REDHORSE NOTES AQUINO PART 2

Constitutional Law 2 Case Digests

Professor: Atty. Rodolfo Aquino

Compiled by Raphael Andrada

CARVAJAL V. CA

G.R. No. 98328. October 9, 1997

FACTS:

Petitioner is the applicant in a land registration case filed with Branch 71, Regional Trial Court of

the Fourth Judicial Region stationed in Antipolo, Rizal. Sought to be brought by petitioner under the
operation of the Land Registration Act (Act No. 496) is a 96,470 square meter lot denominated as
Lots6846-A, 6846-B, 6846-C and 6846-D. Copies of the application were ordered by respondent Court to
be furnished (to) the National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration (NLTDRA) which on
March 18, 1987 submitted a report recommending that applicant be ordered to amend his petition by
including the names and complete postal addresses of the adjoining owners and correcting the
discrepancy regarding the boundary lot number along line 2-3 of Lot 6846-D on plan Csd-04-005516-D.

On order of respondent Court [trial court], the petition was accordingly amended.

On June 22, 1988, private respondent Solid Homes, Inc. filed its opposition stating that a land registered
in its name under the Torrens System and covered by then TCT No. N-7873 is almost identical to the
property subject of the application by petitioner. On June 28, 1988, private respondent filed a motion to
lift the order of general default and to admit its opposition on the ground that its right would be adversely
affected by the application. In the same order dated July 1, 1988, respondent Court in the interest of
justice set aside the order of general default in so far as private respondent was concerned and admitted
private respondent's opposition.

During the hearings conducted on September 13, 1988, September 27, 1988, October 4, 1988, October
11, 1988, October 11, 1988, November 22, 1988, December 6, 1988, petitioner presented his evidence on
the question as to whether or not he had a registrable right over the land in question.

On February 28, 1989, the petitioner's application for registration was dismissed.

On March 13, 1989, petitioner filed his motion to reconsider the February 28, 1989 dismissal of the
application for registration to which private respondent filed an opposition dated March 20, 1989.

The motion for reconsideration was denied in an order dated March 4, 1989.

On May 2, 1989 petitioner filed a second motion to reconsider the dismissal of his petition. The second
motion to reconsider the dismissal of the application for registration was denied in an order dated July 5,
1989.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner was given (the) chance and the opportunity to be heard or
allowed to fully introduce his evidence in the (proceeding) for Land Registration and (to) rest (his) case.

HELD:

NO. The essence of due process is the opportunity to be heard. It is the denial of this opportunity that is
repugnant to due process. In this case, petitioner was afforded an opportunity to present witnesses, and
he did present three. However, petitioner did not invoke his right to take the witness stand even when
the trial court ordered the submission of the parties memoranda which signified the termination of the
proceedings. Because he acquiesced to the termination of the case, he forfeited his right to take the
witness stand.

Likewise, we are not persuaded by his allegation that his own counsel hardly participated in the
proceedings. The records show that said counsel did cross-examine Engineer Silverio Perez by
propounding clarificatory questions to the latter. In any event, the client is generally bound by the acts of
his counsel. Petitioner has not shown at all that his previous counsel had acted in such grossly negligent
manner as to deprive him of effective representation, or of due process.

In support of his contention, petitioner cites Tirona vs. Naawa which held:

We hold the view, however that respondent Judge erred when he ordered the dismissal of the registration
case over the objection of the oppositors; and when he refused to reconsider the order of dismissal and
reinstate the case he had neglected to perform an act which the law enjoins as a duty resulting from an
office, and had thereby deprived the oppositors of a right to which they are entitled.

Such ruling finds no application to the present case, because neither Respondent Mariano Raymundo (the
applicant in the land registration case) nor Petitioner Constantino Tirona (the oppositor in the cited case)
was a holder of any certificate of title over the land intended for registration. Such being the case, the
land registration court was ordered to act in accordance with Section 37 of Act No. 496[22] either by
dismissing the application if none of the litigants succeeded in showing a proper title or by entering a
decree awarding the land applied for to the person entitled thereto.

RE: REQUEST RADIO-TV COVERAGE OF THE TRIAL IN THE SANDIGANBAYAN OF THE PLUNDER CASES
AGAINST THE FORMER PRESIDENT JOSEPH E. ESTRADA, SECRETARY OF JUSTICE HERNANDO PEREZ,
KAPISANAN NG MGA BRODKASTER NG PILIPINAS, CESAR SARINO, RENATO CAYETANO and ATTY.
RICARDO ROMULO,petitioners,

vs.

JOSEPH E. ESTRADA and INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositors.

A.M. No. 01-4-03-SC.

June 29, 2001

Facts:

On 13 March 2001, the Kapisanan ng mgaBrodkaster ng Pilipinas (KBP) sent a letterrequesting this Court
to allow live media coverage of the anticipated trial of the plunder and other criminal cases filed against
former President Joseph E. Estrada before the Sandiganbayan. The petitioners invoked other than the
freedom of the press, the constitutional right of the people to be informed of matters of public concern
which could only be recognized, served and satisfied by allowing live radio and television coverage of the
court proceedings. Moreover, the live radio and television coverage of the proceedings will also serve the
dual purpose of ensuring the desired transparency in the administration of justice.

However, in the Resolution of the Court on October 1991, in a case for libel filed by then President Corazon
C. Aquino read that the Court resolved to prohibit live radio and television coverage of court proceedings
in view of protecting the parties’ right to due process, to prevent distraction of the participants in the
proceedings and to avoid miscarriage of justice.

Issue : Whether the constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press and right to information of public
concern be given more weight than the fundamental rights of the accused.

Ruling :

The petition is denied.

The courts recognize the constitutionally embodied freedom of the press and the right to public
information. It also approves of media's exalted power to provide the most accurate and comprehensive
means of conveying the proceedings to the public and in acquainting the public with the judicial process
in action; nevertheless, within the courthouse, the overriding consideration is still the paramount right of
the accused to due process which must never be allowed to suffer diminution in its constitutional
proportions.

Due process guarantees the accused a presumption of innocence until the contrary is proved in a trial that
is not lifted above its individual settings nor made an object of public's attention and where the conclusions
reached are induced not by any outside force or influencebut only by evidence and argument given in open
court, where fitting dignity and calm ambiance is demanded."Television can work profound changes in the
behavior of the people it focuses on."The conscious or unconscious effect that such coverage may have on
the testimony of witnesses and the decision of judges cannot be evaluated but, it can likewise be said, it is
not at all unlikely for a vote of guilt or innocence to yield to it.

Although an accused has a right to a public trial but it is a right that belongs to him, more than anyone
else, where his life or liberty can be held critically in balance. A public trial aims to ensure that he is fairly
dealt with and would not be unjustly condemned and that his rights are not compromised. A public trial
is not synonymous with publicized trial; it only implies that the court doors must be open to those who
wish to come, sit in the available seats, conduct themselves with decorum and observe the trial process.
In the constitutional sense, a courtroom should have enough facilities for a reasonable number of the
public to observe the proceedings, not too small as to render the openness negligible and not too large
as to distract the trial participants from their proper functions, who shall then be totally free to report
what they have observed during the proceedings.

ANG TIBAY VS. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS (CIR) 69 PHIL 635; G.R. NO. 46496; 27 FEB 1940

Facts:

There was agreement between Ang Tibay and the National Labor Union, Inc (NLU). The NLU alleged that
the supposed lack of leather material claimed by Toribio Teodoro was but a scheme adopted to
systematically discharge all the members of the NLU, from work. And this averment is desired to be proved
by the petitioner with the records of the Bureau of Customs and Books of Accounts of native dealers in
leather. That National Worker's Brotherhood Union of Ang Tibay is a company or employer union
dominated by Toribio Teodoro, which was alleged by the NLU as an illegal one. The CIR, decided the case
and elevated it to the Supreme Court, but a motion for new trial was raised by the NLU. But the Ang Tibay
filed a motion for opposing the said motion.

Issue: Whether or not the motion for new trial should be granted.

Held:

Yes. The interest of justice would be better served if the movant is given opportunity to present at the
hearing the documents referred to in his motion and such other evidence as may be relevant to the main
issue involved.

It must be noted that the CIR is a special court. It is more an administrative board than a part of the
integrated judicial system of the nation. CIR is not narrowly constrained by technical rules of procedure,
and equity and substantial merits of the case, without regard to technicalities or legal forms and shall not
be bound by any technical rules of legal evidence but may inform its mind in such manner as it may deem
just and equitable. The fact, however, that the CIR may be said to be free from rigidity of certain
procedural requirements does not mean that it can in justiciable cases coming before it, entirely ignore
or disregard the fundamental and essential requirements of due process in trials and investigations of an
administrative character. There are cardinal primary rights which must be respected even in proceedings
of this character:

(1) the right to a hearing, which includes the right to present one's cause and submit evidence in support
thereof;

(2) The tribunal must consider the evidence presented; (3) The decision must have something to support
itself;

(4) The evidence must be substantial;

(5) The decision must be based on the evidence presented at the hearing; or at least contained in the record
and disclosed to the parties affected;

(6) The tribunal or body or any of its judges must act on its own independent consideration of the law and
facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate;

(7) The Board or body should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such manner that the
parties to the proceeding can know the various Issue involved, and the reason for the decision rendered.

Office of the Court Administrator v. Pascual

259 SCRA 604

Facts:

Sometime in February, 1993, a certain Ceferino Tigas wrote a letter, addressed to Hon. ReynaldoSuarez
of the Office of the Court Administrator of the Supreme Court, charging that irregularities andcorruption
were being committed by the respondent Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court of Angat,Bulacan.
On March 10, 1993, the letter was referred to the National Bureau of Investigation in order that an
investigation on the alleged illegal and corrupt practices of the respondent may be conducted. Ordered
to conduct a “discreet investigation” by the then NBI Director Epimaco Velasco were: SA Edward
Villarta,team leader, SI Reynaldo Olazo, HA Teofilo Galang, SI Florino Javier and SI Jose
Icasiano. They proceeded to Angat, Bulacan, in order to look for Ceferino Tigas, the letter writer. Tigas, t
he NBI teamrealized was a fictitious character. In view of their failure to find Tigas, they proceeded to the
residence of Candido Cruz, an accused in respondent’s sala.

In his affidavit executed on March 23, 1993 before SA Edward Villarta, Cruz declared that he was
theaccused in Criminal Case No. 2154, charged with the crime of Frustrated Murder. Respondent judge,
afterconducting the preliminary investigation of the case, decided that the crime he committed was only
physicalinjuries and so, respondent judge assumed jurisdiction over the case. Cruz believed that he was
made tounderstand by the respondent that, in view of his favorable action, Cruz was to give to respondent
the sum ofP2,000.00. Respondent judge is believed to be a drunkard and, in all probability, would need
money toserve his vice.In view of this statement, the NBI agents assigned to the case caused respondent
judge to be entrapped, forwhich reason, the judge was thought to have been caught in
flagrante delicto. NBI agents Villarta and Olazofiled the following report:

“On 25 March 1993, at about 4:00 in the afternoon, CANDIDO CRUZ met with Judge PASCUAL at the

Colegio de Sta. Monica, near the Municipal Building of Angat, Bulacan, where Subject is attending the
graduation of his daughter. CANDIDO CRUZ told Judge PASCUAL that he already had the P2,000.00which
he (Judge PASCUAL) is asking him. However, Judge PASCUAL did not receive the money because according
to him there were plenty of people around. He then instructed CANDIDO CRUZ to see him(Judge
PASCUAL) at his office the following day. At about 8:30 in the morning of the following day (26 March
1993), CANDIDO CRUZ proceeded to the office of Judge PASCUAL at the Municipal Trial Court of Angat,
Bulacan, and thereat handed to him four(4) pieces of P500.00 bills contained in a white mailing envelope
previously marked and glazed with fluorescent powder. In the meantime, the Undersigned stayed outside
the court room and after about 15 minutes, CANDIDOCRUZ came out of the room and signaled to the
Undersigned that Judge PASCUAL had already received the marked money. The Undersigned immediately
entered the room and informed Subject about the entrapment. Subject denied having received anything
from CANDIDO CRUZ, but after a thorough search, the marked money was found inserted between the
pages of a blue book on top of his table. Subject was invited to the Office of the NBI-NCR, Manila wherein
he was subjected to ultra violet light examination. After finding Subject‟s right hand or the presence of
fluorescent powder, he was booked, photographed and fingerprinted in accordance with our Standard
Operating Procedure (S.O.P.).On even date, the results of our investigation together with the person of
Judge FILOMENO PASCUAL was referred to the Inquest Prosecutor of the Office of the Special Prosecutor,
Ombudsman, with the recommendation that he be charged and prosecuted for Bribery as defined and
penalized under Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code of the Philippines.”

