G.R. No.

161434 March 3, 2004

MARIA JEANETTE C. TECSON and FELIX B. DESIDERIO, JR. vs.COMELEC, FPJ and
VICTORINO X. FORNIER,

G.R. No. 161634 March 3, 2004

ZOILO ANTONIO VELEZ vs.FPJ

G. R. No. 161824 March 3, 2004

VICTORINO X. FORNIER, vs. HON. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and FPJ

Facts:
Petitioners sought for respondent Poe‘s disqualification in the presidential elections for having
allegedly misrepresented material facts in his (Poe‘s) certificate of candidacy by claiming that he
is a natural Filipino citizen despite his parents both being foreigners. Comelec dismissed the
petition, holding that Poe was a Filipino Citizen. Petitioners assail the jurisdiction of the
Comelec, contending that only the Supreme Court may resolve the basic issue on the case
under Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution.
Issue:
Whether or not it is the Supreme Court which had jurisdiction.
Whether or not Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that Poe was a Filipino
citizen.
Ruling:
1.) The Supreme Court had no jurisdiction on questions regarding ―qualification of a candidate‖ for
the presidency or vice-presidency before the elections are held.
"Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal" in connection with Section 4, paragraph 7, of the
1987 Constitution, refers to ―contests‖ relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the
"President" or "Vice-President", of the Philippines which the Supreme Court may take
cognizance, and not of "candidates" for President or Vice-President before the elections.
2.) Comelec committed no grave abuse of discretion in holding Poe as a Filipino Citizen.

The 1935 Constitution on Citizenship, the prevailing fundamental law on respondent‘s birth,
provided that among the citizens of the Philippines are "those whose fathers are citizens of the
Philippines."

Tracing respondent‘s paternal lineage, his grandfather Lorenzo, as evidenced by the latter‘s
death certificate was identified as a Filipino Citizen. His citizenship was also drawn from the
presumption that having died in 1954 at the age of 84, Lorenzo would have been born in 1870.
In the absence of any other evidence, Lorenzo‘s place of residence upon his death in 1954 was
presumed to be the place of residence prior his death, such that Lorenzo Pou would have
benefited from the "en masse Filipinization" that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902. Being
so, Lorenzo‘s citizenship would have extended to his son, Allan---respondent‘s father.

Respondent, having been acknowledged as Allan‘s son to Bessie, though an American citizen,
was a Filipino citizen by virtue of paternal filiation as evidenced by the respondent‘s birth
certificate. The 1935 Constitution on citizenship did not make a distinction on the legitimacy or
illegitimacy of the child, thus, the allegation of bigamous marriage and the allegation that
respondent was born only before the assailed marriage had no bearing on respondent‘s
citizenship in view of the established paternal filiation evidenced by the public documents
presented.

But while the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively that respondent FPJ is a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines, the evidence on hand still would preponderate in his favor
enough to hold that he cannot be held guilty of having made a material misrepresentation in his
certificate of candidacy in violation of Section 78, in relation to Section 74 of the Omnibus
Election Code.
Tecson vs. COMELEC , GR 16134 , March 3, 2004
FACTS: Petitioners questioned the jurisdiction of the COMELEC in taking cognizance of and
deciding the citizenship issue affecting Fernando Poe Jr. They asserted that under Section 4(7)
, Article VII of the 1987 Constituition, only the Supreme Court had original and exclusive
jurisdiction to resolve the basic issue of the case.

ISSUE: As the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) , does the Supreme Court have jurisdiction
over the qualifications of presidential candidates?

RULING: No. An examination of the phraseology in Rule 12, 13, and Rule 14 of the "Rules of
the Presidential Electoral Tribunal," promulgated by the Supreme Court on April 1992
categorically speak of the jurisdiction of the tribunal over contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of the "President" or "Vice-President", of the Philippines, and not of
"candidates" for President or Vice-President. A quo warranto proceeding is generally defined as
being an action against a person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a
public office. In such context, the election contest can only contemplate a post-election
scenario. In Rule 14, only a registered candidate who would have received either the second or
third highest number of votes could file an election protest. This rule again presupposes a post-
election scenario.
It is fair to conclude that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, defined by Section 4, paragraph
7, of the 1987 Constitution, would not include cases directly brought before it, questioning the
qualifications of a candidate for the presidency or vice-presidency before the elections are held.

[G.R. No. 161434. March 3, 2004]

MARIA JEANETTE C. TECSON and FELIX B. DESIDERIO, JR., petitioners, vs. The
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, RONALD ALLAN KELLY POE (a.k.a. FERNANDO
POE, JR.) and VICTORINO X. FORNIER, respondents.

[G.R. No. 161634. March 3, 2004]

ZOILO ANTONIO VELEZ, petitioner, vs. RONALD ALLAN KELLEY POE, a.k.a. FERNANDO
POE, JR., respondent.
 [G. R. No. 161824. March 3, 2004]

VICTORINO X. FORNIER, petitioner, vs. HON. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and

RONALD ALLAN KELLEY POE, ALSO KNOWN AS FERNANDO POE
JR., respondents.

DECISION
VITUG, J.:

Citizenship is a treasured right conferred on those whom the state believes are
deserving of the privilege. It is a precious heritage, as well as an inestimable
acquisition,[1]that cannot be taken lightly by anyone - either by those who enjoy it or by
those who dispute it.
Before the Court are three consolidated cases, all of which raise a single question of
profound importance to the nation. The issue of citizenship is brought up to challenge the
qualifications of a presidential candidate to hold the highest office of the land. Our people are
waiting for the judgment of the Court with bated breath. Is Fernando Poe, Jr., the hero of silver
screen, and now one of the main contenders for the presidency, a natural-born Filipino or is he
not?
The moment of introspection takes us face to face with Spanish and American colonial
roots and reminds us of the rich heritage of civil law and common law traditions, the fusion
resulting in a hybrid of laws and jurisprudence that could be no less than distinctly Filipino.

Antecedent Case Settings

On 31 December 2003, respondent Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, also known as Fernando Poe,
Jr. (hereinafter "FPJ"), filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of President of the
Republic of the Philippines under the Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino (KNP) Party, in the
forthcoming national elections. In his certificate of candidacy, FPJ, representing himself to be a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines, stated his name to be "Fernando Jr.," or "Ronald Allan"
Poe, his date of birth to be 20 August 1939 and his place of birth to be Manila.
Victorino X. Fornier, petitioner in G.R. No. 161824, entitled "Victorino X. Fornier, Petitioner,
versus Hon. Commission on Elections and Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, also known as Fernando
Poe, Jr., Respondents," initiated, on 09 January 2004, a petition docketed SPA No. 04-003
before the Commission on Elections ("COMELEC") to disqualify FPJ and to deny due course or
to cancel his certificate of candidacy upon the thesis that FPJ made a material
misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by claiming to be a natural-born Filipino citizen
when in truth, according to Fornier, his parents were foreigners; his mother, Bessie Kelley Poe,
was an American, and his father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish national, being the son of Lorenzo
Pou, a Spanish subject. Granting, petitioner asseverated, that Allan F. Poe was a Filipino
citizen, he could not have transmitted his Filipino citizenship to FPJ, the latter being an
illegitimate child of an alien mother. Petitioner based the allegation of the illegitimate birth of
respondent on two assertions - first, Allan F. Poe contracted a prior marriage to a certain Paulita
Gomez before his marriage to Bessie Kelley and, second, even if no such prior marriage had
existed, Allan F. Poe, married Bessie Kelly only a year after the birth of respondent.
In the hearing before the Third Division of the COMELEC on 19 January 2004, petitioner, in
support of his claim, presented several documentary exhibits - 1) a copy of the certificate of birth
of FPJ, 2) a certified photocopy of an affidavit executed in Spanish by Paulita Poe y Gomez
attesting to her having filed a case for bigamy and concubinage against the father of
respondent, Allan F. Poe, after discovering his bigamous relationship with Bessie Kelley, 3) an
English translation of the affidavit aforesaid, 4) a certified photocopy of the certificate of birth of
Allan F. Poe, 5) a certification issued by the Director of the Records Management and Archives
Office, attesting to the fact that there was no record in the National Archives that a Lorenzo Poe
or Lorenzo Pou resided or entered the Philippines before 1907, and 6) a certification from the
Officer-In-Charge of the Archives Division of the National Archives to the effect that no available
information could be found in the files of the National Archives regarding the birth of Allan F.
Poe.
On his part, respondent, presented twenty-two documentary pieces of evidence, the more
significant ones being - a) a certification issued by Estrella M. Domingo of the Archives Division
of the National Archives that there appeared to be no available information regarding the birth of
Allan F. Poe in the registry of births for San Carlos, Pangasinan, b) a certification issued by the
Officer-In-Charge of the Archives Division of the National Archives that no available information
about the marriage of Allan F. Poe and Paulita Gomez could be found, c) a certificate of birth of
Ronald Allan Poe, d) Original Certificate of Title No. P-2247 of the Registry of Deeds for the
Province of Pangasinan, in the name of Lorenzo Pou, e) copies of Tax Declaration No. 20844,
No. 20643, No. 23477 and No. 23478 in the name of Lorenzo Pou, f) a copy of the certificate of
death of Lorenzo Pou, g) a copy of the purported marriage contract between Fernando Pou and
Bessie Kelley, and h) a certification issued by the City Civil Registrar of San Carlos City,
Pangasinan, stating that the records of birth in the said office during the period of from 1900
until May 1946 were totally destroyed during World War II.
On 23 January 2004, the COMELEC dismissed SPA No. 04-003 for lack of merit. Three
days later, or on 26 January 2004, Fornier filed his motion for reconsideration. The motion was
denied on 06 February 2004 by the COMELEC en banc. On 10 February 2004, petitioner
assailed the decision of the COMELEC before this Court conformably with Rule 64, in relation to
Rule 65, of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. The petition, docketed G. R. No. 161824,
likewise prayed for a temporary restraining order, a writ of preliminary injunction or any other
resolution that would stay the finality and/or execution of the COMELEC resolutions.
The other petitions, later consolidated with G. R. No. 161824, would include G. R. No.
161434, entitled "Maria Jeanette C. Tecson, and Felix B. Desiderio, Jr., vs. The Commission on
Elections, Ronald Allan Kelley Poe (a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr.), and Victorino X. Fornier," and the
other, docketed G. R. No. 161634, entitled "Zoilo Antonio G. Velez, vs. Ronald Allan Kelley
Poe, a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr.," both challenging the jurisdiction of the COMELEC and asserting
that, under Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, only the Supreme Court
had original and exclusive jurisdiction to resolve the basic issue on the case.

Jurisdiction of the Court

In G. R. No. 161824
 In seeking the disqualification of the candidacy of FPJ and to have the COMELEC deny due
course to or cancel FPJs certificate of candidacy for alleged misrepresentation of a material fact
(i.e., that FPJ was a natural-born citizen) before the COMELEC, petitioner Fornier invoked
Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code

Section 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. --- A verified
petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any
person exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained therein as required
under Section 74 hereof is false

in consonance with the general powers of COMELEC expressed in Section 52 of the Omnibus
Election Code -

Section 52. Powers and functions of the Commission on Elections. In addition to the powers and
functions conferred upon it by the Constitution, the Commission shall have exclusive charge of
the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections for the
purpose of ensuring free, orderly and honest elections -

and in relation to Article 69 of the Omnibus Election Code which would authorize "any interested
party" to file a verified petition to deny or cancel the certificate of candidacy of any nuisance
candidate.
Decisions of the COMELEC on disqualification cases may be reviewed by the Supreme
Court per Rule 64[2] in an action for certiorari under Rule 65[3] of the Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure. Section 7, Article IX, of the 1987 Constitution also reads

"Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its Members any case or matter brought
before it within sixty days from the date of its submission for decision or resolution. A case or
matter is deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief,
or memorandum, required by the rules of the Commission or by the Commission itself. Unless
otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each
Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within
thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof."

Additionally, Section 1, Article VIII, of the same Constitution provides that judicial power is
vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law which
power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been
a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch
or instrumentality of the Government.
It is sufficiently clear that the petition brought up in G. R. No. 161824 was aptly elevated to,
and could well be taken cognizance of by, this Court. A contrary view could be a gross denial to
our people of their fundamental right to be fully informed, and to make a proper choice, on who
could or should be elected to occupy the highest government post in the land.
In G. R. No. 161434 and G. R. No. 161634
Petitioners Tecson, et al., in G. R. No. 161434, and Velez, in G. R. No. 161634, invoke the
provisions of Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution in assailing the
jurisdiction of the COMELEC when it took cognizance of SPA No. 04-003 and in urging the
Supreme Court to instead take on the petitions they directly instituted before it. The
Constitutional provision cited reads:

"The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and may promulgate its
rules for the purpose."

The provision is an innovation of the 1987 Constitution. The omission in the 1935 and the 1973
Constitution to designate any tribunal to be the sole judge of presidential and vice-presidential
contests, has constrained this Court to declare, in Lopez vs. Roxas,[4] as not (being) justiciable
controversies or disputes involving contests on the elections, returns and qualifications of the
President or Vice-President. The constitutional lapse prompted Congress, on 21 June 1957, to
enact Republic Act No. 1793, "An Act Constituting an Independent Presidential Electoral
Tribunal to Try, Hear and Decide Protests Contesting the Election of the President-Elect and the
Vice-President-Elect of the Philippines and Providing for the Manner of Hearing the
Same." Republic Act 1793 designated the Chief Justice and the Associate Justices of the
Supreme Court to be the members of the tribunal. Although the subsequent adoption of the
parliamentary form of government under the 1973 Constitution might have implicitly affected
Republic Act No. 1793, the statutory set-up, nonetheless, would now be deemed revived under
the present Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution.
Ordinary usage would characterize a "contest" in reference to a post-
election scenario. Election contests consist of either an election protest or a quo
warranto which, although two distinct remedies, would have one objective in view, i.e., to
dislodge the winning candidate from office. A perusal of the phraseology in Rule 12, Rule 13,
and Rule 14 of the "Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal," promulgated by the Supreme
Court en banc on 18 April 1992, would support this premise -

Rule 12. Jurisdiction. - The Tribunal shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President of the Philippines.

