeting others’
needs. This is no problem, however, in my viewpoint, if it is well communicated. I can tell
all civil servants … you won’t get higher than this position, you won’t reach this other po-
sition.
The pawn sacrifice is not an individual interpretation or an individual attempt to ex-
tract advantages. Rather, superiors negotiated the legitimate use of pawn sacrifices as a
culturally accepted way of applying the new regulation in practice. For instance, the
new regulation was intensively discussed at a meeting where the superiors and HR
staff from a regional division and representatives from the HR Division discussed the
new performance appraisal system. In this discussion, superiors confirmed to each
other that this, although not covered by the regulation, is a commonly accepted strate-
gy in conducting performance appraisals. Representatives of the HR Division (at this
meeting but also through house journals and information letters, etc.), however,
stressed that pawn sacrifices are an application error. They argued that they intend to
decrease the use of pawn sacrifices (if used beyond isolated cases anyway, which has
64 Arjan Kozica, Julia Brandl: Handling paradoxical tensions through conventions

been questioned) through, for instance, education or tougher leadership. However,

this has not actually inhibited superiors from openly confirming to each other in con-
ferences and daily talks that using pawn sacrifices is a legitimate way to conduct per-
formance appraisals. The use of the pawn sacrifice is generalised through negotiation,
which leads to a convention that stabilises the interpretation of the regulation.
We have found indications that the convention has become highly established in
our setting over time. Complaints have decreased, for instance, and criticism was no
longer allowed in official meetings such as conferences. Superiors have stated that
conducting the performance appraisal system has become a smoother process. Dis-
cussing the logics has become somewhat ‘theoretical’, as the next statement shows:
Certainly one can continue to question what is more reasonable – but this is a meta-level
above the actual evaluation system, with implications for many other issues. Is lack of
transparency worthwhile in order to appreciate other factors more? But this is a discus-
sion that has not been led yet.
The convention enables organisational members to anticipate how to handle the new
regulation, and, in particular, how to prioritise people in the rankings. In doing so, it
reduces insecurity in coordination. From BAND’s viewpoint, the convention ‘works’:
it paves the way for a ranking of civil servants in the performance evaluation. This is
important for BAND in order to implement personnel placement and promotion in a
way that satisfies the demands of rule compliance and comradeship.
Discussion and conclusion
We used our study of a performance appraisal system reform in a German public or-
ganisation to shed light on how organisational actors cope with paradoxical tensions
in performance evaluation. In the concluding discussion, we consider what the specif-
ic solution for managing paradoxical tensions looks like, how it was developed, and
how ‘well’ the solution allows these tensions to be addressed.
First, the case underlines that paradoxical tensions can be aligned in a specific
convention that incorporates information about how to align the competing sides of
the paradox in a specific way. Because the convention of the ‘pawn sacrifice’ incorpo-
rates both accountability logic and professional logic, it enables superiors to apply the
appraisal system in such a way that they fulfil inconsistent, yet important demands
simultaneously. The notion of the convention allows us to understand how superiors
apply appraisal systems so that they comply with demands to differentiate for aptitude,
yet confirm comradeship. In line with previous research our study shows: (1) that the
facade of evaluative practices differs from their intra-organisational workings (Ansari
& Euske, 1987; Barlow, 1989); (2) that individual actors in public organisations not
only acknowledge competing logics (Meyer & Hammerschmid, 2006; Witman et al.,
2010), but also manage the handling of competing logics on their organisation’s be-
half; (3) and that organisational actors draw on a shared understanding how to inter-
pret regulations and manage the paradoxical tensions.
Second, and extending existing research (Witman et al., 2010), it is useful to con-
sider the implementation of appraisal system reforms to show how organisational ac-
tors establish collective understandings of rules for managing paradoxical tensions.
The implementation of the new regulation revealed a multiplicity of activities: the re-
Zeitschrift für Personalforschung, 29(1), 49-48 DOI 10.1688/ZfP-2015-01-Kozica 65

form raised superiors’ awareness of tensions as the new rule strongly questioned the
existing compromise and the possibilities for meeting professional logic in particular.
Actors such as superiors and HR staff contributed to the search for new solutions for
aligning the logics based on their formal role in the organisation. With their col-
leagues, superiors discussed strategies for compensating downgraded civil servants to
create space for colleagues who needed a positive evaluation. For instance, we heard
that superiors offered downgraded civil servants additional training days, attractive
tasks or more comfortable schedules. The HR staff created opportunities for formal
meetings for discussions. Such activities are difficult to understand if one assumes that
superiors can handle paradoxes individually or if one sees senior management as re-
sponsible for creating solutions. They are in line with the idea that rules can be inter-
preted differently and that individuals expect to benefit from an agreement on a solu-
tion. The observations indicate that establishing ‘solutions’ for paradoxical tensions
takes time and effort from various actors, in line with convention theory’s idea of ‘in-
vestments’ that are needed for establishing a convention (Thévenot, 1984). While our
study identified several investment activities, we primarily focused on a few ‘visible’
elements. A more complete investigation of investment activities would consider
structural factors (e.g. the existence of an internal labour market) and individual fac-
tors, such as the actors’ reflexive competencies (Eymard-Duvernay, 2002, p. 71).
Finally, the case triggers the question of how well the paradoxical solution is able
to address tensions. Research on evaluating employee performance suggests that solu-
tions are temporary (Meyer & Gupta, 1994; Bach, 2009). The fact that several previ-
ous performance appraisal systems at BAND have also collapsed, supports this. Sys-
tems run out over time, and the reforms contained within them provide the seeds for
further reforms. Although our analysis has not explicitly addressed the role of power,
we consider power as relevant for the creation and stability of paradoxical solutions.
The downgrading of civil servants in the performance evaluation could be an element
in the practice for which the solution is likely to be questioned. In fact, when we pre-
sented the study at academic conferences, audiences had strong opinions on the mo-
rality of this solution. If practitioners feel the same way and dare to question the para-
doxical solution, it is likely that tensions will become manifest again and trigger further
reforms.
As with any empirical case study, our paper has limitations. Some findings (such
as the pawn sacrifice) may be specific to the circumstances of our case setting and fur-
ther research would be needed to show what causes variation in reform outcomes.
Yet, we deem our findings to be at least partially theoretically generalisable (Flyvberg,
2006). Paradoxes are ubiquitous and natural in organisations (Smith & Lewis, 2011)
and we would expect paradoxical tension in performance appraisal systems to be un-
exceptional. Hence, we assume that compromises between incompatible states of af-
fairs can also be found in performance appraisal systems of other (public sector) or-
ganisations, even though the specific logics differ due to debates (or institutional de-
mands) varying across time and space. Further, our study has not acknowledged that
organisations are characterised by multiple paradoxes, arising, for instance, in processes
of learning (new and old), organising (stability and change) and belonging (self and
other) (Lewis, 2000; Smith & Lewis, 2011; Jarzabkowski, Lê, & Van de Ven, 2013).
66 Arjan Kozica, Julia Brandl: Handling paradoxical tensions through conventions

How paradoxes of performance appraisal systems co-evolve with other organisational

paradoxes (Jarzabkowski Lê & Van de Ven, 2013) is another relevant question for fur-
ther research. Especially in relation to other HR practices (e.g. Kozica & Kaiser, 2012)
or within systems of bundled HR practices (such as high performance work systems),
in which performance appraisal systems are an integral part, the co-evolution of dif-
ferent tensions and paradoxes would be worth studying.
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