CASE DIGEST

NILO HIPOS v. RTC JUDGE TEODORO A. BAY, GR Nos. 174813-15, 2009-03-17

Facts:
two Informations for the crime of rape and one Information for the crime of acts of lasciviousness
were filed against petitioners Darryl Hipos, Jaycee Corsiño, Arthur Villaruel and two other
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,... acting as a Family Court, presided by respondent Judge Bay
Informations were signed by Assistant City Prosecutor Ronald C. Torralba.
private complainants AAA[1] and BBB filed a Motion for Reinvestigation asking Judge Bay to order
the City Prosecutor of Quezon City to study if the proper Informations had been filed against
petitioners and their co-accused. Judge Bay... granted the Motion and ordered a reinvestigation
of the cases.
petitioners filed their Joint Memorandum to Dismiss the Case[s] before the City Prosecutor. They
claimed that there was no probable cause
Office of the City Prosecutor issued a Resolution on the reinvestigation affirming the Informations
filed against petitioners... signed by Assistant City Prosecutor Raniel S. Cruz... and approved by City
Prosecutor Claro A. Arellano.
Assistant City Prosecutor Lamberto C. de Vera, treating the Joint Memorandum to Dismiss the
Case as an appeal of the 10 August 2004 Resolution, reversed the Resolution dated 10 August
2004, holding that there was lack of probable cause.
On the same date, the City Prosecutor filed a Motion to Withdraw Informations before Judge Bay.
Judge Bay denied the Motion to Withdraw Informations
Issues:
CAN THE HON. SUPREME COURT COMPEL RESPONDENT JUDGE BAY TO DISMISS THE CASE
THROUGH A WRIT OF MANDAMUS BY VIRTUE OF THE RESOLUTION OF THE OFFICE OF THE CITY
PROSECUTOR OF QUEZON CITY FINDING NO PROBABLE CAUSE AGAINST THE ACCUSED AND
SUBSEQUENTLY FILING A MOTION TO
WITHDRAW INFORMATION
Ruling:
Mandamus is an extraordinary writ commanding a tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person,
immediately or at some other specified time, to do the act required to be done, when the
respondent unlawfully neglects the performance of an act
Mandamus is an extraordinary writ commanding a tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person,
immediately or at some other specified time, to do the act required to be done, when the
respondent unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically... enjoins as
a duty resulting from an office... the remedy of mandamus lies only to compel an officer to perform
a ministerial duty, not a discretionary one; mandamus will not issue to control the exercise of
discretion by a public officer where the law imposes upon him the duty to exercise... his judgment
in reference to any manner... while a judge refusing to act on a Motion to Withdraw Informations...
can be compelled by mandamus to act on the same, he cannot be compelled to act in a certain
way, i.e., to grant or deny such Motion
Judge Bay did not refuse to act on the Motion to Withdraw Informations; he had already acted on
it... by denying the same. Accordingly, mandamus is not available anymore. If petitioners believed
that Judge Bay committed grave abuse of discretion in the issuance of such Order denying the
Motion to Withdraw Informations, the proper remedy of petitioners should have been to... file a
Petition for Certiorari
We held that even this Court cannot order... the prosecution of a person against whom the
prosecutor does not find sufficient evidence to support at least a prima facie case. However, if
there was an unmistakable showing of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the prosecutors in
that case, Mayor
Sanchez should have filed a Petition for Mandamus to compel the filing of charges against said two
other persons.
once a criminal complaint or an information is filed in court, any... disposition or dismissal of the
case or acquittal or conviction of the accused rests within the jurisdiction, competence, and
discretion of the trial court.
Petitioners also claim that since Judge Bay granted a Motion for Reinvestigation, he should have
"deferred to the Resolution of Asst. City Prosecutor De Vera withdrawing the case.
The dismissal of the case in Montesa, Jr. was done despite the disapproval of the Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor's Resolution by the Provincial Prosecutor (annotated in the same
Resolution), and despite the fact that the reinvestigation the latter... ordered was still ongoing,
since the Resolution of the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor had not yet attained finality. We held
that the judge should have waited for the conclusion of the Petition for Reinvestigation he
ordered... the statement quoted by petitioners from Montesa, Jr. is not meant to establish a
doctrine that the judge should just follow the determination by the prosecutor of whether or not
there is probable cause.
a motion to dismiss the case filed by the prosecutor before or after the arraignment, or after a
reinvestigation,... or upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the records upon
reinvestigation, should be addressed to the discretion of the court. The action of the court must
not, however, impair the substantial rights of the accused or the right of the People to due
process... of law... we never stated in Ledesma that a judge is allowed to deny a Motion to
Withdraw Information from the prosecution only when there is grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the prosecutors moving for such withdrawal. Neither did we rule therein that... where there
is no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the prosecutors, the denial of the Motion to
Withdraw Information is void.
What we held therein is that a trial judge commits grave abuse of discretion if he denies a Motion
to Withdraw Information without an independent... and complete assessment of the issues
presented
A trial court, however, commits... reversible error or even grave abuse of discretion if it
refuses/neglects to evaluate such recommendation and simply insists on proceeding with the trial
on the mere pretext of having already acquired jurisdiction over the criminal action.
the insertion of the word "no" in the above dispositive portion was a mere clerical error... the body
of the assailed Order not only plainly stated that the court found probable cause against the
petitioners, but likewise provided an adequate discussion of the reasons for such finding. Indeed,
the general rule is that where there is a conflict between... the dispositive portion or the fallo and
the body of the decision, the fallo controls. However, where the inevitable conclusion from the
body of the decision is so clear as to show that there was a mistake in the dispositive portion, the
body of the decision will... prevail.
While mandamus is available to compel action on matters involving judgment and discretion when
refused, it is never... available to direct the exercise of judgment or discretion in a particular way
or the retraction or reversal of an action already taken in the exercise of either.
The trial court, when confronted with a Motion to Withdraw an Information on the ground of...
lack of probable cause, is not bound by the resolution of the prosecuting arm of the government,
but is required to make an independent assessment of the merits of such motion, a requirement
satisfied by the respondent judge in the case at bar.
we are in agreement with the trial court... that there is indeed probable cause against the
petitioners sufficient to hold them for trial. We decided to omit a detailed discussion of the merits
of the case, as we are not unmindful of the undue influence that might result should this Court do
so, even if such discussion is... only intended to focus on the finding of probable cause.
DISMISSED.
 Allied bank vs CA

