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Final Crim2
CRIMINAL LAW 2
SUBMITTED TO:
SUBMITTED BY:
Arbitrary Detention as defined and penalized under Article 124 of the Revised Penal
Code, based on mere speculations, surmises and conjectures and, worse,
notwithstanding the Affidavit of Desistance executed by the five (5) complaining witnesses
wherein the latter categorically declared petitioners innocence of the crime charged.
Arbitrary Detention is committed by any public officer or employee who, without legal
grounds, detains a person. The elements of the crime are:
In the case of People v. Acosta,2 which involved the illegal detention of a child, we found
the accused-appellant therein guilty of kidnapping despite the lack of evidence to show
that any physical restraint was employed upon the victim. However, because the victim
was a boy of tender age and he was warned not to leave until his godmother, the accused-
appellant, had returned, he was practically a captive in the sense that he could not leave
because of his fear to violate such instruction.
In the case of People v. Cortez,3 we held that, in establishing the intent to deprive the
victim of his liberty, it is not necessary that the offended party be kept within an enclosure
to restrict her freedom of locomotion. At the time of her rescue, the offended party in said
case was found outside talking to the owner of the house where she had been taken. She
explained that she did not attempt to leave the premises for fear that the kidnappers would
make good their threats to kill her should she do so. We ruled therein that her fear was
not baseless as the kidnappers knew where she resided and they had earlier announced
that their intention in looking for her cousin was to kill him on sight. Thus, we concluded
that fear has been known to render people immobile and that appeals to the fears of an
individual, such as by threats to kill or similar threats, are equivalent to the use of actual
force or violence.4
1II Reyes, The Revised Penal Code 43 (14th ed. 1998); citing U.S. v. Braganza, 10 Phil. 79 [1908] and Milo v. Salanga, G.R. No.
37007, 20 July 1987, 152 SCRA 113 (emphasis in the original).
3 381 Phil. 345 [2000]; citing People v. Dela Cruz, 342 Phil. 854 [1997] and People v. Ramos, 358 Phil. 261 [1998].
4 Id.; citing People v. Hope, 177 N.E. 402, 257 N.Y. 147.
CASE #2: FELICIANO GALVANTE v. ORLANDO C. CASIMIRO
GR No. 162808 Apr 22, 2008
Grave Abuse of Discretion
Grave Threats
The Solicitor General aptly pointed out that the same is based merely on petitioner's
bare allegation that private respondents aimed their firearms at him. 6 Such bare
allegations stands no chance against the well-entrenched rule applicable in this, that
public officers enjoy a presumption of regularity in the performance of their official
function.7 The IAS itself observed that private respondents may have been carried away
by their "enthusiasm in the conduct of the arrest in line of duty".8 Petitioner express the
same view when, in his Affidavit of Desistance, he accepted that private respondents may
have been merely following orders when they pointed their long firearms at him.
Arbitrary Detention
The criminal complaint for arbitrary detention was likewise properly dismissed by
public respondents. To sustain a criminal charge for arbitrary detention, it must be shown
that: (a) the offender is a public officer or employee, (b) the offender detained the
complainant, and (c) the detention is without legal grounds.9
Warrantless Search
The complaint for warrantless search charges no criminal offense. The conduct of
a warrantless search is not a criminal act for it is not penalized under the Revised Penal
Code (RPC) or any other special law. What the RPC punishes are only two forms of
searches:
5 Baviera v. Zoleta, G.R. No. 169098, October 12, 2006, 504 SCRA 281, 303; Soria v. Desierto, G.R. Nos. 153524-25, January 31,
2005, 450 SCRA 339, 345.
6 Rollo, p. 146.
7 Salma v. Miro, supra note 32, at 735, citing Rules of Court, Rule 131, Sec. 3(m); Ombudsman v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 147762,
Art. 130. Searching domicile without witnesses. - The penalty of arresto mayor
in its medium and maximum periods shall be imposed upon a public officer or employee
who, in cases where a search is proper, shall search the domicile, papers or other
belongings of any person, in the absence of the latter, any member of his family, or in
their default, without the presence of two witnesses residing in the same locality.
Illegal Search
Public respondents' dismissal of the criminal complaint for illegal search which
petitioner filed with the Ombudsman against private respondents was therefore proper,
although the reasons public respondents cited for dismissing the complaint are rather off
the mark because they relied solely on the finding that the warrantless search conducted
by private respondents was valid and that the Affidavit of Desistance which petitioner
executed cast doubt on the veracity of his complaint.11 Public respondents completely
overlooked the fact that the criminal complaint was not cognizable by the Ombudsman as
illegal search is not a criminal offense. Nevertheless, the result achieved is the same: the
dismissal of a groundless criminal complaint for illegal search which is not an offense
under the RPC. Thus, the Court need not resolve the issue of whether or not public
respondents erred in their finding on the validity of the search for that issue is completely
hypothetical under the circumstance.
