Political Law Barqs

2015 Bar Questions and Suggested Answers Political Law
I. The Philippines and the Republic of Kroi Sha established diplomatic relations and immediately their respective Presidents
signed the following: (1) Executive Agreement allowing the Republic of Kroi Sha to establish its embassy and consular
offices within Metro Manila; and (2) Executive Agreement allowing the Republic of Kroi Sha to bring to the Philippines its
military complement, warships, and armaments from time to time for a period not exceeding one month for the purpose of
training exercises with the Philippine military forces and exempting from Philippine criminal jurisdiction acts committed in
the line of duty by foreign military personnel, and from paying custom duties on all the goods brought by said foreign forces
into Philippine territory in connection with the holding of the activities authorized under the said Executive Agreement.
Senator Maagap questioned the constitutionality of the said Executive Agreements and demanded that the Executive
Agreements be submitted to the Senate for ratification pursuant to the Philippine Constitution. Is Senator Maagap correct?
Explain. (4%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER: Senator Maagap is correct in so far as the second Executive Agreement is concerned. The first
Executive Agreement is in such a nature that such need not be concurred in by the Senate. In Bayan Muna v. Romulo, the
right of the Executive to enter into binding agreements without the necessity of subsequent congressional approval has
been confirmed by long usage. From the earliest days of our history, we have entered executive agreements covering such
subjects as commercial and consular relations, most favored nation rights, patent rights trademark and copyright protection,
postal and navigation arrangements and
the settlement of claims. However, for the second Executive Agreement which is in the nature of an International
agreements involving political issues or changes on national policy and those involving international arrangements of a
permanent character, is deemed as a treaty (Commissioner of Customs v. Eastern Sea Trading), in which case must be
concurred in by the Senate (Section 21, Article VI, 1987 Constitution). Hence Senator Maagap is only correct as regards
the second Executive Agreement which must be submitted for the concurrence of the Senate.
II.(1) A bill was introduced in the House of Representatives in order to implement faithfully the provisions of the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) to which the Philippines is a signatory. Congressman Pat Rio Tek
questioned the constitutionality of the bill on the ground that the provisions of UNCLOS are violative of the provisions of
the Constitution defining the Philippine internal waters and territorial sea. Do you agree or not with the said objection?
Explain. (3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER: No, the objection is not tenable. UNCLOS has nothing to do with the redefinition of our territory.
It merely regulates sea-use rights over maritime zones, contiguous zones, exclusive economic zones, and continental
shelves which it delimits. Whether the bodies of water lying landward of the baselines of the Philippines are internal waters
or archipelagic waters, the Philippines retains jurisdiction over them (Magallona v. Ermita, GR No. 187167, July 16, 2011,
655 SCRA 476).
(2) Describe the following maritime regimes under UNCLOS (4%) (a) Territorial sea  (b) Contiguous zone  (c) Exclusive
economic zone (d) Continental shelf
SUGGESTED ANSWER: (a)Territorial sea – is the belt of waters adjacent to the coasts of the State, excluding internal
waters in bays and gulfs, over which the state claims sovereignty and jurisdiction and which is 12 nautical miles from the
baseline. (b)Contiguous zone – is that belt of waters measured 24 nautical miles from the same baseline used to measure
the breadth of the territorial sea. In this zone, the coastal state may exercise the control necessary to i) Prevent infringement
of its customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws and regulations within its territory or territorial sea. ii) Punish infringement
of the above laws and regulations committed within its territory or territorial sea (Article 53, UNCLOS) (c) Exclusive
Economic Zone is an area beyond and adjacent to the territorial sea, over which a state has special rights over the
exploration and utilization of marine resources. It shall not extend beyond 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which
the breadth of the territorial sea is measured. In case of archipelagic states, its breadth shall be measured from the
archipelagic baseline (Article 57, 58, 48, UNCLOS) (d)Continental shelf - The continental shelf of a coastal State comprises
the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas that extend beyond its territorial sea throughout the natural prolongation of
its land territory to the outer edge of the continental margin, or to a distance of 200 nautical miles from the baselines from
which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured where the outer edge of the continental margin does not extend up to
that distance (Article 76, UNCLOS).
III.Professor Masipag who holds a plantilla or regular item in the University of the Philippines (UP) is appointed as an
Executive Assistant in the Court of Appeals (CA). The professor is considered only on leave of absence in UP while he
reports for work at the CA which shall pay him the salary of the Executive Assistant. The appointment to the CA position
was questioned, but Professor Masipag countered that he will not collect the salary for both positions; hence, he can not
be accused of receiving double compensation. Is the argument of the professor valid? Explain. (4%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER: No, the argument is not valid. The prohibition of dual employment does not apply to Professor
Masipag because Section 5 [c], Canon III of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel allows court personnel to acquire
outside employment provided, among others, that the outside employment does not require the practice of law; and
provided, however, that court personnel may render services as professor, lecturer, or resource person in law schools,
review or continuing education centers or similar institutions. Dual employment applies to appointive officials who are not
allowed to hold any other office or employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof,
including government-owned corporation or their subsidiaries, unless otherwise allowed by law or the primary functions of
his position (Article IX B Section 7 of the 1987 Constitution; Sections 1 and 2, Rule XVIII of the Omnibus Rules Implementing
Book V of E.O. No. 292).
IV.When is a facial challenge to the constitutionality of a law on the ground of violation of the Bill of Rights traditionally
allowed? Explain your answer. (3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER: Facial challenge to the constitutionality of a law is traditionally allowed when it operates in the
area of freedom of expression. The established rule is that a party can question the validity of a statute only if, as applied
to him, it is unconstitutional. The exception is the so-called “Facial challenge". But the only time a facial challenge to a
statute is allowed is when it operates in the area of freedom of expression. ln such instance, the "overbreadth doctrine"
permits a party to challenge the validity of a statute even though, as applied to him, it is not unconstitutional, but it might
be if applied to others not before the Court whose activities are constitutionally protected. lnvalidation of the statute "on its
face", rather than "as applied", is permitted in the interest of preventing a "chilling effect" on freedom of expression (Justice
Mendoza's concurring opinion in Cruz v. DENR, G.R. No. 135385, December 06, 20001). A facial challenge to a legislative
act is the most difficult challenge to mount successfully since the challenge must establish that no set of circumstances
exists under which the act would be valid (Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 148560, November 19,20011).
V. BD Telecommunications, Inc. (BDTI), a Filipino-owned corporation, sold its 1,000 common shares of stock in the
Philippine Telecommunications Company (PTC), a public utility, to Australian Telecommunications (AT), another
stockholder of the PTC which also owns 1,000 common shares. A Filipino stockholder of PTC questions the sale on the
ground that it will increase the common shares of AT, a foreign company, to more than 40% of the capital (stock) of PTC
in violation of the 40% limitation of foreign ownership of a public utility. A T argues that the sale does not violate the 60-40
ownership requirement in favor of Filipino citizens decreed in Section II, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution because
Filipinos still own 70% of the capital of the PTC. AT points to the fact that it owns only 2,000 common voting shares and
1,000 non-voting preferred shares while Filipino stockholders own 1,000 common shares and 6,000 preferred shares,
therefore, Filipino stockholders still own a majority of the outstanding capital stock of the corporation, and both classes of
shares have a par value of Php 20.00 per share. Decide. (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER: AT’s contention does not hold water. The determination of the percentage of Filipino ownership
in a corporation is no longer primarily based on the number of apparent shares of a stockholder, nor to the class of stock a
shareholder holds. In the latest ruling of the Supreme Court in Narra Nickel Mining v. Redmont Consolidated Mines (G.R.
No. 195580 January 28, 2015), the computation of the total percentage of the Filipino ownership in a corporation is applied
to BOTH (a) the total outstanding shares of stock entitled to vote in the election of directors; AND (b) the total number of
outstanding shares of stock, whether or not entitled to vote in the election of directors. In Narra v. Redmont, foreign
corporations have resorted to elaborate corporate layering as to make it appear that there is compliance with the minimum
Filipino ownership in the Constitution. The corporate layering employed by certain foreign corporation was
evidently designed to circumvent the constitutional caveat allowing only Filipino citizens and corporations 60%-owned by
Filipino citizens to explore, develop, and use the country’s natural resources. The application of the Control Test and the
Grandfather Rule must be applied where doubts or various indicia that the "beneficial ownership" and "control" of the
corporation do not in fact reside in Filipino shareholders but in foreign stakeholders. Hence, AT cannot claim that PTC is
Filipino-owned based only on the apparent number of stocks belonging to Filipinos.
VI.(1) Distinguish the President's authority to declare a state of rebellion from the authority to proclaim a state of national
emergency. (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER: (1) The authority to declare a state of rebellion emanates from the President’s powers as Chief
Executive (Sec. 4, Chapter 2, Book II, Administrative Code of 1997). Its declaration is deemed harmless and without legal
significance (Canlakas v. Executive Secretary). In declaring a state of national emergency in PP1017, President Arroyo did
not only rely on Sec. 18, Art. VII of the Constitution, but also on Sec. 17, Article Xll of the Constitution, calling for the
exercise of awesome powers which cannot be deemed as harmless or without legal significance [David v. Macapagal -
Arroyo, supra].
(2) What are the limitations, if any, to the pardoning power of the President? (3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER: The limitations to the pardoning power of the President are that, it: i. Cannot be granted in cases
of impeachment (Sec. 19, Art. VII) ii. Cannot be granted in cases of violation of election laws without the favorable
recommendation of the Commission on Elections [Sec. 5, Art. IX-C].
iii. Can be granted only after conviction by final judgment iv. Cannot be granted in cases of legislative contempt (as it would
violate separation of powers), or civil contempt (as the State is without interest in the same) v. Cannot absolve the convict
of civil liability. vi. Cannot restore public offices forfeited [Monsanto v. Factoran, supra].
VII.Senator Fleur De Lis is charged with plunder before the Sandiganbayan. After finding the existence of probable cause,
the court issues a warrant for the Senator's arrest. The prosecution files a motion to suspend the Senator relying on Section
5 of the Plunder Law. According to the prosecution, the suspension should last until the termination of the case. Senator
Lis vigorously opposes the motion contending that only the Senate can discipline its members; and that to allow his
suspension by the Court would violate the principle of separation of powers. Is Senator Lis' contention tenable? Explain.
(4%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER: No, Senator Lis’, contention is not tenable. The suspension contemplated in the Constitution to
discipline Member of the Senate is not the suspension contemplated under the Sec. 5 of the Plunder Law. The latter is not
a penalty but a preliminary preventive measure and is not imposed upon the petitioner for misbehavior as a member of
Congress. In a synonymous case (Miriam Defensor-Santiago v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 128055, April 18,2001) it
appears to be a ministerial duty of the court to issue the order of suspension upon a determination of the validity of the
criminal information filed before it. The order of suspension provided in RA 3019 is distinct from the power of Congress to
discipline its own ranks. Neither does the order of suspension encroach upon the power of Congress. The doctrine of
separation of powers, by itself, is not deemed to have effectively excluded the members of Congress from RA 3019.
VIII.A law provides that the Secretaries of the Departments of Finance and Trade and Industry, the Governor of the Central
Bank, the Director General of the National Economic Development Authority, and the Chairperson of the Philippine
Overseas Construction Board shall sit as exofficio members of the Board of Directors (BOD) of a government owned and
controlled corporation (GOCC). The other four (4) members shall come from the private sector. The BOD issues a resolution
to implement a new organizational structure, staffing pattern, a position classification system, and a new set of qualification
standards. After the implementation of the Resolution, Atty. Dipasupil questioned the legality of the Resolution alleging that
the BOD has no authority to do so. The BOD claims otherwise arguing that the doctrine of qualified political agency applies
to the case. It contends that since its agency is attached to the Department of Finance, whose head, the Secretary of
Finance, is an alter ego of the President, the BOD's acts were also the acts of the President. Is the invocation of the doctrine
by the BOD proper? Explain. (4 %)
SUGGESTED ANSWER: The contention of the BOD is proper. Under the doctrine of qualified political agency or alter ego
principle, all executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department, the heads of the various
executive, and, except in cases where the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution 0r law t0 act in person or the
exigencies of the situation demand that he acts personally, the multifarious executive and administrative functions of the
Chief Executive are performed by and through the executive departments, and the acts of the Secretaries of Executive
departments when performed and promulgated in the regular course of business or unless disapproved or reprobated by
the Chief Executive, are presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive (Villena v. Secretary of the lnterior, No. 46574, April
21, 1939). Under our governmental set-up, corporations owned or controlled by the
government… partake of the nature of government bureaus or offices, which are administratively supervised by (one)
“whose compensation and rank shall be that of a head of an Executive Department” and who “shall be responsible to the
President of the Philippines under whose control his functions ... shall be exercised.” (Executive Order No. 386 of December
22, 1950, section 1, issued under the Reorganization Act of 1950). (in Namarco v. Arca, 29 SCRA 648). Through the
Secretary of Finance, any act of the BOD shall be subject to the constitutional power of control by the President over all
executive departments, bureaus and offices.
IX.Several senior officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines received invitations from the Chairperson of the Senate