Facts:
Private respondent Potenciano Galanida was hired by petitioner Allied Banking wherein it is agreed
that the bank reserves the right to transfer or assign respondent to other departments or branches
of the bank as the need arises and in the interest of maintaining smooth and uninterrupted service
to the public.”Private respondent was promoted several times and was transferred to several
branches.
Petitioner listed respondent as second in the order of priority of assistant managers to be assigned
outside of Cebu City having been stationed in Cebu for seven years already. Private respondent
manifested his refusal to be transferred toBacolod. He then filed a complaint before the Labor
Arbiter for constructive dismissal.Subsequently, petitioner bank informed private respondent that
he was to report to the Tagbilaran City Branch but the respondent refused.
On 5 October 1994, Galanida received a memo that Allied Bank had terminated his services
effective 1 September 1994. The reasons given for the dismissal were: (1) Galanida’s continued
refusal to be transferred from the Jakosalem, Cebu City branch; and (2) his refusal to report for
work despite the denial of his application for additional vacation leave.
Labor Arbiter- Galanida’s transfer was inconvenient
NLRC- Allied Bank terminated Galanida without just cause.
CA- Affirmed NLRC ruling.

Issue:
w/n Galanida’s continued refusal to obey the transfer orders constituted willful disobedience or
insubordination, which is a just cause for termination under the Labor Code.

Held:
The memorandum prepared by Atty. Durano and the assailed Decision of the Labor Arbiter, both
misquoted the Supreme Court’s ruling in Dosch v. NLRC.The phrase refusal to obey a transfer order
cannot be considered insubordination where employee cited reason for said refusal, such as that
of being away from the family” does not appear anywhere in the Dosch decision. (misleading the
court. Gawa gawa)
GR: The employer exercises the prerogative to transfer an employee for valid reasons and
according to the requirement of its business, provided the transfer does not result in demotion in
rank or diminution of the employee’s salary, benefits and other privileges.[24] In illegal dismissal
cases, the employer has the burden of showing that the transfer is not unnecessary, inconvenient
and prejudicial to the displaced employee.Dosch case not applicable to the present case. The
transfer of an employee to an overseas post cannot be likened to a transfer from one city to
another within the country. Willful refusal to be transferred within the Philippines based on
personal grounds was considered willful disobedience.
 Deiparine vs. CA and Trinidad

GR. No. 96643, April 23, 1993

FACTS:

Spouses Carungay entered into a contract with Deiparine for the construction of a 3-story
dormitory in Cebu. Carungay agreed to pay Php970,000 inclusive of contractor’s fee, and
Deiparine bound himself to erect the building “in strict accordance to plans and specifications.”
Trinidad, a civil engineer, was designated as Carungays’ representative, with powers of inspection
and coordination with the contractor.