Rule 13. How Initiated. - An election contest is initiated by the filing of an election protest or a
petition for quo warranto against the President or Vice-President. An election protest shall not
include a petition for quo warranto. A petition for quo warranto shall not include an election
protest.

Rule 14. Election Protest. - Only the registered candidate for President or for Vice-President of
the Philippines who received the second or third highest number of votes may contest the
election of the President or the Vice-President, as the case may be, by filing a verified petition
with the Clerk of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal within thirty (30) days after the proclamation
of the winner.

The rules categorically speak of the jurisdiction of the tribunal over contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of the "President" or "Vice-President", of the Philippines, and
not of "candidates" for President or Vice-President. A quo warranto proceeding is generally
defined as being an action against a person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or
exercises a public office.[5] In such context, the election contest can only contemplate a post-
election scenario. In Rule 14, only a registered candidate who would have received either the
second or third highest number of votes could file an election protest. This rule again
presupposes a post-election scenario.
 It is fair to conclude that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, defined by Section 4,
paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, would not include cases directly brought before it,
questioning the qualifications of a candidate for the presidency or vice-presidency before the
elections are held.
Accordingly, G. R. No. 161434, entitled "Maria Jeanette C. Tecson, et al., vs. Commission
on Elections et al.," and G. R. No. 161634, entitled "Zoilo Antonio Velez vs. Ronald Allan Kelley
Poe a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr." would have to be dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
The Citizenship Issue
Now, to the basic issue; it should be helpful to first give a brief historical background on the
concept of citizenship.
Perhaps, the earliest understanding of citizenship was that given by Aristotle, who,
sometime in 384 to 322 B.C., described the "citizen" to refer to a man who shared in the
administration of justice and in the holding of an office.[6] Aristotle saw its significance if only to
determine the constituency of the "State," which he described as being composed of such
persons who would be adequate in number to achieve a self-sufficient existence.[7] The concept
grew to include one who would both govern and be governed, for which qualifications like
autonomy, judgment and loyalty could be expected. Citizenship was seen to deal with rights and
entitlements, on the one hand, and with concomitant obligations, on the other.[8] In its ideal
setting, a citizen was active in public life and fundamentally willing to submit his private interests
to the general interest of society.
The concept of citizenship had undergone changes over the centuries. In the 18th century,
the concept was limited, by and large, to civil citizenship, which established the rights necessary
for individual freedom, such as rights to property, personal liberty and justice.[9] Its meaning
expanded during the 19th century to include political citizenship, which encompassed the right
to participate in the exercise of political power.[10] The 20th century saw the next stage of the
development of social citizenship, which laid emphasis on the right of the citizen to economic
well-being and social security.[11] The idea of citizenship has gained expression in the modern
welfare state as it so developed in Western Europe. An ongoing and final stage of development,
in keeping with the rapidly shrinking global village, might well be the internationalization of
citizenship.[12]

The Local Setting - from Spanish

Times to the Present

There was no such term as "Philippine citizens" during the Spanish regime but "subjects
of Spain" or "Spanish subjects."[13] In church records, the natives were called 'indios', denoting a
low regard for the inhabitants of the archipelago. Spanish laws on citizenship became highly
codified during the 19th century but their sheer number made it difficult to point to one
comprehensive law. Not all of these citizenship laws of Spain however, were made to apply to
the Philippine Islands except for those explicitly extended by Royal Decrees.[14]
Spanish laws on citizenship were traced back to the Novisima Recopilacion, promulgated in
Spain on 16 July 1805 but as to whether the law was extended to the Philippines remained to
be the subject of differing views among experts;[15] however, three royal decrees were
undisputably made applicable to Spaniards in the Philippines - the Order de la Regencia of 14
August 1841,[16] the Royal Decree of 23 August 1868 specifically defining the political status of
children born in the Philippine Islands,[17] and finally, the Ley Extranjera de Ultramar of 04 July
1870, which was expressly made applicable to the Philippines by the Royal Decree of 13 July
1870.[18]
The Spanish Constitution of 1876 was never extended to the Philippine Islands because of
the express mandate of its Article 89, according to which the provisions of the Ultramaramong
which this country was included, would be governed by special laws.[19]
It was only the Civil Code of Spain, made effective in this jurisdiction on 18 December 1889,
which came out with the first categorical enumeration of who were Spanish citizens. -

(a) Persons born in Spanish territory,

(b) Children of a Spanish father or mother, even if they were born outside of Spain,

(c) Foreigners who have obtained naturalization papers,

(d) Those who, without such papers, may have become domiciled inhabitants of any
town of the Monarchy.[20]

Grace Poe vs COMELEC

(Case Digest: GR 221697, GR 221698-700 March 8, 2016)
Facts:
In her COC for presidency for the May 2016 elections, Grace Poe declared that she is a natural-
born citizen and that her residence in the Philippines up to the day before 9 May 2016 would be
10 years and 11 months counted from 24 May 2005.

May 24, 2005 was the day she came to the Philippines after deciding to stay in the PH for
good. Before that however, and even afterwards, she has been going to and fro between US
and Philippines. She was born in 1968, found as newborn infant in Iloilo, and was legally
adopted. She immigrated to the US in 1991 and was naturalized as American citizen in 2001.
On July 18, 2006, the BI granted her petition declaring that she had reacquired her Filipino
citizenship under RA 9225. She registered as a voter and obtained a new Philippine passport.
In 2010, before assuming her post as an appointed chairperson of the MTRCB, she
renounced her American citizenship to satisfy the RA 9225 requirement . From then on, she
stopped using her American passport.

Petitions were filed before the COMELEC to deny or cancel her candidacy on the ground
particularly, among others, that she cannot be considered a natural-born Filipino citizen since
she cannot prove that her biological parents or either of them were Filipinos. The COMELEC en
banc cancelled her candidacy on the ground that she is in want of citizenship and residence
requirements, and that she committed material misrepresentations in her COC.

On certiorari, the SC reversed the ruling and held (9-6 votes) that Poe is qualified as a
candidate for Presidency. Three justices, however, abstained to vote on the natural-
born citizenship issue.

Issue 1: W/N the COMELEC has jurisdiction to rule on the issue of qualifications of
candidates (Read Dissent)
Held:
No. Article IX-C, Sec 2 of the Constitution provides for the powers and functions of the
COMELEC, and deciding on the qualifications or lack thereof of a candidate is not one among
them.

In contrast, the Constitution provides that only the SET and HRET tribunals have sole
jurisdiction over the election contests, returns, and qualifications of their respective members,
whereas over the President and Vice President, only the SC en banc has sole jurisdiction. As
for the qualifications of candidates for such positions, the Constitution is silent. There is simply
no authorized proceeding in determining the ineligibility of candidates before elections. Such
lack of provision cannot be supplied by a mere rule, and for the COMELEC to assimilate
grounds for ineligibility into grounds for disqualification in Rule 25 in its rules of procedures
would be contrary to the intent of the Constitution.

Hence, the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when it decided on the qualification
issue of Grace as a candidate in the same case for cancellation of her COC.

Issue 2: W/N Grace Poe-Llamanzares is a natural-born Filipino citizen (Read Dissent)

Held:
Yes, Grace Poe might be and is considerably a natural-born Filipino. For that, she satisfies one
of the constitutional requirements that only natural-born Filipinos may run for presidency.

First, there is a high probability that Grace Poe‘s parents are Filipinos. Her physical features
are typical of Filipinos. The fact that she was abandoned as an infant in a municipality where the
population of the Philippines is overwhelmingly Filipinos such that there would be more than
99% chance that a child born in such province is a Filipino is also a circumstantial evidence of
her parents‘ nationality. That probability and the evidence on which it is based are admissible
under Rule 128, Section 4 of the Revised Rules on Evidence. To assume otherwise is to accept
the absurd, if not the virtually impossible, as the norm.

Second, by votes of 7-5, the SC pronounced that foundlings are as a class, natural-born
citizens. This is based on the finding that the deliberations of the 1934 Constitutional
Convention show that the framers intended foundlings to be covered by the
enumeration. While the 1935 Constitution’s enumeration is silent as to foundlings, there
is no restrictive language which would definitely exclude foundlings either. Because of
silence and ambiguity in the enumeration with respect to foundlings, the SC felt the need
to examine the intent of the framers.
Third, that foundlings are automatically conferred with natural-born citizenship is supported by
treaties and the general principles of international law. Although the Philippines is not a
signatory to some of these treaties, it adheres to the customary rule to presume foundlings as
having born of the country in which the foundling is found.

Issue 3: W/N Grace Poe satisfies the 10-year residency requirement

Held:
Yes. Grace Poe satisfied the requirements of animus manendi coupled with animus revertendi
in acquiring a new domicile.

Grace Poe‘s domicile had been timely changed as of May 24, 2005, and not on July 18, 2006
when her application under RA 9225 was approved by the BI. COMELEC‘s reliance on cases
which decree that an alien‘s stay in the country cannot be counted unless she acquires a
permanent resident visa or reacquires her Filipino citizenship is without merit. Such cases are
different from the circumstances in this case, in which Grace Poe presented an overwhelming
evidence of her actual stay and intent to abandon permanently her domicile in the US. Coupled
with her eventual application to reacquire Philippine citizenship and her family‘s actual
continuous stay in the Philippines over the years, it is clear that when Grace Poe returned on
May 24, 2005, it was for good.

Issue 4: W/N the Grace Poe‘s candidacy should be denied or cancelled for committing material
misrepresentations in her COC
Held:
No. The COMELEC cannot cancel her COC on the ground that she misrepresented facts as to
her citizenship and residency because such facts refer to grounds for ineligibility in which the
COMELEC has no jurisdiction to decide upon. Only when there is a prior authority finding that a
candidate is suffering from a disqualification provided by law or the Constitution that the
COMELEC may deny due course or cancel her candidacy on ground of false representations
regarding her qualifications.

In this case, by authority of the Supreme Court Grace Poe is now pronounced qualified as a
candidate for the presidency. Hence, there cannot be any false representations in her COC
regarding her citizenship and residency. ##

Carpio Dissent (Highlights): ―Foundlings are Deemed Naturalized Filipino Citizens‖

Brion Dissent (Highlights): ―COMELEC’s Broad Quasi-Judicial Power Includes the
Determination of a Candidate’s Eligibility‖
Bar Matter No. 914, October 1, 1999
Re: Application for Admission to the Philippine Bar
vs.
Vicente D. Ching, petitioner

Facts:
Vicente D. Ching, a legitimate child of a Filipino mother and an alien Chinese father, was born
on April 11, 1964 in Tubao La Union, under the 1935 Constitution. He has resided in the
Philippines

He completed his Bachelor of Laws at SLU in Baguio on July 1998, filed an application to take
the 1998 Bar Examination.
The Resolution in this Court, he was allowed to take the bar if he submit to the Court the
following documents as proof of his Philippine Citizenship:
1. Certification issued by the PRC Board of Accountancy that Ching is a certified accountant;
2. Voter Certification issued COMELEC in Tubao La Union showing that Ching is a registered
voter of his place; and
3. Certification showing that Ching was elected as member of the Sangguniang Bayan of
Tubao, La Union
On April 5, 1999, Ching was one of the bar passers. The oath taking ceremony was scheduled
on May 5, 1999.
Because of his questionable status of Ching's citizenship, he was not allowed to take oath.
He was required to submit further proof of his citizenship.
The Office of the Solicitor General was required to file a comment on Ching's petition for
admission to the Philippine Bar.
In his report:
1. Ching, under the 1935 Constitution, was a Chinese citizen and continue to be so, unless
upon reaching the age of majority he elected Philippine citizenship, under the compliance with
the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 265 "an act providing for the manner in which the
option to elect Philippine citizenship shall be declared by a person whose mother is a Filipino
citizen"
2. He pointed out the Ching has not formally elected Philippine citizenship, and if ever he does,
it would already be beyond the "reasonable time" allowed by the present jurisprudence.

Issue:
Whether or not he has elected Philippine citizenship within "a reasonable time".

Rulings:
1. No. Ching, despite the special circumstances, failed to elect Philippine citizenship within a
reasonable time. The reasonable time means that the election should be made within 3 years
from "upon reaching the age of majority", which is 21 years old. Instead, he elected Philippine
citizenship 14 years after reaching the age of majority which the court considered not within the
reasonable time. Ching offered no reason why he delayed his election of Philippine citizenship,
as procedure in electing Philippine citizenship is not a tedious and painstaking process. All that
is required is an affidavit of election of Philippine citizenship and file the same with the nearest
civil registry.

Categories: Constitutional Law 1

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

BAR MATTER No. 914 October 1, 1999

RE: APPLICATION FOR ADMISSION TO THE PHILIPPINE BAR,

vs.

VICENTE D. CHING, applicant.

RESOLUTION

KAPUNAN, J.:

Can a legitimate child born under the 1935 Constitution of a Filipino mother and an alien father
validly elect Philippine citizenship fourteen (14) years after he has reached the age of majority?
This is the question sought to be resolved in the present case involving the application for
admission to the Philippine Bar of Vicente D. Ching.

The facts of this case are as follows:

Vicente D. Ching, the legitimate son of the spouses Tat Ching, a Chinese citizen, and Prescila
A. Dulay, a Filipino, was born in Francia West, Tubao, La Union on 11 April 1964. Since his
birth, Ching has resided in the Philippines.

On 17 July 1998, Ching, after having completed a Bachelor of Laws course at the St. Louis
University in Baguio City, filed an application to take the 1998 Bar Examinations. In a Resolution
of this Court, dated 1 September 1998, he was allowed to take the Bar Examinations, subject to
the condition that he must submit to the Court proof of his Philippine citizenship.

