Section 9. Ancestral Lands.

— For purposes of this Act, ancestral lands of each indigenous cultural community shall
include, but not be limited to, lands in the actual, continuous and open possession and occupation of the community and
its members: provided, that the Torrens Systems shall be respected.

The right of these communities to their ancestral lands shall be protected to ensure their economic, social and cultural well-
being, in line with the principles of self-determination and autonomy, the systems of land ownership, land use, and the
modes of settling land disputes of all these communities must be recognized and respected.

Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, the PARC may suspend the implementation of this Act with respect to
ancestral lands for the purpose of identifying and delineating such lands: provided, that in the autonomous regions, the
respective legislatures may enact their own laws on ancestral domain subject to the provisions of the Constitution and the
principles enunciated in this Act and other national laws.

>Section 9 provides for the recognition of the ancestral domain claims of the IPs with respect to the implementation of
CARP.

>we know that CARP was approved sometime in 1988 while IPRA, the law that is behind these ancestral domains, was
approved sometime in 1997, so almost 10 years a gap. Nevertheless, CARP was already ancestral domain-ready when it
was created.

>it has already factored the ancestral domains in its provision

>now, the Torrens system that is mentioned in the first paragraph relates to our current system of land registration.
Torrens systems refers to the system of registration f transactions with interest in land whose declared object is, under
governmental authority, to establish and certify to the ownership of an absolute and indefeasible title to realty, and to
simplify its transfer.

>started in year 1902, Torrens system is adopted by the government then to do away with the delay, uncertainty and
expenses of the sold conveyancing system.

> the second paragraph is very clear to the effect that CARP recognizes “the right of these communities to their ancestral
lands shall be protected to ensure their economic, social and cultural well-being, in line with the principles of self-determination
and autonomy, the systems of land ownership, land use, and the modes of settling land disputes of all these communities
must be recognized and respected.”
>thus, in the third paragraph, the provision states that “Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, the PARC may
suspend the implementation of this Act with respect to ancestral lands for the purpose of identifying and delineating such
lands: provided, that in the autonomous regions, the respective legislatures may enact their own laws on ancestral domain
subject to the provisions of the Constitution and the principles enunciated in this Act and other national laws.”

>in so far as this provision is concerned, it is clear that there are now at least 3 agencies that concerns with the ownership
of land, the DAR, NCIP and the DENR…these agencies have the mandates that are relative with land distribution

>and they did recognize the potential chaos resulting from overlapping jurisdictions:
-untitled lands being claimed by IPs to be part of their AD which are covered by approved survey plans and are also
being claimed by DAR and/or DENR
-and many more…

>thus, the creation of the Joint DAR-DENR-LRA-NCIP Administrative Order No. 01, Series of 2012, which is accordingly a
guideline issued to address said issues of overlapping jurisdiction, operational issues and conflicting claims by and among
the aforementioned agencies.

<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Cruz vs Secretary of DENR
Natural Resources and Environmental Law; Constitutional Law; IPRA; Regalian Doctrine
GR. No. 135385, Dec. 6, 2000

FACTS:
Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa filed a suit for prohibition and mandamus as citizens and taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of certain
provisions of Republic Act No. 8371, otherwise known as the Indigenous People’s Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA) and its implementing rules and regulations
(IRR). The petitioners assail certain provisions of the IPRA and its IRR on the ground that these amount to an unlawful deprivation of the State’s
ownership over lands of the public domain as well as minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine embodied in
section 2, Article XII of the Constitution.

ISSUE:
Do the provisions of IPRA contravene the Constitution?

HELD:
No, the provisions of IPRA do not contravene the Constitution. Examining the IPRA, there is nothing in the law that grants to the ICCs/IPs ownership
over the natural resources within their ancestral domain. Ownership over the natural resources in the ancestral domains remains with the State and the
rights granted by the IPRA to the ICCs/IPs over the natural resources in their ancestral domains merely gives them, as owners and occupants of the
land on which the resources are found, the right to the small scale utilization of these resources, and at the same time, a priority in their large scale
development and exploitation.
Additionally, ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not part of the lands of the public domain. They are private lands and belong to the ICCs/IPs by
native title, which is a concept of private land title that existed irrespective of any royal grant from the State. However, the right of ownership and
possession by the ICCs/IPs of their ancestral domains is a limited form of ownership and does not include the right to alienate the same.

<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

Section 10. Exemptions and Exclusions. — Lands actually, directly and exclusively used and found to be necessary for
parks, wildlife, forest reserves, reforestation, fish sanctuaries and breeding grounds, watersheds, and mangroves, national
defense, school sites and campuses including experimental farm stations operated by public or private schools for
educational purposes, seeds and seedlings research and pilot production centers, church sites and convents appurtenant
thereto, mosque sites and Islamic centers appurtenant thereto, communal burial grounds and cemeteries, penal colonies
and penal farms actually worked by the inmates, government and private research and quarantine centers and all lands
with eighteen percent (18%) slope and over, except those already developed shall be exempt from the coverage of the Act.

>section 10 enumerates the exemptions and exclusions under the land distribution program of CARP…

Section 11. Commercial Farming. — Commercial farms, which are private agricultural lands devoted to commercial
livestock, poultry and swine raising, and aquaculture including salt beds, fishponds and prawn ponds, fruit farms,
orchards, vegetable and cut-flower farms, and cacao, coffee and rubber plantations, shall be subject to immediate
compulsory acquisition and distribution after (10) years from the effectivity of the Act. In the case of new farms, the ten-year
period shall begin from the first year of commercial production and operation, as determined by the DAR. During the ten-
year period, the government shall initiate the steps necessary to acquire these lands, upon payment of just compensation
for the land and the improvements thereon, preferably in favor of organized cooperatives or associations, which shall
hereafter manage the said lands for the worker-beneficiaries.

If the DAR determines that the purposes for which this deferment is granted no longer exist, such areas shall automatically
be subject to redistribution.

The provisions of Section 32 of the Act, with regard to production-and income-sharing, shall apply to commercial farms.

>if you notice, a portion of this section has been declared by the Supreme Court as unconstitutional.

>in the case of Luz Farms v Secretary of Agrarian Reform, the Court has excluded agricultural lands devoted to commercial
livestock, poultry and swine raising from the coverage of CARP

>facts of the case

-
-=====================================-
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 86889 : December 4, 1990.]
192 SCRA 51
LUZ FARMS, Petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, Respondent.