11 Rollo, p. 26.
CASE #3: VICENTE P. LADLAD, et. al. vs SENIOR STATE
PROSECUTOR EMMANUEL Y. VELASCO, et. Al
G.R. Nos. 172070-72 June 1, 2007
Rebellion under Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code is committed –
By rising publicly and taking arms against the Government for the purpose of
removing from the allegiance to said Government or its laws, the territory of the Republic
of the Philippines or any part thereof, or any body of land, naval, or other armed forces or
depriving the Chief Executive or the Legislature, wholly or partially, of any of their powers
or prerogatives.
The elements of the offense are:
1. That there be a (a) public uprising and (b) taking arms against the Government;
and
2. That the purpose of the uprising or movement is either –
(a) to remove from the allegiance to said Government or its laws:
(1) the territory of the Philippines or any part thereof; or
(2) any body of land, naval, or other armed forces; or
(b) to deprive the Chief Executive or Congress, wholly or partially, of any of
their powers and prerogatives.
Thus, by its nature, rebellion is a crime of the masses or multitudes involving crowd
action done in furtherance of a political end. 12
Probable Cause
Probable cause is the "existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite the
belief in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor,
that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted."14
To accord respect to the discretion granted to the prosecutor and for reasons of
practicality, this Court, as a rule, does not interfere with the prosecutor’s determination of
probable cause for otherwise, courts would be swamped with petitions to review the
prosecutor’s findings in such investigations. 15
However, in the few exceptional cases where the prosecutor abused his discretion by
ignoring a clear insufficiency of evidence to support a finding of probable cause, thus
denying the accused his right to substantive and procedural due process, we have not
hesitated to intervene and exercise our review power under Rule 65 to overturn the
15 Acuña v. Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon, G.R. No. 144692, 31 January 2005, 450 SCRA 232.)
prosecutor’s findings.16
WARANTLESS ARREST
Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe
based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested
has committed it; and
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a
warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be
proceeded against in accordance with section 7 of Rule 112.
Where Arrest Not Properly Effected.' Should the Inquest Officer find that the arrest was
not made in accordance with the Rules, he shall:
Where the recommendation for the release of the detained person is approved by
the City or Provincial Prosecutor but the evidence on hand warrant the conduct of a
regular preliminary investigation, the order of release shall be served on the officer having
custody of said detainee and shall direct the said officer to serve upon the detainee the
subpoena or notice of preliminary investigation, together with the copies of the charge
sheet or complaint, affidavit or sworn statements of the complainant and his witnesses
and other supporting evidence.
Section 7, Rule 112 provides: "When accused lawfully arrested without warrant.-
When a person is lawfully arrested without a warrant involving an offense which requires
a preliminary investigation, the complaint or information may be filed by a prosecutor
without need of such investigation provided an inquest has been conducted in accordance
with existing Rules. In the absence or unavailability of an inquest prosecutor, the
complaint may be filed by the offended party or a peace officer directly with the proper
court on the basis of the affidavit of the offended party or arresting officer or person.17
Before the complaint or information is filed, the person arrested may ask for a
preliminary investigation in accordance with this Rule, but he must sign a waiver of the
provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, in the presence of his
16 Allado v. Diokno, G.R. No. 113630, 5 May 1994, 232 SCRA 192; Salonga v. Cruz-Paño, No. L-59524, 18 February 1985, 134 SCRA
438.
17 Rules of Court, Rule 112 Sec 7.
counsel. Notwithstanding the waiver, he may apply for bail and the investigation must be
terminated within fifteen (15) days from its inception.18
After the filing of the complaint or information in court without a preliminary
investigation, the accused may, within five (5) days from the time he learns of its filing,
ask for a preliminary investigation with the same right to adduce evidence in his defense
as provided in this Rule.19 In
Inquest proceedings are proper only when the accused has been lawfully arrested without
warrant.20
ART. 134-A. Coup d’état - How committed. - The crime of coup d’état is a swift
attack, accompanied by violence, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth, directed against
18Beltran also claims that on the night of his arrest, his jailors showed him a warrant of arrest, dated 7 October 1985, issued by
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 84, in connection with Criminal Case No. Q-21905 for "inciting to rebellion" which
had been archived in October 1985.
19 Id.
20Section 7, Rule 112 provides: "When accused lawfully arrested without warrant.— When a person is lawfully arrested without
a warrant involving an offense which requires a preliminary investigation, the complaint or information may be filed by a
prosecutor without need of such investigation provided an inquest has been conducted in accordance with existing Rules. In the
absence or unavailability of an inquest prosecutor, the complaint may be filed by the offended party or a peace officer directly
with the proper court on the basis of the affidavit of the offended party or arresting officer or person.
Before the complaint or information is filed, the person arrested may ask for a preliminary investigation in accordance
with this Rule, but he must sign a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, in the
presence of his counsel. Notwithstanding the waiver, he may apply for bail and the investigation must be terminated
within fifteen (15) days from its inception.
