CABRERA vs.

CA

GR no. 78673, March 18, 1991

FACTS: The Provincial Board of Catanduanesadopted Resolution No. 158 which provides the closing of
the old road leading to the new Capitol Building of the province and to give the owners of the properties
traversed by the new road equal area from the old road adjacent to the respective remaining portion of
their properties. Deeds of Exchange were executed by the Province of Catanduanes.

Upon learning about the resolution, the petitioner filed a complaint for “Restoration of Public Road and/or
Abatement ofNuisance, Annulment of Resolutions and Documents withDamages.” He alleged that the
land fronting his house was a publicroad owned by the Province of Catanduanes in its governmental
capacity and therefore beyond the commerce of man and that the deed of exchange was invalid.

The CFI sustained the authority of the provincial board toenact Resolution No. 158 under existing
law.Pursuant to Republic Act No. 5185, municipal authorities can close, subjectto the approval or
direction of the Provincial Board, thoroughfares underSection 2246 of the Revised Administrative Code.
Although in this case theroad was not closed by the municipality of Catanduanes but by theprovincial
board of Catanduanes, the closure, nevertheless, is valid since itwas ordered by the approving authority
itself. However, while it could doso, the provincial government of Catanduanes could close the road only
ifthe persons prejudiced thereby were indemnified, Section 2246 of theRevised Administrative Code being
very explicit on this.

The petitioner insist that Sec. 2246 is not applicablebecause the public road was owned bythe province in
its governmental capacity and, without a prior orderof closure, could not be the subject of a barter.
Control over publicroads, he insists, is with Congress and not with the provincialboard. He also alleged
the closure of the road injured him and his family.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Provincial Board can validly enact the resolution.

RULING: YES. Resolution 158 clearly says that it is“hereby resolved to close the old road.”The authority
of the provincial board to close that road and useor convey it for other purposes is derived from the
followingprovisions of Republic Act No. 5185 in relation to Section 2246 ofthe Revised Administrative
Code. Property thus withdrawn from public servitude may be used or conveyedfor any purpose for which
other real property belonging to the municipalitymight be lawfully used or conveyed.

In the case of Favis vs. City of Baguio, the court held that theCity Council of Baguio City has the power to
close city streets and withdraw them frompublic use. While it is true that the above case dealt with city
councils and not theprovincial board, there is no reason for not applying the doctrine announcedtherein
to the provincial board in connection with theclosure of provincial roads. The provincial board has, after
all, the duty ofmaintaining such roads for the comfort and convenience of the inhabitantsof the province.
Moreover, this authority is inferable from the grant by thenational legislature of the funds to the Province
of Catanduanes for theconstruction of provincial roads.
CITY OF OZAMIZ vs LUMAPAS

GR no. L-30727, July 15, 1975

FACTS:Lumapas is an operator of transportationbuses for passengers and cargoes, under the name of
Romar Line. TheMunicipal Board of Ozamiz City enacted an ordinance imposing parking fees for every
motor vehicle parked on any portion of the existing parking space in the City of Ozamiz.

After approvalthe City of Ozamizbegan collecting the prescribed parking fees and collected fromLumapas,
who had paid underprotest. 4 years later Lumapas filed a complaint against the City of Ozamiz for
recovery of parking fees, alleging, among others, thatsaid Ordinance No. 466 is ultra vires.

The court rendered judgmentdeclaring that such parking fee is in the nature of toll fees for theuse of
public road and made in violation of Section 59[b] of Land Transportation and Traffic Code, there
beingno prior approval therefor by the President of the Philippines uponrecommendation of the Secretary
of Public Works andCommunications.

Petitioner now contends that the lower court erred: (1) indeclaring Ordinance No. 466, series of 1964, of
Ozamiz City, nulland void; (2) in considering parking fees as road tolls under Section59[b] of RA No.
4136; (3) in declaring the parking area asa public street and not the patrimonial property of the city; and
(4)in ordering the reimbursement of parking fees paid by Lumapas.

ISSUE: Whether the Municipal Board of the City of Ozamiz had power to enact the ordinance

RULING: Yes. The rule is well-settled that municipal corporations, being merecreatures of the law, have
only such powers as are expresslygranted to them and those which are necessarily implied orincidental to
the exercise thereof, and the power to tax is inherentupon the State and it can only be exercised by
Congress, unlessdelegated or conferred by it to a municipal corporation. As such,said corporation has
only such powers as the legislative departmentmay have deemed fit to grant. By reason of the limited
powers oflocal governments and the nature thereof, said powers are to beconstrued strictissimi juris and
any doubt or ambiguity arising outof the terms used in granting said powers must be construedagainst
the municipality.

