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ALEJANDRO ESTRADA, petitioner v. SOLEDAD S. ESCRITOR, respondent

A.M. No. P-02-1651 August 4, 2003
Facts: Escritor is a court interpreter since 1999 in the RTC of Las Pinas City. She has been living with Quilapio, a man who
is not her husband, for more than twenty five years and had a son with him as well. Respondent’s husband died a year before
she entered into the judiciary while Quilapio is still legally married to another woman. Complainant Estrada requested the
Judge of said RTC to investigate respondent. According to complainant, respondent should not be allowed to remain
employed therein for it will appear as if the court allows such act. Respondent claims that their conjugal arrangement is
permitted by her religion—the Jehovah’s Witnesses and the Watch Tower and the Bible Trace Society. They allegedly have
a ‘Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness’ under the approval of their congregation. Such a declaration is effective when legal
impediments render it impossible for a couple to legalize their union.
Issue: Whether or Not the State could penalize respondent for such conjugal arrangement.
Held: No. The State could not penalize respondent for she is exercising her right to freedom of religion. The free exercise of
religion is specifically articulated as one of the fundamental rights in our Constitution. As Jefferson put it, it is the most
inalienable and sacred of human rights. The State’s interest in enforcing its prohibition cannot be merely abstract or symbolic
in order to be sufficiently compelling to outweigh a free exercise claim. In the case at bar, the State has not evinced any
concrete interest in enforcing the concubinage or bigamy charges against respondent or her partner. Thus the State’s interest
only amounts to the symbolic preservation of an unenforced prohibition. Furthermore, a distinction between public and secular
morality and religious morality should be kept in mind. The jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and secular morality.
The Court further states that our Constitution adheres the benevolent neutrality approach that gives room for accommodation
of religious exercises as required by the Free Exercise Clause. This benevolent neutrality could allow for accommodation of
morality based on religion, provided it does not offend compelling state interests. Assuming arguendo that the OSG has
proved a compelling state interest, it has to further demonstrate that the state has used the least intrusive means possible so
that the free exercise is not infringed any more than necessary to achieve the legitimate goal of the state. Thus the conjugal
arrangement cannot be penalized for it constitutes an exemption to the law based on her right to freedom of religion.

Guinguing vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 128959)

FACTS: Cirse Choy Torralba, a broadcast journalist with two radio programs airing in Visayas and Mindanao, filed a criminal
complaint for libel against Segundo Lim and petitioner, Guinguing for causing the publication of records of his criminal cases
as well as photographs of his arrest. ! The criminal records and photos were published by means of a one-page advertisement
paid for by Lim in the Sunday Post, a weekly publication edited and published by petitioner. ! Choy Torralba asserted that he
has been acquitted and that the cases referred to in the publication had already been settled. He sought the conviction of
Lim and Guinguing for libel and claims that such publication placed him in public contempt and ridicule and was designed to
degrade and malign his person and destroy him as a broadcast journalist. ! The trial court and the Court of Appeals found
the publication indeed libelous declaring that malice, the most important element of libel, was present in this case every
defamatory publication prima facie implies malice on the part of the author and publisher towards the person subject thereof.
Lim, in his defense, claimed that complainant was allegedly making scurrilous attacks against him and his family over the
airwaves. Since Lim had no access to radio time, he opted for paid advertisements via newspaper to answer the attacks, as
a measure of self-defense. o Lim also argued that complainant, as a media man and member of the fourth estate, occupied
a position almost similar to a public functionary and should not be onion-skinned and be able to absorb the thrust of public
scrutiny. ! The lower courts also ruled that publication of calumny even against public officers or candidates for public office,
according to the trial court, is an offense most dangerous to the people. It deserves punishment because the latter may be
deceived thereby and reject the best and deserving citizens to their great injury. Thus, petitioner prayed for reversal of the
judgment against him contending that his conviction by the lower courts constitutes an infringement of his constitutional right
to freedom of speech and of the press.
ISSUES: Whether or not the publication in the instant case is indeed libelous
RULING:
- The lower courts applied the strict letter of the law. However, this Court is compelled to delve deeper into the issue
considering that changes in the factual milieu evoked a change in the judgment applicable
- Under the law, criminal libel is defined as a public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or
imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status, or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or
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contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the memory of one who is dead. ! Thus, the elements of libel
are: (a) imputation of a discreditable act or condition to another; (b)publication of the imputation; (c) identity of the
person defamed; and, (d) existence of malice. However, in order to protect the constitutional guarantee of free speech,
additional rules were applied to libel cases involving public figures.
- Originally, truth was not a defense in criminal libel. TORRALBA IS A PUBLIC FIGURE
- Ayer Productions Pty. Ltd v. Capulong defined a public figure as a person who, by his accomplishments, fame, or
mode of living, or by adopting a profession or calling which gives the public a legitimate interest in his doings, his
affairs, and his character, has become a 'public’ person. ! There should be little controversy in holding that
complainant is a public figure. He is a broadcast journalist hosting two radio programs aired over a large portion of
the Visayas and Mindanao.
- The newspaper in question, the Sunday Post, is particularly in circulation in the areas where complainant’s broadcasts
were aired. NO ACTUAL MALICE
- It is clear that there was nothing untruthful about what was published in the Sunday Post. The criminal cases listed
in the advertisement as pending against the complainant had indeed been filed
- The information, moreover, went into the very character and integrity of complainant to which his listening public has
a very legitimate interest. Complainant hosts a public affairs program, one which he himself claimed was imbued with
public character since it deals with “corruptions in government, corruptions by public officials, irregularities in
government in comrades.”
- By entering into this line of work, complainant in effect gave the public a legitimate interest in his life.
- It cannot be helped if the commentary protected by the Bill of Rights is accompanied by excessive color or innuendo.
Certainly, persons in possession of truthful facts are not obliged to present the same in bland fashion.
- As adverted earlier, the guarantee of free speech was enacted to protect not only polite speech, but even expression
in its most unsophisticated form.

