In Re: Diosdado Gutierrez 5 SCR 661 – Legal Ethics –

Conditional Pardon will not bar disbarment Attorney Diosdado Gutierrez was convicted for the murder of one
Filemon Samaco in 1956. He was sentenced to the penalty of reclusion perpetua. In 1958, after serving a portion of
the penalty, he was granted a conditional pardon by the President. He was released on the condition that he shall
not commit any crime. Subsequently, the widow of Samaco filed a disbarment case against Gutierrez by reason of
the latter’s conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. Murder, is without a doubt, such a crime.

ISSUE: Whether or not Gutierrez may be disbarred considering the fact that he was granted pardon.

HELD: Yes. The pardon granted to Gutierrez is not absolute but conditional. It merely remitted his sentence. It
does not reach the offense itself. Gutierrez must be judged upon the fact of his conviction for murder without regard
to the pardon (which he invoked in defense). The crime was actually qualified by treachery and aggravated by its
having been committed in hand, by taking advantage of his official position (Gutierrez being municipal mayor at
the time) and with the use of motor vehicle. The degree of moral turpitude involved is such as to justify his being
purged from the profession.

Enrique Zaldivar vs Raul Gonzalez

FACTS: Zaldivar was the governor of Antique and was charged before the Sandiganbayan for violations of the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Gonzales was the then Tanodbayan who was investigating the case. Zaldivar
then filed with the Supreme Court a petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus assailing the authority of
the Tanodbayan to investigate graft cases under the 1987 Constitution. The Supreme Court, acting on the petition
issued a Cease and Desist Order against Gonzalez directing him to temporarily restrain from investigating and
filing informations against Zaldivar. Gonzales however proceeded with the investigation and he filed
criminal informations against Zaldivar. Respondent Gonzalez has also asserted that the Court was preventing him
from prosecuting "rich and powerful persons," that the Court was in effect discrimination between the rich and
powerful on the one hand and the poor and defenseless upon the other, and allowing "rich and powerful" accused
persons to go "scot-free" while presumably allowing or affirming the conviction of poor and small offenders.
Zaldivar then filed a Motion for Contempt against Gonzalez. The Supreme Court then ordered Gonzalez
to explain his side. Gonzalez stated that the statements in the newspapers were true; that he was only exercising his
freedom of speech; that he is entitled to criticize the rulings of the Court, to point out where he feels the Court may
have lapsed into error.

ISSUE: Whether or not Gonzalez is guilty of contempt.

HELD: YES. The statements made by respondent Gonzalez clearly constitute contempt and call for the exercise of
the disciplinary authority of the Supreme Court. According to Canon 11: A lawyer shall observe and maintain the
respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others. It is one of the
bounded duties of an attorney to observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officer
(Section 20 [b], Rule 138 of the Rules of Court). His statements necessarily imply that the justices of the
Supreme Court betrayed their oath of office. Such statements very clearly debase and degrade the Supreme Court
and, through the Court, the entire system of administration of justice in the country. Gonzalez is entitled to the
constitutional guarantee of free speech. What Gonzalez seems unaware of is that freedom of speech and
of expression, like all constitutional freedoms, is not absolute and that freedom of expression needs on occasion to
be adjusted to and accommodated with the requirements of equally important public interests. One of these
fundamental public interests is the maintenance of the integrity and orderly functioning of the administration of
justice. There is no antinomy between free expression and the integrity of the system of administering justice.
Gonzalez, apart from being a lawyer and an officer of the court, is also a Special Prosecutor who owes duties of
fidelity and respect to the Republic and to the Supreme Court as the embodiment and the repository of the judicial
power in the government of the Republic. The responsibility of Gonzalez to uphold the dignity and authority of the
Supreme Court and not to promote distrust in the administration of justice is heavier than that of a private
practicing lawyer. Gonzalez is also entitled to criticize the rulings of the court but his criticisms must be bona fide.
In the case at bar, his statements, particularly the one where he alleged that members of the Supreme Court
approached him, are of no relation to the Zaldivar case.

The Court concludes that respondent Gonzalez is guilty both of contempt of court in facie curiae and of gross
misconduct as an officer of the court and member of the Bar.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to SUSPEND Atty. Raul M. Gonzalez from the practice of law indefinitely and
until further orders from this Court, the suspension to take effect immediately.
C.E. PIATT, Chief of Police of Manila, Complainant,

Vs. Perfecto Abordo, respondent

FACTS:

On February 19, 1932, Perfecto Abordo, a member of the Philippine Bar entered into a transaction between
two individuals to purchase a quantity of opium for Php 600. He found out that the opium was fake and he filed
charges to the two individuals with the crime of estafa and convicted.

Abordo admits that he entered into the transaction detailed above, adding that "he is sincerely sorry for it
and vows not to repeat". His defense is that "there being no evidence in the record establishing the relationship of
attorney and client between the respondent and the malefactors", and "the act complained of not having been
committed in the exercise of his profession of attorney-at-law", the acts he committed could not affect his status as
attorney-at-law and could not, therefore, constitute a ground for disciplinary action.

ISSUE:

Wherher or not the acts committed by Atty. Abordo constitute a ground for disciplinary action.

RULING:

Yes, the Court issued an Order that the respondent Perfecto Abordo be suspended from the practice of law
for a period of one year to begin on September 1, 1933. The courts are not curators of the morals of the bar. At the
same time the profession is not compelled to harbor all persons whatever their character, who are fortunate enough
to keep out of prison. As good character is an essential qualification for admission of an attorney to practice, when
the attorney's character is bad in such respect as to show that he is unsafe and unfit to be entrusted with the powers
of an attorney, the courts retain the power to discipline him.

It will be recalled that Perfecto Abordo, a member of the Philippine Bar, attempted to engage in an opium deal in
direct contravention of the criminal law of the Philippine Islands. All that kept the nefarious plan from succeeding
was the treacherous conduct of his co-conspirators. The intention to flaunt the law was present even if
consummation of the overt act was not accomplished. In the eyes of the canons of professional ethics which govern
the conduct of attorneys, the act was as reprehensible as if it had been brought to a successful culmination. "Of all
classes and professions, the lawyer is most sacredly bound to uphold the laws" said the United States Supreme
Court in the well-known case of Ex Parte Wall ( [1882], 107 U.S., 265), and to that doctrine we give our unqualified
support.