After the filing of the complaint or information in court without a preliminary investigation, the accused may, within
five (5) days from the time he learns of its filing, ask for a preliminary investigation with the same right to adduce
evidence in his defense as provided in this Rule." (Emphasis supplied)
Doctrine of Absorption
Those charged with coup d’etat before the RTC should not be charged before the
military tribunal for violation of Articles of War.24 The doctrine of ‘absorption of crimes’ is
peculiar to criminal law and generally applies to crimes punished by the same statute, 25
unlike here where different statutes are involved. Secondly, the doctrine applies only if
the trial court has jurisdiction over both offenses.
Navales v. Abaya
The court, through Mr. Justice Romeo J. Callejo, Sr., held: We agree with the
respondents that the sweeping declaration made by the RTC (Branch 148) in the
dispositive portion of its Order dated February 11, 2004 that all charges before the court-
martial against the accused were not service-connected, but absorbed and in furtherance
of the crime of coup d’etat, cannot be given effect. x x x, such declaration was made
without or in excess of jurisdiction; hence, a nullity. 26
Double Jeopardy
“No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If
an act is punished by law or an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall
constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act.”27
The doctrine of condonation does not apply to criminal cases. Election, or more
precisely, re-election to office, does not obliterate a criminal charge. Petitioner’s electoral
victory only signifies pertinently that when the voters elected him to the Senate, "they did
so with full awareness of the limitations on his freedom of action [and] x x x with the
Whereas amending Presidential Decree No. 1822, providing for trial by courts -
martial of members of the Armed Forces charged with offenses related to the
performance of their duties.
“Whereas, such officers, soldiers and personnel of the Armed Forces including the
Philippine Constabulary charged with any crime or offense related to the Performance of
their duties shall be exclusively tried and punished as a court martial may direct pursuant
to Articles of War as provided for in said presidential decree;29
Art. 148. Direct assaults.— Any person or persons who, without a public uprising,
shall employ force or intimidation for the attainment of any of the purpose enumerated in
defining the crimes of rebellion and sedition, or shall attack, employ force, or seriously
intimidate or resist any person in authority or any of his agents, while engaged in the
performance of official duties, or on occasion of such performance. When the assault is
committed with a weapon or when the offender is a public officer or employee, or when
the offender lays hands upon a person in authority qualifies the crime.30
Art. 249. Homicide. — Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article
246, shall kill another without the attendance of any of the circumstances enumerated in
the next preceding article.31
Art. 48. Penalty for complex crimes. — When a single act constitutes two or more
grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the
While the elements constituting the crime of Homicide were properly alleged in the two
informations and were duly established in the trial
The said informations, however, failed to allege all the elements constitutive of the
applicable form of direct assault. To be more specific, the informations do not allege that
the offenders/petitioners knew that the ones they were assaulting were agents of a person
in authority, in the exercise of their duty.33
Direct assault, a crime against public order, may be committed in two ways: first, by "any
person or persons who, without a public uprising, shall employ force or intimidation for
the attainment of any of the purposes enumerated in defining the crimes of rebellion and
sedition"; and second, by any person or persons who, without a public uprising, "shall
attack, employ force, or seriously intimidate or resist any person in authority or any of his
agents, while engaged in the performance of official duties, or on occasion of such
performance."34
Indubitably, the instant case falls under the second form of direct assault. The following
elements must be present, to wit:
1. That the offender (a) makes an attack, (b) employs force, (c) makes a serious
intimidation, or (d) makes a serious resistance;
2. That the person assaulted is a person in authority or his agent;
3. That at the time of the assault, the person in authority or his agent (a) is engaged in
the actual performance of official duties, or (b) is assaulted by reason of the past
performance of official duties;
4. That the offender knows that the one he is assaulting is a person in authority or his
agent in the exercise of his duties; and
5. That there is no public uprising.
Nevertheless, the establishment of the fact that the petitioners came to know that the
victims were agents of a person in authority cannot cure the lack of allegation in the
informations that such fact was known to the accused which renders the same defective.
In addition, neither can this fact be considered as a generic aggravating circumstance
under paragraph 3 of Article 14 of the RPC for acts committed with insult or in disregard
of the respect due the offended party on account of his rank to justify the imposition of an
increased penalty against the petitioners.
While the evidence definitely demonstrated that appellant knew because the
victim, who was in civilian clothing, told him that he was an agent of a person in authority,
he cannot be convicted of the complex crime of homicide with assault upon an agent of
a person in authority, for the simple reason that the information does not allege the fact
that the accused then knew that, before or at the time of the assault, the victim was an
agent of a person in authority.
It is essential that the accused must have knowledge that the person attacked was
a person in authority or his agent in the exercise of his duties, because the accused must
have the intention to offend, injure, or assault the offended party as a person in authority
or agent of a person in authority.38
In other words, the complaint must contain a specific allegation of every fact and
circumstance necessary to constitute the crime charged, the accused being presumed to
have no independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense.39 People v.
Flores, Jr., supra note 48, at 569-570. Under Section 9 of Rule 117 of the 2000 Revised
Rules on Criminal Procedure, an accused's failure to raise an objection to the
insufficiency or defect in the information would not amount to a waiver of any objection
based on said ground or irregularity.
