RULE 117: MOTION TO QUASH gunshot wounds and has blood type B, Yang sustained 3 gunshot wounds and
ounds and has blood type B, Yang sustained 3 gunshot wounds and has blood type A; (5)
HERRERA AND MARAINO V. SANDIGANBAYAN
GR NO. 119660-61 (2009)
Facts:
● Pat. Edgardo Herrera and Pat. Redentor Mariano, together with Pat. Roberto Barrera and Pat. Rodolfo
Alcalde, all members of the Paranaque Police Station, were charged with 2 counts of murder, for killing
Shi Shu Yang and George Go, before the Sandiganbayan (SB).
● (NOTE: The other two accused, Barrera and Alcalde, did not file any more pleading after they were
convicted that’s why they are not part of the case.)
● The two original Informations, both dated December 4, 1990, against Herrera and Mariano alleged that:
On December 28, 1989 in Paranaque, Herrera and Mariano who were then public officers, being then
members of the Paranaque Police Force, armed with guns, and conspiring, confederating, mutually
helping and aiding one another, with intent to kill and with treachery and by taking advantage of their
public positions as members of the Paranaque Police Force, willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously shoot
Shi Shu Yang and George Go on different parts of his body, thereby inflicting serious mortal wounds
upon the victim thereby inflicting serious and mortal wounds upon the victim which were the direct and
immediate cause of his death. (One Information for each victim)
● During the arraignment, Herrera and Mariano pleaded not guilty. They also filed a Joint Petition for Bail
and raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction for failure of the prosecution to allege in the Information that
they committed the crimes “in relation to their office.”
● HOWEVER, on the same day, Sandiganbayan ordered the amendment of the Informations and stated
that the evidence adduced during the pre-trial of the case and the hearing on the petition of the bail
shall be deemed automatically reproduced as evidence during the trial of the case on the merits.
● The amended Informations, both dated July 15, 1992, alleged that: On December 28, 1989 in
Paranaque, Herrera and Mariano who were then public officers, being then members of the Paranaque
Police Force, armed with guns, and conspiring, confederating, mutually helping and aiding one another,
committing the offense in relation to their public position or office, with intent to kill and with
treachery and by taking advantage of their public positions as members of the Paranaque Police Force,
willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously shoot Shi Shu Yang and George Go on different parts of his body,
thereby inflicting serious mortal wounds upon the victim thereby inflicting serious and mortal wounds
upon the victim which were the direct and immediate cause of his death. (Again, one Info per victim)
● Herrera and Mariano were arraigned anew on September 1992, and both entered their pleas of not
guilty. They also withdrew their prior objections to the issue of lack of jurisdiction of the SB.
● During the pre-trial, the parties stipulated that Herrera and Mariano were public officers at the time of
the commission of the crimes and thus the cases were consolidated and a joint trial on merits ensued.
● According to the prosecution, this is basically what happened: The police officers were lighting
firecrackers near Chow Chow which is the restaurant owned by Go, and when Go came down with his
pistol, he was apprehended by Pat. Barrera who introduced himself as a policeman, asked for the
license of the .45 caliber pistol, and told Go that he will bring the firearm to the police station for
verification. Barrera ordered Go and his Taiwanese friend Shi Shu to board their jeepney. (In short,
kinda like entrapment/ instigation) The police officers also ordered the Go and Yang to undergo medical
examination and thus they were taken to the Paranaque Community Hospital (PCH). Thereafter, Go and
Yang were brought to Timothy Street, Multinational Village where they were killed.
● They presented many witnesses and testimonies such as (1) Reynaldo Ong, the manager of Chow
Chow; (2) Edna Go, wife of Go; (3) Winterhalter, a foreigner who witnessed the killing using a pair of
binoculars (woah); (4) Dr. Garcia who conducted the autopsy à important details: Go sustained 8 fatal
Forensic Chemist of NBI who reported that the victims never fired a gun based on a paraffin test.
● The defense on the other hand claims that Herrera and Mariano were just assisting Barrera in bringing
some persons for medical examination. Prior to the shooting incident, they were informed that George
Go was previously arrested by Barrera for illegal possession of firearm. They brought Go and Yang to
the PCH and on the way back to the police station, they heard a struggle ensue at the back of the patrol
van as Alcalde said, “George, bitawan mo ang baril ko.” And then they heard successive shots. When
they looked back, they saw Go grappling for the possession of a firearm (later on, they said it was an
armalite) with Alcalde, they stopped the car and alighted to pacify the trouble but alas there were more
shots and they found Go and Young bloodied. (Basically, Herrera and Mariano testified individually but
they said almost the same things.) The defense also presented Dr. Soliven’s findings that Go was
positive for alcohol and that Go had no signs of physical injuries.
● What really happened: Mariano parked the patrol van along Timothy Street which was a practically
deserted area, isolated from traffic and pedestrians. Alcalde, Barrera, and petitioner Herrera brought
out the two handcuffed victims from the back portion of the patrol van in order to eventually salvage
them. Petitioner Mariano appeared to be faking an alleged interrogation and was trying to get the name
of Shi Shu Yang, whose identity was then not yet immediately known. Later, petitioner Mariano also
participated in shooting at the unarmed victims.
● The SB convicted Herrera and Mariano each for 2 counts of murder, and denied petitioners’ Joint Motion
for Reconsideration. Thus, Herrera and Mariano filed a petition for review on certiorari.
Issue:
WON H&M’s conviction will place them in double jeopardy
Held: No
Ruling:
 H&M insist that SB erred in convicting H&M for the crime of murder under the amended Informations as
they had earlier been arraigned under the original Informations for murder and their arraignment under
the amended Informations placed them in double jeopardy. HOWEVER, the SC found this argument
untenable.
 SB ordered the amendment of the Informations and made it of record that the evidence adduced during
the pre-trial of the case and the hearing on the petition for bail shall be deemed automatically
reproduced as evidence during the trial of the case on the merits. Double jeopardy did not attach by
virtue of petitioners’ plea of not guilty under the amended information. For a claim of double jeopardy
to prosper, the following requisites must concur: (1) there is a complaint or information or other formal
charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction; (2) the same is filed before a court of
competent jurisdiction; (3) there is a valid arraignment or plea to the charges; and (4) the accused is
convicted or acquitted or the case is otherwise dismissed or terminated without his express consent.
 In the present case, H&M pleaded not guilty to the two original Informations for the crimes of murder.
Thereafter, in their Joint Petition for Bail, H&M raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction on the ground that
the prosecution failed to allege in the information that the crimes were committed “in relation to their
office.” On the same day, public respondent ordered the amendment of the Informations accordingly.
Thus, the first requirement for double jeopardy to attach, i.e., that the Informations against the
petitioners were valid, has not been complied with.
 Likewise, the fourth element was lacking. H&M cannot be validly convicted on the basis of the original
Informations as the prosecution failed to allege in the Informations that the crimes were committed “in
relation to their office.” Thus, petitioners were not placed in danger of being convicted when they
 entered their pleas of not guilty to the two original Informations which were insufficient in form and
substance to sustain their conviction. There was also no dismissal or termination of the cases.
 Furthermore, it was well-within the power of SB to order the amendment of the two original
Informations. Section 4, Rule 117 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure states that if the motion
to quash is based on an alleged defect of the complaint or Information which can be cured by
amendment, the court shall order that an amendment be made. If it is based on the ground that
the facts charged do not constitute an offense, the prosecution shall be given by the court an
opportunity to correct the defect by amendment. The motion shall be granted if the prosecution fails to
make the amendment, or the complaint or Information still suffers from the same defect despite the
amendment.
 LIEZL CO V. HAROLD GO cards that were stolen from her were being sold at A-K Video Store. The store was owned by Go. Lim, who was
GR NO. 164669-70 OCT. 30, 2009 found administering the store at the time of the raid, was arrested. In all, a total of thirty (30) boxes containing
cell cards worth P332,605.00 were seized from the store.

RECIT-READY: Avelino Go owns A-K Video store, and it is manned by Harold Lim. Liezl Co complained to the NBI
An Information was filed before the RTC of Manila charging Lim with violation of Presidential Decree No. 1612
that cell cards were stolen from her and were now being sold at A-K Video store. NBI raided the store and found 30
(Anti-fencing law).
boxes of cell cards. Information was filed against Lim and he moved for reinvestigation. Meanwhile, Co filed a
complaint against Go. An information was also filed against him. Lim and Go filed a petition for review with the
Lim moved for a reinvestigation of his case and was granted by the RTC. The arraignment that was initially
DOJ, and DOJ Acting Sec. Guttierez recommended withdrawal of Information. Public Prosecutor filed motion to
scheduled on 21 November 2002 was rescheduled on 22 January 2003,and further rescheduled thereafter
withdraw. However, on 11 February 2004, the respondents were arraigned, and the prosecution and the defense
pending the reinvestigation proceedings. Pending the reinvestigation of Lim's case, petitioner filed a complaint
marked their evidence and submitted their stipulations of facts. Thereafter, the defense counsel orally moved
against Go before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila for the violation of Presidential Decree No. 1612.The
for the dismissal of the case on the ground that the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila, through
reinvestigation of the case against Lim was conducted together with the preliminary investigation of Go. In a
Assistant Prosecutor Corpuz, had already filed a Motion to Withdraw Informations. RTC ordered dismissal
Review Resolution, the prosecutor found probable cause against Lim and recommended the prosecution of Go.
of both cases adhering to the Motion to withdraw filed by the prosecutor, as recommended by the SOJ. The issue is
So an Information against Go was filed.
W/N the rights of the accused against double jeopardy was violated.

Respondents filed a Petition for Review with the Department of Justice assailing the Review Resolution.
The SC ruled that there was no infringement on right against double jeopardy. Respondents, through counsel, had
Thereafter, respondents moved for the consolidation of Criminal Cases on the ground that these cases arose
given their express consent to the termination of the case on 11 February 2004. Therefore, the fourth requisite,
from the same series of incidents and it was granted.
which necessitates the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case without his or her
approval, was not met. Moreover, SC also ruled that RTC dismissal of the case pursuant to the recommendation of
On 16 January 2004, the Acting Secretary of the Department of Justice, Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez, issued a
the DOJ Acting Secretary was invalid, as it did not make an independent determination of the facts of the case.
Resolution reversing the Review Resolution and directed to withdraw the informations against respondents
There was also no forum shopping in this case.
Harold G. Lim and Avelino Uy Go. So Assistant Prosecutor Yvonne G. Corpuz filed a Motion to Withdraw
Informationsseeking the dismissal of the cases filed against respondents.
DOCTRINE:
The following requisites must be complied with for double jeopardy to set in:
However, on 11 February 2004, the date set by the RTC for the arraignment of the respondents and for pre-trial,
(1) there is a valid complaint of information;
the respondents were arraigned, and the prosecution and the defense marked their evidence and submitted their
(2) the complaint should be filed before a court of competent jurisdiction;
stipulations of facts. Thereafter, the defense counsel orally moved for the dismissal of the case on the
(3) the accused has pleaded to the charge; and
ground that the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila, through Assistant Prosecutor Corpuz, had
(4) the accused has been convicted or acquitted, or the case has been dismissed or terminated without
already filed a Motion to Withdraw Informations. (1st issue) Private prosecutor Lodelberto Parungao
the express consent of the accused.
opposed the motion to dismiss on the ground that the Resolution of the Acting Secretary of Justice was not
binding upon the Court. Nevertheless, the RTC ordered the dismissal of Criminal Cases on the ground that
At the heart of the policy is the concern that permitting the sovereign freely to subject the citizen to a second
the Prosecutor and the Department of Justice would not prosecute these cases.(2 nd issue)
judgment for the same offense would arm the government with a potent instrument of oppression.

