Sundström

International Public Management Journal
ISSN: 1096-7494 (Print) 1559-3169 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/upmj20
Management by Results: Its Origin and

Development in the Case of the Swedish State
Göran sundström
To cite this article: Göran sundström (2006) Management by Results: Its Origin and Development
in the Case of the Swedish State, International Public Management Journal, 9:4, 399-427
To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/10967490601077178
Published online: 05 Jan 2007.
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International
Public
Management
Journal
MANAGEMENT BY RESULTS: ITS ORIGIN AND
DEVELOPMENT IN THE CASE OF THE SWEDISH STATE
GÖRAN SUNDSTRÖM
STOCKHOLM CENTRE FOR ORGANIZATIONAL RESEARCH (SCORE)
ABSTRACT: The paper discusses the origin and development of management by

results in Swedish state administration. The historical presence and stability of this
political institution is analyzed. It is argued that it can be traced to program budgeting,
which was introduced in the early 1960s, and that the institution has been marked by a
high degree of stability. An attempt is made to explain the constancy of the steering
model. The question is brought to the fore by the fact that the learning process has failed
in several respects. The course of events is explained from a historical-institutional per-
spective and different theories of bureaucratic power. It is asserted that different initial
decisions made in connection to the introduction of program budgeting created different
positive feedbacks, which were to have stabilizing effects on the institution.
INTRODUCTION1
In recent years ‘‘public management policy’’ (PMP) has become an increasingly
popular research area in the academic study of public administration (Barzelay
2001, 2003; Pollitt and Bouckaert 2004). The term refers to government-wide policy
ideas and measures concerning government’s way of organizing and working. A part
of this research has focused on the policymaking process and the dynamics of
change. Scholars working within this tradition are interested in what triggers changes
in beliefs about problems and potential solutions, the mobilization of resourses to
accomplish change, the engagement of politicians, civil servants, and other stake-
holders, and the rise and resolution of conflicts (Barzelay 2003).
Often this research focuses on specific reforms. Through case studies covering
rather short time periods—usually one or a few years—researchers try to demon-
strate different mechanisms that can explain the reforms. This is the case both for
rational choice-oriented studies, where reforms are explained as rational adaptations
to changes in the economy and in technology, and for sociologically oriented studies,
International Public Management Journal, 9(4), pages 399–427 Copyright # 2006 Taylor & Francis Group, LLC
DOI: 10.1080/10967490601077178 ISSN: 1096-7494
400 International Public Management Journal Vol. 9, No. 4, 2006
where they are explained as imitation due to states’ disposition to follow rules and
act appropriately (March and Olsen 1989; Powell and DiMaggio 1991).
These kinds of studies have undoubtedly contributed to the development of a pro-
cess understanding of PMP reforms. However, just as within other policy areas,
there are cases of institutional stickiness within the PMP area. Some institutions
seem to be marked more by continuity than change, and case studies covering just
a few years are unable to capture such broader and more enduring patterns. Here,
historical institutionalists have provided a powerful correction by focusing our atten-
tion on forces that promote continuity and by developing analytical tools enabling
researchers to conduct longitudinal studies of particular practices.
However, historical institutionalism is a rather recent perspective.2 During the last
ten years, it has been discussed and elaborated. The discussion regards all sorts of
questions, from what ontological points of departure the perspective has, to the
way in which different analytical tools within the perspective are to be understood
and applied. Further, the perspective has been criticized for failing to illuminate
the mechanisms that keep institutions in place and of offering too few tools for ana-
lyzing how established institutions lose support and become de-institutionalised. It
had also been criticized for being too deterministic, giving too little room for actors
(Weir 2006). Also, studies where central analytical tools within the perspective are
used in a more systematic way, as well as more general discussions about how
to use the tools systematically in concrete empirical studies, are quite hard to find
(Thelen 2003).
A general aim of this paper is to contribute to the discussion on how to regard and
adopt the historical-institutional perspective in empirical studies of PMP reforms. I
will do so by analyzing the origin and development of what I analytically refer to as
the ‘‘rationalistic steering model’’ in Swedish government. The rationalistic steering
model is an interesting object of study because it has been one of the most important
ingredients in Swedish PMP. Today, labelled management by results (MBR), it is
meant generally to permeate Swedish public administration. Sweden is also con-
sidered to be among the leaders regarding both how far MBR has been developed
and in spreading MBR ideas and techniques to other countries. Responsible actors
in Sweden are quite proud of their achievement.
The rationalistic steering model is also an interesting object of study, since there
are different stories common in Sweden regarding how this institution was put in
place. The dominant story is a rationalistic one. According to this account, it all
started with the financial crises in the 1970s. In this connection the public sector soon
came under fire, criticized for being too big, too expensive, uncontrollable, inaccess-
ible, and generally difficult to understand. The government responded by initiating
two major ad hoc commissions, which investigated and discussed the problems at
hand and presented a solution—the rationalistic steering model, labelled MBR. In
1988, the MBR reform was launched in a budget bill, and since then the government
has been working hard implementing the model. MBR methods and techniques have
continuously improved through pilot projects and evaluations.
However, when talking to civil servants and listening to scholars—especially those
who have been around for a while—one can find an alternative story. Here, two
MANAGEMENT BY RESULTS 401
interesting points tend to be stressed. The first is that the origin of the steering model
isn’t to be found in the mid-1980s but in the early 1960s, when program budgeting
(PB) was tried out in Sweden. It is also stated that responsible actors since then—
obstinately, if not to say foolhardily—have been trying to develop and implement
the model. The second point is that actors responsible for the steering model—in
terms of development of ideas and methods, education, information, evaluation,
etc.—have been few and have formed a rather homogenous and secluded group,
dominated by career officials (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2004; Premfors 1999). These
officials have been accused of being unable to raise their eyes above the technicalities
occupying them daily and, thus, being unable to learn from experience.
The discussion above raises a number of questions worth posing:
. When was the rationalistic steering model introduced in the Swedish state? To
what extent has the development been marked by stability?
. How can the learning process be characterized—has the model been developed
and adjusted on the basis of experience with how it works in practice?
. If the model shows a high degree of stability, and if the learning process has failed,
how can this be understood?
The research presented here is gathered mainly from studying documents, fore-
most collected from agencies that have been responsible for developing and imple-
menting the rationalistic steering model. A large number of policy documents,
investigations, government bills, experimental work, evaluations, and publications
have been scrutinized. These have been complemented by some 40 interviews. The
interviewees have been strategically chosen and embrace both officials (top level
and lower) and politicians.3
This paper is divided into five sections. After this first—in which I also discuss his-
torical institutionalism and MBR—three sections follow where I discuss the three
questions posed above. In a final section I present my conclusions.
HISTORICAL INSTITUTIONALISM
As it is applied in this study, historical institutionalism fundamentally differs from
its two neo-institutional ‘‘cousins’’: rational-choice institutionalism and sociological
institutionalism.4 The latter two approaches start from fundamental and well
worked-out ideas about actors’ behavior: rational-choice institutionalism from
‘‘economic man,’’ acting from a logic of consequences, and sociological institution-
alism from ‘‘sociological man,’’ acting from a logic of appropriateness. These two
‘‘models of man’’ imply that the perspectives can be characterized as two more
full-blown social scientific theories (Premfors 2002). The overall goal of the research
within these theoretical perspectives is also to elaborate further and refine these
‘‘models of man.’’
Historical institutionalism, on the other hand, lacks a ‘‘model of man’’ of its own
(Pierson 1996). It has been stated, and I concur, that the intention is in fact not to
create a separate ‘‘model of man’’ or to decide which existing model is the best.
The historical-institutional perspective has a somewhat different purpose. It is not so