Issue:

Whether or not the evidences presented against Judge Filomeno Pascual were strong enough toconvict
him.
Held:

We find that the evidence on record does not warrant conviction.

We note that the only bases for the Report and Recommendation submitted by Executive Judge Natividad
G. Dizon consist of: The Complaint, the Answer, the Memorandum of the respondent, and the transcript
of stenographic notes of the hearing of the bribery case of respondent judge at the Sandiganbayan. The
respondent was, therefore, not afforded the right to open trial wherein respondent can confront the
witnesses against him and present evidence in his defense.

This lapse in due process is unfortunate. The Rules, even in an administrative cases, demand that, if the
respondent judge should be disciplined for grave misconduct or any graver offense, the evidence against
him should be competent and should be derived from direct knowledge. The Judiciary to which
respondent belongs demands no less. Before any of its members could be faulted, it should be only after
due investigation and after presentation of competent evidence, especially since the charge is penal in
character.[7] The above-quoted Report and Recommendation of the investigating judge had fallen short
ofthe requirements of due process. The evidence aforesaid admits of irreconcilable inconsistencies in the
testimonies of principal witness, Candido Cruz, and NBI Agent SI Reynaldo Olazo on several material
points. It will be remembered that the charge was intimated by someone who must have had an ax to
grind against the respondent judge but who, by reason of cowardice or lack of evidence to put up a
righteous case, did not come out in the open and instead wrote an anonymous letter. The letter-writer,
naming himself as Ceferino Tigas, did not specify crimes committed or illegal acts perpetrated but charged
respondent with anomalies in general terms. Respondent judge could not have been expected to make a
valid answer or to otherwise defend himself from such vague accusations. While then NBI Director
Epimaco Velasco, upon being apprised of the Tigas letter, ordered the NBI investigating team to make a
“discreet investigation” of respondent, the NBI team had instead caused an instigation or the entrapment
of respondent judge. Not having found letter-writer Tigas and concluding that no such person exists, they
sought out an accused before respondent’s court who could possibly be respondent judge’s virtual victim.
Approached by the NBI team was Candido Cruz, a person who had been brought before the Municipal
Trial Court of Angat, Bulacan, for preliminary investigation on the charge of Frustrated Murder.
Respondent judge gave judgment to the effect that the crime committed by Candido Cruz was that of
physical injuries merely. He declared then that he had original jurisdiction to try the case.

But, respondent’s action in this regard was perpetrated some time before Candido Cruz was “persuaded
to participate in what they (the NBI agents) called „entrapment operation.‟” The opportune time to bribe
the respondent should have been before he acted in reducing Cruz‟ criminal liability from Frustrated
Murder to Physical Injuries. No bribe was asked then. It was unlikely that respondent would ask for it on
the date ofthe entrapment on March 26, 1993, the favorable verdict having been rendered already.

It is significant to note that NBI Agent Olazo admitted[8] that, despite the fact that he “scoured” the table
of the respondent in search of the envelope, with marked money in it, no envelope was found and so he
had tocall Candido Cruz who was already outside so that Cruz can locate the envelope.In view of these
antecedents, we find reason to favorably consider the allegations of respondent judge in his defense that,
at around 9:30 o‟clock in the morning of March 26, 1993, Candido Cruz, along with the NBIagents, went
to the Municipal Building of Angat, Bulacan. Candido Cruz, alone, went inside respondent judge‟s
chambers, located thereat, and placed before respondent judge an envelope containing markedmoney.
Respondent judge thought that what was placed before him was a pleading for filing and so, he
toldCandido Cruz to file it with the Office of the Clerk of Court, that is, in a room adjacent to his
chambers.Candido Cruz replied that it was the money the judge was asking for. Upon hearing this reply,
respondent judge suddenly erupted in anger. He grabbed the envelope on the desk and hurled it at
Candido Cruz. The envelope fell on the floor. Respondent judge then picked it up and inserted it inside
the pocket of Cruz‟ polo shirt and drove him out of his chambers. NBI Agents Villarta and Olazo
immediately entered the door of the judge‟s chambers, introduced themselves, and told respondent
judge that the money that Cruz gave him was marked. Respondent judge told them that he did not receive
or accept money from Candido Cruz.After respondent judge said this, the NBI Agents nevertheless
proceeded to search the room, examined tables, drawers, and every nook and cranny of respondent’s
chambers, and the pockets of the pants ofrespondent judge. Even after rigid search of the chambers of
respondent, the NBI Agents failed to find theenvelope containing marked money allegedly given by
Candido Cruz to respondent judge.

Lumiqued vs. Exevea

G.R. No. 117565. November 18, 1997

FACTS:

Lumiqued was the Regional Director of DAR-CAR. He was charged by Zamudio, the Regional Cashier, for
dishonesty due to questionable gas expenses under his office. It was alleged that he was falsifying gas
receipts for reimbursements and that he had an unliquidated cash advance worth P116,000.00. Zamudio
also complained that she was unjustly removed by Lumiqued two weeks after she filed the two
complaints. The issue was referred to the DOJ. Committee hearings on the complaints were conducted on
July 3 and 10, 1992, but Lumiqued was not assisted by counsel. On the second hearing date, he moved for
its resetting to July 17, 1992, to enable him to employ the servicesof counsel. The committee granted the
motion, but neither Lumiqued nor his counsel appeared on the date he himself had chosen, so the
committee deemed the case submitted for resolution. The Investigating Committee recommended the
dismissal of Lumiqued. DOJ Sec Drilon adopted the recommendation. Fidel Ramos issued AO 52 dismissing
Lumiqued.

ISSUE:

Does the due process clause encompass the right to be assisted by counsel during an administrative
inquiry?

HELD:

The SC ruled against Lumiqued. The right to counsel, which cannot be waived unless the waiver is in
writing and in the presence of counsel, is a right afforded a suspect or an accused during custodial
investigation. It is not an absolute right and may, thus, be invoked or rejected in a criminal proceeding
and, with more reason, in an administrative inquiry. In the case at bar, petitioners invoke the right of an
accused in criminal proceedings to have competent and independent counsel of his own choice.
Lumiqued, however, was not accused of any crime in the proceedings below. The investigation conducted
by the committee created by Department Order No. 145 was for the purpose of determining if he could
be held administratively liable under the law for the complaints filed against him. The right to counsel
is not indispensable to due process unless required by the Constitution or the law.
FABELLA V. CA

FACTS:

On September 17, 1990, DECS Secretary Carino issued a return-to-work order to all public school teachers
who had participated in walk-outs and strikes on various dates during the period of September to October
1990. The mass action had been staged to demand payment of 13th month pay, allowances and passage
of debt cap bill in Congress. On October 1990, Secretary Carino filed administrative cases against
respondents, who are teachers of Mandaluyong High School. The charge sheets required respondents to
explain in writing why they should not be punished for having taken part in the mass action in violation of
civil service laws. Administrative hearings started on December 1990. Respondents, through counsel
assailed the legality of the proceedings on the following due process grounds: first, they were not given
copies of the guidelines adopted by the committee for the investigation and denied access to evidence;
second, the investigation placed the burden of proof on respondents to prove their innocence; third, that
the investigating body was illegally constituted, their composition and appointment violated Sec.9 of the
Magna Carta for Public School Teachers. Pending the action assailing the validity of the administrative
proceedings, the investigating committee rendered a decision finding the respondents guilty and ordered
their immediate dismissal.

ISSUE:

Whether or not private respondents were denied due process?

HELD:

YES. In administrative proceedings, due process has been recognized to include the following: (1) the right
to actual or constructive notice of the institution of proceedings which may affect a respondent’s legal
rights; (2) a real opportunity to be heard personally or with the assistance of counsel, to present witnesses
and evidence in one’s favor, and to defend one’s rights; (3) a tribunal vested with competent jurisdiction
and so constituted as to afford a person charged administratively a reasonable guarantee of honesty as
well as impartiality; and (4) a finding by said tribunal which is supported by substantial evidence submitted
for consideration during the hearing or contained in the records or made known to the parties affected.
The legislature enacted a special law, RA 4670 known as the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers,
which specifically covers administrative proceedings involving public schoolteachers. Section 9 of said law
expressly provides that the committee to hear public schoolteachers’ administrative cases should be
composed of the school superintendent of the division as chairman, a representative of the local or any
existing provincial or national teachers’ organization and a supervisor of the division. In the present case,
the various committees formed by DECS to hear the administrative charges against private respondents
did not include “a representative of the local or, in its absence, any existing provincial or national teacher’s
organization” as required by Section 9 of RA 4670. Accordingly, these committees were deemed to have
no competent jurisdiction. Thus, all proceedings undertaken by them were necessarily void. They could
not provide any basis for the suspension or dismissal of private respondents. The inclusion of a
representative of a teachers’ organization in these committees was indispensable to ensure an impartial
tribunal. It was this requirement that would have given substance and meaning to the right to be heard.
Indeed, in any proceeding, the essence of procedural due process is embodied in the basic requirement
of notice and a real opportunity to be heard. Other minor issues: Petitioners allege that Sec 9 of RA 4670
was complied with because the respondents are members of Quezon City Teachers Federation. We
disagree. Mere membership of said teachers in their respective teachers’ organizations does not ipso facto
make them authorized representatives of such organizations as contemplated by Section 9 of RA 4670.
Under this section, the teachers’ organization possesses the right to indicate its choice of representative
to be included by the DECS in the investigating committee. Such right to designate cannot be usurped by
the secretary of education or the director of public schools or their underlings. In the instant case, there
is no dispute that none of the teachers appointed by the DECS as members of its investigating committee
was ever designated or authorized by a teachers’ organization as its representative in said committee. Sec
9 of RA 4670 was repealed by PD 807. Statcon principle, a subsequent general law cannot repeal a previous
specific law, unless there is an express stipulation. Always interpret laws so as to harmonize them.

Summary Dismissal v. Torcita (2000)

G.R. No. 130442

Petitioners: Summary Dismissal Board and Regional Appellate Board, PNP, Region VI, Iloilo City

Respondent: C/INSP Lazaro Torcita

Doctrine: We are unable to sustain the theory of the petitioners that the definition of “conduct
unbecoming of a police officer” as earlier granted, is broad enough to include any act of an officer which
tends to bring dishonor and disgrace to the PNP organization, and that there is “no legal prohibition”
which would prevent the Summary Dismissal Board from finding petitioner guilty of the lesser offense.
While the definition of the more serious offense is broad, and almost all-encompassing a finding of guilt
for an offense, no matter how light, for which one is not properly charged and tried cannot be
countenanced without violating the rudimentary requirements of due process.

Facts:

• 12 administrative complaints were filed against Torcita which were then consolidated into one
“major complaint” for “conduct unbecoming of a police officer” under Par. e, Sec. 3, Rule II,
Memorandum Circular No. 92-006 pursuant to RA 6975.

• In 1994, at about 10:30 in the evening, a red Cortina Ford, driven by C/Insp. Lazaro H. Torcita, with
his aide, PO2 Java, in the front seat and his wife with two ladies at the backseat, were overtaken
by a mazda pick-up, in the vicinity of Sitio Puting Tubig, owned by Congressman Manuel Puey and
driven by Consejo with four (4) passengers in the persons of and three (3) helpers employed under
the Congressman.

• After the mazda pick-up has overtaken the red Cortina Ford, it accelerated speed and proceeded
to Hda. Aimee, a sugarcane plantation in Cadiz City, also owned by Congressman Manuel Puey;
The red Cortina Ford followed also at high speed until it reached Hda. Aimee where C/Insp. Torcita
and PO2 Java alighted and the confrontation with Alex Edwin del Rosario and Jesus Puey,
occurred.

• The Board gave credence to the affidavits and the testimony of C/Insp. Torcita that a vehicular
collision almost took place due to reckless driving of the driver of the mazda pick-up and that it
was the duty inherent to the position as Chief of Police of Cadiz City and as deputy of the Land
 Transportation Office to enforce traffic rules and regulation to prevent chaos and accidents in
roads and highways of the country.

• The Board found that there was armed men near the gate of the compound pursuant to the
testimony of Torcita (this event led him to call for back-up) and a metropolitan newspaper with
nationwide circulation and with unquestionable credential which published a news item about
the presence of armed security personnel of Congressman Manuel Puey. Thereafter, Torcita,
together with the back-up force, proceeded to the place where Jesus Puey and del Rosario were.

