INTERPRETATION OF

STATUTE

ASSIGMENT

CASE LAWS REGARDING THE GENERAL RULES OF

THE INTERPRETATION
SUBMITTED BY

SAMRA NAZ

REGISTARTION NUM

4288-FSL-LLB-F14

SUBMITTED TO

MAM MEHREEN

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 1990 MLD 1293 SC (AJ&K)at P-1309

Present: Raja Muhammad Khurshid Khan, CJ. And

Sardar Said Muhammad Khan, J.

MUHAMMAD AYUB—Appellant

versus

ABDUAL KHALID—Responded

(Decided on 22.01.1990)

 CASE SUMMARY:

The brief fact are that a case was registered against the responded under section
10,11 and 16 of the offence of Zina Ordinance, and was subsequently was tried by the Tehsil
criminal court Dudyal. The responded was acquitted of the charge under section 10 of the
ordinance but was convicted and sentenced for the offences falling under section 11/16 of the
ordinance and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment he was awarded 3 months rigorous
imprisonment and was also fined Rs.500 on each count. Two appeals were preferred to the
district criminal court against the judgment of the trial court, one is by Muhammad Ayub and
the other appeal was filed by Abdul Khalid his conviction under section 10 and 16 of the
ordinance. The District Criminal Court disposed of both the appeals by a single order
whereby the appeal filed by responded Abdul Khalid was accepted and the appeal of
Muhammad Ayub was dismissed. An appeal against the judgment of the District Criminal
Court was preferred to the Shariat Court by the appellant. The learned Judges of the Shariat
court dismissed the appeal on the ground that an appeal against the order of acquittal in view
of the provisions contained in section 25(2) of the ordinance could be preferred only by the
state and not by a private party.

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 The learned counsel for the appellant that the Shariat Court has taken an erroneous
view of the statutory provisions contained in the Islamic Penal Law Enforcement Act, 1974.
He has contended that the Islamic Penal Laws Act is a self-contained code which does not
stipulate any acquittal is competent only by the state and not by the private party. The
provision regarding the right of appeal against an order of acquittal or conviction was
dropped by the state.

He has further argued that in case of acquittal by the Tehsil Criminal Court the
appeal was competent to the district court not to the Shariat Court through the amendment.
He has contended that the amendment during the pendency of the appeals could not affect the
legal proceeding and the District Criminal Court continuous the possess the jurisdiction to
decide the same in view of the provisions contained in section 6 of General Clauses Act.

The learned counsel for the responded has argue that in case of acquittal a private
party is competent to prefer an appeal the provisions of section Cr.P.C were rightly resorted
to by the Shariat Court under section 32of the Islamic Penal Laws Act, 1974.

This case was heard by one chief justice and one other judge. The court held that
the appeal filed by the complainant and the responded in the Shariat Court were competent
and the Islamic Penal Laws Act, 1974 was not amended. The provisions contained in the
Islamic Penal Laws Act, 1974 as amendment from time to time an appeal in case of acquittal
is competent only by the state to the District Criminal Court, Shariat Court or to this court or
the complainant has also right to file an appeal against the order of acquittal. And the right of
appeal is not procedural right but a substantive right.

An order of acquittal passed by the Tehsil Criminal Court could only be preferred
by the state. It only envisages that appeal against an order acquittal would be preferred to the
Shariat Court within six months. An amendment made in section 25 of the Islamic Penal
Laws Act did not take away the right of a private party to file an appeal against an order of
acquittal only forum of appeal was changed from District Criminal Court to Shariat Court.
The Islamic Penal Laws act was made whereby the original provision that an appeal against

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the order of acquittal could be filed but the public prosecutor on the direction of the
government was dropped and thud ambiguity, if any, was removed.

The legislature intended that in case of acquittal by any of the courts established
under the provisions of the Islamic Penal Laws Act the rights of appeal would be available
only to the state, it would have to specially said to. It follow from what has been stated above
that the complainant or any other aggrieved person has right of appeal against an order
passed by the Tehsil Criminal Court, the District Criminal Court or Shariat Court,
irrespective of the fact whether the same was an order of acquittal and conviction.