Ui vs. Bonifacio

Adm. Case No. 3319, June 8, 2000

Facts:

Complainant Lesli Ui found out that her husband Carlos Ui was carrying out an illicit relationship with respondent
Atty. Iris Bonifacio with whom he begot two children. Hence, a complaint for disbarment was filed by complainant
against respondent before the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines on the ground
of immorality, more particularly, for carrying on an illicit relationship with the complainant’s husband. It is
respondent’s contention that her relationship with Carlos Ui is not illicit because they were married abroad and that
after June 1988, when respondent discovered Carlos Ui’s true civil status, she cut off all her ties with him.
Respondent averred that Carlos Ui never lived with her.

Issue:

Whether or not she has conducted herself in an immoral manner for which she deserves to be barred from the
practice of law.

Held:

The complaint for disbarment against respondent Atty. Iris L. Bonifacio, for alleged immorality, was dismissed.

All the facts taken together leads to the inescapable conclusion that respondent was imprudent in managing her
personal affairs. However, the fact remains that her relationship with Carlos Ui, clothed as it was with what
respondent believed was a valid marriage, cannot be considered immoral. For immorality connotes conduct that
shows indifference to the moral norms of society and the opinion of good and respectable members of the
community. Moreover, for such conduct to warrant disciplinary action, the same must be “grossly immoral,” that is,
it must be so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high
degree.

PATRICIA FIGUEROA v. SIMEON BARRANCO, SBC Case No. 519, 1997-07-31

Facts:
1971, Patricia Figueroa petitioned that respondent Simeon Barranco, Jr. be denied admission to the legal
profession. Respondent had passed the 1970 bar examinations on the fourth attempt, after unsuccessful attempts in
1966, 1967 and 1968. Before he could take his oath, however, complainant filed the instant petition averring that
respondent and she had been sweethearts, that a child out of wedlock was born to them and that respondent did
not fulfill his repeated promises to marry her.
Respondent and complainant were townmates in Janiuay, Iloilo. Since 1953, when they were both in their teens,
they were steadies. Respondent even acted as escort to... complainant when she reigned as Queen at the 1953 town
fiesta. Complainant first acceded to sexual congress with respondent sometime in 1960. Their intimacy yielded a
son, Rafael Barranco, born on December 11, 1964.[1] It was after the child was born,... complainant alleged, that
respondent first promised he would marry her after he passes the bar examinations. Their relationship continued
and respondent allegedly made more than twenty or thirty promises of marriage. He gave only P10.00 for the child
on the latter's birthdays.
Her trust in him and their relationship ended in 1971, when she learned that respondent married another woman.
Hence, this petition.
Upon complainant's motion, the Court authorized the taking of testimonies of witnesses by deposition in 1972. On
February 18, 1974, respondent filed a Manifestation and Motion to Dismiss the case citing complainant's failure to
comment on the motion of Judge Cuello seeking to be... relieved from the duty to take aforesaid testimonies by
deposition. Complainant filed her comment stating that she had justifiable reasons in failing to file the earlier
comment required and that she remains interested in the resolution of the present case. On June 18, 1974, the
Court denied respondent's motion to dismiss.
On October 2, 1980, the Court once again denied a motion to dismiss on the ground of abandonment filed by
respondent on September 17, 1979.[2] Respondent's third motion to dismiss was noted in the Court's Resolution
dated September 15, 1982.[3] In 1988, respondent repeated his request, citing his election as a member of the
Sangguniang Bayan of Janiuay, Iloilo from 1980-1986, his active participation in civic organizations and good
standing in the community as well as the length of time this case has... been pending as reasons to allow him to take
his oath as a lawyer.[4]
On September 29, 1988, the Court resolved to dismiss the complaint for failure of complainant to prosecute the
case for an unreasonable period of time and to allow Simeon Barranco, Jr. to take the lawyer's oath upon payment
of the required fees.[5]
Issues:
Respondent was prevented from taking the lawyer's oath in 1971 because of the charges of gross immorality made
by complainant. To recapitulate, respondent bore an illegitimate child with his sweetheart, Patricia Figueroa, who
also claims that he did not fulfill his promise to... marry her after he passes the bar examinations.
Ruling:
We find that these facts do not constitute gross immorality warranting the permanent exclusion of respondent from
the legal profession. His engaging in premarital sexual relations with complainant and promises to marry suggests a
doubtful moral character on his part but the same... does not constitute grossly immoral conduct. The Court has
held that to justify suspension or disbarment the act complained of must not only be immoral, but grossly immoral.
"A grossly immoral act is one that is so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so... unprincipled or
disgraceful as to be reprehensible to a high degree."[6] It is a willful, flagrant, or shameless act which shows a moral
indifference to the opinion of respectable members of the community.[7]
We find the ruling in Arciga v. Maniwang[8] quite relevant because mere intimacy between a man and a woman,
both of whom possess no impediment to marry, voluntarily carried on and devoid of any deceit on the part of
respondent, is neither so corrupt nor so... unprincipled as to warrant the imposition of disciplinary sanction against
him, even if as a result of such relationship a child was born out of wedlock.[9]... espondent and complainant were
sweethearts whose sexual relations were evidently consensual. We do not find complainant's assertions that she
had been forced into sexual intercourse, credible. She continued to see and be respondent's girlfriend even after she
had given birth to... a son in 1964 and until 1971. All th... course, credible. She continued to see and be respondent's
girlfriend even after she had given birth to... a son in 1964 and until 1971. All those years of amicable and intimate
relations refute her allegations that she was forced to have sexual congress with him. Complainant was then an
adult who voluntarily and actively pursued their relationship and was not an innocent young girl... who could be
easily led astray. Unfortunately, respondent chose to marry and settle permanently with another woman. We
cannot castigate a man for seeking out the partner of his dreams, for marriage is a sacred and perpetual bond which
should be entered into because of love, not... for any other reason.
We cannot help viewing the instant complaint as an act of revenge of a woman scorned, bitter and unforgiving to
the end. It is also intended to make respondent suffer severely and it seems, perpetually, sacrificing the profession
he worked very hard to be admitted into. Even... assuming that his past indiscretions are ignoble, the twenty-six
years that respondent has been prevented from being a lawyer constitute sufficient punishment therefor. During
this time there appears to be no other indiscretion attributed to him.[10]
Respondent, who is now sixty-two years of age, should thus be allowed, albeit belatedly, to take the lawyer's oath
HEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED. Respondent Simeon Barranco, Jr. is ALLOWED to take his
oath as a lawyer upon payment of the proper fees.
SO ORDERED.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED. Respondent Simeon Barranco, Jr. is ALLOWED to take
his oath as a lawyer upon payment of the proper fees.
SO ORDERED.

Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. vs. Attys. Antonio M. Llorente and Ligaya P. Salayon
A.C. No. 4690. August 29, 2000

Facts: Attys. Antonio Llorente and Ligaya Salayon were election officers of the COMELEC and held the position of
Chairman and Vice-Chairman respectively for the Pasig City Board of Candidates. The respondents helped conduct
and oversee the 1995 elections. Then Senatorial candidate Aquilino Pimentel, Jr. alleged that the respondents
tampered with the votes received by them by either adding more votes for particular candidates in their Statement
of Votes (SoV) or reducing the number of votes of particular candidates in their SoV. Pimentel filed an
administrative complaint for their disbarment. Respondents argued that the discrepancies were due to honest
mistake, oversight and fatigue. Respondents also argued that the IBP Board of Governors had already exonerated
them from any offense and that the motion for reconsideration filed by Pimentel was not filed in time.

Held: GUILTY. Respondents do not dispute the fact that massive irregularities attended the canvassing of the
Pasig City election returns. The only explanation they could offer for such irregularities is that the same could be
due to honest mistake, human error, and/or fatigue on the part of the members of the canvassing committees who
prepared the SoVs. There is a limit, we believe, to what can be construed as an honest mistake or oversight due to
fatigue, in the performance of official duty. The sheer magnitude of the error renders the defense of honest mistake
or oversight due to fatigue, as incredible and simply unacceptable. Indeed, what is involved here is not just a case of
mathematical error in the tabulation of votes per precinct as reflected in the election returns and the subsequent
entry of the erroneous figures in one or two SoVs but a systematic scheme to pad the votes of certain senatorial
candidates at the expense of the petitioner in complete disregard of the tabulation in the election returns. A lawyer
who holds a government position may not be disciplined as a member of the bar for misconduct in the discharge of
his duties as a government official. However, if the misconduct also constitutes a violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility or the lawyer’s oath or is of such character as to affect his qualification as a lawyer or
shows moral delinquency on his part, such individual may be disciplined as a member of the bar for such
misconduct. Here, by certifying as true and correct the SoVs in question, respondents committed a breach of Rule
1.01 of the Code which stipulates that a lawyer shall not engage in “unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.” By express provision of Canon 6, this is made applicable to lawyers in the government service. In
addition, they likewise violated their oath of office as lawyers to “do no falsehood.” The Court found the
respondents guilty of misconduct and fined them PhP 10,000 each and issued a stern warning that similar conduct
in the future will be severely punished.
 In Re Terrell (1903)

In the matter of the suspension of Howard D. Terrell from the practice of law.

Ponente: Per Curiam

Doctrine: The promotion of an organization with the knowledge that it was created for the purpose of violating or
evading penal laws justifies an attorney’s removal or suspension from the practice of law.

Facts: An action for the suspension of attorney-at-law Howard Terrell from the practice of law was filed in the CFI
of Manila for allegedly assisting in the organization of “Centro Bellas Artes” and acting as attorney for such
association with full knowledge that it was created for the purpose of evading the law then in force in said city. The
CFI of Manila held that the charges against Terrell were true and made an order suspending him from his office as a
lawyer in the Philippine Islands. Aside from the action for his suspension from the practice of law, Terrell was also
charged with estafa in a separate criminal action but was eventually acquitted.

Issue: W/N Terrell should be suspended from the practice of law

Held/Ratio: Yes, he should be suspended. Malpractice or gross misconduct in his office warrants a lawyer’s
removal or suspension from the practice of law. Assisting a client in a scheme which the attorney knows to be
dishonest or conniving at a violation of law are acts which are enough to justify disbarment. However, Terrell’s
acquittal on the charge of estafa serves to lower his sanction to suspension from the practice of law in the
Philippine Islands for the term of one year from February 7, 1903.

ESTRADA vs. SANDIGANBAYAN G.R. No. 159486-88. November 25, 2003

Partisan Political Activities

FACTS:

Atty. Alan F. Paguia, speaking for petitioner, Joseph Ejercito Estrada claims of political partisanship against the
members of the Court, asserting that the justices have violated Rule 5.10 of the Code of Judicial Conduct which
prohibits justices or judges from participating in any partisan political activity by attending the ‘EDSA 2 Rally’ and
by authorizing the assumption of Vice-President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo to the Presidency in violation of the 1987
Constitution. Petitioner contends that the justices have thereby prejudged a case that would assail the legality of the
act taken by President Arroyo.

Sandiganbayan issued an order denying the foregoing motion, as well as the motion to dismiss, filed by petitioner.
Forthwith, petitioner filed a ‘Mosyong Pangrekonsiderasyon’ of the foregoing order.

ISSUE:

Was the act of the Chief Justice in swearing into office PGMA in EDSA a partisan political activity?

RULING:

No. The claim of the petitioner is of no merit. It should be clear that the phrase “partisan political activities,” in its
statutory context, relates to acts designed to cause the success or the defeat of a particular candidate or candidates
who have filed certificates of candidacy to a public office in an election. The taking of an oath of office by any
incoming President of the Republic before the Chief Justice of the Philippines is a traditional official function of the
Highest Magistrate. The assailed presence of other justices of the Court at such an event could be no different from
their appearance in such other official functions as attending the Annual State of the Nation Address by the
President of the Philippines before the Legislative Department.
Willem Kupers vs. Atty. Johnson B. Hontanosas
A. C. No. 5704
May 8, 2009

In preparing and notarizing the illegal lease contracts, respondent violated the Attorney’s Oath and several canons
of the Code of Professional Responsibility. One of the foremost sworn duties of an attorney-at-law is to “obey the
laws of the Philippines."

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Johnson B. Hontanosas, is found GUILTY of violating the lawyer’s oath and gross
misconduct. He is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months with a WARNING that a repetition of
the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely.

Complainant Kupers filed an administative case against respondent Atty. Hontanosas for allegedly preparing and
notarizing contracts that are both invalid and illegal for being violative of the limitations on aliens leasing private
lands under P. D. 471.

The supreme penalty of disbarment is meted out only in clear cases of misconduct that seriously affect the standing
and character of the lawyer as an officer of the court.

This duty is enshrined in the Attorney’s Oath and in Canon 1, which provides that “(a) lawyer shall uphold the
constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal processes.”

CANON 17 - A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND HE SHALL BE MINDFUL OF
THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM.

Rule 15.07 - A lawyer shall impress upon his client compliance with the laws and the principles of fairness.

He knowingly indicated that the contract shall be enforced for 49 years, instead of 25 years, and renewable for
another 49 years. He failed to inform his clients of the limitations of the aforesaid law and by his acts, deliberately
prepared a document contrary to law.