• Chief Insp. Lazaro Torcita does not deny having taken alcoholic drink; However, not to the point
of drunkness which the Board gave credence because: (a) no sane person will risk the life of a
member of his family when he is mentally and physically incapable; (b) Torcita was able to drive
a distance of 40 kilometers (Victorias to Cadiz City) on a dark night and raining and was also able
to avoid the collision of the vehicles; and (c) he was fully aware of the presence of armed men
when he entered the compound and reacted to this by exercising prudence while approaching
the compound of Hda. Aimee

• Summary Dismissal Board Decision – Torcita committed Simple Irregularity in the Performance
of Duty and is ordered suspended for 20 days and forfeiture of salary for the same period because
he committed a breach of internal discipline by taking alcoholic drinks while in the performance
of his official duties.

• Regional Appellate Board Decision – Dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

• Regional Trial Court Decision – Annulled the decision of the Summary Dismissal Board due to lack
of procedural due process.

• Court of Appeals Decision - affirmed the same for the reason that the respondent could not have
been guilty of irregularity considering that “the twelve (12) cases treated as Conduct Unbecoming
of a Police Officer were eventually dismissed.”

Issue: Whether or not Torcita’s right to due process of law was corrosively abridged and impaired.

Ruling:

Yes.

Memorandum Circular No. 92-006 – the decision shall contain “a brief statement of the material facts
and the findings of the summary dismissal authority as well as the disposition thereof (Sec. 6).

The cursory conclusion of the Dismissal Board that Torcita “committed breach of internal discipline by
taking drinks while in the performance of same” should have been substantiated by factual findings
referring to this particular offense.

There is no indication or warning at all in the summary dismissal proceedings that C/Insp. Torcita was
also being charged with breach of internal discipline consisting of taking alcoholic drinks while in the
performance of his duties. The omission is fatal to the validity of the judgment finding him guilty of the
offense for which he was not notified nor charged. Notification of the charges contemplates that
respondent be informed of the specific charges against him. Torcita was entitled to know that he was
being charged with being drunk while in the performance of duty, so that he could traverse the accusation
squarely and adduce evidence in his defense. Although he was given an opportunity to be heard on the
multiple and broad charges initially filed against him, the absence of specification of the offense for
which he was eventually found guilty is not a proper observance of due process.

We hold that the Court of Appeals correctly found that the decision of the petitioners Board was rendered
without or in excess of jurisdiction, as respondent Torcita was found guilty of an offense for which he was
not properly charged.

Office of the Ombudsman v Coronel

G.R. No. 164460, June 27, 2006

In administrative cases, a finding of guilt must be supported by substantial evidence. In the present case,
an unauthenticated photocopy of an alleged receipt does not constitute substantial evidence to show that
respondent is guilty of dishonesty. In fact, absent any authentication, the photocopy is inadmissible in
evidence; at the very least, it has no probative value.

Facts:

Carmencita D. Coronel is a Senior Accounting Processor of the Linamon Water District, Lanao del Norte.
Board of Directors of Linamon Water District, by virtue of Resolution No. 056, Series of 1997, designated
[respondent] as Officer-in-Charge, effective October 1, 1997 until a General Manager shall have been
appointed. In the morning of October 14, 1998, [respondent] called for a meeting the officers of the
different Water Districts in Lanao del Norte and Lanao del Sur. Since it was nearing lunchtime, the group
opted to continue their meeting the luncheon meeting, attended by more or less ten (10) persons.
[respondent] paid for the lunch in the amount of [P]esos (P1,213.00), as shown in cash Invoice No. 0736
dated October 14, 1998.[respondent] claimed for reimbursement of her expenses covered by Voucher
No. 98-11-23, chargeable against the representation and entertainment account of her office. That very
same day, the voucher was approved and [respondent] got her reimbursement in the amount of One
Thousand Two [H]undred Thirteen [P]esos (P1,213.00). Pedro C. Sausal, Jr. was appointed General
Manager of Linamon Water District filed with the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao a sworn letter-
complaint against herein Coronel for dishonesty. The complaint alleges that [respondent] falsified the
cash invoice she submitted for reimbursement by making it appear that the (P1,213.00) when in fact, it
was only (P213.00), as reflected in the photocopy of the original duplicate of cash invoice No. 0736 dated
October 14, 1998.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this office finds and so holds that respondent CARMENCITA D.
CORONEL is guilty of DISHONESTY and is hereby DISMISSED from the service, with forfeiture of all leave
credits and retirement benefits, pursuant to Section 22 (a) in relation to Sec. 9 of Rule XIV of the Omnibus
Rules Implementing Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987. She is disqualified from re-employment
in the national and local governments, as well as in any agency, including government-owned or
controlled corporations. Let a copy of this decision be entered in the personal records of respondent.

Issue:

Whether or not Coronel was deprived of due process

Whether or not the administrative proceedings of the Ombudsman erred in the decision rendered.

Held:

The notation does not deny respondent of her right to due process. In administrative proceedings, the
essence of due process lies simply in the opportunity to explain one’s side or to seek reconsideration of
the action or ruling complained of. What is proscribed is the absolute lack of notice or hearing. In this
case, respondent was given every opportunity to be heard. Significantly, her intelligible pleadings before
the CA and this Court indicate that she knew the bases for the ombudsman’s Decision. In fact, she very
ably pinpointed its alleged errors that she thought would merit our review. Not having been left in the
dark as to how it was reached, respondent’s insistence on a denial of due process has no legal leg to stand
on.

In administrative cases, the quantum of proof necessary for a finding of guilt is substantial evidence;that
is, such relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. In
the instant case, the complainant did not present evidence to support his theory that the photocopy of
the original duplicate reflected the true amount, or that OR No. 0736 had indeed been falsified. That
oversight was fatal to the discharge of his burden of proof. A reasonable mind will not carelessly jump to
the conclusion that respondent is the guilty party.

The complainant’s evidence to prove falsification consisted of an unauthenticated45 photocopy of the

original duplicate. He could have obtained an affidavit from the restaurant proprietor or employee who
had issued the receipt, in order to attest to its due execution and authenticity. Absent any proof of due
execution and authenticity, the alleged photocopy of the original duplicate of OR No. 0736 does not
convince us that it is an accurate reflection of the actual bill incurred.

While this Court adheres to a liberal view of the conduct of proceedings before administrative agencies,
it also consistently requires some proof of authenticity or reliability as a condition for the admission of
documents.

Absent any such proof of authenticity, the photocopy of the original duplicate should be considered
inadmissible and, hence, without probative value.

Given the flimsy charge and the paucity of the evidence against respondent, there is no need for her to
present additional evidence to vindicate herself. The Office of the Ombudsman should have dismissed the
Administrative Complaint against her in the first place. Clearly, her guilt was not proven by substantial
evidence.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. Respondent Carmencita D. Coronel is hereby EXONERATED of the
charge against her for lack of substantial evidence. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.
Secretary of Justice v. Lantion

[GR 139465, 17 October 2000]

Facts:

On 13 January 1977, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree 1069 "Prescribing the
Procedure for the Extradition of Persons Who Have Committed Crimes in a Foreign Country". On 13
November 1994, then Secretary of Justice Franklin M. Drilon, representing the Government of the
Republic of the Philippines, signed in Manila the "Extradition Treaty Between the Government of the
Republic of the Philippines and the Government of the United States of America. "The Senate, by way of
Resolution 11,

expressed its concurrence in the ratification of said treaty. It also expressed its concurrence in the
Diplomatic Notes correcting Paragraph (5)(a), Article 7 thereof (on the admissibility of the documents
accompanying an extradition request upon certification by the principal diplomatic or consular officer of
the requested state resident in the Requesting State). On 18 June 1999, the Department of Justice
received from the Department of Foreign Affairs U. S. Note Verbale 0522 containing a request for the
extradition of Mark Jimenez to the United States. Attached to the Note Verbale were the Grand Jury
Indictment, the warrant of arrest issued by the U.S. District Court, Southern District of Florida, and other
supporting documents for said extradition. Jimenez was charged in the United States for violation of (a)
18 USC 371 (Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the United States, 2 counts), (b) 26 USC 7201
(Attempt to evade or defeat tax, 4 counts), (c) 18 USC 1343 (Fraud by wire, radio, or television, 2 counts),
(d) 18 USC 1001 (False statement or entries, 6 counts), and (E) 2 USC 441f (Election contributions in name
of another; 33 counts). On the same day, the Secretary issued Department Order 249 designating and
authorizing a panel of attorneys to take charge of and to handle the case. Pending evaluation of the
aforestated extradition documents, Jimenez (on 1 July 1999requested copies of the official extradition
request from the US Government, as well as all documents and papers submitted therewith, and that he
be given ample time to comment on the request after he shall have received copies of the requested
papers. The Secretary denied the request. On 6 August 1999, Jimenez filed with the Regional Trial Court a
petition against the Secretary of Justice, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and the Director of the National
Bureau of Investigation, for mandamus (to compel the Justice Secretary to furnish Jimenez the extradition
documents, to give him access thereto, and to afford him an opportunity to comment on, or oppose, the
extradition request, and thereafter to evaluate the request impartially, fairly and objectively); certiorari
(to set aside the Justice Secretary’s letter dated 13 July 1999); and prohibition (to restrain the Justice
Secretary from considering the extradition request and from filing an extradition petition in court; and to
enjoin the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the Director of the NBI from performing any act directed to the
extradition of Jimenez to the United States), with an application for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction. The trial court ruled in favor of Jimenez. The
Secretary filed a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court. On 18 January 2000, by a vote of 9-6,
the Supreme Court dismissed the petition and ordered the Justice Secretary to furnish Jimenez copies of
the,extradition request and its supporting papers and to grant him a reasonable period within which to
file his comment with supporting evidence. On 3 February 2000, the Secretary timely filed an Urgent
Motion for Reconsideration.
Issue:

Whether Jimenez had the right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of an extradition process.

Held:

Presidential Decree (PD) 1069 which implements the RP-US Extradition Treaty provides the time when an
extraditee shall be furnished a copy of the petition for extradition as well as its supporting papers, i.e.,
after the filing of the petition for extradition in the extradition court (Section 6). It is of judicial notice that
the summons includes the petition for extradition which will be answered by the extraditee. There is
noprovision in the Treaty and in PD 1069 which gives an extraditee the right to demand from the Justice
Secretary copies of the extradition request from the US government and its supporting documents and to
comment thereon while the request is still undergoing evaluation. The DFA and the DOJ, as well as the US
government, maintained that the Treaty and PD 1069 do not grant the extraditee a right to notice and
hearing during the evaluation stage of an extradition process. It is neither an international practice to
afford a potential extraditee with a copy of the extradition papers during the evaluation stage of the
extradition process. Jimenez is, thus, bereft of the right to notice and hearing during the extradition
process’ evaluation stage. Further, as an extradition proceeding is not criminal in character and the
evaluation stage in an extradition proceeding is not akin to a preliminary investigation, the due process
safeguards in the latter do not necessarily apply to the former. The procedural due process required by a
given set of circumstances "must begin with a determination of the precise nature of the government
function involved as well as the private interest that has been affected by governmental action." The
concept of due process is flexible for "not all situations calling for procedural safeguards call for the same
kind of procedure." Thus, the temporary hold on Jimenez's privilege of notice and hearing is a soft restraint
on his right to due process which will not deprive him of fundamental fairness should he decide to resist
the request for his extradition to the US. There is no denial of due process as long as fundamental fairness
is assured a party.

Gov't. of the USA vs. Purganan

G.R. No. 148571, Sept. 24, 2002

In the case of Government of the United States v. Hon. Purganan the court had the occasion to resolve
the issue as to whether or not extraditees are entitled tothe right to bail and provisional liberty while the
extradition proceedings are pending. Private respondent (extraditee) invoked the constitutional provision
under the 1987 Constitution, that persons are entitled to bail except those charged with offenses
punishable by reclusion perpetua or death when evidence of guilt is strong. The court, in rejecting the
claim of private respondent held that said constitutional provision is applicable only in criminal cases but
not to extradition proceedings.Again, the court reiterated its pronouncement in the Lantion case that
the Ultimate purpose of extradition proceedings in court is only to determine whether theextradition
request complies with the Extradition treaty, and whether the person sought is extraditable.

Equally important, is the pronouncement that the courtof the requested state has the discretion
to grant or deny bail and that as a rule bail is not a matter of right in extradition cases. But the court
enunciated that thereare exceptions to this rule if only to serve the ends of justice, (1) once granted bail,
the applicant will not be a flight risk or danger to the community; (2) that thereexist special, humanitarian
and compelling circumstances. Having no statutory basis the applicant bears the burden of proving
these exceptions with clarity andprecision. Unfortunately, the court exercised its discretion in denying bail
to private respondent who considered him as a flight risk when he fled the United Statesafter learning
of the criminal charges filed against him.