much about testing and creating explanatory theories as it is about ‘‘borrowing’’
established middle-range theories in order to explain, through the study of historical
processes, the stability and continuity of unique and complex phenomena that are
considered interesting and important by the researcher (Sinatra 1996). In this work
we should not in advance decide either which ‘‘model of man’’ is best, or on which
level of analysis the most important actors can be found. The main thing is rather
to remain open to explanations of both actor and structure character and for differ-
ent kinds of ‘‘models of man.’’ It is also important to open up to the fact that it can
be fruitful to study different stages within one and the same course of events with
different levels of analysis (individuals, units, agencies, government as a whole). His-
torical institutionalism provides us with a number of tools that make this work
easier. According to this interpretation, the perspective is primarily structural, and
its character is rather of a methodological than a theoretical kind (Premfors 2002).
Hence, within historical institutionalism an empirical case is not a means of
achieving an all-embracing theoretic goal in the same direct way as in rational-choice
or sociological institutionalism. The case is to a higher degree a goal in itself (Thelen
and Steinmo 1992; Sinatra 1996). However, this does not mean that we are dealing
with purely descriptive case studies. The purpose is indeed to explain events, but the
explanations are qualitatively different from those found in traditional variable-
oriented analyses (Hall 2003; Tilly 1995). Rather than showing that one independent
variable has an effect on one dependent variable in a certain general way, the
research should focus on showing how different variables stand in relation to each
other and influence each other over time (Bennett and George 1997; Weir 1992).
The important thing is to catch and reconstruct the dynamics and interplay between
many different factors, by making a large number of observations during a long per-
iod of time (Hall 2003). However, these observations are not made in an uncon-
strained way, but are, as mentioned above, directed by middle-range theories. This
kind of case method, implying a mapping of the way in which processes are devel-
oping with respect to theoretically relevant variables, is sometimes called process tra-
cing (George and McKeown 1985; Hall 2003; Mohr 1982).
What do the analytical tools within this perspective look like? The most central
concept is path dependence. In the literature different kinds of path dependencies
are discussed (Mahoney 2000; Thelen 2003; Peters 1999). The most common one,
and the one used in this study, is the self reinforcing path dependency (Pierson
2000).5 This path dependency may be divided into two rather distinct periods. The
first—called critical juncture—has constituting qualities and is marked by agency,
choice, and contingency. These moments of institutional change are followed by per-
iods of institutional reproduction marked by adaptation to institutional incentives
and constraints (Thelen 2003; Weir 1992). The reproduction is driven by what is
called positive feedback, implying that the course of events is not only maintained
but also reinforced over time. This can be put in another way: before the critical
juncture the area of study is organized and regulated in a specific way, generating
a specific incentive structure influencing important actors within the area to behave
in specific ways. During the juncture the way of organizing and regulating changes.
And for the juncture to be critical, the new way of organizing and regulating must
generate a new incentive structure influencing important actors to behave in such
a way that the political institution under study is maintained and reinforced.
Thus, criticality is one important feature of a juncture. Contingency is another.
That early historical events are contingent occurrences means that they cannot be
explained on the basis of prior historical conditions; the final outcome is unintended
and unpredictable (Mahoney 2000; Thelen 2003).
A third important feature of self reinforcing path dependencies is sensitivity.
Because events during a critical juncture set into motion institutional patterns that
have reinforcing properties, timing and sequentially are important features of path
dependency processes. As Paul Pierson notes: ‘‘Small events early on might have
big impacts, while ‘large’ events at later stages may be less consequential’’ (Pierson
1998, 6).
Critical junctures can be, and often are, assessed by counterfactual analyses (Sina-
tra 1996; Tetlock and Belkin 1996). Here, the investigator imagines that an alterna-
tive option had been selected and tries to rerun the course of events. The aim is
simply to illustrate the importance of the option actually selected by showing that
another option would have had dramatically different effects. As Mahoney notes,
this kind of analysis is especially persuasive when the investigator discusses options
predicted by theory to be selected but were not (Mahoney 2000, 513). Hence, the
specification of path dependence is always a theory-laden process. According to
Michael Sinatra, ‘‘Counter-factual arguments cannot really be made in the absence
of good theory, and attempts to do so are counterproductive’’ (Sinatra 1996, 34).
Theories of Explanation – Bureaucratic Power

In the literature different types of positive feedback are distinguished. James
Mahoney discusses four types: utilitarian, functional, power, and legitimating
(Mahoney 2000). In this study I focus on power-based positive feedback. The point
of departure for a power-based approach is that political institutions distribute
power, e.g., resources and information, differently among actors, and that actors
therefore also have different possibilities and motives to influence an institution
(Thelen 1998; Weir 1992). Actors whose power position is strengthened initially by
an institutional arrangement will consequently have the incentives and the possibili-
ties to act in such a way that the institution is surrounded by further arrangements,
which will reinforce their power position even more, and so on. And as hinted above,
being ‘‘first out of the gate’’ increases the chances of success.
The choice of a power explanation has been guided by the observation mentioned
earlier, that participants have been few and formed a rather homogenous and
secluded group, dominated by career public officials. Thus, when reading documents
and interviewing officials and politicians, I have had different perspectives of the
power of bureaucracy in mind. During the study three different kinds of ‘‘middle
range theories’’ have been found particularly fruitful in explaining the course of
events.
The first one I call bureaucratic empires. It includes public-choice theories. I am

especially focusing on Dunleavy’s ideas about ‘‘bureau shaping’’ (Dunleavy 1991).
Just like Downs (1967) and Niskanen (1971), Dunleavy used ‘‘economic man’’ as
a point of departure for analyzing public administration. However, he argued that
officials in higher positions typically do not aim for higher wages or to lead big orga-
nizations with a lot of employees. Instead they prefer smaller agencies working with
challenging and interesting policy problems, populated by interesting and bright
people giving the agency high status. The point is that top-level officials can use dif-
ferent resources, not the least expertise, to create and uphold such agencies, even
though they might be inefficient from the overall societal point of view. These
resources may include ignoring evaluating political institutions that are useful to
the agency or not taking into account experience gained earlier or by other actors.
The second theory of explanation I use in this paper I call bureaucratic groups. It
includes theories about groupthink. This concept was developed by Janis (1972).
Groupthink implies that small groups of people tend to get stuck into a way of think-
ing about a problem and its potential solutions. Quickly the group becomes wedded
to one way of acting and shuts off sources than could provide information about
other ways of thinking and acting. In this way learning is obstructed (Flippen
1999). This introversion is sometimes strengthened through group members’ tend-
ency to think in terms of ‘‘in-group’’ and ‘‘out-group members,’’ where ‘‘in-group
members’’ are depicted as brighter and better informed than ‘‘out-group members’’
(Argote 1999; Taras 1991).
Groupthink tends to occur around complex questions where clear answers are
hard to find. Attractive environments offering positions with high status, good
wages, and stimulating work also tend to facilitate emergence of groupthink. So does
the presence of strong-willed and charismatic leaders (Street 1997; t’Hart 1990;
Taras 1991).
In groupthink situations, unsure members do not speak out, partly because of the
complexity and uncertainty surrounding the problems, partly because of fear of
sanctions from other group members, but also because of norms of anticipatory
compliance with the strong-willed chiefs and their preferred alternatives. Since most
prefer to keep their doubts to themselves, the group will have the appearance of una-
nimity (Flippen 1999).
The third theory I use I call bureaucratic professions. A problem with professional
experts is that they have a strong tendency to rely on their own scientifically estab-
lished knowledge (Jacobsen 1997; Hill 1997). They lack the strong loyalty towards
their political masters, which characterizes the traditional official. Instead they are
loyal to norms within their own profession, and to their professional colleagues.
Due to their expertise these professional experts feel they have a right to work with
a high degree of autonomy within the area where their expertise is needed. Control
by ‘‘outsiders’’ should be limited, since outsiders are unable to understand the work
assigned to the professional experts (Mosher 1982). Typical for professional experts
is also that they turn to their own profession for guidance when running into pro-
blems. By talking to each other, and by consulting publications in their own field,
they try to find out how their professional colleagues discuss alternative ways of
acting. However, these discussions go on within an established paradigm held by the

profession, and therefore the alternatives experts try out the next time are quite simi-
lar to those tried before.
To Assess Path Dependencies