In compliance with the above resolution, Ching submitted on 18 November 1998, the following
documents:

1. Certification, dated 9 June 1986, issued by the Board of Accountancy of the

Professional Regulations Commission showing that Ching is a certified public
accountant;

2. Voter Certification, dated 14 June 1997, issued by Elizabeth B. Cerezo,

Election Officer of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in Tubao La Union
showing that Ching is a registered voter of the said place; and

3. Certification, dated 12 October 1998, also issued by Elizabeth B. Cerezo,

showing that Ching was elected as a member of the Sangguniang Bayan of
Tubao, La Union during the 12 May 1992 synchronized elections.

On 5 April 1999, the results of the 1998 Bar Examinations were released and Ching was one of
the successful Bar examinees. The oath-taking of the successful Bar examinees was scheduled
on 5 May 1999. However, because of the questionable status of Ching's citizenship, he was not
allowed to take his oath. Pursuant to the resolution of this Court, dated 20 April 1999, he was
required to submit further proof of his citizenship. In the same resolution, the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) was required to file a comment on Ching's petition for admission to the
bar and on the documents evidencing his Philippine citizenship.
The OSG filed its comment on 8 July 1999, stating that Ching, being the "legitimate child of a
Chinese father and a Filipino mother born under the 1935 Constitution was a Chinese citizen
and continued to be so, unless upon reaching the age of majority he elected Philippine
citizenship" 1 in strict compliance with the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 625 entitled "An
Act Providing for the Manner in which the Option to Elect Philippine Citizenship shall be
Declared by a Person Whose Mother is a Filipino Citizen." The OSG adds that "(w)hat he
acquired at best was only an inchoate Philippine citizenship which he could perfect by election
upon reaching the age of majority." 2 In this regard, the OSG clarifies that "two (2) conditions
must concur in order that the election of Philippine citizenship may be effective, namely: (a) the
mother of the person making the election must be a citizen of the Philippines; and (b) said
election must be made upon reaching the age of majority." 3 The OSG then explains the
meaning of the phrase "upon reaching the age of majority:"

The clause "upon reaching the age of majority" has been construed to mean a
reasonable time after reaching the age of majority which had been interpreted by
the Secretary of Justice to be three (3) years (VELAYO, supra at p. 51 citing Op.,
Sec. of Justice No. 70, s. 1940, Feb. 27, 1940). Said period may be extended
under certain circumstances, as when a (sic) person concerned has always
considered himself a Filipino (ibid., citing Op. Nos. 355 and 422, s. 1955; 3, 12,
46, 86 and 97, s. 1953). But in Cuenco, it was held that an election done after
over seven (7) years was not made within a reasonable time.

In conclusion, the OSG points out that Ching has not formally elected Philippine citizenship and,
if ever he does, it would already be beyond the "reasonable time" allowed by present
jurisprudence. However, due to the peculiar circumstances surrounding Ching's case, the OSG
recommends the relaxation of the standing rule on the construction of the phrase "reasonable
period" and the allowance of Ching to elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with C.A. No.
625 prior to taking his oath as a member of the Philippine Bar.

On 27 July 1999, Ching filed a Manifestation, attaching therewith his Affidavit of Election of
Philippine Citizenship and his Oath of Allegiance, both dated 15 July 1999. In his Manifestation,
Ching states:

1. I have always considered myself as a Filipino;

2. I was registered as a Filipino and consistently declared myself as one in my

school records and other official documents;

3. I am practicing a profession (Certified Public Accountant) reserved for Filipino

citizens;

4. I participated in electoral process[es] since the time I was eligible to vote;

5. I had served the people of Tubao, La Union as a member of the Sangguniang

Bayan from 1992 to 1995;

6. I elected Philippine citizenship on July 15, 1999 in accordance with

Commonwealth Act No. 625;
 7. My election was expressed in a statement signed and sworn to by me before a
notary public;

8. I accompanied my election of Philippine citizenship with the oath of allegiance

to the Constitution and the Government of the Philippines;

9. I filed my election of Philippine citizenship and my oath of allegiance to (sic)

the Civil Registrar of Tubao La Union, and

10. I paid the amount of TEN PESOS (Ps. 10.00) as filing fees.

Since Ching has already elected Philippine citizenship on 15 July 1999, the question raised is
whether he has elected Philippine citizenship within a "reasonable time." In the affirmative,
whether his citizenship by election retroacted to the time he took the bar examination.

When Ching was born in 1964, the governing charter was the 1935 Constitution. Under Article
IV, Section 1(3) of the 1935 Constitution, the citizenship of a legitimate child born of a Filipino
mother and an alien father followed the citizenship of the father, unless, upon reaching the age
of majority, the child elected Philippine citizenship. 4 This right to elect Philippine citizenship was
recognized in the 1973 Constitution when it provided that "(t)hose who elect Philippine
citizenship pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution of nineteen hundred and thirty-five" are
citizens of the Philippines. 5 Likewise, this recognition by the 1973 Constitution was carried over
to the 1987 Constitution which states that "(t)hose born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino
mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority" are Philippine
citizens. 6 It should be noted, however, that the 1973 and 1987 Constitutional provisions on the
election of Philippine citizenship should not be understood as having a curative effect on any
irregularity in the acquisition of citizenship for those covered by the 1935 Constitution. 7 If the
citizenship of a person was subject to challenge under the old charter, it remains subject to
challenge under the new charter even if the judicial challenge had not been commenced before
the effectivity of the new Constitution. 8

C.A. No. 625 which was enacted pursuant to Section 1(3), Article IV of the 1935 Constitution,
prescribes the procedure that should be followed in order to make a valid election of Philippine
citizenship. Under Section 1 thereof, legitimate children born of Filipino mothers may elect
Philippine citizenship by expressing such intention "in a statement to be signed and sworn to by
the party concerned before any officer authorized to administer oaths, and shall be filed with the
nearest civil registry. The said party shall accompany the aforesaid statement with the oath of
allegiance to the Constitution and the Government of the Philippines."

However, the 1935 Constitution and C.A. No. 625 did not prescribe a time period within which
the election of Philippine citizenship should be made. The 1935 Charter only provides that the
election should be made "upon reaching the age of majority." The age of majority then
commenced upon reaching twenty-one (21) years. 9 In the opinions of the Secretary of Justice
on cases involving the validity of election of Philippine citizenship, this dilemma was resolved by
basing the time period on the decisions of this Court prior to the effectivity of the 1935
Constitution. In these decisions, the proper period for electing Philippine citizenship was, in turn,
based on the pronouncements of the Department of State of the United States Government to
the effect that the election should be made within a "reasonable time" after attaining the age of
majority. 10 The phrase "reasonable time" has been interpreted to mean that the election should
be made within three (3) years from reaching the age of
majority. 11 However, we held in Cuenco vs. Secretary of Justice, 12 that the three (3) year
period is not an inflexible rule. We said:

It is true that this clause has been construed to mean a reasonable period after
reaching the age of majority, and that the Secretary of Justice has ruled that
three (3) years is the reasonable time to elect Philippine citizenship under the
constitutional provision adverted to above, which period may be extended under
certain circumstances, as when the person concerned has always considered
himself a Filipino. 13

However, we cautioned in Cuenco that the extension of the option to elect Philippine citizenship
is not indefinite:

Regardless of the foregoing, petitioner was born on February 16, 1923. He

became of age on February 16, 1944. His election of citizenship was made on
May 15, 1951, when he was over twenty-eight (28) years of age, or over seven
(7) years after he had reached the age of majority. It is clear that said election
has not been made "upon reaching the age of majority." 14

In the present case, Ching, having been born on 11 April 1964, was already thirty-five (35) years
old when he complied with the requirements of C.A. No. 625 on 15 June 1999, or over fourteen
(14) years after he had reached the age of majority. Based on the interpretation of the phrase
"upon reaching the age of majority," Ching's election was clearly beyond, by any reasonable
yardstick, the allowable period within which to exercise the privilege. It should be stated, in this
connection, that the special circumstances invoked by Ching, i.e., his continuous and
uninterrupted stay in the Philippines and his being a certified public accountant, a registered
voter and a former elected public official, cannot vest in him Philippine citizenship as the law
specifically lays down the requirements for acquisition of Philippine citizenship by election.

Definitely, the so-called special circumstances cannot constitute what Ching erroneously labels
as informal election of citizenship. Ching cannot find a refuge in the case of In re: Florencio
Mallare, 15 the pertinent portion of which reads:

And even assuming arguendo that Ana Mallare were (sic) legally married to an
alien, Esteban's exercise of the right of suffrage when he came of age,
constitutes a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship. It has been
established that Esteban Mallare was a registered voter as of April 14, 1928, and
that as early as 1925 (when he was about 22 years old), Esteban was already
participating in the elections and campaigning for certain candidate[s]. These
acts are sufficient to show his preference for Philippine citizenship. 16

Ching's reliance on Mallare is misplaced. The facts and circumstances obtaining therein are
very different from those in the present case, thus, negating its applicability. First,
EstebanMallare was born before the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution and the enactment of
C.A. No. 625. Hence, the requirements and procedures prescribed under the 1935 Constitution
and C.A. No. 625 for electing Philippine citizenship would not be applicable to him. Second, the
ruling in Mallare was an obiter since, as correctly pointed out by the OSG, it was not necessary
for Esteban Mallare to elect Philippine citizenship because he was already a Filipino, he being a
natural child of a Filipino mother. In this regard, the Court stated:
 Esteban Mallare, natural child of Ana Mallare, a Filipina, is therefore himself a
Filipino, and no other act would be necessary to confer on him all the rights and
privileges attached to Philippine citizenship (U.S. vs. Ong Tianse, 29 Phil. 332;
Santos Co vs. Government of the Philippine Islands, 42 Phil. 543, Serra vs.
Republic, L-4223, May 12, 1952, Sy Quimsuan vs. Republic, L-4693, Feb. 16,
1953; Pitallano vs. Republic, L-5111, June 28, 1954). Neither could any act be
taken on the erroneous belief that he is a non-filipino divest him of the citizenship
privileges to which he is rightfully entitled. 17

The ruling in Mallare was reiterated and further elaborated in Co vs. Electoral Tribunal of the
House of Representatives, 18 where we held:

We have jurisprudence that defines "election" as both a formal and an informal

process.

In the case of In re: Florencio Mallare (59 SCRA 45 [1974]), the Court held that
the exercise of the right of suffrage and the participation in election exercises
constitute a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship. In the exact
pronouncement of the Court, we held:

Esteban's exercise of the right of suffrage when he came of age

constitutes a positive act of Philippine citizenship. (p. 52:
emphasis supplied)

The private respondent did more than merely exercise his right of suffrage. He has established
his life here in the Philippines.

For those in the peculiar situation of the respondent who cannot be excepted to
have elected Philippine citizenship as they were already citizens, we apply the In
Re Mallare rule.

xxx xxx xxx

The filing of sworn statement or formal declaration is a requirement for those who
still have to elect citizenship. For those already Filipinos when the time to elect
came up, there are acts of deliberate choice which cannot be less binding.
Entering a profession open only to Filipinos, serving in public office where
citizenship is a qualification, voting during election time, running for public office,
and other categorical acts of similar nature are themselves formal manifestations
for these persons.

An election of Philippine citizenship presupposes that the person electing is an

alien. Or his status is doubtful because he is a national of two countries. There is
no doubt in this case about Mr. Ong's being a Filipino when he turned twenty-one
(21).

We repeat that any election of Philippine citizenship on the part of the private
respondent would not only have been superfluous but it would also have resulted
in an absurdity. How can a Filipino citizen elect Philippine citizenship? 19
The Court, like the OSG, is sympathetic with the plight of Ching. However, even if we consider
the special circumstances in the life of Ching like his having lived in the Philippines all his life
and his consistent belief that he is a Filipino, controlling statutes and jurisprudence constrain us
to disagree with the recommendation of the OSG. Consequently, we hold that Ching failed to
validly elect Philippine citizenship. The span of fourteen (14) years that lapsed from the time he
reached the age of majority until he finally expressed his intention to elect Philippine citizenship
is clearly way beyond the contemplation of the requirement of electing "upon reaching the age
of majority." Moreover, Ching has offered no reason why he delayed his election of Philippine
citizenship. The prescribed procedure in electing Philippine citizenship is certainly not a tedious
and painstaking process. All that is required of the elector is to execute an affidavit of election of
Philippine citizenship and, thereafter, file the same with the nearest civil registry. Ching's
unreasonable and unexplained delay in making his election cannot be simply glossed over.

Philippine citizenship can never be treated like a commodity that can be claimed when needed
and suppressed when convenient. 20 One who is privileged to elect Philippine citizenship has
only an inchoate right to such citizenship. As such, he should avail of the right with fervor,
enthusiasm and promptitude. Sadly, in this case, Ching slept on his opportunity to elect
Philippine citizenship and, as a result. this golden privilege slipped away from his grasp.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court Resolves to DENY Vicente D. Ching's application for
admission to the Philippine Bar.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Purisima,
Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 Citing Cu vs. Republic of the Philippines, 89 Phil. 473, 476 (1951).

2 Citing CRUZ, Constitutional Law, 1991 Ed., p. 359.

3 Citing Cuenco. vs. Secretary of Justice, 5 SCRA 108, 110 (1962).

4 Sec. 1, Art. IV of the 1935 Constitution reads:

Sec. 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:

(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands

at the time of the adoption of the Constitution;

(2) Those born in the Philippine Islands of foreign

parents who, before the adoption of this
Constitution, had been elected to public office;

(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the

Philippines;
 (4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the
Philippines, and, upon reaching the age of majority,
elect Philippine citizenship;

(5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.