FACTS:

Pursuant to the existing RP-US Extradition Treaty, the US Government requested the extradition of Mark
Jimenez. A hearing was held to determine whether awarrant of arrest should be issued. Afterwards, such
warrant was issued but the trial court allowed Jimenez to post bail for his provisional liberty.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not extraditee is entitled to notice and hearing before issuance of warrant of arrest

2. Whether or not the right to bail is available in extradition proceedings

RULING:

Held:

Five Postulates of Extradition

1. Extradition Is a Major Instrument for the Suppression of Crime.First, extradition treaties are entered
into for the purpose of suppressing crime by facilitating the arrest and the custodial transfer of a
fugitive from one state to theother.With the advent of easier and faster means of international travel,
the flight of affluent criminals from one country to another for the purpose of committing crimeand
evading prosecution has become more frequent. Accordingly, governments are adjusting their
methods of dealing with criminals and crimes that transcendinternational boundaries.Today, a
majority of nations in the world community have come to look upon extradition as the major effective
instrument of international co-operation in thesuppression of crime. It is the only regular system that
has been devised to return fugitives to the jurisdiction of a court competent to try them in
accordancewith municipal and international law.xxxIndeed, in this era of globalization, easier and
faster international travel, and an expanding ring of international crimes and criminals, we cannot
afford to be anisolationist state. We need to cooperate with other states in order to improve our
chances of suppressing crime in our own country.

2. The Requesting State Will Accord Due Process to the Accused Second, an extradition treaty
presupposes that both parties thereto have examined, and that both accept and trust, each other s
legal system and judicial process.More pointedly, our duly authorized representative s signature on
an extradition treaty signifies our confidence in the capacity and the willingness of the other stateto
protect the basic rights of the person sought to be extradited. That signature signifies our full faith
that the accused will be given, upon extradition to therequesting state, all relevant and basic rights
in the criminal proceedings that will take place therein; otherwise, the treaty would not have been
signed, or wouldhave been directly attacked for its unconstitutionality.

3. The Proceedings Are Sui Generis Third, as pointed out in Secretary of Justice v. Lantion, extradition
proceedings are not criminal in nature. In criminal proceedings, the constitutional rights of
 theaccused are at fore; in extradition which is sui generis -- in a class by itself -- they are not. An
extradition proceeding is sui generis. It is not a criminal proceeding which will call into operation all
the rights of an accused as guaranteed by the Bill of Rights.To begin with, the process of extradition
does not involve the determination of the guilt or innocence of an accused. His guilt or innocence will
be adjudged in thecourt of the state where he will be extradited. Hence, as a rule, constitutional
rights that are only relevant to determine the guilt or innocence of an accused cannotbe invoked by
an extradite. There are other differences between an extradition proceeding and a criminal
proceeding. An extradition proceeding is summary in nature while criminalproceedings involve a full-
blown trial. In contradistinction to a criminal proceeding, the rules of evidence in an extradition
proceeding allow admission of evidenceunder less stringent standards. In terms of the quantum of
evidence to be satisfied, a criminal case requires proof beyond reasonable doubt for conviction while
afugitive may be ordered extradited upon showing of the existence of a prima facie case. Finally,
unlike in a criminal case where judgment becomes executory uponbeing rendered final, in an
extradition proceeding, our courts may adjudge an individual extraditable but the President has the
final discretion to extradite him. TheUnited States adheres to a similar practice whereby the Secretary
of State exercises wide discretion in balancing the equities of the case and the demands of
thenation s foreign relations before making the ultimate decision to extradite. Given the foregoing,
it is evident that the extradition court is not called upon to ascertain the guilt or the innocence of the
person sought to be extradited. Suchdetermination during the extradition proceedings will only result
in needless duplication and delay. Extradition is merely a measure of international judicial
assistancethrough which a person charged with or convicted of a crime is restored to a jurisdiction
with the best claim to try that person. It is not part of the function of theassisting authorities to enter
into questions that are the prerogative of that jurisdiction. The ultimate purpose of extradition
proceedings in court is only to determinewhether the extradition request complies with the
Extradition Treaty, and whether the person sought is extraditable.

4. Compliance Shall Be in Good Faith.Fourth, our executive branch of government voluntarily entered
into the Extradition Treaty, and our legislative branch ratified it. Hence, the Treaty carries
thepresumption that its implementation will serve the national interest.Fulfilling our obligations
under the Extradition Treaty promotes comity with the requesting state. On the other hand, failure
to fulfill our obligations thereunder paintsa bad image of our country before the world community.
Such failure would discourage other states from entering into treaties with us, particularly an
extraditiontreaty that hinges on reciprocity.Verily, we are bound by pacta sunt servanda to comply
in good faith with our obligations under the Treaty. This principle requires that we deliver the accused
to therequesting country if the conditions precedent to extradition, as set forth in the Treaty, are
satisfied. In other words, the demanding government, when it has done all that the treaty and the
law require it to do, is entitled to the delivery of the accused on the issue of the proper warrant, and
the other government is underobligation to make the surrender. Accordingly, the Philippines must
be ready and in a position to deliver the accused, should it be found proper.

5. There Is an Underlying Risk of Flight Fifth, persons to be extradited are presumed to be flight risks.
This prima facie presumption finds reinforcement in the experience of the executive branch:
nothingshort of confinement can ensure that the accused will not flee the jurisdiction of the
requested state in order to thwart their extradition to the requesting state.The present extradition
case further validates the premise that persons sought to be extradited have a propensity to flee.
 Indeed, extradition hearings would noteven begin, if only the accused were willing to submit to trial
in the requesting country. Prior acts of herein respondent -- (1) leaving the requesting state right
beforethe conclusion of his indictment proceedings there; and (2) remaining in the requested state
despite learning that the requesting state is seeking his return and thatthe crimes he is charged with
are bailable -- eloquently speak of his aversion to the processes in the requesting state, as well as his
predisposition to avoid them at allcost. These circumstances point to an ever-present, underlying
high risk of flight. He has demonstrated that he has the capacity and the will to flee. Having fled
once,what is there to stop him, given sufficient opportunity, from fleeing a second time?

Due Process

Is an extraditee entitled to notice and hearing before the issuance of a warrant of arrest?It is significant
to note that Section 6 of PD 1069, our Extradition Law, uses the word immediate to qualify the arrest
of the accused. This qualification would berendered nugatory by setting for hearing the issuance of the
arrest warrant. Hearing entails sending notices to the opposing parties, receiving facts and argumentsfrom
them, and giving them time to prepare and present such facts and arguments. Arrest subsequent to a
hearing can no longer be considered immediate. Thelaw could not have intended the word as a mere
superfluity but, on the whole, as a means of imparting a sense of urgency and swiftness in the
determination of whether a warrant of arrest should be issued.By using the phrase if it appears, the
law further conveys that accuracy is not as important as speed at such early stage. The trial court is not
expected to make anexhaustive determination to ferret out the true and actual situation, immediately
upon the filing of the petition. From the knowledge and the material then availableto it, the court is
expected merely to get a good first impression -- a prima facie finding -- sufficient to make a speedy initial
determination as regards the arrest anddetention of the accused.

Even Section 2 of Article III of our Constitution, which is invoked by Jimenez, does not require a notice or
a hearing before the issuance of a warrant of arrest. It provides:

“Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for anypurpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally
by the judge afterexamination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons orthings to be seized.”

To determine probable cause for the issuance of arrest warrants, the Constitution itself requires only the
examination -- under oath or affirmation -- of complainantsand the witnesses they may produce. There is
no requirement to notify and hear the accused before the issuance of warrants of arrest.

At most, in cases of clear insufficiency of evidence on record, judges merely further examine complainants
and their witnesses. In the present case, validating the actof respondent judge and instituting the practice
of hearing the accused and his witnesses at this early stage would be discordant with the rationale for the
entiresystem. If the accused were allowed to be heard and necessarily to present evidence during the
prima facie determination for the issuance of a warrant of arrest,what would stop him from presenting
his entire plethora of defenses at this stage -- if he so desires -- in his effort to negate a prima facie finding?
Such a procedurecould convert the determination of a prima facie case into a full-blown trial of the entire
proceedings and possibly make trial of the main case superfluous. Thisscenario is also anathema to the
summary nature of extraditions.

That the case under consideration is an extradition and not a criminal action is not sufficient to justify the
adoption of a set of procedures more protective of theaccused. If a different procedure were called for at
all, a more restrictive one -- not the opposite -- would be justified in view of respondent s demonstrated
predisposition to flee.

Right to Bail

Extradition Different from Ordinary Criminal Proceedings

We agree with petitioner. As suggested by the use of the word conviction, the constitutional provision
on bail quoted above, as well as Section 4 of Rule 114 of theRules of Court, applies only when a person
has been arrested and detained for violation of Philippine criminal laws. It does not apply to extradition
proceedings,because extradition courts do not render judgments of conviction or acquittal.

Moreover, the constitutional right to bail flows from the presumption of innocence in favor of every
accused who should not be subjected to the loss of freedom as hereafter he would be entitled to acquittal,
unless his guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt. It follows that the constitutional provision on bail
will not apply toa case like extradition, where the presumption of innocence is not at issue.

The provision in the Constitution stating that the right to bail shall not be impaired even when the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended does notdetract from the rule that the constitutional
right to bail is available only in criminal proceedings. It must be noted that the suspension of the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus finds application only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses
inherent in or directly connected with invasion. Hence, the secondsentence in the constitutional
provision on bail merely emphasizes the right to bail in criminal proceedings for the aforementioned
offenses. It cannot be taken tomean that the right is available even in extradition proceedings that are
not criminal in nature.

That the offenses for which Jimenez is sought to be extradited are bailable in the United States is not an
argument to grant him one in the present case. To stress,extradition proceedings are separate and distinct
from the trial for the offenses for which he is charged. He should apply for bail before the courts trying
the criminalcases against him, not before the extradition court.

Exceptions to the No Bail Rule

The rule, we repeat, is that bail is not a matter of right in extradition cases. However, the judiciary has the
constitutional duty to curb grave abuse of discretion andtyranny, as well as the power to promulgate rules
to protect and enforce constitutional rights. Furthermore, we believe that the right to due process is broad
enoughto include the grant of basic fairness to extraditees. Indeed, the right to due process extends to
the life, liberty or property of every person. It is dynamic andresilient, adaptable to every situation
calling for its application.

Accordingly and to best serve the ends of justice, we believe and so hold that, after a potential extraditee
has been arrested or placed under the custody of the law,bail may be applied for and granted as an
exception, only upon a clear and convincing showing (1) that, once granted bail, the applicant will not be
a flight risk or adanger to the community; and (2) that there exist special, humanitarian and compelling
circumstances including, as a matter of reciprocity, those cited by the highestcourt in the requesting state
when it grants provisional liberty in extradition cases therein.

Since this exception has no express or specific statutory basis, and since it is derived essentially from
general principles of justice and fairness, the applicant bears theburden of proving the above two-tiered
requirement with clarity, precision and emphatic forcefulness. The Court realizes that extradition is
basically an executive,not a judicial, responsibility arising from the presidential power to conduct foreign
relations. In its barest concept, it partakes of the nature of police assistanceamongst states, which is not
normally a judicial prerogative. Hence, any intrusion by the courts into the exercise of this power should
be characterized by caution, sothat the vital international and bilateral interests of our country will not be
unreasonably impeded or compromised. In short, while this Court is ever protective of the sporting idea
of fair play, it also recognizes the limits of its own prerogatives and the need to fulfill international
obligations.

Bail is a Matter of Discretion on the part of Appellate Court.

Government of Hongkong v. Olalia, 521 SCRA 470 April 19, 2007)

FactsO

Private respondent Muñoz was charged before Hong Kong Court. Warrants of arrest were issued and by
virtue of a final decree the validity of the Order of Arrest was upheld. The petitioner Hong Kong
Administrative Region filed a petition for the extradition of the private respondent. In the same case, a
petition for bail was filed by the private respondent.

The petition for bail was denied by reason that there was no Philippine law granting the same in
extradition cases and that the respondent was a high “flight risk”. Private respondent filed a motion for
reconsideration and was granted by the respondent judge subject to the following conditions:

1. Bail is set at Php750,000.00 in cash with the condition that accused hereby undertakes that he
will appear and answer the issues raised in these proceedings and will at all times hold himself amenable
to orders and processes of this Court, will further appear for judgment. If accused fails in this undertaking,
the cash bond will be forfeited in favor of the government;

2. Accused must surrender his valid passport to this Court;

3. The Department of Justice is given immediate notice and discretion of filing its own motion for
hold departure order before this Court even in extradition proceeding; and

4. Accused is required to report to the government prosecutors handling this case or if they so
desire to the nearest office, at any time and day of the week; and if they further desire, manifest before
this Court to require that all the assets of accused, real and personal, be filed with this Court soonest, with
the condition that if the accused flees from his undertaking, said assets be forfeited in favor of the
government and that the corresponding lien/annotation be noted therein accordingly.

