DACANAY vs. ASISTIO, JR.

FACTS:
This is a petition for mandamus to the non-action of the city government of Caloocan in accordance with
the decision of the RTC to evict the occupants of a flea market located in the streets of Caloocan.

January 5, 1979 – Metropolitan Manila Commission enacted an ordinance allowing the use of streets for
the purpose of flea markets subject to several conditions.
1987 – Mayor Martinez caused the demolition of the flea markets and the stallowners filed a case against
such action.

RTC dismissed the case on the ground that the streets in questions (Heros del '96, Gozon and Gonzales)
are of public dominion, hence outside the commerce of man.

After the decision came out, there was a change in the city administration and current mayor (Asistio) did
not pursue the action of the previous mayor and left the flea markets in the streets as is.
Dacanay, being a resident of Heroes del '96 filed a petition for mandamus to remove the stalls in their
street

ISSUE:
May public streets be leased or licensed to market stallholders by virtue of a city ordinance or resolution
of Metropolitan Manila Commission?

HELD: NO

A public street is property for public use hence outside the commerce of man. Being outside the
commerce of man, it may not be the subject of lease or other contract

The vested right of the public to use city streets for the purpose they were intended to serve such as for
traveling

Any executive order or city resolution cannot change the nature of the public street because it is going to
be contrary to the general law

MACASIANO vs. DIOKNO

FACTS:
On June 13, 1990, the municipality of Paranaque passed an ordinance authorizing the closure of some
streets located at Baclaran, Paranaque, Metro Manila and the establishment of a flea market thereon. By
virtue of this Paranaque Mayor Ferrer was authorized to enter into a contract to any service cooperative
for the establishment, operation, maintenance and management of flea market and/or vending areas.
Because of this purpose, respondent Palanyag entered into an agreement with the municipality of
Paranaque with the obligation to remit dues to the treasury. Consequently, market stalls were put up by
respondent Palanyag on the said streets.

On September 30, 1990, Brig. Gen Macasiano, PNP Superintendent of Metropolitan Traffic
Command ordered the destruction and confiscation of the stalls. These stalls were later returned to
Palanyag. Petitioner then sent a letter to Palanyag giving the latter 10 days to discontinue the flea market
otherwise the market stalls shall be dismantled. Hence, respondents filed with the court a joint petition
for prohibition and mandamus with damages and prayer for preliminary injunction, to which the
petitioner filed his memorandum/opposition to the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction. The
court issued a temporary restraining order to enjoin petitioner from enforcing his letter pending the
hearing on the motion for writ of preliminary injunction.

ISSUE:
Whether an ordinance issued by the municipality of Paranaque authorizing the lease and use of public
streets or thoroughfares as sites for flea market is valid?

HELD:
Article 424 lays down the basic principle that properties of public domain devoted to public use and made
available to the public in general are outside the commerce of man and cannot be disposed or leased by
the local government unit to private persons. Aside from the requirement of due process, the closure of
the road should be for the sole purpose of withdrawing the road or other public property from public use
when circumstances show that such property is no longer intended or necessary for public use or public
service. When it is already withdrawn from public use, the property becomes patrimonial property of the
local government unit concerned. It is only then that respondent municipality can use or convey them for
any purpose for which other real property belonging to the local unit concerned might lawfully used or
conveyed.

Those roads and streets which are available to the public in general and ordinarily used for
vehicular traffic are still considered public property devoted to public use. In such case, the local
government has no power to use it for another purpose or to dispose of or lease it to private persons.
Hence the ordinance is null and void.

SANGALANG vs. IAC (1989) 176 SCRA 719

Before the Court are six consolidated petitions, docketed as G.R. nos. 71169, 74376, 76394, 78182,
82281 and 60727. The first five petitions for a motion for reconsideration raise the issue of whether
Jupiter Street is for the exclusive use of Bel-Air Village residents. Meanwhile, the last petition (G.R.
60727) raises the lone issue of whether or not the Mayor of Makati could have validly opened Jupiter and
Orbit Streets to vehicular traffic.

FACTS:
Ayala Corporation (original owner of the property subsequently subdivided as Bel-Air Village) executed a
Deed of Donation covering Jupiter and Orbit streets to Bel-Air Village Association (BAVA).
Respondents allege that upon instructions of the Mayor of Makati, studies were made by the on the
feasibility of opening streets in Bel-Air Village calculated to alleviate traffic congestions along the public
streets adjacent to Bel-Air Village.
Accordingly, it was deemed necessary by the Municipality of Makati in the interest of the general public to
open to traffic several village streets including Jupiter and Orbit streets.
Respondent’s claim: BAVA had agreed to the opening of Bel-Air Village streets and that the opening was
demanded by public necessity and in the exercise of police power.
Petitioner’s counter-argument: It has never agreed on the opening of Jupiter and Orbit streets. By virtue
of its ownership of the streets, it should not be deprived without due process of law and without just
compensation.