Legal Profession – Admission to the Bar – Citizenship Requirement

In 1998, Vicente Ching finished his law degree at the Saint Louis University in Baguio City. He
eventually passed the bar but he was advised that he needs to show proof that he is a Filipino
citizen before he be allowed to take his oath. Apparently, Ching‘s father was a Chinese citizen
but his mother was a Filipino citizen. His parents were married before he was born in 1963.
Under the 1935 Constitution, a legitimate child, whose one parent is a foreigner, acquires the
foreign citizenship of the foreign parent. Ching maintained that he has always considered
himself as a Filipino; that he is a certified public accountant – a profession reserved for Filipinos;
that he even served as a councilor in a municipality in La Union.
The Solicitor-General commented on the case by saying that as a legitimate child of a Chinese
and a Filipino, Ching should have elected Filipino citizenship upon reaching the age of majority;
that under prevailing jurisprudence, ―upon reaching the age of majority‖ is construed as within 7
years after reaching the age of majority (in his case 21 years old because he was born in 1964
while the 1935 Constitution was in place).
Ching did elect Filipino citizenship but he only did so when he was preparing for the bar in 1998
or 14 years after reaching the age of majority. Nevertheless, the Solicitor-General
recommended that the rule be relaxed due to the special circumstance of Ching.
ISSUE: Whether or not Ching should be allowed to take the lawyer‘s oath.
HELD: No. Unfortunately, he belatedly elected Filipino citizenship. The Supreme Court cannot
agree with the recommendation of the Solicitor-General. Fourteen years had lapsed and it‘s way
beyond the allowable 7 year period. The Supreme Court even noted that the period is originally
3 years but it was extended to 7 years. (It seems it can‘t be extended any further). Ching‘s
special circumstances can‘t be considered. It is not enough that he considered all his life that he
is a Filipino; that he is a professional and a public officer (was) serving this country. The rules
for citizenship are in place. Further, Ching didn‘t give any explanation why he belatedly chose to
elect Filipino citizenship (but I guess it‘s simply because he never thought he‘s Chinese not until
he applied to take the bar). The prescribed procedure in electing Philippine citizenship is
certainly not a tedious and painstaking process. All that is required of the elector is to execute
an affidavit of election of Philippine citizenship and, thereafter, file the same with the nearest
civil registry. Ching‘s unreasonable and unexplained delay in making his election cannot be
simply glossed over.
Mercado v. Manzano Case Digest [G.R. No. 135083. May 26, 1999]
FACTS:

Petitioner Ernesto Mercado and Eduardo Manzano were both candidates for Vice-Mayor of
Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections.

Based on the results of the election, Manzano garnered the highest number of votes. However,
his proclamation was suspended due to the pending petition for disqualification filed by Ernesto
Mercado on the ground that he was not a citizen of the Philippines but of the United States.

From the facts presented, it appears that Manzano is both a Filipino and a US citizen.
The Commission on Elections declared Manzano disqualified as candidate for said elective
position.

However, in a subsequent resolution of the COMELEC en banc, the disqualification of the

respondent was reversed. Respondent was held to have renounced his US citizenship when he
attained the age of majority and registered himself as a voter in the elections of 1992, 1995 and
1998.

Manzano was eventually proclaimed as the Vice-Mayor of Makati City on August 31, 1998.

Thus the present petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a dual citizen is disqualified to hold public elective office in the philippines.

RULING:

The court ruled that the phrase "dual citizenship" in R.A. 7160 Sec. 40 (d) and R.A. 7854 Sec.
20 must be understood as referring to dual allegiance. Dual citizenship is different from dual
allegiance. The former arises when, as a result of the application of the different laws of two or
more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the said states. Dual
allegiance on the other hand, refers to a situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by
some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual
allegiance is a result of an individual's volition. Article IV Sec. 5 of the Constitution provides
"Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law."

Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification. Unlike
those with dual allegiance, who must, therefore, be subject to strict process with respect to the
termination of their status, for candidates with dual citizenship, it should suffice if, upon the filing
of their certificates of candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate their status as
persons with dual citizenship considering that their condition is the unavoidable consequence of
conflicting laws of different states.

By electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at the same time forswear allegiance to the
other country of which they are also citizens and thereby terminate their status as dual citizens.
It may be that, from the point of view of the foreign state and of its laws, such an individual has
not effectively renounced his foreign citizenship. That is of no moment.

When a person applying for citizenship by naturalization takes an oath that he renounces his
loyalty to any other country or government and solemnly declares that he owes his allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippines, the condition imposed by law is satisfied and complied with.
The determination whether such renunciation is valid or fully complies with the provisions of our
Naturalization Law lies within the province and is an exclusive prerogative of our courts. The
latter should apply the law duly enacted by the legislative department of the Republic. No
foreign law may or should interfere with its operation and application.

The court ruled that the filing of certificate of candidacy of respondent sufficed to renounce his
American citizenship, effectively removing any disqualification he might have as a dual citizen.
By declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen; that he is not a permanent
resident or immigrant of another country; that he will defend and support the Constitution of the
Philippines and bear true faith and allegiance thereto and that he does so without mental
reservation, private respondent has, as far as the laws of this country are concerned, effectively
repudiated his American citizenship and anything which he may have said before as a dual
citizen.

On the other hand, private respondent‘s oath of allegiance to the Philippines, when considered
with the fact that he has spent his youth and adulthood, received his education, practiced his
profession as an artist, and taken part in past elections in this country, leaves no doubt of his
election of Philippine citizenship.

His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will fulfill his undertaking made under oath.
Should he betray that trust, there are enough sanctions for declaring the loss of his Philippine
citizenship through expatriation in appropriate proceedings. In Yu v. Defensor-Santiago, the
court sustained the denial of entry into the country of petitioner on the ground that, after taking
his oath as a naturalized citizen, he applied for the renewal of his Portuguese passport and
declared in commercial documents executed abroad that he was a Portuguese national. A
similar sanction can be taken against any one who, in electing Philippine citizenship, renounces
his foreign nationality, but subsequently does some act constituting renunciation of his
Philippine citizenship.

The petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

MERCADO VS MANZANO
Posted by kaye lee on 5:15 PM

G.R. No. 135083, 26 May 1999 [Dual Citizenship; Dual Allegiance]

FACTS:
Petition for disqualification was filed against Edu Manzano to hold elective office on the ground
that he is both an American citizen and a Filipino citizen, having been born in the United States
of Filipino parents. COMELEC granted the petition and disqualified Manzano for being a dual
citizen pursuant to the Local Government Code RA 7160, that those with dual citizenship are
disqualified from running any public position.

ISSUE:
Whether or not dual citizenship is a ground for disqualification to hold or run office in the local
position.

RULING:
No. Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. What is inimical is not dual citizenship per
se, but with naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their countries of origin even
after their naturalization. Hence, the phrase ―dual citizenship‖ in RA 7160 must be understood
as referring to ―dual allegiance‖. Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall
under this disqualification.
Facts:

– Petitioner Ernesto Mercado and respondent Eduardo Manzano were candidates for vice-mayor in
Makati City in the May 11, 1998

– Manzano got the most number of votes but his proclamation was suspended in view of the pending
petition for disqualification filed by a certain Ernesto Mamaril who alleged that private respondent was not a
citizen of the PH but of the US

– On May 7 1998, COMELEC Second Division ordered the cancellation of the CoC of the respondent
on the ground that he is a dual citizen and, under Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code, persons with
dual citizenship are disqualified from running for any elective position

– Manzano was born to his Filipino parents in San Francisco California on September 14, 1955 and is
considered an American citizen under US laws

– 31August: COMELEC en banc reversed decision of the Second Division and declared Manzano
qualified to run for vice-mayor stating that Manzano is also a Filipino citizen by operation of the 1935
constitution and he has effectively renounced his US citizenship when he registered himself as a voter and
voted in the elections of 1992, 1995 and 1998

– In view of this, Manzano was proclaimed as vice-mayor of Makati

– Ernesto Mercado who ranked next to Manzano in the elections filed this petition

Issue/s:

1. Whether petitioner Mercado has personality to bring this suit

2. Whether respondent Manzano possesses dual citizenship and, if so, whether he is disqualified from
being a candidate for vice mayor of Makati City

Ruling: Petition DISMISSED.

Ratio:

1. 1. YES
– Failure of COMELEC en banc to address the petitioner‘s Motion to Intervene justifies petitioner to file this
case

1. 2. DUAL CITIZENSHIP VS DUAL ALLEGIANCE

– DUAL CITIZENSHIP: arises when, as a result of the concurrent application of the different laws of two
or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the said states

– DUAL ALLEGIANCE: person owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states; result of an
individual‘s own volition

– Section 5 Art 4 of the Constitution concerns naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their
country of origin

– Disqualification based on ―dual citizenship‖ contemplates dual allegiance

– For candidates with dual citizenship, it would be suffice if they elect Philippine citizenship upon filing
their CoC to terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship

US vs. Rodrigo (Consti1)

En Banc

Cruz, February 26,1990

Topic: Sovereignty - Suits not against the state - Failure to raise immunity as defense

Facts:
 In the 4 consolidated suits, the USA moves to dismiss the cases on the ground that they
are in effect suits against it which it has not consented
On the first suit:
 On February 24, 1986, the Western Pacific Contracting Office, Okinawa Area Exchange,
US Air Force, solicited bids for barber services contracts through its contracting officer James F.
Shaw
 Among those who submitted their bids were private respondents Roberto T. Valencia,
Emerenciana C. Tanglao, and Pablo C. del Pilar
 Bidding was won by Ramon Dizon over the objection of the private respondents who
claimed that he had made a bid for 4 facilities, including the Civil Engineering Area which was
not included in the invitation to bid
 The Philippine Area Exchange (PHAX), through its representatives petitioners Yvonne
Reeves and Frederic M. Smouse, upon the private respondents' complaint, explained that the
Civil Engineering concession had not been awarded to Dizon
 But Dizon was alreayd operating this concession, then known as the NCO club
concession
 On June 30, 1986, the private respondents filed a complaint in the court below to compel
PHAX and the individual petitioners to cancel the award to Dizon, to conduct a rebidding for the
barbershop concessions and to allow the private respondents by a writ of preliminary injunction
to continue operating the concessions pending litigation
 Respondent court directed the individual petitioners to maintain the status quo
 On July 22, 1986, the petitioners filed a motion to dismiss and opposition to the petition
for preliminary injunction on the ground that the action was in effect a suit against USA which
had not waived its non-suability
 On July 22, 1986, trial court denied the application for a writ of preliminary injunction
 On Oct. 10, 1988, trial court denied the petitioners' motion to dismiss
On the second suit:
 Fabian Genove filed a complaint for damages against petitioners Anthony Lamachia,
Wilfredo Belsa, Rose Cartalla and Peter Orascion for his dismissal as cook in the US Air Force
Recreation Center at the John Hay Air Station in Baguio City
 It had been ascertained that Genove had poured urine into the soup stock used in
cooking the vegetables served to the club customers
 His dismissal was effected on March 5, 1986 by Col. David C. Kimball, Commander of
the 3rd Combat Support Group, PACAF Clark Air Force Base
 Genove filed a complaint in the RTC of Baguio
 The defendants, joined by the United States of America, moved to dismiss the
complaint, alleging that Lamachia (the manager) as an officer of the US Air Force was immune
from suit for the acts done by him in his official capacity; they argued that the suit was in effect
against USA, which had not given its consent to be sued
 Motion was denied by respondent judge: although acting intially in their official
capacities, the defendants went beyond what their functions called for; this brought them out of
the protective mantle of whatever immunities they may have had in the beginning

On the third suit:

 Luis Bautisa, who was employed as a barracks boy in Camp O'Donnell, an extension of
Clark Air Base, was arrested following a buy-bust operation conducted by the individual
petitioners Tomi J. King, Darrel D. Dye and Stephen F. Bostick, officers of the US Air Force and
special agents of the Air Force of Special Investigators (AFOSI)
 Bautista was dismissed from his employment as a result of the filing of the charge
 He then filed a complaint for damages against the individual petitioners, claiming that it
was because of their acts that he was removed
 Defendants alleged that they had only done their duty in the enforcement of laws of the
Philippines inside the American bases, pursuant to the RP-US Military Bases Agreement
 The counsel for the defense invoked that the defendants were acting in their official
capacity; that the complaint was in effect a suit against the US without its consent
 Motion was denied by respondent judge: immunity under the Military Bases Agreement
covered only criminal and not civil cases; moreover, the defendants had come under the
jurisdiction of the court when they submitted their answer

On the fourth suit:

 Complaint for damages was filed by private respondents against the petitioners (except
USA)
 According to the plaintiffs, the defendants beat them up, handcuffed the, and unleashed
dogs on them
 Defendants deny this and claim that the plaintiffs were arrested for theft and were bitten
by dogs because they were struggling and resisting arrest
 USA and the defendants argued that the suit was in effect a suit against the United
States which had not given its consent to be sued; that they were also immune from suit under
the RP-US Bases Treaty for acts done by them in the performance of their official functions
 Motion to dismiss was denied by the trial court: the acts cannot be considered Acts of
State, if they were ever admitted by the defendants
Issue:
 Whether or not the suits above are in effect suits against United States of America
without its consent
 In relation, whether or not the defendants are also immune from suit for acting within
their official functions.
Holding and Ratio:
 1st suit: No. The barbershops concessions are commercial enterprises operated by
private persons. They are not agencies of the US Armed forces. Petitioners cannot plead
immunity. Case should be remanded to the lower court.
 2nd suit: No. The petitioners cannot invoke the doctrine of state immunity. The
restaurants are commercial enterprises. By entering into the employment contract with Genove,
it impliedly divested itself of its sovereign immunity from suit. (However, the petitioners are only
suable, not liable.)
 3rd suit: Yes. It is clear that the petitioners were acting in the exercise of their official
functions. For discharging their duties as agents of the US, they cannot be directly impleaded
for acts attributable to their principal, which has not given its consent to be sued.
 4th suit: The contradictory factual allegations deserve a closer study. Inquiry must first
be made by the lower court. Only after can it be known in what capacity the petitioners were
acting at the time of the incident.