DECISION
PARAS, J.:
This is a petition for prohibition with prayer for restraining order and/or preliminary and permanent injunction against the Honorable
Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform for acting without jurisdiction in enforcing the assailed provisions of R.A. No. 6657,
otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 and in promulgating the Guidelines and Procedure
Implementing Production and Profit Sharing under R.A. No. 6657, insofar as the same apply to herein petitioner, and further from
performing an act in violation of the constitutional rights of the petitioner.
As gathered from the records, the factual background of this case, is as follows:
On June 10, 1988, the President of the Philippines approved R.A. No. 6657, which includes the raising of livestock, poultry and
swine in its coverage (Rollo, p. 80).
On January 2, 1989, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform promulgated the Guidelines and Procedures Implementing Production and
Profit Sharing as embodied in Sections 13 and 32 of R.A. No. 6657 (Rollo, p. 80).
On January 9, 1989, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform promulgated its Rules and Regulations implementing Section 11 of R.A. No.
6657 (Commercial Farms). (Rollo, p. 81).
Luz Farms, petitioner in this case, is a corporation engaged in the livestock and poultry business and together with others in the
same business allegedly stands to be adversely affected by the enforcement of Section 3(b), Section 11, Section 13, Section 16(d)
and 17 and Section 32 of R.A. No. 6657 otherwise known as Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law and of the Guidelines and
Procedures Implementing Production and Profit Sharing under R.A. No. 6657 promulgated on January 2, 1989 and the Rules and
Regulations Implementing Section 11 thereof as promulgated by the DAR on January 9, 1989 (Rollo, pp. 2-36). : rd

Hence, this petition praying that aforesaid laws, guidelines and rules be declared unconstitutional. Meanwhile, it is also prayed that
a writ of preliminary injunction or restraining order be issued enjoining public respondents from enforcing the same, insofar as they
are made to apply to Luz Farms and other livestock and poultry raisers.
This Court in its Resolution dated July 4, 1939 resolved to deny, among others, Luz Farms' prayer for the issuance of a preliminary
injunction in its Manifestation dated May 26, and 31, 1989. (Rollo, p. 98).
Later, however, this Court in its Resolution dated August 24, 1989 resolved to grant said Motion for Reconsideration regarding the
injunctive relief, after the filing and approval by this Court of an injunction bond in the amount of P100,000.00. This Court also gave
due course to the petition and required the parties to file their respective memoranda (Rollo, p. 119).
The petitioner filed its Memorandum on September 6, 1989 (Rollo, pp. 131-168).
On December 22, 1989, the Solicitor General adopted his Comment to the petition as his Memorandum (Rollo, pp. 186-187).
Luz Farms questions the following provisions of R.A. 6657, insofar as they are made to apply to it:
(a) Section 3(b) which includes the "raising of livestock (and poultry)" in the definition of "Agricultural, Agricultural
Enterprise or Agricultural Activity."
(b) Section 11 which defines "commercial farms" as "private agricultural lands devoted to commercial, livestock, poultry and
swine raising . . ."
(c) Section 13 which calls upon petitioner to execute a production-sharing plan.
(d) Section 16(d) and 17 which vest on the Department of Agrarian Reform the authority to summarily determine the just
compensation to be paid for lands covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law.
(e) Section 32 which spells out the production-sharing plan mentioned in Section 13 —
". . . (W)hereby three percent (3%) of the gross sales from the production of such lands are distributed within sixty (60)
days of the end of the fiscal year as compensation to regular and other farmworkers in such lands over and above the
compensation they currently receive: Provided, That these individuals or entities realize gross sales in excess of five million
pesos per annum unless the DAR, upon proper application, determine a lower ceiling.
In the event that the individual or entity realizes a profit, an additional ten (10%) of the net profit after tax shall be
distributed to said regular and other farmworkers within ninety (90) days of the end of the fiscal year . . ."
The main issue in this petition is the constitutionality of Sections 3(b), 11, 13 and 32 of R.A. No. 6657 (the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law of 1988), insofar as the said law includes the raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage as well as the
Implementing Rules and Guidelines promulgated in accordance therewith. :-cralaw

The constitutional provision under consideration reads as follows:

ARTICLE XIII
x x x
AGRARIAN AND NATURAL RESOURCES REFORM
Section 4. The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program founded on the right of farmers and regular
farmworkers, who are landless, to own directly or collectively the lands they till or, in the case of other farmworkers, to
receive a just share of the fruits thereof. To this end, the State shall encourage and undertake the just distribution of all
agricultural lands, subject to such priorities and reasonable retention limits as the Congress may prescribe, taking into
 account ecological, developmental, or equity considerations, and subject to the payment of just compensation. In
determining retention limits, the State shall respect the rights of small landowners. The State shall further provide incentives
for voluntary land-sharing.
x x x"
Luz Farms contended that it does not seek the nullification of R.A. 6657 in its entirety. In fact, it acknowledges the
correctness of the decision of this Court in the case of the Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc.
vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform (G.R. 78742, 14 July 1989) affirming the constitutionality of the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law. It, however, argued that Congress in enacting the said law has transcended the mandate of the Constitution, in
including land devoted to the raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage (Rollo, p. 131). Livestock or poultry
raising is not similar to crop or tree farming. Land is not the primary resource in this undertaking and represents no more
than five percent (5%) of the total investment of commercial livestock and poultry raisers. Indeed, there are many owners of
residential lands all over the country who use available space in their residence for commercial livestock and raising
purposes, under "contract-growing arrangements," whereby processing corporations and other commercial livestock and
poultry raisers (Rollo, p. 10). Lands support the buildings and other amenities attendant to the raising of animals and birds.
The use of land is incidental to but not the principal factor or consideration in productivity in this industry. Including
backyard raisers, about 80% of those in commercial livestock and poultry production occupy five hectares or less. The
remaining 20% are mostly corporate farms (Rollo, p. 11).
On the other hand, the public respondent argued that livestock and poultry raising is embraced in the term "agriculture" and the
inclusion of such enterprise under Section 3(b) of R.A. 6657 is proper. He cited that Webster's International Dictionary, Second
Edition (1954), defines the following words:
"Agriculture — the art or science of cultivating the ground and raising and harvesting crops, often, including also, feeding,
breeding and management of livestock, tillage, husbandry, farming.
It includes farming, horticulture, forestry, dairying, sugarmaking . . .
Livestock — domestic animals used or raised on a farm, especially for profit.
Farm — a plot or tract of land devoted to the raising of domestic or other animals." (Rollo, pp. 82-83).
The petition is impressed with merit.
The question raised is one of constitutional construction. The primary task in constitutional construction is to ascertain and
thereafter assure the realization of the purpose of the framers in the adoption of the Constitution (J.M. Tuazon & Co. vs. Land
Tenure Administration, 31 SCRA 413 [1970]). : rd