The implied powers which a municipal corporation possesses andcan exercise are only those necessarily
incident to the powersexpressly conferred. Inasmuch as a city has no power, except bydelegation from
Congress, in order to enable it to impose a tax orlicense fee, the power must be expressly granted or be
necessarilyimplied in, or incident to, the powers expressly conferred upon thecity.

Under Sec. 15[y] of the Ozamiz City Charter, themunicipal board has the power “x x x to regulate the use
of streets,avenues, alleys, sidewalks, wharves, piers, parks; cemeteries andother public places; x x x”,
andthe authority “To enact all ordinances it may deemnecessary and proper for the sanitation and safety,
the furtheranceof prosperity and the promotion of the morality, peace, good order,comfort, convenience,
and general welfare of the city and itsinhabitants, and such others as may be necessary to carry
intoeffect and discharge the powers and duties conferred by thisCharter x x x.” By this express legislative
grant of authority, policepower is delegated to the municipal corporation to be exercised as
agovernmental function for municipal purposes.
FAVIS vs CITY OF BAGUIO

GR no. L-29910, April 25, 1969

FACTS: Favis bought a parcel of land from the Assumption Convent Inc. the lot is bounded by a
proposed road lot, owned by Assumption. The proposed road lot was donated by Assumption to the City
of Baguio for road purposes. Favis uses this road as means of egress and ingress from his residence to a
public street called Lapu-Lapu st.

Resolution no.115 of the City Council of Baguio leased lot 25 to Shell for 10-year period renewable for
another 10 years. Resolution no.132 authorized the Mayor to lease to Shell lot 25 and the donated lot.
Said office, in a letter noted that lot B is for public use and may not be leased.

Favis sent a letter-protest against the additional lease made in favor of Shell. He claimed that it would
diminish the width of Lapu-Lapu st. and that it would destroy the symmetry of the said st. thus making it
look ugly and the City was bereft of authority to lease any portion of public st. in favor of anyone.

Resolution no.215, amending no.132, by converting the portion of Lapu-Lapu st. from lot B of sketch
plan, beginning at the portion’s intersection with Dagohoy st., into an alley. Declaring for this purpose,
that said lot B shall not be part of this alley.

Favis then instituted a petition annulling the lease contract. The lower court ruled that the 2 resolution
were valid.

ISSUES:

1. Whether the closing of the street without an ordinance is valid

2. Whether the City Council of Baguio has the power to close city streets

RULING:

1. YES. It has beenheld that “even where the statute or municipal charter requires themunicipality to
act by ordinance, if a resolution is passed in themanner and with the statutory formality required in
the enactmentof an ordinance, it will be binding and effective as an ordinance."Such resolution may
operate regardless of the name by which it iscalled.
2. Considering that “municipal corporations in the Philippines aremere creatures of Congress; that, as
such, said corporationspossessed, and may exercise, only such power as Congress maydeem fit to
grant thereto",9 a reference to the organic act of the Cityof Baguio appears to be in order. In
subsection (L) of Section 2553 ofBaguio Charter, the language ofthe grant of authority runs thus—
"(L) To provide for laying out, opening, extending-, widening, straightening,closing up, constructing,
or regulating, in whole or in part, any public plaza,square, street, sidewalk, trail, park, waterworks, or
water mains, or anycemetery, sewer, sewer connection or connections, either on, in, or uponpublic or
private property; x x x."Undoubtedly, the City is explicitly empowered to close a city street.
FIGURACION vs LIBI

GR no. 155688, Nov 28, 2007

FACTS: The Ceby City government expropriated lot no. 899-D-2 andturned the same into a portion of N.
Escario Street. The said lot is owned by Figuracion and Cebu City paid him for the expropriation.

In Resolution No. 330, the Cebu CitySangguniang Panlungsod approved thereconveyance toIsagani
Figuracion, successor-in-interest of Galileo Figuracion, ofan unused portion of Lot No. 899-D-2. On the
basis thereof, CebuCity Mayorexecuted in favor ofIsagani Figuracion a deed of saleover thesubject lot.

It appearing that herein respondents had been using the subjectlot, and refused to vacate it despite
demand, petitioners, assuccessors-in-interest of Isagani Figuracion, filed againstrespondents a complaint
for unlawful detainer.