Committees on National Defense and Security for them to appear as resource persons in scheduled public hearings
regarding a wide range of subjects. The invitations state that these public hearings were triggered by the privilege speeches
of the Senators that there was massive electoral fraud during the last national elections. The invitees Brigadier General
Matapang and Lieutenant Coronel Makatuwiran, who were among those tasked to maintain peace and order during the
last election, refused to attend because of an Executive Order banning all public officials enumerated in paragraph 3 thereof
from appearing before either house of Congress without prior approval of the President to ensure adherence to the rule of
executive privilege. Among those included in the enumeration are "senior officials of executive departments who, in the
judgment of the department heads, are covered by executive privilege." Several individuals and groups challenge the
constitutionality of the subject executive order because it frustrates the power of the Congress to conduct inquiries in aid
of legislation under Section 21, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. Decide the case. (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER: The subject executive order is unconstitutional. The Court in Senate v. Ermita (GR No. 169777)
declared that the executive privilege is the power of the government to withhold information from the public, the courts, and
the Congress. But this is recognized only for certain types of information of a sensitive character. When Congress exercises
its power of inquiry, the only way for department heads to exempt themselves therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege.
They are not exempt by the mere fact that they are department heads. Only one official may be exempted from this power
-- the President.
Under the Constitution, there are two different functions of the Legislature: The power to conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation and the power to conduct inquiry during question hour. The objective of conducting a question hour is to obtain
information in pursuit of Congress’ oversight function. When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how department
heads are implementing the statutes which it had issued, the department heads’ appearance is merely requested. The
power of inquiry in aid of legislation is inherent in the power to legislate. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or
effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change. And
where the legislative body does not itself possess the requisite information, recourse must be had to others who do possess
it. The executive privilege is the exception under this type of inquiry.
When an official is being summoned by Congress on a matter which, in his own judgment, might be covered by executive
privilege, he must be afforded reasonable time to inform the President or the Executive Secretary of the possible need for
invoking the privilege. This is necessary to provide the President or the Executive Secretary with fair opportunity to consider
whether the matter indeed calls for a claim of executive privilege. If, after the lapse of that reasonable time, neither the
President nor the Executive Secretary invokes the privilege, Congress is no longer bound to respect the failure of the official
to appear before Congress and may then opt to avail of the necessary legal means to compel his appearance. (Senate v.
Ermita)
X.The Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) issued Memorandum Circular No. 123-
15 prescribing the administrative requirements for the conversion of a timber license agreement (TLA) into an Integrated
Forestry Management Agreement (IFMA). ABC Corporation, a holder of a TLA which is about to expire, claims that the
conditions for conversion imposed by the said circular are unreasonable and arbitrary and a patent nullity because it violates
the nonimpairment clause under the Bill of Rights of the 1987 Constitution. ABC Corporation goes to court seeking the
nullification of the subject circular. The DENR moves to dismiss the case on the ground that ABC Corporation has failed to
exhaust administrative remedies which is fatal to its cause of action. If you were the judge, will you grant the motion?
Explain. (4%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER: The motion by the DENR to dismiss the case for ABC’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies
should be set aside. The rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies applies only to decisions of administrative agencies
made in the exercise of their quasi-judicial powers [Association of Philippine Coconut Desiccators v. Philippine Coconut
Authority, G.R. No. 110526, February 10, 1 9981. Thus, where what is assailed is the validity or constitutionality of a rule
or regulation issued by the administrative agency in the performance of its quasi-legislative function, the regular courts
have jurisdiction to pass upon the same (Smart communications v. National telecommunications commission, G.R. No.
151908, August 12, 2003).
XI.(1) What is the concept of expanded judicial review under the 1987 Constitution? (3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER: The 1987 Constitution has narrowed the reach of the political question doctrine when it expanded
the power of judicial review of this court not only to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable
and enforceable but also to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of government. Heretofore, the judiciary has focused on
the "thou shalt not's" of the Constitution directed against the exercise of its jurisdiction. With the new provision, however,
courts are given a greater prerogative to determine what it can do to prevent grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of government. Clearly, the new provision did not just
grant the Court power of doing nothing. (Belgica v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 208566 November 19, 2013)
(2) Differentiate the rule-making power or the power of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules under Section 5, Article VIII
of the 1987 Constitution and judicial legislation. (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER: The Rule-making power of the Supreme Court was vested by the 1987 Constitution to promulgate
rules that would protect the constitutional rights of our people, pleadings, practice and proceedings in all courts. This is
recognized power exclusive to the Supreme Court. But while the power of the judiciary is to interpret laws, judicial legislation
takes place when a court steps in to craft missing parts or to fill in the gaps in laws or when it oversteps its discretional
boundaries and goes beyond the law to coin doctrines or principles where none was before (Judicial Legislation: Dissected.
M. Vidal). This is frowned upon because the courts should merely interpret laws, and not make new laws.
XII.Discuss the evolution of the principle of jus sanguinis as basis of Filipino citizenship under the 1935, 1973, and 1987
Constitutions. (3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER: Under the 1935 Constitution, Filipino citizens under the principle of jus sanguinis are only those
whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines. Under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions, Filipino citizens are those whose
fathers or mothers are Filipino citizens.
XIII.On August 15, 2015, Congresswoman Dina Tatalo filed and sponsored House Bill No. 5432, entitled "An Act Providing
for the Apportionment of the Lone District of the City of Pangarap." The bill eventually became a law, R.A. No. 1234. It
mandated that the lone legislative district of the City of Pangarap would now consist of two (2) districts. For the 2016
elections, the voters of the City of Pangarap would be classified as belonging to either the first or second district, depending
on their place of residence. The constituents of each district would elect their own representative to Congress as well as
eight (8) members of the Sangguniang Panglungsod. R.A. No. 1234 apportioned the City's barangays. The COMELEC
thereafter promulgated Resolution No. 2170 implementing R.A. No. 1234. Piolo Cruz assails the COMELEC Resolution
as unconstitutional. According to him, R.A. No. 1234 cannot be implemented without conducting a plebiscite because the
apportionment under the law falls within the meaning of creation, division, merger, abolition or substantial alteration of
boundaries of cities under Section 10, Article X o f the 1987 Constitution. Is the claim correct? Explain. (4%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER: No, Piolo Cruz’s claim in incorrect. While the Constitution and the Local Government Code
expressly require a plebiscite to carry out any creation, division, merger, abolition or alteration of the boundary of a local
government unit, no plebiscite requirement exists under the apportionment or reapportionment provision (Bagabuyo v.
COMELEC). In the case at bar, RA 1234 merely increased its representation in the House of Representatives. There was
no creation, division, merger, abolition or alteration of a local government unit that took place. RA 1234 did not bring about
any change in the City of Pangarap’s territory, population and income classification. Hence no plebiscite is required.
XIV.Congress enacted R.A. No. 14344 creating the City of Masuwerte which took effect on September 25, 2014. Section
23 of the law specifically exempts the City of Masuwerte from the payment of legal fees in the cases that it would file and/or
prosecute in the courts of law. In two (2) cases that it filed, the City of Masuwerte was assessed legal fees by the clerk of
court pursuant to Rule 141 (Legal Fees) of the Rules of Court. The City of Masuwerte questions the assessment claiming
that it is exempt from paying legal fees under Section 23 of its charter. Is the claim of exemption tenable? Explain. (4%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER: The claim of exemption is not tenable. Section 23 of the RA 14344 runs contrary to the provisions
of the Constitution. Under the 1987 Constitution, only the Supreme Court has the power to promulgate its rules on
pleadings, practice and procedures in court (Section 5, Article VIII, 1987 Constitution). Payment of legal fees is a vital
component of the rules promulgated by this Court concerning pleading, practice and procedure, it cannot be validly
annulled, changed or modified by Congress. As one of the safeguards of this Court’s institutional independence, the power
to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is now the Court’s exclusive domain. That power is no longer
shared by this Court
with Congress, much less with the Executive (AM No. 12-2-03-0). Such act by Congress also transgresses the fiscal
autonomy of the Courts. Hence the City of Masuwerte cannot question the assessment of legal fees for the cases it filed
before the court.
XV.The President appointed Dexter I. Ty as Chairperson of the COMELEC on June 14, 2011 for a term of seven (7) years
pursuant to the 1987 Constitution. His term of office started on June 2, 2011 to end on June 2, 2018. Subsequently, the
President appointed Ms. Marikit as the third member of the COMELEC for a term of seven (7) years starting June 2, 2014
until June 2, 2021. On June 2, 2015, Chairperson Ty retired optionally after having served the government for thirty (30)
years. The President then appointed Commissioner Marikit as COMELEC Chairperson. The Commission on Appointments
confirmed her appointment. The appointment papers expressly indicate that Marikit will serve as COMELEC Chairperson
"until the expiration of the original term of her office as COMELEC Commissioner or on June 2, 2021." Matalino, a tax
payer, files a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court asserting that the appointment of Marikit as COMELEC
Chairperson is unconstitutional for the following reasons: (1) The appointment of Marikit as COMELEC Chairperson
constituted a re- appointment which is proscribed by Section 1(2), Article IX of the 1987 Constitution; and (2) the term of
office expressly stated in the appointment papers of Marikit likewise contravenes the aforementioned constitutional
provision. Will the constitutional challenge succeed?
SUGGESTED ANSWER: No, the constitutional challenge will not succeed. It is well settled in the case of Matibag v.
Benipayo, the Supreme Court said that when an ad interim appointment (of the Chairman of the Commission on Elections)
is not
confirmed (as it was by-passed, or that there was not ample time for the Commission on Appointments to pass upon the
same), another ad interim appointment may be extended to the appointee without violating the Constitution.
XVI. (1)Gandang Bai filed her certificate of candidacy (COC) for municipal mayor stating that she is eligible to run for the
said position. Pasyo Maagap, who also filed his COC for the same position, filed a petition to deny due course or cancel
Bai's COC under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code for material misrepresentation as before Bai filed her COC, she
had already been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude. Hence, she is disqualified perpetually from holding any
public office or from being elected to any public office. Before the election, the COMELEC cancelled Bai's COC but her
motion for reconsideration (MR) remained pending even after the election. Bai garnered the highest number of votes
followed by Pasyo Maagap, who took his oath as Acting Mayor. Thereafter, the COMELEC denied Bai's MR and declared
her disqualified for running for Mayor. P. Maagap asked the Department of Interior and Local Government Secretary to be
allowed to take his oath as permanent municipal mayor. This request was opposed by Vice Mayor Umaasa, invoking the
rule on succession to the permanent vacancy in the Mayor's office. Who between Pasyo Maagap and Vice Mayor Umaasa
has the right to occupy the position of Mayor? Explain your answer. Explain. (4%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER: Vice Mayor Umaasa has the right to occupy the position of Mayor. This was settled in Talaga v.
COMELEC (G.R. No. 196804 October 9, 2012). where the court upheld that the disqualification of Bai created a situation
of a permanent vacancy in the office of the Mayor. A permanent vacancy is filled
pursuant to the law on succession defined in Section 44 of the LGC which states the “If a permanent vacancy occurs in the
office of the governor or mayor, the vicegovernor or vice-mayor concerned shall become the governor or mayor. “
Pasyo Maagap who garnered only the second highest number of votes lost to Gandang Bai. Applying the Labo case cited
in Talaga, Maagap could not assume office for he was only second placer despite the disqualification of the Gandang Bai
because the second placer was "not the choice of the sovereign will."60 Surely, the Court explained, a minority or defeated
candidate could not be deemed elected to the office.61 There was to be no question that the second placer lost in the
election, was repudiated by the electorate, and could not assume the vacated position.62 No law imposed upon and
compelled the people of Lucena City to accept a loser to be their political leader or their representative.
The only time that a second placer is allowed to take the place of a disqualified winning candidate is when two requisites
concur, namely: (a) the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes is disqualified; and (b) the electorate was fully
aware in fact and in law of that candidate’s disqualification as to bring such awareness within the realm of notoriety but the
electorate still cast the plurality of the votes in favor of the ineligible candidate.64 Under this sole exception, the electorate
may be said to have waived the validity and efficacy of their votes by notoriously misapplying their franchise or throwing
away their votes, in which case the eligible candidate with the second highest number of votes may be deemed elected.65
The facts of the case at bar did not state the existence of such exception, thus it cannot apply in favor of Maagap simply
because the second element was absent.
(2)How do you differentiate the petition filed under Section 68 from the petition filed under Section 78, both of the Omnibus
Election Code? (3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER: The two remedies available to prevent a candidate from running in an electoral race are under
Section 68 and under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. The candidate who is disqualified based on the grounds
under Section 68 (i.e., prohibited acts of candidates, and the fact of a candidate’s permanent residency in another country