On 2 July 2004, petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals, which sought the reversal of
The constitutional provision, therefore, guarantees that the State shall not be
the Resolution dated 16 January 2006 of the Acting Secretary of the Department of Justice directing the Office of
permitted to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged
the City Prosecutor of Manila to withdraw the informations filed against the respondents.This petition was still
offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense, and ordeal and
pending with the Court of Appeals when the petitioner filed the present petition with the Supreme Court assailing
compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as
the Orders dated 11 February 2004 and 29 June 2004 of the RTC dismissing the criminal complaints against
enhancing the possibility that even though innocent he may be found guilty.
respondents. The present Petition, filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. (3rd issue)

The trial court is not bound to adopt the resolution of the Secretary of Justice, since it is mandated to
Issues:
independently evaluate or assess the merits of the case.
1. Are the rights of the two (2) accused against double jeopardy violated, considering that they expressly moved
for the dismissal of the criminal cases against them? (NO)
Ponente: Chico-Nazario, J.
Petitioner: Liezl Co 2. Was the order of the presiding judge of RTC in dismissing criminal cases for the sole reason that the
Respondent: Harrold Lim and Avelino Go department of justice ordered the withdrawal of the corresponding informations, and without making an
Facts: independent assessment and finding of evidence, valid? (NO)
On 6 December 2001, NBI raided a commercial establishment named A-K Video Store, located at 1214
Masangkay Street, Manila. They had acted upon the information relayed by complainant Liezl Co (Co) that cell 3. W/N the petitioner is guilty of forum shopping. (NO)

Ratio:
First. Section 21, Article III of the Constitution prescribes the rule against double jeopardy:
No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an act is punished by a
law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution
for the same act.
The following requisites must be complied with for double jeopardy to set in:
(1) there is a valid complaint of information;
(2) the complaint should be filed before a court of competent jurisdiction;
(3) the accused has pleaded to the charge; and
(4) the accused has been convicted or acquitted, or the case has been dismissed or terminated without
the express consent of the accused.
The Order dated 11 February 2004 of the RTC categorically stated that the defense counsel moved for the
dismissal of the cases against the respondents. Verily, respondents, through counsel, had given their express
consent to the termination of the case on 11 February 2004. Therefore, the fourth requisite, which necessitates
the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case without his or her approval, was not met.
Undoubtedly, the rule on double jeopardy is inapplicable to this case.
At the heart of the policy is the concern that permitting the sovereign freely to subject the citizen to a second
judgment for the same offense would arm the government with a potent instrument of oppression. The
constitutional provision, therefore, guarantees that the State shall not be permitted to make repeated attempts
to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense, and ordeal
and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility
that even though innocent he may be found guilty.
This Court finds the proceedings conducted on 11 February 2004 highly unusual in that the RTC judge had
arraigned the respondents before granting the respondent's oral motion to dismiss solely based on the
Resolution of the Acting Secretary of Justice dated 16 January 2004, a copy of which was attached to the Motion
to Withdraw Informations filed by the public prosecutor on 27 January 2004. The irregularity is even more
pronounced when we consider the fact that the public prosecutor, whose office had filed a Motion to Withdraw
Informations on 27 January 2004, agreed to have respondents arraigned on 11 February 2004. Added to the fact
that the defense was allowed to move for the dismissal of the case even without a written motion, such
irregularity arouses suspicions that the arraignment of the respondents after the public prosecutor was already
ordered to withdraw the Informations was intended to aid respondents in raising the defense of double jeopardy
should another case based on the same incidents be 􏱌led against them. While this Court does not make any
conclusive findings of bad faith on the part of the RTC judge and the public prosecutor, it deems it proper to
issue a reminder to o􏱌cers of the court to avoid all appearances of suspicious or questionable behavior so as not
to unduly strain public trust.
Second. Once a case is filed with the court, any disposition of it rests on the sound discretion of the court. The
trial court is not bound to adopt the resolution of the Secretary of Justice, since it is mandated to independently
evaluate or assess the merits of the case. Reliance on the resolution of the Secretary of Justice alone would be
an abdication of its duty and jurisdiction to determine a prima facie case. The trial court may make an
independent assessment of the merits of the case based on the a􏱌davits and counter-a􏱌davits, documents, or
evidence appended to the Information; the records of the public prosecutor, which the court may order the latter
to produce before the court; or any evidence already adduced before the court by the accused at the time the
motion is filed by the public prosecutor.
The failure of the trial court judge to independently evaluate and assess the merits of the case against the
accused violates the complainant's right to due process and constitutes grave abuse of discretion amounting to
excess of jurisdiction. This Court must therefore remand the case to the RTC, so that the latter can rule on the
merits of the case to determine if a prima facie case exists and consequently resolve the Motion to Withdraw
Informations anew.
In dismissing the criminal cases against the respondents, the RTC in this case relied on the unwillingness of the
Department of Justice to prosecute these cases and the awkward situation in which the public prosecutor would
find himself.
Third. Respondents alleged that petitioner is guilty of forum shopping since she 􏱌led the present petition
assailing the Orders dated 11 February 2004 and 29 June 2004 of the RTC after she filed a Petition for Certiorari
before the Court of Appeals questioning the Resolution of the Acting Secretary of Justice.
This argument is specious. Forum shopping exists when a party repetitively avails himself of several judicial
remedies in different courts, simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on the same transactions
and the same essential facts and circumstances and all raising substantially the same issues either pending in or
already resolved adversely by some other court. The test for determining forum shopping is whether in the two
(or more) cases pending, there is an identity of parties, rights or causes of action, and relief sought.
Petitioner in this case is not guilty of forum shopping since there is no identity of relief and cause of action in the
present petition and in CA-G.R. SP No. 84703. The Petition for Certiorari 􏱌led by petitioners before the Court of
Appeals questions the propriety of the Resolution of the Acting Secretary of Justice. The present petition
docketed as G.R. Nos. 164669-70 seeks the reversal of the Orders dated 11 February 2004 and 29 June 2004 of
the RTC. The determination made by the Acting Secretary of Justice that no prima facie case exists for the
prosecution of the case is distinct from the judicial determination of the RTC that there is no probable cause for
the continued hearing of the criminal case. These are two very different actions which should be separately
assailed.
Consequently, a determination by the Court of Appeals that the prosecution of the criminal case must proceed
will not affect whether or not this Court may or may not adjudge that the RTC should continue to hear the same
criminal case.
Ruling:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant Petition is GRANTED. The Orders RTC in dismissing Criminal Cases No.
01-197839 and No. 03-213403, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The records of this case shall be remanded to
the trial court in order that it may resolve the Motion to Withdraw Informations filed by the public prosecutor
based on an independent assessment of the evidence in this case.
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS EDGARDO ODTUHAN
GR. NO. 191566 , JUL 17, 2013 The petition on review on ceritorari is granted. The CA’s decision is set aside and the case is remanded to the
RTC.
FACTS:

On July 2, 1980, respondent Edgardo Odtuhan married Jasmin Modina. On October 28, 1993, he also married
Eleanor Alagon. He later filed a petition for annulment of his marriage with Modina. The RTC granted
respondent’s petition and declared his first marriage void ab initio for lack of a valid marriage license. On
November 10, 2003, Alagon died. In the meantime, private complainant Evelyn Alagon learned of respondent’s
previous marriage with Modina and thus filed a Complaint-Affidavit charging respondent with Bigamy.
Respondent moved to quash the information on two grounds: (1) that the facts do not charge the offense of
bigamy; and (2) that the criminal action or liability has been extinguished.

The RTC held that the facts constitute the crime of bigamy. There was a valid marriage between respondent and
Modina and without such marriage having been dissolved, respondent contracted a second marriage with
Alagon. It further held that neither can the information be quashed on the ground that criminal liability has been
extinguished, because the declaration of nullity of the first marriage is not one of the modes of extinguishing
criminal liability.

Respondent appealed to the CA on certiorari and it concluded that the RTC gravely abused its discretion in
denying respondent’s motion to quash the information, considering that the facts alleged in the information do
not charge an offense.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the motion to quash by respondent is proper

2. Whether or not the court’s judgment declaring respondent’s first marriage void ab initio extinguished
respondent’s criminal liability

HELD:

1. No. A motion to quash information is the mode by which an accused assails the validity of a criminal
complaint or information filed against him for insufficiency on its face in point of law, or for defects which are
apparent in the face of the information. In this case however, there is sufficiency of the allegations in the
information to constitute the crime of bigamy. It contained all the elements of the crime as provided for in
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code: (1) that respondent is legally married to Modina; (2) that without such
marriage having been legally dissolved; (3) that respondent willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously contracted a
second marriage with Alagon; and (4) that the second marriage has all the essential requisites for validity.
Respondent’s evidence showing the court’s declaration that his marriage to Modina is null and void from the
beginning should not be considered because matters of defense cannot be raised in a motion to quash. It is not
proper, therefore, to resolve the charges at the very outset without the benefit of a full blown trial.