It is not easy to detect and assess path dependencies. I try to do it in three steps.
Firstly, I distinguish different degrees of change that the rationalistic steering model
has been going through during the years (Hall 1993). Changes of the first degree con-
cern modifying the precise settings of techniques and methods. Changes of the
second degree imply a renovation of the very techniques and methods. And when
the techniques and methods as well as the fundamental assumptions and objectives
on which the techniques and methods are based are being modified, we are dealing
with changes of the third degree. Here, Argyris’ (1990) distinction between single-
loop learning and double-loop learning can be helpful. Single-loop learning refers
to a situation where modifications are made within the scope of dominating and fun-
damental patterns of ideas and thoughts. Double-loop learning is about questioning
these fundamental patterns of ideas and thoughts as well.
Secondly, I relate observed changes to the knowledge and experience with the
rationalistic steering model available to those responsible for developing the model.
Here, my point of departure is that state actors (both politicians and officials) nor-
mally try to learn from experience regarding an institution’s way of functioning, and
they also, on the basis of these lessons, typically try to change the institutions (Weir
and Skocpol 1985; Sinatra 1996; North 1993).6 Thus, I expect the changes to reflect
experience. If they do not, I assume that something has obstructed a learning process
from occurring.
This way of comparing changes with gained experiences does not necessarily imply
a simplistic view on learning. Even though ideas about learning can be connected to a
rationalistic view on behavior, my understanding is that a government always will
have to act under conditions making learning difficult, i.e., unspecified and contra-
dicting objectives, vague and fragmentary information, incomplete knowledge about
relations between actions and effects, short time limits, knowledge seepage, poor rec-
ord keeping, personal turnover, etc. (March and Simon 1958; Levitt and March 1988;
Levinthal and March 1993; Feldman and Pentland 2003; Argote 1999; Wilson 1989).
Thus, there are obstacles other than path dependencies that can account for poss-
ible learning failures. I will, however, argue that different choices made in the early
1960s on how to organize and regulate a part of Swedish central government institu-
tions triggered different forces that obstructed learning, which in turn meant that the
rationalistic steering model got reinforced over time. But, of course, there is no easy
and foolproof way to assess that a possible learning failure has been caused by a path
dependency. Here, as in other types of studies based on a hermeneutical method-
ology, the researcher has to argue for her or his interpretation and try to make
credible that the perspectives and theories being used have strong explanatory value.
And this is the third and final step in my efforts to assess the presence of a path
dependency.
Finally, I would like to emphasize that historical institutionalists do not suggest

that all public management reforms best can be understood in terms of path depen-
dencies. The perspective merely points out that sometimes, under certain circum-
stances and due to certain events, institutions tend to get ‘‘locked in.’’ How often
this occurs, and if it tends to occur in certain environments or policy areas, is an
empirical question.
MANAGEMENT BY RESULTS (MBR)

The political institution in which I am interested, and that I will trace back in time,
is MBR. Over the years this model has been used at different levels within the Swedish
central administration. This study focuses on MBR as a tool for ministries to control
central agencies. In order to understand how the model is meant to work it is neces-
sary to have some knowledge about how the Swedish central state is organized.
In contrast to most other countries in the Western world, the Swedish central state
is not organized into a number of large ministries. Instead ministries in Sweden are
small and organized together in a formal organisation headed by the Prime Minis-
ter—the Government Office (Regeringskansliet).7 The bulk of central government
activities, which are typically performed within ministries in other countries, are in
Sweden undertaken in a large number of semi-autonomous state agencies.8 These
agencies are depicted as ‘‘semi-autonomous’’ not only because they are organization-
ally separated from the ministries but also because the power of the ministers and the
government to issue orders for the agencies is constitutionally very circumscribed.9
This organizational ‘‘dualism’’ does resemble the pattern strived for by many
countries, which today are engaged in what has been termed ‘‘agencification’’, i.e.,
efforts to create more or less autonomous agencies for the production of many
government services while largely keeping staff functions and policy-making activi-
ties at the center (Pollitt et al. 2004; Christensen and Lægreid 2006). However, Swe-
den’s ‘‘dualism’’ goes way back in history. Its origins may be found in the 1630s, and
it was quite fully formed by about 1720 (Andersson 2004).
The ‘‘dualism’’ implies that there are two distinct categories of civil servants inha-
biting the central state in Sweden: civil servants of the Government Office (departe-
mentstjänstemän) and civil servants of the agencies (myndighetstjänstemän).
According to the ‘‘formal scheme,’’ civil servants of the agencies are specialists or
substantial experts, and they are expected to take policy initiatives. Also, authoritat-
ive decisions concerning individuals and private organizations should foremost be
made by agencies. Civil servants of the Government Office are expected to be gen-
eralists rather than specialists. Their main tasks are to prepare government matters
and to keep the ministers informed of what is going on within their policy areas, but
they are also expected to steer, control, and coordinate the activities of the agencies.
Before an important decision is taken, the government often chooses to appoint an
ad hoc commission to examine the issue in accordance with guidelines set out by the
government. These commissions are made up of experts, public officials, and politi-
cians who are familiar with the matter concerned. On completion of their work, the
committees publish their findings in a final report. A commissioner has the right to
object to proposals in the report. Such an objection is to be attached to the report. A
committee proposal is circulated for comment before it is drafted as a government
bill. This gives government agencies, interest groups, and the general public an
opportunity to express their views on the matter.
MBR embraces two main ideas:one about delegation, the other about information.
According to the first, politicians should leave ‘‘smaller’’ decisions and those of a
more administrative character, such as concerning an agency’s internal organization
and staffing, to the agency. Such delegation will unload the politicians so they can
devote their precious time to politics, which is considered as involving formulating
goals and guidelines for the administration and following up results (Wilson 1887;
Goodnow 1900). Delegation will also increase creativity and efficiency, since the
agencies more freely can choose means in efforts to fulfill their goals.
The second main idea embraced by MBR is that agencies can be controlled better
through a certain kind of information flow. Such a flow is characterized by its cir-
culating form and its intensity. In special budget documents the politicians should
‘‘place an order’’ from each agency regarding both activities (through formulation
of objectives and results requirements) and information about results (through for-
mulation of reporting requirements). Objectives should include both activities and
outcomes (de Bruijn 2002). Further, the objectives should be as precise as possible,
preferably measurable and time specified. The agencies, in their turn, are to report
back their activities as well as their costs and results. On the basis of this infor-
mation, the agency should also make proposals regarding their future activities. This
information should form a basis for new objectives and results requirements.
The actors responsible for the development of MBR have not explicitly made clear
what basic assumptions the model rests on, but is possible to reconstruct them. A
first, and perhaps the most important, is that individual administrative units at a
rather low level can map out the causal connection between their own activities
and the results of these activities. A second is that the units can, without making
value judgments, report such information to higher administrative units, and on
to the central government, and also make impartial proposals regarding direction
and financing of their own future activities. A third assumption is that information
about results from lower levels can be aggregated at higher levels and be made the
base for new decisions on goals, result requirements and resource distribution. These
goals and result requirements can also—and this is a forth assumption—be made
clear and measurable by the politicians. A fifth assumption is that the public sector
can be divided into two relatively clear-cut and stable spheres: one political (where
goals and ends are discussed and stated) and one non-political (where administrative
action and means are discussed and chosen in order to fulfill the goals).
HAS MBR BEEN MARKED BY CHANGE OR STABILITY?