The plain reading of section 25 of the Islamic Penal Laws Act cannot be interpreted
to place an embargo on the right of private party to file an appeal against the order of
acquittal. The argument by the learned counsel for the responded that as there is no specific
provision in section 25 giving right to a private party to file an appeal.

The appeal against the order of the Shariat Court to this court by the private party
concerned it may be observed that under section 42 (2) of the Interim Constitution Act, the
same can also be conferred by any other law. As has already been stated in section 25 of the
Islamic Penal Law Act, invests this court to exercise appellate jurisdiction against an order of
Shariat Court irrespective of the fact that the order was that of acquittal or conviction, the
provision of a Code of Criminal Procedure does not apply regarding the appellate
jurisdiction of this court and thus any reference to section 417, Cr.p.c. is not relevant.

The chief justice was of the opinion that a private party or the complainant is not
competent to prefer an appeal because the statute gives the rights only to the state and the
court is not entitled to read the words into an Act of legislature giving the private person such
right. If the legislature mistakenly did not mention the right of the private party the court
have no right to remove the provisions as through resorting to section 417 of Cr.PC under
section 32(2) of the IPL 1974, in this case.

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 He stated that the judgment of the Shariat Court regarding the appeal of the
appellant shall be upheld as it was incompetently filed by the complainant or aggrieved party.

In view of different opinion between the two judges according to rules the opinion
of chief justice prevailed. The appeal before the Shariat Court against the acquittal order
passed by the District Criminal Court was in competently filed by the complainant. Thus the
judgment passed by the Shariat Court the appeal stands dismissed.

 GENERAL RULES OF INTERPRETATION:

The general rules of interpretation stated by the Supreme Court of Pakistan while deciing this
case. The supreme court stated the general rules of interpretation and said:-
1) The first object of the court to discover the intention of the author and that such
intention is to be gathered from the words used in the statute of document.
2) The intention of the legislature in enacting a statute ought to be derived from a
consideration of the whole enactment in order to arrive at a consistent plan. It is
wrong a start with some of priori idea of that intention and to try construction to
wedge it into the words of the statute.
3) A statute may not be extended to meet case for which provision has clearly and
undoubtedly not been made.
4) Whenever there is a particular enactment and a general enactment in the same statute
and the latter taken in its most comprehensive sense, would overrule the former the
particular enactment must be operative, and the general enactment must be taken to
effect only the other part of the statute to which may properly apply.
5) The fundamental principle of constitutional construction has always been to give
effect to the intent of the framers of the organic law and the people adopting it.
6) Another elementary rule of construction of constitutional instruments is that effect
should be given to every part and every word of the constitution. Hence as a general
rule the courts should avoid a construction which renders any provision meaningless
or inoperative and must lean in favor of a construction which will render every word
operative rather than one which may make some words idle and nugatory.

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 7) The next rule in construing a constitutional provision is that is the duty of the court to
have recourse to the whole instrument, if necessary to ascertain the true intent and
meaning of any particular provision. The best mode of ascertaining the meaning
affixed to any word or sentence by deliberative body is by comparing it with the
words and sentences with the context. Nosciture a sociis is the rule of construction
applied to all written instruments.
8) If there be any apparent repugnancy between different provisions the court should
harmonize them if possible. The rule of construction of constitutional law requires
that two sections to be construed ,if possible as not to create repugnancy but that both
be allowed to stand, and that effect be given to each.
9) The court has to interpret the law as it has been enacted and not as what it would have
been.
10) In order to prevent conflict between two sections, the two sections must be read
together and the language of one interpreted and where necessary modified by that of
the other. In this way, it may be possible to arrive at a reasonable and practical
construction of the language of the sections so as to reconcile the respective notion
they contain and give effect to all of them.
11) Where an omission in an act flowed from forgetfulness of the draftsman or was
intentional it is no concern of the courts to make up such deficiency.
12) Where the statute’s meaning is clear and explicit, the words cannot be interpreted.
13) Every word used in the statute is intended to have some effect and no words to be
considered as superfluous or redundant.

It would appear that one of the cardinal principles of interpretations is that the law should be
interpreted in such manner that it should rather be saved then destroyed. The law including the
constitution must be interpreted in a broad liberal manner giving effect to all its parts and the
presumption should be that no conflict or repugnancy was intended by the farmers.

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