CABALLES v CA

FACTS: Caballes was charged with rape of a minor. Because the petitioner was charged with a non-bailable offense, he was detained. He filed a
petition for bail which was denied. He filed MR but without waiting for the resolution, he filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that his right to
speedy trial had been violated on account of various postponements and on the failure of the prosecution to promptly serve the subpoena duces
tecum/ad testificandum to its witness (the medico-legal). The RTC MR as having been abandoned upon the filing of his motion to dismiss the case
without waiting for the resolution of the MR on the petition for bail. Judge Laurea also inhibited from the case.
Caballes then filed with CA a "Petition for Habeas Corpus and/or Certiorari and Prohibition." As required by the CA, Caballes filed a manifestation
that he had chosen his petition to be treated as a petition for habeas corpus without prejudice "to the concomitant application of certiorari if the court
considered the same necessary or appropriate to give effect to the writ of habeas corpus." He averred that (a) he was deprived of his right to a
speedy trial and his constitutional right to a speedy disposition of the case; (b) Judge Laurea erred in inhibiting himself from the case; (c) the trial
court committed grave abuse of its discretion in denying his petition for bail. The CA denied the petition.
ISSUE:
1. Whether a petition for certiorari from the decision of the CA dismissing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus is proper
NO. The period for appeal from the judgment of any court in habeas corpus cases shall be forty-eight (48) hours from notice of the judgment
appealed from. The period of appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or reconsideration. No motion for extension of time to file a
motion for new trial or reconsideration shall be allowed.
Following the rule, the petitioner should have appealed to this Court from the CA decision denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, as well as
the denial of his motion for reconsideration thereof; instead, the petitioner filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. The well-settled rule is that
certiorari is not available where the aggrieved party’s remedy of appeal is plain, speedy and adequate in the ordinary course, the reason being that
certiorari cannot co-exist with an appeal or any other adequate remedy. The existence and availability of the right to appeal are antithetical to the
availment of the special civil action for certiorari. These two remedies are mutually exclusive. An appeal in this case would still have been a speedy
and adequate remedy. Consequently, when the petitioner filed his petition in this Court, the decision of the CA was already final and executory.
A decision in a habeas corpus action stands in no different position than with any other proceeding and if the appealed decision is to be reviewed by
an appellate court, the remedy is by writ of error because the error committed by the court is an error of judgment and not an error of jurisdiction.
2. Whether a writ of habeas corpus is the proper remedy to assail the trial court’s denial of the petitioner’s motion to dismiss the case, the
denial of the petition for bail, as well as the voluntary inhibition of Judge Laurea.
NO. Resorting to the writ is not to inquire into the criminal act of which the complaint is made, but into the right of liberty, notwithstanding the act and
the immediate purpose to be served is relief from illegal restraint.
Habeas corpus is not in the nature of a writ of error; nor intended as substitute for the trial court’s function.28 It cannot take the place of appeal,
certiorari or writ of error. The writ cannot be used to investigate and consider questions of error that might be raised relating to procedure or on the
merits. The inquiry in a habeas corpus proceeding is addressed to the question of whether the proceedings and the assailed order are, for any
reason, null and void. The writ is not ordinarily granted where the law provides for other remedies in the regular course, and in the absence of
exceptional circumstances. Moreover, habeas corpus should not be granted in advance of trial. The orderly course of trial must be pursued and the
usual remedies exhausted before resorting to the writ where exceptional circumstances are extant. In another case, it was held that habeas corpus
cannot be issued as a writ of error or as a means of reviewing errors of law and irregularities not involving the questions of jurisdiction occurring
during the course of the trial, subject to the caveat that constitutional safeguards of human life and liberty must be preserved, and not destroyed.It
has also been held that where restraint is under legal process, mere errors and irregularities, which do not render the proceedings void, are not
grounds for relief by habeas corpus because in such cases, the restraint is not illegal.
3. Whether a petition for habeas corpus can be joined with a petition for certiorari
NO. The two remedies are governed by a different set of rules. Rule 2, Section 5(b) of the Rules of Court mandates that the joinder of causes of
action shall not include special actions or actions governed by special rules, thus proscribing the joinder of a special proceeding with a special civil
action. The writ of habeas corpus is a collateral attack on the processes, orders, or judgment of the trial court, while certiorari is a direct attack of said
processes, orders, or judgment on the ground of lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction. A writ of
certiorari reaches only jurisdictional errors. It has no other use, except to bring before the court a record material to be considered in exercising
jurisdiction. A writ of certiorari reaches the record. On the other hand, a writ of habeas corpus reaches the body but not the record; it also reaches
jurisdictional matters but does not reach the record.
4. Whether Caballes is entitled to the writ
NO. The records show that the Caballes was charged with rape punishable by reclusion perpetua and was detained based on the said charge;
hence, if the evidence of his guilt is strong, he shall not be admitted to bail regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution. The trial court had
jurisdiction over the offense charged and over the person of the petitioner. The jail warden has the authority and, in fact, is mandated to detain the
petitioner until granted bail by the court, or the case against him dismissed, or until he is acquitted after trial. The petitioner failed to establish that his
incarceration pendente lite was illegal, and likewise failed to establish exceptional circumstances warranting the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus
by the CA.
