Case Subject matter |Ruling

1. G.R. No. 101949 Immunity of The logical question is whether the foreign state is
December 1,1994 Foreign States & engaged in the activity in theregular course of
Diplomats; business. If the foreign stateis not engaged regularly
THE HOLY SEE in a business or trade,the particular act or
vs. Principle of par in transaction must then betested by its nature. If the
parem non habet act is in pursuit of asovereign activity, or an incident
THE HON. imperium; thereof, thenit is an act jure imperii , especially when
ERIBERTO U. it isnot undertaken for gain or profit.Lot 5-A was
ROSARIO, JR., as Process of acquired by petitioner as a donation from the
Presiding Judge of Suggestion Archdiocese of Manila. Thedonation was made not
theRegional Trial for commercialpurpose, but for the use of petitioner
Court of to construct thereon the official place of residenceof
Makati,Branch 61 the Papal Nuncio. The right of a foreign sovereign to
and STARBRIGHT acquire property, real or personal,in a receiving
SALESENTERPRISE state, necessary for the creationand maintenance of
S, INC. its diplomatic mission, is recognized in the 1961
Vienna Convention onDiplomatic Relations.In Article
31(a) of the Convention, a diplomatic envoy is
granted immunity from thecivil and administrative
jurisdiction of the receiving state over any real action
relating toprivate immovable property situated in the
territory of the receiving state which the envoyholds
on behalf of the sending state for thepurposes of the
mission. If this immunity is provided for a diplomatic
envoy, with all themore reason should immunity be
recognized as regards the sovereign itself, which in
this caseis the Holy See

SALIENT POINTS:

There are two conflicting concepts of sovereign

immunity, according to the Supreme Court: (a)
Classical or absolute theory — a sovereign cannot,
without its consent, be made a respondent in the
courts of another sovereign; and (b) Restrictive
theory — the immunity of the sovereign is
recognized only with regard to public acts or acts
jure imperii (public acof a state, but not with regard
to private acts or acts jure gestionis.

2. G.R. No. 125865 Determination of ISSUE: Whether immunity invoked by

Januar Immunity by the DFA for ADB employees based on the
y 28, 2000 Department of Agreement is cognizable in our courts.
Foreign Affairs
JEFFREY LIANG HELD: The immunity mentioned therein is not
(HUEFENG), petitioner, absolute, but subject to the exception that the act
was done in “official capacity.” The prosecution
vs. should have been given the chance to rebut the DFA
PEOPLE OF THE protocol and it must be accorded the opportunity to
PHILIPPINES, present its controverting evidence.

Page 1 of 13
 respondent.
Slandering a person could not possibly be covered by
the immunity agreement because our laws do

not allow the commission of a crime, such as

defamation, in the name of official duty. It is a well-

settled principle of law that a public official may be

liable in his personal private capacity for whatever

damage he may have caused by his act done with

malice or in bad faith or beyond the scope of his

authority or jurisdiction. Under the Vienna

Convention on Diplomatic Relations, the commission
of a

crime is not part of official duty.

The petition is therefore denied.

3. G.R. No. 86773 Immunity of SALIENT POINTS:

February 14, 1992 International
Organizations and
SOUTHEAST ASIAN Agencies A. Permanent international commissions and
FISHERIES administrative bodies have been created by
DEVELOPMENT the agreement of a considerable number of
CENTER- States for a variety of international purposes,
AQUACULTURE economic or social and mainly non-political.
DEPARTMENT In so far as they are autonomous and
(SEAFDEC-AQD), DR. beyond the control of any one State, they
FLOR LACANILAO have a distinct juridical personality
(CHIEF), RUFIL independent of the municipal law of the
CUEVAS (HEAD, State where they are situated. As such,
ADMINISTRATIVE according to one leading authority "they
DIV.), BEN DELOS must be deemed to possess a species of
REYES (FINANCE international personality of their own."
OFFICER), petitioners,
vs. B. One of the basic immunities of an
international organization is immunity from
NATIONAL LABOR local jurisdiction, i.e., that it is immune from
RELATIONS the legal writs and processes issued by the
COMMISSION and tribunals of the country where it is found.
JUVENAL LAZAGA, (See Jenks, Id., pp. 37-44) The obvious
respondents. reason for this is that the subjection of such
an organization to the authority of the local
courts would afford a convenient medium
thru which the host government may
interfere in there operations or even
influence or control its policies and decisions
of the organization; besides, such subjection
to local jurisdiction would impair the capacity
of such body to discharge its responsibilities
impartially on behalf of its member-states. In

Page 2 of 13
 the case at bar, for instance, the
entertainment by the National Labor
Relations Commission of Mr. Madamba's
reinstatement cases would amount to
interference by the Philippine Government in
the management decisions of the SEARCA
governing board; even worse, it could
compromise the desired impartiality of the
organization since it will have to suit its
actuations to the requirements of Philippine
law, which may not necessarily coincide with
the interests of the other member-states.
4. ERNESTO L. CALLADO, Issue:
petitioner,
Did the (IRRI) waive its immunity from suit in this
vs. dispute which arose from an employer-employee
INTERNATIONAL RICE relationship?
RESEARCH INSTITUTE,
respondent. Held:

No.P.D. No. 1620, Article 3 provides:

Art.3. Immunity from Legal Process. The

Institute shall enjoy immunity from any
penal,civil and administrative proceedings,
except in so far as that immunity has been
expressly waived by the Director-General of the
Institute or his authorized representatives.

