G.R. No.
132362 | June 28, 2001 Payment will be deemed effected and the obligation for which the check was
Pio Barretto Realty Development Corporation, Petitioner, v.
Court of Appeals, Judge Perfecto A. S. Laguio, Jr., Rtc-Branch 18, Manila, And
Honor P. Moslares, Respondents
Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred
 In disregarding jurisprudence declaring that cashier's or manager's
checks are deemed cash or as good as the money they represent.
We grant the petition.
Final and executory decisions, more so with those already executed, may no
longer be amended except only to correct errors which are clerical in nature.
 They become the law of the case and are immutable and
unalterable regardless of any claim of error or incorrectness.
 Amendments or alterations which substantially affect such
judgments as well as the entire proceedings held for that purpose
are null and void for lack of jurisdiction.
Litigations must be terminated at some definite time and that the prevailing
party should not be denied the fruits of his victory by some subterfuge devised
by the losing party.
Petitioner bought the disputed lots of the Drepin Estate subject matter of the
Compromise Agreement ahead of Moslares and that the checks issued in
payment thereof were even personally delivered by the Deputy Sheriff of the
RTC-Br. 18, Manila, upon Order of respondent Judge dated 14 June 1990 after
tender was refused by Moslares and the Drepin Estate.
 Respondent Moslares never raised the invalidity of the payment
through checks either through a motion for reconsideration or a
timely appeal.
 Hence, with the complete execution and satisfaction of the Decision
dated 24 July 1986 which approved the Compromise Agreement,
Civil Case No. 84-27008 became closed and terminated leaving
nothing else to be done by the trial court with respect thereto.
The Court of Appeals erred when it concluded that petitioner did not pursue
the fruitful and effective implementation of the writ of execution in its favor.
 Petitioner paid for the lots through the court-sanctioned procedure
outlined above.
 There was no more need for the Drepin Estate, owner of the lots, to
execute a deed of conveyance in petitioner's favor because it had
already done so on October 1980.
 In fact the disputed lots were already registered in petitioner's name
under TCT Nos. 50539, 50540 and 50541 as a consequence thereof.
 That was also why in the penultimate paragraph of the Compromise
Agreement it was provided that in the event respondent Moslares
bought the lots ahead of petitioner Barretto Realty the latter, not
the Drepin Estate, was to execute the corresponding deed of
conveyance and deliver all the titles and pertinent papers to
respondent Moslares.
Clearly then respondent Judge Laguio no longer had any jurisdiction
whatsoever to act on, much less grant, the motion for execution and
supplement thereto filed by Moslares on 17 September 1993 or more than
three (3) years later, claiming that he had already bought the lots.
 Fact that the check paid to him by Barretto Realty was never
encashed should not be invoked against the latter.
 Moslares never questioned the tender done three (3) years earlier.
While delivery of a check produces the effect of payment only when it is
encashed, the rule is otherwise if the debtor was prejudiced by the creditor's
unreasonable delay in presentment.
 Acceptance of a check implies an undertaking of due diligence in
presenting it for payment.
 If no such presentment was made, the drawer cannot be held liable
irrespective of loss or injury sustained by the payee.
given as conditional payment will be discharged.
Considering the foregoing, respondent Judge Laguio's Order dated 8
November 1993 which granted private respondent's motion for execution thus
nullifying the 1990 sale in favor of petitioner after he had in effect approved
such sale in his Order of 14 June 1990 and after such order had already become
final and executory, amounted to an oppressive exercise of judicial authority, a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, for which reason,
all further orders stemming therefrom are also null and void and without effect.
Principle of laches (Doctrine of Stale Demands) does not attach when the
judgment is null and void for want of jurisdiction.
 Fact that petitioner invoked par. 3 of the Order of 11 February 1994
praying that its P1,000,000.00 check still in Moslares' possession be
considered sufficient payment of the disputed lots, could not be
cited against it.
 For one thing, petitioner from the very start had always consistently
questioned and assailed the jurisdiction of the trial court to entertain
respondent's motion for execution filed three (3) years after the case
had in fact been executed.