when that fact affects the residency requirement of a candidate) is merely prohibited to continue as a candidate. On the
other hand, a candidate whose certificate is cancelled or denied due course based on a statement of a material
representation in the said certificate that is false under Section 78, is not treated as a candidate at all, as if he/she never
filed a Certificate of Candidacy. (Talaga v. COMELEC)
XVI.The Gay, Bisexual and Transgender Youth Association (GBTYA), an organization of gay, bisexual, and transgender
persons, filed for accreditation with the COMELEC to join the forthcoming party-list elections. The COMELEC denied the
application for accreditation on the ground that GBTYA espouses immorality which offends religious dogmas. GBTY A
challenges the denial of its application based on moral grounds because it violates its right to equal protection ofthe law.
(I) What are the three (3) levels of test that are applied in equal protection cases? Explain. (3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER: The three kinds of tests applied in equal protection cases are: a. Strict Scrutiny Test – requires
the government to show that the challenged classifications serve a compelling state interest and that the classification is
necessary to serve that interest. This is used in cases involving classifications based on race, national origin, religion,
alienage, denial of right to vote, interstate migration, access to courts and other rights recognized as fundamental b.
Immediate or middle-tier scrutiny test – requires government to show that the challenged classification serves as an
important state interest and that the classification is at least substantially related to serving that interest. This applies to
suspect classification like gender or illegitimacy.
c. Minimum or rational basis scrutiny – according to which the government need only to show that the challenged
classification is rationally related to serving a legitimate state interest. This is the traditional rationality test and it applies to
all subjects other than those listed above. (see Bernas Commentary, in Ang Ladlad v. COMELEC, GR No. 190582, April
8, 2010 for the explanation)
(II) Which of the three (3) levels of test should be applied to the present case? Explain. (3%) Rational Basis Test
SUGGESTED ANSWER: The Rational Basis Test should be applied to the present case. In our jurisdiction, the Supreme
Court declared that the standard of analysis of equal protection challenges is the rational basis test. Jurisprudence has
affirmed that if a law neither burdens a fundamental right nor targets a suspect class, the classification shall be upheld as
long as it bears a rational relationship to some legitimate end. In the case at bar, in so far as the party-list system is
concerned, GBTYA is similarly situated as all other groups which are running for a party-list seat in Congress (Ang Ladlad
v. COMELEC).
XVII.Around 12:00 midnight, a team of police officers was on routine patrol in Barangay Makatarungan when it noticed an
open delivery van neatly covered with banana leaves. Believing that the van was loaded with contraband, the team leader
flagged down the vehicle which was driven by Hades. He inquired from Hades what was loaded on the van. Hades just
gave the police officer a blank stare and started to perspire profusely. The police officers then told Hades that they will look
inside the vehicle. Hades did not make any reply. The police officers then lifted the banana leaves and saw several boxes.
They opened the boxes and discovered several kilos of shabu inside. Hades was charged with illegal possession of illegal
drugs. After due
proceedings, he was convicted by the trial court. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction. In his final bid
for exoneration, Hades went to the Supreme Court claiming that his constitutional right against unreasonable searches and
seizures was violated when the police officers searched his vehicle without a warrant; that the shabu confiscated from him
is thus inadmissible in evidence; and that there being no evidence against him, he is entitled to an acquittal. For its part,
the People ofthe Philippines maintains that the case ofHades involved a consented warrantless search which is legally
recognized. The People adverts to the fact that Hades did not offer any protest when the police officers asked him if they
could look inside the vehicle. Thus, any evidence obtained in the course thereof is admissible in evidence. Whose claim
is correct? Explain. (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER: Hades’ claim is correct. The evidence obtained was illegally seized and is thus inadmissible in
evidence. A consented warrantless search, if it exists or whether it was in fact voluntary is a question of fact to be
determined from the totality of all the circumstances. Hades’ mere silence does not amount to consent. In the absence of
such consent, evidence obtained thereof shall be inadmissible in evidence, in which case precludes conviction and calls
for the acquittal of the accused (Ong v. People, GR No. 197788, Feb. 29, 2012).
XVIII.Pursuant to its mandate to manage the orderly sale, disposition and privatization of the National Power Corporation's
(NPC) generation assets, real estate and other disposable assets, the Power Sector Assets and Liabilities Management
(PSALM) started the bidding process for the privatization of Angat Hydro Electric Power
Plant (AHEPP). After evaluation of the bids, K-Pop Energy Corporation, a South Korean Company, was the highest bidder.
Consequently, a notice of award was issued to KPop. The Citizens' Party questioned the sale arguing that it violates the
constitutional provisions on the appropriation and utilization of a natural resource which should be limited to Filipino citizens
and corporations which are at least 60% Filipino-owned. The PSALM countered that only the hydroelectric facility is being
sold and not the Angat Dam; and that the utilization of water by a hydroelectric power plant does not constitute appropriation
of water from its natural source of water that enters the intake gate of the power plant which is an artificial structure. Whose
claim is correct? Explain. (4%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER: PSALM’s claim is correct. Under the Water Code, a foreign company may not be said to be
“appropriating” our natural resources if it utilizes the waters collected in the dam and converts the same into electricity
through artificial devices such as the hydroelectric facility as in the case case at bar. Since the NPC remains in control of
the operation of the dam by virtue of water rights granted to it, there is no legal impediment to foreign-owned companies
undertaking the generation of electric power using waters already appropriated by the NPC, the holder of the water permit.
With the advent of privatization of the electric power industry which resulted in its segregation into four sectors, NPC’s
generation and transmission functions were unbundled. Hence the acquisition by a foreign company of the hydroelectric
facility did not violate any constitutional provision (IDEALS v. PSALM, GR No. 192088).
XIX.Typhoon Bangis devastated the Province of Sinagtala. Roads and bridges were destroyed which impeded the entry of
vehicles into the area. This caused food shortage resulting in massive looting of grocery stores and malls. There is power
outage also in the area. For these reasons, the governor of the province declares a state of emergency in their province
through Proclamation No. 1. He also invoked Section 465 of the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160) which
vests on the provincial governor the power to carryout emergency measures during man-made and natural disasters and
calamities, and to call upon the appropriate national law enforcement agencies to suppress disorder and lawless violence.
In the same proclamation, the governor called upon the members of the Philippine National Police, with the assistance of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to set up checkpoints and chokepoints, conduct general searches and seizures
including arrests, and other actions necessary to ensure public safety. Was the action of the provincial governor proper?
Explain. (4%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER: No, the action of the governor is not proper. Under the Constitution, it is only the President, as
Executive, who is authorized to exercise emergency powers as provided under Section 23, Article VI, as well as the
callingout powers under Section 7, Article VII thereof. In the case at bar, the provincial governor is not endowed with the
power to call upon the state forces at his own bidding. It is an act which is ultra vires and may not be justified by the
invocation of Section 465 of the Local Government Code (Kulayan v. Gov. Tan, GR No. 187298, July 3, 2012).
XX.The Partido ng Mapagkakatiwalaang Pilipino (PMP) is a major political party which has participated in every election
since the enactment of the 1987 Constitution. It has fielded candidates mostly for legislative district elections. In fact, a
number of its members were elected, and are actually serving, in the House of Representatives. In the coming 2016
elections, the PMP leadership intends to join the party-list system.
Can PMP join the party-list system without violating the Constitution and Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7941? (4%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER: Yes, the PMP can join the party-list system in accordance with the rules enunciated in Atong
Paglaum v. COMELEC. Accordingly, political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register under the
partylist system and do not field candidates in legislative district elections. A political party, whether major or not, that fields
candidates in legislative district elections can participate in party-list elections only through its sectoral wing that can
separately register under the party-list system. The sectoral wing is by itself an independent sectoral party, and is linked to
a political party through a coalition (Atong Paglaum v. COMELEC, GR Nos. 203766, 203818-19, et al.)
XXI.The President appoints Emilio Melchor as Chairperson of the Civil Service Commission. Upon confirmation of Melchor's
appointment, the President issues an executive order including him as Ex-Officio member of the Board of Trustees of the
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), Employees Compensation Commission (ECC), and the Board of Directors
of the Philippine Health Insurance Corporation (PHILHEALTH). Allegedly, this is based on the Administrative Code of 1997
(E.O. No. 292), particularly Section 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V. This provision reads: "The chairman ofthe CSC shall
be a member of the Board of Directors of other governing bodies of
government entities whose functions affect the career development, employment, status, rights, privileges, and welfare of
government officials and employees..." A taxpayer questions the designation of Melchor as exofficio member of the said
corporations before the Supreme Court based on two (2) grounds, to wit: (1) it violates the constitutional prohibition on
members of the Constitutional Commissions to hold any other office or employment during his tenure; and (2) it impairs the
independence of the CSC. Will the petition prosper? Explain. (4%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER: Yes, the petition will prosper. The appointment of Melchor as ex-officio member of the GSIS,
ECC and PHILHEALTH during his tenure as the chairperson of the CSC is unconstitutional for violating Section 2, Article
IX-A of the 1987 Constitution, prohibiting members of Constitutional Commissions from holding any other office or
employment and impairing the independence of the CSC (Section 1, Article IX-A). This has been a settled case where the
Court ruled that the CSC Chairperson’s holding other offices resulted in double compensation and impairment to CSC’s
independence because other offices held by the CSC chairperson are under the Office of the President (Funa v. Duque,
GR No. 191672, November 25, 2014).
2016 Bar Examinations In Political Law Page of 1 19
-I- The contents of the vault of ABC company consisting of cash and documents were stolen. Paulyn, the treasurer of ABC,
was invited by the Makati City Police Department to shed light on the amount of cash stolen and the details of the missing
documents. Paulyn obliged and volunteered the information asked. Later, Paulyn was charged with qualified theft together
with other suspects. Paulyn claims her rights under the Constitution and pertinent laws were blatantly violated. The police
explained that they were just gathering evidence when Paulyn was invited for a conference and she was not a suspect at
that time. Rule on her defense. (5%) SUGGESTED ANSWER: No, the defense of Paulyn is not valid. When she was
invited for questioning by the Makati City Police Department and she volunteered information, she was not yet a suspect.
Her constitutional rights of a person under investigation for the commission of an offense under Section 12(1), Article III of
the Constitution begins to operate when the investigation ceases to be a general inquiry upon an unsolved crime and begins
to be aimed upon a particular suspect who has been taken into custody and the questions tend to elicit incriminating
statements. (People v. Marra, 236 SCRA 565 [1994]).
-II- Sec. 11, Art. XII of the Constitution, provides: "No franchise, certificate or any other form of authorization for the
operation of a public utility shall be granted except to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or associations organized
under the laws of the Philippines at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens xx x." Does the term
"capital" mentioned in the cited section refer to the total common shares only, or to the total outstanding capital stock, or to
both or "separately to each class of shares, whether common, preferred non-voting, preferred voting or any class of
shares?" Explain your answer. (5%) SUGGESTED ANSWER: The term “capital” mentioned in Section 11, Article XII of
the Constitution refers to the total outstanding capital stock of public utilities. The requirement that at least sixty percent of
the capital must be owned by Filipino citizens applies separately to each class of shares, whether common, preferred, non-
voting, preferred voting, or any class of shares. Mere legal title is not enough. Full beneficial ownership of sixty percent of
the outstanding capital stock is required. (Gamboa v. Teves, 652 SCRA 690, [2011]).
-III- A law converted the component city of Malumanay, Laguna into a highly urbanized city. The Local Government Code
(LGC) provides that the conversion "shall take effect only after it is approved by the majority of votes cast in a plebiscite to
be held in the political units directly affected." Before the COMELEC, Mayor Xenon of Malumanay City insists that only the
registered voters of the city should vote in the plebiscite because the city is the only political unit directly affected by the
conversion. Governor Yuri asserts that all the registered voters of the entire province of Laguna should participate in the
plebiscite, because when the LGC speaks of the "qualified voters therein," it means all the voters of all the political units
affected by such conversion, and that includes all the voters of the entire province. He argues that the income, population
and area of Laguna will be reduced. Who, between Mayor Xenon and Governor Yuri, is correct? Explain your answer. (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER: Governor Yuri is correct. All the registered voters of the Province of Laguna should be included
in the plebiscite. The conversion of the City of Malumanay into a highly urbanized city will adversely affect the Province of
Laguna and its residents. The territory of the Province of Laguna will be reduced. Its share in the internal revenue allotment
will be reduced, because the population and land area are included as basis for determining its share. Once the City of
Malumanay becomes a highly urbanized city, the Province of Laguna will no longer share in the taxes collected by the City
of Malumanay. The City of Malumanay will be under the supervision of the President instead of the Province of Laguna.
Decisions of the City of Malumanay in administrative cases involving barangay officials will no longer be appealable to the
Sanguniang Panlalawigan. The registered voters of the City of Malumanay will no longer be entitled to vote for provincial
officials. To limit the plebiscite to the voters of the City of Malumanay would nullify the principle of majority rule. (Umali vs.
Commission on Elections, 723 SCRA 170 [2014]).