Ascertainment of the meaning of the provision of Constitution begins with the language of the document itself. The words used in
the Constitution are to be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed in which case the significance
thus attached to them prevails (J.M. Tuazon & Co. vs. Land Tenure Administration, 31 SCRA 413 [1970]).
It is generally held that, in construing constitutional provisions which are ambiguous or of doubtful meaning, the courts may
consider the debates in the constitutional convention as throwing light on the intent of the framers of the Constitution. It is true
that the intent of the convention is not controlling by itself, but as its proceeding was preliminary to the adoption by the people of
the Constitution the understanding of the convention as to what was meant by the terms of the constitutional provision which was
the subject of the deliberation, goes a long way toward explaining the understanding of the people when they ratified it (Aquino, Jr.
v. Enrile, 59 SCRA 183 [1974]).
The transcripts of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission of 1986 on the meaning of the word "agricultural," clearly
show that it was never the intention of the framers of the Constitution to include livestock and poultry industry in the coverage of
the constitutionally-mandated agrarian reform program of the Government.
The Committee adopted the definition of "agricultural land" as defined under Section 166 of R.A. 3844, as laud devoted to any
growth, including but not limited to crop lands, saltbeds, fishponds, idle and abandoned land (Record, CONCOM, August 7, 1986,
Vol. III, p. 11).
The intention of the Committee is to limit the application of the word "agriculture." Commissioner Jamir proposed to insert the word
"ARABLE" to distinguish this kind of agricultural land from such lands as commercial and industrial lands and residential properties
because all of them fall under the general classification of the word "agricultural". This proposal, however, was not considered
because the Committee contemplated that agricultural lands are limited to arable and suitable agricultural lands and therefore, do
not include commercial, industrial and residential lands (Record, CONCOM, August 7, 1986, Vol. III, p. 30).
In the interpellation, then Commissioner Regalado (now a Supreme Court Justice), posed several questions, among others, quoted
as follows:
x x x
"Line 19 refers to genuine reform program founded on the primary right of farmers and farmworkers. I wonder if it means
that leasehold tenancy is thereby proscribed under this provision because it speaks of the primary right of farmers and
farmworkers to own directly or collectively the lands they till. As also mentioned by Commissioner Tadeo, farmworkers
include those who work in piggeries and poultry projects.
I was wondering whether I am wrong in my appreciation that if somebody puts up a piggery or a poultry project and for that
purpose hires farmworkers therein, these farmworkers will automatically have the right to own eventually, directly or
ultimately or collectively, the land on which the piggeries and poultry projects were constructed. (Record, CONCOM, August
2, 1986, p. 618).
x x x
The questions were answered and explained in the statement of then Commissioner Tadeo, quoted as follows:
x x x
"Sa pangalawang katanungan ng Ginoo ay medyo hindi kami nagkaunawaan. Ipinaaalam ko kay Commissioner Regalado na
hindi namin inilagay ang agricultural worker sa kadahilanang kasama rito ang piggery, poultry at livestock workers. Ang
inilagay namin dito ay farm worker kaya hindi kasama ang piggery, poultry at livestock workers (Record, CONCOM, August
2, 1986, Vol. II, p. 621).
It is evident from the foregoing discussion that Section II of R.A. 6657 which includes "private agricultural lands devoted to
commercial livestock, poultry and swine raising" in the definition of "commercial farms" is invalid, to the extent that the aforecited
agro-industrial activities are made to be covered by the agrarian reform program of the State. There is simply no reason to include
livestock and poultry lands in the coverage of agrarian reform. (Rollo, p. 21).
Hence, there is merit in Luz Farms' argument that the requirement in Sections 13 and 32 of R.A. 6657 directing "corporate farms"
which include livestock and poultry raisers to execute and implement "production-sharing plans" (pending final redistribution of
their landholdings) whereby they are called upon to distribute from three percent (3%) of their gross sales and ten percent (10%)
of their net profits to their workers as additional compensation is unreasonable for being confiscatory, and therefore violative of due
process (Rollo, p. 21).:-c ralaw

It has been established that this Court will assume jurisdiction over a constitutional question only if it is shown that the essential
requisites of a judicial inquiry into such a question are first satisfied. Thus, there must be an actual case or controversy involving a
conflict of legal rights susceptible of judicial determination, the constitutional question must have been opportunely raised by the
proper party, and the resolution of the question is unavoidably necessary to the decision of the case itself (Association of Small
Landowners of the Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, G.R. 78742; Acuna v. Arroyo, G.R. 79310; Pabico v. Juico, G.R.
79744; Manaay v. Juico, G.R. 79777, 14 July 1989, 175 SCRA 343).
However, despite the inhibitions pressing upon the Court when confronted with constitutional issues, it will not hesitate to declare a
law or act invalid when it is convinced that this must be done. In arriving at this conclusion, its only criterion will be the Constitution
and God as its conscience gives it in the light to probe its meaning and discover its purpose. Personal motives and political
considerations are irrelevancies that cannot influence its decisions. Blandishment is as ineffectual as intimidation, for all the
awesome power of the Congress and Executive, the Court will not hesitate "to make the hammer fall heavily," where the acts of
these departments, or of any official, betray the people's will as expressed in the Constitution (Association of Small Landowners of
the Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, G.R. 78742; Acuna v. Arroyo, G.R. 79310; Pabico v. Juico, G.R. 79744;
Manaay v. Juico, G.R. 79777, 14 July 1989).
Thus, where the legislature or the executive acts beyond the scope of its constitutional powers, it becomes the duty of the judiciary
to declare what the other branches of the government had assumed to do, as void. This is the essence of judicial power conferred
by the Constitution "(I)n one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law" (Art. VIII, Section 1 of the
1935 Constitution; Article X, Section I of the 1973 Constitution and which was adopted as part of the Freedom Constitution, and
Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution) and which power this Court has exercised in many instances (Demetria v. Alba, 148
SCRA 208 [1987]).
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. Sections 3(b), 11, 13 and 32 of R.A. No. 6657 insofar as the
inclusion of the raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage as well as the Implementing Rules and Guidelines promulgated
in accordance therewith, are hereby DECLARED null and void for being unconstitutional and the writ of preliminary injunction issued
is hereby MADE permanent.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan (C.J.), Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea and
Regalado, JJ., concur.
Feliciano, J., is on leave.
Section 32. Production-Sharing. — Pending final land transfer, individuals or entities owning, or operating under lease or
workers or farmworkers' reorganization, if any, whereby three percent (3%) of the gross sales from the production of such
lands are distributed within sixty (60) days of the end of the fiscal year as compensation to regular and other farmworkers
in such lands over and above the compensation they currently receive: provided, that these individuals or entities realize
gross sales in excess of five million pesos per annum unless the DAR, upon proper application, determines a lower ceiling.
In the event that the individual or entity realizes a profit, an additional ten percent (10%) of the net profit after tax shall be
distributed to said regular and other farmworkers within ninety (90) days of the end of the fiscal year.