Trinidad reported to Carungay that Deiparine had been deviating from the plans and
specifications, thus impairing the strength and safety of the building. Carungay ordered Deiparine
to first secure approval from him before pouring cement. This order was not heeded, prompting
Carungay to send Deiparine another memorandum complaining that the construction works are
faulty and done haphazardly mainky due to lax supervision coupled with inexperienced and
unqualified staff.

Carungay then filed a complaint for the rescission of the construction contract for damages.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the rescission of contract is valid due to breach.

RULING:

Yes. Article 1385 states that rescission creates the obligation to return the things which were the
object of the contract, together with the fruits, and the price with its interest; consequently, it can
be carried out only when he who demands rescission can return whatever he may be obliged to
restore.

The construction contract falls squarely under Article 1191 because it imposes upon Deiparine the
obligation to build the structure and upon the Carungays the obligation to pay for the project upon
its completion. Article 1191 is not predicated on economic prejudice to one of the parties but on
breach of faith by one of them that violated the reciprocity between them. The violation of
reciprocity between Deiparine and Carungay spouses, to wit, the breach caused by Deiparine’s
failure to follow the stipulated plans and specifications, has given the Carungay spouses the right
to rescind or cancel the contract.

* Case digest by Prince Dave Santiago, LLB-1, Andres Bonifacio Law School, SY 2017-2018
 THE INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE CO., LTD., EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION-NATU, FGU INSURANCE
GROUP WORKERS and EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION-NATU, and INSULAR LIFE BUILDING EMPLOYEES
ASSOCIATION-NATU
vs.
THE INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE CO., LTD., FGU INSURANCE GROUP, JOSE M. OLBES and COURT OF
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS

FACTS: The Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd., Employees Association-NATU, FGU Insurance Group
Workers & Employees Association-NATU, and Insular Life Building Employees Association-NATU
(hereinafter referred to as the Unions), while still members of the Federation of Free Workers
(FFW), entered into separate CBAs with the Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd. and the FGU Insurance
Group (hereinafter referred to as the Companies).

Two of the lawyers of the Unions then were Felipe Enaje and Ramon Garcia; the latter was
formerly the secretary-treasurer of the FFW and acting president of the Insular Life/FGU unions
and the Insular Life Building Employees Association. Garcia, as such acting president, in a circular
issued in his name and signed by him, tried to dissuade the members of the Unions from
disaffiliating with the FFW and joining the National Association of Trade Unions (NATU), to no avail.
Enaje and Garcia soon left the FFW and secured employment with the Anti-Dummy Board of the
Department of Justice. Thereafter, the Companies hired Garcia in the latter part of 1956 as
assistant corporate secretary and legal assistant in their Legal Department. Enaje was hired as
personnel manager of the Companies, and was likewise made chairman of the negotiating panel
for the Companies in the collective bargaining with the Unions.
Unions jointly submitted proposals to the Companies; negotiations were conducted on the Union’s
proposals, but these were snagged by a deadlock on the issue of union shop, as a result of which
the Unions filed on January 27, 1958 a notice of strike for “deadlock on collective bargaining.” The
issue was dropped subsequently (in short, nagkasundo). But, the parties negotiated on the labor
demands but with no satisfactory result due to a stalemate on the matter of salary increases.

Meanwhile, 87 unionists were reclassified as supervisors without increase in salary nor in

responsibility while negotiations were going on in the Department of Labor after the notice to strike
was served on the Companies. These employees resigned from the Unions.
On May 21, 1958 the Companies through their acting manager and president, sent to each of the
strikers a letter (exhibit A) quoted verbatim as follows:
We recognize it is your privilege both to strike and to conduct picketing.

However, if any of you would like to come back to work voluntarily, you may:

1. Advise the nearest police officer or security guard of your intention to do so.
2. Take your meals within the office.
3. Make a choice whether to go home at the end of the day or to sleep nights at the office where
comfortable cots have been prepared.
4. Enjoy free coffee and occasional movies.
5. Be paid overtime for work performed in excess of eight hours.
6. Be sure arrangements will be made for your families.
7. The decision to make is yours — whether you still believe in the motives of the strike or in the
fairness of the Management.