-IV- Several concerned residents of the areas fronting Manila Bay, among them a group of students who are minors, filed
a suit against the Metro Manila Development · Authority (MMDA), the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR), the Department of Health (DOH), the Department of Agriculture (DA), the Department of Education (DepEd), the
Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG), and a number of other executive agencies, asking the court to order
them to perform their duties relating to the cleanup, rehabilitation and protection of Manila Bay. The complaint alleges that
the continued neglect by defendants and their failure to prevent and abate pollution in Manila Bay constitute a violation of
the petitioners' constitutional right to life, health and a balanced ecology. [a] If the defendants assert that the
students/petitioners who are minors do not have locus standi to file the action, is the assertion correct? Explain your answer.
(2.5%) [b] In its decision which attained finality, the Court ordered the defendants to clean up, rehabilitate and sanitize
Manila Bay within eighteen (18) months, and to submit to the Court periodic reports of their accomplishment, so that the
Court can monitor and oversee the activities undertaken by the agencies in compliance with the Court's directives.
Subsequently, a resolution was issued extending the time periods within which the agencies should comply with the
directives covered by the final decision. A view was raised that the Court's continued intervention after the case has been
decided violates the doctrine of separation of powers considering that the government agencies all belong to the Executive
Department and are under the control of the President. Is this contention correct? Why or why not? (2.5%) SUGGESTED
ANSWER: [A] The assertion that the students/ petitioners who are minors have no locus standi is errorneous. Pursuant to
the obligation of the State under Section 16, Article II if the Constitution to protect and advance the right of the people to a
balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature, minor have standing to sue based on the
concept of intergenerational responsibility (Oposa v. Factoran, 224 SCRA 792 [1993]).
[B] The order of the Supreme Court to the defendants to clean up, rehabilitate and sanitize Manila Bay is an exercise of
judicial power, because the execution of its decision is an integral part of its adjudicative function. Since the submission of
periodic reports is needed to fully implement the decision, the Supreme Court can issue writ of mandamus to the
Metropolitan Manila Development Authority until full compliance with its order is shown. (Metropolitan Manila Development
Authority v. Concerned Residents of Manila Bay, 643 SCRA 90 [2011])
-V- Section 8 of P.D. No. 910, entitled "Creating an Energy Development Board, defining its powers and functions, providing
funds therefor and for other purposes," provides that: "All fees, revenues and receipts of the Board from any and all sources
x x x shall form part of a Special Fund to be used to finance energy resource development and exploitation programs and
projects of the government and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President." The Malampaya
NGO contends that the provision constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power since the phrase "and for such other
purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President" gives the President unbridled discretion to determine the purpose
for which the funds will be used. On the other hand, the government urges the application of ejusdem generis. [a] Explain
the "completeness test" and "sufficient standard test." (2.5%) [b] Does the assailed portion of section 8 of PD 910 hurdle
the two (2) tests? (2.5%) SUGGESTED ANSWER: [A] The “completeness test means” that the law sets forth the policy to
be executed, carried out, or implemented by the delegate. (Abakada Guro Party List v. Ermita, 469 SCRA 1 [2005]). The
“sufficient standard test” means the law lays down adequate guidelines or limitations to map out the boundaries of the
authority of the delegate and prevent the delegate from running riot. The standard must specify the limits of the authority
of the delegate, announce the legislative policy and identify the condition under which it is to be implemented. (Abakada
Guro Party List v. Ermita, 469 SCRA 1 [2005]). [B] The assailed portion of the Presidential Decree No. 910 does no satisfy
the two tests. The phrase “and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President” gives the President
unbridled discretion to determine the purpose for which the funds will be used. An infrastructure is any basic facility needed
by society. The power to determine what kind of infrastructure to prioritize and fund is a power to determine the purpose of
the appropriation and is an undue delegation of the power to appropriate. (Belgica v. Ochoa, Jr., 710 SCRA 1 [2013]) The
assailed provision does not fall under the principle of ejusdem generis. First, the phrase “energy resource development
and exploitation programs and projects of the government states a singular and general class. Second, it exhausts the
class it represents. (Belgica v. Ochoa, Jr., 710 SCRA 1 [2013])
-VI- Pornographic materials in the form of tabloids, magazines and other printed materials, proliferate and are being sold
openly in the streets of Masaya City. The City Mayor organized a task force which confiscated these materials. He then
ordered that the materials be burned in public. Dominador, publisher of the magazine, "Plaything", filed a suit, raising the
following constitutional issues: (a) the confiscation of the materials constituted an illegal search and seizure, because the
same was done without a valid search warrant; and (b) the confiscation, as well as the proposed destruction of the materials,
is a denial of the right to disseminate information, and thus, violates the constitutional right to freedom of expression. Is
either or both contentions proper? Explain your answer. (5%) SUGGESTED ANSWER: The confiscation of the materials
constituted an illegal search and seizure, because it was done without a valid warrant. It cannot be justified as a valid
warrantless search and seizure, because such search and seizure must have been an incident of a lawful arrest. There
was no lawful arrest (Pita v. Court of Appeals, 178 SCRA 362 [1989]) The argument of Dominador that pornographic
materials are protected by the constitutional right to freedom of expression is erroneous. Obscenity is not a protected
expression (Fernando v. Court of Appeals, 510 SCRA 351 [2006]). Section 2 of Presidential Decree No. 969 requires the
forfeiture and destruction of pornographic materials (Nograles v. People, 660 SCRA 475 [2011]).
-VII- Ernesto, a minor, while driving a motor vehicle, was stopped at a mobile checkpoint. Noticing that Ernesto is a minor,
SPOl Jojo asked Ernesto to exhibit his driver's license but Ernesto failed to produce it. SPOI Jojo requested Ernesto to
alight from the vehicle and the latter acceded. Upon observing a bulge in the pants of Ernesto, the policeman frisked him
and found an unlicensed .22-caliber pistol inside Ernesto's right pocket. Ernesto was arrested, detained and charged. At
the trial, Ernesto, through his lawyer, argued that, policemen at mobile checkpoints are empowered to conduct nothing
more than a ''visual search". They cannot order the persons riding the vehicle to alight. They cannot frisk, or conduct a
body search of the driver or the passengers of the vehicle. Ernesto's lawyer thus posited that: [a] The search conducted
in violation of the Constitution and established jurisprudence was an illegal search; thus, the gun which was seized in the
course of an illegal search is the "fruit of the poisonous tree" and is inadmissible in evidence. (2.5%) [b] The arrest made
as a consequence of the invalid search was likewise illegal, because an unlawful act (the search) cannot be made the basis
of a lawful arrest. (2.5%) Rule on the correctness of the foregoing arguments, with reasons. SUGGESTED ANSWER:
[A] The warrantless search of the motor vehicles at checkpoints should be limited to a visual search. Its occupants should
not be subjected to a body search (Aniag, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, 237 SCRA 424 [1994]). The “stop and frisk rule”
applies when a police officer observes suspicious activity or unusual activity which may lead him to believe that a criminal
act may be afoot. The “stop and frisk” is merely a limited protected search of outer clothing for weapons. (Luz v. People,
667 SCRA 421 [2012]).
[B] Since there was no valid warrantless search, the warrantless search was also illegal. The unlicensed .22 caliber pistol
is inadmissible in evidence. (Luz v. People, 667 SCRA 421 [2012]).
-VIII- A law is passed intended to protect women and children from all forms of violence. When a woman perceives an act
to be an act of violence or a threat of violence against her, she may apply for a Barangay Protection Order (BPO) to be
issued by the Barangay Chairman, which shall have the force and effect of law. Conrado, against whom a BPO had been
issued on petition of his wife, went to court to challenge the constitutionality of the law. He raises the following grounds: [a]
The law violates the equal protection clause, because while it extends protection to women who may be victims of violence
by their husbands, it does not extend the same protection to husbands who may be battered by their wives. (2.5%) [b] The
grant of authority to the Barangay Chairman to issue a Barangay Protection Order (BPO) constitutes an undue delegation
of judicial power, because obviously, the issuance of the BPO entails the exercise of judicial power. (2.5%) Rule on the
validity of the grounds raised by Conrado, with reasons. SUGGESTED ANSWER:
[A] The law does not violate the equal protection clause. It is based on substantial distinctions. The unequal power
relationship between women and men, the greater likelihood for women than men to be victims of violence, and the
widespread gender bias and prejudice against women all make for real differences. (Garcia v. Drilon, 699 SCRA 352
[2013]).
[B] The grant of authority to the Barangay Chairman to issue a Barangay Protection Orders is a purely executive function
pursuant to his duty to enforce all laws and ordinances and to maintain public order. (Garcia v. Drilon, 699 SCRA 352
[2013]).
-IX- The Government, through Secretary Toogoody of the Department of · Transportation (DOTr), filed a complaint for
eminent domain to acquire a 1,000- hectare property in Bulacan, owned by Baldomero. The court granted the expropriation,
fixed the amount of just compensation, and installed the Government in full possession of the property. [a] If the
Government does not immediately pay the amount fixed by the court as just compensation, can Baldomero successfully
demand the return of the property to him? Explain your answer. (2.5%) [b] If the Government paid full compensation but
after two years it abandoned its plan to build an airport on the property, can Baldomero compel the Government to re-sell
the property back to him? Explain your answer. (2.5%) SUGGESTED ANSWER: [A] If the government does not pay
Baldomero the just compensation immediately, he cannot demand the return of the property to him. Instead, legal interest
should be paid from the time of taking of the property until actual payment in full. (Republic v. Court of Appeals, 383 SCRA
611 [2002]).
[B] With respect to the element of public use, the expropriator should commit to use the property for the purposes stated in
the petition. If not, it is incumbent upon it to return the property to the owner, if the owner desires to reacquire it. Otherwise,
the judgment of the expropriation will lack the element of public use. The owner will be denied due process and the judgment
will violate his right to justice. (Mactan-Cebu Airport Authority v. Lozada, Sr., 613 SCRA 618 [2010]). If the just
compensation was not paid within 5 years from finality of judgment, the owner is entitled to recover the property. (Republic
v. Lim. 462 SCRA 265 [2005]).
-X- The Philippines entered into an international agreement with members of the international community creating the
International Economic Organization (IEO) which will serve as a forum to address economic issues between States, create
standards, encourage greater volume of trade between its members, and settle economic disputes. After the Philippine
President signed the agreement, the Philippine Senate demanded that the international agreement be submitted to it for
its ratification. The President refused, arguing that it is an executive agreement that merely created an international
organization and it dwells mainly on addressing economic issues among States. Is the international agreement creating
the IEO a treaty or an executive agreement? Explain. (5%) SUGGESTED ANSWER: The agreement creating the
International Economic Organization is an executive agreement and not a treaty. In Section 21, Article VII is the only
provision of the Constitution which defines a “treaty or international agreement” as valid and effective law by reason of
concurrence of the Senate. However, it is the intendment of the Constitution that such “treaty or international agreement”
does not include executive agreement which is excluded from the Senate’s authority of concurrence over treaties. This
constitutional intent is expressed in the proceedings of the Constitutional Commission in its awareness that at the time the
power of the President to conclude executive agreement was clearly recognized by at least decisions of the Supreme Court
establishing the principle that the President’s power includes conclusion of executive agreements which are valid without
need of Senate concurrence. Hence, logically the Treaty Clause in Section 21, Article VII is to be interpreted as excluding
executive agreement. (Commissioner v. Eastern Sea Trading, 3 SCRA 351 [1961];USAFFE Veterans Association v.
Treasurer, 105 Phil. 1030 [1959]). Moreover, as the Supreme Court has pointed out in Pimentel v. Office of the Executive
Secretary (462 SCRA 622, [2005]) the President has the sole power to ratify treaties. The Senate may be able to exercise
its authority of concurrence only if the President transmits the instrument of ratification by which he accepts the terms
agreed on by his diplomatic negotiators of the proposed treaty as requested by the President. It is only on the basis of the
authority of the President to ratify treaties that the Senate may act in concurrence under the Treaty clause of the
Constitution.
-XI- The USS Liberty, a warship of the United States (U.S.), entered Philippine archipelagic waters on its way to Australia.
Because of the negligence of the naval officials on board, the vessel ran aground off the island of Pala wan, damaging
coral reefs and other marine resources in the area. Officials of Palawan filed a suit for damages against the naval officials
for their negligence, and against the U.S., based on Articles 30 and 31 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea (UNCLOS). Article 31 provides that the Flag State shall bear international responsibility for any loss or damage to the
Coastal State resulting from noncompliance by a warship with the laws and regulations of the coastal State concerning
passage through the territorial sea. The U. S. Government raised the defenses that: [a] The Philippine courts cannot
exercise jurisdiction over another sovereign State, including its warship and naval officials. (2.5%) [b] The United States is
not a signatory to UN CLOS and thus cannot be bound by its provisions. (2.5%) Rule on the validity of the defenses raised
by the U.S., with reasons. SUGGESTED ANSWER: The defenses raised by the U.S. Government are not valid. [A] This
defense relies on sovereign immunity from suit as advanced by the U.S. Government. But the suit file by the Officials of
Palawan draws its strength from Article 30 and 31 of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). However, the
U.S. defense is defeated by the UNCLOS through the application of Article 32 which provides: “With such exceptions as
are contained in subsection A and in Articles 30 and 31, nothing in the Convention affects the immunities of warships and
other government ships operated for non-commercial purposes. [emphasis added]” In reality the supreme relevance of
Article 32 quoted above is actualized by quoting an existing U.S. government document sourced from Dispatch
Supplement, Law of the Sea Convention: Letters of Transmittal and Submittal and Commentary, as follows: “Article 32
provides, in effect that the only rules in the Convention derogating from the immunities of warships and government ships
operated for nongovernment purposes are those found in Articles 17-26, 30 and 31 (February 1995, Vol. 6, Supplement
No. 1 p.12). [B] The U.S. Government turns to the defense that it is not bound by the UNCLOS for the reason that it is not