2. No. Respondent’s claim that there are more reasons to quash the information against him because he
obtained the declaration of nullity of marriage before the filing of the complaint for bigamy against him is
without merit. Criminal culpability attaches to the offender upon the commission of the offense and from that
instant, there is already liability. The time of filing of the criminal complaint or information is material only for
determining prescription. It has been held in a number of cases that a judicial declaration of nullity is required
before a valid subsequent marriage can be contracted. Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage before
the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.
 PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM V. ROMARS INTERNATIONAL
G.R. No. 189669, February 16, 2015
FACTS: Petitioners received information that respondent was selling, offering for sale, or distributing liquefied
petroleum gas (LPG) by illegally refilling the steel cylinders manufactured byand bearing the duly registered
trademark and device of respondent Petron. Petron then obtained the services of a paralegal investigation team
who sent their people to investigate. The Marketing Coordinator of Petron Gasul verified that respondent was not
authorized to distribute and/or sell, or otherwise deal with Petron LPG products, and/or use or imitate any Petron
trademarks. Petitioners then requested the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to investigate said activities of
respondent for the purpose of apprehending and prosecuting establishments conducting illegal refilling,
distribution and/or sale of LPG products using the same containers of Petron and Shell, which acts constitute a
violation of Section 168,3 in relation to Section 1704 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8293, otherwise known as the
Intellectual Property Code of the Philippines.
Thus, the NBI, in behalf of Petron and Shell, filed with the Regional Trial Court of Naga City (RTC-Naga), two
separate Applications for Search Warrant for Violation of Section 155.1,6 in relation to Section 1707 of R.A. No.
8293 against respondent and/or its occupants. On October 23, 2002, the RTC-Naga City issued an Order
granting said Applications and Search Warrant. On the same day, the NBI served the warrants at the
respondent's premises in an orderly and peaceful manner, and articles or items described in the warrants were
seized.
On November 4, 2002, respondent filed a Motion to Quash Search Warrant, where the only grounds cited were:
(a) there was no probable cause; (b) there had been a lapse of four weeks from the date of the test-buy to the
date of the search and seizure operations; (c) most of the cylinders seized were not owned by respondent but by
a third person; and (d) Edrich Enterprises is an authorized outlet of Gasul and Marsflame. In an Order dated
February 21, 2003, the RTC-Naga denied the Motion to Quash.
However, on March 27,2003, respondent's new counsel filed an Appearance with Motion for Reconsideration. It
was only in said motion where respondent raised for the first time, the issue of the impropriety of filing the
Application for Search Warrant at the RTC-Naga City when the alleged crime was committed in a place within the
territorial jurisdiction of the RTC-Iriga City.
Respondent pointed out that the application filed with the RTC-Naga failed to state any compelling reason to
justify the filing of the same in a court which does not have territorial jurisdiction over the place of the
commission of the crime, as required by Section 2 (b), Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Petitioner opposed the Motion for Reconsideration, arguing that it was already too late for respondent to raise
the issue regarding the venue of the filing of the application for search warrant, as this would be in violation of
the Omnibus Motion Rule.
ISSUE/S
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT VENUE IN AN APPLICATION FOR
SEARCH WARRANT IS JURISDICTIONAL. THIS IS BECAUSE A SEARCH WARRANT CASE IS NOT
A CRIMINAL CASE.
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO
QUASHIS NOT SUBJECT TO THE OMNIBUS MOTION RULE AND THATTHE ISSUE OF LACK OF
JURISDICTION MAY NOT BE WAIVED AND MAY EVEN BE RAISED FOR THE FIRST TIME ON
APPEAL.
HELD:
Section 2, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides thus:
SEC. 2. Court where applications for search warrant shall be filed. - An application for search warrant shall be
filed with the following:
(a) Any court within whose territorial jurisdiction a crime was committed.
(b) For compelling reasons stated in the application, any court within the judicial region where the crime
was committed if the place of the commission of the crime is known, or any court within the judicial
region where the warrant shall be enforced.
Under paragraph (b) thereof, the application for search warrant in this case should have stated compelling
reasons why the same was being filed with the RTC-Naga instead of the RTC-Iriga City, considering that it is the
latter court that has territorial jurisdiction over the place where the alleged crime was committed and also the
place where the search warrant was enforced. The wordings of the provision is of a mandatory nature, requiring
a statement of compelling reasons if the application is filed in a court which does not have territorial jurisdiction
over the place of commission of the crime. On this point, then, petitioner's application for a search warrant was
indeed insufficient for failing to comply with the requirement to state therein the compelling reasons why they
had to file the application in a court that did not have territorial jurisdiction over the place where the alleged
crime was committed.
Notwithstanding said failure to state the compelling reasons in the application, the more pressing question that
would determine the outcome of the case is, did the RTC-Naga act properly in taking into consideration the issue
of said defect in resolving respondent's motion for reconsideration where the issue was raised for the very first
time? Does the omnibus motion rule cover a motion to quash search warrants?
In accordance with the omnibus motion rule, therefore, the trial court could only take cognizance of an issue
that was not raised in the motion to quash if, (1) said issue was not available or existent when they filed the
motion to quash the search warrant; or (2) the issue was one involving jurisdiction over the subject matter.
Obviously, the issue of the defect in the application was available and existent at the time of filing of the motion
to quash. What remains to be answered then is, if the newly raised issue of the defect in the application is an
issue of jurisdiction.
An application for a search warrant is a "special criminal process," rather than a criminal action:
The basic flaw in this reasoning is in erroneously equating the application for and the obtention of a search
warrant with the institution and prosecution of a criminal action in a trial court. It would thus categorize what is
only a special criminal process, the power to issue which is inherent in all courts, as equivalent to a criminal
action, jurisdiction over which is reposed in specific courts of indicated competence. Such warrant is definitively
considered merely as a process, generally issued by a court in the exercise of its ancillary jurisdiction, and not a
criminal action to be entertained by a court pursuant to its original jurisdiction. As elucidated by the Court,
proceedings for said applications are not criminal in nature and, thus, the rule that venue is jurisdictional does
not apply thereto. Evidently, the issue of whether the application should have been filed in RTC-Iriga City or
RTC-Naga, is not one involving jurisdiction because, as stated in the afore-quoted case, the power to issue a
special criminal process is inherent in all courts.
Inferring from the foregoing, the Court deems it improper for the RTC-Naga to have even taken into
consideration an issue which respondent failed to raise in its motion to quash, as it did not involve a question of
jurisdiction over the subject matter. It is quite clear that the RTC-Naga had jurisdiction to issue criminal
processes such as a search warrant.
 JOEL GALZOTE Y SORIAGA VS. JONATHAN BRIONES AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. NO. 164682, SEPTEMBER 14, 2011
FACTS: 1/23/97--The prosecution filed an Information for robbery in an uninhabited place against Galzote
before MeTC, Br. 1, Manila, when Galzote conspiring and confederating with Rosendo Oquina who is already
charged with the same offense with the same court. Galzote and Oquina break into and enter the Admin. Office
of the Prince Town Inn Corp. in Sta. Mesa, in an uninhabited place, and there destroying the Jipson board ceiling
of the said establishment with the use of a fan knife and passing through the same, an opening not intended for
entrance or egress, and once inside, and without the knowledge and consent of the owner,took, stole and
carried away cash money of ₱109k belonging to said Corp., to the damage and prejudice of said owner.
Galzote moved to quash the information by alleging that it was patently irregular and fatally flawed in form and
in substance. MeTC denied Galzote’s motion to quash and MR.
Galzote elevated MeTC’s ruling to RTC Br. 8, Manila. He argued that the MeTC committed grave abuse of
discretion in not granting his motion to quash. Jonathan Brioness moved to dismiss the petition arguing that: (a)
Galzote failed to prosecute the petition for an unreasonably long period of time; (b) a petition for certiorari is not
the proper remedy to address the denial of a motion to quash; and (c) MeTC did not abuse its discretion in
denying Galzote’s motion. RTC granted Briones’ motion as well as Galzote’s MR.
On appeal, CA dismissed the petition and held that Galzote lost his right to appeal when he failed to appeal
within the 15D reglementary period under Rule 41 ROC. CA explained that Galzote should have filed an appeal,
instead of a special civil action for certiorari, upon receipt of the RTC’s denial of his MR. CA also noted that
Galzote failed to implead the People as party-respondent in his petition.
ISSUES:
1. Whether MeTC and RTC committed grave abuse of discretion when both denied Galzote’s Motion to
Quash.
2. Whether Galzote’s claims that his recourse to a petition for certiorari before the CA was proper.
RULING:
1. A denial of a motion to quash filed by the accused results in the continuation of the trial and the
determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused. If a judgment of conviction is rendered and the lower
court’s decision of conviction is appealed, the accused can then raise the denial of his motion to quash not only
as an error committed by the trial court but as an added ground to overturn the latter’s ruling.
In this case, Galzote did not proceed to trial but opted to immediately question the denial of his motion to quash
via a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 ROC.
As a rule, the denial of a motion to quash is an interlocutory order and is not appealable; an appeal from an
interlocutory order is not allowed under Sec. 1(b), Rule 41 ROC. Neither can it be a proper subject of a petition
for certiorari which can be used only in the absence of an appeal or any other adequate, plain and speedy
remedy. The plain and speedy remedy upon denial of an interlocutory order is to proceed to trial.
A direct resort to a special civil action for certiorari is an exception rather than the general rule, and is a
recourse that must be firmly grounded on compelling reasons.
In grave abuse of discretion cases, certiorari is appropriate if the petitioner can establish that the lower court
issued the judgment or order without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, and the
remedy of appeal would not afford adequate and expeditious relief. The petitioner carries the burden of showing
that the attendant facts and circumstances fall within any of the cited instances.
At the RTC, SC find no compelling reason to justify a resort to a petition for certiorari against the orders of the
MeTC as Galzote failed to show that the factual circumstances of his case fall under any of the above exceptional
circumstances. The MeTC in fact did not commit any grave abuse of discretion as its denial of the motion to
quash was consistent with the existing rules and applicable jurisprudence. The ground used by Galzote in his
motion to quash (i.e., that his co-conspirator had been convicted of an offense lesser than the crime of robbery)
is not among the exclusive grounds enumerated under Sec. 3, Rule 11 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure that warrant the quashal of a criminal information.
This ground is an extraneous matter that has no bearing and is irrelevant to the validity of the criminal
information filed against the accused; the designated purpose of a motion to quash is to assail the validity of the
criminal information (or criminal complaint) for defects or defenses apparent on the face of the information. A
facial examination of the criminal information against the petitioner shows it to be valid and regular on its face
considering its conformity with the guidelines under Sec. 6, Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure.
2. SC find no reversible error in the CA’s dismissal of Galzote’s petition for certiorari assailing the RTC’s order;
the petition was both procedurally and substantively infirm.
SC find that the petition for certiorari filed with the CA was a wrong legal remedy to question the RTC order. The
petition for certiorari filed by Galzote before the RTC was an original action whose resulting decision is a final
order that completely disposed of the petition; the assailed CA resolution was in all respect a ruling on the
propriety of the petition for certiorari filed with the RTC. Hence, Galzote’s remedy was to appeal the RTC order to
the CA pursuant to Sec. 2, Rule 41 ROC: “Modes of appeal. – (a) Ordinary appeal. – The appeal to the CA in
cases decided by the RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with
the court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from and serving a copy thereof upon the
adverse party.”
Given the plain, speedy and adequate remedy of appeal, Galzote cannot avail of the remedy of certiorari.
Even on the substantive aspect, the petition for certiorari filed with the CA must fail considering Galzote’s failure
to show any justifiable reason for his chosen mode of review. SC find no grave abuse of discretion committed by
the RTC since it was merely affirming a correct ruling of denial by the MeTC of Galzote’s motion to quash.
SC cannot allow a party to delay litigation by filing a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 based on scant
allegations of grave abuse of discretion. It is only in the presence of extraordinary circumstances where a resort
to a petition for certiorari is proper. Under the circumstances, Galzote’s recourses cannot but be dilatory moves
that deserve sanction from SC.
SC deny the petition for lack of merit, and affirmed CA’s resolutions
 HILARIO P. SORIANO VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, BANKOSENTRAL NG PILIPINAS (BSP),
PHILIPPINE DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION (PDIC), PUBLIC PROSECUTOR ANTONIO C. BUAN,
AND STATE PROSECUTOR ARLBERTO R. FONACIER
G.R. No. 162336, February 1, 2010
DOCTRINE:
 The prohibition in Section 83 is broad enough to cover various modes of borrowing. It covers loans by a
bank director or officer which are made either: (1) directly, (2) indirectly, (3) for himself, (4) or as the
representative or agent of others. It applies even if the director or officer is a mere guarantor, indorser
or surety for someone else's loanor is in any manner an obligor for money borrowed from the bank or
loaned by it. The covered transactions are prohibited unless the approval, reportorial and ceiling
requirements under Section 83 are complied with.
 A direct borrowing is obviously one that is made in the name of the DOSRI himself or where the DOSRI
is a named party, while an indirect borrowing includes one that is made by a third party, but the DOSRI
has a stake in the transaction.
FACTS:
Sometime in 2000, the Office of Special Investigation (OSI) of the BangkoSentral ng Pilipinas (BSP), through its
officers, transmitted a letter to JovencitoZuo, Chief State Prosecutor of the Department of Justice (DOJ). The
letter attached as annexes five affidavits, which would allegedly serve as bases for filing criminal charges for
Estafa thru Falsification of Commercial Documents, in relation to Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1689, and for
Violation of Section 83 of RA 337, as amended by PD 1795, against, inter alia, petitioner herein Hilario P.
Soriano. It was stated in the affidavits that spouses Enrico and Amalia Carlos appeared to have an outstanding
loan of P8 million with the Rural Bank of San Miguel (Bulacan), Inc. (RBSM), but had never applied for nor
received such loan; that it was petitioner, who was then president of RBSM, who had ordered, facilitated, and
received the proceeds of the loan; and that the P8 million loan had never been authorized by RBSM's Board of
Directors and no report thereof had ever been submitted to the Department of Rural Banks, Supervision and
Examination Sector of the BSP. The letter of the OSI, which was not subscribed under oath, ended with a
request that a preliminary investigation be conducted and the corresponding criminal charges be filed against
petitioner at his last known address.
State Prosecutor Albert R. Fonacier proceeded with the PI. The investigating officer issued a Resolution finding
probable cause and correspondingly filed two separate informations against petitioner before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan.
The first Information docketed as Criminal Case No. 237-M-2001, was for estafa through falsification of
commercial documents, under Article 315, paragraph 1(b), in relation to Article 172 of the RPC and PD 1689. It
basically alleged that petitioner and his co-accused, in abuse of the confidence reposed in them as RBSM
officers, caused the falsification of a number of loan documents, making it appear that one Enrico Carlos filled up
the same, and thereby succeeded in securing a loan and converting the loan proceeds for their personal gain and
benefit.
The Second Information docketed as Criminal Case No. 238-M-2001, was for violation of Section 83 of RA 337,
as amended by PD 1795. The said provision refers to the prohibition against the so-called DOSRI loans. The
information alleged that, in his capacity as President of RBSM, petitioner indirectly secured an P8 million loan
with RBSM, for his personal use and benefit, without the written consent and approval of the bank's Board of
Directors, without entering the said transaction in the bank's records, and without transmitting a copy of the
transaction to the supervising department of the bank. His ruse was facilitated by placing the loan in the name
of an unsuspecting RBSM depositor, one Enrico Carlos.
Petitioner’s Contention:
Petitioner moved to quash] these informations on two grounds: that the court had no jurisdiction over the
offense charged, and that the facts charged do not constitute an offense. Petitioner contended that the
commission of estafa under RPC is inherently incompatible with the violation of DOSRI of RA 337, as amended
by PD 1795), hence a person cannot be charged for both offenses. He argued that a violation of DOSRI law
requires the offender to obtain a loan from his bank, without complying with procedural, reportorial, or ceiling
requirements. On the other hand, estafa under RPC requires the offender to misappropriate or convert
something that he holds in trust, or on commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation
involving the duty to return the same. Petitioner theorized that the characterization of possession is different in
the two offenses. If petitioner acquired the loan as DOSRI, he owned the loaned money and therefore, cannot
misappropriate or convert it as contemplated in the offense of estafa. Conversely, if petitioner committed estafa,
then he merely held the money in trust for someone else and therefore, did not acquire a loan in violation of
DOSRI rules.
RTC Ruling: Ruled in favor of the respondents.
CA RULING: The CA denied the petition on both issues presented by petitioner. Petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration was likewise denied for lack of merit. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
1. W/N a loan transaction within the ambit of the DOSRI law could also be the subject of Estafa under the
RPC? YES
HELD: We have examined the two informations against petitioner and we find that they contain allegations
which, if hypothetically admitted, would establish the essential elements of the crime of DOSRI violation and
estafa thru falsification of commercial documents. Petitioner raises the theory that he could not possibly be held
liable for estafa in concurrence with the charge for DOSRI violation. According to him, the DOSRI charge
presupposes that he acquired a loan, which would make the loan proceeds his own money and which he could
neither possibly misappropriate nor convert to the prejudice of another, as required by the statutory definition of
estafa. On the other hand, if petitioner did not acquire any loan, there can be no DOSRI violation to speak
of. Thus, petitioner posits that the two offenses cannot co-exist. This theory does not persuade us. Petitioners
theory is based on the false premises that the loan was extended to him by the bank in his own name, and that
he became the owner of the loan proceeds. Both premises are wrong.
The bank money (amounting to P8 million) which came to the possession of petitioner was money
held in trust or administration by him for the bank, in hisfiduciary capacity as the President of said
bank. It is not accurate to say that petitioner became the owner of the P8 million because it was the
proceeds of a loan. That would have been correct if the bank knowingly extended the loan to
petitioner himself. But that is not the case here. According to the information for estafa, the loan was
supposed to be for another person, a certain Enrico Carlos; petitioner, through falsification, made it
appear that said Enrico Carlos applied for the loan when in fact he (Enrico Carlos) did not. Through
such fraudulent device, petitioner obtained the loan proceeds and converted the same. Under these
circumstances, it cannot be said that petitioner became the legal owner of the P8 million. Thus,
petitioner remained the banks fiduciary with respect to thatmoney, which makes it capable of
misappropriation or conversion in his hands.
The next question is whether there can also be, at the same time, a charge for DOSRI violation in such a
situation wherein the accused bank officer did not secure a loan in his own name, but was alleged to have used
the name of another person in order to indirectly secure a loan from the bank. We answer this in the when the DOSRI acts as a mere guarantor or surety). If the law finds it necessary to protect the bank and the
affirmative. Section 83 of RA 337 reads: banking system in such situations, it will surely be illogical for it to exclude a case like this where the DOSRI
acted for his own benefit, using the name of an unsuspecting person. A contrary interpretation will effectively
Section 83. No director or officer of any banking institution shall, either directly or indirectly, for himself or as allow a DOSRI to use dummies to circumvent the requirements of the law.
the representative or agent of others, borrow any of the deposits of funds of such bank, nor shall he become a
guarantor, indorser, or surety for loans from such bank to others, or in any manner be an obligor for moneys
borrowed from the bank or loaned by it, except with the written approval of the majority of the directors of the
bank, excluding the director concerned. Any such approval shall be entered upon the records of the corporation
and a copy of suchentry shall be transmitted forthwith to the Superintendent of Banks. The office of any director
or officer of a bank who violates the provisions of this section shall immediately become vacant and the director
or officer shall be punished by imprisonment of not less than one year nor more than ten years and by a fine of
not less than one thousand nor more than ten thousand pesos. x xx

The prohibition in Section 83 is broad enough to cover various modes of borrowing. It covers loans
by a bank director or officer (like herein petitioner) which are made either: (1) directly, (2)
indirectly, (3) for himself, (4) or as the representative or agent of others. It applies even if the
director or officer is a mere guarantor, indorser or surety for someone else's loanor is in any manner
an obligor for money borrowed from the bank or loaned by it. The covered transactions are
prohibited unless the approval, reportorial and ceiling requirements under Section 83 are complied
with.