LITO CORPUZ vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 180016, April 29, 2014 PERALTA, J.:

FACTS: Accused Corpuz received from complainant Tangcoy pieces of jewelry with an obligation to sell the same and remit
the proceeds of the sale or to return the same if not sold, after the expiration of 30 days. The period expired without Corpuz
remitting anything to Tangcoy. When Corpuz and Tangcoy met, Corpuz promised that he will pay, but to no avail.
Tangcoy filed a case for estafa with abuse of confidence against Corpuz.Corpuz argued as follows:
a. The proof submitted by Tangcoy (receipt) is inadmissible for being a mere photocopy.
b. The information was defective because the date when the jewelry should be returned and the date when crime occurred is
different from the one testified to by Tangcoy.
c. Fourth element of estafa or demand is not proved.
d. Sole testimony of Tangcoy is not sufficient for conviction

ISSUES and RULING

Can the court admit as evidence a photocopy of document without violating the best evidence rule (only original documents,
as a general rule, is admissible as evidence)? Yes. The established doctrine is that when a party failed to interpose a timely
objection to evidence at the time they were offered in evidence, such objection shall be considered as waived.
Here, Corpuz never objected to the admissibility of the said evidence at the time it was identified, marked and testified upon
in court by Tangcoy. Corpuz also failed to raise an objection in his Comment to the prosecution’s formal offer of evidence and
even admitted having signed the said receipt.
Is the date of occurrence of time material in estafa cases with abuse of confidence?

No. It is true that the gravamen of the crime of estafa with abuse of confidence under Article 315, paragraph 1, subparagraph
(b) of the RPC is the appropriation or conversion of money or property received to the prejudice of the owner and that the
time of occurrence is not a material ingredient of the crime. Hence, the exclusion of the period and the wrong date of the
occurrence of the crime, as reflected in the Information, do not make the latter fatally defective.
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Further, the following satisfies the sufficiency of information:

1. The designation of the offense by the statute;
2. The acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense;
3. The name of the offended party; and
4. The approximate time of the commission of the offense, and the place wherein the offense was committed.
The 4th element is satisfied. Even though the information indicates that the time of offense was committed “on or about the
5th of July 1991,” such is not fatal to the prosecution’s cause considering that Section 11 of the same Rule requires a statement
of the precise time only when the same is a material ingredient of the offense.

What is the form of demand required in estafa with abuse of confidence?

Note first that the elements of estafa with abuse of confidence are as follows:
(a) that money, goods or other personal property is received by the offender in trust, or on commission, or for administration,
or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of, or to return the same;
(b) that there be misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the offender or denial on his part of such receipt;
(c) that such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and
(d) that there is a demand made by the offended party on the offender.