 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1
 US VS GUINTO
 February 26, 1990
 FACTS:
 These cases are consolidated because they all involve the doctrine of state immunity.
 1)

 US VS GUINTO (GR No. 76607)
 The private respondents are suing several officers of the US Air Force in Clark Air Base
inconnection with the bidding conducted by them for contracts for barber services in
the said base whichwas won by a certain Dizon. The respondents wanted to cancel the
award to the bid winner becausethey claimed that Dizon had included in his bid an area
not included in the invitation to bid, andsubsequently, to conduct a rebidding.
 2} US VS RODRIGO (GR No 79470)
 Genove, employed as a cook in the Main Club at John Hay Station, was dismissed after
it hadbeen ascertained in an investigation that he poured urine in the soup
 stock. Genove filed a complaintfor damages against the club manager who was also an
officer of USAF.
 2)

 US VS CEBALLOS (GR No 80018)
 L
 uis Bautista, a barracks boy in Camp ODonnel, was arrested following a buy-bust
operationconducted by petitioners who were USAF officers and special agents of the Air
Force Office. A trialensued where petitioners testified against respondent Bautista. As a
result of the charge, Bautista wasdismissed from his employment. He then filed for
damages against petitioners claiming that because of the latters acts, he was removed
from his job.
 3
 )

 US VS ALARCON VERGARA (GR No 80258)
 Complaint for damages was filed by private respondents against individual petitioners
forinjuries allegedly sustained by handcuffing and unleashing dogs on them by the
latter. The individualpetitioners, US military officers, deny this stressing that the private
respondents were arrested fortheft but resisted arrest, thus incurring the injuries.In all
these cases, the individual petitioners claimed they were just exercising their
officialfunctions. The USA was not impleaded in the complaints but has moved to dismiss on the ground
thatthey are in effect suits against it to which it has not consented.
 ISSUE:
 Is
 the doctrine of state immunity applicable in the cases at bar?

 H
 ELD:
 A state may not be sued without its consent. This doctrine is not absolute and does not
say thestate may not be sued under any circumstance. The rule says that the state may
not be sued withoutits consent, which clearly imports that it may be sued if it
consents.The consent of the state to be sued may be manifested expressly or
impliedly. Express consentmay be embodied in a general law or a special law. Consent
is implied when the sate enters into acontract or it itself commences litigation. When the
government enters into a contract, it is deemed tohave descended to the level of the
other contracting party and divested itself of its sovereign immunityfrom suit with its
implied consent. Waiver is also implied when the government files a complaint,
thusopening itself to a counterclaim.The USA, like any other state, will be deemed to
have impliedly waived its non-suability if it hasentered into a contract in its proprietary or
private capacity
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
 SECOND DIVISION

 G.R. No. 108813 December 15, 1994
 JUSMAG PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
 THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (Second Division) and
FLORENCIO SACRAMENTO, Union President, JPFCEA, respondents.
 Juan, Luces, Luna and Associates for petitioner.
 Galutera & Aguilar Law Offices for private respondent.

 PUNO, J.:
 The immunity from suit of the Joint United States Military Assistance Group to the
Republic of the Philippines (JUSMAG-Philippines) is the pivotal issue in the case at
bench.
 JUSMAG assails the January 29, 1993 Resolution of the NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION (public respondent), in NLRC NCR CASE NO. 00-03-
02092-92, reversing the July 30, 1991 Order of the Labor Arbiter, and ordering the latter
to assume jurisdiction over the complaint for illegal dismissal filed by FLORENCIO
SACRAMENTO (private respondent) against petitioner.
 First, the undisputed facts.
 Private respondent was one of the seventy-four (74) security assistance support
personnel (SASP) working at JUSMAG-Philippines. 1 He had been with JUSMAG from
December 18, 1969, until his dismissal on April 27, 1992. When dismissed, he held the
position of Illustrator 2 and was the incumbent President of JUSMAG PHILIPPINES-
FILIPINO CIVILIAN EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (JPFCEA), a labor organization duly
registered with the Department of Labor and Employment. His services were terminated
allegedly due to the abolition of his position. 2 He was also advised that he was under
administrative leave until April 27, 1992, although the same was not charged against his
leave.
 On March 31, 1992, private respondent filed a complaint with the Department of Labor
and Employment on the ground that he was illegally suspended and dismissed from
service by JUSMAG. 3 He asked for his reinstatement.
 JUSMAG then filed a Motion to Dismiss invoking its immunity from suit as an agency of
the United States. It further alleged lack of employer-employee relationship and that it
has no juridical personality to sue and be sued.4
 In an Order dated July 30, 1991, Labor Arbiter Daniel C. Cueto dismissed the subject
complaint " for want of jurisdiction." 5 Private respondent appealed 6 to the National Labor
Relations Commission (public respondent), assailing the ruling that petitioner is immune
from suit for alleged violation of our labor laws. JUSMAG filed its Opposition, 7 reiterating
its immunity from suit for its non-contractual, governmental and/or public acts.
 In a Resolution, dated January 29, 1993, the NLRC 8 reversed the ruling of the Labor
Arbiter as it held that petitioner had lost its right not to be sued. The resolution was
predicated on two grounds: (1) the principle of estoppel — that JUSMAG failed to refute
the existence of employer-employee relationship under the "control test"; and (2)
JUSMAG has waived its right to immunity from suit when it hired the services of private
respondent on December 18, 1969.
 The NLRC relied on the case of Harry Lyons vs. United States of America, 9 where the
"United States Government (was considered to have) waived its immunity from suit by
entering into (a) contract of stevedoring services, and thus, it submitted itself to the
jurisdiction of the local courts."
 Accordingly, the case was remanded to the labor arbiter for reception of evidence as to
the issue on illegal dismissal.
 Hence, this petition, JUSMAG contends:
 I
 THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK AND/OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION —
 A. IN REVERSING THE DECISION OF THE LABOR ARBITER AND IN NOT
AFFIRMING THE DISMISSAL OF THE COMPLAINT IT BEING A SUIT AGAINST THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA WHICH HAD NOT GIVEN ITS CONSENT TO BE
SUED; AND
 B. IN FINDING WAIVER BY JUSMAG OF IMMUNITY FROM SUIT;
 II
 THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK AND/OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION —
 A. WHEN IT FOUND AN EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
JUSMAG AND PRIVATE RESPONDENT; AND
 B. WHEN IT CONSIDERED JUSMAG ESTOPPED FROM DENYING THAT PRIVATE
RESPONDENT IS ITS EMPLOYEE FOR FAILURE TO PRESENT PROOF TO THE
CONTRARY.
 We find the petition impressed with merit.
 It is meet to discuss the historical background of the JUSMAG to determine its immunity
from suit.
 JUSMAG was created pursuant to the Military Assistance Agreement 10 dated March 21,
1947, between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Government
of the United States of America. As agreed upon, JUSMAG shall consist of Air, Naval
and Army group, and its primary task was to advise and assist the Philippines, on air
force, army and naval matters. 11
 Article 14 of the 1947 Agreement provides, inter alia, that "the cost of all services
required by the Group, including compensation of locally employed interpreters, clerks,
laborers, and other personnel, except personal servants, shall be borne by the Republic
of the Philippines."
 This set-up was to change in 1991. In Note No 22, addressed to the Department of
Foreign Affairs (DFA) of the Philippines, dated January 23, 1991, the United States
Government, thru its Embassy, manifested its preparedness "to provide funds to cover
the salaries of security assistance support personnel" and security guards, the rent of
JUSMAG occupied buildings and housing, and the cost of utilities. 12 This offer was
accepted by our Government, thru the DFA, in Note No. 911725, dated April 18, 1991. 13
 Consequently, a Memorandum of Agreement 14 was forged between the Armed Forces
of the Philippines and JUSMAG-Philippines, thru General Lisandro C. Abadia and U.S.
Brigadier General Robert G. Sausser. The Agreement delineated the terms of the
assistance-in-kind of JUSMAG for 1991, the relevant parts of which read:
 a. The term salaries as used in this agreement include those for the security guards
currently contracted between JUSMAG and A' Prime Security Services Inc., and
the Security Assistance Support Personnel (SASP). . . . .
 b. The term Security Assistance Support Personnel (SASP) does not include active duty
uniformed members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines performing duty at JUSMAG.
 c. It is understood that SASP are employees of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP). Therefore, the AFP agrees to appoint, for service with JUSMAG, no
more than 74 personnel to designated positions with JUSMAG.
 d. SASP are under the total operational control of the Chief, JUSMAG-Philippines. The
term "Operational Control" includes, but is not limited to, all personnel administrative
actions, such as: hiring recommendations; firing recommendations; position
classification; discipline; nomination and approval of incentive awards; and payroll
computation. Personnel administration will be guided by Annex E of JUSMAG-
Philippines Memo 10-2. For the period of time that there is an exceptional funding
agreement between the government of the Philippines and the United States
Government (USG), JUSMAG will pay the total payroll costs for the SASP employees.
 Payroll costs include only regular salary; approved overtime, costs of living allowance;
medical insurance; regular contributions to the Philippine Social Security System, PAG-
IBIG Fund and Personnel Economic Relief Allowance (PERA); and the thirteenth-month
bonus. Payroll costs do not include gifts or other bonus payments in addition to those
previously defined above. Entitlements not considered payroll costs under this
agreement will be funded and paid by the AFP.
 e. All SASP employed as of July 1, 1990 will continue their service with JUSMAG at their
current rate of pay and benefits up to 30 June 1991, with an annual renewal of
employment thereafter subject to renewal of their appointment with the AFP (employees
and rates of pay are indicated at Enclosure 3). No promotion or transfer internal to
JUSMAG of the listed personnel will result in the reduction of their pay and benefits.
 f. All SASP will, after proper classification, be paid salaries and benefits at established
AFP civilian rates. Rules for computation of pay and allowances will be made available
to the Comptroller, JUSMAG, by the Comptroller, GHQ, AFP. Additionally, any legally
mandated changes in salary levels or methods of computation shall be transmitted within
48 hours of receipt by Comptroller, GHQ to Comptroller, JUSMAG.
 g. The AFP agrees not to terminate SASP without 60 days prior written notice to Chief,
JUSMAG-Philippines. Any termination of these personnel thought to be necessary
because of budgetary restrictions or manpower ceiling will be subject to consultations
between AFP and JUSMAG to ensure that JUSMAG's mission of dedicated support to
the AFP will not be degraded or harmed in any way.
 h. The AFP agrees to assume the severance pay/retirement pay liability for all appointed
SASP. (Enclosure 3 lists the severance pay liability date for current SASP). Any
termination of services, other than voluntary resignations or termination for cause, will
result in immediate payments of AFP of all termination pay to the entitled employee.
Vouchers for severance/retirement pay and accrued bonuses and annual leave will be
presented to the Comptroller, GHQ, AFP, not later than 14 calendar days prior to
required date of payment.
 i. All SASP listed in Enclosure 3 will continue to participate in the Philippine Social
Security System.
 A year later, or in 1992, the United States Embassy sent another note of similar import to
the Department of Foreign Affairs (No. 227, dated April 8, 1992), extending the funding
agreement for the salaries of SASP and security guards until December 31, 1992.
 From the foregoing, it is apparent that when JUSMAG took the services of private
respondent, it was performing a governmental function on behalf of the United States
pursuant to the Military Assistance Agreement dated March 21, 1947. Hence, we agree
with petitioner that the suit is, in effect, one against the United States Government, albeit
it was not impleaded in the complaint. Considering that the United States has not waived
or consented to the suit, the complaint against JUSMAG cannot not prosper.
 In this jurisdiction, we recognize and adopt the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of the land. 15 Immunity of State from suit is one of
these universally recognized principles. In international law, "immunity" is commonly
understood as an exemption of the state and its organs from the judicial jurisdiction of
another state. 16 This is anchored on the principle of the sovereign equality of states
under which one state cannot assert jurisdiction over another in violation of the
maxim par in parem non habet imperium (an equal has no power over an equal).17
 Under the traditional rule of State immunity, a state cannot be sued in the courts of
another State, without its consent or waiver. However, in Santos, et al., vs. Santos, et
al., 18 we recognized an exception to the doctrine of immunity from suit by a state, thus:
 . . . . Nevertheless, if, where and when the state or its government enters into a contract,
through its officers or agents, in furtherance of a legitimate aim and purpose and
 pursuant to constitutional legislative authority, whereby mutual or reciprocal benefits
accrue and rights and obligations arise therefrom, and if the law granting the authority to
enter into such contract does not provide for or name the officer against whom action
may be brought in the event of a breach thereof, the state itself may be sued, even
without its consent, because by entering into a contract, the sovereign state has
descended to the level of the citizen and its consent to be sued is implied from the very
act of entering into such contract. . . . . (emphasis ours)
 It was in this light that the state immunity issue in Harry Lyons, Inc., vs. United States of
America 19 was decided.
 In the case of Harry Lyons, Inc., the petitioner entered into a contract with the United
States Government for stevedoring services at the U.S. Naval Base, Subic Bay,
Philippines. It then sought to collect from the US government sums of money arising
from the contract. One of the issues posed in the case was whether or not the defunct
Court of First Instance had jurisdiction over the defendant United States, a sovereign
state which cannot be sued without its consent. This Court upheld the contention of
Harry Lyons, Inc., that "when a sovereign state enters into a contract with a private
person, the state can be sued upon the theory that it has descended to the level of an
individual from which it can be implied that it has given its consent to be sued under the
contract."
 The doctrine of state immunity from suit has undergone further metamorphosis. The
view evolved that the existence of a contract does not, per se, mean that sovereign
states may, at all times, be sued in local courts. The complexity of relationships between
sovereign states, brought about by their increasing commercial activities, mothered a
more restrictive application of the doctrine. 20 Thus, in United States of America vs.
Ruiz, 21 we clarified that our pronouncement in Harry Lyons, supra, with respect to the
waiver of State immunity, was obiter and "has no value as an imperative authority."
 As it stands now, the application of the doctrine of immunity from suit has
been restricted to sovereign orgovernmental activities ( jure imperii). 22 The mantle of
state immunity cannot be extended to commercial, private and proprietary acts ( jure
gestionis). As aptly stated by this Court (En banc) in US vs. Ruiz, supra:
 The restrictive application of State immunity is proper when the proceedings arise out of
commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or economic
affairs. Stated differently, a State may be said to have descended to the level of an
individual and thus can be deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be
used only when it enters into business contracts. It does not apply where the contract
relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions. (emphasis ours)
 We held further, that the application of the doctrine of state immunity depends on
the legal nature of the act. Ergo, since a governmental function was involved — the
transaction dealt with the improvement of the wharves in the naval installation at Subic
Bay — it was held that the United States was not deemed to have waived its immunity
from suit.
 Then came the case of United States vs. Hon. Rodrigo, et al. 23 In said case, Genove
was employed as a cook in the Main Club located at U.S. Air Force Recreation Center,
John Hay Air Station. He was dismissed from service after he was found to have
polluted the stock of soup with urine. Genove countered with a complaint for damages.
Apparently, the restaurant services offered at the John Hay Air Station partake of the
nature of a business enterprise undertaken by the United States government in
its proprietary capacity. The Court then noted that the restaurant is well known and
available to the general public, thus, the services are operated for profit, as a
commercial and not a governmental activity. Speaking through Associate Justice Isagani
Cruz, the Court (En Banc) said:
 The consequence of this finding is that the petitioners cannot invoke the doctrine of state
immunity to justify the dismissal of the damage suit against them by Genove. Such
defense will not prosper even if it be established that they were acting as agents of the
United States when they investigated and later dismissed Genove. For the matter, not
even the United States government itself can claim such immunity. The reason is that by
entering into the employment contract with Genove in the discharge of its proprietary
functions, it impliedly divested itself of its sovereign immunity from suit. (emphasis ours)
 Conversely, if the contract was entered into in the discharge of its governmental
functions, the sovereign state cannot be deemed to have waived its immunity from
suit. 24 Such is the case at bench. Prescinding from this premise, we need not determine
whether JUSMAG controls the employment conditions of the private respondent.
 We also hold that there appears to be no basis for public respondent to rule that
JUSMAG is stopped from denying the existence of employer-employee relationship with
private respondent. On the contrary, in its Opposition before the public respondent,
JUSMAG consistently contended that the (74) SASP, including private respondent,
working in JUSMAG, are employees of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. This can be
gleaned from: (1) the Military Assistance Agreement, supra, (2) the exchange of notes
between our Government, thru Department of Foreign Affairs, and the United States,
thru the US Embassy to the Philippines, and (3) the Agreement on May 21,
1991, supra between the Armed Forces of the Philippines and JUSMAG.
 We symphatize with the plight of private respondent who had served JUSMAG for more
than twenty (20) years. Considering his length of service with JUSMAG, he deserves a
more compassionate treatment. Unfortunately, JUSMAG is beyond the jurisdiction of this
Court. Nonetheless, the Executive branch, through the Department of Foreign Affairs
and the Armed Forces of the Philippines, can take the cudgel for private respondent and
the other SASP working for JUSMAG, pursuant to the aforestated Military Assistance
Agreement.
 IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition for certiorari is GRANTED. Accordingly, the
impugned Resolution dated January 29, 1993 of the National Labor Relations
Commission is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. No costs.
 SO ORDERED.
 Narvasa, C.J., Regalado and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
 FROILAN VS PAN ORIENTAL SHIPPING
 G.R. No. L-6060 September 30, 1954
 FERNANDO A. FROILAN, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
PAN ORIENTAL SHIPPING CO., defendant-appellant,
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, intervenor-appellee.