The prohibition is intended to protect the public, especially the depositors from the overborrowing of bank funds
by bank officers, directors, stockholders and related interests, as such overborrowing may lead to bank failures.
It has been said that banking institutions are not created for the benefit of the directors [or officers]. While
directors have great powers as directors, they have no special privileges as individuals. They cannot use the
assets of the bank for their own benefit except as permitted by law. Stringent restrictions are placed about them
so that when acting both for the bank and for one of themselves at the same time, they must keep within
certain prescribed lines regarded by the legislature as essential to safety in the banking business.

A direct borrowing is obviously one that is made in the name of the DOSRI himself or where the
DOSRI is a named party, while an indirect borrowing includes one that is made by a third party, but
the DOSRI has a stake in the transaction. The latter type indirect borrowing applies here. The
information in Criminal Case 238-M-2001 alleges that petitioner in his capacity as President of Rural
Bank of San Miguel San Ildefonso branch x xx indirectly borrow[ed] or secure[d] a loan with
[RBSM] x xx knowing fully well that the same has been done by him without the written consent and
approval of the majority of the board of directors x xx, and which consent and approval the said
accused deliberately failed to obtain and enter the same upon the records of said banking institution
and to transmit a copy thereof to the supervising department of the said bank x xx by using the
name of one depositor Enrico Carlos x xx, the latter having no knowledge of the said loan, and
once in possession of the said amount of eight million pesos (P8 million), [petitioner] converted the
same to his own personal use and benefit.

The foregoing information describes the manner of securing the loan as indirect; names petitioner as the
benefactor of the indirect loan; and states that the requirements of the law were not complied with. It contains
all the required elements for a violation of Section 83, even if petitioner did not secure the loan in his own
name.
The broad interpretation of the prohibition in Section 83 is justified by the fact that it even expressly covers
loans to third parties where the third parties are aware of the transaction (such as principals represented by the
DOSRI), and where the DOSRIs interest does not appear to be beneficial but even burdensome (such as in cases
 THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS vs.EL HOGAR FILIPINO,
G.R. No. L-26649, July 13, 1927
DOCTRINE:
 Section 21 of the Corporation Law expressly gives the power to the corporation to provide in its by-
laws for the qualifications of directors; and the requirement of security from them for the proper
discharge of the duties of their office, in the manner prescribed in article 70, is highly prudent and in
conformity with good practice. Article 76, prohibiting directors from making loans to themselves, is of
course designed to prevent the possibility of the looting of the corporation by unscrupulous directors. A
more discreet provision to insert in the by-laws of a building and loan association would be hard to
imagine. Clearly, the eighth cause of action cannot be sustained
During the period before May 1921, El Hogar was not in a position to pass an indefeasible title to any purchaser.
Therefore, El Hogar cannot be held accountable for this delay which was not due to its fault. Likewise, the period
from March 25, 1926 to April 20, 1926 must not be part of the five-year period because this was the period
where respondent was under the obligation to sell the property to Alcantara prior to the contract’s rescission due
to Alcantara’s non-payment.
Another circumstance causing the delay is the fact that El Hogar purchased the property in the full amount of the
loan made by the former owner which is nearly P24K when it was subsequently found that the property was not
salable and later sold for P6K notwithstanding El Hogar’s efforts to find a purchaser upon better terms.
ISSUE: Whether the acts of respondent corporation merit its dissolution or deprivation of its corporate franchise
and to exclude it from all corporate rights and privileges.
HELD: SUSTAINED only as to administering of real property not owned by it and when permitted by contract.

FACTS:
Causes of action
This is a quo warranto proceeding, alleging 17 causes of action, instituted originally in this court by the
Philippine Government on the relation of the Attorney-General against the building and loan association known
CAUSE OF ACTION 1: W/N El Hogar is illegally holding title to real property in excess of 5 years, in violation of
as El Hogar Filipino, for the purpose of depriving it of its corporate franchise, excluding it from all corporate
the law that while corporations may loan funds upon real estate security, they shall dispose of the same within 5
rights and privileges, and effecting a final dissolution of said corporation.
years after receiving title

The Philippine Commission enacted Act No. 1459, also known as the Corporation Law, on March 1, 1906. El
Held: NO. El Hogar has not offended the law in such a way that its charter has to be forfeited. The evident
Hogar Filipino, organized in 1911 under the laws of the Philippine Islands, was the first corporation organized
purpose behind the law restricting the rights of corporations with respect to the tenure of land was
under Sec. 171-190 Act No. 1459, devoted to the subject of building and loan associations, their organization
to prevent the revival of the entail or other similar institution by which land could be fettered and its
and administration. In the said law, the capital of the corporation was not permitted to exceed P3M, but Act No.
alienation hampered. In the case, El Hogar had in GF disposed of the property at the expiration of the
2092 amended the statute, permitting capitalization to the amount of 10M.
period fixed by law. Under the circumstances the destruction of the corporation would bring irreparable loss
upon thousands of innocent shareholders of the corporation without any corresponding benefit to the public.
El Hogar took advantage of the amendment of Act No. 1459 and amended its AOI as a result thereof, stating
that the amount of capital must not exceed what has been stated in Act No. 2092. This resulted to El Hogar
CAUSE OF ACTION 2: W/N el Hogar is illegally owning and holding a business lot in excess of the reasonable
having 5,826 shareholders, 125,750 shares with paid-up value of P8.7M. The corporation paid P7.16M to its
requirements and in contravention of the Corpo law that every corporation has the power to purchase hold lease
withdrawing stockholders.
real property as reasonable and necessary required for the transaction of the lawful business