 Secondly, estoppel being an equitable doctrine cannot be invoked
to perpetuate an injustice.
Consequently, petitioner Pio Barretto Realty Development Corporation is
declared the absolute owner of the disputed properties subject matter of the
Compromise Agreement dated 2 May 1986 as fully implemented by the
Deputy Sheriff, RTC-Br. 18, Manila, pursuant to the final and executory Order
dated 14 June 1990 of its Presiding Judge Perfecto A. S. Laguio, Jr.
G.R. No. L-222 | April 26, 1950
Salvacion F. Vda. De Eduque, Etc., Plaintiff-Appellee, v.
Jose M. Ocampo, Defendant-Appellant
This is an action to compel acceptance of payment of a mortgage debt.
On February 16, 1935, Dr. Jose Eduque secured two loans from Mariano
Ocampo de Leon, Doña Escolastica de los Reyes and Don Jose M. Ocampo,
the first in the amount of P40,000 and the second in the sum of P15,000, both
payable within the period of 20 years, with interest at the rate of 5 per cent per
annum.
 Payment of these 2 loans was guaranteed by mortgage on real
property.
 In the mortgage contract it is stipulated that any of the mortgage
creditors may receive payment and execute deeds of cancellation
of the mortgage debts.
On December 6, 1943, plaintiff and appellee, as administratrix of the estate of
the deceased Dr. Jose Eduque, tendered payment, by means of cashier's check,
of the total amount of the two loans, P55,000, to defendant-appellant Jose M.
Ocampo, one of the creditors, who refused to accept payment.
 By reason of such refusal, an action was brought and a cashier's
check for the total amount of P55,000 deposited in court.
After trial, judgment was rendered against defendant compelling him to accept
the P55,000 deposited in court, to issue deeds for cancellation of the mortgage
debts, and to pay the expenses of consignation and costs.
Defendant accepted the judgment with respect to the second loan of P15,000
upon the ground that, according to him, in the deed of mortgage
corresponding to that loan it clearly appeared that the loan was payable
"durante el termino de 20 años," and that the only question remaining between
the parties is the interpretation of the first deed of mortgage regarding the first
loan of P40,000.
The order was issued accordingly and the sum of P15,000 out of the P55,000
deposited in court was delivered to the defendant.
 Present appeal concerns the decision of the lower court regarding
the first loan of P40,000.
Principal error assigned by the appellant is that tender of payment by means
of a cashier's check representing Japanese war notes is not valid.
We have already help that Japanese military notes were legal tender during the
Japanese occupation.
But appellant argues, further, that the consignation of a cashier's check, which
is not legal tender, is not binding upon him.
 This question, however, has never been raised in the lower court.
Upon the contrary, defendant accepted impliedly the consignation of the
cashier's check when he himself asked the court that out of the money thus
consigned he be paid the amount of the second loan of P15,000.
A cashier's check may constitute a sufficient tender where no objection is made
on this ground.
Additional Notes
The delivery of promissory notes payable to order, or bills of exchange or other
mercantile documents shall produce the effect of payment:
1. Only when they have been cashed, or
2. When through the fault of the creditor they have been impaired.
Settled is the rule that payment must be made in legal tender.
 A check is not legal tender and, therefore, cannot constitute a valid
tender of payment.
 Since a negotiable instrument is only a substitute for money and
not money, the delivery of such an instrument does not, by itself,
operate as payment.
Mere delivery of checks does not discharge the obligation under a judgment.
 The obligation is not extinguished and remains suspended until the
payment by commercial document is actually realized.
Although Article 1271 of the Civil Code provides for a legal presumption of
renunciation of action (in cases where a private document evidencing a credit
was voluntarily returned by the creditor to the debtor), this presumption is
merely prima facie and is not conclusive; the presumption loses efficacy when
faced with evidence to the contrary.
Moreover, the cited provision merely raises a presumption, not of payment, but
of the renunciation of the credit where more convincing evidence would be
required than what normally would be called for to prove payment.