Petitioner filed a motion to vacate the said order but was denied by the respondent judge. Hence, this
instant petition.
Issue

WON a potential extraditee is entitled to post bail

Ruling

A potential extraditee is entitled to bail.

Ratio Decidendi

Petitioner alleged that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in admitting private respondent to bail; that there is nothing in the Constitution or statutory
law providing that a potential extraditee has a right to bail, the right being limited solely to criminal
proceedings.

On the other hand, private respondent maintained that the right to bail guaranteed under the Bill of Rights
extends to a prospective extraditee; and that extradition is a harsh process resulting in a prolonged
deprivation of one’s liberty.

In this case, the Court reviewed what was held in Government of United States of America v. Hon.
Guillermo G. Purganan, Presiding Judge, RTC of Manila, Branch 42, and Mark B. Jimenez, a.k.a. Mario
Batacan Crespo GR No. 153675 April 2007, that the constitutional provision on bail does not apply to
extradition proceedings, the same being available only in criminal proceedings. The Court took cognizance
of the following trends in international law:

(1) the growing importance of the individual person in public international;

(2) the higher value now being given to human rights;

(3) the corresponding duty of countries to observe these universal human rights in fulfilling their treaty
obligations; and

(4) the duty of this Court to balance the rights of the individual under our fundamental law, on one hand,
and the law on extradition, on the other.

In light of the recent developments in international law, where emphasis is given to the worth of the
individual and the sanctity of human rights, the Court departed from the ruling in Purganan, and held that
an extraditee may be allowed to post bail.

OCAMPO V. ABANDO G.R. No. 176830 February 11, 2014

FACTS:

A mass graveyard was found at Sitio Sapang Daco, Barangay Kaulisihan, Inopacan, Leyte by the43rd
Infantry Brigade containing 67 skeletal remains of those believed to be victims of “Operation Venereal
Disease (VD)” by the Communist Party of the Philippines/ New People’s Army/National Democratic Front
(CPP/NPA/NPDF) of the Philippines. This was done to purge their ranks of suspected military informers.
Members of the Scene of the Crime Operation team conducted forensic crime analysis to identify the
bodies by way of DNA sample. The initial report of the PNP Crime Laboratory on their identities remained
inconclusive, but, in a Special Report, the Case Secretariat of the Regional and National Inter-Agency Legal
Action Group came up with ten names of possible victims after comparing the testimonies of relatives and
witnesses.

Police Chief Inspector George L. Almaden and Staff Judge Advocate Captain Allan Tiu sent undated letters
to Pros. Vivero, requesting for legal action on the twelve attached complaint affidavits. These were from
relatives of the alleged victims of Operation VD who all swore that their relatives had been abducted or
last seen with members of the CPP/NPA/NDFP.

Charging them with murder, the affidavits were directed to 71 named members of the group, including
the petitioners. Namely, the petitioners were Ocampo, Echanis, Baylosis and Ladlad who were all pointed
out to be members of the Central Committee that ordered the campaign to be carried out in 1985.

On this basis, Pros. Vivero issued a subpoena requiring them to submit their counter-affidavits and
Ocampo complied. However, Echanis and Baylosis did not do so because allegedly they were not served
the copy of a subpoena. As for Ladlad, though his counsel made formal appearance during the preliminary
investigation, he also did not submit for the same reason as the two.

Pros. Vivero, in a resolution, directed the filing of information for 15 counts of multiple murder against
the 54 named members, including the petitioners. He also caused some respondents to be used as state
witnesses for their testimony is vital to the prosecution. Said information was filed before RTC Hilongos,
Leyte branch 18 presided by Judge Abando.

Prior to receiving the resolution, Ocampo filed an Ex Parte Motion to Set Case for Clarificatory Hearing.
Judge Obando found probable cause and ordered the issuance of warrants of arrest against them with no
recommended bail.

Ocampo went to the Supreme Court by way of special civil action for certiorari and prohibition under Rule
65 and asked for the abovementioned order and the prosecutor’s resolution to be annulled. He said that
a case for rebellion against him and 44 others was then already pending before RTC Makati and so, the
crime of murder was absorbed by the rebellion in line with the political offense doctrine.

The Court ordered the Solicitor General to comment on the issue and also ordered the parties to submit
their memoranda. From the oral arguments, the Court found that the single Information charging them
all of 15 counts of murder was defective. The prosecution moved to admit amended and new information,
but Judge Abando suspended the proceedings during the pendency of the case before the Court.

Meanwhile, Echanis was arrested and he, along with Baylosis, filed a Motion for Judicial Reinvestigation/
Determination of Probable Cause with Prayer to Dismiss the Case Outright and Alternative Prayer to
Recall/ Suspend Service of Warrant, but it was dismissed by Judge Abando. Around this time, Ladlad filed
a Motion to Quash/Dismiss with the RTC Manila.

Echanis and Baylosis moved to reconsider but it was not acted because, as per request of the DOJ
Secretary to change the venue of the trial, the records were transmitted to RTC Manila. Echanis and
Baylosis continued to seek relief from the Supreme Court in response to Judge Abando’s orders. Echanis
also prayed for his release.
Both Ocampo and Echanis were granted provisional release by the Supreme Court under cash bonds.

As to Ladlad’s Motion to Quash, it was denied by respondent judge and the same happened to his Motion
for Reconsideration. Ladlad sought to annul the latter’s orders by way of special civil action for certiorari
under Rule 65.

As to their bail, Ladlad filed an Urgent Motion to Fix Bail whereas Baylosis filed a Motion to Allow
Petitioner to Post Bail which were granted, with no opposition from the OSG (bec. they’re consultants of
the NDFP negotiating team, then having talks with the GRP peace panel).

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioners’ right to due process was violated.

HELD:

NO. Petitioners were accorded due process during preliminary investigation and in the issuance of the
warrants of arrest.

A preliminary investigation is "not a casual affair." It is conducted to protect the innocent from the
embarrassment, expense and anxiety of a public trial. While the right to have a preliminary investigation
before trial is statutory rather than constitutional, it is a substantive right and a component of due process
in the administration of criminal justice.

In the context of a preliminary investigation, the right to due process of law entails the opportunity to be
heard. It serves to accord an opportunity for the presentation of the respondent’s side with regard to the
accusation. Afterwards, the investigating officer shall decide whether the allegations and defenses lead
to a reasonable belief that a crime has been committed, and that it was the respondent who committed
it. Otherwise, the investigating officer is bound to dismiss the complaint.

"The essence of due process is reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit evidence in support of
one's defense." What is proscribed is lack of opportunity to be heard. Thus, one who has been afforded a
chance to present one’s own side of the story cannot claim denial of due process.

As to the claim of petitioners Echanis and Baylosis that they were denied due process, we quote the
pertinent portion of Prosecutor Vivero’s Resolution, which states:

In connection with the foregoing and pursuant to the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure[,] the
respondents were issued and served with Subpoena at their last known address for them to submit their
counter-affidavits and that of their witnesses.

Majority of the respondents did not submit their counter-affidavits because they could no longer be found
in their last known address, per return of the subpoenas. On the other hand, Saturnino Ocampo Satur,
Fides Lim, Maureen Palejaro and Ruben Manatad submitted their Counter-Affidavits. However, Vicente
Ladlad and Jasmin Jerusalem failed to submit the required Counter Affidavits in spite entry of appearance
by their respective counsels.

Section 3(d), Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, allows Prosecutor Vivero to resolve the complaint based on
the evidence before him if a respondent could not be subpoenaed. As long as efforts to reach a
respondent were made, and he was given an opportunity to present countervailing evidence, the
preliminary investigation remains valid. The rule was put in place in order to foil underhanded attempts
of a respondent to delay the prosecution of offenses.In this case, the Resolution stated that efforts were
undertaken to serve subpoenas on the named respondents at their last known addresses. This is sufficient
for due process. It was only because a majority of them could no longer be found at their last known
addresses that they were not served copies of the complaint and the attached documents or evidence.

Moreover, Petitioner Ladlad, through his counsel, had every opportunity to secure copies of the complaint
after his counsel’s formal entry of appearance and, thereafter, to participate fully in the preliminary
investigation. Instead, he refused to participate.

We have previously cautioned that "litigants represented by counsel should not expect that all they need
to do is sit back, relax and await the outcome of their case."106 Having opted to remain passive during
the preliminary investigation, petitioner Ladlad and his counsel cannot now claim a denial of due process,
since their failure to file a counter-affidavit was of their own doing.

As to Ocampo’s claim that he was denied the right to file a motion for reconsideration or to appeal the
Resolution of Prosecutor Vivero due to the 19-day delay in the service of the Resolution, it must be pointed
out that the period for filing a motion for reconsideration or an appeal to the Secretary of Justice is
reckoned from the date of receipt of the resolution of the prosecutor, not from the date of the resolution.
This is clear from Section 3 of the 2000 National Prosecution Service Rule on Appeal:

Sec. 3. Period to appeal. – The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the resolution,
or of the denial of the motion for reconsideration/ reinvestigation if one has been filed within fifteen (15)
days from receipt of the assailed resolution. Only one motion for reconsideration shall be allowed.
(Emphasis supplied)

Thus, when petitioner Ocampo received the Resolution of Prosecutor Vivero on 12 March 2007,108 the
former had until 27 March 2007 within which to file either a motion for reconsideration before the latter
or an appeal before the Secretary of Justice. Instead, petitioner Ocampo chose to file the instant petition
for certiorari directly before this Court on 16 March 2007.

EN. JINGGOY ESTRADA v. OMBUDSMAN G.R. Nos. 212140-41 January 21, 2015

FACTS:

Sometime in November and December 2013, the Ombudsman served on Sen. Estrada two (2) criminal
complaints for plunder, among others. Eighteen (18) of Sen. Estrada’s co-respondents in the two
complaints filed their counter-affidavits between 9 December 2013 and 14 March 2014.

On 20 March 2014, Sen. Estrada filed his “Request to be Furnished with Copies of Counter-Affidavits of
the Other Respondents, Affidavits of New Witnesses and Other Filings” (the “Request”). Sen. Estrada’s
request was made “[p]ursuant to the right of a respondent ‘to examine the evidence submitted by the
complainant which he may not have been furnished’ (Section 3[b], Rule 112 of the Rules of Court) and to
‘have access to the evidence on record’ (Section 4[c], Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
Ombudsman).”

The Ombudsman denied Sen. Estrada’s Request, which is not the subject of the present certiorari case.
ISSUE:

WON petitioner Estrada was denied due process of law

HELD:

NO. The denial did not violate Sen. Estrada’s constitutional right to due process.

First. There is no law or rule which requires the Ombudsman to furnish a respondent with copies of the
counter-affidavits of his co-respondents.

The SC cited in its decision Sections 3 and 4, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as well
as Rule II of Administrative Order No. 7, Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, for ready
reference.

Sen. Estrada claims that the denial of his Request for the counter-affidavits of his co-respondents violates
his constitutional right to due process. Sen. Estrada, however, fails to specify a law or rule which states
that it is a compulsory requirement of due process in a preliminary investigation that the Ombudsman
furnish a respondent with the counter-affidavits of his co-respondents. Neither Section 3(b), Rule 112 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure nor Section 4(c), Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of
the Ombudsman supports Sen. Estrada’s claim. What the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
Ombudsman require is for the Ombudsman to furnish the respondent with a copy of the complaint and
the supporting affidavits and documents at the time the order to submit the counter-affidavit is issued to
the respondent. This is clear from Section 4(b), Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
Ombudsman when it states, "[a]fter such affidavits [of the complainant and his witnesses] have been
secured, the investigating officer shall issue an order, attaching thereto a copy of the affidavits and other
supporting documents, directing the respondent to submit, within ten (10) days from receipt thereof, his
counter-affidavits x x x." At this point, there is still no counter-affidavit submitted by any respondent.
Clearly, what Section 4(b) refers to are affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses, not the affidavits
of the co-respondents. Obviously, the counter-affidavits of the co-respondents are not part of the
supporting affidavits of the complainant. No grave abuse of discretion can thus be attributed to the
Ombudsman for the issuance of the 27 March 2014 Order which denied Sen. Estrada’s Request.