The MTC rendered a decision, declaringpetitioners entitled to possession of the subject lot and
orderingrespondents to remove the fence they had constructed.

Respondents filed against petitioners a complaint forthe annulment of Resolutions and the deed of sale in
favor of Isagani.

RTC rendered the resolutions and deed of sale as null and void.

ISSUE: Whether the action by the Spouses Libi to annul the reconveyance of the lot to FIguracion is
proper

RULING: No. The Court ruled that the Spouses Libi were not the real-parties-in-interest to annul theTCT
of Figuracion, since they are not themselves claiming title to or possession of the lot. Libi alleged that
they bought the adjacent lot in the belief that they had an outlet to N. Escario Street through the lot
owned by the Cebu City government. Clearly, they have no interest in the title ofthe lot.

Reversion is a proceeding by which the State seeks the return of lands of the public domain through the
cancellation of private title erroneously or fraudulently issued over it. The action should be in the name of
the State. Thus, Spouses Libi cannot be considered the properparties therein.

The Spouses’ sole interest is the use of the property as access to N. Escaro Street. Such interest is
tangential to any issue regarding ownership or possession of the property. Hence, it is not sufficient to
vest in them the legal standing to sue for reversion of the property. They should have maintained the
action for easement.

The wisdom and intent of the City Council to recognize the right of Isagani Figuracion to

repurchase the lot cannot be gainsaid. The City of Cebu has the power and authority to sell the
expropriated property that is no longer needed for that purpose for which it was intended.

The Spouses Libi not only lacked the legal personality but also have no legal basis to challenge the
reconveyance.
RUIZ vs GORDON

GR no. L-65695, Dec 19, 1983

FACTS: The constitutional rights to free speech and free assemblyare invoked in this mandamus
proceeding filedagainst Gordon, City Mayor of OlongapoCity. It was alleged that petitioner
personallydelivered to the respondent a letterapplicationrequesting in behalf of theOlongapo Citizen's
Alliance for National Reconciliation, Justice forAquino Justice for All (JAJA), Concern (sic) Citizen for
Justice andPeace (CCJP), Damdamin Bayan na Nagkakaisa (DAMBANA),United Nationalist Democratic
Organization (UNIDO), for a permit to hold a prayer-rally at theRizal Triangle, Olongapo City.

The Court required the respondents to answer. Respondents replied by stating the request for a prayer
rally was received in the Office of the Mayor and that respondent had repeatedly announced in his
regular program on Sunday over the radio (DWGO) and at the Monday morning flag ceremony before
hundreds of government employees that he would grant the request of any group that would like to
exercise their freedom of speech and assembly.

When interviewed on the matter by the Editor-in Chief of the 'Guardian', he mentioned the fact that he
had granted the permit of the petitioner, which interview appeared in the November 22-28, 1983 issue of
the said newspaper.

Given these, the respondent prayed for the dismissal of the petition. This was complied with.

ISSUE: Can the petition be granted

RULING: No. Reyes decision as to the role of the judiciary in petitions for permitsto hold peaceable
assemblies may have to be supplemented. This ishow the J.B.L. Reyes opinion reads on this point: "The
applicantsfor a permit to hold an assembly should inform the licensingauthority of the date, the public
place where and the time when itwill take place. If it were a private place, only the consent of theowner
or the one entitled to its legal possession is required Suchapplication should be filed well ahead in time to
enable the publicofficial concerned to appraise whether there may be valid objectionsto the grant of the
permit or to its grant but at another public place.It is an indispensable condition to such refusal or
modification thatthe clear and present danger test be the standard for thedecision reached. If he is of the
view that there is such an imminentand grave danger of a substantive evil, the applicants must beheard
on the matter. Thereafter, his decision, whether favorable oradverse, must be transmitted to them at the
earliest opportunity.Thus if so minded, they can have recourse to the proper judicialauthority.

As shown both in the manifestation and the answer, this actionfor mandamus could have been obviated if
only petitioner took thetrouble of verifying on November 23 whether or not a permit hadbeen issued. A
party desirous of exercising the right to peaceableassembly should be the one most interested in
ascertaining theaction taken on a request for a permit. Necessarily, after areasonable time or, if the day
and time was designated for thedecision on the request, such party or his representative should beat the
office of the public official concerned. If he fails to do so, acopy of the decision reached, whether adverse
or favorable, shouldbe sent to the address of petitioner. In that way, there need not bewaste of time and
effort not only of the litigants but likewise of acourt from which redress is sought in case of a denial
ormodification of a request for a permit.