CRUZ v.

CA

GR L-44178 AUGUST 21, 1987

FACTS:

The private respondents instituted a class suit before the then Court of First Instance of Manila,
Branch VIII in behalf of the vendors and regular stall holders in Padre Rada Market for annulment with
preliminary injunction against the then Manila Mayor Antonio J. Villegas, petitioner Cruz, and other
persons whose names were unknown to them after the decision of the City Mayor to withdraw Padre
Rada Market as a public market.

ISSUE:

WON the Mayor of Manila can withdraw Padre Rada Market from government supervision.

HELD:

NO.

By the very nature of a market, its location, opening, operations, and closure must be regulated
by government. It is not a question of the petitioner's right to run his market as he pleases but what
agency or office should supervise its operations. We agree with the Court of Appeals that the Mayor had
no legal authority to, by himself, allow the petitioner to withdraw the major portion of Padre Rada Market
from its use as a public market, thereby also withdrawing it from the city's constant supervision. The
establishment and maintenance of public markets is by law among the legislative powers of the City of
Manila. Since the operation of Padre Rada Market was authorized by a municipal board resolution and
approved by the City Mayor, as provided by law, it follows that a withdrawal of the whole or any portion
from use as a public market must be subject to the same joint action of the Board and the Mayor. The
Mayor of Manila, by himself, cannot provide for the opening, operations, and closure of a public market.
There is no question that the Padre Rada Market is a public market as it was authorized to operate and it
operates as such. The Padre Rada Market is, therefore, a public market which happens to be privately-
owned and privately operated. The Padre Rada Market is a public market and as such should be subject
to the local government's supervision and control. It’s conversion into a private market or its closure must
follow the procedures laid down by law.

PILAPIL v. CA

G.R. No. 97619 November 26, 1992

FACTS:

Spouses Pilapil own a parcel of land in Bahak, Poblacion, Liloan, Cebu. Spouses Colomida, on the
other hand, bought a parcel of land located also in Bahak. Now this land owned by the Colomidas has for
its ingress and egress to the National Road a caminovecinal (barrio road). However, this caminovecinal
transverses the property of the Pilapil, which was the root of all their problems.

The Pilapil denied the existence of the caminovecinal. Socrates Pilapil, the husband, presented
himself as witness (which was lousy) as well as Engineer Epifanio Jordan, Municipal Planning and
Development Coordinator of Liloan. The engineer said that while that zoning map of Poblacion, Liloan
made reference to a caminovecinal, said reference was but a mere proposal of its existence to the
Sangguniang Bayan of Liloan.

The Colomidas, on the other hand, relied on old-timers as witnesses – witnesses such as
FlorentinoPepito, who attested to the existence of the Camino vecinal and its availability to the general
public since practically time immemorial.

The trial court ruled in favor of the Colomidas because the zoning map used as evidence by the
Pilapil did not specifically indicate that the amino vecinal was indeed merely “proposed” since other roads
and streets were classified as such. The CA upheld that trial court, basically because it said that findings
of facts by the trial court, as a general rule, should be undisturbed.

ISSUE: WON the zoning plan must give way to the claims of the adversaries?

HELD: NO

In its infinite wisdom, the SC said that it didn’t matter what opinion the Colomidas or the
engineer gave regarding the existence of the caminovecinal. What really mattered is the zoning plan (the
Urban Land Use Plan) as finally approved by the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Liloan. The
zoning plan showed that the caminovecinal was declared closed. And it’s beyond dispute that the
abandonment, closure or establishment of the caminovecinal is the sole prerogative of the Municipality of
Liloan under the LGU of 1983. The SC rebuked the parties for not having resorted to a pre-trial
conference which would have prevented the dragging of a trivial case for six years.

ALBON v. FERNANDO

G.R. No. 148357 June 30, 2006Corona, J.

FACTS:

In May 1999, the City of Marikina undertook a public works project to widen, clear and repair the existing
sidewalks of Marikina Green heights Subdivision. It was undertaken by the city government pursuant to
Ordinance No. 59. Subsequently, petitioner Albon filed a taxpayer’s suit for certiorari, prohibition and
injunction with damages against respondents City Engineer Alfonso Espirito, Assistant City Engineer
AnakiMaderal and City Treasurer NatividadCabalquinto. According to the petitioner it was unconstitutional
and unlawful for respondents to use government equipment and property, and to disburse public funds,
of the City of Marikina for the grading, widening, clearing, repair and maintenance of the existing
sidewalks of Marikina Greenheights Subdivision. He alleged that the sidewalks were private property
because Marikina Greenheights Subdivision was owned by V.V. Soliven, Inc. Hence, the city government
could not use public resources on them. In undertaking the project, therefore, respondents allegedly
violated the constitutional proscription against the use of public funds for private purposes as well as
Sections 335 and 336 of RA 7160 and the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The trial court ruled in
favor of the respondents. Ordinance No. 59 is a valid enactment. The court recognized the inherent police
power of the municipality and with this it is allowed to carry out the contested works. The Court of
Appeals sustained the decision of the trial court stating that sidewalks of Marikina Greenheights
Subdivision were public in nature and ownership thereof belonged to the City of Marikina or the Republic
of the Philippines following the 1991 White Plains Association decision. Thus, the improvement and
widening of the sidewalks pursuant to Ordinance No. 59 of 1993 was well within the LGU’s powers.