The course of events from the early 1960s, when program budgeting (PB) was
introduced into the Swedish government, to the present day is marked by both
stability and change. This is not a surprising observation. It is hard to imagine any
political institution being totally unchanged during a period of 40 years. But how
profound have these changes been?
Changes of the Third Degree

PB was introduced in Sweden by the Program Budgeting Commission (SOU 1967,
11–13), initiated in 1963. According to the commission a general problem at the time
was the difficulty in determining the exact costs of specific public products and ser-
vices. Further, budget documents neither contained information about why a certain
agency received a certain amount of money nor about what the agency did with the
money. Lacking this kind of information, politicians were, the commission argued,
unable to steer government activities towards desirable objectives and to organize
the administration efficiently and distribute resources among its different parts.
To improve the situation, the commission argued for a new way of controlling
government activities, and here PB was seen as a solution. The commission declared
that the model was an import from the U.S., but that it had to be adjusted to
Swedish conditions. In 1970 the National Audit Office (RRV) described PB in the
following way:
In PB control occurs through the formulation of goals and result require-

ments. The present system [to be replaced by PB, (my note)] aims at
resources rather than results. PB aims at concrete results and gives more
room than the present budget system to select means. From the govern-
ment’s point of view it will be a matter of controlling the agencies
through the formulation of goals. MBO puts increased demands on the
agencies, and requires efficient information and accounting systems, as
well as systematical follow-up activities and analysis of results. Each
agency has to be results-oriented, results-conscious (RRV 1970, 10).
Neither the commission, nor RRV or Statskontoret (Swedish Agency for Public
Management)—the two agencies that became responsible for developing, imple-
menting, and evaluating PB—explicitly discussed the basic assumptions on which
the model rested. But by looking more closely at their discussions, and at handbooks
and guidelines produced by RRV and Statskontoret, it is clear that the five assump-
tions mentioned above, which today underpin MBR, also underpinned PB.
In 1977, the government proposed that PB should ‘‘be transformed’’ into what
was called the ‘‘state economic-administrative system’’ (SEA), a system RRV was
developing at the time (prop. 1976=77, 130). This transformation was seen as neces-
sary because of difficulties shown when pilot projects ware conducted with PB in the
early 1970s.
SEA was presented as a circle showing how ‘‘planning and budgeting’’ was to be
followed by ‘‘accounting and analysis of results,’’ which in turn was to be followed
by ‘‘auditing,’’ which led back to ‘‘planning and budgeting,’’ and so on (RRV
1975a). Just as with PB, the agencies were given a central position in SEA, doing
strict and recurring analysis of their own results, and sending proposals to the cabi-
net about their own future activities. On the basis of this information the cabinet was
supposed to make plans (short- and long-term) and to formulate objectives for each
agency. Hence, there were striking similarities between SEA and PB. In fact, RRV
characterized SEA as the Swedish version of PB.
Then, during the 1980s, SEA was replaced by MBR. And even though the govern-
ment tried to distance MBR from PB by claiming that implementation of MBR
should be done ‘‘from another point of departure than when working with PB,’’ it
was very hard to separate them. Here, the reader should compare RRV’s description
of PB from 1970 cited above with the government’s description of MBR from 1988:
The government shall determine the objectives and main directions for
state activities for a period of three years. The government shall also state
the resources available for the activities. Agencies are gradually to be
given increased responsibility for fulfilling their tasks by choosing means
themselves. This implies less detailed central regulation . . . The demands
on information about, and analysis of, results will sharpen, and focus
ought to shift from budgeting to follow-up activities and evaluations
(prop. 1987=88:150 appendix 1, page 69).
When described on this general level, MBR and PB seem to be almost identical
control models. This impression only increases when one reads legal texts, hand-
books, and other documents from different time periods in this study.
My conclusion is that the same five basic assumptions have been basic throughout
the whole time period. Surely some of them have been stressed more than others over
time, but none was ever abandoned. They were guiding officials in the 1960s when
trying to implement PB, in the 1970s when trying to implement SEA, and in the
1980s and 1990s when trying to implement MBR.
Changes of the Second and First Degree

It is not always easy to draw the line between changes of the first and the second
degree; the study shows both have occurred. Starting with changes of the second
degree, many of the techniques and methods used today within the MBR model
appeared at an early stage. For example, the Program Budget Commission stressed
the importance of the cabinet delegating decisions to the agencies; decisions on
details were seen as ‘‘irrelevant bonds,’’ preventing agencies from being efficient
and creative (SOU 1967, 13). The commission paid special attention to the far-reach-
ing regulation of appropriations in the annual governmental approval documents
(regleringsbrev), given each agency. Cabinet direction regarding wages, recruitment,
and administrative expenses ought to be given the form of overall budgeting, it was
argued.10 During the 1970s and 1980s this idea was to be repeated several times, and
it also gradually came to pass, with the introduction of ‘‘general appropriations’’
(ramanslag)—i.e., an elimination of line-item appropriations—in the early 1990s as a

final step. But it should also be pointed out that new delegation techniques were
introduced during the process. The most striking example is perhaps when each
agency, in the early 1990s, was given an interest-bearing account at the Swedish
National Debt Office, allowing agencies to take out loans and deposit year-end
savings.
Regarding the other main component of the Rationalistic Steering Model—abun-
dant information flow—changes of the second degree have been rarer. Already the
Program Budget Commission elaborated quite a bit on the idea that the cabinet
should ‘‘place orders for’’ both information about results (through reporting require-
ments) and activities (through objectives and results requirements at different levels)
from every agency. The commission also stressed that each agency should both
report and analyze their own results in terms of activities and the effects and costs
of each activity, and draw up proposals regarding their own future activities. Here,
the methods and techniques have certainly been adjusted and refined over the years;
handbooks on how to formulate objectives at different levels and for shorter and
longer time periods—and on how to measure, analyze, and present results—have
been produced in large quantities. So, the precise settings of techniques and methods
have changed; that is, changes of the first degree have occurred. But the techniques
and methods as such haven’t really changed.
My overall conclusion regarding the first question posed in this paper is that the
process has shown quite a lot of changes of the first degree. Changes of the second
degree have occurred more seldom, and changes of the third degree not at all.
HOW CAN THE LEARNING PROCESS BE CHARACTERIZED?

Have these changes been reasonable, or should there have been more changes and
more profound ones? To be able to discuss this question I will, as mentioned earlier,
relate the changes to the knowledge and experience about the steering model that
have been available to those responsible for developing the model.
About Pilot Projects

During the years several control methods and techniques have been tried out in
pilot projects. However, when reading directives, and looking at how these projects
have been arranged, it becomes quite clear that they haven’t been conducted in order
to really try out the model but rather to develop and refine it. For example, pilot
projects with PB in the early 1970s were seen as ‘‘a necessary base for further devel-
opment’’ (RRV 1975b, 11). The results were to ‘‘deepen the experience base and to
develop detailed and concrete systems’’ (RRV 1975c, 18). A Swedish professor of
political science stated at the time:
From the beginning, however, it has been perfectly clear that the experi-
ment simply has to be successful and that the major principles of PB have
come to stay. Only the forms and details, not the basic principles, have
been open to challenge and change (Andrén 1976, 351–352).
Parts of the SEA reform can be characterized in the same way. In 1978, RRV used
SEA as a point of departure when working out a new, ambitious budget handbook
to guide the agencies in their efforts to write budget requests. A pilot project was
conducted, but when the project was to be evaluated it became clear that the aim
was to ‘‘increase the interest for modernizing the budget system’’ and to ‘‘produce
data and impulses for the next edition of the budget handbook’’ (RRV 1979). The
handbook as such, and the basic ideas that formed its foundation, were not to be
put to the test.
The MBR reform was also accompanied by pilot projects. The commission pro-
posing the reform suggested that pilots should be conducted with its main proposal,
‘‘three year budgeting’’ (replacing annual with triannual budgets). But as soon as
results were collected, three year budgeting was to be ‘‘carried through on a full
scale’’ (SOU 1985:40, 78). Apparently, the results from the pilots had very little to
do with this.
Further, decisions about universalizing reforms have on several occasions been
made without pilot projects being awaited and reported. For example, the Program
Budget Commission finished its work without awaiting the results from pilot pro-
jects initiated by the commission itself. Later, when the projects were running, offi-
cials prepared handbooks and ran information campaign stressing the excellence of
PB.
Another example was the introduction of agency annual reports in the early 1990s.
This reform was preceded by a pilot project with what was called an ‘‘annual report
on results.’’ However, while this project was running, the government appointed an
ad hoc commission to examine introducing higher-quality annual reports, using the
private sector as a model. These two documents—the annual report on results and
the annual report—were very similar. However, the decision to introduce annual
reports on a full scale was taken without awaiting the results from the pilots with
the annual reports on results.
Finally, decisions about going ahead with reforms have, rather often, been made
even though results from pilot projects have been quite discouraging. This was, for
example, the case with the annual reports just mentioned. Here, the experiments
revealed severe difficulties in identifying and measuring activities, effects, and costs.
It was also shown that information about results wasn’t used at the ministerial level.
In the same manner, decisions to let PB morph into SEA in 1977 and to go ahead
with three-year budgeting in 1988 were taken even though the pilots had revealed
severe difficulties.
About the Evaluations