The Government of the Philippine Islands filed an action against El Hogar due to the alleged illegal holding title
Held: NO. The law expressly declares that corporations may acquire such real estate as is reasonably necessary
to real property for a period exceeding five (5) years after the same was bought in a foreclosure sale. Sec. 13(5)
to enable them to carry out the purposes for which they were created; and we are of the opinion that the owning
of the Corporation Law states that corporations must dispose of real estate obtained within 5 years from
of a business lot upon which to construct and maintain its offices is reasonably necessary to a building and loan
receiving the title. The Philippine Government also prays that El Hogar be excluded from all corporate rights and
association such as the respondent was at the time this property was acquired. A different ruling on this point
privileges and effecting a final dissolution of said corporation.
would compel important enterprises to conduct their business exclusively in leased offices — a result which could
serve no useful end but would retard industrial growth and be inimical to the best interests of society. El Hogar
It appears from the records that El Hogar was the holder of a recorded mortgage on the San Clemente land as
is entitled to the beneficial use of its property.
security for a P24K loan to El Hogar. However, shareholders and borrowers defaulted in payment so El Hogar
foreclosed the mortgage and purchased the land during the auction sale. A deed of conveyance in favor of El
CAUSE OF ACTION 3: W/N el Hogar has engaged in activities foreign to the purposes for which the corporation
Hogar was executed and sent to the Register of Deeds of Tralac with a request that the certificate of title be
was created and not reasonably necessary to its legitimate ends, specifically:
cancelled and a new one be issued in favor of El Hogar from the Register of Deeds of Tarlac. However, no reply
(1) the administration of the offices in the El Hogar building not used by the respondent itself and the
was received. El Hogar filed a complaint with the Chief of the General Land Registration Office. The certificate of
renting of such offices to the public;
title to the San Clemente land was received by El Hogar and a board resolution authorizing Benzon to find a
(2) the administration and management of properties belonging to delinquent shareholders of the
buyer was issued. Alcantara, the buyer of the land, was given extension of time to make payment but defaulted
association;
so the contract treated rescinded. Efforts were made to find another buyer. Respondent acquired title in
(3) the management of some parcels of improved real estate situated in Manila not under mortgage to it,
December 1920 until the property was finally sold to Felipa Alberto in July 1926. The interval exceeded 5 years
but owned by shareholders, and has held itself out by advertisement as prepared to do so
but the period did not commence to run until May 7, 1921 when the register of deeds delivered the new
certificate of title. It has been held that a purchaser of land registered under the Torrens system cannot acquire
Held:
the status of an innocent purchaser for value unless the vendor is able to place the owner’s duplicate in his
hands showing the title to be in the vendor.
 (1) NO. The activities clearly fall within the legitimate powers of the respondent. (SEE CAUSE OF duties of their office, in the manner prescribed in article 70, is highly prudent and in conformity with
ACTION 2) If the respondent had the power to acquire the lt, construct the edifice and hold it good practice. Article 76, prohibiting directors from making loans to themselves, is of course
beneficially, as there decided, the beneficial administration by it of such parts of the building as are let designed to prevent the possibility of the looting of the corporation by unscrupulous directors. A
more discreet provision to insert in the by-laws of a building and loan association would be hard to
to others must necessarily be lawful.
imagine. Clearly, the eighth cause of action cannot be sustained.
(2) No, the clause is VALID. The case for the government supposes that the only remedy which the
respondent has in case of default on the part of its shareholders is to proceed to enforce collection of
CAUSE OF ACTION 9: W/N el Hogar had abused its franchise in issuing special shares, which is alleged to be
the whole loan in the manner contemplated in section 185 of the Corporation Law. But, according to
illegal and inconsistent with the plan and purposes of building and loan associations, and that these are held by
said section, the association may treat the whole indebtedness as due, "at the option of the board of
well-to-do people purely for investment purposes and not by wage-earners for savings
directors," and this remedy is not made exclusive. The clause giving the association the right to take
over the property which constitutes the security for the delinquent debt and to manage it with a view to
HELD: The ground for supposing the issuance of the "special" shares to be unlawful is that special shares are not
the satisfaction of the obligations due to the debtor than the immediate enforcement of the entire
mentioned in the Corporation Law as one of the forms of security which may be issued by the association. Upon
obligation, and the clause allowing this course are VALID.
examination of the nature of the special shares in the light of American usage, it will be found that said shares
(3) 3) Yes, this practice is unauthorized by law. The administration of property in the manner
are precisely the same kind of shares that, in some American jurisdictions, are generally known as advance
described is more befitting to the business of a real estate agent or trust company than to the business
payment shares; in if close attention be paid to the language used in the last sentence of section 178 of the
of a building and loan association. The practice to which this criticism is directed relates of course solely
Corporation Law, it will be found that special shares where evidently created for the purpose of meeting the
to the management and administration of properties which are not mortgaged to the association. The
condition cause by the prepayment of dues that is there permitted.
circumstance that the owner of the property may have been required to subscribe to one or more
It will escape notice that the provision quoted say that interest shall not be allowed on the advance payments at
shares of the association with a view to qualifying him to receive this service is of no significance. It is
a greater rate than 6% per annum nor for a longer period than one year. The word "interest " as there used
a general rule of law that corporations possess only such express powers. The management
must be taken in its true sense of compensation for the used of money loaned, and it not must not be confused
and administration of the property of the shareholders of the corporation is not expressly
with the dues upon which it is contemplated that the interest may be paid. Now, in the absence of any
authorized by law, and we are unable to see that, upon any fair construction of the law,
showing to the contrary, we infer that no interest is ever paid by the association in any amount for
these activities are necessary to the exercise of any of the granted powers. Here, El Hogar has
the advance payments made on these shares; and the reason is to be found in the fact that the
gone beyond its powers but this does not mean that it should be dissolved.
participation of the special shares in the earnings of the corporation, in accordance with section 188
of the Corporation Law, sufficiently compensates the shareholder for the advance payments made by
CAUSE OF ACTION 7: W/N the royalty paid to the founder of el Hogar, Antonio Melian, as compensation for his
him; and no other incentive is necessary to induce inventors to purchase the stock.
services rendered by him during the early stages of the organization of the corporation, is unconscionable,
It will be observed that the final 20% of the par value of each special share is not paid for by the
excessive, and thus necessitates dissolution
shareholder with funds out of the pocket. The amount is satisfied by applying a portion of the shareholder's
participation in the annual earnings. But as the right of every shareholder to such participation in the earnings is
HELD:NOT REALLY. If the amount of the compensation now appears to be a subject of legitimate criticism, this
undeniable, the portion thus annually applied is as much the property of the shareholder as if it were in fact
must be due to the extraordinary development of the association in recent years. If the Melian contract had been
taken out of his pocket. It follows that the mission of the special shares does not involve any violation of the
clearly ultra vires — which is not charged and is certainly untrue — its continued performance might conceivably
principle that the shares must be sold at par.Thus, here, there is express authority. Also, in Severino vs. El
be enjoined in such a proceeding as this; but if the defect from which it suffers is mere matter for an action
Hogar Filipino, implied authority to issue such shares is allowed.
because Melian is not a party. It is rudimentary in law that an action to annul a contract cannot be maintained
without joining both the contracting parties as defendants. Moreover, the proper party to bring such an action is
CAUSE OF ACTION 10: W/n El Hogar is pursuing illegally a policy of depreciating, at an excessive rate at the
either the corporation itself, or some shareholder who has an interest to protect.
discretion of its Board, the value of real properties acquired by it at its sales, thereby frustrating the right of SHs
to participate annually and equally in the earnings.
CAUSE OF ACTION 8: W/N articles 70 and 76 of El Hogar’sconstitution by-laws are unlawful? NO
HELD: NO. There is an erroneous notion as to what a court may do in determining the internal policy
Article 70 of the by-laws in effect requires that persons elected to the board of directors must be holders of of a business corporation. If the criticism contained in the brief of the Attorney-General upon the practice of
shares of the paid up value of P5,000 which shall be held as security may be put up in the behalf of any director
the respondent association with respect to depreciation be well founded, the Legislature should supply the
by some other holder of shares in the amount stated. Article 76 of the by-laws declares that the directors
remedy by defining the extent to which depreciation may be allowed by building and loan associations.
waive their right as shareholders to receive loans from the association.
Certainly this court cannot undertake to control the discretion of the board of directors of the
association about an administrative matter as to which they have legitimate power of action.
It is asserted, under the eight cause of action, that article 70 is objectionable in that, under the requirement for
CAUSE OF ACTIONs 11 AND 12 :W/n el Hogar’s charter should be revoked because it illegally maintains
security, a poor member, or wage-earner, cannot serve as director, irrespective of other qualifications and that
as a matter of fact only men of means actually sit on the board. Article 76 is criticized on the ground that excessive reserve funds and because it pursues a policy, allegedly unlawful, of paying a straight annual dividend
the provision requiring directors to renounce their right to loans unreasonably limits their rights and of 10% regardless of losses suffered and profits made by the corporation and in violation of the requirement s of
privileges as members. There is nothing of value in either of theses suggestions. Section 21 of the the corpo code.
Corporation Law expressly gives the power to the corporation to provide in its by-laws for the
qualifications of directors; and the requirement of security from them for the proper discharge of the
HELD:NO. El Hogar has the right to maintain these reserves. It is true that the corporation law does not
expressly grant this power, but we think it is to be implied. It is a fact of common observation that all
commercial enterprises encounter periods when earnings fall below the average, and the prudent manager
makes provision for such contingencies. Fluctuations in the dividend rate are highly detrimental to any fiscal
institutions, while uniformity in the payments of dividends, continued over long periods, supplies the surest
foundations of public confidence.
Moreover, it is said that the practice of the association in declaring regularly a 10 per cent dividend is
in effect a guaranty by the association of a fixed dividend which is contrary to the intention of the
statute. The government insists upon an interpretation of section 188 of the Corporation Law that is altogether
too strict and literal. From the fact that the statute provides that profits and losses shall be annually apportioned
among the shareholders it is argued that all earnings should be distributed without carrying anything to the
reserve. But it will be noted that it is provided in the same section that the profits and losses shall be
determined by the board of directors: and this means that they shall exercise the usual discretion of good
businessmen in allocating a portion of the annual profits to purposes needful to the welfare of the association.
The law contemplates the distribution of earnings and losses after other legitimate obligations have been met.
Our conclusion is that the respondent has the power to maintain the reserves criticized in the eleventh
and twelfth counts of the complaint; and at any rate, if it be supposed that the reserves referred to
have become excessive, the remedy is in the hands of the Legislature.
CAUSE OF ACTION 13: W/n el Hogar illegally departed from its charter because it has made loans which were
intended to be used by the borrowers for other purposes than the building of homes.
HELD: There is no statute here expressly declaring that loans may be made by these associations solely for the
purpose of building homes. On the contrary, the building of homes is mentioned in section 171 of the
Corporation Law as only one among several ends which building and loan associations are designed to promote.)
Also, section 181 of the Corporation Law expressly authorities the Board of directors of the association from time
to time to fix the premium to be charged. The primary design of building and loan associations should be to help
poor people to procure homes of their own. But in this jurisdiction at least the lawmaker has taken care not to
limit the activities of building and loan associations in an exclusive manner, and the exercise of the broader
powers must in the end approve itself to the business community.
CAUSE OF ACTION 17: W/n el Hogar, in disposing of real estate purchased in the collection of defaulted loans,
on credit at first and then sold and mortgaged to el Hogar to secure payment of the purchase price, had incurred
several outstanding loans, and that that the persons and entities to which said properties are sold under the
condition charged are not members or shareholders nor are they made members or shareholders of the
defendant.
HELD:NO. This part of the complaint is based upon a mere technicality of bookkeeping. The central idea
involved in the discussion is the provision of the Corporation Law requiring loans to be stockholders only and on
the security of real estate and shares in the corporation, or of shares alone. It seems to be that, when the
respondent sells property acquired at its own foreclosure sales and takes a mortgage to secure the deferred
payments, the obligation of the purchaser is a true loan, and hence prohibited.
But in requiring the respondent to sell real estate which it acquires in connection with the collection of its loans
within five years after receiving title to the same, the law does not prescribe that the property must be sold for
cash or that the purchaser shall be a shareholder in the corporation. Such sales can of course be made upon
terms and conditions approved by the parties; and when the association takes a mortgage to secure the
deferred payments, the obligation of the purchaser cannot be fairly described as arising out of a loan. Nor does
the fact that it is carried as a loan on the books of the respondent make it a loan on the books of the respondent
make it a loan in law. The contention of the Government under this head is untenable.
Respondent is enjoined in the future from administering real property not owned by itself, except as
may be permitted to it by contract when a borrowing shareholder defaults in his obligation. In all other
respects, the complaint is DISMISSED.

CAUSE OF ACTION 16: W/n the el Hogar charter may be revoked because various loans now outstanding have
been made by the respondent to corporations and partnerships, and that these entities have in some instances
subscribed to shares in the respondent for the sole purpose of obtaining such loans, and that some of these
juridical entities became shareholders merely for the purpose of qualifying themselves to take loans from the
association.
HELD: The Corporation Law declares that "any person" may become a stockholder in building and loan
associations. The word "person" appears to be here used in its general sense, and there is nothing in the context
to indicate that the expression is used in the restricted sense of both natural and artificial persons, as indicated
PEOPLE VS. BAYABOS G.R. NO.171222
in section 2 of the Administrative Code. The word "person" or persons," is NOT to be taken in this broad sense in
G.R. NOS. 171222 & 174786, 18 FEBRUARY 2015
every part of the Corporation Law. For instance, it would seem reasonable to say that the incorporators of a
corporation ought to be natural persons, although in section 6 it is said that five or more "persons", although in
section 6 it is said that five or more "persons," not exceeding fifteen, may form a private corporation. But the FACTS: The failure by school authorities to take any action to prevent the offenses as provided by the law
context there, as well as the common sense of the situation, suggests that natural persons are meant. exposes them to criminal liability as accomplices in the criminal acts. Thus, the institution and its officers cannot
When it is said, however, in section 173, that "any person" may become a stockholder in a building and loan stand idly by in the face of patently criminal acts committed within their sphere of responsibility. They bear the
association, no reason is seen why the phrase may not be taken in its proper broad sense of either a natural or commensurate duty to ensure that the crimes covered by the Anti-Hazing Law are not committed. Fernando C.
artificial person. At any rate the question whether these loans and the attendant subscriptions were properly Balidoy, Jr. was admitted as a probationary midshipman at the Philippine Merchant Marine Academy (PMMA). In
made involves a consideration of the power of the subscribing corporations and partnerships to own the stock order to reach active status, all new entrants were required to successfully complete the mandatory
and take the loans; and it is not alleged in the complaint that they were without power in the premises. “Indoctrination and Orientation Period,” which was set from 2 May to 1 June 2001. Balidoy died on 3 May 2001.
PMMA were criminally charged before the Sandiganbayan as accomplices to hazing under the Anti-Hazing Law.
Before they were arraigned, the Sandiganbayan quashed the Information against them on the basis of the
dismissal of the criminal case against the principal accused and, the failure to include in the Information the
material averments required by the Anti-Hazing Law. Consequently, this petition was filed before this Court
questioning the Sandiganbayan’s quashal of the Information.

ISSUE: May the dismissal of the criminal case of the principal accused be invoked as a ground to dismiss the
criminal case of the accomplices, some school authorities herein?

RULING: No. That the case against those charged as accomplices is not ipso facto dismissed in the absence of
trial of the purported principals; the dismissal of the case against the latter; or even the latter’s acquittal,
especially when the occurrence of the crime has in fact been established.

In the case of school authorities and faculty members who have had no direct participation in the act, they may
nonetheless be charged as accomplices if it is shown that (1) hazing, as established by the above elements,
occurred; (2) the accused are school authorities or faculty members; and (3) they consented to or failed to take
preventive action against hazing in spite actual knowledge thereof.

First, the Court rejects the contention of respondents that PMMA should not be considered an organization.
Under the Anti-Hazing Law, the breadth of the term organization includes – but is not limited to – groups,
teams, fraternities, sororities, citizen army training corps, educational institutions, clubs, societies, cooperatives,
companies, partnerships, corporations, the PNP, and the AFP.

Attached to the Department of Transportation and Communications, the PMMA is a government-owned