ISSUE:

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in upholding the validity of Ordinance No. 59

HELD:

NO. Like all LGUs, the City of Marikina is empowered to enact ordinances for the purposes set forth in the
Local Government Code (RA 7160). It is expressly vested with police powers delegated to LGUs under the
general welfare clause of RA 7160. With this power, LGUs may prescribe reasonable regulations to
protect the lives, health, and property of their constituents and maintain peace and order within their
respective territorial jurisdictions. Also, in the exercise of their inherent police power the cities and
municipalities have the power to exercise such powers and discharge such functions and responsibilities
as may be necessary, appropriate or incidental to efficient and effective provisions of the basic services
and facilities, including infrastructure facilities intended primarily to service the needs of their residents
and which are financed by their own funds. These infrastructure facilities include municipal or city roads
and bridges and similar facilities. Regarding the nature of ownership of the sidewalks in question, there is
also no hindrance in declaring that the sidewalks are of public dominion. PD 957, as amended by
PD1216, mandates subdivision owners to set aside open spaces which shall be devoted exclusively for
the use of the general public.

New Sun Valley v. Sangguniang Barangay, G.R. No. 156686, July 27, 2011

FACTS:

The Sangguniang Barangay of Barangay Sun Valley issued a Resolution directing the New Sun Valley
Homeowners Association to Open Rosemallow and Aster Streets to vehicular and pedestrian traffic. NSV
residents, contended that when they bought their residential properties, they also paid proportionately for
the roads and the park in then subdivision. They have therefore an existing equity on these roads. To
open the roads to public use is a violation of the rights and interests to a secure, peaceful and healthful
environment. Further, they claimed that a "Barangay Resolution" cannot validly cause the opening of the
subject roads because under the law, an "ordinance" is required to effect such an act.

ISSUE: WON the claim of NSV that a "Barangay Resolution" cannot validly cause the opening of the
subject roads because under the law, an "ordinance" is required to effect such an act, is correct.
HELD: No. NSV is incorrect. The requirement under Sec. 21 of the passage of an ordinance by a local
government unit to effect the opening of a local road, can have no applicability to the instant case since
the subdivision road lots sought to be opened to decongest traffic in the area - namely Rosemallow and
Aster Streets – have already been donated by the Sun Valley Subdivision to, and the titles thereto already
issued in the name of, the City Government of Parañaque since the year 1964. Having been already
donated or turned over to the City Government of Parañaque, the road lots in question have since then
taken the nature of public roads which are withdrawn from the commerce of man, and hence placed
beyond the private rights or claims of herein Appellant. Accordingly, NSV was not in the lawful exercise of
its predicated rights when it built obstructing structures closing the road lots in question to vehicular
traffic for the use of the general Public. Consequently, defendant’s act of passing the disputed barangay
resolution, the implementation of which is sought to be restrained by Appellant, had for its purpose not
the opening of a private road but may be considered merely as a directive or reminder to the Appellant to
cause the opening of a public road which should rightfully be open for use to the general public.

City of Manila V. Teotico

Facts:
At about 8:00 in the evening, private respondent Genaro Teotico was at the corner of the Old Luneta and
P. Burgos Avenue, Manila, within a loading and unloading zone, waiting for a jeepney when one came
along to stop. As he stepped down from the curb to board the jeepney and took a few steps, he fell
inside an uncovered and unlighted manhole. The fall caused Teotico’s head to hit the rim and break his
eyeglasses and the broken pieces thereof to pierce his left eyelid. Respondent was then brought to PGH
to be treated of his injuries. Respondent suffered contusions in various parts of his body and allergic
eruptions caused by the anti-tetanus injections administered to him required further medical treatment
and payment of these charges. Thus, respondent filed a complaint for damages against the City of
Manila, its mayor, city engineer, city health officer, city treasurer and chief of police. The trial court
dismissed the complaint. On appeal, the City of Manila was sentenced to pay the damages.
Issue:
Whether or not the City of Manila is liable for damages.
Ruling: YES.
Article 2189 of the Civil Code constitutes a particular prescription making “provinces, cities and
municipalities . . . liable for damages for the death of, or injury suffered by any person by reason” —
specifically — “of the defective condition of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other-public
works under their control or supervision.” In other words, Article 2189 governs liability due to “defective
streets,” in particular. Since the present action is based upon the alleged defective condition of a road,
said Article 2189 is decisive thereon.
In its answer to the amended complaint, the City, in turn, alleged that “the streets aforementioned were
and have been constantly kept in good condition and regularly inspected and the storm drains and
manholes thereof covered by the defendant City and the officers concerned” who “have been ever
vigilant and zealous in the performance of their respective functions and duties as imposed upon them by
law.” Thus, the City had, in effect, admitted that P. Burgos Avenue was and is under its control and
supervision. At any rate, under Article 2189 of the Civil Code, it is not necessary for the liability therein
established to attach that the defective roads or streets belong to the province, city or municipality from
which responsibility is exacted. What said article requires is that the province, city or municipality have
either “control or supervision” over said street or road.