Therefore, the petitioners can only be convicted of the crime of Homicide instead
of the complex crime of Direct Assault Upon an Agent of a Person in Authority with
Homicide due to the simple reason that the Informations do not sufficiently charge the
latter.
The MeTC, as echoed by RTC and CA later, did not rely on the medical certificate
Dr. Balucating issued on June 12, 2006 as to petitioner’s intoxicated state, as the former
was not able to testify as to its contents, but on the testimony of SPO4 Bodino, on the
assumption that he and his fellow police officers were acting in the regular performance
of their duties. It cannot be emphasized enough that smelling of liquor/alcohol and be
under the influence of liquor are differing concepts. Corollarily, it is difficult to determine
with legally acceptable certainty whether a person is drunk in contemplation of Sec. 56(f)
of RA 4136 penalizing the act of driving under the influence of alcohol. The legal situation
has of course changed with the approval in May 2013 of the Anti-Drunk and Drugged
Driving Act of 2013 (RA 10586) which also penalizes driving under the influence of alcohol
(DUIA),42 a term defined under its Sec. 3(e) as the "act of operating a motor vehicle while
the driver’s blood alcohol concentration level has, after being subjected to a breath
analyzer test reached the level of intoxication as established jointly by the [DOH], the
NAPOLCOM] and the [DOTC]. And under Sec. 3(g) of the IRR of RA 10586, a driver of a
private motor vehicle with gross vehicle weight not exceeding 4,500 kilograms who has
BAC [blood alcohol concentration] of 0.05% or higher shall be conclusive proof that said
driver is driving under the influence of alcohol. Viewed from the prism of RA 10586,
petitioner cannot plausibly be convicted of driving under the influence of alcohol for this
obvious reason: he had not been tested beyond reasonable doubt, let alone conclusively,
40
Velasco v. Sandiganbayan, et al., 704 Phil. 302, 314 (2013), citing Pilapil v. Sandiganbayan,
293 Phil. 368, 378 (1993).
Under Art. 22 of the RPC,43 penal laws shall be given retroactive insofar as they
are favorable to the accused. Section 19 of RA 10586 expressly modified Sec. 56(f) of
RA 4136. Verily, even by force of Art. 22 of the RPC in relation to Sec. 3(e) of RA 10586
alone, petitioner could very well be acquitted for the charge of driving under the influence
of alcohol, even if the supposed inculpatory act occurred in 2006.
RECKLESS DRIVING
SWERVING
43 Art. 22. Retroactive effect of penal laws. - Penal laws shall have retroactive effect in so far as they favor the person guilty of a
felony, who is not a habitual criminal, as this term is defined in rule 5 of article 62 of this Code although at the time of the
publication of such laws a final sentence has been pronounced and the convict is serving the same.
44 Republic Act 4136, Section 48.
45 Revised Penal Code, Article 151.
Going over the records, it is fairly clear that what triggered the confrontational
stand-off between the police team, on one hand, and petitioner on the other, was the
latter’s refusal to get off of the vehicle for a body and vehicle search juxtaposed by his
insistence on a plain view search only. Petitioner’s twin gestures cannot plausibly be
considered as resisting a lawful order.46 He may have sounded boorish or spoken crudely
at that time, but none of this would make him a criminal. It remains to stress that the
petitioner has not, when flagged down, committed a crime or performed an overt act
warranting a reasonable inference of criminal activity. He did not try to avoid the road
block established. He came to a full stop when so required to stop. The two key elements
of resistance and serious disobedience punished under Art. 151 of the RPC are: (1) That
a person in authority or his agent is engaged in the performance of official duty or gives
a lawful order to the offender; and (2) That the offender resists or seriously disobeys such
person or his agent.47
There can be no quibble that P/Insp. Aguilar and his apprehending team are
persons in authority or agents of a person in authority manning a legal checkpoint. But
surely petitioner’s act of exercising one’s right against unreasonable searches 48 to be
conducted in the middle of the night cannot, in context, be equated to disobedience let
alone resisting a lawful order in contemplation of Art. 151 of the RPC. As has often been
said, albeit expressed differently and under dissimilar circumstances, the vitality of
democracy lies not in the rights it guarantees, but in the courage of the people to assert
and use them whenever they are ignored or worse infringed.49
The RTC affirmed the conviction of the petitioner, addressing the first issue thus
raised in the appeal in the following wise: Dr. Balucating’s failure to testify relative to
petitioner’s alcoholic breath, as indicated in the medical certificate, is not fatal as such
testimony would only serve to corroborate the testimony on the matter of SPO4 Bodino,
noting that under the Rules of Court,50 observations of the police officers regarding the
petitioner’s behavior would suffice to support the conclusion of the latter’s drunken state
on the day he was apprehended.
46 Abenes v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 156320, February 14, 2007, 515 SCRA 690.
47 Reyes, The Revised Penal Code, Book II, 18th ed., 2008, p. 154.
48 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, Article III, Section 2. "The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the
judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized."