a State Party or a signatory. However, to be bound by the principle, it does not have to be a party to a treaty or convention.
If it has the normative status of a customary norm of international law, it is binding on all states. This appears to be holding
of the principle of immunity of warship in question, as upheld by the U.S. Government in the document cited above (Ibid.,
at p.17). It states from the UNCLOS, thus: The Convention protects and strengthens the key principle of sovereign immunity
for warships. Although not a new concept, sovereign immunity is a principle or of vital importance to the United States. The
Convention provides for a universally recognized formulation of this principle. Article 32 provides that, with such exceptions
as are contained in subsection A and in Articles 30 and 31 nothing in the Convention affects the immunities of warships.
-XII- Paragraphs c, d and f of Section 36 of Republic Act No. 9165 provide: "Sec. 36. Authorized drug testing. xx x The
following shall be subjected to undergo drug testing: xx x c. Students of secondary and tertiary schools x x x; d. Officers
and employees of public and private offices x x x; f. All persons charged before the prosecutor's office with a criminal
offense having an imposable imprisonment of not less than 6 years and 1 day;" Petitioners contend that the assailed
portions of Sec. 36 are unconstitutional for violating the right to privacy, the right against unreasonable searches and
seizures and the equal protection clause. Decide if the assailed provisions are unconstitutional. (5%) SUGGESTED
ANSWER: The drug testing of students of secondary and tertiary schools is valid. Deterring their use of drugs by random
drug testing is as important as enhancing efficient enforcement. Random drug testing of officers and employees of public
and private is justifiable. Their expectation of privacy in office is reduced. The drug tests and results are kept confidential.
Random drug testing is an effective way of deterring drug use and is reasonable. Public officials and employees are required
by the Constitution to be accountable at all times to the people and to serve them with utmost responsibility and efficiency.
The mandatory testing of all persons charged before the prosecutor’s office of a criminal offense punishable with
imprisonment of at least six years and one day is void. They are not randomly picked and are not beyond suspicions. They
do not consent to the procedure or waive their right to privacy. (Social Justice Society v. Dangerous Drugs Board, 570
SCRA 410 [2008])
-XIII- While Congress was not in session, the President appointed Antero as Secretary of the Department of Tourism
(DOT), Benito as Commissioner of the Bureau of Immigration (BI), Clodualdo as Chairman of the Civil Service Commission
(CSC), Dexter as Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights (CHR), and Emmanuel as Philippine Ambassador to
Cameroon. The following day, all the appointees took their oath before the President, and commenced to perform the
functions of their respective offices. [a] Characterize the appointments, whether permanent or temporary; and whether
regular or interim, with reasons. (2.5%) [b] A civil society group, the Volunteers Against Misguided Politics (VAMP), files
suit, contesting the legality of the acts of the appointees and claiming that the appointees should not have entered into the
performance of the functions of their respective offices, because their appointments had not yet been confirmed by the
Commission on Appointments. Is this claim of VAMP correct? Why or why not? (2.5%) SUGGESTED ANSWER:
[A1] The appointment of Antero as Secretary of Tourism is ad interim, because it is subject to confirmation of the
Commission on Appoinments and was made while Congress was not in session. He can start perfoming his duties upon
his acceptance, because it is permanent and cannot be withdrawn after its acceptance. (Matibag vs. Benipayo, 380 SCRA
49 [2002]). [A2] The appointment of Benito as Commission of the Bureau of Immigration is regular and permanent. It is not
required to be confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. He can start performing his duties upon acceptance of the
appointment. (Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution). [A3] The appointment of Clodualdo as Chairman of the Civil
Service Commission is ad interim, because it is subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments and was made
while Congress was not in session. He can start performing his duties upon his acceptance of the appointment, because it
is permanent and cannot be withdrawn. [A4} The appointment of Dexter as Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights
is regular and permanent upon his acceptance. It is not required to be confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. He
can start performing his duties upon his acceptance. (Bautista v. Salonga, 172 SCRA 160 [1989]) [A5] the appointment of
Emmanuel as Ambassador to Cameron is ad interim, because it is subject to confirmation by the Commission on
Appointment. (Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution)
[B] The claim of VAMP is not correct. The Commission of Investigation and the Commission on Human Rights can
immediately start performing their functions upon acceptance since they are not required to be confirmed. The Secretary
of the Department of Tourism and the Chairman of the Civil Service Commission, can immediately start performing their
duties upon acceptance, since their ad interim appointment is permanent.
-XIV- Onofre, a natural born Filipino citizen, arrived in the United States in 1985. In 1990, he married Salvacion, a Mexican,
and together they applied for and obtained American citizenship in 2001. In 2015, the couple and their children --Alfred, 21
years of age, Robert, 16, and Marie, 14, who were all born in the U.S. -- returned to the Philippines on June 1, 2015. On
June 15, 2015, informed that he could reacquire Philippine citizenship without losing his American citizenship, Onofre went
home to the Philippines and took the oath of allegiance prescribed under R.A. No. 9225. On October 28, 2015, he filed a
Certificate of Candidacy to run in the May 9, 2016 elections for the position of Congressman in his home province of Pala
wan, running against re-electionist Congressman Profundo. [a] Did Onofre's reacquisition of Philippine citizenship benefit
his wife, Salvacion, and their minor children and confer upon them Filipino citizenship? Explain your answer. (2.5%) [b]
Before the May 9, 2016 elections, Profundo's lawyer filed a Petition to Deny Due Course or to Cancel the Certificate of
Candidacy against Onofre. What grounds can he raise in his Petition to support it? Explain your answer. (2.5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER: [a] The reacquisition of the Philippine citizenship by Onofre did not automatically make his
American wife, Salvacion, a Filipino citizen. Nowhere does Republic Act No. 9225provide that the foreign wife of a former
Filipino citizen who reacquired his Filipino citizenship will automatically become a Filipino citizen. Robert, who is 16 years
old, and Marie, who is 14 years old, also became Filipino citizens. The unmarried children below eighteen (18) years of
age, of those who reacquire Philippine citizenship are also deemed citizen of the Philippines. (Section 4 of Republic Act
No. 9225).
[b] The lawyer of Congressman Profundo can ask for the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy on the ground that he
did not execute an affidavit renouncing his American citizenship as required by Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 and
he lacked one-year residence in the Philippines as required by Section 6, Article VI of the Constitution.
-XV- Congress passed a bill appropriating PlOO-billion. Part of the money is to be used for the purchase of a 200-hectare
property in Antipolo. The rest shall be spent for the development of the area and the construction of the Universal Temple
for All the World's Faiths (UTAW-F). When completed, the site will be open, free of charge, to all religions, beliefs, and
faiths, where each devotee or believer shall be accommodated and treated in a fair and equal manner, without distinction,
favor, or prejudice. There will also be individual segments or zones in the area which can be used for the conduct of
whatever rituals, services, sacraments, or ceremonials that may be required by the customs or practices of each particular
religion. The President approved the bill, happy in the thought that this could start the healing process of our wounded
country and encourage people of varied and oftenconflicting faiths to live together in harmony and in peace. If the law is
questioned on the ground that it violates Sec. 5, Article III of the Constitution that "no law shall be made respecting an
establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof," how will you resolve the challenge? Explain. (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER: The contention must be rejected. The use of the site temple will not be limited a particular religious
sect. it will be made available to all religious sects. The temporary use of public property for religious purposes without
discrimination does not violate the Constitution. (Ignacio v. De la Cruz, 99 Phil. 346 [1956]; People v. Fernandez, 40 O.G.
1089 [1956]).
ALTERNATIVE SUGGESTED ANSWER: The contention is meritorious. The state cannot pass laws which aid one religion,
all religions, or prefer one religion over another (Emerson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S.A. 1 [1947]). Note: It is
recommended that both answers be accepted as correct and be given full credit.
-XVI- Jojo filed a criminal complaint against Art for theft of a backpack worth P150.00 with the Office of the City Prosecutor
of Manila. The crime is punishable with arresto mayor to prision correccional in its minimum period, or not to exceed 4
years and 2 months. The case was assigned to Prosecutor Tristan and he applied Sec. 8(a) of Rule 112 which reads: "(a)
If filed with the prosecutor. - If the complaint is filed directly with the prosecutor involving an offense punishable by
imprisonment of less than four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day, the procedure outlined in Sec. 3(a) of this Rule
shall be observed. The Prosecutor shall act on the complaint within ten (10) days from its filing." On the other hand, Sec.
3(a) of Rule 112 provides: "(a) The complaint shall state the address of the respondent and shall be accompanied by
affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses as well as other supporting documents to establish probable cause. x x x"
Since Sec. 8(a) authorizes the Prosecutor to decide the complaint on the basis of the affidavits and other supporting
documents submitted by the complainant, Prosecutor Tristan did not notify Art nor require him to submit a counter- affidavit.
He proceeded to file the Information against Art with the Metropolitan Trial Court. Art vehemently assails Sec. 8(a) of Rule
112 as unconstitutional and violative of due process and his rights as an accused under the Constitution for he was not
informed of the complaint nor was he given the opportunity to raise his defenses thereto before the Information was filed.
Rule on the constitutionality of Sec. 8(a) of Rule 112. Explain. (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER: The contention of Art is not meritorious. The right to be informed of the complaint and to be given
the opportunity to raise one’s defenses does not apply to preliminary investigation. Preliminary investigation is merely
procedural. It may be dispensed with without violating the right of the accused to due process. (Bustos v. Lucero, 81 Phil.
640 [1948]).
-XVII- [a] Define the archipelagic doctrine of national territory, state its rationale; and explain how it is implemented through
the straight baseline method. (2.5%) [b] Section 2 of RA 9522 declared the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG) and Scarborough
Shoal as "Regimes of Islands." Professor Agaton contends that since the law did not enclose said islands, then the
Philippines lost its sovereignty and jurisdiction over them. Is his contention correct? Explain. (2.5%) SUGGESTED
ANSWER:
[a] By the term “archipelagic doctrine of national territory” is meant that the islands and waters of the Philippine archipelago
are unified in sovereignty, together with “all the territories over which the Philippines has sovereignty or jurisdiction. This
archipelagic docrine, so described under Article I of the Constitution, draws its rationale from the status of the whole
archipelago in sovereignty by which under Part IV of the UNCLOS the Philippines is defined as an Achipelagic State in
Article 46, thus: (a) “Archipelagic state” means a state constituted wholly nu one or more archipelagos and may include
other islands; (b) “Archipelago” means group of islands including parts of islands interconnecting waters and other natural
features which are so closely interrelated that such islands waters and other natural features form an intrinsic geographic,
economic and political entity, or which historically have been regarded as such. As an archipelagic state, the national
territory is implemented by drawing its “straight archepelgic baselines” pursuant to Article 47 of UNCLOS which prescribes
among its main elements, as follows: 1. By “joining the outermost points of the outermost islands and drying reefs of the
archipelago”, including the main islands and an area in which the ratio of the area of the water to the land including atolls,
is between 1 to 1 and 9 to 1. 2. Mainly, the length of such baselines “ shall not exceed 100 nautical miles…” 3. “The drawing
of such baselines shall not depart to any appreciable extent from the general configuration of the archipelago.”
[b] The contention of Prof. Agaton is not correct at all. “Regime of islands” is a concept provided in Article 121 of the
UNCLOS. It is a definition of the island as “a naturally formed area of land, surrounded by water which is above water at
high tide.” On the other hand, this provision is differentiated from “rocks” which cannot sustain human habitation of their
own. The importance of the difference between a natural island and rock is that an island is provided with territorial sea,
exclusive economic zone and continental shelf. This is the difference by which RA 9522 introduced into the KIG and
separately Panatag or Scarborough Shoal is an island. “Regime of Islands”, has no relevance to acquisition or loss of
sovereignty. RA 9522 has the effect of possibility dividing the area in question into island and rocks, apparently to make
clear for each the maritime zones involved in the definition of island or of rocks.
-XVIII- Sec. 8, Article X of the 1987 Constitution provides that no elective official shall serve for more than three (3)
consecutive terms. Rule and explain briefly the reason if the official is prohibited to run for another term in each of the
following situations: (a) if the official is a Vice-Mayor who assumed the position of Mayor for the unexpired term under the
Local Government Code; (b) if the official has served for three consecutive terms and did not seek a 4th term but who won
in a recall election; (c) if the position of Mayor of a town is abolished due to conversion of the town to a city; (d) if the official
is preventively suspended during his term but was exonerated; and (e) if the official is proclaimed as winner and assumes
office but loses in an election protest. (5%) SUGGESTED ANSWER:
[a] In computing the three term limit, only the term for which the local official was elected should be considered. The second
sentence of Section 8, Article X of the Constitution states that the voluntary renunciation shall not be considered as
interruption of the continuity of the service for the full term for which he was elected. (Borja v. Commission on Elections,
295 SCRA 157 [1998]).
[b] A mayor who served three consecutive terms and did not seek a fourth term but ran and won in the recall election can
serve. Because the recall election was not an immediate re-election. (Socrates v. Commission on Elections, 391 SCRA
547 [2002]).
[c] If the municipality in which a mayor served for three consecutive terms was converted to a city, he cannot run as city
mayor in the first election. For purposes of applying the three term limit, the office of the municipal mayor should not be
considered as different from that of the city mayor. (Latasa v. Commission on Election, 417 SCRA 601[2003]).
[d] The temporary inability of an elective official to exercise his functions due to preventive suspension is not an interruption
of his term, because it did not involve loss of title to the offie. (Aldovino, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, 609 SCRA 234
