PEOPLE v.
NARVAEZ The conflict reached an “amicable” settlement that was later repudiated by
April 20, 1983 | Makasiar, J. | Justifying circumstances
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE: The People of the Philippines
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT: Mamerto Narvaez
SUMMARY: Appellant Narvaez was found guilty of murder for shooting
Fleischer and Rubia when he saw and failed to stop them from fencing his
house. He claims that the act of shooting was in defense of his person and of his
rights. The SC ruled that he was rightfully exercising defense of his property,
but only amounted to an incomplete self-defense due to the absence of the 2nd
requisite. The Court also recognized 2 mitigating circumstances of voluntary
surrender and passion or obfuscation.
DOCTRINE:
Defense of one’s person or rights is treated as a justifying circumstance under
Art. 11, par. 1 of the Revised Penal Code, but in order for it to be appreciated,
the following requisites must occur:
1. Unlawful aggression;
2. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it;
3. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself
Privileged mitigated circumstance of incomplete defense:
(where majority of the requisites are present)
“in view of the presence of unlawful aggression on the part of the victims and
lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the appellant” In this case, the
second requisite is lacking.
Civil Code Art. 429. The owner or lawful possessor of a thing has the right to
exclude any person from the enjoyment and disposal thereof. For this purpose,
he may use such force as may be reasonably necessary to repel or prevent an
actual or threatened unlawful physical invasion or usurpation of his property.
FACTS:
1. Narvaez was convicted by the trial court of murder for killing Fleischer and
Rubia from shooting, qualified by treachery with the aggravating
circumstance of evident premeditation offset by the mitigating circumstance
of voluntary surrender. He was sentenced to reclusion perpetua and to
indemnify the heirs of the deceased Davis Q. Fleischer in the sum of
P12,000.00 as compensatory damages, P10,000.00 as moral damages,
P2,000.00 as attorney’s fees.
2. The shooting incident appears to be intertwined with the long drawn out
legal battle between the Fleischer and Co., Inc. of which deceased Fleischer
was the secretary-treasurer and deceased Rubia the assistant manager, on
the one hand, and the land settlers of Cotabato, among whom was appellant.
the settlers, but the Director of Lands, acting upon the report of Atty.
Gozon, approved the same and ordered the formal award of the land in
question to Fleischer and Company. The land settlers including the
appellant also lost the case in the Court of First Instance and the CA.
3. Among those ejected from the land was the appellant who, to avoid trouble,
voluntarily dismantled his house, built in 1947 at a cost of around
P20,000.00, and transferred to his other house which he built in 1962 or
1963 near the highway.
4. Appellant was also among the settlers who filed a case in the CFI to obtain
an injunction or annulment of the order of award with prayer for
preliminary injunction. During the pendency of the case, he entered into a
contract of lease with the company where he agreed to lease an area of land
form the company for a consideration of P16.00 monthly. He signed the
contract although the ownership of the land was still uncertain, in
order to avoid trouble, until the question of ownership could be
decided. He never paid the agreed rental, although he alleges that the
milling job they did for Rubia was considered payment.
5. Fleischer wrote him a letter demanding for his payment for his rent. He
gave the appellant 6 months to remove his house, ricemill, bodega, and
water pitcher pumps from the land.
6. Fleischer and Rubia (both deceased), together with their laborers,
commenced fencing the portion of land by by putting bamboo posts along
the property line parallel to the highway. The fence, when finished, would
have the effect of shutting off the accessibility to appellant’s house and rice
mill from the highway, since the door of the same opens to the Fleischers’
side. This continued on the day the killing happened.
7. At that time, appellant was woken up from his nap when he heard that the
walls of his house were being chiselled, he arose and there he saw the
fencing going on. He tried to talk things over with the deceased but the
latter continued. Appellant lost his equilibrium and he got his gun and shot
Fleischer. As Fleischer fell down, Rubia ran towards the jeep, and knowing
there is a gun on the jeep, appellant fired at Rubia, likewise hitting him.
8. Before this Court, appellant claims that he shot the deceased in defense
of his person and of his rights, and therefore he should be exempt from
criminal liability.
9. Prosecution claims that the deceased were in lawful exercise of their rights
of ownership over the land in question, when they did the fencing that
sealed off appellant’s access to the highway.
ISSUE/s: WoN the the appellant is entitled to the justifying circumstance of self-
defense – NO
RULING: Finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of only 2 homicides,
mitigated by the privileged extenuating circumstance of incomplete self-defense as
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well as by 2 generic mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender and
obfuscation, without any aggravating circumstance, appellant is hereby sentenced to
suffer an imprisonment of 4 months of arresto mayor, to indemnify each group of
heirs of Davis Fleischer and of Flaviano Rubia in the sum of P4000, w/osubsidiary
imprisonment and without any award for moral damages and attorney’s fees.