No specific type of proof is required to show that there was demand. Demand need not even be formal; it may be verbal. The
specific word “demand” need not even be used to show that it has indeed been made upon the person charged, since even
a mere query as to the whereabouts of the money [in this case, property], would be tantamount to a demand.

In Tubb v. People, where the complainant merely verbally inquired about the money entrusted to the accused, the query was
tantamount to a demand.

May a sole witness be considered credible?

Yes. Note first that settled is the rule that in assessing the credibility of witnesses, SC gives great respect to the evaluation
of the trial court for it had the unique opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses and their deportment on the witness
stand, an opportunity denied the appellate courts, which merely rely on the records of the case.

The assessment by the trial court is even conclusive and binding if not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or
circumstance of weight and influence, especially when such finding is affirmed by the CA. Truth is established not by the
number of witnesses, but by the quality of their testimonies, for in determining the value and credibility of evidence, the
witnesses are to be weighed not numbered.

G.R. Nos. L-32613-14 December 27, 1972

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, ,vs. HON. SIMEON. FERRER (act), FELICIANO CO alias LEONCIO CO alias "Bob,"
and NILO S. TAYAG alias Romy Reyes alias "Taba,".
CASTRO, J.

Facts of the Case: On March 5, 1970 a criminal complaint for violation of section 4 of the Anti-Subversion Act was filed
against the respondent Feliciano Co in the Court of First Instance of Tarlac. The abovenamed accused, feloniously became
an officer and/or ranking leader of the Communist Party of the Philippines, an outlawed and illegal organization aimed to
overthrow the Government of the Philippines by means of force, violence, deceit, subversion, or any other illegal means for
the purpose of establishing in the Philippines a totalitarian regime and placing the government under the control and
domination of an alien power.Meanwhile, on May 25, 1970, another criminal complaint was filed with the same court, sharing
the respondent Nilo Tayag and five others with subversion. Resolving the constitutional issues raised, the trial court, under
the decision of Hon. Simeon Ferrer in its resolution of September 15, 1970, declared the statute void on the grounds that it is
a bill of attainder and that it is vague and overboard, and dismissed the informations against the two accused. The Government
appealed.
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Issue: Whether or not, REPUBLIC ACT No. 1700, otherwise known as the Anti-Subversion Law a bill of attainder.

Held: No. A bill of attainder is the substitution of judicial determination to a legislative determination of guilt.
In the instant case, if Anti-Subversion Act is a bill of attainder, it would be totally unnecessary to charge Communists in court,
as the law alone, without more, would suffice to secure their punishment. But the undeniable fact is that their guilt still has to
be judicially established. The Government has yet to prove at the trial that the accused joined the Party knowingly, willfully
and by overt acts, and that they joined the Party, knowing its subversive character and with specific intent to further its basic
objective. The ingredient of specific intent to pursue the unlawful goals of the Party must be shown by "overt acts." This
constitutes an element of "membership" distinct from the ingredient of guilty knowledge. The former requires proof of direct
participation in the organization's unlawful activities, while the latter requires proof of mere adherence to the organization's
illegal objectives.

G.R. No. L-18208 February 14, 1922

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. VICENTE DIAZ CONDE and APOLINARIA R. DE CONDE,
JOHNSON, J.:

Facts of the Case: On December 30, 1915, Bartolome Oliveros and Engracio Liaco borrowed from Vicente Diaz-Conde
and Apolinaria R. De Conde the sum of P300. They obligated themselves to pay the defendants 5% per month, payable within
the first ten days beginning on January 1916. On May 1, 1916, Act No. 2655 (Usury Law) took effect.

Issue: Whether or not the defendants violated Act No. 2655.

Held: No. If a contract is legal at its inception, it cannot be rendered illegal by any subsequent legislation. The
obligation of the contract is the law which binds the parties to perform their agreement if it is not contrary to the law of the
land, morals or public order. That law must govern and control the contract in every aspect in which it is intended to bear upon
it, whether it affect its validity, construction, or discharge. In the present case, making Act No. 2655 applicable to the act
complained of which had been done before the law was adopted, a criminal act, would give it an ex post facto operation.
An ex post facto law, is a law that makes an action, done before the passage of the law, and which was innocent
when done, criminal. Ex post facto laws are absolutely prohibited unless its retroactive effect is favorable to the defendant.
The decision of the lower court is revoked and the complaint dismissed.