[2009]). [e] If a candidate was proclaimed for three consecutive terms but did not serve it in full because of loss in a election
protest he is not disqualified. (Lonzanida v. Commission on Elections, 311 SCRA 602 [1991]).
-XIX- Fernando filed an administrative complaint against his co- teacher, Amelia, claiming that the latter is living with a
married man who is not her husband. Fernando charged Amelia with committing "disgraceful and immoral conduct" in
violation of the Revised Administrative Code and, thus, should not be allowed to remain employed in the government.
Amelia, on the other hand, claims that she and her partner are members of a religious sect that allows members of the
congregation who have been abandoned by their respective spouses to enter marital relations under a "Declaration of
Pledging Faithfulness." Having made such Declaration, she argues that she cannot be charged with committing immoral
conduct for she is entitled to free exercise of religion under the Constitution. [a] Is Amelia administratively liable? State
your reasons briefly. (2.5%) [b] Briefly explain the concept of "benevolent neutrality." (2.5%) . SUGGESTED ANSWER:
[a] Amelia is not administratively liable. There is no compelling state interest that justifies inhibiting the free exercise of
religious beliefs. The means used by the government to achieve its legitimate objective is not the least intrusive means
(Estrada v. Escritor, 492 SCRA 1 [2006]).
[b] Benevolent neutrality means that with respect to governmental actions, accommodation of religion may be permitted to
allow individual and groups to exercise their religion without hindrance. That is sought is not a declaration
unsconstitutionality of the law but an exemption from its application. ((Estrada v. Escritor, 492 SCRA 1 [2006]).
-XX- Under Sec. 5, Article VIII of the Constitution, the Supreme Court shall have the power to "promulgate rules concerning
the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice and procedure in all courts xxx." Section 23 of
R.A. No. 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 provides that "any person charged under any provision
of this Act regardless of the imposable penalty shall not be allowed to avail of the provision on pleabargaining." Patricio, a
user who was charged with alleged sale of shabu but who wants to enter a plea of guilt to a charge of possession, questions
the constitutionality of Sec. 23 on the ground that Congress encroached on the rule- making power of the Supreme Court
under Sec. 5, Article VIII. He argues that plea-bargaining is procedural in nature and is within the exclusive constitutional
power of the Court. Is Patricio correct? Explain your answer. (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER: Patricio is not correct. Defining the penalty for criminal offense involves the exercise of legislative
power (People v. Dacuycuy, 173 SCRA 90 [1989]). When Section 23 of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act
prohibited pleabargaining, Congress defined what should be the penalty for the criminal offense. The power of the Supreme
Court to promulgate rules of procedure is subject to the limitation that it should not modify substantive rights (Section 5(5),
Article VIII of the Constitution).
2017 BAR EXAMINATIONS POLITICAL LAW Questions and Suggested Answers
Article XVII: Amendments and Revision
I. A priority thrust of the Administration is the change of the form of government from unitary to federal. The change can be
effected only through constitutional amendment or revision.
(a) What are the methods of amending the Constitution? Explain briefly each method. (3%)
(b) Cite at least three provisions of the Constitution that need to be amended or revised to effect the change from unitary
to federal, and briefly explain why? (3%)
Suggested Answer s: (a) The following are the methods of amending the Constitution:
(i) By Constitutional Convention, where Article XVII, Section 3 of the Constitution states, "The Congress may, by a vote of
two-thirds of all its Members, call a constitutional convention, or by a majority vote of all its Members, submit to the
electorate the question of calling such a convention." Both houses shall vote separately, and the members includes all
those within the jurisdiction of the Congress.
(ii) By Constitutional Assembly, composed of all members of the bicameral Philippine Congress (Senate and the House of
Representatives). It is convened by Congress to propose amendments to the 1987 constitution. Under Article XVII of the
Constitution of the Philippines, amendments pass upon a vote of three fourths of all members of Congress, but it is not
clear if the Congress should vote as a single body or as separate houses.
(iii) Amendments to the Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of
at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented
by at least three per centum of the registered votes therein. No amendment under this section shall be authorized within
five years following the ratification of this Constitution nor oftener than once every five years thereafter.
(b) The following Constitutional provisions that should be amended to effect the change from unitary to federal are: (i)
Section 1, Article II which states, "The Philippines is a Democratic and Republican State, sovereignty resides in the people
and all government authorities emanates from them"; This provision should be amended and the phrase “Democratic and
Republican state” should be changed into Federal Democratic State.
(ii) Section 1, Article VI which states, "The Legislative Department shall be composed of the House of Senate and the
House of Representatives"; The Bicameral composition of the Legislative department should transformed into a Unicameral
system.
(iii) Section 1, Article VII which states that, "Executive powers shall be vested to the President"; There shall be a local
government as may provided by law"; In this provision, the executive powers should reside into a Prime Minister selected
from the members of the parliament.
Article XVI, Section 3: State Immunity from Suit
II. A. Under the doctrine of immunity from suit, the State cannot be sued without its consent. How may the consent be given
by the State? Explain your answer. (3%)
B. The doctrine of immunity from suit in favor of the State extends to public officials in the performance of their official
duties. May such officials be sued nonetheless to prevent or to undo their oppressive or illegal acts, or to compel them to
act? Explain your answer. (3%)
C. Do government-owned or -controlled corporations also enjoy the immunity of the State from suit? Explain your answer.
(3%)
Suggested answers: (A) The consent to be sued is given by the State either expressly or impliedly.
There is express consent when there is a law enacted by the Congress expressly granting to sue the State or any of its
agencies.
There is implied consent when the State enters into a private contract, unless the contract is merely incidental to the
performance of a governmental function; when the State enters into an operation that is essentially a business operation,
unless the business operation is merely incidental to the performance of a governmental function; or when the State sues
a private party, unless the suit is entered into only to resist a claim.
(B) Yes. Although the immunity from suit of the State can be extended to public officials in the performance of their official
functions and duties, the rule is not absolute at all.
The suit against the government officer must be in a case in which the ultimate liability will belong to the officer, not to the
government. Public officials cannot hid under the veil of state immunity for the acts performed in connection with official
duties where they have acted ultra vires or where there is a showing of bad faith or grave and patent negligence. In this
case, the public official may be prevented or ordered to undo the oppressive or illegal act or compelled to perform an act
which is legal. It is not the public official per se but his performance in line with his duty which is being compelled or
prevented thru petition for mandamus or prohibition.
(C) Yes. Government-Owned or-Controlled Corporations enjoy immunity from suit as they are regarded as instruments of
the State.
However, the rule does accept exemptions such as when the law creating the GOCC provides for its suability or when it
enters into a commercial contract, acts on its proprietary capacity, sues or files a counterclaim , confiscates property in
expropriation, acts thru an agent or gives it consent to be sued.
Public International Law: Treaty: Pacta sunt servanda, Rebus sic stantibus
III. State A and State B, two sovereign states, enter into a 10-year mutual defense treaty. After five years, State A finds that
the more progressive State B did not go to the aid of State A when it was threatened by its strong neighbor State C. State
B reasoned that it had to be prudent and deliberate in reacting to State C because of their existing trade treaties.
(a) May State A now unilaterally withdraw from its mutual defense treaty with State B? Explain your answer. (2.5%)
(b) What is the difference between the principles of pacta sunt servanda and rebus sic stantibus in international law? (2.5%)
(c) Are the principles of pacta sunt servanda and rebus sic stantibus relevant in the treaty relations between State A and
State B? What about in the treaty relations between State B and State C? Explain your answer. (2.5%)
Suggested Answers:
(a) State A cannot unilaterally withdraw from its treaty obligations under the principle of pacta sunt servanda upon which
signatory States who entered in treaty must comply with its obligation in good faith.
However, in invoking the principle of rebus sic stantibus, State A can unilaterally withdraw from its treaty obligation with
State B, on the ground that in such withdrawal from the treaty, State A is protecting its existence from harm.
(b) Pacta sunt servanda as generally accepted principle of international law, requires compliance of treaty obligations of
signatory states in good faith irrespective of constrains in its enforcement, while rebus sic stantibus demands the unitary
withdrawal or severance in the enforcement of state's treaty obligations, when impossibility to comply intervenes. Under
this principle of international law, if the change in fundamental circumstance affects a signatory state, and to comply with
the treaty provisions would seriously jeopardize its own existence, a withdrawal is allowed because its fundamental right to
exist is stronger than its duty to comply with the treaty.
(c) Yes. State A and B who are both signatories to the Mutual Defense Treaty must comply with their treaty agreements
as it is a norm in International law applying the principle of pacta sunt servanda.
State B is also correct in invoking the principle of rebus sic stantibus in his relationship with State A. The principle of rebus
sic stantibus can be invoked by a signatory state in a treaty when there is a vital change in the fundamental circumstance,
and said change and circumstance will affect the signatory state that for it to continue to comply with his treaty obligation
would seriously jeopardize its own existence. Also the change in the fundamental circumstance has not been foreseen by
state B during the time it entered into a treaty agreement with state A.
As to the relations between State b and State C, both as signatories to their trade treaties must comply with their treaty
obligations under the principle of pacta sunt servanda. However both states cannot invoke the principle of Rebus sic
stantibus since there is no fundamental change or circumstances present that could affect or jeopardize their existence as
a sovereign state.
Article VII, Section 19: Pardoning power of the President
IV. A. What is the pardoning power of the President under * Art. VIII , Sec. 19 of the Constitution?
Is the exercise of the power absolute? (4%) (*Should have been Article VII)
B. Distinguish pardon from amnesty. (4%)
Suggested Answers: (A) The pardoning power of the President under the 1987 Constitution includes pardon, amnesty,
commutation, reprieves, remit fines and forfeitures after conviction by final judgment.
(B) Pardon can be granted by the President to offending criminals while amnesty may be given to political offenders;
The former does not requires concurrence by the Congress while the latter does;Pardon does not erase the crime
committed but only the penalty and the civil liability attached to it. Amnesty obliterates the effects of the offense hence the
grantee is cleanse from the commission of the offense;
Finally, pardon is given individually while amnesty is collectively granted.
Public International Law: Right of Legation a.k.a . Right of Diplomatic Intercourse
V. (a) What is the right of legation, and how is it undertaken between states? Explain your answer. (2%)
(b) Under this right, may a country like Malaysia insist that the Philippines establishes a consulate in Sabah to look after
the welfare of the Filipino migrants in the area? Explain your answer. (2%)
Suggested Answers: (a) Right of legation, also known as the right of diplomatic intercourse, refers to the right of the State
to send and receive diplomatic missions, which enables States to carry on friendly intercourse. It is not a natural or inherent
right, but exists only by common consent. No legal liability is incurred by the State for refusing to send or receive diplomatic
representatives. Governed by the Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations (1961).
The exercise of the right of legation is one of the most effective ways of facilitating and promoting intercourse among
nations. Through the active right of sending diplomatic representatives and the passive right of receiving them, States arew
able to deal more directly and closely with each other in the improvement of their mutual intercourse.
(b) No. Malaysia cannot insist as it is not a natural or inherent right. The right of legation is purely consensual. The
Philippines should give its consent. No legal liability is incurred by refusing to send or to receive a diplomatic representative.
Article VII, Section 3:
VI. A. The President appoints the Vice President as his Administration's Housing Czar, a position that requires the appointee
to sit in the Cabinet. Although the appointment of the members of the Cabinet requires confirmation by the Commission on
Appointment (CA), the Office of the President does not submit the appointment to the CA. May the Vice President validly
sit in the Cabinet? (2.5%)
Suggested Answer: (A) Yes, as it is prescribed under Article VII, Section 3 (2) which states that “The VicePresident may
be appointed as a Member of the Cabinet. Such appointment requires no confirmation.”
Article VI, Section 25 (5): Congress’ Power of the Purse, cross-border transfers: in re: Araulo vs AquinoG.R. No. 209287,
July 1, 2014
B. The Executive Department has accumulated substantial savings from its appropriations. Needing ₱3,000,000.00 for the
conduct of a plebiscite for the creation of a new city but has no funds appropriated soon by the Congress for the purpose,
the COMELEC requests the President to transfer funds from the savings of the Executive Department in order to avoid a
delay in the holding of the plebiscite.
May the President validly exercise his power under the 1987 Constitution to transfer funds from the savings of the Executive
Department, and make a cross-border transfer of
₱3,000,000.00 to the COMELEC by way of augmentation? Is your answer the same if the transfer is treated as aid to the
COMELEC? Explain your answer. (4%)
Suggested Answer: (B) In Araullo vs Aquino (GR No. 209287, July 1, 2014), the Supreme Court (SC) declared as
unconstitutional the following act and practice under the DAP, to wit: “The funding of Programs, Activities and Projects
(PAPs) that are not covered by any appropriation in the General Appropriations Act (GAA) since augmentation can only be
made from one existing item to another existing item into the budget.”
However, in a resolution dated February 3, 2015, the Sc partially granted the Motion for reconsideration filed by the Office
of the Solicitor General and allowed the funding of PAPs not covered by any appropriation in the GAA.
Cross-border transfers are illegal as it was ruled in the Araullo case where the SC declared that the cross-border transfers
of the savings of the executive to augment the appropriations of other offices outside the executive is an unconstitutional
act. .
Article VI, Sections 24 and 25: The Congress’ Power of the Purse: General Appropriations Act: Limitations:
VII. Give the limitations on the power of the Congress to enact the General Appropriations Act? Explain your answer. (5%)
Suggested Answer:
As an implied limitation, an appropriation law in order to be valid must be devoted for public purpose. No public money
shall be spent for private gains only. For example, an appropriation for the construction of roads inside a private subdivision