educational institution established for the primary purpose of producing efficient and well-trained merchant
marine officers. Clearly, it is included in the term organization within the meaning of the law. Nevertheless, the
Court finds – albeit for a different reason – that the Motion to Quash must be granted, as the Information does
not include all the material facts constituting the crime of accomplice to hazing. Failure to aver this crucial
ingredient would prevent the successful prosecution of the criminal responsibility of the accused, either as
principal or as accomplice, for the crime of hazing.
 People vs. CA
G.R. No. 183652
FACTS:
● On March 25, 2004, around 8:00 a.m., AAA attended her high school graduation ceremony. Afterwards,
they had a luncheon party at their house in Maranding, Lala, Lanao del Norte. AAA then asked permission
from her mother to go to the Maranding Stage Plaza because she and her bandmates had to perform for an
election campaign. She went home at around 4:00 p.m. from the plaza. At about 7:00 p.m., AAA told her
father that she would be attending a graduation dinner party with her friends. AAA, together with Lim,
Oporto, and Carampatana, ate dinner at the house of one Mark Gemeno at Purok, Bulahan, Maranding. After
eating, Lim invited them to go to Alson’s Palace, which was merely a walking distance away from Gemeno’s
house. Outside the Alson’s Palace, they were greeted by Aldrin Montesco, Junver Alquizola, and Cherry Mae
Fiel. After a while, they went inside and proceeded to a bedroom on the second floor where they again saw
Montesco with Harold Batoctoy, Jansen Roda, Emmanuel dela Cruz, Samuel Rudinas, a certain Diego, and
one Angelo. Rudinas suggested that they have a drinking session to celebrate their graduation, to which the
rest agreed.
● They all contributed and it was Joseph Villame who bought the drinks – two (2) bottles of Emperador
Brandy. Then they arranged themselves in a circle for the drinking spree. Two (2) glasses were being
passed around: one glass containing the sweetener (Pepsi) and the other glass containing the liquor. At
first, AAA refused to drink because she had never tried hard liquor before. During the session, they shared
their problems with each other. When it was AAA’s turn, she became emotional and started crying. It was
then that she took her first shot. The glasses were passed around and she consumed more or less five (5)
glasses of Emperador Brandy. Thereafter, she felt dizzy so she laid her head down on Oporto’s lap. Oporto
then started kissing her head and they would remove her baseball cap. This angered her so she told them to
stop, and simply tried to hide her face with the cap. But they just laughed at her. Then, Roda also kissed
her. At that time, AAA was already sleepy, but they still forced her to take another shot. They helped her
stand up and make her drink. She even heard Lim say, "Hubuga na, hubuga na," (You make her drunk, you
make her drunk). She likewise heard someone say, "You drink it, you drink it." She leaned on Oporto’s lap
again, then she fell asleep. They woke her up and Lim gave her the Emperador Brandy bottle to drink the
remaining liquor inside. She tried to refuse but they insisted, so she drank directly from the bottle. Again,
she fell asleep.
● The next thing she knew, Roda and Batoctoy were carrying her down the stairs, and then she was asleep
again. When she regained consciousness, she saw that she was already at the Alquizola Lodging House. She
recognized that place because she had been there before. She would thereafter fall back asleep and wake
up again. And during one of the times that she was conscious, she saw Oporto on top of her, kissing her on
different parts of her body, and having intercourse with her. She started crying. She tried to resist when she
felt pain in her genitals. She also saw Carampatana and Moises Alquizola inside the room, watching as
Oporto abused her. At one point, AAA woke up while Carampatana was inserting his penis into her private
organ. She cried and told him to stop. Alquizola then joined and started to kiss her. For the last time, she
fell unconscious.
● When she woke up, it was already 7:00a.m. of the next day. She was all alone. Her body felt heavy and
exhausted. She found herself with her shirt on but without her lower garments. The upper half of her body
was on top of the bed but her feet were on the floor. There were also red stains on her shirt. After dressing
up, she hailed a trisikad and went home. When AAA reached their house, her father was waiting for her and
was already furious. When she told them that she was raped, her mother started hitting her. They brought
her to the Lala Police Station to make a report. Thereafter, they proceeded to the district hospital for her
medical examination.
● Dr. Cyrus Acusta of the Kapatagan District Hospital examined AAA in the morning of March 26, 2004, and
found an old hymenal laceration at 5 o’clock position and hyperemia or redness at the posterior fornices.
The vaginal smear likewise revealed the presence of sperm.
● The accused denied that they raped AAA and insisted that everything was done with consent.
● RTC found private respondents Carampatana, Oporto and Alquizola guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of rape. It, however, acquitted Dela Cruz, Rudinas, Roda, Batoctoy, and Villame for failure of the
prosecution to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt
● Aggrieved by the RTC Decision, private respondents brought the case to the CA. On June 6, 2008, the
appellate court rendered the assailed Decision reversing the trial court’s ruling and, consequently, acquitted
private respondents.
● CA found that the prosecution failed to prove private respondents’ guilt beyond reasonable doubt. It gave
more credence to the version of the defense and ruled that AAA consented to the sexual congress. She was
wide awake and aware of what private respondents were doing before the intercourse. She never showed
any physical resistance, never shouted for help, and never fought against her alleged ravishers.
ISSUE:
WON the private respondents are guilty of the crime of rape - Yes
RULING:
Court notes that although the prosecution filed only a single Information, it, however, actually charged the
accused of several rapes. As a general rule, a complaint or information must charge only one offense, otherwise,
the same is defective.
The rationale behind this rule prohibiting duplicitous complaints or informations is to give the accused the
necessary knowledge of the charge against him and enable him to sufficiently prepare for his defense. The State
should not heap upon the accused two or more charges which might confuse him in his defense.
Non-compliance with this rule is a ground for quashing the duplicitous complaint or information under Rule117 of
the Rules on Criminal Procedure and the accused may raise the same in a motion to quash before he enters his
plea, otherwise, the defect is deemed waived.
The accused herein, however, cannot avail of this defense simply because they did not file a motion to quash
questioning the validity of the Information during their arraignment. Thus, they are deemed to have waived their
right to question the same. Also, where the allegations of the acts imputed to the accused are merely different
counts specifying the acts of perpetration of the same crime, as in the instant case, there is no duplicity to speak
of. There is likewise no violation of the right of the accused to be informed of the charges against them because
the Information, in fact, stated that they "took turns in having carnal knowledge against the will of AAA" on
March 25, 2004.
Further, allegations made and the evidence presented to support the same reveal that AAA was indeed raped
and defiled several times. Here, according to the accused themselves, after undressing AAA, Carampatana
positioned himself in between her legs and had intercourse with her. On the other hand, Oporto admitted that he
had sexual intercourse with AAA three times. When two or more offenses are charged in a single complaint or
information but the accused fails to object to it before trial, the court may convict him of as many offenses as
are charged and proved, and impose upon him the proper penalty for each offense. Carampatana, Oporto, and
Alquizola can then be held liable for more than one crime of rape, or a total of four (4) counts in all, with
conspiracy extant among the three of them during the commission of each of the four violations. Each of the
accused shall thus be held liable for every act of rape committed by the other. But while Oporto himself testified
that he inserted his sexual organ into AAA’s mouth, the Court cannot convict him of rape through sexual assault
therefor because the same was not included in the Information. This is, however, without prejudice to the filing
of a case of rape through sexual assault as long as prescription has not yet set in.
 CO VS. NEW PROSPERITY PLASTIC PRODUCTS
June 30, 2014, G.R. No. 183994
[RULE 117, SEC. 8] The essential requisites of the first paragraph of Section 8, Rule 117 of theRules of Court,
are conditions sine qua non to the application of the time-bar in the secondparagraph. In this case, there is no
notice of any motion for the provisional dismissal or of thehearing which was served on the private complainant.
FACTS: Respondent New Prosperity Plastic Products, represented by Elizabeth Uy, filed a complaintfor violation
of B.P. 22 against petitioner William Co. In the absence of Uy and the private counsel,the cases were
provisionally dismissed on June 9, 2003 in open court pursuant to Section 8, Rule 117of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure. Uy received a copy of the June 9, 2003 Order on July 2,2003, while her counsel-of-record
received a copy a day after. On July 2, 2004, Uy, through counsel,filed a Motion to Revive the Criminal Cases
which was granted. Co filed a petition challenging therevival of the criminal cases. He argues that the June 9,
2003 Order provisionally dismissing thecriminal cases should be considered as a final dismissal on the ground
that his right to speedy trial wasdenied. Assuming that the criminal cases were only provisionally dismissed, Co
further posits thatsuch dismissal became permanent one year after the issuance of the June 9, 2003 Order, not
afternotice to the offended party. He also insists that both the filing of the motion to revive and the trialcourt's
issuance of the order granting the revival must be within the one-year period. Even assumingthat the one-year
period to revive the criminal cases started on July 2, 2003 when Uy received the June9, 2003 Order, Co asserts
that the motion was filed one day late since year 2004 was a leap year.
ISSUE: Whether or not the provisional dismissal of the criminal case has become permanent (NO)
HELD: NO. The essential requisites of the first paragraph of Section 8, Rule 117 of the Rules ofCourt, which are
conditions sine qua non to the application of the time-bar in the second paragraphthereof are: (1) the
prosecution with the express conformity of the accused or the accused moves for aprovisional (sin perjuicio)
dismissal of the case; or both the prosecution and the accused move for aprovisional dismissal of the case; (2)
the offended party is notified of the motion for a provisionaldismissal of the case; (3) the court issues an order
granting the motion and dismissing the caseprovisionally; (4) the public prosecutor is served with a copy of the
order of provisional dismissal ofthe case.In this case, there is no notice of any motion for the provisional
dismissal or of the hearing which wasserved on the private complainant at least 3 days before said hearing as
mandated by Section 4, Rule15 of the Rules. Furthermore, the second paragraph of the new rule should be
construed to mean thatthe order of dismissal shall become permanent one year after service of the order of
dismissal on thepublic prosecutor who has control of the prosecution without the criminal case having been
revived.Correlatively, when a party is represented by a counsel, notices of all kinds emanating from the
courtshould be sent to the latter at his/her given address pursuant to Section 2, Rule 13 of the Rules. Thepublic
prosecutor cannot be expected to comply with the timeline unless he is served with a copy ofthe order of
dismissal.Also, the contention that both the filing of the motion to revive the case and the court order reviving
itmust be made prior to the expiration of the one-year period is not found in the Rules. Further, the factthat year
2004 was a leap year is inconsequential to determine the timeliness of Uy's motion to revivethe criminal cases.
Even if the Court will consider that 2004 is a leap year and that the one-year periodto revive the case should be
reckoned from the date of receipt of the order of provisional dismissal byUy.
SALDERIEGA VS. HON. PANGANIBAN
G.R. NO. 211933
FACTS: For failure of the principal witness, PO2 Nelson Villas, to attend several hearings, the presiding judge
Elvira Panganiban (respondent), ordered that the case against accused Roberta Saldariega (petitioner) for
violation of Section 5 and 11 of RA 9165 be provisionally dismissed, with the express consent of the accused.
However, on June 5, 2013, PO2 Villas moved to re-open the case, averring that his failure to attend was due to
the successive deaths of his uncle and aunt, attaching thereto their respective death certificates. The
respondent judge then granted the motion and ordered the cases set for hearing. Roberta moved for
reconsideration, arguing that the provisional dismissal of the cases is considered an acquittal and PO2 Villas had
no personality to file the motion to re-open case. The respondent denied her motion for reconsideration, hence,
Roberta filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the Supreme Court to assail the judge’s orders.
ISSUE: Whether or not the provisional dismissal of the cases with the consent of the accused but predicated on
failure to prosecute which violates the right of the accused to speedy trial is equivalent to an acquittal, the
reopening of which violates her right against double jeopardy;
HELD: NO. When a criminal case is provisionally dismissed with the express consent of the accused, the case
may be revived by the State within the periods provided under the 2nd paragraph of Section 8, Rule 117 of the
Rules of Criminal Procedure.
A case shall not be provisionally dismissed except with the express consent of the accused and with notice to the
offended party. Here, a perusal of the Order, dated May 16, 2013, stresses that the dismissal of the case was
provisional, i.e., the case could be revived at some future time. If petitioner believed that the case against her
should be dismissed with prejudice, she should not have agreed to a provisional dismissal. She should have
moved for a dismissal with prejudice so that the court would have no alternative but to require the prosecution
to present its evidence. There was nothing in the records showing the accused’s opposition to the provisional
dismissal nor was there any after the Order of provisional dismissal was issued. She cannot claim now that the
dismissal was with prejudice. Thus, if a criminal case is provisionally dismissed with the express consent of the
accused, as in this case, the case may be revived by the State within the periods provided under the 2nd
paragraph of Section 8, Rule 117 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure. There is no violation of due process as long
as the revival of a provisionally dismissed complaint was made within the time-bar provided under the law.
The provisional dismissal of the case does not operate as an acquittal since its dismissal was made with the
express consent of the accused, thus, there is no double jeopardy.
Further, the proscription against double jeopardy presupposes that an accused has been previously charged with
an offense, and the case against him is terminated either by his acquittal or conviction, or dismissed in any other
manner without his consent. As a general rule, the following requisites must be present for double jeopardy to
attach: (1) a valid indictment, (2) before a court of competent jurisdiction, (3) the arraignment of the accused,
(4) a valid plea entered by him, and (5) the acquittal or conviction of the accused, or the dismissal or
termination of the case against him without his express consent. However, there are two (2) exceptions to the
foregoing rule, and double jeopardy may attach even if the dismissal of the case was with the consent of the
accused: first, when there is insufficiency of evidence to support the charge against him; and second, where
there has been an unreasonable delay in the proceedings, in violation of the accused’s right to speedy trial.⁠4
In the instant case, while the first four requisites are present, the last requisite is lacking, considering that here