Kupers v Hontanosas

Whether or not Atty. Hontanosas violated the Lawyer's Oath and several canons of the Code of Professional
Responsibilty in preaparing and notarizing the illegal lease contacts.

RULINGS:

The other canons of professional responsibility which respondent transgressed are the ff:

CANON 15 -- A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND LOYALTY IN ALL HIS DEALINGS AND
TRANSACTIONS WITH HIS CLIENTS.

Aside from constituting violation of the lawyer's oath, the acts of respondents also amount to gross misconduct
under Section 27, Rule 138 of Rules Court.
GABRIELA CORONEL v. ATTY. NELSON A. CUNANAN, AC. No. 6738, 2015-08-12
Facts:
The Supreme Court (SC) has suspended a lawyer for malpractice and negligence.
"A lawyer who proposes to his client a recourse or remedy that is contrary to law, public policy, public order and
public morals, or that lessens the public confidence in the legal system is guilty of gross misconduct, and should be
suspended from the practice of law, or even disbarred."
Thus stressed the SC in its ruling written by Associate Justice Lucas P. Bersamin that suspended Atty. Nelson A.
Cunanan from the practice of law for one year for malpractice and negligence.
The SC also ordered Cunanan to return to Gabriela Coronel the PHP70,000 the latter had paid for the transfer of
certificates of title to her name.
Coronel engaged the services of Cunanan for the transfer of certificates of title registered in the name of her
deceased grandparents to her name and to the names of her co-heirs.
Cunanan advised Coronel that the transfer may be effected by two means, the "ordinary procedure" and "direct
registration".
According to him, "ordinary procedure" involves the transfer of the titles as mandated by law and registration with
the Register of Deeds (RD), which will cost an estimated PHP56,000, P50,000 of which, will be spent for the
payment of taxes, and would take a period of at least five months, while "direct registration" involves preparing
documents upon the advise of the RD and will involve an estimated cost to be negotiated with the RD officials or
employees at a flat amount of PHP50,000, and would take only one month or less.
Agreeing on the "direct registration" approach, Cunanan billed Coronel the following fees: PHP50,000 as package
deal for one of the titles; another PHP50,000 as package deal for another title; PHP5,000 for litigation expenses
and PHP15,000 as professional fees, to which Coronel agreed.
After Coronel paid PHP70,000, she could no longer contact Cunanan.
She wrote him a letter, to which Cunanan responded with an extra-judicial settlement agreement and later on asked
for the duplicate copy of one of the titles, which Coronel sent.
This prompted her to demand the PHP70,000 back and return the owner's duplicate copy of the title she had sent
him.
When her request was not heeded, Coronel initiated a disbarment case charging Cunanan with deceit, malpractice
and gross misconduct for advising and convincing her to engage his services in the transfer of her grandparents'
certificates of title.
However, Coronel submitted an affidavit of desistance saying that she had made amends with Cunanan, and the
disbarment complaint was only due to a misunderstanding between them.
A few days later, the parties also submitted their joint motion to dismiss.
Issues:
A lawyer who proposes to his client a recourse or remedy that is contrary to law, public policy, public order and
public morals, or that lessens the public confidence in the legal system is guilty of gross misconduct, and should be
suspended from the... practice of law, or even disbarred.
Ruling:
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) found Cunanan guilty of
malpractice and negligence, recommending his suspension and required him to return the PHP70,000 to Coronel.
The IBP Board of Governors denied Cunanan's subsequent motion for reconsideration (MR).
Upholding IBP's recommendations, the SC underscored that Cunanan made the proposal despite its patent
illegality in order to take advantage of the complainant's limited legal knowledge of the regular procedures for the
transfer of title under circumstances of intestacy.
"[Atty. Cunanan] made [Coronel] agree to the 'direct registration' through deceitful misrepresentation," the SC said.
It added that "[h]e thereby abused his being a lawyer to the hilt in order to cause not only his client but also the
public in general to doubt the sincerity of the member of the Law Profession, and consequently diminish the
public's trust and confidence in lawyers in general."
The SC pointed out that although Cunanan outlined to Coronel the "ordinary procedure" of an extra-judicial
settlement of estate as a means of transferring title, he also proposed the option of "direct registration" despite
being fully aware that such option was actually a shortcut intended to circumvent the law, and thus patently
contrary to law.
It added that "[t]he proposal of 'direct registration' was unquestionably unlawful, immoral and deceitful all at
once." - PNA — KBAPI

CASTANEDA V AGO CASTRO; July 30, 1975

NATURE - Petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals

FACTS - 1955 – Castaneda and Henson filed a replevin suit against Ago in the CFI of Manila to recover certain
machineries. -1957 – judgment in favor of Castaneda and Henson - 1961 – SC affirmed the judgment; trial court
issued writ of execution; Ago’s motion denied, levy was made on Ago’s house and lots; sheriff advertised the sale,
Ago moved to stop the auction; CA dismissed the petition; SC affirmed dismissal - Ago thrice attempted to obtain
writ of preliminary injunction to restrain sheriff from enforcing the writ of execution; his motions were denied -
1963 – sheriff sold the house and lots to Castaneda and Henson; Ago failed to redeem - 1964 – sheriff executed final
deed of sale; CFI issued writ of possession to the properties - 1964 – Ago filed a complaint upon the judgment
rendered against him in the replevin suit saying it was his personal obligation and that his wife ½ share in their
conjugal house could not legally be reached by the levy made; CFI of QC issued writ of preliminary injunction
restraining Castaneda the Registed of Deeds and the sheriff from registering the final deed of sale; the battle on the
matter of lifting and restoring the restraining order continued - 1966 – Agos filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition to enjoin sheriff from enforcing writ of possession; SC dismissed it; Agos filed a similar petition with
the CA which also dismissed the petition; Agos appealed to SC which dismissed the petition - Agos filed another
petition for certiorari and prohibition with the CA which gave due course to the petition and granted preliminary
injunction.