Considering that appellant has been under detention for almost 14 years now since
his voluntary surrender, his immediate release is hereby ordered.
RATIO:
1. Presence of unlawful aggression by the deceased: The continuance of the
fencing would have resulted in the further chiselling of the walls of
appellant’s house as well as the closure of the access to and from his house
and rice mill·which were not only imminent but were actually in
progress. There was aggression on the part of the victims: Fleischer was
ordering, and Rubia was actually participating in the fencing. This was
indeed aggression, not on the person of appellant, but on his property rights.
The deceased had no right to destroy or cause damage to appellant’s
house, nor to close his accessibility to the highway while he was
pleading with them to stop and talk things over with him. The assault
on appellant’s property, therefore, amounts to unlawful aggression as
contemplated by law. In any case, Fleischer had given him up to
December 31, 1968 within which to vacate the land. He should have
allowed appellant the peaceful enjoyment of his properties up to that time,
instead of chiselling the walls of his house and closing appellant’s entrance
and exit to the highway. There was an actual physical invasion of
appellant’s property which he had the right to resist, pursuant to Art.
429 of the Civil Code.
2. Lack of 2nd requisite – reasonable necessity of means employed: When the
appellant fired his shotgun from his window, killing his two victims, his
resistance was disproportionate to the attack.
3. Presence of 3rd requisite – lack of sufficient provocation on the part of
appellant who was defending his property: Appellant who was sleeping
when the victims chiselled his house and fenced off his estate and who
asked them to stop doing so is not guilty of sufficient provocation when he
shot the victims who ignored his plea. As a matter of fact, there was no
provocation at all on his part, since he was asleep at first and was only
awakened.
4. Lack of treachery: The crime committed is homicide on two counts. The
qualifying circumstance of treachery cannot be appreciated in this case
because of the presence of provocation on the part of the deceased. In order
to appreciate alevosia, “it must clearly appear that the method of assault
adopted by the aggressor was deliberately chosen with a special view to the
accomplishment of the act without risk to the assailant from any defense
that the party assailed might have made. This cannot be said of a situation
where the slayer acted instantaneously x x x” (People v. Cañete)
5. No evidence of premeditation: The witness presented by the prosecution, a
laborer employed by the victim, is an obviously biased witness. Evident
premeditation is further negated by appellant pleading with the victims to
stop the fencing and destroying his house and to talk things over just before
the shooting.
6. Mitigating circumstance of passion/obfuscation: Passion and obfuscation
attended the commission of the crime. The appellant awoke to find his
house being damaged and its accessibility to the highway as well as of his
rice mill bodega being closed. Not only was his house being unlawfully
violated; his business was also in danger of closing down for lack of access
to the highway. These circumstances, coming so near to the time when his
first house was dismantled, thus forcing him to transfer to his only
remaining house, must have so aggravated his obfuscation that he lost
momentarily all reason causing him to reach for his shotgun and fire at the
victims in defense of his rights.
7. Penalty for incomplete self-defense with 2 mitigating circumstances: The
accused is entitled to a penalty lower by one or two degrees. The same
may be further reduced where there are two mitigating circumstances.
Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code prescribes the penalty for homicide
as reclusion temporal. Pursuant to Article 69, the penalty lower by one or
two degrees shall be imposed if the deed is not wholly excusable by reason
of the lack of some of the conditions required to justify the same.
Considering that the majority of the requirements for defense of
property are present, the penalty may be lowered by two degrees, i.e.,
to prision correccional. And under paragraph 5 of Article 64, the same
may further be reduced by one degree, i.e., arresto mayor, because of the
presence of two mitigating circumstances and no aggravating
circumstance.
8. Reducing the civil liability: The civil liability of the appellant should be
modified. In the case of Zulueta vs. Pan American World Airways, the
award for moral damages was reduced because the plaintiff contributed to
the gravity of defendantÊs reaction. In the case at bar, the victims not only
contributed but they actually provoked the attack by damaging
appellant’s properties and business. Considering appellant’s standing in
the community, being married to a municipal councilor, the victimsÊ
actuations were apparently designed to humiliate him and destroy his
reputation.
Gutierrez, J., separate opinion; dissenting in part:
Defense of property is not of such importance as the right to life and defense of
property can only be invoked when it is coupled with some form of attack on the
person of one entrusted with said property. The defense of property, whether
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complete or incomplete, to be available in prosecutions for murder or homicide must
be coupled with an attack by the one getting the property on the person defending it.
In this case, there is absolutely no evidence that an attack was attempted, much less
made upon the person of appellant. I agree with the majority opinion that the crime is
homicide but without any privileged mitigating circumstance.

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