ISSUES
1. Whether the Mayor of Makati could have validly opened Jupiter and Orbit streets? – YES
2. If yes, what is the nature of the state power being invoked by the Mayor? – POLICE POWER

HELD:
1. BAVA cannot rightfully complain that the Mayor of Makati, in opening up Jupiter and Orbit streets, had
acted arbitrarily.
Citing Sangalang v. IAC, the Court held that Jupiter street lies as the boundary between Bel-Air Village
and Ayala Corporation’s commercial section. Being considered as merely a boundary – and hence not part
of Ayala’s real estate development projects – it cannot be said to have been for the exclusive benefit of
Bel-Air Village residents.
The very Deed of Donation executed by Ayala Corp. covering Jupiter and Orbit Streets, amongst others,
effectively required both passageways open to the general public.
“…the property will be used as a street for the use of the members of the DONEE (BAVA), their families,
personnel, guests, domestic help and under certain reasonable conditions and restrictions, by the general
public…”
* As the Court asserted in Sangalang, the opening of Jupiter and Orbit streets was warranted by the
demands of the common good, in terms of traffic decongestion and public convenience.
2. The act of the Mayor now challenged is in the concept of police power.
The demolition of the gates at Orbit and Jupiter streets does not amount to deprivation of property
without due process of law or expropriation without just compensation – there is no taking of property
involved.
Police power as the “state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or
property in order to promote the general welfare.”
Even liberty itself, the greatest of all rights, is not unrestricted license to act accordingly to one’s will. It is
subject to the far more overriding demands and requirements of the greater number.
Public welfare when clashing with the individual right to property should not be made to prevail through
the state’s exercise of its police power.
The exercise of police power, however, may not be done arbitrarily or unreasonably. But the burden of
showing that it is unjustified lies on the aggrieved party.
In the case at bar, BAVA has failed to show that the opening up of Orbit and Jupiter streets was
unjustified or that the Mayor acted unreasonably.
The fact that the opening has led to the loss of privacy of BAVA residents is no argument against the
Municipality’s effort to ease vehicular traffic in Makati. The duty of local executive is to take care of the
needs of the greater number, in many cases at the expense, of the minority

SANGALANG vs. IAC (177 SCRA 87)

FACTS:
Atty. J. Cezar Sangco, counsel for the petitioners Spouses Jose and Lutgarda Sangalang, allegedly used
intemperate and accusatory language in his motion for reconsideration.The Court finds Atty. Sangco's
remarks in his motion for reconsideration, particularly, “. . .The Court not only put to serious question its
own integrity and competence but also jeopardized its own campaign against graft and corruption
undeniably pervading the judiciary . . .” disparaging, intemperate, and uncalled-for.

ISSUE: DI KO ALAM BAKIT SINAMA NI SIR TO SA LIST

HELD:
His suggestions that the Court might have been guilty of graft and corruption in acting on these cases are
not only unbecoming, but comes, as well, as an open assault upon the Court’s honor and integrity.

Atty. Sangco is entitled to his opinion, but not to a license to insult the Court with
derogatory statements and recourses to argumenta ad hominem. In that event, it is the Court’s duty "to
act to preserve the honor and dignity .. and to safeguard the morals and ethics of the legal profession."
We sought to hold Atty. Sangco in contempt, specifically, for resort to insulting language amounting to
disrespect toward the Court within the meaning of Section 1, of Rule 71, of the Rules of Court. Clearly,
however, his act also constitutes malpractice as the term isdefined by Canon 11 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.

Atty. J. Cezar Sangco is (1) SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3) monthseffective from
receipt hereof, and (2) ORDERED to pay a fine of P 500.00

CEBU OXYGEN vs. BERCILLES

FACTS:
In 1968, a terminal portion of a street in Cebu was excluded in the city’s development plan hence the
council declared it as abandoned and was subsequently opened for public bidding. Cebu Oxygen was the
highest bidder at P10,800.00. Cebu Oxygen applied for the land’s registration before CFI Cebu but the
provincial fiscal denied it, so did the court later, alleging that the road is part of the public domain hence
beyond the commerce of man.

ISSUE:
Whether Cebu Oxygen can validly own said land.

HELD:
Yes. Under Cebu’s Charter (RA 3857), the city council “may close any city road, street or alley, boulevard,
avenue, park or square. Property thus withdrawn from public servitude may be used or conveyed for any
purpose for which other real property belonging to the City may be lawfully used or conveyed.” Since that
portion of the city street subject of Cebu Oxygen’s application for registration of title was withdrawn from
public use, it follows that such withdrawn portion becomes patrimonial property which can be the object
of an ordinary contract. Article 422 of the Civil Code expressly provides that “Property of public dominion,
when no longer intended for public use or for public service, shall form part of the patrimonial property of
the State