49 Ynot v. IAC, 148 SCRA 659.
50 Sec. 50. Opinion of ordinary witnesses. — The opinion of a witness for which proper basis is given, may be received in evidence
regarding —
(a) The identity of a person about whom he has adequate knowledge;
(b) A handwriting with which he has sufficient familiarity; and
(c) The mental sanity of a person with whom he is sufficiently acquainted.
The witness may also testify on his impressions of the emotion, behavior, condition or appearance of a person.
PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT
Conviction must come only after it survives the test of reason.51 It is thus required
that every circumstance favoring one’s innocence be duly taken into account.52 Given the
deviation of the police officers from the standard and usual procedure in dealing with
traffic violation by perceived drivers under the influence of alcohol and executing an
arrest, the blind reliance and simplistic invocation by the trial court and the CA on the
presumption of regularity in the conduct of police duty is clearly misplaced. As stressed
in People v. Ambrosio,53 the presumption of regularity is merely just that, a presumption
disputable by contrary proof and which when challenged by the evidence cannot be
regarded as binding truth. And to be sure, this presumption alone cannot preponderate
over the presumption of innocence that prevails if not overcome by proof that obliterates
all doubts as to the offender’s culpability. In the present case, the absence of conclusive
proof being under the influence of liquor while driving coupled with the forceful manner
the police yanked petitioner out of his vehicle argues against or at least cast doubt on the
finding of guilt for drunken driving and resisting arrest.
In case of doubt as to the moral certainty of culpability, the balance tips in favor of
innocence or at least in favor of the milder form of criminal liability. This is as it should be.
For, it is basic, almost elementary, that the burden of proving the guilt of an accused lies
on the prosecution which must rely on the strength of its evidence and not on the
weakness of the defense.
ELEMENTS:
a.) That the offender is a public officer, employee, or notary public.
51 People v. Castro, G.R. No. L-42478 October 4, 1989., People v. Bania, 134 SCRA 347 [1985]., People v. Tempongko, Jr., 144 SCRA
483 [1986].
52 People v. Dramayo, G.R. No. L-21325, October 29, 1971, 42 SCRA 59.
53 G.R. No. 135378, April 14, 2004, 427 SCRA 312.
3. Attributing to persons who have participated in an act or proceeding statements
other than those in fact made by them;
4. Making untruthful statements in a narration of facts;
5. Altering true dates;
6. Making any alteration or intercalation in a genuine document which changes its
meaning;
7. Issuing in authenticated form a document purporting to be a copy of an original
document when no such original exists, or including in such copy a statement
contrary to, or different from, that of the genuine original; or
8. Intercalating any instrument or note relative to the issuance thereof in a protocol,
registry, or official book.54
The Information alleges that petitioner, a public officer, conspiring with a private
individual (Rowena Bustillo), "feloniously made it appear in official documents that
municipal funds were expended for the purchase of lumber from Estigoy Lumber when,
in truth and in fact, as both accused well knew, said lumber were actually purchased from
Rowena Woodcraft, a single proprietorship owned by accused Rowena G. Bustillo." This
falls under paragraph 2 of Article 171 which makes it punishable for anyone to " cause it
to appear that persons have participated in any act or proceeding when they did not in
fact so participate,"
ELEMENTS:
a.) That the offender is a private individual or a public officer or employee who did
not take advantage of his official position.
b.) That he committed any of the acts of falsification enumerated in ART. 171.
c.) That the falsification was committed in any public or official or commercial
document.55
Petitioner contends that the Information filed against him and his co-accused is invalid
because it failed to allege the element of gain, the party benefited or prejudiced by the falsification,
or that the "integrity of the [falsified] document was tarnished." Petitioner also invokes the findings
of Special Prosecutor II Francis Ilustre, Jr. ("Ilustre") of the OSP who recommended the dismissal
of the complaint against the accused.58
At any rate, the allegation of intent to gain, the party benefited or prejudiced by the falsification,
or tarnishing of a document's integrity, is not essential to maintain a charge for falsification of official
documents. Such charge stands if the facts alleged in the Information fall under any of the modes of
committing falsification under Article 17159 of the RPC.
56 Bustillo vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 146217, 07 April 2006, 486 SCRA 545
57 Pimentel v. Garchitorena, G.R. NOS. 98340-42, 10 April 1992, 208 SCRA 122.
58 Id. at 9-10, 13-16
59 "Falsification by public officer, employee or notary or ecclesiastic minister. - The penalty of prisión mayor and a fine not to
exceed 5,000 pesos shall be imposed upon any public officer, employee, or notary who, taking advantage of his official position,
shall falsify a document by committing any of the following acts:
1. Counterfeiting or imitating any handwriting, signature or rubric;
2. Causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act or proceeding when they did not in fact so participate;
3. Attributing to persons who have participated in an act or proceeding statements other than those in fact made by them;
4. Making untruthful statements in a narration of facts;
5. Altering true dates;
6. Making any alteration or intercalation in a genuine document which changes its meaning;
7. Issuing in authenticated form a document purporting to be a copy of an original document when no such original exists, or
including in such copy a statement contrary to, or different from, that of the genuine original; or