is not allowed. ( Pascual vs. Secretary of Public Works and Communications) .
Also, the following are the limitations on the power of the Congress to enact the General Appropriations Act set forth in
the 1987Constitution:
All appropriations bill shall originate from the House of Representatives.
Discretionary funds appropriated for particular officials shall be disbursed only for public purpose to be supported by
appropriate vouchers and subject to guidelines as may be prescribed by law.
Special appropriations bill shall specify the purpose for which it is intended and shall be supported by funds actually
available as certified by the National Treasurer, or to be raised
by a corresponding revenue proposal included therein.
The Congress shall not increase the general appropriations recommended by the President. Form, content and manner
of preparation of the budget shall be prescribed by law.
No "riders" or irrelevant provisions shall be included in the general appropriations bill.
The procedure in approving the appropriations for the Congress shall strictly follow the same procedure for approving
appropriations for other departments and agencies.
Transfer of appropriations shall not be allowed but the President, Senate President, Speaker of the House of
Representatives, Chief Justice and heads of Constitutional Commissions may be authorized to augment any item in the
general appropriations law for their respective agencies from savings in other items of their respective appropriations.
Prohibition against the use of public funds or property for sectarian purposes.
Old general appropriations act is deemed re-enacted if the Congress fails to pass a new general appropriations bill.
All money collected on any tax levied for a special purpose shall be treated as a special fund and paid out for such
purpose only.
Article XII, Section 2: Jure Regalia: Regalian Doctrine.
VIII.
A bank acquired a large tract of land as the highest bidder in the foreclosure sale of the mortgaged assets of its borrower.
It appears that the land has been originally registered under the Torrens system in 1922 pursuant to the provisions of the
Philippine Bill of 1902, the organic act of the Philippine Islands as a colony of the USA. Sec. 21 of the Philippine Bill of 1902
provided that "all valuable mineral deposits in public lands in the Philippine Islands, both surveyed and unsurveyed, are
hereby declared to be free and open to exploration, occupation and purchase, and the land in which they are found to
occupation and purchase, by citizens of the United States, or of said Islands." Sec. 27 of the law declared that a holder of
the mineral claim so located was entitled to all the minerals that lie within his claim, but he could not mine outside the
boundary lines of his claim.
The 1935 Constitution expressly prohibited the alienation of natural resources except agricultural lands. Sec. 2, Art. XII of
the 1987 Constitution contains a similar prohibition, and proclaims that all lands of the public domain, waters, minerals,
coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna,
and other natural resources are owned by the State. This provision enunciates the Regalian Doctrine.
May the Government, on the basis of the Regalian Doctrine enunciated in the constitutional
provisions, deny the bank its right as owner to the mineral resources underneath the surface of its property as recognized
under the Philippine Bill of 1902? Explain your answer. (5%)
Suggested Answer:
No. The government may not deny the mineral right vested upon the bank.
Pursuant to the Philippine Bill of 1902, therefore, once a mining claim was made or a mining patent was issued over a
parcel of land in accordance with the relative provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902, such land was considered private
property and no longer part of the public domain. The claimant or patent holder was the owner of both the surface of the
land and of the minerals found underneath.
Since the 1902 Philippine Bill recognized private ownership over the minerals underneath, the subsequent ratification of
1935 and 1987 Constitutions cannot take it away for vested right had already set in.
Public International Law: Treaties: Diplomatic Immunity: Extradition proceedings Article II, Section 2:
IX. A. Ambassador Robert of State Alpha committed a very serious crime while he headed his foreign mission in the
Philippines. Is he subject to arrest by Philippine authorities? Explain your answer. (3%)
B. Extradition is the process pursuant to a treaty between two State parties for the surrender by the requested State to the
custody of the requesting State of a fugitive criminal residing in the former. However, extradition depends on the application
of two principles - the principle of specialty and the dual criminality principle. Explain these principles. (4%)
C. The President signs an agreement with his counterpart in another country involving reciprocity in the treatment of each
country's nationals residing in the other's territory. However, he does not submit the agreement to the Senate for
concurrence.
Sec. 21, Art. VII of the Constitution provides that no treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective without
such concurrence.
Is the agreement signed by the President effective despite the lack of Senate concurrence?
Explain your answer. (4%)
Suggested Answers: (A) As a general rule, he is not subject to arrest. Being an Ambassador of a foreign State he is
immune from arrest and exempted from criminal prosecution by virtue of their diplomatic immunity, which is also absolute
in nature. Through their diplomatic immunity, they are exempted from criminal prosecutions except when the very serious
crime relates to crimes against international law.
(B) In principle of specialty, a person extradited to the requesting state may be tried and punished only for the offense for
which extradition had been sought and granted.
While in principle of dual criminality, the crime subject of request for extradition must be punishable in both the requesting
state and the requested state.
(C) Yes. The agreement entered into by the President is executive agreement which needs no concurrence of the Senate,
not a treaty or international agreement as provided in Sec. 21, Art. VII of the Constitution.
Article VI: Legislative Department: Enrolled Bill doctrine: Bill Enactment.
X. A. Under the enrolled bill doctrine, the signing of a bill by both the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the
President of the Senate and the certification by the secretaries of both Houses of Congress that the bill was passed on a
certain date are conclusive on the bill's due enactment. Assuming there is a conflict between the enrolled bill and the
legislative journal, to the effect that the enrolled bill signed by the Senate President and eventually approved by the
President turned out to be different from what the Senate actually passed as reflected in the legislative journal.
(a) May the Senate President disregard the enrolled bill doctrine and consider his signature as invalid and of no effect?
(2.5%)
(b) May the President thereafter withdraw his signature? Explain your answer. (2.5%)
Suggested Answers: (a) No. The enrolled bill became a law already. It has to be repealed by a subsequent law, except
when the signature was attained due to fraud or other illegal circumstances which appears that the enrolled bill is totally
different from that which was intended as reflected in the journal.
(b) Yes, in this extra ordinary situation, the President may withdraw his signature to avoid constitutional or legal impediment
B. Sec. 26(2), Art. VI of the Constitution provides that no bill passed by either House of Congress shall become a law
unless it has passed three readings on separate days and printed copies of it in its final form have been distributed to the
Members of the House three days before its passage.
Is there an exception to the provision? Explain your answer. (3%)
Suggested Answer: (B) Yes, there is an exception to the abovementioned provision. When the President certifies the
urgency and necessity of the enactment of a bill into law to meet a public calamity or emergency or for the advancement
of the people, the (1) printing requirement and (2) readings on separate days may be dispensed. However, this does not
guarantee that a bill will be passed. It only speeds up the procedure.
Artcile VI, Section 17: Jurisdiction of Electoral Tribunals.
XI.
Sec. 17, Art. VI of the Constitution establishes an Electoral Tribunal for each of the Houses of Congress, and makes each
Electoral Tribunal "the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective
Members." On the other hand, Sec. 2(1), C (Commission on Elections), Art. IX of the Constitution grants to the COMELEC
the power to enforce and administer all laws and regulations "relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative,
referendum, and recall."
Considering that there is no concurrence of jurisdiction between the Electoral Tribunals and the COMELEC, state when
the jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunals begins, and the COMELEC's jurisdiction ends. Explain your answer. (4%)
Suggested Answer:
The jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunal as the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of its members commences when the said members have already been (1) validly proclaimed, (2) taken oath
and (3) assumed office. Here, the jurisdiction of the COMELEC as the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications also ceases.
In the absence of any of the mentioned requisites, the jurisdiction of the COMELEC as the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns and qualifications continues.
In short, pre-proclamation is under the jurisdiction of the COMELEC and it ends after post proclamation of the winning
candidates.
Article IX-D, Sec. 2(1):
XII.
The Congress establishes by law Philippine Funds, Inc., a private corporation, to receive foreign donations coming from
abroad during national and local calamities and disasters, and to enable the unhampered and speedy disbursements of
the donations through the mere action of its Board of Directors. Thereby, delays in the release of the donated funds
occasioned by the stringent rules of procurement would be avoided. Also, the releases would not come under the
jurisdiction of the Commission on Audit (COA).
(a) Is the law establishing Philippine Funds, Inc. constitutional? Explain your answer. (3%)
(b) Can the Congress pass the law that would exempt the foreign grants from the jurisdiction of the COA? Explain your
answer. (3%)
Suggested Answers: (a) No. All GOCCs should be subject to COA regardless of their incorporation. Funds received by the
government by means of any of its proprietary act, or through its power of taxation, or through any gratuitous act shall
accrue to the national treasury. All funds accrued to the national treasury are public funds, subject to the jurisdiction of
COA. The Congress are the only governmental department vested with the power of appropriation and such power cannot
be delegated to any department or instrumentalities of the government.
(b) No. All donations especially foreign aids/grants cannot be without the jurisdiction of COA.
Article VII, Section 18: Commander-in-Chief clause: Command Responsibility
XIII.
Command responsibility pertains to the responsibility of commanders for crimes committed by subordinate members of the
armed forces or other persons subject to their control in international wars or domestic conflicts. The doctrine has now
found application in civil actions for human rights abuses, and in proceedings seeking the privilege of the writ
of amparo.
(a) What are the elements to be established in order to hold the superior or commander liable under the doctrine of
command responsibility? (4%)
(b) May the doctrine of command responsibility apply to the President for the abuses of the armed forces (AFP and PNP)
given his unique role as the commander-in-chief of all the armed forces? Explain your answer. (4%)
Suggested Answers: (a) In the decided case of Saez vs Macapagal-Arroyo, , citing the decision in Noriel rodriguez vs
Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 191805, November 15, 2011, the following elements must be established to to hold someone
liable under the doctrine of command responsibility: (i) The existence of a superior-subordinate relationship between the
accused as superior and the perpetrator of the crime as his subordinate; (ii) the superior knew or had reason to know that
the crime was about to be or had been committed; and (iii)the superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable
measures to prevent the criminal acts or punish the perpetrators itself.
(b) Yes, the President may be held liable for the abuses made by the armed forces under the doctrine command
responsibility. It is stated in the decision held by the Supreme Court in the case of Saez vs Macapagal-Arroyo, Gr No.
183533, Sept. 25, 2012, that “pursuant to the doctrine of command responsibility, the President, as the Commander-in-
Chief of the AFP, can be held liable for affront against the petitioners life, liberty and security as long as substantial evidence
exist to show that she had exhibited involvement in or can be imputed with knowledge of the violations, or had failed to
exercise necessary and reasonable diligence in conducting the necessary investigations required under the rules.”
Article VI, Section 25 (6), and Section 29 (2)
XIV.
To fulfill a campaign promise to the poor folk in a far-flung area in Mindanao, the President requested his friend, Pastor
Roy, to devote his ministry to them. The President would pay Pastor Roy a monthly stipend of ₱50,000.00 from his
discretionary fund, and would also erect a modest house of worship in the locality in an area of the latter's choice.
Does the President thereby violate any provisions of the Constitution? Explain your answer. (3%)
Suggested Answer:
Yes, the President has violated the provision under Section 25(6), Article VI of the Constitution under which, it provides
that discretionary funds appropriated for particular officials shall be disbursed only for public purpose. The act of the
President in relation to his
discretionary funds id an act of spending for his personal benefit which is contrary to public interest.
Also, the President also violated the provision under Section 29 (2), Article VI of the Constitution which states that “No
public money or property shall be appropriated, applied, paid, or employed, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or
support of any sect, church, denomination, sectarian institution, or system of religion, or of any priest, preacher, minister,
or other religious teacher, or dignitary as such, except when such priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the
armed forces, or to any penal institution, or government orphanage or leprosarium. ”
Article VIII, Section 3: Fiscal Autonomy of the Judiciary. Article XI, Section 9: Qualifications of Ombudsman. Article XI,
Section 3: Impeachment: Initiation
XV.
A. According to Sec. 3, Art. VIII of the Constitution, the Judiciary shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. What does the term fiscal
autonomy signify? Explain your answer. (3%)
B. May a complaint for disbarment against the Ombudsman prosper during her incumbency? Explain your answer. (3%)
C. Sec. 3, Art. XI of the Constitution states that "[n]o impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official
more than once within a period of one year."
What constitutes initiation of impeachment proceedings under the provision? (3%)
Suggested Answers: (A) Fiscal autonomy signifies the independence of judiciary to utilize the funds allocated therein. It
refers to the independence of a branch of government to utilize the funds allocated to it in order to attain its governmental
objective.
Fiscal autonomy means that the approved annual appropriations of the Judiciary shall be released automatically without
imposing any condition before releasing the funds.
Furthermore, in the case of the Judiciary, the Congress is prohibited from reducing the appropriations below the amount
appropriated for them for the previous year.
(B) No. The Ombudsman is immune from suits. The Ombudsman should be ousted first through impeachment to remove
the immunity and only then the disbarment case will go through.
For the disbarment case to prosper, the Ombudsman must first be removed from office via impeachment. (Ombudsman
vs. CA and Mojica, G.R. No. 146486. March 4, 2005)
An impeachable Officer who is a member of the Philippine Bar cannot be disbarred without first being impeached (Jarque
v. Desierto, AC No. 4509)
(C) It is held in the case of Francisco vs House of Representatives 415 SCRA 44; G.R. No. 160261; 10 Nov 2003, that an
impeachment complaint is initiated when a verified complaint is filed and referred to the Committee on Justice for action.
-NOTHING FOLLOWS-