the dismissal was merely provisional and it was done with the express consent of the accused-petitioner.
Petitioner is not in danger of being twice put in jeopardy with the reopening of the case against her as it is clear
that the case was only provisionally dismissed by the trial court. The requirement that the dismissal of the case
must be without the consent of the accused is not present in this case. Neither does the case fall under any of
the aforementioned exceptions because, in fact, the prosecution had failed to continue the presentation of
evidence due to the absence of the witnesses, thus, the fact of insufficiency of evidence cannot be established.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
 RULE 118: PRE TRIAL
ESTIPOSA, JR. V. JUDGE LOBRIGO
GR NO. 226679 (2017)
Facts:
● Petitioner Salvador Estipona Jr. was charged with a violation of Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165
(Possession of Dangerous Drugs).In Criminal Case No. 13586, it was alleged that in March 2016 in
Legazpi City, the accused was caught in possession of shabu without authority and without the license
or prescription.
● In June 2016, Estipona filed a Motion to Allow the Accused to Enter into Plea Bargaining and prayed
that he be allowed to withdraw his plea of not guilty and to enter a plea of guilty for violation of Sec.
12, Art. II of R.A. 9165 (Possession of Equipment, Instrument, Apparatus and other Paraphernalia for
Dangerous Drugs) with a penalty of rehabilitation in view of his being a first-time offender and the
minimal quantity of shabu seized from him.
● Estipona also argued that Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165 violates: (a) the intent of the law expressed in
paragraph 3, Section 2 thereof; (b) the rule-making authority of the Supreme Court under Section 5(5),
Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution; and (c) the principle of separation of powers among the three
equal branches of the government.
● The prosecution moved for the denial of Estipona’s motion. For being violative of Sec. 23 of R.A. 9165
and averred that Sec. 23 is justified by Congress’ prerogative to choose which offense it would allow
plea bargaining.
● The prosecution later manifested that it is open to Estipona’s motion to give life to the intent of the
law; however, since Sec. 23 expressly prohibits plea-bargaining, it must reject Estipona’s motion.
● RTC: issued an Order denying Estipona's motion. Estipona filed a MR, but it was denied.
Issue: Whether Sec. 23 of R.A. 9165, which prohibits plea-bargaining in all violations of the law, is
unconstitutional for being violative of the constitutional right to equal protection of the law.
Ruling: The Court did not resolve the issue of whether Sec. 23 is unconstitutional for being violative of the right
to equal protection. However, pending further discussions, it declared as invalid the prohibition against plea-
bargaining on drug cases until it is made a part of the rules of procedure through an administrative circular.
Moreover, Sec. 23 is declared invalid for being contrary to the rule making power of the Supreme Court under
Sec. 5 (5) of Art. VIII of the 1987 Constitution.
Plea bargaining is defined as the process whereby the accused and the prosecution work out a mutually
satisfactory disposition of the case subject to court of approval. It is an agreement where both parties can make
concessions to avoid potential losses, and encouraged for the benefit of the accused, the offended party, the
prosecution and the court. It is subject to the sound discretion of the trial court.
There is no constitutional right to plea-bargaining, and the defendant’s rights are not violated if he is tried
instead of accepting his plea of guilty. It neither creates nor takes away vested rights. Consent of the offended
party and the prosecutor be obtained as a condition precedent before the accused be allowed to plea of guilty to
a lesser offense that is necessarily included in the offense charged. In fact, trial courts are cautiously reminds
that a plea of guilty for a lighter offense than that actually charged is not supposed to be allowed as a matter of
bargaining or compromise for the convenience of the accused.
Further, plea bargaining is allowed during arraignment, pre-trial, and even until the prosecution has rested its
case. During pre-trial stage, the court’s exercise of jurisdiction anent plea-bargaining should not be made with
grave abuse.
Whenever the accused moved to plead guilty to a lighter offense subsequent to a bail hearing OR after the
prosecution rested its case, the rules allow such a plea only when the prosecution does not have sufficient
evidence to establish the guilt of the accused with regard to the crime charged against him. The prosecutor and
the court can only allow the change in former plea of the accused based on the evidence on record.
Subsequently, the ruling on the motion to allow the later plea should disclose the strength or weakness of the
prosecution’s evidence. Absent such finding of evidence, the judge’s acceptance of the change of plea of the
accused is improper and irregular.
The present rules on plea-bargaining under the 2000 Rules on Civil procedure are the following: (a) Sec. 2, Rule
116[1] and (b) Sec. 1 Rule 118[2]. Plea bargaining being a rule of procedure, is within the domain of the
Supreme Court pursuant to its power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure, and other
branches of the government encroaches upon such power if the enact laws that would repeal or modify
procedural rules promulgated by the Supreme Court.
Dispositive Portion: Wherefore, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is GRANTED. Section 23 of Republic Act
No. 9165 is declared unconstitutional for being contrary to the rule-making authority of the Supreme Court
under Section 5(5), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution.
RULE 119: TRIAL
JOCELYN ASISTIO CONSINO versus PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND MONICA NEALIGA
G.R. NO. 200465 APRIL 2, 2015
FACTS: Petitioner Jocelyn Asistio y Consino was charged with violation of Section 46 of the Cooperative Code of
the Philippines (Republic Act No. [RA] 6938). That on July 27, 1998, the accused being the Chairperson and
Managing Director of A. Mabini Elementary School Teachers Multi-Purpose Cooperative entered into a contract
with Coca Cola Products in her own personal capacity when in truth and in fact as the said accused fully well
knew, the sale of Coca-Cola products at A. Mabini Elementary School Teachers Multi-Purpose Cooperative should
have accrued to Cooperative to the damage and prejudice of the said Cooperative.
Section 46. Liability of Directors, Officers and Committee Members. - Directors, officers and
committee members, who willfully and knowingly vote for or assent to patently unlawful acts or who are
guilty of gross negligence or bad faith in directing the affairs of the cooperative or acquire any personal
or pecuniary interest in conflict with their duty as such directors, officers or committee member shall be
liable jointly and severally for all damages or profits resulting there from to the cooperative, members
and other persons. When a director, officer or committee member attempts to acquire or acquires, in
violation of his duty, any interest or equity adverse to the cooperative in respect to any matter which
has been reposed in him in confidence, he shall, as a trustee for the cooperative, be liable for damages
and for double the profits which otherwise would have accrued to the cooperative.
The school principal directedpetitioner to submit her financial reports during her tenure as Chairperson.Instead,
petitioner claimed that the principal had no business and authority torequire her to produce financial statements,
and that the said reports hadbeen posted on the school bulletin board.The principal ordered to conduct an
auditing. Based on the documents obtained from Coca-Cola, including therecords of actual deliveries and sales,
and the financial statements preparedby petitioner, the audit committee found that petitioner defrauded the
Cooperative and its members for 3 years.
After the presentation and offer of evidence by the prosecution, petitioner moved to dismiss the case by way of
Demurrer to Evidence with prior leave of court. She argued, among other matters, that the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Manila, Branch 40, does not have jurisdiction over the case, as the crime charged (Violation of Section
46 of RA 6938) does not carry with it a sanction for which she can be held criminally liable. On October 14,
2008, the RTC dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction.
The private respondent appealed the decision of the RTC to the Court of Appeals which was granted. Hence this
petition.
ISSUE:
(1) WON the RTC has the Jurisdiction to try the case
(2) WON the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies was violated
(3) WON the dismissal of the charged against petitioner on demurrer to evidence amounts to an acquittal,
hence final and unappealable
(4) WON the right of the accused against double jeopardy has been violated
RULING:
(1) NO. Petitioner failed to present any compelling reason to warrant a departure from the exhaustive CA
ruling on why the RTC, not the MeTC, has jurisdiction over her criminal case for violation of Section 46
of RA 6938. Clearly, the accused-appellee cannot insist that reference to [Sec.] 124, paragraph 4, as
the trial court did, is necessary and therefore, warranted the dismissal of the criminal case for lack of
jurisdiction. To reiterate, [Sec.] 46 of the Code, entitled “Liability of Directors, Officers, and Committee
Members,” provides for violations under which the said officers could be held liable for, and the
corresponding liability for damages and profits from the said violations. We, thus, agree with the
contention of the People that [Section]124 (3) should refer to “[Section] 46 (Liability of Directors,
Officers and Committee Members, [Section] 49 (Disloyalty of a Director) and [Section] 51 (Illegal use of
confidential information).” Following this interpretation, violation of [Sec.] 46, therefore, is punishable
by a fine of not less than Five thousand pesos (5,000.00), or imprisonment of not less than five
(5)years but not more than ten (10) years or both at the court's discretion, which under B.P. Blg. 129,
shall be within the jurisdiction of the RTC.
(2) NO. Conciliation or mediation is not a pre-requisite to the filing of a criminal case for violation of RA
6938 against petitioner, because such case is not an intra-cooperative dispute. Intra-cooperative
dispute is a dispute arising between or among members of the same cooperative. The instant case is a
dispute between the Cooperative and its former chairperson, the accused-appellee.
(3) NO. In this case, the RTC granted the demurrer to evidence and dismissed the case not for insufficiency
of evidence, but for lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged. Notably, the RTC did not decide the
case on the merits, let alone resolve the issue of petitioner's guilt or innocence based on the evidence
proffered by the prosecution.
(4) NO.The accused-appellee cannot also contend that she will be placed in double jeopardy upon this
appeal. It must be stressed that the dismissal of the case against her was premised upon her filing of a
demurrer to evidence, and the finding, albeit erroneous, of the trial court that it is bereft of jurisdiction.
The requisites that must be present for double jeopardy to attach are: (a) a valid complaint or
information; (b) a court of competent jurisdiction; (c) the accused has pleaded to the charge; and (d)
the accused has been convicted or acquitted or the case dismissed or terminated without the express
consent of the accused. Definitely, there is no double jeopardy in this case as the dismissal was with
the accused-appellee's consent, that is, by moving for the dismissal of the case through a demurrer to
evidence he is deemed to have waived his protection against double jeopardy.
Vda. De Manguerra v. Risos GR No. 152643 (2008)
FACTS: Respondents were charged with Estafa through Falsification of Public Document before the TRC of Cebu.
The case arose from the falsification of a deed of real estate mortgage allegedly committed by respondents
where they made it appear that Concepcion, the owner of the mortgaged property known as Gorordo property,
affixed her signature to the document. Respondents file a Motion for Suspension of Proceedings on the ground of
prejudicial question. They argued that the civil case in an action for declaration of nullity of the mortgage should
first be resolved. RTC granted the said motion. Concepcion’s motion for reconsideration was denied.
Concepcion instituted a special civil action for certiorari before the CA to nullify the RTC orders. The counsel of
Concepcion filed a motion to take the latter’s deposition on the ground that there is a need to perpetuate her
testimony due to her weak physical condition and old age, which limited her freedom of mobility. The motion
was granted. Respondents’ motion for reconsideration was denied by the trial court as the latter ratiocinated
that procedural technicalities should be brushed aside because of the urgency of the situation, since Concepcion
was already of advanced age. After several motions, her deposition was finally taken.
Respondents assailed the said RTC orders in a special civil action for certiorari before the CA. CA rendered a
decision favourable to the respondents. At the outset, itt observed that there was a defect in the respondent’s
petitioner by NOT impleading the People of the Philippines, an indispensable party. This notwithstanding, the
appellate court rresolved the matter on its merit, declaring that the examination of prosecution witness is
governed by Section 15, Rule 119 of the ROC and not Rule 23 of the ROC as the latter applies only to civil cases.
Pursuant to Rule 119, Concepcion’s deposition should have not been taken before the judge or court where the
case is pending, which is the RTC of Cebu and not before the COC of Makati City. Further, it said that the taking
of deposition before the same court is the constitutional right of the accused to meet the witness face to face.
ISSUE
1. Whether failure to implead the “People of the Philippines” in a petition for certiorari arising from a criminal
case a quo constitutes a waivable defect in the petition for certiorari
2. Whether Rule 23 of the ROC can be applied in this case
HELD
1. It is undisputed that in their petition for certiorari before the CA, respondents failed to implead the
People of the Philippines as a party thereto. Because of this, the petition was obviously defective. As provided in
Section 5, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, all criminal actions are prosecuted under the
direction and control of the public prosecutor. Therefore, it behoved the petitioners to implead the People of the
Philippines as respondent in the CA case to enable the Solicitor General to comment on the petition.
However, SC has repeatedly declared that the failure to implead an indispensable party is not a ground for the
dismissal of an action. In such a case, the remedy is to implead the non-party claimed to be indispensable.
Parties may be added by order of the court, on motion of the party or on its own initiative at any stage of the
action and/or such times as are just. If the petitioner/plaintiff refuses to implead an indispensable party despite
the order of the court, the latter may dismiss the complain/petition for the petitioner’s/plaintiff’s failure to
comply.
In this case, CA disregarded the procedural flaw by allowing the petition to proceed, in the interest of substantial
justice. Notwithstanding the non-joinder of the People of the Philippines as party-respondent, it
managed,throught the OSG, to file its Comment on the petition for certiorari. Thus, the People was given the
opportunity to refute the respondent’s arguments.
CA cannot be faulted for deciding the case on the merits despite the procedural defect
2. SC ruled that Rule 23 of the ROC cannot be applied in the instant case. It is basic that all witnesses shall
give their testimonies at the trial of the case in the presence of the judge. This is especially true in criminal
cases in order that the accused may be afforded the opportunity to cross-examine the witness pursuant to
his constitutional right to confront the witnesses face to face. It also gives the parties and their counsel the
 chance to propound such questions as they deem material and necessary to support their position or to test
the credibility of said witnesses. Lastly, this rule enables the judge to observe the witnesses’ demeanor.
However, this rule is not absolute. As exceptions, Rules 23 to 28 of the ROC provide for the different modes of