To forestall any disruption in the normal operation of lands to be turned over to the farmworker-beneficiaries mentioned
above, a transitory period, the length of which shall be determined by the DAR, shall be established.

During this transitory period, at least one percent (1%) of the gross sales of the entity shall be distributed to the managerial,
supervisory and technical group in place at the time of the effectivity of this Act, as compensation for such transitory
managerial and technical functions as it will perform, pursuant to an agreement that the farmworker-beneficiaries and the
managerial, supervisory and technical group may conclude, subject to the approval of the DAR.

-==========================-

Section 73. Prohibited Acts and Omissions. — The following are prohibited:
(a) The ownership or possession, for the purpose of circumventing the provisions of this Act, of agricultural lands in excess
of the total retention limits or award ceilings by any person, natural or juridical, except those under collective ownership by
farmer-beneficiaries.

(b) The forcible entry or illegal detainer by persons who are not qualified beneficiaries under this Act to avail themselves of
the rights and benefits of the Agrarian Reform Program.

(c) The conversion by any landowner of his agricultural land into any non-agricultural use with intent to avoid the
application of this Act to his landholdings and to dispossess his tenant farmers of the land tilled by them.

(d) The willful prevention or obstruction by any person, association or entity of the implementation of the CARP.

(e) The sale, transfer, conveyance or change of the nature of lands outside of urban centers and city limits either in whole or
in part after the effectivity of this Act. The date of the registration of the deed of conveyance in the Register of Deeds with
respect to titled lands and the date of the issuance of the tax declaration to the transferee of the property with respect to
unregistered lands, as the case may be, shall be conclusive for the purpose of this Act.
(f) The sale, transfer or conveyance by a beneficiary of the right to use or any other usufructuary right over the land he
acquired by virtue of being a beneficiary, in order to circumvent the provisions of this Act.

Section 74. Penalties. — Any person who knowingly or willfully violates the provisions of this Act shall be punished by
imprisonment of not less than one (1) month to not more than three (3) years or a fine of not less than one thousand pesos
(P1,000.00) and not more than fifteen thousand pesos (P15,000.00), or both, at the discretion of the court.
If the offender is a corporation or association, the officer responsible therefore shall be criminally liable.

-==============================-
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 86889 : December 4, 1990.]
192 SCRA 51
LUZ FARMS, Petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, Respondent.

DECISION
PARAS, J.:
This is a petition for prohibition with prayer for restraining order and/or preliminary and permanent injunction against the Honorable
Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform for acting without jurisdiction in enforcing the assailed provisions of R.A. No. 6657,
otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 and in promulgating the Guidelines and Procedure
Implementing Production and Profit Sharing under R.A. No. 6657, insofar as the same apply to herein petitioner, and further from
performing an act in violation of the constitutional rights of the petitioner.
As gathered from the records, the factual background of this case, is as follows:
On June 10, 1988, the President of the Philippines approved R.A. No. 6657, which includes the raising of livestock, poultry and
swine in its coverage (Rollo, p. 80).
On January 2, 1989, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform promulgated the Guidelines and Procedures Implementing Production and
Profit Sharing as embodied in Sections 13 and 32 of R.A. No. 6657 (Rollo, p. 80).
On January 9, 1989, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform promulgated its Rules and Regulations implementing Section 11 of R.A. No.
6657 (Commercial Farms). (Rollo, p. 81).
Luz Farms, petitioner in this case, is a corporation engaged in the livestock and poultry business and together with others in the
same business allegedly stands to be adversely affected by the enforcement of Section 3(b), Section 11, Section 13, Section 16(d)
and 17 and Section 32 of R.A. No. 6657 otherwise known as Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law and of the Guidelines and
Procedures Implementing Production and Profit Sharing under R.A. No. 6657 promulgated on January 2, 1989 and the Rules and
Regulations Implementing Section 11 thereof as promulgated by the DAR on January 9, 1989 (Rollo, pp. 2-36). : rd