ISSUE WON the Agos’ lawyer, encourage his clients to avoid controversy

HELD - No. Despite the pendency in the trial court of the complaint for the annulment of the sheriff’s sale, justice
demands that the petitioners, long denied the fruits of their victory in the replevin suit, must now enjoy them, for,
the respondents Agos abetted by their lawyer Atty. Luison, have misused legal remedies and prostituted the judicial
process to thwart the satisfaction of the judgment, to the extended prejudice of the petitioners. - Forgetting his
sacred mission as a sworn public servant and his exalted position as an officer of the court, Atty. Luison has allowed
himself to become an instigator of controversy and a predator of conflict instead of a mediator for concord and a
conciliator for compromise, a virtuoso of technicality in the conduct of litigation instead of a true exponent of the
primacy of truth and moral justice. - A counsel’s assertiveness in espousing with candor and honesty his client’s
cause must be encouraged and is to be commended; what the SC does not and cannot countenance is a lawyer’s
insistence despite the patent futility of his client’s position. It is the duty of the counsel to advice his client on the
merit or lack of his case. If he finds his client’s cause as defenseless, then he is his duty to advice the latter to
acquiesce and submit rather than traverse the incontrovertible. A lawyer must resist the whims and caprices of his
client, and temper his client’s propensity to litigate.
Adelino H. Ledesma v. Hon. Rafael C. Climaco
G.R. No. L- 23815 (June 28, 1974)

FACTS:

Atty. Ledesma was the counsel de parte of one of the accused when he was appointed as Election Registrar by the C
ommission on Elections. He then filed a motion withdrawing as such, but Judge Climaco denied it and appointed hi
m as counsel de officio for the two defendants. Again, Atty. Ledesma filed a motion to withdraw on the ground that
his appointment requires full time, but the Judge still denied it. Consequently, the defense obtained 8 postponeme
nts.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Atty. Ledesma should be allowed to withdraw as counsel de officio considering his appointment as
Election Registrar.

RULING:

No. If respondent Judge were required to answer the petition, the welfare of the accused could be prejudiced as stre
ssed by Chief Justice Moran in People v. Holgado in these words: ” Even the most intelligent or educated man may
have no skill in the science of law, particularly in the rules of procedure, and; without counsel, he may be convicted
not because he is guilty but because he does not know how to establish his innocence. And this can happen more ea
sily to persons who are ignorant or uneducated. It is for this reason that the right to be assisted by counsel is deeme
d so important that it has become a constitutional right and it is so implemented that under rules of procedure it is
not enough for the Court to apprise an accused of his right to have an attorney, it is not enough to ask him whether
he desires the aid of an attorney, but it is essential that the court should assign one de oficio for him if he so desires
and he is poor or grant him a reasonable time to procure an attorney of his own.”

It has to be borne in mind that membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. It could be that for s
ome lawyers, especially the neophytes in the profession, being appointed counsel de oficio is an irksome chore. How
ever, the admonition is ever timely for those enrolled in the ranks of legal practitioners that there are times, and thi
s is one of them, when duty to court and to client takes precedence over the promptings of self-interest.

In re Luis B. Tagorda (1929) (card and letter)

Doctrine: • The most worthy and effective advertisement possible, even for a young lawyer, and especially with his
brother lawyers, is the establishment of a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust.

Facts: Luis B. Tagorda was an attorney who was elected as the third member of the provincial board of Isabela. He
admits that prior to his election, he made use of a card2 written in Spanish and Ilocano, which contains a list of
tasks he may undertake as a notary public, and a lawyer, as well as a general invitation to consult with him for free.
Tagorda also admits that after he was elected into office, he wrote a letter3 to one of his hometown”s barrio
lieutenants. The letter basically informed the recipient of Tagorda”s intention to continue residing in Echague,
despite having to attend board sessions in Ilagan, in order that he may continue to serve his hometown as a notary
public and lawyer. The letter subtly offered information regarding Tagorda”s office hours, together with an express
request that the recipient spread the word as to his willingness to accept land registration cases for a fee of P3.00
per title. The government, through the provincial fiscal of Isabela, together with the Attorney-General, brought this
matter to the attention of the Court.

Issue: 1. W/N Tagorda”s actions constitute malpractice

Held/Ratio: 1. YES. Section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act No. 2828 expressly provides that
the practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally, or through paid agents or brokers,
constitutes malpractice. This is in accord with the Canons of Professional Ethics adopted by the Philippine Bar
Association in 1917. Canon 27 of the said document provides that a well-merited reputation serves as a lawyer”s
most effective form of advertisement.
Ulep vs. Legal Clinic, 223 SCRA 378 (1993)

FACTS:

Mauricio C. Ulep, petitioner, prays this Court "to order the respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., to cease and desist
from issuing advertisements similar to or of the same tenor as that of Annexes `A' and `B' (of said petition) and to
perpetually prohibit persons or entities from making advertisements pertaining to the exercise of the law profession
other than those allowed by law.” The advertisements complained of by herein petitioner are as follows:

Annex A
SECRET MARRIAGE?
P560.00 for a valid marriage.
Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE.
ANNULMENT. VISA.
Please call: 521-0767,
LEGAL5217232, 5222041
CLINIC, INC.8:30 am-6:00 pm
7-Flr. Victoria Bldg. UN Ave., Mla.

Annex B
GUAM DIVORCE
DON PARKINSON
an Attorney in Guam, is giving FREE BOOKS on Guam Divorce through The Legal Clinic beginning Monday to
Friday during office hours.
Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage. Immigration Problems, Visa Ext.
Quota/Non-quota Res. & Special Retiree's Visa. Declaration of Absence.
Remarriage to Filipina Fiancees. Adoption. Investment in the Phil. US/Foreign
Visa for Filipina Spouse/Children. Call Marivic.
THE 7 F Victoria Bldg. 429 UN Ave.
LEGALErmita, Manila nr. US Embassy
CLINIC, INC. Tel. 521-7232521-7251522-2041; 521-0767

It is the submission of petitioner that the advertisements above reproduced are champertous, unethical, demeaning
of the law profession, and destructive of the confidence of the community in the integrity of the members of the bar
and that, as a member of the legal profession, he is ashamed and offended by the said advertisements, hence the
reliefs sought in his petition as herein before quoted.

In its answer to the petition, respondent admits the fact of publication of said advertisements at its instance, but
claims that it is not engaged in the practice of law but in the rendering of "legal support services" through paralegals
with the use of modern computers and electronic machines. Respondent further argues that assuming that the
services advertised are legal services, the act of advertising these services should be allowed supposedly in the light
of the caseof John R. Bates and Van O'Steen vs. State Bar of Arizona, reportedly decidedby the United States
Supreme Court on June 7, 1977.

Issue:

Whether or not the services offered by respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., as advertised by it constitutes practice of
law and, in either case, whether the same can properly be the subject of the advertisements herein complained of.