discovery that may be resorted to by a party to an action. These rules are adopted either to perpetuate the
testimonies of witnesses or as modes of discovery. IN criminal proceedings, Sections 12, 13, and 15 of Rule 119
of the RRCP allow the conditional examination of both the defense and prosecution witnesses.
In this case, in issue is the examination of a prosecution witness, who, according to the petitioners, was too sick
to travel and appear before the trial court. Section 15 of Rule 119, RRCP which provides:
Section 15. Examination of witness for the prosecution. – When it satisfactorily appears that a witness for the
prosecution is too sick or infirm to appear at the trial as directed by the court, or has to leave the Philippines
with no definite date of returning, he may forthwith be conditionally examined before the court where the case is
pending. Such examination, in the presence of the accused, or in his absence after reasonable notice to attend
the examination has been served on him, shall be conducted in the same manner as an examination at the trial.
Failure or refusal of the accused to attend the examination after notice shall be considered a waiver.
The statement taken may be admitted in behalf of or against the accused.
The CA ruled and thus agreed by the SC, that the taking of deposition before the COC of Makati was erroneous
and contrary to the clear mandate of the Rules that the same be made before the court where the case is
pending. The RTC order was issued with grave abuse of discretion.
SC agrees with the CA and quote with approval its ratiocination in this wise:
Unlike an examination of a defense witness which, pursuant to Section 5, Rule 119 of the previous
Rules, and now Section 13, Rule 119 of the present Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, may be taken
before any "judge, or, if not practicable, a member of the Bar in good standing so designated by the
judge in the order, or, if the order be made by a court of superior jurisdiction, before an inferior court
to be designated therein," the examination of a witness for the prosecution under Section 15 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (December 1, 2000) may be done only "before the court where the
case is pending.
It is true that Section 3, Rule 1 of the ROC provides that the rules of civil procedure apply to all actions. IN
effect, it says that the rule of civil procedure have suppletory application to criminal cases. However, it is
likewise true that the criminal proceedings are primarily governed by the RRCP. Considering that Rule 119
adequately and squarely covers the situation in the instant case, the Court finds no cogent reason to apply Rule
23.
The giving of testimony during trial is a general rule. The conditional examination of a witness outside of the trial
is only an exception, and as such, calls for a strict construction of the rules.
People v. Sandiganbayan GR No. 185729-32 (2013)
Ampatuan v. Sec. De Lima GR No. 197291 (2013)
FACTS:
● 57 Innocent civilians were massacred in Sitio Masalay, Municipality of Ampatuan in Maguindanao
Province
● Among the principal suspects was petitioner, then the Mayor of the Municipality of Datu Unsay,
Maguindanao Province
● Inquest proceedings were conducted against petitioner before he was flown to manila and detained at
the main office of the NBI
● The Department of Justice (DOJ) resolved to file the corresponding informations for murder against
petitioner, and to issue subpoena to several persons.
● 25 Informations for murder were also filed against petitioner in the RTC in Cotabato City
● Secretary of Justice Devanadera request the transfer of the venue of trial of the Maguindanao Massacre
to Metro Manila either in Quezon or Manila to prevent miscarriage of justice. The Court granted the
request
● However, prior to the transfer of the venue of the trial the Prosecution filed a manifestation regarding
the filing of 15 additional informations for murder against petitioner in the RTC of Cotabato City
● The records show that petitioner pleaded not guilty to each of the 41 informations for murder when he
was arraigned
● In a joint resolution, the Panel of Prosecutors charged 196 individuals with multiple murder in relation
to the Maguindanao massacre which they partly relied on the twin affidavits of Kenny Dalandag
● Dalandag was admitted into the Witness Protection Program of the DOJ and was listed as one of the
Prosecution witnesses
● Petitioner, through counsel, wrote to respondent Secretary of Justice Leila De Lima and Assistant Chief
State Prosecutor Richard Fadullon to request the inclusion of Dalandag in the informations for murder
considering that Dalandag had already confessed his participation in the massacre through his two
sworn declarations
● Secretary De Lima denied the request
● Petitioner brought a petition for mandamus in the RTC in Manila seeking to compel respondents to
charge Dalandag as another accused in the various murder cases undergoing trial in the QC RTC.
● The RTC in Manila set a pre-trial conference and issued a pre-trial order. The respondents questioned
the propriety of the conduct of a trial in a proceeding for mandamus.
● Petitioner opposed
ISSUE: Whether respondents may be compelled by writ of mandamus to charge Dalandag as an accused for
multiple murder in relation to the Maguindanao massacre despite his admission to the Witness Protection
Program of the DOJ.
HELD: The appeal lacks merit.
The prosecution of crimes pertains to the Executive Department of the Government whose principal power and
responsibility are to see to it that our laws are faithfully executed. A necessary component of the power to
execute our laws is the right to prosecute their violators. The right to prosecute vests the public prosecutors with
a wide range of discretion the discretion of what and whom to charge, the exercise of which depends on a
smorgasbord of factors that are best appreciated by the public prosecutors. The public prosecutors are solely
responsible for the determination of the amount of evidence sufficient to establish probable cause to justify the
filing of appropriate criminal charges against a respondent. Theirs is also the quasi-judicial discretion to
determine whether or not criminal cases should be filed in court.
The two modes by which a participant in the commission of a crime may become a state witness are, namely:
(a) by discharge from the criminal case pursuant to Section 17 of Rule 119 of the Rules of Court; and (b) by the
approval of his application for admission into the Witness Protection Program of the DOJ in accordance with
Republic Act No. 6981 (The Witness Protection, Security and Benefit Act). These modes are intended to
encourage a person who has witnessed a crime or who has knowledge of its commission to come forward and
testify in court or quasi-judicial body, or before an investigating authority, by protecting him from reprisals, and
shielding him from economic dislocation. These modes, while seemingly alike, are distinct and separate from
each other.
Under Section 17, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court, the discharge by the trial court of one or more of several
accused with their consent so that they can be witnesses for the State is made upon motion by the Prosecution
before resting its case. The trial court shall require the Prosecution to present evidence and the sworn
statements of the proposed witnesses at a hearing in support of the discharge. The trial court must ascertain if
the following conditions fixed by Section 17 of Rule 119 are complied with, namely: (a) there is absolute
necessity for the testimony of the accused whose discharge is requested; (b) there is no other direct evidence
available for the proper prosecution of the offense committed, except the testimony of said accused; (c) the
testimony of said accused can be substantially corroborated in its material points; (d) said accused does not
appear to be most guilty; and (e) said accused has not at any time been convicted of any offense involving
moral turpitude.
A participant in the commission of the crime, to be discharged to become a state witness pursuant to Rule 119,
must be one charged as an accused in the criminal case. The discharge operates as an acquittal of the
discharged accused and shall be a bar to his future prosecution for the same offense, unless he fails or refuses
to testify against his co-accused in accordance with his sworn statement constituting the basis for his discharge.
The discharge is expressly left to the sound discretion of the trial court, which has the exclusive responsibility to
see to it that the conditions prescribed by the rules for that purpose exist.
On the other hand, Section 10 of Republic Act No. 6981 provides:
Section 10. State Witness.―Any person who has participated in the commission of a crime and desires
to be a witness for the State, can apply and, if qualified as determined in this Act and by the
Department, shall be admitted into the Program whenever the following circumstances are present:
a. the offense in which his testimony will be used is a grave felony as defined under the
Revised Penal Code or its equivalent under special laws;
b. there is absolute necessity for his testimony;
c. there is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the offense
committed;
d.His testimony can be substantially corroborated on its material points;
e. He does not appear to be most guilty; and
f. He has not at any time been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude.
An accused discharged from an information or criminal complaint by the court in order that he may be a
State Witness pursuant to Sections 9 and 10 of Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Court may upon his petition
be admitted to the Program if he complies with the other requirements of this Act. Nothing in this Act shall
prevent the discharge of an accused, so that he can be used as a State Witness under Rule 119 of the
Revised Rules of Court.
OLBES V. HON. BUEMIO
GR NO. 173319 (2009)
Doctrines (AKA SYLLABUS HAHA): Criminal Procedure; Speedy Trial Act of 1998 (R.A. No. 8493); The
exceptions consisting of the time exclusions provided in the Speedy Trial Act of 1998 reflect the fundamentally
recognized principle that “speedy trial” is a relative term and necessarily involves a degree of flexibility.—
Petitioner argues, however, that the lapse of 253 days (from arraignment to October 23, 2003) was not justified
by any of the excusable delays as embodied in the time exclusions specified under Section 3 of Rule 119. The
argument is unavailing. In Solar Team Entertainment, Inc. v. Judge How, 338 SCRA 511 (2000) the Court
stressed that the exceptions consisting of the time exclusions provided in the Speedy Trial Act of 1998 reflect the
fundamentally recognized principle that “speedy trial” is a relative term and
necessarily involves a degree of flexibility.
The time limits set by the Speedy Trial Act of 1998 do not thus preclude justifiable postponements and delays
when so warranted by the situation.—The time limits set by the Speedy Trial Act of 1998 do not
thus preclude justifiable postponements and delays when so warranted by the situation. To the Court, the
reasons for the postponements and delays attendant to the present case reflected above are not unreasonable.
While the records indicate that neither petitioner nor his counsel was notified of the
resetting of the pre-trial to October 23, 2003, the same appears to have been occasioned by oversight or simple
negligence which, standing alone, does not prove fatal to the prosecution’s case. The faux pas was
acknowledged and corrected when the MeTC recalled the arrest warrant it had issued against petitioner under
the mistaken belief that petitioner had been duly notified of the October 23, 2003 pre-trial setting.
Balancing Test; Due Process; Courts are summoned to maintain a delicate balance between the demands of due
process and the strictures of speedy trial on the one hand, and the right of the State to prosecute crimes and rid
society of criminals on the other.—Reiterating the Court’s pronouncement in Solar Team Entertainment, Inc.
that “speedy trial” is a relative and flexible term, Lumanlaw v. Peralta, Jr., 482 SCRA 396 (2006) summons the
courts to maintain a delicate balance between the demands of due process and the strictures of speedy trial on
the one hand, and the right of the State to prosecute crimes and rid society of criminals on the other. Applying
the balancing test for determining whether an accused has been denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial,
or a speedy disposition of his case, taking into account several factors such as the length and reason of the
delay, the accused’s assertion or non-assertion of his right, and the prejudice to the accused resulting from the
delay, the Court does not find petitioner to have been unduly and excessively prejudiced by the “delay” in the
proceedings, especially given that he had posted bail.
FACTS: On complaint of Samir and Rowena Muhsen, Federico Miguel Olbes (petitioner) was indicted for Grave
Coercion before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila by Information dated June 28, 2002 which was
raffled to Branch 22 thereof. On October 28, 2002, petitioner posted bail and was released.
● February 12, 2003 -Denying petitioner’s motion to defer or suspend his arraignment in light of his
pending petition for review before the Department of Justice from the City Fiscal’s Resolution finding
probable cause to hale him into court, Judge Hipolito dela Vega proceeded with petitioner’s arraignment
in which he pleaded not guilty to the charge.
● pre-trial was thereupon set to May 28, 2003 which was, however, declared a non-working day due to
the occurrence of typhoon "Chedeng." The pre-trial was thus reset to October 23, 2003.3
● At the scheduled pre-trial on October 23, 2003, petitioner failed to appear, prompting the trial court to
issue a warrant for his arrest, which warrant was, however, later recalled on discovery that neither
petitioner nor his counsel was notified of said schedule. Pre-trial was again reset to January 21, 2004.4
● Before the scheduled pre-trial on January 21, 2004 or on November 3, 2003, petitioner filed a Motion to
Dismiss the Information on the ground of violation of his right to a speedy trial under Republic Act No.
84936 or the Speedy Trial Act of 1998 and Supreme Court Circular (SCC) No. 38-98.7 He argued that
"considering that [he] was not - without any fault on his part - brought to trial within 80 days from the
date he was arraigned, this case should be dismissed pursuant to Rule 119, Section 98 in relation to
Rule 119, Section 6 of the Rules
● Petitioner argues that his right to speedy trial is a substantive right and that, contrary to the RTC ruling,
Section 9 of Rule 119 is mandatory in character, having been taken from SCC No. 38-98, strict
 compliance with which is urged to remove any attempt on the part of judges to exercise discretion with
respect to the time frame for conducting the trial of an accused; that the last paragraph of said Section
9 clearly indicates that it is the right of an accused to move for dismissal of the Information should the
prosecution fail to prove the existence of the time exclusions under Section 3 of Rule 119; and that the
enumeration of the allowable time exclusions under Section 3 is exclusive, hence, the RTC erred in
considering the excessive caseload of respondent judge, as a mere pairing judge, to be an allowable
time exclusion under the Rules.

ISSUE: WON his right to speedy trial was violated

HELD: The petition does not impress.

Petitioner draws attention to the time gap of 105 days from his arraignment on February 12, 2003 up to the first
pre-trial setting on May 28, 2003, and another gap of 148 days from the latter date up to the second pre-trial
setting on October 23, 2003 or for a total of 253 days - a clear contravention, according to petitioner, of the 80-
day time limit from arraignment to trial.

It bears noting, however, that on his arraignment on February 12, 2003, petitioner interposed no objection to
the setting of the pre-trial to May 28, 2003 which was, as earlier stated, later declared a non-working day.
Inarguably, the cancellation of the scheduled pre-trial on that date was beyond the control of the trial court.

R.A. No. 8493 and its implementing rules and the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure enumerate certain
reasonable delays as exclusions in the computation of the prescribed time limits. They also provide that "no
provision of law on speedy trial and no rule implementing the same shall be interpreted as a bar to any charge
of denial of speedy trial as provided by Article III, Section 14(2), of the 1987 Constitution." Thus, in spite of
the prescribed time limits, jurisprudence continues to adopt the view that the concept of "speedy
trial" is a relative term and must necessarily be a flexible concept.