Hence, this petition praying that aforesaid laws, guidelines and rules be declared unconstitutional. Meanwhile, it is also prayed that
a writ of preliminary injunction or restraining order be issued enjoining public respondents from enforcing the same, insofar as they
are made to apply to Luz Farms and other livestock and poultry raisers.
This Court in its Resolution dated July 4, 1939 resolved to deny, among others, Luz Farms' prayer for the issuance of a preliminary
injunction in its Manifestation dated May 26, and 31, 1989. (Rollo, p. 98).
Later, however, this Court in its Resolution dated August 24, 1989 resolved to grant said Motion for Reconsideration regarding the
injunctive relief, after the filing and approval by this Court of an injunction bond in the amount of P100,000.00. This Court also gave
due course to the petition and required the parties to file their respective memoranda (Rollo, p. 119).
The petitioner filed its Memorandum on September 6, 1989 (Rollo, pp. 131-168).
On December 22, 1989, the Solicitor General adopted his Comment to the petition as his Memorandum (Rollo, pp. 186-187).
Luz Farms questions the following provisions of R.A. 6657, insofar as they are made to apply to it:
(a) Section 3(b) which includes the "raising of livestock (and poultry)" in the definition of "Agricultural, Agricultural
Enterprise or Agricultural Activity."
(b) Section 11 which defines "commercial farms" as "private agricultural lands devoted to commercial, livestock, poultry and
swine raising . . ."
(c) Section 13 which calls upon petitioner to execute a production-sharing plan.
(d) Section 16(d) and 17 which vest on the Department of Agrarian Reform the authority to summarily determine the just
compensation to be paid for lands covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law.
(e) Section 32 which spells out the production-sharing plan mentioned in Section 13 —
". . . (W)hereby three percent (3%) of the gross sales from the production of such lands are distributed within sixty (60)
days of the end of the fiscal year as compensation to regular and other farmworkers in such lands over and above the
compensation they currently receive: Provided, That these individuals or entities realize gross sales in excess of five million
pesos per annum unless the DAR, upon proper application, determine a lower ceiling.
In the event that the individual or entity realizes a profit, an additional ten (10%) of the net profit after tax shall be
distributed to said regular and other farmworkers within ninety (90) days of the end of the fiscal year . . ."
The main issue in this petition is the constitutionality of Sections 3(b), 11, 13 and 32 of R.A. No. 6657 (the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law of 1988), insofar as the said law includes the raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage as well as the
Implementing Rules and Guidelines promulgated in accordance therewith. :-cralaw

The constitutional provision under consideration reads as follows:

 ARTICLE XIII
x x x
AGRARIAN AND NATURAL RESOURCES REFORM
Section 4. The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program founded on the right of farmers and regular
farmworkers, who are landless, to own directly or collectively the lands they till or, in the case of other farmworkers, to
receive a just share of the fruits thereof. To this end, the State shall encourage and undertake the just distribution of all
agricultural lands, subject to such priorities and reasonable retention limits as the Congress may prescribe, taking into
account ecological, developmental, or equity considerations, and subject to the payment of just compensation. In
determining retention limits, the State shall respect the rights of small landowners. The State shall further provide incentives
for voluntary land-sharing.
x x x"
Luz Farms contended that it does not seek the nullification of R.A. 6657 in its entirety. In fact, it acknowledges the
correctness of the decision of this Court in the case of the Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc.
vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform (G.R. 78742, 14 July 1989) affirming the constitutionality of the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law. It, however, argued that Congress in enacting the said law has transcended the mandate of the Constitution, in
including land devoted to the raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage (Rollo, p. 131). Livestock or poultry
raising is not similar to crop or tree farming. Land is not the primary resource in this undertaking and represents no more
than five percent (5%) of the total investment of commercial livestock and poultry raisers. Indeed, there are many owners of
residential lands all over the country who use available space in their residence for commercial livestock and raising
purposes, under "contract-growing arrangements," whereby processing corporations and other commercial livestock and
poultry raisers (Rollo, p. 10). Lands support the buildings and other amenities attendant to the raising of animals and birds.
The use of land is incidental to but not the principal factor or consideration in productivity in this industry. Including
backyard raisers, about 80% of those in commercial livestock and poultry production occupy five hectares or less. The
remaining 20% are mostly corporate farms (Rollo, p. 11).
On the other hand, the public respondent argued that livestock and poultry raising is embraced in the term "agriculture" and the
inclusion of such enterprise under Section 3(b) of R.A. 6657 is proper. He cited that Webster's International Dictionary, Second
Edition (1954), defines the following words:
"Agriculture — the art or science of cultivating the ground and raising and harvesting crops, often, including also, feeding,
breeding and management of livestock, tillage, husbandry, farming.
It includes farming, horticulture, forestry, dairying, sugarmaking . . .
Livestock — domestic animals used or raised on a farm, especially for profit.
Farm — a plot or tract of land devoted to the raising of domestic or other animals." (Rollo, pp. 82-83).
The petition is impressed with merit.
The question raised is one of constitutional construction. The primary task in constitutional construction is to ascertain and
thereafter assure the realization of the purpose of the framers in the adoption of the Constitution (J.M. Tuazon & Co. vs. Land
Tenure Administration, 31 SCRA 413 [1970]). : rd

Ascertainment of the meaning of the provision of Constitution begins with the language of the document itself. The words used in
the Constitution are to be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed in which case the significance
thus attached to them prevails (J.M. Tuazon & Co. vs. Land Tenure Administration, 31 SCRA 413 [1970]).
It is generally held that, in construing constitutional provisions which are ambiguous or of doubtful meaning, the courts may
consider the debates in the constitutional convention as throwing light on the intent of the framers of the Constitution. It is true
that the intent of the convention is not controlling by itself, but as its proceeding was preliminary to the adoption by the people of
the Constitution the understanding of the convention as to what was meant by the terms of the constitutional provision which was
the subject of the deliberation, goes a long way toward explaining the understanding of the people when they ratified it (Aquino, Jr.
v. Enrile, 59 SCRA 183 [1974]).
The transcripts of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission of 1986 on the meaning of the word "agricultural," clearly
show that it was never the intention of the framers of the Constitution to include livestock and poultry industry in the coverage of
the constitutionally-mandated agrarian reform program of the Government.
The Committee adopted the definition of "agricultural land" as defined under Section 166 of R.A. 3844, as laud devoted to any
growth, including but not limited to crop lands, saltbeds, fishponds, idle and abandoned land (Record, CONCOM, August 7, 1986,
Vol. III, p. 11).
The intention of the Committee is to limit the application of the word "agriculture." Commissioner Jamir proposed to insert the word
"ARABLE" to distinguish this kind of agricultural land from such lands as commercial and industrial lands and residential properties
because all of them fall under the general classification of the word "agricultural". This proposal, however, was not considered
because the Committee contemplated that agricultural lands are limited to arable and suitable agricultural lands and therefore, do
not include commercial, industrial and residential lands (Record, CONCOM, August 7, 1986, Vol. III, p. 30).
In the interpellation, then Commissioner Regalado (now a Supreme Court Justice), posed several questions, among others, quoted
as follows:
x x x
"Line 19 refers to genuine reform program founded on the primary right of farmers and farmworkers. I wonder if it means
that leasehold tenancy is thereby proscribed under this provision because it speaks of the primary right of farmers and
farmworkers to own directly or collectively the lands they till. As also mentioned by Commissioner Tadeo, farmworkers
include those who work in piggeries and poultry projects.
I was wondering whether I am wrong in my appreciation that if somebody puts up a piggery or a poultry project and for that
purpose hires farmworkers therein, these farmworkers will automatically have the right to own eventually, directly or
ultimately or collectively, the land on which the piggeries and poultry projects were constructed. (Record, CONCOM, August
2, 1986, p. 618).
x x x
 The questions were answered and explained in the statement of then Commissioner Tadeo, quoted as follows:
x x x
"Sa pangalawang katanungan ng Ginoo ay medyo hindi kami nagkaunawaan. Ipinaaalam ko kay Commissioner Regalado na
hindi namin inilagay ang agricultural worker sa kadahilanang kasama rito ang piggery, poultry at livestock workers. Ang
inilagay namin dito ay farm worker kaya hindi kasama ang piggery, poultry at livestock workers (Record, CONCOM, August
2, 1986, Vol. II, p. 621).
It is evident from the foregoing discussion that Section II of R.A. 6657 which includes "private agricultural lands devoted to
commercial livestock, poultry and swine raising" in the definition of "commercial farms" is invalid, to the extent that the aforecited
agro-industrial activities are made to be covered by the agrarian reform program of the State. There is simply no reason to include
livestock and poultry lands in the coverage of agrarian reform. (Rollo, p. 21).
Hence, there is merit in Luz Farms' argument that the requirement in Sections 13 and 32 of R.A. 6657 directing "corporate farms"
which include livestock and poultry raisers to execute and implement "production-sharing plans" (pending final redistribution of
their landholdings) whereby they are called upon to distribute from three percent (3%) of their gross sales and ten percent (10%)
of their net profits to their workers as additional compensation is unreasonable for being confiscatory, and therefore violative of due
process (Rollo, p. 21).:-c ralaw