Unions, however, continued on strike, with the exception of a few unionists who were convinced
to desist by the aforesaid letter

From the date the strike was called on May 21, 1958, until it was called off on May 31, 1958, some
management men tried to break thru the Unions’ picket lines xxx succeeded in penetrating the
picket lines in front of the Insular Life Building, thus causing injuries to the picketers and also to the
strike-breakers due to the resistance offered by some picketers.
Alleging that some non-strikers were injured and with the use of photographs as evidence, the
Companies then filed criminal charges against the strikers with the City Fiscal’s Office of Manila.xxx
Another letter was sent by the company to the individual strikers:

The first day of the strike was last 21 May 1958.

Our position remains unchanged and the strike has made us even more convinced of our decision.

We do not know how long you intend to stay out, but we cannot hold your positions open for long.
We have continued to operate and will continue to do so with or without you.

If you are still interested in continuing in the employ of the Group Companies, and if there are no
criminal charges pending against you, we are giving you until 2 June 1958 to report for work at the
home office. If by this date you have not yet reported, we may be forced to obtain your
replacement.

Before, the decisions was yours to make.

So it is now.

Incidentally, all of the more than 120 criminal charges filed against the members of the Unions,
except 3, were dismissed by the fiscal’s office and by the courts. These three cases involved “slight
physical injuries” against one striker and “light coercion” against two others.
At any rate, because of the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction against them as well as
the ultimatum of the Companies giving them until June 2, 1958 to return to their jobs or else be
replaced, the striking employees decided to call off their strike and to report back to work on June
2, 1958.

* However, before readmitting the strikers, the Companies required them not only to secure
clearances from the City Fiscal’s Office of Manila but also to be screened by a management
committee among the members of which were Enage and Garcia. The screening committee
initially rejected 83 strikers with pending criminal charges. However, all non-strikers with pending
criminal charges which arose from the breakthrough incident were readmitted immediately by the
Companies without being required to secure clearances from the fiscal’s office. Subsequently,
when practically all the strikers had secured clearances from the fiscal’s office, the Companies
readmitted only some but adamantly refused readmission to 34 officials and members of the Unions
who were most active in the strike, on the ground that they committed “acts inimical to the interest
of the respondents,” without however stating the specific acts allegedly committed. Some 24 of the
above number were ultimately notified months later that they were being dismissed retroactively
as of June 2, 1958 and given separation pay checks computed under Rep. Act 1787, while others
(ten in number) up to now have not been readmitted although there have been no formal
dismissal notices given to them.

CIR prosecutor filed a complaint for unfair labor practice against the Companies under Republic
Act 875. The complaint specifically charged the Companies with (1) interfering with the members
of the Unions in the exercise of their right to concerted action, by sending out individual letters to
them urging them to abandon their strike and return to work, with a promise of comfortable cots,
free coffee and movies, and paid overtime, and, subsequently, by warning them that if they did
not return to work on or before June 2, 1958, they might be replaced; and (2) discriminating
against the members of the Unions as regards readmission to work after the strike on the basis of
their union membership and degree of participation in the strike.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent company is guilty of ULP

HELD: YES

The act of an employer in notifying absent employees individually during a strike following
unproductive efforts at collective bargaining that the plant would be operated the next day and
that their jobs were open for them should they want to come in has been held to be an unfair
labor practice, as an active interference with the right of collective bargaining through dealing with
the employees individually instead of through their collective bargaining representatives.
Although the union is on strike, the employer is still under obligation to bargain with the union as
the employees’ bargaining representative.
Individual solicitation of the employees or visiting their homes, with the employer or his
representative urging the employees to cease union activity or cease striking, constitutes unfair
labor practice. All the above-detailed activities are unfair labor practices because they tend to
undermine the concerted activity of the employees, an activity to which they are entitled free
from the employer’s molestation.

Indeed, when the respondents offered reinstatement and attempted to “bribe” the strikers with
“comfortable cots,” “free coffee and occasional movies,” “overtime” pay for “work performed in
excess of eight hours,” and “arrangements” for their families, so they would abandon the strike
and return to work, they were guilty of strike-breaking and/or union-busting and, consequently,
of unfair labor practice. It is equivalent to an attempt to break a strike for an employer to offer
reinstatement to striking employees individually, when they are represented by a union, since the
employees thus offered reinstatement are unable to determine what the consequences of
returning to work would be.