8. Intercalating any instrument or note relative to the issuance thereof in a protocol, registry, or official book.
The same penalty shall be imposed upon any ecclesiastical minister who shall commit any of the offenses enumerated in the
preceding paragraphs of this article, with respect to any record or document of such character that its falsification may affect
the civil status of persons." (Emphasis supplied)
CASE #8: CARLOS L. TANENGGEE v. PEOPLE
GR No. 179448 June 26, 2013
ESTAFA DEFINED
Estafa is generally committed when (a) the accused defrauded another by abuse
of confidence, or by means of deceit, and (b) the offended party or a third party suffered
damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation.60
FORGERY DEFINED
60 Eugenio v. People, G.R. No. 168163, March 26, 2008, 549 SCRA 433, 447.
61 Ocampo v. Land Bank of the Philippines, G.R. No. 164968, July 3, 2009, 591 SCRA 562, 570.
63 ART. 171. Falsification by public officer, employee; or notary or ecclesiastical minister. – The penalty of prision mayor and a
fine not to exceed 5,000 pesos shall be imposed upon any public officer, employee, or notary who, taking advantage of his official
position, shall falsify a document by committing any of the following acts:
2. Causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act or proceeding when they did not in fact so participate;
3. Attributing to persons who have participated in an act or proceeding statements other than those in fact made by
them;
CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION
RIGHT TO COUNSEL
RIGHT TO COUNSEL
However, it must be remembered that the right to counsel under Section 12 of the
Bill of Rights is meant to protect a suspect during custodial investigation. Thus, the
exclusionary rule under paragraph (2), Section 12 of the Bill of Rights applies only to
admissions made in a criminal investigation but not to those made in an administrative
investigation.67
6. Making any alteration or intercalation in a genuine document which changes its meaning;
7. Issuing in an authenticated form a document purporting to be a copy of an original document when no such original
exists, or including in such copy a statement contrary to, or different from, that of the genuine original; or
8. Intercalating any instrument or note relative to the issuance thereof in a protocol, registry, or official book.
64 Domingo vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. NO. 186101 October 12, 2009.
65 People v. Bandula, G.R. No. 89223, May 27, 1994, 232 SCRA 566, 574
66 414 Phil. 590, 599 (2001).
67 Id. at 207.
CONFESSION
It is settled that a confession [or admission] is presumed voluntary until the contrary
is proved and the confessant bears the burden of proving the contrary." 68
INDICIA OF VOLUNTARINESS
In People v. Muit,69 it was held that "[o]ne of the indicia of voluntariness in the
execution of [petitioner's] extrajudicial [statement] is that [it] contains many details and
facts which the investigating officers could not have known and could not have supplied
without the knowledge and information given by [him]."
It is a settled rule that where the defendant did not present evidence of compulsion,
where he did not institute any criminal or administrative action against his supposed
intimidators, where no physical evidence of violence was presented, his extrajudicial
statement shall be considered as having been voluntarily executed.70
ART. 201. Immoral doctrines, obscene publications and exhibitions, and indecent
shows.
– The penalty of prision mayor or a fine ranging from six thousand to twelve thousand
pesos, or both such imprisonment and fine, shall be imposed upon:
1. Those who shall publicly expound or proclaim doctrines openly contrary to public
morals;
2. (a) The authors of obscene literature, published with their knowledge in any form; the
editors publishing such literature; and the owners/operators of the establishment selling
the same;
DEFINITION OF OBSCENITY
There is no perfect definition of "obscenity" but the latest word is that of Miller v.
California which established basic guidelines, to wit: (a) whether to the average person,
applying contemporary standards would find the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the
prurient interest; (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way,
sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work,
taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.72 But, it would
be a serious misreading of Miller to conclude that the trier of facts has the unbridled
discretion in determining what is "patently offensive." 73 No one will be subject to
prosecution for the sale or exposure of obscene materials unless these materials depict
or describe patently offensive "hard core" sexual conduct.74 Examples included (a)
patently offensive representations or descriptions of ultimate sexual acts, normal or
perverted, actual or simulated; and (b) patently offensive representations or descriptions
of masturbation, excretory functions, and lewd exhibition of the genitals.75 What remains
clear is that obscenity is an issue proper for judicial determination and should be treated
on a case to case basis and on the judge’s sound discretion.
The test to determine the existence of obscenity is, whether the tendency of the
matter
charged as obscene, is to deprave or corrupt those whose minds are open to such
immoral influences and into whose hands a publication or other article charged as being
obscene may fall.76
No one will be subject to prosecution for the sale or exposure of obscene materials
unless these materials depict or describe patently offensive "hard core" sexual conduct. 78
Obscenity is an unprotected speech and the Court upheld that is something which
is offensive to chastity, decency or delicacy, which the State has the right to regulate. The
State in pursuing its mandate to protect, as parens patriae, the public from obscene,
immoral and indecent materials may justify the regulation or limitation.
The expiration of the mayor’s permit does not negate the fact that petitioner owned
and operated the establishment. It would be absurd to make his failure to renew his
business permit and illegal operation a shield from prosecution of an unlawful act.