Second, it should be underscored that the conduct of a preliminary investigation is only for the
determination of probable cause, and “probable cause merely implies probability of guilt and should be
determined in a summary manner. A preliminary investigation is not a part of the trial and it is only in a
trial where an accused can demand the full exercise of his rights, such as the right to confront and cross-
examine his accusers to establish his innocence.” Thus, the rights of a respondent in a preliminary
investigation are limited to those granted by procedural law.

A preliminary investigation is defined as an inquiry or proceeding for the purpose of determining whether
there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime cognizable by the Regional Trial
Court has been committed and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial.
The quantum of evidence now required in preliminary investigation is such evidence sufficient to
“engender a well-founded belief” as to the fact of the commission of a crime and the respondent’s
probable guilt thereof. A preliminary investigation is not the occasion for the full and exhaustive display
of the parties’ evidence; it is for the presentation of such evidence only as may engender a well-grounded
belief that an offense has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof. We are in
accord with the state prosecutor’s findings in the case at bar that there exists prima facie evidence of
petitioner’s involvement in the commission of the crime, it being sufficiently supported by the evidence
presented and the facts obtaining therein.

Third, the technical rules on evidence are not binding on the fiscal who has jurisdiction and control over
the conduct of a preliminary investigation. If by its very nature a preliminary investigation could be waived
by the accused, we find no compelling justification for a strict application of the evidentiary rules.

Fourth, the quantum of evidence in preliminary investigations is not akin to those in administrative
proceedings as laid down in the landmark doctrine of Ang Tibay. The quantum of evidence needed in Ang
Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, is greater than the evidence needed in a preliminary investigation to establish
probable cause, or to establish the existence of a prima facie case that would warrant the prosecution of
a case. Ang Tibay refers to “substantial evidence,” while the establishment of probable cause needs “only
more than ‘bare suspicion,’ or ‘less than evidence which would justify . . . conviction’.” In the United States,
from where we borrowed the concept of probable cause, the prevailing definition of probable cause is
this:

In dealing with probable cause, however, as the very name implies, we deal with probabilities. These are
not technical; they are the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and
prudent men, not legal technicians, act. The standard of proof is accordingly correlative to what must be
proved.

Thus, probable cause can be established with hearsay evidence, as long as there is substantial basis for
crediting the hearsay. Hearsay evidence is admissible in determining probable cause in a preliminary
investigation because such investigation is merely preliminary, and does not finally adjudicate rights and
obligations of parties. However, in administrative cases, where rights and obligations are finally
adjudicated, what is required is “substantial evidence” which cannot rest entirely or even partially on
hearsay evidence. Substantial basis is not the same as substantial evidence because substantial evidence
excludes hearsay evidence while substantial basis can include hearsay evidence. To require the application
of Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, in preliminary investigations will change the quantum of evidence
required in determining probable cause from evidence of likelihood or probability of guilt to substantial
evidence of guilt.

Actually, the Ombudsman went beyond legal duty and even furnished Sen. Estrada with copies of the
counter-affidavits of his co-respondents whom he specifically named, as well as the counter-affidavits of
some of other co-respondents. In the 4 June 2014 Joint Order, the Ombudsman even held in abeyance
the disposition of the motions for reconsideration because the Ombudsman granted Sen. Estrada five
days from receipt of the 7 May 2014 Joint Order to formally respond to the claims made by his co-
respondents. The Ombudsman faithfully complied with the existing Rules on preliminary investigation and
even accommodated Sen. Estrada beyond what the Rules required. Thus, the Ombudsman could not be
faulted with grave abuse of discretion. Since this is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65, the Petition
fails in the absence of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Ombudsman.

The constitutional due process requirements mandated in Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, are not
applicable to preliminary investigations which are creations of statutory law giving rise to mere statutory
rights. A law can abolish preliminary investigations without running afoul of the constitutional
requirements of due process as prescribed in Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS. The present procedures for
preliminary investigations do not comply and were never intended to comply, with Ang Tibay, as amplified
in GSIS. Preliminary investigations do not adjudicate with finality rights and obligations of parties, while
administrative investigations governed by Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, so adjudicate.

Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, requires substantial evidence for a decision against the respondent in the
administrative case.In preliminary investigations, only likelihood or probability of guilt is required. To
apply Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, to preliminary investigations will change the quantum of evidence
required to establish probable cause. The respondent in an administrative case governed by Ang Tibay, as
amplified in GSIS, has the right to an actual hearing and to cross-examine the witnesses against him. In
preliminary investigations, the respondent has no such rights.

Also, in an administrative case governed by Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, the hearing officer must be
impartial and cannot be the fact-finder, investigator, and hearing officer at the same time. In preliminary
investigations, the same public officer may be the investigator and hearing officer at the same time, or
the fact-finder, investigator and hearing officer may be under the control and supervision of the same
public officer, like the Ombudsman or Secretary of Justice. This explains why Ang Tibay, as amplified in
GSIS, does not apply to preliminary investigations. To now declare that the guidelines in Ang Tibay, as
amplified in GSIS, are fundamental and essential requirements in preliminary investigations will render all
past and present preliminary investigations invalid for violation of constitutional due process. This will
mean remanding for reinvestigation all criminal cases now pending in all courts throughout the country.
No preliminary investigation can proceed until a new law designates a public officer, outside of the
prosecution service, to determine probable cause. Moreover, those serving sentences by final judgment
would have to be released from prison because their conviction violated constitutional due process.

Thus, petition dismissed for being premature and it constitutes forum shopping.

Guzman vs. National University,

G.R. No. 68288, July 11, 1986, 142 SCRA 699

In Guzman v. National University, G.R. No. 68288, July 11, 1986, 142 SCRA 699, respondent school was
directed to allow the petitioning students to re-enroll or otherwise continue with their respective courses,
without prejudice to any disciplinary proceedings that may be conducted in connection with their
participation in the protests that led to the stoppage of classes.

Facts:

Petitioners Diosdado Guzman, Ulysses Urbiztondo and Ariel Ramacula, students of respondent
National University, have come to this Court to seek relief from what they describe as their school's
"continued and persistent refusal to allow them to enroll." In their petition "for extraordinary legal and
equitable remedies with prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction" dated August 7, 1984, they alleged
that they were denied due to the fact that they were active participation in peaceful mass actions within
the premises of the University.

The respondents on the other hand claimed that the petitioners’ failure to enroll for the first
semester of the school year 1984-1985 is due to their own fault and not because of their alleged exercise
of their constitutional and human rights. That as regards to Guzman, his academic showing was poor due
to his activities in leading boycotts of classes. That Guzman “is facing criminal charges for malicious
mischief before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila in connection with the destruction of properties
of respondent University. The petitioners have “failures in their records, and are not of good scholastic
standing.”

Issue: w/n the petitioners were afforded due process

Held:

Immediately apparent from a reading of respondents' comment and memorandum is the fact
that they had never conducted proceedings of any sort to determine whether or not petitioners-students
had indeed led or participated "in activities within the university premises, conducted without prior
permit from school authorities, that disturbed or disrupted classes therein" 3 or perpetrated acts of
"vandalism, coercion and intimidation, slander, noise barrage and other acts showing disdain for and
defiance of University authority." 4 Parenthetically, the pendency of a civil case for damages and a criminal
case for malicious mischief against petitioner Guzman, cannot, without more, furnish sufficient warrant
for his expulsion or debarment from re-enrollment. Also apparent is the omission of respondents to cite
this Court to any duly published rule of theirs by which students may be expelled or refused re-enrollment
for poor scholastic standing.

There are withal minimum standards which must be met to satisfy the demands of procedural due
process; and these are, that

(1) the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation against them;

(2) they shag have the right to answer the charges against them, with the assistance of counsel, if desired;

(3) they shall be informed of the evidence against them;

(4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and

(5) the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or official designated by the
school authorities to hear and decide the case.

THE PETITION WAS GRANTED AND THE RESPONDENTS ARE DIRECTED TO ALLOW THE PETITIONERS TO RE-
ENROLL WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO ANY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS.

Non v. Dames

[GR 89317, 20 May 1990]

Facts:

Ariel Non, Rex Magana, Alvin Agura, Normandy Occiano, Jorge Dayaon, Lourdes Banares, Bartolome
Ibasco, Emmanuel Barba, Sonny Moreno. Giovani Palma, Joselito Villalon, Luis Santos and Daniel Torres,
students in Mabini Colleges, Inc. in Daet, Camarines Norte, were not allowed to re-enroll by the school for
the academic year 1988-1989 for leading or participating in student mass actions against the school in the
preceding semester. They thus filed a petition in the Regional Trial Court of Daet (Branch 38) seeking their
readmission or re-enrollment to the school, but the trial court dismissed the petition in an order dated 8
August 1988. A motion for reconsideration was filed, but this was denied by the trial court on 24 February
1989; stating that they waived-their privilege to be admitted for re-enrollment with respondent college
when they adopted, signed, and used its enrollment form for the first semester of school year 1988-89.
In addition, for the same semester, they duly signed pledges "to abide and comply with all the rules and
regulations laid down by competent authorities in the College Department or School in which I am
enrolled." Hence, the affected students filed the petition for certiorari with prayer for preliminary
mandatory injunction before the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether the school exclude students because of failing grades when the cause for the action taken
against them relates to possible breaches of discipline.

Held:

The contract between the school and the student is not an ordinary contract. It is imbued with public
interest, considering the high priority given by the Constitution to education and the grant to the State of
supervisory and regulatory powers over all educational institutions. The authority for schools to refuse
enrollment to a student on the ground that his contract, which has a term of one semester, has already
expired, cannot be justified. Still, institutions' discretion on the admission and enrollment of students as
a major component of the academic freedom guaranteed to institutions of higher learning. The right of
an institution of higher learning to set academic standards, however, cannot be utilized to discriminate
against students who exercise their constitutional rights to speech and assembly, for otherwise there will
be a violation of their right to equal protection. Thus, an institution of learning has a contractual obligation
to afford its students a fair opportunity to complete the course they seek to pursue. However, when a
student commits a serious breach of discipline or fails to maintain the required academic standard, he
forfeits his contractual right; and the court should not review the discretion of university authorities.
Excluding students because of failing grades when the cause for the action taken against them undeniably
related to possible breaches of discipline not only is a denial of due process but also constitutes a violation
of the basic tenets of fair play. Further, the failures in one or two subjects by some cannot be considered
marked academic deficiency. Neither can the academic deficiency be gauged from the academic standards
of the school due to insufficiency of information. Herein, the students could have been subjected to
disciplinary proceedings in connection with the mass actions, but the penalty that could have been
imposed must be commensurate to the offense committed and it must be imposed only after the
requirements of procedural due process have been complied with (Paragraph 145, Manual of Regulations
for Private Schools). But this matter of disciplinary proceedings and the imposition of administrative
sanctions have become moot and academic; as the students have been refused readmission or re-
enrollment and have been effectively excluded from for 4 semesters, have already been more than
sufficiently penalized for any breach of discipline they might have committed when they led and
participated in the mass actions that resulted in the disruption of classes. To still subject them to
disciplinary proceedings would serve no useful purpose and would only further aggravate the strained
relations between the students and the officials of the school which necessarily resulted from the heated
legal battle.
ATENEO DE MANILA UNIVERSITY VS. HON. JUDGE IGNACIO CAPULONG 222 SCRA 644; G.R. 99327; 27
MAY 1993

Facts:

Leonardo H. Villa, a first year law student of Petitioner University, died of serious physical injuries at
Chinese General Hospital after the initiation rites of Aquila Legis. Bienvenido Marquez was also
hospitalized at the Capitol Medical Center. Petitioner Dean Cynthia del Castillo created a Joint
Administration-Faculty-Student Investigating Committee which was tasked to investigate and submit a
report within 72 hours on the circumstances surrounding the death of Lennie Villa. Said notice also
required respondent students to submit their written statements within twenty-four (24) hours from
receipt. Although respondent students received a copy of the written notice, they failed to file a reply. In
the meantime, they were placed on preventive suspension. The Investigating Committee found a prima
facie case against respondent students for violation of Rule 3 of the Law School Catalogue entitled
"Discipline."

Respondent students were then required to file their written answers to the formal charge. Petitioner
Dean created a Disciplinary Board to hear the charges against respondent students. The Board found
respondent students guilty of violating Rules on Discipline which prohibits participation in hazing
activities. However, in view of the lack of unanimity among the members of the Board on the penalty of
dismissal, the Board left the imposition of the penalty to the University Administration. Accordingly, Fr.
Bernas imposed the penalty of dismissal on all respondent students. Respondent students filed with RTC
Makati a TRO since they are currently enrolled. This was granted. A day after the expiration of the
temporary restraining order, Dean del Castillo created a Special Board to investigate the charges of hazing
against respondent students Abas and Mendoza. This was requested to be stricken out by the respondents
and argued that the creation of the Special Board was totally unrelated to the original petition which
alleged lack of due process. This was granted and reinstatement of the students was ordered.