Political Law Barqs

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Political Law Barqs

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

2015 Bar Questions and Suggested Answers Political Law

2016 Bar Examinations In Political Law Page of 1 19

2016 Bar Examinations In Political Law Page of 2 19

2016 Bar Examinations In Political Law Page of 3 19

2016 Bar Examinations In Political Law Page of 4 19

2016 Bar Examinations In Political Law Page of 5 19

2016 Bar Examinations In Political Law Page of 6 19

2016 Bar Examinations In Political Law Page of 7 19

2016 Bar Examinations In Political Law Page of 8 19

2016 Bar Examinations In Political Law Page of 9 19

2016 Bar Examinations In Political Law Page of 10 19

2016 Bar Examinations In Political Law Page of 12 19

2016 Bar Examinations In Political Law Page of 13 19

2016 Bar Examinations In Political Law Page of 14 19

2016 Bar Examinations In Political Law Page of 15 19

2016 Bar Examinations In Political Law Page of 16 19

2016 Bar Examinations In Political Law Page of 17 19

2016 Bar Examinations In Political Law Page of 18 19

2016 Bar Examinations In Political Law Page of 19 19

Article XVII: Amendments and Revision

Article XVI, Section 3: State Immunity from Suit

Article VII, Section 19: Pardoning power of the President

B. Distinguish pardon from amnesty. (4%)

Finally, pardon is given individually while amnesty is collectively granted.

Public International Law: Right of Legation a.k.a . Right of Diplomatic Intercourse

Diplomatic Relations (1961).

Article VII, Section 3:

All appropriations bill shall originate from the House of Representatives.

by a corresponding revenue proposal included therein.

No "riders" or irrelevant provisions shall be included in the general appropriations bill.

Article XII, Section 2: Jure Regalia: Regalian Doctrine.

Explain your answer. (4%)

Article VI: Legislative Department: Enrolled Bill doctrine: Bill Enactment.

Is there an exception to the provision? Explain your answer. (3%)

Artcile VI, Section 17: Jurisdiction of Electoral Tribunals.

Article IX-D, Sec. 2(1):

Article VII, Section 18: Commander-in-Chief clause: Command Responsibility

Article VI, Section 25 (6), and Section 29 (2)

What constitutes initiation of impeachment proceedings under the provision? (3%)

You might also like