Held:

Yes. The Supreme Court held that the services offered by the respondent constitute practice of law. The definition of
“practice of law” is laid down in the case of Cayetano vs. Monsod, as defined:Black defines "practice of law" as:"The
rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal principles and technique to serve the
interest of another with his consent. It is not limited to appearing in court, or advising and assisting in the conduct
of litigation, but embraces the preparation of pleadings, and other papers incident to actions and special
proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of legal instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all legal advice to
clients. It embraces all advice to clients and all actions taken for them in matters connected with thelaw." The
contention of respondent that it merely offers legal support services can neither be seriously considered nor
sustained. Said proposition is belied by respondent's own description of the services it has been offering. While
some of the services being offered by respondent corporation merely involve mechanical and technical know-how,
such as the installation of computer systems and programs for the efficient management of law offices, or the
computerization of research aids and materials, these will not suffice to justify an exception to the general rule.
What is palpably clear is that respondent corporation gives out legal information to laymen and lawyers. Its
contention that such function is non-advisory and non-diagnostic is more apparent than real. In providing
information, for example, about foreign laws on marriage, divorce and adoption, it strains the credulity of this
Court that all that respondent corporation will simply do is look for the law, furnish a copy thereof to the client, and
stop there as if it were merely a bookstore. With its attorneys and so called paralegals, it will necessarily have to
explain to the client the intricacies of the law and advise him or her on the proper course of action to be taken as
may be provided for by said law. That is what its advertisements represent and for which services it will
consequently charge and be paid. That activity falls squarely within the jurisprudential definition of "practice of
law." Such a conclusion will not be altered by the fact that respondent corporation does not represent clients in
court since law practice, as the weight of authority holds, is not limited merely to court appearances but extends to
legal research, giving legal advice, contract drafting, and so forth. That fact that the corporation employs paralegals
to carry out its services is not controlling. What is important is that it is engaged in the practice of law by virtueof
the nature of the services it renders which thereby brings it within the ambit of the statutory prohibitions against
the advertisements which it has caused to be published and are now assailed in this proceeding. The standards of
the legal profession condemn the lawyer's advertisement of his talents. (SEE CANON 2) A lawyer cannot, without
violating the ethics of his profession, advertise his talents or skills as in a manner similar to a merchant advertising
his goods. The proscription against advertising of legal services or solicitation of legal business rests on the
fundamental postulate that the practice of law is a profession. The canons of the profession tell us that the best
advertising possible for a lawyer is a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust, which
must be earned as the outcome of character and conduct. Good and efficient service to a client as well as to the
community has a way of publicizing itself and catching public attention. That publicity is a normal by-product of
effective service which is rightand proper. A good and reputable lawyer needs no artificial stimulus to generate it
and to magnify his success. He easily sees the difference between a normal by-product of able service and the
unwholesome result of propaganda.

PEDRO L. LINSANGAN v. ATTY. NICOMEDES TOLENTINO, AC. No. 6672, 2009-09-04

Facts:
Complainant alleged that respondent, with the help of paralegal Fe Marie Labiano, convinced his clients[2] to
transfer legal representation. Respondent promised them financial assistance[3] and expeditious collection on
their... claims.[4] To induce them to hire his services, he persistently called them and sent them text messages.
To support his allegations, complainant presented the sworn affidavit[5] of James Gregorio attesting that Labiano
tried to prevail upon him to sever his lawyer-client relations with complainant and utilize respondent's services
instead, in exchange for a... loan of P50,000.
Hence, this complaint.
Respondent, in his defense, denied knowing Labiano and authorizing the printing and circulation of the said calling
card.[7]
The complaint was referred to the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.[8]
The complaint before us is rooted on the alleged intrusion by respondent into complainant's professional practice in
violation of Rule 8.02 of the CPR. And the means employed by respondent in furtherance of the said misconduct
themselves constituted distinct violations of... ethical rules.
Complainant presented substantial evidence[19] (consisting of the sworn statements of the very same persons
coaxed by Labiano and referred to respondent's office) to prove that respondent indeed solicited legal business as
well as profited from referrals'... suits.
Although respondent initially denied knowing Labiano in his answer, he later admitted it during the mandatory
hearing.
Through Labiano's actions, respondent's law practice was benefited. Hapless seamen were enticed to transfer
representation on the strength of Labiano's word that respondent could produce a more favorable result.
With regard to respondent's violation of Rule 8.02 of the CPR, settled is the rule that a lawyer should not steal
another lawyer's client nor induce the latter to retain him by a promise of better service, good result or reduced fees
for his services.
Moreover, by engaging in a money-lending venture with his clients as borrowers, respondent violated Rule 16.04
Labiano's calling card contained the phrase "with financial assistance." The phrase was clearly used to entice clients
(who already had representation) to change counsels with a promise of loans to finance their legal actions. Money
was dangled to lure clients away from... their original lawyers, thereby taking advantage of their financial distress
and emotional vulnerability.
Issues:
lawyers are reminded that the practice of law is a profession and not a business; lawyers should not advertise their
talents as merchants advertise their wares.[13] To allow a lawyer to advertise his talent or skill is to commercialize...
the practice of law, degrade the profession in the public's estimation and impair its ability to efficiently render that
high character of service to which every member of the bar is called.[
Ruling:
Hence, the CBD... recommended that respondent be reprimanded with a stern warning that any repetition would
merit a heavier penalty.
We adopt the findings of the IBP on the unethical conduct of respondent but we modify the recommended penalty.
respondent Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino for violating Rules 1.03, 2.03, 8.02 and 16.04 and Canon 3 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice
of law for a period of one... year effective immediately from receipt of this resolution. He is STERNLY WARNED
that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely.

Manuel G. Villatuya vs. Atty. Bede S. Tabalingcos

A. C. No. 6622 July 10, 2012
Manuel G. Villatuya (complainant) filed this complaint for disbarment
against Atty. Bede S. Tabalingcos (respondent).

Facts:
In this Complaint for disbarment, complainant Villatuya charged Atty. Bede S. Tabalingcos with:
1.) Unlawful solicitation of cases by setting up two financial consultancy firms as fronts for his legal
services;
2.) Non-payment of fees to complainant despite having promised to complainant (a financial consultant),
via a verbal agreement, that the latter would be entitled to ₱ 50,000 for every Stay Order issued by the court in the
cases they would handle, in addition to ten percent (10%) of the fees paid by their clients; and
3.) Gross immorality for marrying two other women while his first marriage was subsisting, as supported by three
different marriage contracts bearing the name of respondent and three other women secured by the complainant.
In his defense, respondent asserted that complainant himself was unprofessional and incompetent in
performing his job and that there was no verbal agreement between them regarding the sharing of professional
fees paid by his clients. He presented documents showing that the salary of complainant had been
paid. Respondent also denied committing any unlawful solicitation. Respondent did not specifically address
the allegations regarding his alleged bigamous marriages with two other women.