During the period of study, a large number of evaluations have been conducted.
When examining these evaluations, one can see some common features. In general
they have all started by reporting a number of successes. These have been of a
general character and have often been reports on attitudes, captured through sur-
veys, for example:
. that the agencies have become more conscious about the importance of results;
. that there is a growing interest for this steering model and its various techniques;
. that the interaction between ministries and the agencies has improved; and
. that the ministries have a better general view of the agencies.
After this discussion of successes the evaluators have, as a rule, discussed a num-
ber of setbacks. Unlike the successes, these setbacks have had a more concrete econ-
omic or administrative character, captured through studies of documents, for
example:
. that the politicians tend to meddle in administration (and are not able to uphold
the desirable distinction between the political and the administrative spheres);
. that the politicians state too few and too indistinct objectives and reporting
requirements;
. that the agencies fail to identify activities and to map out the causal connection
between activities and outcomes;
. that the agencies are disinclined to present proposals about savings to question
their own activities; and
. that information from the agencies about performance against targets isn’t used
by the ministries.
Finally, the evaluations have contained a set of solutions. Here, the uniformity has
been very high over the years. The solutions have been four in number:
1. Refine and specify methods and techniques.
2. Increase and improve information and education.
3. Increase engagement among politicians and officials.
4. Show patience — the reform is new and complicated.
A common feature of the evaluations is that these solutions haven’t been discussed
in relation to the setbacks. Their importance has been taken for granted. However,
by looking more closely at the solutions one may draw some conclusions about the
evaluators’ understandings. The first solution—refine and specify methods and tech-
niques—implies that the steering model is not yet fully built, or that there are (minor)
problems, which in turn means that politicians and officials are not able fully to meet
demands the model makes. The second solution—increase and improve education
and information—implies that the model and the methods are unclear, which in turn
means that politicians and officials are not able fully to understand demands placed
on them. The third solution—increase engagement—implies that methods and tech-
niques are in place but that politicians and officials are not interested in doing what
is required. The fourth solution—show patience—also implies methods and techni-
ques are in place but that politicians and officials need time to learn how to use them
(see Table 1):
As the reader notices, the solutions suggested have been quite shallow. Problems
have been regarded as temporary and have not generated more fundamental
TABLE 1
The Relation Between Proposed Solutions and Understanding of the Problems
Solutions Understanding of the Problems
Refine and specify methods and techniques Unfinished: lack of ability

Increase and improve education Indistinct: lack of understanding
and information
Increase the engagement among Uninterested: lack of commitment
politicians and officials
Show patience Running-in period: (temporary)
lack of ability
analyses or questioning. When differences have arisen between model and practice it
has constantly been taken as an argument for the efforts to be even stronger. This is
perhaps an expected pattern of behavior in the short run. However, what is parti-
cularly interesting when studying the learning process over a longer period of time
is that responsible officials systematically have ignored experience gradually pro-
duced. Knowledge collected through evaluation has never—I emphasize never—been
compared to experience gained through earlier evaluations, and this despite the fact
that evaluations have been conducted by the same organizations over the years.
There are plenty of what a former senior official at RRV has called ‘‘cloned evalua-
tions’’ (Furubo 2003). Observations and formulations in evaluations from the 1970s
are very similar to those in evaluations from the 1990s. To a large extent the same
general successes have been reported (and emphasized), the same concrete problems
have been reported (and defused), and the same solutions have been suggested (with-
out further relating to the problems observed). And those responsible have not paid
attention to, or maybe not wanted to point out, that the successes and setbacks
reported, as well as solutions suggested, already have been made previously.
The evaluations have not been cumulative. The fact that the same problems have
been observed time after time has not led, for example, to studies designed to test the
validity of the steering model’s fundamental assumptions. Certainly there have been
studies in which the steering model’s assumptions and objectives have been discussed
and questioned. For example, over the years Swedish scholars on organizational
theory and political science have produced several papers and books criticizing the
rationalistic steering model (see, e.g., Tarschys 1978; Brunsson and Jönsson 1979;
Jacobsson 1989; Ehn and Sundström 1997). Now and then there have also been
‘‘think-tanks’’ within both RRV and Statskontoret that have criticized the model
(see, e.g., Statskontoret 1974; RRV 1976; Gorpe 1978; Brunsson 1988). But even
though many of these actors have worked very near those in charge of the model,
these critical discussions never really have influenced policymaking in this domain.
My overall conclusion regarding the second question posed in this paper is that the
learning process has been failing. Knowledge and experience regarding the con-
ditions for forming a functioning information and control system have not been
properly used by officials responsible for policy in this area. Experience has only
been used for single-loop learning, though there has been experience available that
could have brought about double-loop learning. In addition, even more experience
of that kind could have been collected if pilot projects and evaluations had been car-
ried out in a more professional way.
EXPLAINING THE COURSE OF EVENTS

I believe that observed learning failures can be explained by the presence of a path
dependency. In this section I argue that there are certain events in the process that
can be interpreted as a critical juncture and others that can be interpreted as positive
feedback.
The Critical Juncture