 Facts:
 Plaintiff, Fernando Froilan filed a complaint against the defendant-appellant, Pan
Oriental Shipping Co., alleging that he purchased from the Shipping Commission the
vessel for P200,000, paying P50,000 down and agreeing to pay the balance in
instalments. To secure the payment of the balance of the purchase price, he executed a
chattel mortgage of said vessel in favor of the Shipping Commission. For various
reasons, among them the non-payment of the installments, the Shipping Commission
 tool possession of said vessel and considered the contract of sale cancelled. The
Shipping Commission chartered and delivered said vessel to the defendant-appellant
Pan Oriental Shipping Co. subject to the approval of the President of the Philippines.
Plaintiff appealed the action of the Shipping Commission to the President of the
Philippines and, in its meeting the Cabinet restored him to all his rights under his original
contract with the Shipping Commission. Plaintiff had repeatedly demanded from the Pan
Oriental Shipping Co. the possession of the vessel in question but the latter refused to
do so.


 Plaintiff, prayed that, upon the approval of the bond accompanying his complaint, a writ
of replevin be issued for the seizure of said vessel with all its equipment and
appurtenances, and that after hearing, he be adjudged to have the rightful possession
thereof . The lower court issued the writ of replevin prayed for by Froilan and by virtue
thereof the Pan Oriental Shipping Co. was divested of its possession of said vessel.


 Pan Oriental protested to this restoration of Plaintiff ‗s rights under the contract of sale,
for the reason that when the vessel was delivered to it, the Shipping Administration had
authority to dispose of said authority to the property, Plaintiff having already relinquished
whatever rights he may have thereon. Plaintiff paid the required cash of P10,000.00 and
as Pan Oriental refused to surrender possession of the vessel, he filed an action to
recover possession thereof and have him declared the rightful owner of said property.
The Republic of the Philippines was allowed to intervene in said civil case praying for the
possession of the in order that the chattel mortgage constituted thereon may be
foreclosed.


 Issues:
 Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the intervenor with regard to the
counterclaim.


 Discussions:
 When the government enters into a contract, for the State is then deem to have divested
itself of the mantle of sovereign immunity and descended to the level of the ordinary
individual. Having done so, it becomes subject to judicial action and processes.


 Rulings:
 Yes. The Supreme Court held that the government impliedly allowed itself to be sued
when it filed a complaint in intervention for the purpose of asserting claim for affirmative
 relief against the plaintiff to the recovery of the vessel. The immunity of the state from
suits does not deprive it of the right to sue private parties in its own courts. The state as
plaintiff may avail itself of the different forms of actions open to private litigants. In short,
by taking the initiative in an action against a private party, the state surrenders its
privileged position and comes down to the level of the defendant. The latter
automatically acquires, within certain limits, the right to set up whatever claims and other
defenses he might have against the state.

30. FROILAN V. ORIENTAL PAN SHIPPING, SEPTEMBER 30, 1950

Facts: Fernando A. Froilan purchased the vessel FS-197 from the Shipping Commission for
P200,000, paying P50,000 down and agreeing to pay the balance in installments. However, the
installments were not paid and the Shipping Commission took possession of the vessel and
considered the sale cancelled. The Shipping Commission then chartered the vessel to Pan
Oriental Shipping Co.

Froilan then filed a complaint against Pan Oriental Shipping Co. Pan Oriental Shipping Co. filed
its answer denying the right of Froilan to the vessel. Following this, the Republic of the
Philippines, as intervenor, filed a complaint in intervention alleging that Froilan had failed to pay
to the Shipping Commission the balance. Froilan then tendered to the Board of Liquidators
(which was liquidating the affairs of the Shipping Administration) a check in payment of his
obligation for the vessel. The lower court held that the check constituted a payment and a
discharge of Froilan's obligation to the government.

However, Pan Oriental Shipping Co. had also filed an answer to the government's complaint in
intervention saying that the government was obligated to deliver the vessel to it by contract. In
response, the government filed a motion to dismiss the counterclaim of Pan Oriental Shipping
Co. against it on the grounds that the action of delivering the vessel to Pan Oriental Shipping
Co. was no longer feasible and was barred by prior judgment, and also that the court has no
jurisdiction over the intervenor government of the Republic of the Philippines.

Issue: Whether or not the Government's motion to dismiss Pan Oriental's counterclaims are
allowable.

Held: The counterclaim was not barred by prior judgment, as the counterclaim was filed before
the decision had been made with regards to Froilan's payment. The State was also not immune
from suit, since by filing its complaint in intervention, the Government waived its right of
nonsuability. Appellee

EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-6060. September 30, 1954.]

FERNANDO A. FROILAN, plaintiff-appellee, vs. PAN ORIENTAL SHIPPING CO., defendant-

appellant, REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, intervenor-appellee.
Quisumbing, Sycip, Quisumbing & Salazar, for appellant.
Ernesto Zaragoza, for appellee.
Hilarion U. Jarencio, for the intervenor.

DECISION

PARAS, C.J p:

The factual antecedents of this case are sufficiently recited in the brief filed by the intervenor-
appellee as follows:

"1. On February 3, 1951, plaintiff-appellee, Fernando A. Froilan, filed a complaint against the
defendant-appellant, Pan Oriental Shipping Co., alleging that he purchased from the Shipping
Commission the vessel FS-197 for P200,000, paying P50,000 down and agreeing to pay the
balance in installments; that to secure the payment of the balance of the purchase price, he
executed a chattel mortgage of said vessel in favor of the Shipping Commission; that for various
reasons, among them the non-payment of the installments, the Shipping Commission tool
possession of said vessel and considered the contract of sale cancelled; that the Shipping
Commission chartered and delivered said vessel to the defendant-appellant Pan Oriental
Shipping Co. subject to the approval of the President of the Philippines; that he appealed the
action of the Shipping Commission to the President of the Philippines and, in its meeting on
August 25, 1950, the Cabinet restored him to all his rights under his original contract with the
Shipping Commission; that he had repeatedly demanded from the Pan Oriental Shipping Co.
the possession of the vessel in question but the latter refused to do so. He, therefore, prayed
that, upon the approval of the bond accompanying his complaint, a writ of replevin be issued for
the seizure of said vessel with all its equipment and appurtenances, and that after hearing, he
be adjudged to have the rightful possession thereof (Rec. on App. pp. 2-8).

"2. On February 3, 1951, the lower court issued the writ of replevin prayed for by Froilan and by
virtue thereof the Pan Oriental Shipping Co. was divested of its possession of said vessel (Rec.
on App. p. 47).

"3. On March 1, 1951, Pan Oriental Shipping Co. filed its answer denying the right of Froilan to
the possession of the said vessel; it alleged that the action of the Cabinet on August 25, 1950,
restoring Froilan to his rights under his original contract with the Shipping Commission was null
and void; that, in any event, Froilan had not complied with the condition precedent imposed by
the Cabinet for the restoration of his rights to the vessel under the original contract; that it
suffered damages in the amount of P22, 764.59 for wrongful replevin in the month of February,
1951, and the sum of P17,651.84 a month as damages suffered for wrongful replevin from
March 1, 1951; it is alleged that it has incurred necessary and useful expenses on the vessel
amounting to P127,057.31 and claimed the right to retain said vessel until its useful and
necessary expenses had been reimbursed (Rec. on App. pp. 8-53).

"4. On November 10, 1951, after the leave of the lower court had been obtained, the intervenor-
appellee, Government of the Republic of the Philippines, filed a complaint in intervention
alleging that Froilan had failed to pay to the Shipping Commission (which name was later
changed to Shipping Administration) the balance due on the purchase price of the vessel in
question, the interest excluding the dry-docking expenses incurred on said vessel by the
session of the said vessel either under the terms of the original contract as supplemented by
Froilan's letter dated January 28, 1949, or in order that it may cause the extrajudicial sale
thereof under the Chattel Mortgage Law. It, therefore, prayed that Froilan be declared to be
without any rights on said vessel and the amounts he paid thereon forfeited or alternately that
the said vessel be delivered to the Board of Liquidators in order that the intervenor may have its
chattel mortgage extrajudicially foreclosed in accordance with the provisions of the Chattel
Mortgage Law; and that pending the hearing on the merits, the said vessel be delivered to its
(Rec. on App. pp. 54-66).

"5. On November 29, 1951, the Pan Oriental Shipping Co. filed an answer to the complaint in
intervention alleging that the Government of the Republic of the Philippines was obligated to
deliver the vessel in question to it by virtue of a contract of bareboat charter with option to
purchase executed on June 16, 1949, by the latter in favor of the former; it also alleged that it
had made necessary and useful expenses of the vessel and claimed the right of retention of the
vessel. It, therefore, prayed that, if the Republic vessel, to comply with its obligations of
delivering to it (Pan Oriental Shipping Co.) or causing its delivery by recovering it from Froilan
(Rec. on App. pp. 69-81).

"6. On November 29, 1951, Froilan tendered to the Board of Liquidators, which was liquidating
the affairs of the Shipping Administration, a check in the amount of P162,576.96 in payment of
his obligation to the Shipping Administration for the said vessel as claimed in the complaint in
intervention of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines. The Board of Liquidators
issued an official report therefor stating that it was a 'deposit pending the issuance of an order of
the Court of First Instance of Manila' (Rec. on App. pp. 92-93).

"7. On December 7, 1951, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines brought the matter
of said payment and the circumstances surrounding it to the attention of the lower court 'in order
that they may be taken into account by this Honorable Court in connection with question that are
now pending before it for determination' (Rec. on App. pp. 82-86).