Issue: Was there denial of due process against the respondent students.

Held:

There was no denial of due process, more particularly procedural due process. The Dean of the Ateneo
Law School, notified and required respondent students to submit their written statement on the incident.
Instead of filing a reply, respondent students requested through their counsel, copies of the charges. The
nature and cause of the accusation were adequately spelled out in petitioners' notices. Present is the twin
elements of notice and hearing.

The Minimum standards to be satisfied in the imposition of disciplinary sanctions in academic

institutions, such as petitioner university herein, thus:

(1) the students must be informed in WRITING of the nature and cause of any accusation against them;

(2) that they shall have the right to answer the charges against them with the assistance of counsel, if
desired:

(3) they shall be informed of the evidence against them

(4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and
(5) the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or official designated by the
school authorities to hear and decide the case.

It cannot seriously be asserted that the above requirements were not met. When, in view of the death of
Leonardo Villa, petitioner Cynthia del Castillo, as Dean of the Ateneo Law School, notified and required
respondent students on February 11, 1991 to submit within twenty-four hours their written statement on
the incident, the records show that instead of filing a reply, respondent students requested through their
counsel, copies of the charges. While of the students mentioned in the February 11, 1991 notice duly
submitted written statements, the others failed to do so. Thus, the latter were granted an extension of up
to February 18, 1991 to file their statements . Indubitably, the nature and cause of the accusation were
adequately spelled out in petitioners' notices dated February 14 and 20, 1991. 30 It is to be noted that
the February 20, 1991 letter which quoted Rule No. 3 of its Rules of Discipline as contained in the Ateneo
Law School Catalogue was addressed individually to respondent students. Petitioners' notices/letters
dated February 11, February 14 and 20 clearly show that respondent students were given ample
opportunity to adduce evidence in their behalf and to answer the charges leveled against them.

The requisite assistance of counsel was met when, from the very start of the investigations before the Joint
Administration Faculty- Student Committee, the law firm of Gonzales Batiler and Bilog and Associates put
in its appearance and filed pleadings in behalf of respondent students.

Respondent students may not use the argument that since they were not accorded the opportunity to
see and examine the written statements which became the basis of petitioners' February 14, 1991 order,
they were denied procedural due process. Granting that they were denied such opportunity, the same
may not be said to detract from the observance of due process, for disciplinary cases involving students
need not necessarily include the right to cross examination. An ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDING
conducted to investigate students' participation in a hazing activity need not be clothed with the attributes
of a judicial proceeding. A closer examination of the March 2, 1991 hearing which characterized the rules
on the investigation as being summary in nature and that respondent students have no righ t to examine
affiants-neophytes, reveals that this is but a reiteration of our previous ruling in Alcuaz . Respondent
students' contention that the investigating committee failed to consider their evidence is far from the
truth because the February 14, 1992 ordered clearly states that it was reached only after receiving the
written statements and hearing the testimonies of several witnesses. Similarly, the Disciplinary Board's
resolution dated March 10, 1991 was preceded by a hearing on March 2, 1991 wherein respondent
students were summoned to answer clarificatory questions.

UP vs. Ligot-Telan

227 SCRA 342 G.R. No. 110280 October 12, 1993

Facts:

In an effort to make the University of the Philippines (U.P.) truly the University of the People, U.P.
administration conceptualized and implemented the socialized scheme of tuition fee payments through
the Socialized Tuition Fee and Assistance Program (STFAP), popularly known as the "Iskolar ng Bayan"
program. After broad consultations with the various university constituencies, U.P. President Jose V.
Abueva, the U.P. Board of Regents issued on April 28, 1988 a Resolution establishing the STFAP. A
year later, it was granted official recognition when the Congress of the Philippines allocated a portion of
the National Budget for the implementation of the program. In the interest of democratizing admission
to the State University, all students are entitled to apply for STFAP benefits which include reduction in
fees, living and book subsidies and student assistantships which give undergraduate students the
opportunity to earn P12.00 per hour by working for the University. Applicants are required to accomplish
a questionnaire where, among others, they state the amount and source of the annual income of the
family, their real and personal properties and special circumstances from which the University may
evaluate their financial status and need on the basis of which they are categorized into brackets. To further
insure the integrity of the program, a random sampling scheme of verification of data indicated in a
student's application form is undertaken. Among those who applied for STFAP benefits for School Year
1989-90 was Ramon P. Nadal, a student enrolled in the College of Law. A team composed of Arsenio L.
Dona and Jose Carlo Manalo conducted a home investigation at the residence of Nadal. Ms. Cristeta
Packing, Nadal's aunt, was interviewed and the team submitted a home visit report. Consolacion
Urbino, Scholarship Affairs Officer II, found discrepancies between the report and Nadal's application
form. Forthwith, she and Bella M. Villanueva, head of the Office of Scholarships and Student
Services, presented the matter to the Diliman Committee on Scholarships and Financial Assistance.
In compliance with the said Committee's directive, Bella Villanueva wrote Nadal informing him that the
investigation showed that he had failed to declare, not only the fact that he had been maintaining a 1977
Corolla car which was owned by his brother but also the income of his mother who was supporting his
brothers Antonio and Federico. Nadal was likewise informed that the Diliman Committee had reclassified
him to Bracket 9 (from Bracket 4), retroactive to June 1989, unless he could submit "proofs to the
contrary." Nadal was required "to pay back the equivalent amount of full school fees" with "interest based
on current commercial rates." Failure to settle his account would mean the suspension of his
registration privileges and the withholding of clearance and transcript of records. He was also warned
that his case might be referred to the Student Disciplinary Tribunal for further investigation.
commercial rates." Failure to settle his account would mean the suspension of his registration privileges
and the withholding of clearance and transcript of records. He was also warned that his case might be
referred to the Student Disciplinary Tribunal for further investigation. Nadal issued a certification stating,
among other things, that his mother migrated to the United States in 1981 but because her residency
status had not yet been legalized, she had not been able to find a "stable, regular, well-paying
employment." U.P. charged Nadal before the Student Disciplinary Tribunal (SDT) that he committed
acts which find him guilty of willfully and deliberately withholding information about the income of his
mother, who is living abroad and that he was maintaining a Toyota Corolla car. As such, the SDT
imposed upon Nadal the penalty of expulsion from the University and required him to reimburse all
STFAP benefits he had received but if he does not voluntarily make reimbursement, it shall be "effected”
by the University thru outside legal action. The SDT decision was thereafter automatically elevated to
the Executive Committee of U.P. Diliman for review pursuant to Sec. 20 of the U.P. Rules on Student
Conduct and Discipline. Board of regents modified the penalty from Expulsion to One Year- Suspension,
effective immediately, plus reimbursement of all benefits received from the STFAP, with legal interest.
However the BOR also decided against giving Nadal, a certification of good moral character. Nadal
forthwith filed a motion for reconsideration of the BOR decision, in the next BOR meeting Regent Antonio
T. Carpio raised the "material importance" of the truth of Nadal's claim that earlier, he was a beneficiary
of a scholarship and financial aid from the Ateneo de Manila University (AdeMU). Learning that the
"certification issued by the AdeMU that it had not given Nadal financial aid while he was a student there
was made through a telephone call," Regent Carpio declared that there was as yet "no direct evidence in
the records to substantiate the charge." According to Carpio, if it should be disclosed that Nadal falsely
stated that he received such financial aid, it would be a clear case of gross and material misrepresentation
that would even warrant the penalty of expulsion. Hence, he cast a conditional vote that would depend
on the verification of Nadal's claim on the matter. U.P. President and concurrently Regent Jose V.
Abueva countered by stating that "a decision should not be anchored solely on one piece of information
which he considered irrelevant, and which would ignore the whole pattern of the respondent's
dishonesty and deception from 1989 which had been established in the investigation and the
reviews."In the morning of March 29, 1993, the AdeMU issued a certification to the effect that Nadal was
indeed a recipient of a scholarship grant from 1979 to 1983. That evening, the BOR met again at a special
meeting, according to Regent Carpio, in executive session, the BOR found Nadal "guilty." However,
on April 22, 1993, Nadal filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a petition for mandamus with
preliminary injunction and prayer for a temporary restraining order against President Abueva, the BOR,
Oscar M. Alfonso, Cesar A. Buenaventura, Armand V. Fabella and Olivia C. Caoili.

Issue: Whether or not the Board of Regent violated Nadal's right to due process when it rendered a
decision finding Nadal guilty of the charges against him" during the March 29, 1993 meeting.

Held:

With respect to the March 29, 1993 meeting, respondent considers the same as "unquestionably
void for lack of due process" inasmuch as he was not sent a notice of said meeting, that imposition of
sanctions on students requires "observance of procedural due process," the phrase obviously referring
to the sending of notice of the meeting. However BOR ruled that in any event it is gross error to equate
due process in the instant case with the sending of notice of the March 29, 1993 BOR meeting to
respondent. University rules do not require the attendance in BOR meetings of individuals whose cases
are included as items on the agenda of the Board. This is not exclusive of students whose disciplinary cases
have been appealed to the Board of Regents as the final review body. At no time did respondent
complain of lack of notice given to him to attend any of the regular and special BOR meetings where his
case was up for deliberation. Counsel for Nadal charged before the lower court that Nadal was not given
due process in the March 29 meeting because the ground upon which he was again convicted was not the
same as the original charge. Obviously, he was referring to the basis of the conditional votes on March 28.
Whether or not Nadal was telling the truth when he claimed that he received a scholarship grant from
the AdeMU. However, Regent Carpio himself testified that the charge considered was "exactly the
same charge" of withholding information on the income of Nadal's mother. It should be stressed that the
reason why Regent Carpio requested a verification of Nadal's claim that he was a scholar at the AdeMU
was that Regent Carpio was not "morally convinced" yet as to the guilt of Nadal. In other words, he sought
additional insights into the character of Nadal through the information that would be obtained from
the AdeMU. The Court in this regard find such information to be irrelevant and a mere superfluity. In his
July, 12, 1991 certification aforementioned, Nadal admitted, although inconsistently, that his mother was
a "TNT" who could not find a "stable, regular, well-paying employment" but that she was supporting the
education of his brothers with the help of another son. The court constitutes this as a sufficient admission
that Nadal withheld information on the income, however measly and irregular, of his mother. The
court also sighted that respondent aspires to join the ranks of the professionals who would uphold truth
at all costs so that justice may prevail. In those who exhibit duplicity in their student days, one spots the
shady character who is bound to sow the seeds of chicanery in the practice of his profession. With this
the court ruled that it sufficiently shown that respondent has committed an act of dishonesty in
withholding vital information in connection with his application for STFAP benefits, all in blatant
violation of the Rules and Regulations on Student Conduct and Discipline of petitioner University, the
latter's inherent power and authority to impose disciplinary sanction may be invoked and rightfully
exercised. Therefore deciding that the BOR did not violate Nadal’s right of due process. The lower court
is hereby ordered to DISMISS the petition for mandamus.

Lao Gi v CA (1989)

180 SCRA 756

Facts

Filomeno Chia Jr. was made a Filipino citizen by virtue of Opinion 191 by the Secretary of justice. However,
this was revoked when his father’s citizenship was cast aside due to fraud and misrepresentation. Charges
of deportation were filed against the Chias. Charges also alleged that they refused to register as aliens
and that they committed acts of undesirability. The Chias said that the CID has no authority to deport
them which was denied by the CID. They filed a petition with the Supreme Court for a writ of preliminary
injunction which was dismissed for lack of merit. Their MFR was also denied.

Earlier, Manuel Chia’s case of falsification of public documents in alleging he was a Filipino citizen. He was
alleged to have done this for the sale of real property. The trial court acquitted him by saying that Opinion
191 was res judicata and cant be contravened by Opinion 147. The CID set the hearing for the deportation
case against the Chias and told them to register as aliens. The Chias tooks further action. Their petition
for injunctive relief was denied by the CFI of Manila. They also lost the appeal in the CA. The Chias was
denied.

In their SC petition, they seek to set aside the CA decision. They argued that they weren’t subject to
immediate deportation, the presence of fraud in the citizenship, the CA’s overstepping of appellate
jurisdiction, and the resolution of the SC didn’t make a ruling that the petitioner entered the Philippines
by false pretenses.

Issue: Does the CID have the jurisdiction to determine the deportation?