II. Issues
1. Whether respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility by non-payment of fees to complainant
2. Whether respondent violated the rule against unlawful solicitation, and
3. Whether respondent is guilty of gross immoral conduct for having married thrice

III. Ruling
1. Under Rule 9.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer is
proscribed by the Code to divide or agree to divide the fees for legal services rendered with a person not licensed to
practice law. There was no violation of this provision in this case, for complainant failed to proffer
convincing
evidence to prove the existence of that agreement.
2. The Court held that respondent indeed used the business entities such as Jesi & Jane Management Inc. and
Christmel Business Link, Inc., both owned by him, to solicit clients and to advertise his legal
services,
purporting to be specialized in corporate rehabilitation cases. Based on the facts of the case, he violated Rule 2.03
of the Code, which prohibits lawyers from soliciting cases for the purpose of profit. A lawyer is not prohibited from
engaging in business or other lawful occupation. Impropriety arises, though, when the business is of such a nature
or is conducted in such a manner as to be inconsistent with the lawyer’s duties as a member of the bar.
3. Respondent exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of morality required of him as a member of the bar. He
made a mockery of marriage, a sacred institution demanding respect and dignity.57 His acts of committing bigamy
twice constituted grossly immoral conduct and are grounds for disbarment under Section 27, Rule 138 of the
Revised Rules of Court.

IV. Adjudication:
The Court resolved the following charges against Atty. Bede S. Tabalingcos as follows:
1. The charge of dishonesty is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
2. Respondent is REPRIMANDED for acts of illegal advertisement and solicitation.
3. Atty. Bede S. Tabalingcos is DISBARRED for engaging in bigamy, a grossly immoral conduct.

Khan vs. Simbillo, A.C No. 5299, August 19, 2003

FACTS:

A paid advertisement in the Philippine Daily Inquirer was published which reads:“Annulment of Marriage
Specialist [contact number]”. Espeleta, a staff of the Supreme Court, called up the number but it was Mrs. Simbillo
who answered. She claims that her husband, Atty. Simbillo was an expert in handling annulment cases and can
guarantee a court decree within 4-6mos provided thecase will not involve separation of property and custody of
children. It appears that similar advertisements were also published.An administrative complaint was filed which
was referred to the IBP for investigation and recommendation. The IBP resolved to suspend Atty. Simbillo for
1year. Note that although the name of Atty. Simbillo did not appear in the advertisement, he admitted the acts
imputed against him but argued that he should not be charged. He said that it was time to lift the absolute
prohibition against advertisement because the interest of the public isn’t served in any wayby the prohibition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Simbillo violated Rule2.03 & Rule3.01.

HELD:

Yes!The practice of law is not a business --- it is a profession in which the primary duty is public service and money.
Gaining livelihood is a secondary consideration while duty to public service and administration of justice should be
primary. Lawyers should subordinate their primary interest.Worse, advertising himself as an “annulment of
marriage specialist” he erodes and undermines the sanctity of an institution still considered as sacrosanct --- he in
fact encourages people otherwise disinclined to dissolve their marriage bond.Solicitation of business is not
altogether proscribed but for it to be proper it must be compatible with the dignity of the legal profession. Note that
the law list where the lawyer’s name appears must be a reputable law list only for that purpose --- a lawyer may not
properly publish in a daily paper, magazine…etc., nor may a lawyer permit his name to be published the contents of
which are likely to deceive or injure the public or the bar.

DACANAY VS. BAKER & MC KENZIE (A.C. NO. 2131 05/10/1985)

FACTS: Atty. Dacanay sought to enjoin Juan Collas and nine other lawyers from practicing law under the name
Baker and McKenzie, a law firm organized in Illinois. In 1979 respondent Vicente A. Torres used the letterhead of
Baker & McKenzie which contains the names of the ten lawyers asking Rosie Clurman for the release of 87 shares of
Cathay Products International, Inc. to H.E. Gabriel, a client. Atty. Dacanay replied denying any liability of Clurman
and asking the lawyer his purpose of using the letterhead of another law office.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondents should enjoin from practising law under the firm name Baker & McKenzie.

HELD: YES. Baker & McKenzie, being an alien law firm, cannot practice law in the Philippines (Sec. 1, Rule 138,
Rules of Court).

 Who may practice law. - Any person heretofore duly admitted as a member of the bar, or hereafter admitted
as such in accordance with the provisions of this rule, and who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to
practice law.

Respondents' use of the firm name Baker & McKenzie constitutes a representation that being associated with the
firm they could "render legal services of the highest quality to multinational business enterprises and others
engaged in foreign trade and investment" which the Court finds unethical because Baker & McKenzie is not
authorized to practise law here.

WHEREFORE, the respondents are enjoined from practising law under the firm name Baker & McKenzie.

92 SCRA 1
PETITION FOR AUTHORITY TO CONTINUE USE OF THE FIRM NAME “SYCIP, SALAZAR,
FELICIANO, HERNANDEZ & CASTILLO.”
July 30, 1979

Facts:
Petitions were filed by the surviving partners of Atty. Alexander Sycip, who died on May 5, 1975 and by the
surviving partners of Atty. Herminio Ozaeta, who died on February 14, 1976, praying that they be allowed to
continue using, in the names of their firms, the names of partners who had passed away.
Petitioners contend that the continued use of the name of a deceased or former partner when permissible by local
custom, is not unethical but care should be taken that no imposition or deception is practiced through this use.
They also contend that no local custom prohibits the continued use of a deceased partner’s name in a professional
firm’s name; there is no custom or usage in the Philippines, or at least in the Greater Manila Area, which recognizes
that the name of a law firm necessarily identifies the individual members of the firm.

Issue:
WON the surviving partners may be allowed by the court to retain the name of the partners who already passed
away in the name of the firm? NO
Held:
In the case of Register of Deeds of Manila vs. China Banking Corporation, the SC said:
The Court believes that, in view of the personal and confidential nature of the relations between attorney and client,
and the high standards demanded in the canons of professional ethics, no practice should be allowed which even in
a remote degree could give rise to the possibility of deception. Said attorneys are accordingly advised to drop the
names of the deceased partners from their firm name.
The public relations value of the use of an old firm name can tend to create undue advantages and disadvantages in
the practice of the profession. An able lawyer without connections will have to make a name for himself starting
from scratch. Another able lawyer, who can join an old firm, can initially ride on that old firm’s reputation
established by deceased partners.
The court also made the difference from the law firms and business corporations:
A partnership for the practice of law is not a legal entity. It is a mere relationship or association for a particular
purpose. … It is not a partnership formed for the purpose of carrying on trade or business or of holding property.”
Thus, it has been stated that “the use of a nom de plume, assumed or trade name in law practice is improper.
We find such proof of the existence of a local custom, and of the elements requisite to constitute the same, wanting
herein. Merely because something is done as a matter of practice does not mean that Courts can rely on the same
for purposes of adjudication as a juridical custom.
Petition suffers legal and ethical impediment.