It has been established that this Court will assume jurisdiction over a constitutional question only if it is shown that the essential
requisites of a judicial inquiry into such a question are first satisfied. Thus, there must be an actual case or controversy involving a
conflict of legal rights susceptible of judicial determination, the constitutional question must have been opportunely raised by the
proper party, and the resolution of the question is unavoidably necessary to the decision of the case itself (Association of Small
Landowners of the Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, G.R. 78742; Acuna v. Arroyo, G.R. 79310; Pabico v. Juico, G.R.
79744; Manaay v. Juico, G.R. 79777, 14 July 1989, 175 SCRA 343).
However, despite the inhibitions pressing upon the Court when confronted with constitutional issues, it will not hesitate to declare a
law or act invalid when it is convinced that this must be done. In arriving at this conclusion, its only criterion will be the Constitution
and God as its conscience gives it in the light to probe its meaning and discover its purpose. Personal motives and political
considerations are irrelevancies that cannot influence its decisions. Blandishment is as ineffectual as intimidation, for all the
awesome power of the Congress and Executive, the Court will not hesitate "to make the hammer fall heavily," where the acts of
these departments, or of any official, betray the people's will as expressed in the Constitution (Association of Small Landowners of
the Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, G.R. 78742; Acuna v. Arroyo, G.R. 79310; Pabico v. Juico, G.R. 79744;
Manaay v. Juico, G.R. 79777, 14 July 1989).
Thus, where the legislature or the executive acts beyond the scope of its constitutional powers, it becomes the duty of the judiciary
to declare what the other branches of the government had assumed to do, as void. This is the essence of judicial power conferred
by the Constitution "(I)n one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law" (Art. VIII, Section 1 of the
1935 Constitution; Article X, Section I of the 1973 Constitution and which was adopted as part of the Freedom Constitution, and
Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution) and which power this Court has exercised in many instances (Demetria v. Alba, 148
SCRA 208 [1987]).
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. Sections 3(b), 11, 13 and 32 of R.A. No. 6657 insofar as the
inclusion of the raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage as well as the Implementing Rules and Guidelines promulgated
in accordance therewith, are hereby DECLARED null and void for being unconstitutional and the writ of preliminary injunction issued
is hereby MADE permanent.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan (C.J.), Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea and
Regalado, JJ., concur.
Feliciano, J., is on leave.

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Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 199008 November 19, 2014

DANILO ALMERO, TERESITA ALAGON, CELIA BULASO, LUDY RAMADA, REGINA GEGREMOSA, ISIDRO LAZARTE, THELMA
EMBARQUE, FELIPE LAZARTE, GUILERMA LAZARTE, DULCESIMA BENIMELE, Petitioners,
vs.
HEIRS OF MIGUEL PACQUING, as represented by LINDA PACQUING FADRILAN, Respondents.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari 1 filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court directly assailing the February 16, 2011
Decision2 and July 19, 2011 resolution3 of the Office of the President (OP) in OP Case No. 10-C-152. The OP recalled and cancelled the
Certificate of Land Ownership Awards ( CLOAs) issued to the petitioners covering certain homestead lots that formed part of the
Pacquing Estate, a 23.6272-hectare property located in Cuambogan, Tagum City.

Factual Antecedents

Miguel Pacquing acquired agricultural lands (the property) with a total area of 23.6272 hectares in Cuambogan, Tagum City through
Homestead Patent No. V-33775. These lands were registered on January 6, 1955 with the Register of Deeds under Original Certificate of
Title No. (P-2590) P-653.
The records show that, on August 5, 1991, the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) sent Miguel’s representative a Notice of
Coverage placing the Pacquing Estate under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). Miguel failed to reply to the notice
and, instead filed a Voluntary Offer to Sell (VOS) with the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) on August 31, 1991. Miguel, however,
died during the pendency of the VOS proceedings. Miguel’s wife, Salome, had died five years earlier.

In January 1992, respondent Linda Pacquing-Fadrilan, sole heir of the spouses Pacquing, executed an affidavit adjudicating to herself
ownership of the property. In August of the sameyear, she filed an application for retention with the DAR Regional Directorwho denied
Linda’s application in an order dated December 14, 1993. The order denying Linda’s application for retention later became final and
executory.

On June 25, 1994, certain individuals, including the present petitioners who were earlier identified as farmer-beneficiaries of the subject
land, were issued CLOAs over their respective cultivated portions of the property.