Held: Yes. Petition granted Hearing must be continued to determine if they are really aliens

Ratio:

Section 37 of the Immigration act states:

SEC. 37. (a) The following aliens shall be arrested upon the warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration
or of any other officer designated by him for the purpose and deported upon the warrant of the
Commissioner of Immigration after a determination by the Board of Commissioners of the existence of
the ground for deportation as charged against the alien:

(1) Any alien who enters the Philippines after the effective date of this Act by means of false and
misleading statements or without inspection and admission by the immigration authorities at a
designated port of entry or at any place other than at a designated port of entry. (As amended by Sec. 13,
Rep. Act No. 503.) ...

There must be a determination of the existence of the ground charged, particularly illegal entry into the
country. Only after the hearing can the alien be deported. Also, there must be appositive finding from the
CID that they are aliens before compelling them to register as such. This power is the police power to
protect the state from undesirable aliens injurious to the public good.

Since the deportation is a harsh process, due process must be observed. In the same law, it is provided
that:

No alien shall be deported without being informed of the specific grounds for deportation nor without
being given a hearing under rules of procedure to be prescribed by the Commissioner of Immigration.

The acts or omissions that they are charged of must be in ordinary language for the person to be informed
and for the CID to make a proper judgment. Also, the warrants of arrewst must be in accordance with the
rules on criminal procedure.

On the information of a private prosecutor in the case: Deportation is the sole concern of the state. There
is no justification for a private party to intervene.

COMMISSIONER DOMINGO VS. SCHEER G.R. No. 154745. January 29, 2004

FACTS:

Herbert Markus Emil Scheer, a German, was given permanent status to reside in the Philippines on July
18, 1986. He married a Filipina and have 3 children. He also opened a restaurant in Puerto Prinsesa.

One day, the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID) received information that Scheer was wanted
by the German Federal Police that a warrant of arrest had been issued against him.

The BOC thereafter issued a Summary Deportation against Scheer.

In issuing the said order, the BOC relied on the correspondence from the German Vice-Consul on its
speculation that it was unlikely that the German Embassy will issue a new passport to the respondent; on
the warrant of arrest issued by the District Court of Germany against the respondent for insurance fraud;
and on the alleged illegal activities of the respondent in Palawan. The BOC concluded that the respondent
was not only an undocumented but an undesirable alien as well.

When the respondent was apprised of the deportation order, he forthwith aired his side to then BID
Commissioner Leandro T. Verceles. The Commissioner allowed the respondent to remain in the
Philippines, giving the latter time to secure a clearance and a new passport from the German Embassy.

Respondent filed an MR. However, the BOC did not resolve the respondent's motion. The respondent was
neither arrested nor deported.

Meanwhile, on February 15, 1996, the District Court of Straubing rendered a Decision dismissing the
criminal case against the respondent for physical injuries. The German Embassy in Manila, thereafter,
issued a temporary passport to the respondent.
In a Letter dated March 1, 1996, the respondent informed Commissioner Verceles that his passport had
been renewed following the dismissal of the said criminal case. He reiterated his request for the
cancellation of the Summary Deportation Order dated September 27, 1995, and the restoration of his
permanent resident status.[19] Subsequently, on March 12, 1996, the German Embassy issued to the
respondent a regular passport, to expire on March 11, 2006.

The BOC still failed to resolve the respondent's Urgent Motion for Reconsideration. Commissioner
Verceles did not respond to the respondents March 1, 1996, Letter.

The respondent remained in the Philippines and maintained his business in Palawan. On March 20, 1997,
the Department of Labor and Employment approved his application for Alien Employment Registration
Certificate as manager of the Bavaria Restaurant in Puerto Princesa City.

In the meantime, petitioner Immigration Commissioner Andrea T. Domingo assumed office. She wrote
the German Embassy and inquired if the respondent was wanted by the German police. On April 12, 2002,
the German Embassy replied that the respondent was not so wanted.

At about midnight on June 6, 2002, Marine operatives and BID agents apprehended the respondent in his
residence on orders of the petitioner. He was whisked to the BID Manila Office and there held in custody
while awaiting his deportation. Despite entreaties from the respondent's wife and his employees, the
petitioner refused to release the respondent.

Shocked at the sudden turn of events, the respondent promptly communicated with his lawyer. The latter
filed with the BID a motion for bail to secure the respondent's temporary liberty.

On June 11, 2002, the respondent's counsel filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari,
prohibition, and mandamus with a prayer for temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary
injunction, to enjoin the petitioner from proceeding with the respondent's deportation.

The respondent (petitioner therein) alleged, inter alia, that his arrest and detention were premature,
unjust, wrongful, illegal and unconstitutional, effected without sufficient cause and without jurisdiction
or with grave abuse of discretion. He asserted that there was no speedy remedy open to him in the
ordinary course of law and that his Urgent Motion for Reconsideration of the Summary Deportation Order
of the BOC had not yet been resolved despite the lapse of more than six years.

The respondent averred that he was a fully documented alien, a permanent resident and a law-abiding
citizen.

CA issued a status quo order restraining the petitioner from deporting the respondent on a bond of
P100,000.00.

BOC issued an Omnibus Resolution dated June 14, 2002, pendente lite denying the respondents Urgent
Motion for Reconsideration, Motion for Bail/Recognizance.

On August 20, 2002, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision in favor of the respondent granting his
petition for certiorari and prohibition and permanently enjoining the petitioner from deporting the
respondent.
ISSUE:

1. WON the Board of Commissioners is an indispensable party.

2. WON the the Non-joinder of an Indispensable Party is a Ground for the Dismissal of the Petition

3. WON The CA had Jurisdiction Over the Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus

HELD:

2. YES. The BOC is an Indispensable Party. We agree with the petitioner's contention that the BOC was an
indispensable party to the respondents' petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus in the Court of
Appeals. The respondent was arrested and detained on the basis of the Summary Deportation Order of
the BOC. The petitioner caused the arrest of the respondent in obedience to the said Deportation Order.
The respondent, in his Memorandum, prayed that the CA annul not only the Summary Deportation Order
of the BOC but also the latter's Omnibus Resolution, and, thus, order the respondents immediate release.
The respondent also prayed that the CA issue a writ of mandamus for the immediate resolution of his
Urgent Motion for Reconsideration. The said motion had to be resolved by the BOC as the order sought
to be resolved and reconsidered was issued by it and not by the petitioner alone. The powers and duties
of the BOC may not be exercised by the individual members of the Commission.

2. NO. Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, as amended, requires indispensable parties to be joined as
plaintiffs or defendants. The joinder of indispensable parties is mandatory. Without the presence of
indispensable parties to the suit, the judgment of the court cannot attain real finality. Strangers to a case
are not bound by the judgment rendered by the court. The absence of an indispensable party renders all
subsequent actions of the court null and void. Lack of authority to act not only of the absent party but
also as to those present. The responsibility of impleading all the indispensable parties rests on the
petitioner/plaintiff.

However, the non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for the dismissal of an action. Parties
may be added by order of the court on motion of the party or on its own initiative at any stage of the
action and/or such times as are just. If the petitioner/plaintiff refuses to implead an indispensable party
despite the order of the court, the latter may dismiss the complaint/petition for the petitioner/plaintiffs
failure to comply therefor.The remedy is to implead the non-party claimed to be indispensable. In this
case, the CA did not require the respondent (petitioner therein) to implead the BOC as respondent but
merely relied on the rulings of the Court in Vivo v. Arca, and Vivo v. Cloribel. The CAs reliance on the said
rulings is, however, misplaced. The acts subject of the petition in the two cases were those of the
Immigration Commissioner and not those of the BOC; hence, the BOC was not a necessary nor even an
indispensable party in the aforecited cases.

3. YES. The settled rule is that the authority to exclude or expel aliens by a power affecting international
relation is vested in the political department of the government, and is to be regulated by treaty or by an
act of Congress, and to be executed by the executive authority according to the regulations so established,
except in so far as the judicial department has been authorized by treaty or by statute, or is required by
the Constitution to intervene. The judicial department cannot properly express an opinion upon the
wisdom or the justice of the measures executed by Congress in the exercise of the power conferred on it,
by statute or as required by the Constitution. Congress may, by statute, allow the decision or order of the
Immigration Commissioner or the BOC to be reviewed by the President of the Philippines or by the courts,
on the grounds and in the manner prescribed by law.

Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution has vested judicial power in the Supreme Court and the lower
courts such as the Court of Appeals, as established by law. Although the courts are without power to
directly decide matters over which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or
executive branch of the government and are not empowered to execute absolutely their own judgment
from that of Congress or of the President, the Court may look into and resolve questions of whether or
not such judgment has been made with grave abuse of discretion, when the act of the legislative or
executive department violates the law or the Constitution. In Harvy Bridges v. I.F. Wixon, the United States
Federal Supreme Court reversed an Order of Deportation made by the Attorney General for insufficiency
of evidence and for improper admission of evidence. In Nging v. Nagh,the United States Court of Appeals
(9th Circuit Court) held that conclusions of administrative offices on the issues of facts are invulnerable in
courts unless when they are not rendered by fair-minded men; hence, are arbitrary. In Toon v. Stump, the
Court ruled that courts may supervise the actions of the administrative offices authorized to deport aliens
and reverse their rulings when there is no evidence to sustain them. When acts or omissions of a quasi-
judicial agency are involved, a petition for certiorari or prohibition may be filed in the Court of Appeals as
provided by law or by the Rules of Court, as amended.

In this case, the respondent alleges that the petitioner acted arbitrarily, contrary to law and with grave
abuse of discretion in causing his arrest and detention at a time when his Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration of the BOCs Summary Deportation Order had yet to be resolved. There was no factual or
legal basis for his deportation considering that he was a documented alien and a law-abiding citizen; the
respondent, thus, prayed for a writ of mandamus to compel the petitioner, the Chairperson of the BOC,
to resolve the said motion. The petition before the CA did not involve the act or power of the President
of the Philippines to deport or exclude an alien from the country. This being so, the petition necessarily
did not call for a substitution of the Presidents discretion on the matter of the deportation of the
respondent with that of the judgment of the CA.

Philcomsat vs Alcuaz

180 SCRA 218

Facts:

By virtue of Republic Act No. 5514, the Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation (PHILCOMSAT)
was granted the authority to “construct and operate such ground facilities as needed to deliver
telecommunications services from the communications satellite system and ground terminal or
terminals” in the Philippines. PHILCOMSAT provides satellite services to companies like Globe Mackay
(now Globe) and PLDT.

Under Section 5 of the same law, PHILCOMSAT was exempt from the jurisdiction, control and regulation
of the Public Service Commission later known as the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC).
However, Executive Order No. 196 was later promulgated and the same has placed PHILCOMSAT under
the jurisdiction of the NTC. Consequently, PHILCOMSAT has to acquire permit to operate from the NTC in
order to continue operating its existing satellites. NTC gave the necessary permit but it however directed
PHILCOMSAT to reduce its current rates by 15%. NTC based its power to fix the rates on EO 546.

PHILCOMSAT now sues NTC and its commissioner (Jose Luis Alcuaz) assailed the said directive and holds
that the enabling act (EO 546) of the NTC, empowering it to fix rates for public service communications,
does not provide the necessary standards which were constitutionally required, hence, there is an undue
delegation of legislative power, particularly the adjudicatory powers of NTC. PHILCOMSAT asserts that
nowhere in the provisions of EO 546, providing for the creation of NTC and granting its rate-fixing powers,
nor of EO 196, placing PHILCOMSAT under the jurisdiction of NTC, can it be inferred that NTC is guided
by any standard in the exercise of its rate-fixing and adjudicatory powers. PHILCOMSAT subsequently
clarified its said submission to mean that the order mandating a reduction of certain rates is undue
delegation not of legislative but of quasi-judicial power to NTC, the exercise of which allegedly requires
an express conferment by the legislative body.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is an undue delegation of power.

HELD:

No. There is no undue delegation. The power of the NTC to fix rates is limited by the requirements of
public safety, public interest, reasonable feasibility and reasonable rates, which conjointly more than
satisfy the requirements of a valid delegation of legislative power. Fundamental is the rule that delegation
of legislative power may be sustained only upon the ground that some standard for its exercise is provided
and that the legislature in making the delegation has prescribed the manner of the exercise of the
delegated power.

Therefore, when the administrative agency concerned, NTC in this case, establishes a rate, its act must
both be non-confiscatory and must have been established in the manner prescribed by the legislature;
otherwise, in the absence of a fixed standard, the delegation of power becomes unconstitutional. In case
of a delegation of rate-fixing power, the only standard which the legislature is required to prescribe for
the guidance of the administrative authority is that the rate be reasonable and just. However, it has been
held that even in the absence of an express requirement as to reasonableness, this standard may be
implied.

However, in this case, it appears that the manner of fixing the rates was done without due process since
no hearing was made in ascertaining the rate imposed upon PHILCOMSAT.