A.C. No. 9896 March 19, 2014

MA. ELENA CARLOS NEBREJA, Petitioner, vs. ATTY. BENJAMIN REONAL, Respondent.
Legal Ethics Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility

FACTS: On June 26, 2006, complainant filed before the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBP) of the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines against respondent. Complainant alleged that she engaged respondent's services to file her
petition for annulment. After paying respondent, however, complainant did not receive any word from him as to the
status of her petition for annulment. She was told that her petition was dismissed for lack of evidence. He then
again asked for sums of money. Complainant again, despite respondents receipt of sums of money, failed to receive
any update from respondent. Complainant met with respondent to secure copies of her annulment case file.
Respondent merely handed to her photocopies of her marriage contract and her childrens birth certificates. When
she asked for copies of her case files, he just told her that his law office could not let her use the pleadings of the
case. Complainant checked her records and found respondents demand letter bearing the address of his claimed
law office, "18/f Century Towers Building, Legaspi St. corner de la Rosa, Makati." When complainant tried to look
for the said office, she discovered that there was no such building. She also found respondents calling card bearing
the address, "86 Magat Salamat Street, Project 4, Quezon City," which, complainant found out, was respondents
residential address. These and other circumstances made complainant suspect that he did not file any petition for
annulment at all. In his answer and position paper, respondent denied having been engaged by complainant to
handle her petition for annulment and having been paid therefor. Respondent averred that complainant did not
engage him to be her lawyer because she was unemployed and could not afford his legal services. CBD found that
respondent was liable for inexcusable negligence for failing to file her petition for annulment, found that indeed,
respondent used a fictitious office address to deceive complainant and recommended his suspension from the
practice of law and ordered him to return the amounts taken from the complainant.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent is liable.

RULING: Yes. Despite the engagement of his services, respondent did not file the contracted petition. His conduct,
as held in Vda. De Enriquez v. San Jose,7 amounted to inexcusable negligence. This was found to be contrary to the
mandate prescribed in Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the TAXATION II CLASS (A.Y. 2014-2015) Code of Professional
Responsibility, which enjoined a lawyer not to neglect a legal matter entrusted to him. Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility provides for the rule on negligence and states: Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not
neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable. This
Court has consistently held, in construing this Rule, that the mere failure of the lawyer to perform the obligations
due to the client is considered per se a violation.8 Thus, a lawyer was held to be negligent when he failed to do
anything to protect his client's interest after receiving his acceptance fee.9 In another case,10 this Court has
penalized a lawyer for failing to inform the client of the status of the case, among other matters. In another
instance, for failure to take the appropriate actions in connection with his client's case, the lawyer was suspended
from the practice of law for a period of six months and was required to render accounting of all the sums he
received from his client. In this case, respondent clearly received his acceptance fee, among others, and then
completely neglected his clients cause. Moreover, he failed to inform complainant of the true status of the petition.
His act of receiving money as acceptance fee for legal services in handling the complainant's case and,
subsequently, failing to render the services, was a clear violation of Canon 18 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
Samonte v. Gatdula, [February 26, 1999], 363 PHIL 369-376)

Facts:

Respondent Gatdula was charged with grave misconduct in engaging in the private practice of law. Complainant
was the representative of her sister for ejectment pending with the MTC. The execution of that decision in favor of
plaintiff was enjoined by Branch 220, RTC, Quezon City where respondent is the Branch Clerk of Court.
Complainant alleged that respondent tried to convince her to change his lawyer if she wanted the execution of the
judgment to proceed and even gave her his calling card with the name "Baligod, Gatdula, Tacardon, Dimailig and
Celera Law Offices'' with address at 220 Mariwasa Bldg., 717 Aurora Blvd., Cubao, Quezon City which complainant
attached to her affidavit-complaint. Respondent, when asked to comment, claimed that it was complainant who
showed him said calling card and asked him if he could handle the case but to which he refused as he was not
connected with the law firm, though he was invited to join the firm. The case was set for hearing for several times
but complainant nor her counsel did not appear. The return of the service stated that complainant was abroad.
Respondent testified in his own behalf and vehemently denied complainant's allegation. He, however, did not deny
that his name appeared on the calling card or that the calling card was printed without his knowledge and consent.

The Court ruled that the inclusion or retention of respondent's name in the professional card constitutes an act of
solicitation which is a violation of Section 7, subparagraph (b)(2) of Republic Act No. 6713 (Code of Conduct and
Ethical Standards for Public Officials or Employees).

The conduct and behavior of everyone connected with the dispensation of justice from the presiding judge to the
lowliest clerk must not only be characterized by propriety and decorum but above all else must be above suspicion.

Issue: WON the respondent violated canon 3.03 for engaging in the private practice of law while holding public
office.

Held: Yes. While the respondent vehemently denies the complainant's allegations, he does not deny that his name
appears on the calling card attached to the complaint, which admittedly came into the hands of the complainant.
The above explanation tendered by the Respondent is an admission that it is his name which appears on the calling
card, a permissible form of advertising or solicitation of legal services. Respondent does not claim that the calling
card printed without his knowledge or consent, and the calling card carries his name primarily and the name of
Baligod, Gatdula, Tacardon, Dimailig and Celera with address at 220 Mariwasa Bldg., 717 Aurora Blvd., Cubao,
Quezon City" in the left corner. The card clearly gives the impression that he is connected with the said law firm.
The inclusion/retention of his name in the professional card constitutes an act of solicitation which violates Section
7 sub-par. (b)(2) of Republic Act No. 6713, otherwise known as "Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public
Officials and Employees."

"(2) Engage in the private practice of their profession unless authorized by the Constitution or law,
provided that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with official functions."

The conduct and behavior of everyone connected with an office charged with the dispensation of justice, from the
presiding judge to the lowliest clerk, should be circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility. His conduct,
at all times must not only be characterized by propriety and decorum but above all else must be above suspicion.
Responded was reprimanded and ordered by the court to exclude his name in the firm name of any office engaged
in the private practice of law.