In this study, the critical juncture extended over a period of eight years, from 1956
to 1963. In 1956, the government initiated an ad hoc commission—the Rationaliza-
tion Commission—to meet an old and growing discontent with the public sector’s
rigid and inefficient way of working. The agencies responsible for developing and
evaluating what we today would call public management policy (PMP) became a
main target. They were criticized forbeing too narrow-minded, unable to adopt
broader views of questions regarding how to organize and regulate government
activities to make them more efficient. However, neither the critics nor the govern-
ment had any ideas of a more basic kind to be used as a point of departure when
reforming this policy area. As a result, the directives guiding the work of the com-
mission became rather general.
The Rationalization Commission submitted a most defensive proposal when it fin-
ished its work in 1959 (SOU 1959:22). This can be explained by the way it was put
together. It was filled with officials from the agencies to be examined and reformed.
This produced a deadlock (Nybom 1980). Commission members spent most of their
time defending their own organizations. According to the commission, the best thing
to do was basically to let the policy area remain as it was. But this was not what the
government wanted to hear; it needed a bolder reform proposal to silence the critics.
Such a proposal was also available. One of the commissioners objected to the com-
mission’s proposal and instead he wrote his own. This proposal was more audacious
and implied that the four former agencies within the policy area should be reduced to
two. These two were to become rather small and professional, with far-reaching
autonomy. Using the latest methods and techniques they were to work on a broad
scale, focusing on questions about steering, controlling, and organizing state activi-
ties. One, RRV, was to focus on control activities. The other agency—Statskon-
toret—was to focus on organizational questions. Statskontoret was the only
agency of the former four to survive in this proposal. Worth noticing is that the
author of this proposal was acting head of Statskontoret and at the same time admin-
istrative head of the Ministry of Finance. Occupying all these positions, he knew well
the wishes of all important actors.
The Ministry of Finance, which was in charge of the question, took a liking to the
proposal and wrote a government bill on the basis of it (prop. 1960:126). According
to the bill, RRV and Statskontoret were to be closely aligned organizationally. Thus,
the director-general of RRV was placed on the board of Statskontoret, while the
director-general of Statskontoret was placed on the board of RRV. At the same time
the director of the Budget Bureau, located inside the Ministry of Finance, was placed
on the board of Statskontoret, a unique arrangement at the time. It was explicitly
stated that these arrangements were to facilitate cooperation and coordination
between the two agencies and the Budget Bureau.
Another central feature of the government bill was the extensive freedom of action
given to the two new agencies. The bill contained only vague directives regarding the
agencies’ working methods and internal organization. It was left to the agencies to
decide how to achieve the efficiency reforms and economy measures desired. It
was made clear, though, that RRV wasn’t to work with auditing only but also with
more general questions about steering, planning, and organizing. Many of these
questions were very close to questions assigned to Statskontoret. Further, both agen-
cies were encouraged to spread their knowledge among state agencies by informing
and educating.
When the two agencies started their work in 1961, expectations were high. But
after just a few years it became clear that the great plans were about to go into
pieces. The activities of RRV and Statskontoret had not changed to any appreci-
able extent compared to the agencies shut down just a few years earlier. In the
spring of 1963, the situation became critical; if new ideas and perspectives of a
more basic kind were not soon introduced, the agencies could be put into question
(Nybom 1980).
At this moment PB appeared like a savior. It was literally brought over from the
United States by a small group of Budget Bureau officials. Statskontoret got wind of
the model, and in 1963 Statskontoret wrote to the Minister of Finance asking for per-
mission to investigate the model together with RRV (SOU 1967:11). The request was
approved, and the government presented the directives of the Program Budget Com-
mission. But it should be noted that the request wasn’t fully met. The commission
was only allowed to examine the conditions of introducing the new steering model
at the agency level. In the request the ministries had been included. It was not until
later, in the 1970s, that the model became a tool for ministries to control agencies.
Statskontoret had requested the Program Budget Commission to work inside
Statskontoret, an unusual way to organize a commission. The government granted
this request. The commission was to be supervised by a group of experts. The general
director of Statskontoret became the chairman and the general director of RRV the
vice-chairman of this group. The director of the Budget Bureau was also assigned.
These members were accompanied by two management professors.
The government’s approval of Statskontoret’s request to examine PB in 1963
marks the end of the critical juncture. During the time between this decision and
the decision to initiate the Rationalization Commission eight years earlier, a number
of events occurred that, according to my interpretation, triggered three different
positive feedback loops of a power-based character.
Empire Building
The deadlock marking the Rationalization Commission cleared the way for two
ambitious and creative officials: Ivar Löfqvist of Statskontoret and Lars Lindmark
of the Budget Bureau and later of RRV. Early on they both knew that they were
to lead the two new modern agencies. In a way, the two built their own agencies.
Löfqvist and Lindmark were already top-level officials, and if we are to believe
Dunleavy (1991), they were not primarily aiming for higher wages or for leading
big organizations. Instead, they preferred smaller agencies working with interesting
problems and populated by ‘‘the best and the brightest.’’ Their ambition was now,
when they were standing on the highest rung on the career ladder, to accomplish
something lasting—to make a mark in history.
In 1963, when it became clear that the new agencies were having great difficulties
meeting the high expectations placed on them, Löfqvist and Lindmark had strong
reasons to look around for a solution—PB. This model provided their agencies with
new ideas about how politicians and officials could and should act, and how minis-
tries and agencies, and relations between them, could be arranged for higher
efficiency. And if the ideas were useful, extensive and long-lasting activities of differ-
ent kinds would be needed for Statskontoret, RRV, and the Budget Bureau. There-
fore, it is understandable that Löfqvist, Lindmark, and their associates had great
hopes for PB, and also early on tried to take control of it. The granting of Statskon-
toret’s request gave these actors a good opportunity to organize the Program Budget
Commission so that a proposal could be formed quickly, a proposal characterized by
consensus and clarity, that could convince skeptics about the superiority of PB and
make them realize that the model had to be introduced on a full scale.
These ambitious actors quickly took a firm grip of the process. Both Statskontoret
and RRV also came to invest heavily in PB. Using PB as a base, Lindmark both
reformed methods for RRV’s performance auditing and created a new large depart-
ment for the development of methods for control, budgeting, and running infor-
mation campaigns and training programs.
These early investments had long-term effects. Statskontoret and RRV soon
became experts on the new steering model. It became natural for the central govern-
ment to assign questions about methods development, implementation, training, and
evaluation to these agencies. Also, it became natural to send people from these agen-
cies to represent Sweden in different international arenas discussing control, plan-
ning, and budgeting questions. This provided the two agencies with more
resources and expertise, which in turn made it even more natural for the central
government to give them new assignments.
The important point here is that this ‘‘self-reinforcing’’ development was driven
actively by senior officials within Statskontoret, RRV, and the Budget Bureau. This
was not only because the model provided them with status and resources. It was also
important that the two agencies were built upon the rationalistic ideas they were
asked to develop and communicate. If these ideas had been found useless, it could
have weakened the position of the two agencies and their leaders, and of the Budget
Bureau.
The defenders of the rationalistic steering model have used different methods to
keep the process under control. One has been to (re)organize activities. As shown
above, they have for example invested heavily in the model. They have also managed
to sidestep several state commissions that have criticized the rationalistic steering
model, sometimes by simply ignoring them and sometimes by initiating working
groups of their own that have worked in parallel with the commissions. By referring
to these working groups they have managed to take the edge off critical proposals.
A second method used has been to (re)locate persons. A number of examples can
be found where those responsible for the rationalistic steering model have picked
people they know support the model for important positions—and sometimes
removed people they regard as ‘‘troublemakers’’ or ‘‘reactionaries.’’
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, those running the effort have managed to
keep a firm grip of the process by controlling the flow of information. Statskontoret,
RRV, and the Budget Bureau have been able to decide when to examine the steering
model, how to examine it and by whom, and how to interpret results from these
examinations. Very often they have chosen to examine the model themselves. And
the conclusion drawn, as noted, has to a large extent been that the effort has been
successful. At the same time they have repeatedly made the point that the reform
hasn’t yet been fully implemented and that more resources would be needed to finish
the work. They have also argued that these resources should be given to them,
because they have worked with these kinds of questions for a long time and therefore
possess unique expertise. What they haven’t noted is that they have made similar
promises about near breakthroughs before. Instead, earlier experience and expressed
hopes have been suppressed. Over and over the rationalistic steering model has been
presented as a new and fresh idea, and this has increased the engagement and the
hope of success among both politicians and officials.
If earlier experience has been suppressed, contemporary experience has been
avoided. As mentioned earlier, pilot projects and evaluations have been handled
quite poorly. Problems have not been thoroughly discussed, and solutions have
mainly involved fine-tuning—largely putting new labels on old techniques. Officials
have also managed to sell—and defend—the model using general statements about
the importance of formulating objectives, following up results, and delegating deci-
sions from the ministerial to the agency level. By pointing at the simple and obvious,
and avoiding a discussion about the more far-reaching and specific assumptions and
objectives characterizing the model, they have succeeded in putting the burden of
proof on critics. They have constantly rushed on, hoping that refinements and a
changed manner of speaking will make problems disappear. This has made the steer-
ing model a moving target.
Groupthink
Decisions made during the critical juncture did not only give central actors the
incentives and possibilities to defend the rationalistic steering model but also to work
closely together. From the beginning Statskontoret and RRV were directed to work
on very similar tasks. The idea was to facilitate cooperation between the two agencies
and the Budget Bureau; it was not to produce checks and balances between them.
These initial arrangements had important long-term effects. The three organiza-
tions that dominated the Program Budget Commission stayed in control through
the whole course of events. In every given moment the process has also been domi-
nated by only a few individuals, among whom interactions have been intense and
informal.
In the light of these facts, it is plausible that theories about groupthink can be use-
ful for understanding the course of events. The process has been marked by several
conditions often pointed out as crucial for groupthink to emerge. Participants have
been handling quite complex questions where clear answers are hard to find. At the
same time, they have been working in rather attractive environments offering posi-
tions with high status, relatively good wages, and stimulating work. Furthermore,
there have been a number of strong-willed and charismatic people in leading posi-
tions within these groups.
In this environment, criticism against the rationalistic steering model has had dif-
ficulties taking root. Early on the actors got committed to one way of thinking about
steering and controlling state activities: the opinion arose that there were only two
ways of controlling state activities: through an old-fashioned steering model, based
on detailed rules, or through a modern rationalistic steering model, based on objec-
tives and results. This ‘‘dualistic’’ thought has been very strong over the years (and
still is), and it has almost automatically made the critics reform enemies and reac-
tionaries in the eyes of group members.
The study also shows that the group members have kept to themselves and
refrained from establishing proper procedures for scrutiny and for information
search that could have challenged dominant ways of thinking. The environments
have been secluded. At times the ‘‘in-group’’ thought has been so prominent that
members have been subject to euphoria and ignorance. Absolutely sure of the legit-
imacy of their own mission, group members haven’t considered it necessary to have
their own ideas tested. By talking to each other, the certainty that dominant ways of
thinking about problems and solutions within the group are superior has only
increased. It should also be noted that those who have left the group soon have
stopped being euphoric and instead turned critical. Typical for groupthink is that
the feeling of hubris and arrogance is temporary and that people tend to sober up
as soon as they leave the group.
Professional Expertise
Finally, the study shows that one particular profession came to dominate the
course of events as a consequence of different decisions made during the formative
phase. Here, the way the Program Budget Commission and a subsequent ad hoc
commission—the Budget Commission—were put together was of great importance.
They were highly dominated by people specializing in accounting and budget tech-
niques. The commissions introduced a large number of economic concepts, mainly
efficiency. This idea wasn’t unknown in Swedish public administration, but now it
was used in a much wider sense than before and as a value on par with other tra-
ditional values such as democracy, transparency, and the rule of law (Amnå 1981).
The study clearly demonstrates how the massive introduction of economic theory
developed into a gradually strengthened position for the economics profession.
From the start the steering model was dressed in an economic-theoretical linguistic
garment not very easy for outsiders to understand (Andrén 1976). Reports, hand-
books, and brochures throughout the years have featured complicated models and
diagrams. And officials and politicians have repeatedly complained that the steering
model was too complicated, time-consuming, and something mostly professional
experts cared about.
In order to meet the demands of the steering model, agencies have been forced to
set up special units led by professional experts. Often the head of these units have
been recruited from RRV or Statskontoret. This has generated a growing pro-
fessional network, reinforced by frequent informal contacts, and by recurrent infor-
mation and training campaigns led by RRV and Statskontoret. These professional
experts came gradually to enjoy increased status. During the 1970s they quickly
climbed from the lower levels to become senior officials. All this had the effect that
this economics profession took an even stronger grip on the process, which in turn
increased demand for these experts among agencies.