 5. Whether a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus may be filed if one is deprived of his right to a speedy disposition of the case
IT DEPENDS. A petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus may be filed if one is deprived of his right to a speedy disposition of the case
under Article IV, Section 16 of the 1987 Constitution and of his right to due process. However, the petitioner never invoked in the trial court his
constitutional right to a speedy disposition of the case against him. What he invoked was his right to a speedy trial under Rule 119 of the 2000 Rules
of Criminal Procedure. He invoked his constitutional right to a speedy disposition of the case against him, for the first time, only in the Court of
Appeals when he filed his petition for habeas corpus.
In determining whether the accused has been deprived of his right to a speedy disposition of the case and to a speedy trial, four factors must be
considered: (a) length of delay; (b) the reason for the delay; (c) the defendant’s assertion of his right; and (d) prejudice to the defendant.
In this case Caballes’ own counsel contributed to the delay. Moreover, he failed to establish any serious prejudice by the delay of the trial, and that
the State deliberately delayed the trial to prejudice him.
Note: Proper remedies:
a. Denial of petition for bail: petition for certiorari in the CA (, his petition would have been granted because as gleaned from the assailed
order of the trial court, it failed to summarize the testimonies of the private complainant and that of her mother)
b. Voluntary inhibition of the judge: petition for certiorari and/or prohibition in the CA
c. Violation of the right of the accused to a speedy trial: Section 8, Rule 119 ROC; petition for certiorari and/or a petition for mandamus to
compel the trial court to comply with the timeline provided for by the said Rule for trial and termination of the case
Ilusorio v Bildner

FACTS: Potenciano Ilusorio, lawyer, is about 86 years of age possessed of extensive property valued at millions of pesos. Erlinda and Potenciano
were married for 30 years, have 6 children and in 1972, they separated from bed and board for undisclosed reasons. Potenciano lived in Makati City
when he was in Manila and at Ilusorio Penthouse, Baguio Country Club when he was in Baguio City. On the other hand, Erlinda lived in Antipolo
City. In 1997, upon Potenciano’s arrival from the US, he stayed with Erlinda for about 5 months in Antipolo. 2 of their children alleged that during this
time, their mother gave Potenciano an overdose of 200 mg instead of 100 mg Zoloft, an antidepressant drug prescribed by his doctor in NY, U.S.A.
As a consequence, Potencianos health deteriorated.
In February 1998, Erlinda filed with the Antipolo City RTC a petition for guardianship over the person and property of Potenciano due to his
advanced age, frail health, poor eyesight and impaired judgment. In May 1998, after attending a corporate meeting in Baguio City, Potenciano did
not return to Antipolo City and instead lived at Cleveland Condominium, Makati.
Erlinda filed a petition for habeas corpus to have the custody of Potenciano and enforce consortium as the wife. She alleged that respondents
refused her demands to see and visit her husband and prohibited Potenciano from returning to Antipolo City. On the other hand, the petition of
Potenciano is to annul that portion of the decision of the CA giving Erlinda visitation rights to her husband and to enjoin Erlinda and the CA from
enforcing the visitation rights.
ISSUE: Whether the petition of writ of habeas corpus will prosper?
RULING: NO.
To justify the grant of the petition, the restraint of liberty must be an illegal and involuntary deprivation of freedom of action. The illegal restraint of
liberty must be actual and effective, not merely nominal or moral.
The evidence shows that there was no actual and effective detention or deprivation of lawyer Potencianos’ liberty that would justify the issuance of
the writ. The fact that lawyer Potenciano is about 86 years of age, or under medication does not necessarily render him mentally incapacitated.
Soundness of mind does not hinge on age or medical condition but on the capacity of the individual to discern his actions.
The CA observed that he was of sound and alert mind, having answered all the relevant questions to the satisfaction of the court. Being of sound
mind, he is thus possessed with the capacity to make choices. In this case, the crucial choices revolve on his residence and the people he opts to
see or live with. The choices he made may not appeal to some of his family members but these are choices which exclusively belong to Potenciano.
He made it clear before the CA that he was not prevented from leaving his house or seeing people. With that declaration, and absent any true
restraint on his liberty, we have no reason to reverse the findings of the Court of Appeals. With his full mental capacity coupled with the right of
choice, Potenciano may not be the subject of visitation rights against his free choice. Otherwise, we will deprive him of his right to privacy. Needless
to say, this will run against his fundamental constitutional right.
The CA exceeded its authority when it awarded visitation rights in a petition for habeas corpus where Erlinda never even prayed for such right. The
ruling is not consistent with the finding of subject’s sanity. When the court ordered the grant of visitation rights, it also emphasized that the same shall
be enforced under penalty of contempt in case of violation or refusal to comply. The CA missed the fact that the case did not involve the right of a
parent to visit a minor child but the right of a wife to visit a husband. In case the husband refuses to see his wife for private reasons, he is at liberty to
do so without threat of any penalty attached to the exercise of his right. No court is empowered as a judicial authority to compel a husband to live
with his wife. Coverture cannot be enforced by compulsion of a writ of habeas corpus carried out by sheriffs or by any other mesne process. That is a
matter beyond judicial authority and is best left to the man and womans free choice.