G.R. No. L-1960. November 26, 1948.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. FLORENTINO ABILONG,

FACTS: That on or about the 17th day of September, 1947,in the City of Manila, Philippines, FlorentinoAbilong, the
accused, being then a convictsentenced and ordered to serve destierro duringwhich he should not enter any
place within theradius of 100 kilometers from the City of Manila forattempted robbery, evaded the service of
saidsentence by going beyond the limits made againsthim and commit vagrancy.ISSUE:Whether the lower court erred in
imposing a penaltyon the accused under article 157 of the RevisedPenal Code, which does not cover evasion
ofservice of "destierro."RULING:It is clear that the word "imprisonment" used in theEnglish text is a wrong or erroneous
translation ofthe phrase "sufriendo privacion de libertad" used inthe Spanish text. It is equally clear that although theSolicitor
General impliedly admits destierro as notconstituting imprisonment, it is a deprivation ofliberty, though partial, in the
sense that as in thepresent case, the appellant by his sentence ofdestierro was deprived of the liberty to enter
theCity of Manila. Under the case of People vs.Samonte, as quoted in the brief of the SolicitorGeneral
that "it is clear that a person undersentence of destierro is suffering deprivation of hisliberty and escapes from
the restrictions of thepenalty when he enters the prohibited area."

PEOPLE vs. FORMIGONES G.R. No. L-3246 November 29, 1950 Parricide, Feeblemindedness, Imbecility, Article 12
of the RPC
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FACTS: Late in the afternoon, Julia was sitting at the head of the stairs of the house. The accused, without any previous
quarrel or provocation whatsoever, took his bolo from the wall of the house and stabbed his wife, Julia, in the back, the blade
penetrating the right lung and causing a severe hemorrhage resulting in her death not long thereafter. The blow sent Julia
toppling down the stairs to the ground, immediately followed by her husband Abelardo who, taking her up in his arms, carried
her up the house, laid her on the floor of the living room and then lay down beside her. In this position he was found by the
people who came in response to the shouts for help made by his eldest daughter, who witnessed and testified to the stabbing
of her mother by her father. Defendant admitted that he killed, motive was admittedly of jealousy because according to his
statement he used to have quarrels with his wife for the reason that he often saw her in the company of his brother Zacarias.

He appealed based on the theory that the appellant is an imbecile and therefore exempt from criminal liability under article 12
of the Revised Penal Code.

ISSUE: Is the appellant imbecile and covered by Article 12 of the RPC?

RULING: Dr. Francisco Gomez, who examined him, it was his opinion that Abelardo was suffering only from feeblemindedness
and not imbecility and that he could distinguish right from wrong.

In order that a person could be regarded as an imbecile within the meaning of article 12 of the Revised Penal Code so as to
be exempt from criminal liability, he must be deprived completely of reason or discernment and freedom of the will at the time
of committing the crime. The Supreme Court of Spain held that in order that this exempting circumstances may be taken into
account, it is necessary that there be a complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act, that is, that the accused be
deprived of reason; that there be no responsibility for his own acts; that he acts without the least discernment;1 that there be
a complete absence of the power to discern, or that there be a total deprivation of freedom of the will. For this reason, it was
held that the imbecility or insanity at the time of the commission of the act should absolutely deprive a person of intelligence
or freedom of will, because mere abnormality of his mental faculties does not exclude imputability.

The Supreme Court of Spain likewise held that deaf-muteness cannot be equaled to imbecility or insanity.The allegation of
insanity or imbecility must be clearly proved. Without positive evidence that the defendant had previously lost his reason or
was demented, a few moments prior to or during the perpetration of the crime, it will be presumed that he was in a normal
condition. Acts penalized by law are always reputed to be voluntary, and it is improper to conclude that a person acted
unconsciously, in order to relieve him from liability, on the basis of his mental condition, unless his insanity and absence of
will are proved.

As to the strange behaviour of the accused during his confinement, assuming that it was not feigned to stimulate insanity, it
may be attributed either to his being feebleminded or eccentric, or to a morbid mental condition produced by remorse at having
killed his wife.