 Reliance on the legal presumption to prove payment is misplaced.
To reiterate, no cash payment was proven by the petitioner.
 Cancellation and return of the check dated April 1, 1997, simply
established his renewal of the loan – not the fact of payment.
G.R. No. L-41764 | December 19, 1980
New Pacific Timber & Supply Company, Inc., Petitioner, v.
Hon. Alberto V. Seneris, Ricardo A. Tong And Ex-Officio Sheriff Hakim S.
Abdulwahid, Respondents
A check of itself does not operate as an assignment of any part of the funds to
the credit of the drawer with the bank. and the bank, is not liable to the holder
unless and until it accepts or certifies it.
The main issue to be resolved in this instance is as to whether or not the private
respondent can validly refuse acceptance of the payment of the judgment
obligation made by the petitioner consisting of P50,000.00 in Cashier's Check
and P13,130.00 in cash which it deposited with the Ex-Officio Sheriff before the
date of the scheduled auction sale.
Payment of debts in money shall be made in the currency stipulated, and if it
is not possible to deliver such currency, then in the currency which is legal
tender in the Philippines.
Delivery of promissory notes payable to order, or bills of exchange or other
mercantile documents shall produce the effect of payment:
1. Only when they have been cashed, or
2. When through the fault of the creditor they have been impaired
Unless there is an express stipulation to that effect, the creditor cannot be
compelled partially to receive the presentations in which the obligation
consists.
 Neither may the debtor be required to make partial payment.
However, when the debt is in part liquidated and in part unliquidated, the
creditor may demand and the debtor may effect the payment of the former
without waiting for the liquidation of the latter.
The check deposited by the petitioner in the amount of P50,000.00 is not an
ordinary check but a Cashier's Check of the Equitable Banking Corporation, a
bank of good standing and reputation.
 As testified to by the Ex-Officio Sheriff with whom it has been
deposited, it is a certified crossed check.
It is a well-known and accepted practice in the business sector that a Cashier's
Check is deemed as cash.
 Moreover, since the said check had been certified by the drawee
bank, by the certification, the funds represented by the check are
transferred from the credit of the maker to that of the payee or
holder, and for all intents and purposes, the latter becomes the
depositor of the drawee bank, with rights and duties of one in such
situation.
Where a check is certified by the bank on which it is drawn, the certification is
equivalent to acceptance.
 Said certification "implies that the (1) check is drawn upon sufficient
funds in the hands of the drawee, that (2) they have been set apart
for its satisfaction, and that they (3) shall be so applied whenever
the check is presented for payment.
 It is an understanding that the check is good then, and shall
continue good, and this agreement is as binding on the bank as its
notes in circulation, a certificate of deposit payable to the order of
the depositor, or any other obligation it can assume.
The object of certifying a check, as regards both parties, is to enable the holder
to use it as money."
 If the holder procures the check to be certified, "the check operates
as an assignment of a part of the funds to the creditors."
A check which has been cleared and credited to the account of the creditor
shall be equivalent to a delivery to the creditor in cash in an amount equal to
the amount credited to his account" shall apply in this case.
Considering that the whole amount deposited by the petitioner consisting of
Cashier's Check of P50,000.00 and P13,130.00 in cash covers the judgment
obligation of P63,000.00 as mentioned in the writ of execution, then, We see
no valid reason for the private respondent to have refused acceptance of the
payment of the obligation in his favor.
 The auction sale, therefore, was uncalled for.
Furthermore, it appears that on January 17, 1975, the Cashier's Check was even
withdrawn by the petitioner and replaced with cash in the corresponding
amount of P50,000.00 on January 27, 1975 pursuant to an agreement entered
into by the parties at the instance of the respondent Judge.
 However, the private respondent still refused to receive the same.

Obviously, the private respondent is more interested in the levied properties

than in the mere satisfaction of the judgment obligation.
 Thus, petitioner's motion for the issuance of a certificate of
satisfaction of judgment is clearly meritorious and the respondent
Judge gravely abused his discretion in not granting the same under
the circumstances.