The fact that the process has been dominated by a particular profession can help
us understand the course of events. That many problems haven’t been discussed in
greater detail, and that the relations between problems and proposed solutions
haven’t been clarified, can be interpreted in the light of theories about professions:
The professional experts in charge haven’t considered it necessary to explain their
ways of thinking and acting in more detail to ‘‘outsiders,’’ and especially not to poli-
ticians. Why should they? The ‘‘outsiders’’ wouldn’t understand the complex
material anyway.
Those in charge of the effort have been more disposed to turn to their professional
colleagues. This has certainly been the case when they have run into problems. This
can help us understand why the same solutions have been proposed time after time,
and that the experts in charge have devoted more time to refining and adjusting the
model than trying to understand the problems that have appeared recurrently—the
paradigm held by the profession simply hasn’t offered any alternative solutions.
Surely, many of the changes made can have been perceived as profound by the pro-
fessional experts, but to an outsider it looks like the wheel has been reinvented time
after time.
A Counterfactual Argument
I have now, in some detail, argued that the period between 1956 and 1963 was
marked by criticality by showing that a number of events occurring during these
eight years triggered three different, power-based positive feedback loops that since
then have reinforced the rationalistic steering model. Here, I will argue that these
events were also contingent.
If the events occurring between 1956 and 1963 were not contingent, we must be
able to explain them by the same forces that later supported the rationalistic steering
model. That means that it should be possible to explain them by: 1) senior officials
trying to build themselves ‘‘empires’’; 2) a tight secluded group of officials stuck on
certain ideas about steering and control; and 3) a strong, specialized economics pro-
fession. This is not a very probable explanation, at least not during the first years of
this period. In 1956, when the Rationalization Commission was set up, no such tight
group and no such profession were in control of Swedish PMP. And even if Ivar
Löfqvist and Lars Lindmark already then had quite strong positions, it is not very
likely that they had the power or skill to purposefully put together the commission
in order to create the deadlock that followed.
I argue that the deadlock was unintended. When populating the commission with
people from the agencies to be reviewed, the government was simply trying to use the
knowledge and experience existing within these organizations. It was not trying to
produce a deadlock—that was an unforeseen consequence. So was, therefore, the
space for maneuver given to Löfqvist and Lindmark. One can certainly argue that
the high level of ambition combined with the wide bailiwick and the extensive free-
dom of action given to the new agencies should have called for more reflection. For
example, it was hardly unimaginable that it might be problematical to intertwine the
two new, highly progressive and advanced (as they were believed to be), agencies in
the name of cooperation and coordination.
Perhaps the risks would have been given more attention if the Rationalization
Commission had been put together in another way. One feasible alternative was
to make the commission a parliamentary one, complemented by experts. At the time
most important commissions were parliamentary. Such an alternative composition
would probably have increased the chances of not ending up in a deadlock and of
getting different arrangements more properly discussed.
In this alternative scenario it is also quite possible that the Program Budget Com-
mission, which was set up in 1963, would have been arranged differently. The
arrangement selected—to organize it inside Statskontoret—was an unusual one,
which made it possible for the group of people ‘‘first out of the gate’’ to see to it that
the commission was put together and worked in a way that ensured a smooth ride.
Again a parliamentary commission would have been a most feasible alternative.
With a parliamentary commission—composed of politicians, officials from different
agencies, and experts of different kinds — perhaps the proposal would not have had
such a strong economic bias. And maybe empirical studies would have been ascribed
more value; after all, criticism against PB was not lacking.
Here, we can also ask if it’s possible to begin the counterfactual argument in the
early 1960s. Was the decision to organize the Program Budget Commission accord-
ing to Statskontoret’s wishes contingent even in a situation with the course of events
prior to that decision? This is more uncertain. In my view, forces had—just because
of earlier events—begun influencing the process in a way that made an alternative
decision less likely. As discussed above, at the time there was a group of committed
people acting in favor of the decision actually made. However, it’s quite hard to
determine the strength of this group, since there also was a group inside the Ministry
of Finance highly unsure of the superiority of PB. The Minister belonged to that
group. And the fact that he didn’t fully grant the request from Statskontoret—he
only gave permission to examine the possibility of introducing the model on an
agency level—indicates that there perhaps was a possibility to arrange the Program
Budget Commission in an alterative way. However, to redirect the course of events
more permanently, I think such an alternative decision would have had to be com-
plemented by a clarification of, and a separation between, the roles of RRV and
Statskontoret and by stressing the need for each to check the other, preferably by
making RRV a pure auditing agency. That was much harder to do in 1963 than
in 1960, when the decision was made to set up the two agencies. Perhaps we can con-
clude by saying that the decision made in 1963 was marked by some contingency, but
it was rapidly fading.
I want to underscore that I am not suggesting that decisions made during the critical
juncture explain why Sweden adopted PB. In any case, Sweden would almost certainly
have tried PB at some point. After all, Sweden wasn’t the only country to try the
model. The Swedish government also had a strong belief in central planning and social
engineering, which goes quite well with models such as PB. Furthermore, Sweden was
quite America-oriented at the time, and the idea was seen to come from the U.S. How-
ever, I do believe that the rationalistic steering model in general would have evolved in
a different way if other decisions had been made during the critical juncture. If critics
had been able to get their voices heard, and if those leading the effort had had stronger
incentives to develop the model on the basis of experience about how it worked in
practice, the model probably would not have gotten such a strong foothold.
CONCLUSIONS
In this paper I have discussed the origin and development of management by
results, which today is meant be applied as a general steering model in Swedish
government. The study shows that this public management policy (PMP) reform
hasn’t primarily been a story about rational adaptations to world-wide changes in
the economy and technology, or imitation due to government’s disposition to follow
rules and act appropriately. The course of events is better understood by forces of
inertia inherent within Swedish public administration and the way the PMP sector
has been organized and regulated. Different initial decisions made in the early
1960s, when the rationalistic steering model was introduced under the name of pro-
gram budgeting (PB), can be interpreted as a critical juncture creating positive feed-
back loops, which were to have a stabilizing effect on the model. This doesn’t mean
that historical institutionalism can explain all PMP reforms. It merely shows that pol-
icy reforms sometimes get locked in by forces making institutions ‘‘sticky.’’ Scholars
trying to develop a process understanding of PMP need to take this into account.
Thus, historical institutionalism should be seen as a complementary perspective to
be used along with other ones.
The paper illustrates how an empirical study can be done using a historical insti-
tutional perspective. For example, in assessing a critical juncture I have stressed the
importance of applying some energy trying to demonstrate that the juncture has been
marked by criticality, contingency, and sensibility. The study also shows that it can
be difficult to separate the constituting part of the path dependency (the critical junc-
ture) from the reproducing part (positive feedback). In this case three different posi-
tive feedback loops have supported the institution. These forces were triggered at
different times during the critical juncture. The ‘‘empire force’’ was triggered first
due to the way the Rationalization Commission was put together. It created certain
conditions necessary for the other two forces to be triggered. Here, the process dur-
ing the critical juncture bears traces of a reactive path dependency. However, these
events were marked by enough contingency to stretch out the critical juncture to
1963.
Further, the study shows that a critical juncture can be quite long—eight years in
this case. Here, the concept ‘‘critical juncture’’ (or ‘‘formative moment,’’ another
expression sometimes used) isn’t that apt. It can foster an idea that the researcher
has to identify some instantaneous event. Perhaps we should talk about critical or
formative phases.
Regarding the three positive feedback loops, they have all been power-based, but
they were interpreted from different power perspectives. Hence, regarding motives,
intentions, and rationalities, the actions underpinning developments have been quite
varied. This might give rise to the question of how these three forces relate to each
other. Can the three perspectives really be combined when explaining the same
course of events? Is it possible that participants have supported the rationalistic
steering model by acting both strategically and with their own wishes and desires
in mind, as assumed in the ‘‘empire force,’’ and non-strategically and with the pub-
lic’s wishes and desires in mind, as assumed with the other two forces? I think it is
possible. The study shows how this problem can be handled within the historical
institutional perspective. Firstly, important actors have been studied on different
levels. This has made it possible to interpret the actions of these actors at different
levels from different power perspectives. For example, the ‘‘empire force’’ may be
more applicable to senior officials than to lower ones, while the opposite applies
for the other two forces. Secondly, the problem is handled by making use of history.
All three forces haven’t been equally prominent throughout. Their importance has
varied over time. The ‘‘empire force’’ was most important in the beginning, while
the ‘‘professional force’’ became more important later on.
This way of reasoning might puzzle the reader. I have earlier talked about self-
reinforcing path dependencies. But here I am saying that one force actually has
decreased and another varied in importance. How can that be? Here, the term
‘‘self-reinforcing’’ can be misleading. It has a strong deterministic connotation.
However, the kinds of path dependencies studied here do not proceed automati-
cally. After all, we are dealing with social processes, and the study shows that it
takes active actors for the course to maintain its direction. For example, the
‘‘empire force’’ has been exercised by actors actively reorganizing activities and
persons, and controlling the flow of information. In the same way it has taken
active actors for the other two forces to proceed. And it is really this level of activi-
ties that has decreased (in the case of the ‘‘empire force’’) and varied (in the case of
the ‘‘groupthink force’’), not the government’s disposition to assign missions and
direct funds to these actors, making it possible for them to uphold the institution
of study.
NOTES
1. This paper is part of a larger study, which is only available in Swedish: Stat På villovä-
gar: Resultatstyrningens framväxt i ett historisk-institutionellt perspektiv (Sundström 2003).
(The Wayward State: The development of Management by Results in a historical institutional
perspective). At a number of points in this paper I will draw conclusions from empirical
material reported in the larger study but not in this paper. I would like to thank Rune
Premfors and two anonymous reviewers for giving useful comments on this article. A special
thanks to Steve Kelman, who has given useful comments on the paper and made language
corrections.
2. The anthology, Structuring Politics. Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis
from 1992, by Steinmo, Thelen and Longstreth, is usually considered a starting point.
3. Most of the interviewees were identified through documents, i.e., commission reports,
evaluations, government bills, and handbooks. Some interviewees found through documents
have also suggested other interviewees.
4. For some comparisons between the three perspectives, see Hall and Taylor 1996 or
Peters 1999.
5. Another one is reactive or evolutionary path dependency. Unlike self reinforcing path
dependencies, where an early institutional pattern is reproduced and stabilized over time,
reactive path dependencies imply that early contingent events starts a chain of reactions giving
the development determining properties. The development is reactive in the sense that each
occurrence in the course of events partly is a reaction to the previous occurrence; each occur-
rence in the course of events is dependent on the previous occurrence and the cause of the fol-
lowing one (Mahoney 2000). Katharine Thelen discusses what I would like to point out as a
third kind of path dependency (Thelen 2003). Perhaps it can be called incorporative path
dependency. Like self reinforcing path dependencies, Thelen is interested in political institu-
tions that persist over long stretches of time. But here institutions are not underpinned by sta-
bilizing and self reinforcing forces triggered early on in the process and which then stay
constant through the whole course of events. Instead, the forces supporting the institutions
change over time. Some institutions seem to survive because new actors are incorporated in
the process while it proceeds. These actors may succeed or act side by side with the actors
who previously supported the institution, and they have other motives, other possibilities,
and other ways of exercising their powers. Also, they may add new properties to the institution
in order to bring it in line with changing social, political, and economic conditions—and to
make it more useful to them. This can also include a redirection of the institution to a new
set of goals. Thus, much change can be going on beneath the surface of apparently stable for-
mal institutional arrangements. But even if the institution is ‘‘conquered’’ by new actors, the
institution as such will not be abandoned or destroyed. Thelen refers to this as processes of
‘‘layering’’ (additional institutional arrangements) and ‘‘conversion’’ (a redirection of the insti-
tution to a new set of goals).
6. Following Peter Hall, social learning is here defined as ‘‘deliberative attempts to adjust
the goals or techniques of policy in response to past experience and new information’’ (Hall
1993, 278).
7. At present there are nine ministries containing all together about 4,600 officials, of
whom around 120 are political appointees. Over 1,500 officials are working in the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs and about 60 in the Prime Minister’s Office.
8. According to the agency Statskontoret, there were 547 agencies in December 2005
(Statskontoret 2005).
9. This restriction has two components: First, decision should, as a main rule, be taken by
collective vote in the full Cabinet (at least five ministers need to be present). This means that an
individual minister is prohibited from issuing orders for agencies under his or her purview.
Secondly, in cases where an agency in the capacity of a public authority, and on the basis
of public law, decides on either rights or obligations for an individual citizen the agency is
to be guided only by the law. In such cases no one, not even the Cabinet as a collective or
the parliament, can decide how the agency should decide.
10. Over all, budgeting means giving each agency its appropriation for administrative
costs in ‘‘a bag’’ and letting them decide how to distribute the money among costs for prem-
ises, staff, education, etc.
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Göran Sundström (goran.sundstrom@score.su.se) is a PhD in political science at Stockholm