On October 20, 1999, Linda, through her attorney-in-fact, Samuel Osias, filed with the Office of the Provincial Adjudicator in Tagum
City a petition to cancel the petitioners’ CLOAs. The Provincial Adjudicator later dismissed the petition due to Linda’s failure to file her
position paper. She appealed the dismissal with the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB).

It appears that, in the meantime, Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs) covering portions of the property were issued to Napoleon Villa Sr.,
et al. who had been contracted by Linda, under an agricultural leasehold agreement, to cultivate the lands.

In a resolution dated June 29, 2001, the DARAB nullified the TCTs issued to Napoleon Villa Sr. et. al. and reinstated Linda’s title to the
property. At the same time, the DARAB ordered the generation and issuance of titles to the petitioners and other farmer-beneficiaries of
the subject land. In a subsequent resolution dated September 28, 2001, the DARAB validated the TCTs issued to the following
individuals: Danilo Almero, Celia Bulaso, Ludy Ramada, Isidro Lazarte, Cepriano Lazarte, Thelma Emorque, Domingo Juanico, Candido
Labeste and Renato Benimate.

Root of the present petition: Petition to Recall and Cancel the petitioners’ CLOAs

Linda again sought to recall and cancel the petitioners’ CLOAs by filing a petition with the DAR, which the latter endorsed to the DAR
Regional Office. Linda argued that the DARAB erred in distributing portions of the land to the petitioners because the entire property
was supposed to be exempt from CARP coverage. The petitioners opposed Linda’s petition.

In an order dated December 18,2008, the DAR Regional Director ruled that the Pacquing Estate was subject to CARP and that the
CLOAs issued to the petitioners were valid. Linda filed an appeal to the DAR Secretary.

In an order dated August 18, 2009, former DAR Secretary Nasser C. Pangandaman denied Linda’s appeal under the following terms:

"xxx, under Section 6 of R.A. No. 6657, there are two requisites to exempt homestead lands from CARP coverage. First, the homestead
grantee or his direct compulsory heir(s) still own the original homestead at the time of the effectivity of R.A. No. 6657 on 15 June 1988;
and second, the original homestead grantee or his direct compulsory heir(s) was cultivating the homestead as of 15 June 1988 and
continues to cultivate the same.

In this case, it is undisputed that the subject landholdings were still owned by the original homestead grantees at the time of the
effectivity of R.A. No. 6657. However,the said homestead grantees no longer cultivate the same. Therefore, on this score, the subject
landholdings cannot be exempted from CARP coverage." (Emphasis ours)

Linda appealed the DAR Secretary’s August 18, 2009 order to the OP.

In a decision dated February 16,2011, the OP, through Executive Secretary Paquito N. Ochoa Jr., reversed the DAR Secretary’s August
18, 2009 Order and recalled and cancelled the petitioners’ CLOAs. The OP held that:

"xxx, the fact that petitioners-appellants (referring to the respondent Linda), since the beginning, have always protested the issuance of
the CLOAs to the respondents-appellees (referring to the petitioners) is a clear demonstration of their willingness to continue with the
cultivation of the subject landholdings, or tostart anew with the cultivation or even to direct the management of the farm.

Given the foregoing, petitioners-appellants should be given the chance to exercise their rights as heirs of the homestead grantee to
continue to cultivate the homestead lots either personally or directly managing the farm pursuant to the pronouncement in the Paris
case. They still own the original homestead issuedto their predecessor-in-interest and have manifested their intention to continue with
the cultivation of the homestead lots."4 (Emphasis supplied)

The petitioners moved to reconsider the decision, but the OP denied their motion in a resolution 5 dated July 19, 2011.

With no appeal or petition for review filed with the Court of Appeals within the fifteen (15) - day appeal period, the DAR Bureau of
Agrarian Legal Assistance issued on August 22, 2011 a Certificate of Finality 6 declaring as final and executory the OP’s February 16,
2011 decision and July 19, 2011 resolution.The petitioners, however, contest the finality of the OP’s decision and allege that their
counsel only received a certified copy of the OP’s resolution denying their motion for reconsideration on September 29, 2011.

On November 14, 2011, the petitioners directly filed with this Court a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 assailing the
subject OP’s decision and resolution.

The Petition

The petitioners raise the following issues:

I- WHO WILL ISSUE A CERTIFICATE OF FINALITY OF THE DECISION WHEN THE DECISION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE
AGENCY IS REVERSE (sic) ON APPEAL BY THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT?
 II- ARE LANDS UNDER THE HOMESTEAD GRANT, EXEMPT FROM AGRARIAN REFORM COVERAGE UNDER SECTION 6 OF
R.A. 6657, EVEN IF THE HEIR OF THE PATENTEE IS NOT CULTIVATING THE LAND, BUT AND HAD EVEN OFFERED THE
SAME UNDER THE VOLUNTARY OFFER TO SELL SCHEME?

III- IN CARP COVERAGE, IS DEPOSIT OF LAND OWNER’S COMPENSATION WITH LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES ENOUGH
TO TRANSFER TITLE TO THE STATE, EVEN IF THE OWNER DOES NOT ACCEPT THE SAME? 7 (Emphasis supplied)

Pleadings Subsequent to the Petition

In her comment dated March 16, 2012, 8 Linda counter-argues that the present petition should be denied outright for being an improper
mode of appeal: the appeal from the OP’s assailed decision and resolution should have been filed with the CA via a petition for review
under Rule 43 and not directly with this Court viaa petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.

The petitioners filed their counter-comment/reply9 asking this Court to decide the present case not on technicalities but based on its
merits, and that the Court, instead, treat their petition as a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65.

OUR RULING

We see MERIT in the present petition.

First, we address the proceduralissue raised by the respondent.

Under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, an appeal from the awards, judgments, final orders or resolutions of or authorized by any quasi-
judicial agency such as the Office of the President, in the exercise of its quasijudicial functions shall be filed to the CA 10 within a period
of fifteen (15) days from notice of, publication or denial of a motion for new trial or reconsideration. 11 The appeal may involve questions
of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law. 12

A direct resort to this Court, however, may be allowed in cases where only questions of law are raised. 13 A question of law exists when
the doubt or controversy concerns the correct application of law or jurisprudence to a certain set of facts; or when the issue does not
call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented, the truth or falsehood of facts being admitted. 14

In the present petition, the petitioners raised valid questions of law that warranted the direct recourse to this Court. Basically, they
question the OP’s application of the law and jurisprudence on the issue of whether the Pacquing Estate should be exempt from CARP
coverage. In this case, no further examination of the truth or falsity of the facts is required. Our review of the case is limited to the
determination of whether the OP has correctly applied the law and jurisprudence based on the facts on record.