"8. On February 3, 1952, the lower court held that the payment by Froilan of the amount of
P162,576.96 On November 29, 1951, to the Board of Liquidators constituted a payment and a
discharge of Froilan's obligation to the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and
ordered the dismissal of the latter's complaint in intervention. In the same order, the lower court
made it very clear that said order did not pre-judge the question involved between Froilan and
the Oriental Shipping Co. which was also pending determination in said court (Rec. on App. pp.
92-93). This order dismissing the complaint in intervention, but reserving for future adjudication
the controversy between Froilan and the Pan Oriental Shipping Co. had already become final
since neither the Government of the Republic of the Philippines nor the Pan Oriental Shipping
Co. had appealed therefrom.
"9. On May 10, 1952, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines filed a motion to
dismiss the counterclaim of the Pan Oriental Shipping Co. against it on the ground that the
purpose of said counterclaim was to compel the Government of the Republic of the Philippines
to deliver the vessel to it (Pan Oriental Shipping Co.) in the event that the Government of the
Republic of the Philippines recovers the vessel in question from Froilan. In view, however, of the
order of the order of the lower court dated February 3, 1952, holding that the payment made by
Froilan's obligation to the Shipping Administration, which order had already become final, the
counterclaim of the Pan Oriental Shipping Co. against the Republic of the Philippines was no
longer feasible, said counterclaim was barred by prior judgment and stated no cause of action. It
was also alleged that movant was not subject to the jurisdiction of the court in connection with
the counterclaim. (Rec. on App. pp. 94-97). This motion was opposed by the Pan Oriental
Shipping Co. in its written opposition dated June 4, 1952 (Rec. on App. pp. 19-104).

"10. In an order dated July 1, 1952, the lower court dismissed the counterclaim of the Pan
Oriental Shipping Co. as prayed for by the Republic of the Philippines (Rec. App. pp. 104-106).

"11. It is from this order of the lower court dismissing its counterclaim against the Government of
the Republic of the Philippines that Pan Oriental Shipping Co. has perfected the present appeal
(Rec. App. pp. 107)."

The order of the Court of First Instance of Manila, dismissing the counterclaim of the defendant
Pan Oriental Shipping Co., from which the latter has appealed, reads as follows:

"This is a motion to dismiss the counterclaim interposed by the defendant in its answer to the
complaint in intervention.

"The counterclaim stated as follows:

'COUNTERCLAIM

'As counterclaim against the intervenor Republic of the Philippines, the defendant alleges:

'1. That the defendant reproduces herein all the pertinent allegations of the foregoing answer to
the complaint in intervention.

'2. That, as shown by the allegations of the foregoing answer to the complaint in intervention,
the defendant Pan Oriental Shipping Company is entitled to the possession of the vessel and
the intervenor Republic of the Philippines is bound under the contract of charter with option to
purchase it entered into with the defendant to deliver that possession to the defendant —
whether it actually has the said possession from the plaintiff Fernando A. Froilan and deliver the
same to the defendant;

'3. That, notwithstanding demand, the intervenor Republic of the Philippines has not to date
complied with its obligation of delivering or causing the delivery of the vessel to the defendant
Pan Oriental Shipping Company.

'RELIEF

'WHEREFORE, the defendant respectfully prays that judgment be rendered ordering the
intervenor Republic of the Philippines alternatively to deliver to the defendants the possession of
the said vessel, or to comply with its obligation to the defendant causing the delivery to the latter
of the said vessel by recovering the same from plaintiff, with costs.

'The defendant prays for such other remedy as the Court may deem just and equitable in the
premises."

"The ground of the motion to dismiss are (a) That the cause of action is barred by prior
judgment; (b) That the counterclaim stated no cause of action; (c) That this Honorable Court has
no jurisdiction over the intervenor government of the Republic of the Philippines in connection
with the counterclaim of the defendant Pan Oriental Shipping Co.

"The intervenor contends that the complaint in intervention having been dismissed and no
appeal having been taken, the dismissal of said complaint is tantamount to a judgment.

"The complaint in intervention did not contain any claim whatsoever against the defendant Pan
Oriental Shipping Co.; hence, the counterclaim has no foundation.
"The question as to whether the Court has jurisdiction over the intervenor with regard to the
counterclaim, the Court is of the opinion that it has no jurisdiction over said intervenor.

"It appearing, therefore, that the grounds of the motion to dismiss are well taken, the
counterclaim of the defendant is dismissed, without pronouncement as to costs."
The defendant's appeal is predicated upon the following assignments of error:

"I. The lower court erred in dismissing the counterclaim on the ground of prior judgment.

II. The lower court erred in dismissing the counterclaim on the ground that the counterclaim had
no foundation because made to a complaint in intervention that over the intervenor Republic of
the Philippines.

III. The lower court erred in dismissing the counterclaim on the ground of alleged lack of
jurisdiction over the intervenor Republic of the Philippines."

We agree with appellant's contention that its counterclaim is not barred by prior judgment (order
of February 8, 1952, dismissing the complaint in intervention), first, because said counterclaim
was filed on November 29, 1951, before the issuance of the order invoked; and, secondly,
because in said order of February 8, the court dismissed the complaint in intervention, "without,
of course, precluding the determination of the right of the defendant in the instant case," and
subject to the condition that the "release and cancellation of the chattel mortgage does not,
however, prejudge the question involved between the plaintiff and the defendant which is still
the subject of determination in this case." It is to be noted that the first condition referred to the
right of the defendant, as distinguished from the second condition that expressly specified the
controversy between the plaintiff and the defendant. That the first condition reserved the right of
the defendant as against the intervenor, is clearly to be deduced from the fact that the order of
February 8 mentioned the circumstance that "the question of the expenses of drydocking
incurred by the counterclaim against the plaintiff," apparently as one of the grounds for granting
the motion to dismiss the complaint in intervention.

The defendant's failure to appeal from the order of February 8 cannot, therefore, be held as
barring the defendant from proceeding with its counterclaim, since, as already stated, said order
preserved its right as against the intervenor. Indeed, the maintenance of said right is in
consonance with Rule 30, section 2, of the Rules of Court providing that "if a counterclaim has
been pleaded by a defendant prior to the service upon him of the plaintiff's motion to dismiss,
the action shall not be dismissed against the defendant's objection unless the counterclaim can
remain pending for independent adjudication by the court."

The lower court also erred in holding that, as the intervenor had not made any claim against the
defendant, the latter's counterclaim had no foundation. The complaint in intervention sought to
recover possession of the vessel in question from the plaintiff, and this claim is logically adverse
to the position assumed by the defendant that it has a better right to said possession than the
plaintiff who alleges in his complaint that he is entitled to recover the vessel from the defendant.
At any rate a counterclaim should judge by its own allegations, and not by the averments of the
adverse party. It should be recalled that the defendant's theory is that the plaintiff had already
lost his rights under the contract with the Shipping Administration and that, on the other hand,
the defendant is relying on the charter contract executed in its favor by the intervenor which is
bound to protect the defendant in its possession of the vessel. In other words, the counter-claim
calls for specific performance on the part of the intervenor. As to whether this counterclaim is
meritorious is another question is not now before us.

The other ground for dismissing the defendant's counterclaim is that the State is immune from
suit. This is untenable, because by filing its complaint in intervention the Government in effect
waived its right of nonsuability.

"The immunity of the state from the suits does not deprive it of the right to sue private parties in
its own courts. The state as plaintiff may avail itself of the different forms of actions open to
private litigants. In short, by taking the initiative in an action against a private party, the state
surrenders its privileged position and comes down to the level of the defendant. The latter
automatically acquires, within certain limits, the right to set up whatever claims and other
defense he might have against the state. The United States Supreme Court thus explains:

'No direct suit can be maintained against the United States. But when an action is brought by
the United States to recover money in the hands of a party who has a legal claim against them,
it would be a very rigid principle to deny to him the right of setting up such claim in a court of
justice, and turn him around to an application to Congress.'". (Sinco, Philippine Political Law,
Tenth Ed., pp. 36-37. citing U.S. vs. Ringgold, 8 Pet. 150, 8 L. ed. 899.)

It is however, contended for the intervenor that, if there was at all any waiver, it was in favor of
the plaintiff against whom the complainant in intervention was directed. This contention is
untenable. As already stated, the complaint in intervention was in a sense in derogation of the
defendant's claim over the possession of the vessel in question.

Wherefore, the appealed order is hereby reversed and set aside and the case remanded to the
lower court for further proceedings. So ordered, without costs.

Pablo, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Jugo, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion and Reyes, J.B.L.,
JJ., concur.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-35645. May 22, 1985.]

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, CAPT. JAMES E. GALLOWAY, WILLIAM I. COLLINS and

ROBERT GOHIER, petitioners, vs. HON. V.M. RUIZ, Presiding Judge of Branch XV, Court of
First Instance of Rizal and ELIGIO DE GUZMAN & CO., INC., respondents.

Sycip, Salazar, Luna & Manalo & Feliciano Law Office for petitioners.
Albert, Vergara, Benares, Perlas & Dominguez Law Office for respondents.

DECISION

ABAD SANTOS, J p:

This is a petition to review, set aside certain orders and restrain the respondent judge from
trying Civil Case No. 779-M of the defunct Court of First Instance of Rizal.

The factual background is as follows:

At times material to this case, the United States of America had a naval base in Subic,
Zambales. The base was one of those provided in the Military Bases Agreement between the
Philippines and the United States.

Sometime in May, 1972, the United States invited the submission of bids for the following
projects:

1. Repair fender system, Alava Wharf at the U.S. Naval Station Subic Bay, Philippines.

2. Repair typhoon damage to NAS Cubi shoreline; repair typhoon damage to shoreline
revetment, NAVBASE Subic; and repair to Leyte Wharf approach, NAVBASE Subic Bay,
Philippines.

Eligio de Guzman & Co., Inc. responded to the invitation and submitted bids. Subsequent
thereto, the company received from the United States two telegrams requesting it to confirm its
price proposals and for the name of its bonding company. The company complied with the
requests. [In its complaint, the company alleges that the United States had accepted its bids
because "A request to confirm a price proposal confirms the acceptance of a bid pursuant to
defendant United States' bidding practices." (Rollo, p. 30.) The truth of this allegation has not
been tested because the case has not reached the trial stage.]

In June, 1972, the company received a letter which was signed by William I. Collins, Director,
Contracts Division, Naval Facilities Engineering Command, Southwest Pacific, Department of
the Navy of the United States, who is one of the petitioners herein. The letter said that the
company did not qualify to receive an award for the projects because of its previous
unsatisfactory performance rating on a repair contract for the sea wall at the boat landings of the
U.S. Naval Station in Subic Bay. The letter further said that the projects had been awarded to
third parties.

In the abovementioned Civil Case No. 779-M, the company sued the United States of America
and Messrs. James E. Galloway, William I. Collins and Robert Gohier all members of the
Engineering Command of the U.S. Navy. The complaint is to order the defendants to allow the
plaintiff to perform the work on the projects and, in the event that specific performance was no
longer possible, to order the defendants to pay damages. The company also asked for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the defendants from entering into contracts
with third parties for work on the projects.

The defendants entered their special appearance "for the purpose only of questioning the
jurisdiction of this court over the subject matter of the complaint and the persons of defendants,
the subject matter of the complaint being acts and omissions of the individual defendants as
agents of defendant United States of America, a foreign sovereign which has not given her
consent to this suit or any other suit for the causes of action asserted in the complaint." (Rollo,
p. 50.)

Subsequently the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint which included an
opposition to the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction. The company opposed the
motion. The trial court denied the motion and issued the writ. The defendants moved twice to
reconsider but to no avail. Hence the instant petition which seeks to restrain perpetually the
proceedings in Civil Case No. 779-M for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court.

The petition is highly impressed with merit.

The traditional rule of State immunity exempts a State from being sued in the courts of another
State without its consent or waiver. This rule is a necessary consequence of the principles of
independence and equality of States. However, the rules of International Law are not petrified;
they are constantly developing and evolving. And because the activities of states have
multiplied, it has been necessary to distinguish them — between sovereign and governmental
acts (jure imperii) and private, commercial and proprietary acts (jure gestionis). The result is that
State immunity now extends only to acts jure imperii. The restrictive application of State
immunity is now the rule in the United States, the United Kingdom and other states in western
Europe. (See Coquia and Defensor-Santiago, Public International Law, pp. 207-209 [1984].)

The respondent judge recognized the restrictive doctrine of State immunity when he said in his
Order denying the defendants' (now petitioners) motion: "A distinction should be made between
a strictly governmental function of the sovereign state from its private, proprietary or non-
governmental acts." (Rollo, p. 20.) However, the respondent judge also said: "It is the Court's
considered opinion that entering into a contract for the repair of wharves or shoreline is certainly
not a governmental function altho it may partake of a public nature or character. As aptly
pointed out by plaintiff's counsel in his reply citing the ruling in the case of Lyons, Inc., [104 Phil.
594 (1958)], and which this Court quotes with approval, viz.:

'It is however contended that when a sovereign state enters into a contract with a private
person, the state can be sued upon the theory that it has descended to the level of an individual
from which it can be implied that it has given its consent to be sued under the contract. . . .

xxx xxx xxx

'We agree to the above contention, and considering that the United States government, through
its agency at Subic Bay, entered into a contract with appellant for stevedoring and
miscellaneous labor services within the Subic Bay Area, a U.S. Naval Reservation, it is evident
that it can bring an action before our courts for any contractual liability that political entity may
assume under the contract. The trial court, therefore, has jurisdiction to entertain this case . . .'"
(Rollo, pp. 20-21.)

The reliance placed on Lyons by the respondent judge is misplaced for the following reasons:

In Harry Lyons, Inc. vs. The United States of America supra, plaintiff brought suit in the Court of
First Instance of Manila to collect several sums of money on account of a contract between
plaintiff and defendant. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the court had
no jurisdiction over defendant and over the subject matter of the action. The court granted the
motion on the grounds that: (a) it had no jurisdiction over the defendant who did not give its
consent to the suit; and (b) plaintiff failed to exhaust the administrative remedies provided in the
contract. The order of dismissal was elevated to this Court for review.

In sustaining the action of the lower court, this Court said:

"It appearing in the complaint that appellant has not complied with the procedure laid down in
Article XXI of the contract regarding the prosecution of its claim against the United States
Government, or, stated differently, it has failed to first exhaust its administrative remedies
against said Government, the lower court acted properly in dismissing this case." (At p. 598.)