University and a research fellow at Stockholm Center for Organizational Research (Score).
His current research is on Public Management Policy, the Europeanization of nation states,
core executives, and the role of civil servants in a transformed state.

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International Public Management Journal

ISSN: 1096-7494 (Print) 1559-3169 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/upmj20

Management by Results: Its Origin and

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ABSTRACT: The paper discusses the origin and development of management by

The historical-institutional perspective has a somewhat different purpose. It is not so

Theories of Explanation – Bureaucratic Power

The first one I call bureaucratic empires. It includes public-choice theories. I am

acting. However, these discussions go on within an established paradigm held by the

To Assess Path Dependencies

Finally, I would like to emphasize that historical institutionalists do not suggest

MANAGEMENT BY RESULTS (MBR)

HAS MBR BEEN MARKED BY CHANGE OR STABILITY?

Changes of the Third Degree

In PB control occurs through the formulation of goals and result require-

Changes of the Second and First Degree

(ramanslag)—i.e., an elimination of line-item appropriations—in the early 1990s as a

HOW CAN THE LEARNING PROCESS BE CHARACTERIZED?

About Pilot Projects

About the Evaluations

Solutions Understanding of the Problems

Refine and specify methods and techniques Unfinished: lack of ability

EXPLAINING THE COURSE OF EVENTS

The Critical Juncture

Flippen, A. R. 1999. ‘‘Understanding Groupthink from a Self-regulatory Perspective.’’ Small

Pierson, P. 1996. ‘‘The Path to European Integration. A Historical Institutionalist Analysis.’’

Thelen, K. 1998. Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics. Paper presented at the

Göran Sundström (goran.sundstrom@score.su.se) is a PhD in political science at Stockholm

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