Furthermore, when he preferred not to present contrary evidence, the things which he
possessed were presumptively his.79
(g) Entering, on behalf of the Government, into any contract or transaction manifestly and
grossly disadvantageous to the same, whether or not the public officer profited or will
profit thereby.80
Behavior that leads to graft includes Bribery and dishonest dealings in the
performance of public official acts. Graft usually implies the existence of theft, corruption,
fraud and lack of integrity that is expected in any transaction involving a public official.81
CORRUPTION DEFINED
An act done with an intent to give some advantage inconsistent with official duty
and the rights of others. It includes bribery, but is more comprehensive; because
an act may be corruptly done, though the advantage to be derived from it be not offered
by another.82
It is the commission of that act as defined by law, not the character or effect thereof,
that determines whether or not the provision has been violated. And this construction
would be in consonance with the announced purpose for which Republic Act 3019 was
Private persons, when conspiring with public officers, may be indicted and, if found
guilty, held liable for violation of Section 3(g) of RA 3019.86
It is well established that the presence or absence of the elements of the crime is
evidentiary in nature and is a matter of defense that may be passed upon after a full-
blown trial on the merits.87
The absence (or presence) of any conspiracy among the accused is evidentiary in
nature and is a matter of defense, the truth of which can be best passed upon after a full-
blown trial on the merits.88
Private persons, when acting in conspiracy with public officers, may be indicted
and, if found guilty, held liable for the pertinent offenses under Section 3 of RA 3019,
including (g) and (h) thereof. This is in consonance with the avowed policy of the anti-
graft law to repress certain acts of public officers and private persons alike constituting
graft or corrupt practices act or which may lead thereto.89
85 Id. at 464-465
86G.R. Nos. 160577-94, December 16, 2005, 478 SCRA 348.
87 Andres v. Cuevas, G.R. No. 150869, June 9, 2005, 460 SCRA 38.
88 Singian v. Sandiganbayan, supra note 17.
89 G.R. No. 172602 April 13, 2007
90 Domingo v. Sandiganbayan, supra note 18.
CASE #11: DINAH C. BARRIG vs.THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN
(4TH DIVISION) and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. Nos. 161784-86 April 26, 2005
Malversation
Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code provides that it shall be prima
facie evidence of malversation when a public officer fails to have duly forthcoming any
public funds or property for which he is chargeable on demand by any duly authorized
officer. That presumption of guilt is founded on human experience and is valid.91
In malversation, all that is necessary to prove is that the defendant received in his
possession public funds, that he could not account for them and did not have them in his
possession and that he could not give a reasonable excuse for the disappearance of the
same. An accountable public officer may be convicted even if there is no direct evidence
of misappropriation and the only evidence is that there is shortage in his accounts which
he has not been able to explain satisfactorily.92
For the accused to be guilty of malversation, the prosecution must prove the following
essential elements:
For the accused to be guilty of illegal use of public funds or property, the prosecution is
burdened to prove the following elements:
The Court has also ruled that one who conspires malversation is also a co-principal
in committing those offenses, and that a private person conspiring with an accountable
public officer in committing malversation is also guilty of malversation.96
Indeed, under the said article, an accountable public officer is one who has actual
control of public funds or property by reason of the duties of his office. Even then, it cannot
thereby be necessarily concluded that a municipal accountant can never be convicted for
malversation under the Revised Penal Code. The name or relative importance of the
office or employment is not the controlling factor.97The nature of the duties of the public
officer or employee, the fact that as part of his duties he received public money for which
he is bound to account and failed to account for it, is the factor which determines whether
or not malversation is committed by the accused public officer or employee.98
PENALTY OF MALVERSATION
The crime of malversation of public funds defined and penalized under Article 217
of the Revised Penal Code and, taking into account the existence of a mitigating
circumstance, sentencing the said accused to: (a) suffer an indeterminate sentence of
imprisonment of ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen
(14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum; (b) suffer
all the appropriate accessory penalties consequent thereto, including perpetual special
disqualification; (c) pay a fine of Eighteen Thousand (P18,000); and (d) pay the costs. 99
95DINAH C. BARRIG vs.THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN (4TH DIVISION) and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. Nos.
161784-86. April 26, 2005.
96 People v. Sendaydiego, G.R. NOS. L-33252 to L-33254, 20 January 1978; 81 SCRA 120.
97 Quion v. People, G.R. No. 136462, 19 September 2002; 389 SCRA 412.
98 Id. At 67.
In the crime of malversation, all that is necessary for conviction is sufficient proof
that the accountable officer had received public funds, that he did not have them in his
possession when demand therefor was made, and that he could not satisfactorily explain
his failure to do so. Direct evidence of personal misappropriation by the accused is hardly
necessary100 as long as the accused cannot explain satisfactorily the shortage in his
accounts.