After a careful study of the record, we are convinced that the appellant is not an imbecile. According to the evidence, during
his marriage of about 16 years, he has not done anything or conducted himself in anyway so as to warrant an opinion that he
was or is an imbecile. He regularly and dutifully cultivated his farm, raised five children, and supported his family and even
maintained in school his children of school age, with the fruits of his work. Occasionally, as a side line he made copra. And a
man who could feel the pangs of jealousy to take violent measure to the extent of killing his wife whom he suspected of being
unfaithful to him, in the belief that in doing so he was vindicating his honor, could hardly be regarded as an imbecile. Whether
or not his suspicions were justified, is of little or no import. The fact is that he believed her faithless.
Appellant was found guilty of parricide.

G.R. NO. 141066 : February 17, 2005]

EVANGELINE LADONGA, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,.
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
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Facts: In 1989, spouses Adronico and Evangeline Ladonga became Alfredo Oculam’s regular customers in his pawnshop
business. Sometime in May 1990, the Ladonga spouses obtained a P9,075.55 loan from him, guaranteed by United Coconut
Planters Bank (UCPB) Check No. 284743, post dated to July 7, 1990 issued by Adronico; sometime in the last week of April
1990 and during the first week of May 1990, the Ladonga spouses obtained an additional loan of P12,730.00, guaranteed by
UCPB Check No. 284744, post dated to July 26, 1990 issued by Adronico; between May and June 1990, the Ladonga spouses
obtained a third loan in the amount of P8,496.55, guaranteed by UCPB Check No. 106136, post dated to July 22, 1990 issued
by Adronico; the three checks bounced upon presentment for the reason “CLOSED ACCOUNT”; when the Ladonga spouses
failed to redeem the check, despite repeated demands, he filed a criminal complaint against them. While admitting that the
checks issued by Adronico bounced because there was no sufficient deposit or the account was closed, the Ladonga spouses
claimed that the checks were issued only to guarantee the obligation, with an agreement that Oculam should not encash the
checks when they mature; and, that petitioner is not a signatory of the checks and had no participation in the issuance thereof.
The RTC rendered a joint decision finding the Ladonga spouses guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating B.P. Blg. 22.
Petitioner brought the case to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction of petitioner.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner who was not the drawer or issuer of the three checks that bounced but her co-accused
husband under the latter’s account could be held liable for violations of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 as conspirator.

Held: The conviction must be set aside. Article 8 of the RPC provides that “a conspiracy exists when two or more persons
come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it.” To be held guilty as a co-principal by
reason of conspiracy, the accused must be shown to have performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the
complicity. The overt act or acts of the accused may consist of active participation in the actual commission of the crime itself
or may consist of moral assistance to his co-conspirators by moving them to execute or implement the criminal plan. In the
present case, the prosecution failed to prove that petitioner performed any overt act in furtherance of the alleged conspiracy.
Apparently, the only semblance of overt act that may be attributed to petitioner is that she was present when the first check
was issued. However, this inference cannot be stretched to mean concurrence with the criminal design. Conspiracy must be
established, not by conjectures, but by positive and conclusive evidence. Conspiracy transcends mere companionship and
mere presence at the scene of the crime does not in itself amount to conspiracy. Even knowledge, acquiescence in or
agreement to cooperate, is not enough to constitute one as a party to a conspiracy, absent any active participation in the
commission of the crime with a view to the furtherance of the common design and purpose.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee vs. MARTIN SIMON y SUNGA,

Facts: The respondent was sentenced with the punishment of reclusion perpetua for violating the Dangerous Drug Act (RA
No. 6425). He allegedly sold four tea bags of marijuana to a Narcotics Command during a buy-bust operation which was sold
for P40.00. The said buy-bust operation was executed on or about October 22, 1988.
In this case, the respondent was praying for a lesser punishment under the Revised Penal Code (RPC).

Issue: Whether or not the respondent can avail of the lesser punishment pursuant to Art. 22 of the RPC.

Held: Yes, the respondent can avail of the lesser punishment prescribed by Art 22 of the RPC. Republic Act No. 7659 already
took effect on December 31, 1993 after its publication on December 16, 1993 while the respondent was still serving his
sentence.
Hence, the respondent was given an indeterminate penalty of arresto mayor or prision correctional instead of serving its full
sentence of reclusion perpetua.