ULP also: (super short cut na to) Hiring of Enage and Garcia with attractive compensations;
respondents reclassified 87 employees as supervisors without increase in salary or in
responsibility, in effect compelling these employees to resign from their unions; respondents, thru
their president and manager, respondent Jose M. Olbes, brought three truckloads of non-strikers
and others, escorted by armed men, who, despite the presence of eight entrances to the three
buildings occupied by the Companies, entered thru only one gate less than two meters wide and
in the process, crashed thru the picket line posted in front of the premises of the Insular Life
Building. This resulted in injuries on the part of the picketers and the strike-breakers; respondents
brought against the picketers criminal charges, only three of which were not dismissed, and these
three only for slight misdemeanors. As a result of these criminal actions, the respondents were
able to obtain an injunction from the court of first instance restraining the strikers from stopping,
impeding, obstructing, etc. the free and peaceful use of the Companies’ gates, entrance and
driveway and the free movement of persons and vehicles to and from, out and in, of the
Companies’ buildings.
Verily, the above actuations of the respondents before and after the issuance of the letters, exhibit
A and B, yield the clear inference that the said letters formed of the respondents scheme to
preclude if not destroy unionism within them.

II. The respondents did not merely discriminate against all the strikers in general. They separated
the active from the less active unionists on the basis of their militancy, or lack of it, on the picket
lines. Unionists belonging to the first category were refused readmission even after they were able
to secure clearances from the competent authorities with respect to the criminal charges filed
against them.

It is noteworthy that — perhaps in an anticipatory effort to exculpate themselves from charges of

discrimination in the readmission of strikers returning to work — the respondents delegated the
power to readmit to a committee.
III. Anent the third assignment of error, the record shows that not a single dismissed striker was
given the opportunity to defend himself against the supposed charges against him. As earlier
mentioned, when the striking employees reported back for work on June 2, 1958, the respondents
refused to readmit them unless they first secured the necessary clearances; but when all, except
three, were able to secure and subsequently present the required clearances, the respondents
still refused to take them back.

Indeed, the individual cases of dismissed officers and members of the striking unions do not
indicate sufficient basis for dismissal.

COMELEC v. Noynay G.R. No.132365 (1998)

Topic. Other unethical conducts

Case. Petition for certiorari and mandamus assailing RTC judge’s decision

Facts. COMELEC charged some public teachers with violations of Omnibus Election in their
engagement in partisan political activities. COMELEC then filed these criminal cases in RTC.
RTC, through Judge Noynay directed COMELEC to file the cases in MTC as RTC supposedly
had no jurisdiction. COMELEC filed an MR arguing that RTC has jurisdiction following Alberto
v. Lavilles where the court supposedly ruled that RTC has jurisdiction over election cases. Noynay
dismissed MR. COMELEC appeals in present court.

Issue. Did RTC Judge Noynay err in remanding the case to MTC? -Yes

Ratio. He did because the present case falls under the jurisdiction of the RTC, not MTC. In this
issue, two laws should be juxtaposed. On the one hand, the Omnibus Election Code states that
RTC has jurisdiction for violations of the code, except on cases of failure to register or vote. One
the other, a BP states that MTC has jurisdiction for cases with penalties of one year to six years.
In this case, the RTC implemented the BP. However, the present court finds his ruling mistaken in
that in the same BP providing MTC jurisdiction, it is stated that MTC has jurisdiction only in cases
that does not fall within RTC jurisdiction. Omnibus Election Code gives jurisdiction to RTC on
violates of the code. The violation presented in this case is a violation of the code. This provided,
RTC has jurisdiction, regardless if the penalty is less than six years. Thus, Judge Noynay erred in
ruling that RTC has no jurisdiction.

Doctrine. In relation to Legal Research, this case is relevant in that it zoomed in on the judge’s
misreading of the law and on the petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.

Canons 4 and 18 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics mandate that judges should be studious in the
principles of law and office administration in due regard of legal system integrity, respectively. As
well, Rule 3.01, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct mandates them to be faithful to the law
and to maintain professional competence. The above actions of Hon. Noynay contradicts these
provisions.
Similarly, Rule 10.02, Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that lawyers
should not misquote or represent court rulings. In its MR, COMELEC through its counsel Atty.
Balbuena cited Alberto v. Judge Lavilles. In this citation, however, the present court finds that
errors persist. One, that the plaintiff in the case is Alberto Naldoza not Alberto Naldeza or Alberto
as used by the COMELEC lawyer. Two, that that case is 254 of SCRA not 245. And third, in its
ascription of a Court Administrator’s Memo as the Court’s ruling. Atty. Balbuena is admonished.