We now proceed to the merits of the case.

R.A. No. 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) of 1988 covers all public and private agricultural lands as provided in
Proclamation No. 13115 and E.O. No. 229,16 including other lands of the public domain suitable for agriculture. Section 4 of R.A. 6657,
as amended,17 specifically lists the lands covered by the CARP, which include:

(a) All alienable and disposable lands of the public domain devoted to or suitable for agriculture. No reclassification of forest or
mineral lands to agricultural lands shall be undertaken after the approval of this Act until Congress, taking into account
ecological, developmental and equity considerations, shall have determined by law, the specific limits of the public domain;

(b) All lands of the public domain in excess to the specific limits as determined by Congress in the preceding paragraph;

(c) All other lands owned by the Government devoted to or suitable for agriculture; and

(d) All private lands devoted to or suitable for agriculture regardless of the agricultural products raised or that can be raised
thereon.

And Section 10 of R.A. 6657, as amended, 18 expressly provides for the lands exempted or excluded from the CARP, namely:

(a) Lands actually, directly and exclusively used for parks, wildlife, forest reserves, reforestation, fish sanctuaries and breeding
grounds, watersheds and mangroves shall be exempt from the coverage of this Act

(b) Private lands actually, directly and exclusively used for prawn farms and fishponds shall be exempt from the coverage of this
Act: Provided, that said prawn farms and fishponds have not been distributed and Certificate of Land Ownership (CLOA) issued
under the Agrarian Reform Program; and

xxxx

(c) Lands actually, directly and exclusively used and found to be necessary for national defense, school sites and campuses,
including experimental farms stations operated by public or private schools for educational purposes, seeds and seedlings
research and pilot production centers, church sites and covenants appurtenant thereto, mosque sites and Islamic centers
appurtenant thereto, communal burial grounds and cemeteries, penal colonies and penal farms actually worked by the inmates,
government and private research and quarantine centers and all lands with eighteen percent (18%) slope and over, except those
already developed, shall be exempt from the coverage of this Act.

The subject land, being agricultural in nature, is clearly not exempt from CARP coverage.

But Linda argues that the subject land is exempt from CARP primarily because it was acquired by her father viaa homestead patent.
She claims that the rights of homestead grantees have been held superior to those of agrarian reform tenants and, thus, her right to the
subject land must be upheld. The OP, agreeing with the respondent, stated that:
"There can be no question that, weighed against each other, the rights of a homesteader prevail over the rights of the tenants
guaranteed by agrarian reform laws.

As early as the case of Patricio v. Bayug, it has been held that the more paramount and superior policy consideration is to uphold the
right of the homesteader and his heirs to own and cultivate personally the land acquired from the State without being encumbered by
tenancy relations.

Just right after the promulgation of Republic Act No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL), the
doctrine enunciated in Patricio was applied in Alita v. Court of Appeals where it was held thatPresidential DecreeNo. 27 cannot be
invoked to defeat the very purpose of the enactment of the Public Land Act or Commonwealth Act No. 141. It was further pointedout
that even the Philippine Constitution respects the superiority of the homesteaders’ rights over the rights of the tenants guaranteed by
the Agrarian Reform statute."19 (Citations omitted.)

The right of homestead grantees to retain or keep their homestead is, however, not absolutely guaranteed by law.1âwphi1 Section 6 of
R.A 6657 provides that:

"Section 6. Retention Limits.— Except as otherwise provided in this Act, no person may own or retain, directly or indirectly, any public
or private agricultural land, the size of which shall vary according to factors governing a viable family-size farm, such as commodity
produced, terrain, infrastructure, and soil fertility as determined by the Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC) created hereunder,
but in no case shall retention by the landowner exceed five (5) hectares. Three (3) hectares may be awarded to each child of the
landowner, subject to the following qualifications: (1) that he is at least fifteen (15) years of age; and (2) that he is actually tilling the land
or directly managing the farm: provided, that landowners whose lands have been covered by Presidential Decree No. 27 shall be allowed
to keep the areas originally retained by them thereunder: provided, further, that original homestead grantees or their direct compulsory
heirs who still own the original homestead at the time of the approval of this Act shall retain the same areas as long as they continue to
cultivate said homestead. (Emphasis ours)

Thus, in order for the homestead grantees or their direct compulsory heirs to retain or keep their homestead, the following conditions
must first be satisfied: (a) they must still be the owners of the original homestead at the time of the CARL's effectivity, and (b) they must
continue to cultivate the homestead land.

In this case, Linda, as the direct compulsory heir of the original homestead grantee, is no longer cultivating the subject homestead land.
The OP misinterpreted our ruling in Paris v. Alfeche20 when it held that Linda's mere expression of her desire to continue or to start
anew with the cultivation of the land would suffice to exempt the subject homestead land from the CARL. On the contrary, we
specifically held in Paris v. Alfeche that:

"Indisputably, homestead grantees or their direct compulsory heirs can own and retain the original homestead, only for "as long as they
continue to cultivate" them. That parcels of land are covered by homestead patents will not automatically exempt them from the
operation of land reform. It is the fact of continued cultivation by the original grantees or their direct compulsory heirs that shall exempt
their lands from land reform coverage."21 (Emphasis supplied) WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, we hereby:
 (a) REVERSE and SET ASIDE the February 16, 2011 Decision and July 19, 2011 Resolution of the Office of the President in OP
Case No. 1 O-C-152;

(b) RECALL and REVOKE the August 22, 2011 Certificate of Finality issued by the Department of Agrarian Reform Bureau of
Agrarian Legal Assistance; and

(c) AFFIRM the August 18, 2009 Order of the Department of Agrarian Reform Secretary in DARCO Order No. MS-0908-295 Series
of 2009 A-999-10-CLT-028-09.

SO ORDERED.

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

See dissenting opinion

MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court's Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division

CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice

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