Accordingly, if the accused is able to present adequate evidence that can nullify
any likelihood that he had put the funds or property to personal use, then that presumption
would be at an end and the prima facie case is effectively negated. This Court has
repeatedly said that when the absence of funds is not due to the personal use thereof by
the accused, the presumption is completely destroyed; in fact, the presumption is never
deemed to have existed at all.101
It is clear that for technical malversation to exist, it is necessary that public funds
or properties has been diverted to any public use other than that provided for by law or
100 Sarigumba v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 154239-41, February 16, 2005, 451 SCRA 533, 554.
101 Agullo v. Sandiganbayan, 414 Phil. 86 (2001).
102 ROMEO L. DAVALOS, SR. vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES; G.R. No. 145229 April 20, 2006
ordinance. 12 To constitute the crime, there must be a diversion of the funds from the
purpose for which they had been originally appropriated by law or ordinance.103
Local Government Code provides that an ordinance has to be enacted to validly apply
funds, already appropriated for a determined public purpose, to some other purpose.
SEC. 336. Use of Appropriated Funds and Savings. – Funds shall be available
exclusively for the specific purpose for which they have been appropriated. No ordinance
shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations from one item to another.
However, the local chief executive or the presiding officer of the sanggunian concerned
may, by ordinance, be authorized to augment any item in the approved annual budget for
their respective offices from savings in other items within the same expense class of their
respective appropriations.104
The law punishes the act of diverting public property earmarked by law or
ordinance for a particular public purpose to another public purpose. The offense is mala
prohibita, meaning that the prohibited act is not inherently immoral but becomes a criminal
offense because positive law forbids its commission based on considerations of public
policy, order, and convenience. 13 It is the commission of an act as defined by the law,
and not the character or effect thereof, that determines whether or not the provision has
been violated. Hence, malice or criminal intent is completely irrelevant.105
In the case at bar, inasmuch as the prosecution had proved that a criminal act was
committed by the accused under Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code, criminal intent
was presumed. The accused did not present any evidence to prove that no such criminal
intent was present when she committed the unlawful act of technical malversation. Hence,
the presumption that the unlawful act of the accused was done with criminal intent had
been satisfactorily proven by the prosecution.106
It bears stressing that the elements of Malversation of Public Funds are distinctly
different from those of Technical Malversation. In the crime of Malversation of Public
103 People v. Montemayor and Ducusin, No. L-17449, 30 August 1962, 116 Phil. 78, 81.
104 Ysidoro v. people, g.r. 192330, nov. 14, 2012.
105 Luciano v. Estrella, 145 Phil. 454, 464-465 (1970).
106 G.R. NO. 150129 April 6, 2005, ABDULLA, v. PEOPLE.
107 Parungao v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 96025, May 15,1991.
Funds, the offender misappropriates public funds for his own personal use or allows any
other person to take such public funds for the latter’s personal use. On the other hand, in
Technical Malversation, the public officer applies public funds under his administration
not for his or another’s personal use, but to a public use other than that for which the fund
was appropriated by law or ordinance. 77 Technical Malversation does not include, or is
not necessarily included in the crime of Malversation of Public Funds.108
In this case, the finding of the Ombudsman falls short of that quantum of proof
necessary to establish the fact that petitioners acted with manifest partiality or there was
a failure to show that there was a clear, notorious or plain inclination or predilection on
the part of the petitioners to favor one side rather than the other. Contrary to the view of
the Ombudsman, the mere act of using government money to fund a project which is
different from what the law states you have to spend it for does not fall under the definition
of manifest partiality nor gross inexcusable negligence. It must always be remembered
that manifest partiality and gross inexcusable negligence are not elements in the crime of
Technical Malversation and simply alleging one or both modes would not suffice to
establish probable cause for violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019, for it is well-settled
that allegation does not amount to proof. Nor can we deduce any or all of the modes from
mere speculation or hypothesis since good faith on the part of petitioners as with any
other person is presumed. [35] The facts themselves must demonstrate evident bad faith
which connotes not only bad judgment, but also palpably and patently fraudulent and
dishonest purpose to do moral obliquity or conscious wrongdoing for some perverse
motive or ill will.109
Unlawful Appointment
110Art. 244. Unlawful appointments. - Any public officer who shall knowingly nominate or appoint to any public office any
person lacking the legal qualifications therefor, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor and a fine not exceeding 1,000 pesos.
Double Jeopardy
Although this Court held in the case of People v. Sandiganbayan111 that once a
court grants the demurrer to evidence, such order amounts to an acquittal and any further
prosecution of the accused would violate the constitutional proscription on double
jeopardy, this Court held in the same case that such ruling on the matter shall not be
disturbed in the absence of a grave abuse of discretion.
Appointment of Elective and Appointive Local Officials; Candidates Who Lost in Election
(b) Except for losing candidates in barangay elections, no candidate who lost in
any election shall, within one (1) year after such election, be appointed to any office in
the government or any government-owned or controlled corporations or in any of their
subsidiaries.113
111 People v. Sandiganbayan; G.R. No. 140633, February 4, 2002, 376 SCRA 74.
112 People v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 128986, June 21, 1999, 308 SCRA 687, 698
113 Section 94, Local Government Code