It can thus be seen that the statement in respect of the waiver of State immunity from suit was
purely gratuitous and, therefore, obiter so that it has no value as an imperative authority.

The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out of
commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or economic affairs.
Stated differently, a State may be said to have descended to the level of an individual and can
thus be deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued only when it enters into business
contracts. It does not apply where the contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions.
In this case the projects are an integral part of the naval base which is devoted to the defense of
both the United States and the Philippines, indisputably a function of the government of the
highest order; they are not utilized for nor dedicated to commercial or business purposes.

That the correct test for the application of State immunity is not the conclusion of a contract by a
State but the legal nature of the act is shown in Syquia vs. Lopez, 84 Phil. 312 (1949). In that
case the plaintiffs leased three apartment buildings to the United States of America for the use
of its military officials. The plaintiffs sued to recover possession of the premises on the ground
that the term of the leases had expired, They also asked for increased rentals until the
apartments shall have been vacated.

The defendants who were armed forces officers of the United States moved to dismiss the suit
for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the court. The Municipal Court of Manila granted the motion
to dismiss; sustained by the Court of First Instance, the plaintiffs went to this Court for review on
certiorari. In denying the petition, this Court said:

"On the basis of the foregoing considerations we are of the belief and we hold that the real party
defendant in interest is the Government of the United States of America; that any judgment for
back or increased rentals or damages will have to be paid not by defendants Moore and Tillman
and their 64 co-defendants but by the said U.S. Government. On the basis of the ruling in the
case of Land vs. Dollar already cited, and on what we have already stated, the present action
must be considered as one against the U.S. Government. It is clear that the courts of the
Philippines including the Municipal Court of Manila have no jurisdiction over the present case for
unlawful detainer. The question of lack of jurisdiction was raised and interposed at the very
beginning of the action. The U.S. Government has not given its consent to the filing of this suit
which is essentially against her, though not in name. Moreover, this is not only a case of a
citizen filing a suit against his own Government without the latter's consent but it is of a citizen
filing an action against a foreign government without said government's consent, which renders
more obvious the lack of jurisdiction of the courts of his country. The principles of law behind
this rule are so elementary and of such general acceptance that we deem it unnecessary to cite
authorities in support thereof." (At p. 323.)

In Syquia, the United States concluded contracts with private individuals but the contracts
notwithstanding the United States was not deemed to have given or waived its consent to be
sued for the reason that the contracts were for jure imperii and not for jure gestionis.

WHEREFORE, the petition is granted; the questioned orders of the respondent judge are set
aside and Civil Case No. 779-M is dismissed. Costs against the private respondent.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Escolin, Relova Gutierrez, Jr.,
De la Fuente, Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.
Fernando, C.J., took no part.

United States of America vs. Ruiz

136 SCRA 487

Facts: The United States of America had a naval base in Subic, Zambales. The base was one
of those provided in the Military Bases Agreement between the Philippines and the US.
Respondent alleges that it won in the bidding conducted by the US fro the construction of
wharves in said base that was wrongly awarded to another group. For this reason, a suit for
specific performance was filed by him against the US.

Issue: Whether the United States Naval Base in bidding for said contracts exercise
governmental functions to be able to invoke state immunity.

Held: The traditional rule of State immunity exempts a state from being sued in the courts of
another state without its consent or waiver. This rule is a necessary consequence of the
principles of independence and equality of states. However, the rules of international law are not
petrified; they are constantly developing and evolving. And because the activities of states have
multiplied, it has been necessary to distinguish them — between sovereign and governmental
acts and private, commercial and proprietary acts. The result is that state immunity now extends
only to sovereign and governmental acts.

The restrictive application of state immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out of
commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or economic affairs. A
state may be said to have descended to the level of an individual and can thus be deemed to
have tacitly given its consent to be sued only when it enters into business contracts. It does not
apply where the contract relates the exercise of its sovereign function. In this case, the projects
are an integral part of the naval base which is devoted to the defense of both the US and the
Philippines, indisputably a function of the government of the highest order; they are not utilized
for nor dedicated to commercial or business purposes.
USA v. RUIZ
GR No. L-35645; May 22, 1985

FACTS:
Sometime in May 1972, the United States invited the submission of bids for certain naval
projects. Eligio de Guzman & Co. Inc. responded to the invitation and submitted bids.
Subsequently, the company received two telegrams requesting it to confirm its price. In June
1972, the copany received a letter which said that the company did not qualify to receive an
award for the projects. The company then sued the United States of America and individual
petitioners demanding that the company perform the work on the projects, or for the petitioners
to pay damages and to issue a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the petitioners from
entering into contracts with third parties concerning the project.

ISSUE:
1) Do the petitioners exercise governmental or proprietary functions?
2) Does the Court have jurisdiction over the case?

HELD:
The rule of State immunity exempts a State from being sued in the courts of another state
without its consent or waiver. This is a necessary consequence of the principles of
independence and equality of states. However, state immunity now extends only to
governmental acts of the state. The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when
the proceedings arise out of commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign. In this case, the
projects are integral part of the naval base which is devoted to the defense of the USA and
Philippines which is, indisputably, a function of the government. As such, by virtue of state
immunity, the courts of the Philippines have no jurisdiction over the case for the US government
has not given consent to the filing of this suit.

22. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE (DOA), petitioner, vs. THE NATIONAL LABOR

RELATIONS COMMISSION, et al., respondents.

Facts:

 DOA and Sultan Security Agency (SSA) entered into a contract for security services.
Several guards filed a complaint against DOA and SSA for under payment of wages,
non-payment of 13th month pay and etc.
 The Labor Arbiter of Cagayan de Oro found DOA and SSA liable for the payment of
money claim of the guards. The Labor Arbiter issued a ―Writ of Execution‖ commanding
the City Sheriff to execute the judgment against the DOA and SSA. Hence, the City
Sheriff seized three motorcycles of the DOA.
 In a petition of certiorari, DOA filed a ―petition for injunction, prohibition and mandamus,
with prayer for preliminary injunction‖ to the NLRC Cagayan De Oro for reasons that the
―writ‖ was null and void
 and the seizure of motorcycles jeopardizes governmental functions. NLRC --- dismissed
the petition.
 DOA charges NLRC for grave abuse of discretion for refusing to nullify the ―writ of
execution‖. DOA further asserts that NLRC has disregarded the rule on the non-suability
of the State.

Issue: Whether or not the doctrine of non-suability of the State applies in the case

Held: Under the Constitution, the rule which says ―the State cannot be sued without its consent‖
is not really absolute. The State‘s consent may be given expressly through a general or special
law, or impliedly when the State commences litigation or enters a contract. In this jurisdiction,
the general law waiving the immunity of the state from suit is found in Act No. 3083, where the
Philippine government "consents and submits to be sued upon any money claim involving
liability arising from contract, express or implied‖. The claims of the guards for underpayment of
wages and similar other items, arising from the Contract for Security Services, clearly constitute
money claims. However, pursuant to Commonwealth Act No. 327, as amended by PD No.
1445, the money claim should first be brought to the Commission on Audit.

13. DA v. NLRC

Department of Agriculture vs. the National Labor Relations Commission

Decision: Petition to nullify the Resolution, 1 dated 27 November 1991, of the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC), Fifth Division, Cagayan de Oro City, which will deny the petition
for injunction, prohibition and mandamus that prays to enjoin permanently the NLRC's Regional
Arbitration Branch X and Cagayan de Oro City Sheriff from enforcing the decision 2 of 31 May
1991 of the Executive Labor Arbiter and from attaching and executing on petitioner's property.

Facts:

1. The NLRC rendered a decision on May 31, 1990 finding the DA jointly and severally
liable with Sultan Security Agency for the payment of money claims, aggregating
P266,483.91, of the complainant security guards. The petitioner and Sultan Security
Agency did not appeal the decision of the Labor Arbiter. Thus, the decision became final
and executory.
2. On 18 July 1991, the Labor Arbiter issued a writ of execution. 5 commanding the City
Sheriff to enforce and execute the judgment against the property of the two respondents.
Forthwith, or on 19 July 1991, the City Sheriff levied on execution the motor vehicles of
the petitioner, i.e. one (1) unit Toyota Hi-Ace, one (1) unit Toyota Mini Cruiser, and one
(1) unit Toyota Crown. 6 These units were put under the custody of Zacharias Roa, the
property custodian of the petitioner, pending their sale at public auction or the final
settlement of the case, whichever would come first.
3. Petitioner charged that the NLRC with grave abuse of discretion for refusing to quash
the writ of execution as the NLRC assumes jurisdiction over a money claim which should
fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commission on Audit and the NLRC disregards
the cardinal rule of the non-suability of the State.

Issue: The non-suability of the State and execution of the NLRC to acquire the government
property.

Ruling:

1. Petition was granted.

2. The basic postulate in the Constitution states that "The State may not be sued without its
consent. (Article XVI, Section 3 of the Constitution). This rule though does not say that
the State cannot be sued in any circumstances.
3. When the state gives its consent to be sued, it does thereby necessarily consent to
unrestrained execution against it. In other words, when the State waives its immunity, all
it does, in effect, is to give the other party an opportunity to prove, if it can, that the State
has a liability.
4. The universal rule that where the State gives its consent to be sued by private parties
either by general or special law, it may limit the claimant's action "only up to the
completion of proceedings anterior to the stage of execution"
5. That the power of the Courts ends when the judgment is rendered, since government
funds and properties may not be seized under writs or execution or garnishment to
satisfy such judgments, is based on obvious considerations of public policy.
Disbursements of public funds must be covered by the correspondent appropriation as
required by law. The functions and public services rendered by the State cannot be
allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public funds from their legitimate
and specific objects, as appropriated by law.
6. Department of Agriculture vs. NLRC G.R. No. 104269, November 11, 1993
7. Sunday, January 25, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law
8.
Facts: Petitioner Department of Agriculture (DA) and Sultan SecurityAgency entered
into a contract for security services to be provided by the latter to the said
governmental entity. Pursuant to their arrangements, guards were deployed by
Sultan Security Agency in the various premises of the DA. Thereafter, several guards
filed a complaint for underpayment of wages, nonpayment of 13th month pay,
uniform allowances, night shift differential pay, holiday pay, and overtime pay, as well
as for damages against the DA and the security agency.

The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision finding the DA jointly and severally liable with
the security agency for the payment of money claims of the complainant security
guards. The DA and the security agency did notappeal the decision. Thus, the
decision became final and executory. The Labor Arbiter issued a writ of execution to
enforce and execute the judgment against the property of the DA and the
security agency. Thereafter, the City Sheriff levied on execution the motor vehicles of
the DA.

Issue: Whether or not the doctrine of non-suability of the State appliesin the case
Held: The basic postulate enshrined in the Constitution that ―the State may not be
sued without its consent‖ reflects nothing less than a recognition of the sovereign
character of the State and an expressaffirmation of the unwritten rule effectively
insulating it from the jurisdiction of courts. It is based on the very essence of
sovereignty. A sovereign is exempt from suit based on the logical and practical
ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on
which the right depends.

The rule is not really absolute for it does not say that the State may not be sued
under any circumstances. The State may at times be sued. The State‘s consent may
be given expressly or impliedly. Express consent may be made through a general
law or a special law. Implied consent, on the other hand, is conceded when the State
itself commences litigation, thus opening itself to a counterclaim, or when it enters
into a contract. In this situation, the government is deemed to have descended to the
level of the other contracting party and to have divested itself of its sovereign
immunity.

But not all contracts entered into by the government operate as a waiver of its non-
suability; distinction must still be made between one which is executed in the
exercise of its sovereign function and another which is done in its proprietary
capacity. A State may be said to have descended to the level of an individual and
can this be deemed to have actually given its consent to be sued only when it enters
into business contracts. It does not apply where the contract relates to the exercise
of its sovereign functions.

In the case, the DA has not pretended to have assumed a capacity apartfrom its
being a governmental entity when it entered into the questioned contract; nor that it
could have, in fact, performed any act proprietary in character.

But, be that as it may, the claims of the complainant security guards clearly
constitute money claims. Act No. 3083 gives the consent of the State to be sued
upon any moneyed claim involving liability arising from contract, express or implied.
 Pursuant, however, to Commonwealth Act 327, asamended by PD 1145, the money
claim must first be brought to the Commission on Audit.
9. POLITICAL LAW DOCTRINES
10.
11. Doctrine of State immunity from suit.
12.
13. The basic postulate enshrined in the Constitution that ―[t]he State may not be sued
without its consent,‖ reflects nothing less than a recognition of the sovereign
character of the State and an express affirmation of the unwritten rule effectively
insulating it from the jurisdiction of courts. It is based on the very essence of
sovereignty. As has been aptly observed by Justice Holmes, a sovereign is exempt
from suit, not because of any formal conception or obsolete theory, but on the logical
and practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that
makes the law on which the right depends. True, the doctrine, not too infrequently, is
derisively called ―the royal prerogative of dishonesty‖ because it grants the state the
prerogative to defeat any legitimate claim against it by simply invoking its non-
suability. We have had occasion to explain in its defense, however, that a continued
adherence to the doctrine of non-suability cannot be deplored, for the loss of
governmental efficiency and the obstacle to the performance of its multifarious
functions would be far greater in severity than the inconvenience that may be caused
private parties, if such fundamental principle is to be abandoned and the availability
of judicial remedy is not to be accordingly restricted. (Department of Agriculture v.
NLRC, 227 SCRA 693, Nov. 11, 1993 [Vitug]
14.
15. Doctrine of Constitutional Supremacy
16.
17. Under the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, if a law or contract violates any norm
of the Constitution, that law or contract, whether promulgated by the legislative or by
the executive branch or entered into by private persons for private purposes, is null
and void and without any force and effect. Thus, since the Constitution is the
fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is deemed written in every
statute and contract. (Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS, 267 SCRA 408 [1997]
[Bellosillo])