The SC upholds the constitutionality of the

aforequoted law. There is in this case "acategorical
recognition by the Executive Branch of the
Government that IRRI enjoysimmunities accorded
to international organizations, which determination
has been held to be a political question conclusive
upon the Courts in order not to embarrass a
politicaldepartment of Government.

It is a recognized principle of international law and

under our system of separation of powersthat
diplomatic immunity is essentially a political question
and courts should refuse to lookbeyond a
determination by the executive branch of the
government, and where the plea of diplomatic
immunity is recognized and affirmed by the
executive branch of the government asin the case at
bar, it is then the duty of the courts to accept the
claim of immunity uponappropriate suggestion by
the principal law officer of the government or other
officer actingunder his direction.

The raison d'etre for these immunities is the

Page 3 of 13
 assurance of unimpeded performance of their
functions by the agencies concerned.The grant of
immunity to IRRI is clear and unequivocal and an
express waiver by its Director-General is the only
way by which it may relinquish or abandon this
immunity.In cases involving dismissed employees,
the Institute may waive its immunity, signifying that
such waiver is discretionary on its part.

5. G.R. No. L-52179 Immunity of Issue:WON the court committed grave abuse of
April 8, 1991 Government; discretion when it deferred and failed to resolve the
MUNICIPALITY OF SAN Agencies; defense of non-suability of the State amounting to
FERNANDO, LA lack of jurisdiction in a motion to dismiss.
UNION, petitioner Incorporated
vs. Municipal Held:Yes
HON. JUDGE ROMEO N. Corporations
FIRME, JUANA Ratio: In the case at bar, the judge deferred
RIMANDO-BANIÑA, the resolution of the defense of non-suability of
IAUREANO BANIÑA, JR., the State until trial.
SOR MARIETA BANIÑA, However, the judge failed to resolve such defense,
MONTANO BANIÑA, proceeded with the trial and then rendered a
ORJA BANIÑA, AND decision against the municipality and its driver. The
LYDIA R. judge did not commit GAD when it arbitrarily failed
BANIÑA, respondents. to resolve the issue of non-suability of the State in
the guise of the municipality. However, the judge
acted in excess of his jurisdiction when in his
decision he held the municipality liable for the
quasi-delict committed by its regular employee.

The doctrine of non-suability of the State is expressly

provided for in Article XVI, Section 3 of the Consti, to
wit: "the State may not be sued without its consent."
Express consent may be embodied in a general law
or a special law. The standing consent of the State to
be sued in case of money claims involving liability
arising from contracts is found in Act No. 3083. A
special law may be passed to enable a person to sue
the government for an alleged quasi-delict. Consent
is implied when the government enters into business
contracts, thereby descending to the level of the
other contracting party, and also when the State files
a complaint, thus opening itself to a counterclaim.

Municipal corporations are agencies of the State

when they are engaged in governmental functions.

and therefore should enjoy the sovereign immunity

from suit. Nevertheless, they are subject to suit
even in the performance of such functions because
their charter provided that they can sue and be
sued.

A distinction should first be made between

Page 4 of 13
suability and liability. "Suability depends on the
consent of the state to be sued, liability on the
applicable law and the established facts. The
circumstance that a state is suable does not
necessarily mean that it is liable; on the other
hand, it can never be held liable if it does not first
consent to be sued. Liability is not conceded by
the mere fact that the state has allowed itself to
be sued. When the state does waive its sovereign
immunity, it is only giving the plaintiff the chance
to prove, if it can, that the defendant is liable."

Anent the issue of whether or not the municipality is

liable for the torts committed by its employee, the
test of liability of the municipality depends on
whether or not the driver, acting in behalf of the
municipality, is performing governmental or
proprietary functions (Torio vs. Fontanilla). According
to City of Kokomo vs Loy(Indiana SC), municipal
corporations exist in a dual capacity, and their
functions are twofold. In one they exercise the right
springing from sovereignty, and while in the
performance of the duties pertaining thereto, their
acts are political and governmental. Their officers
and agents in such capacity, though elected or
appointed by them, are nevertheless public
functionaries performing a public service, and as
such they are officers, agents, and servants of the
state. In the other capacity the municipalities
exercise a private, proprietary or corporate right,
arising from their existence as legal persons and not
as public agencies. Their officers and agents in the
performance of such functions act in behalf of the
municipalities in their corporate or individual
capacity, and not for the state or sovereign power."

It has already been remarked that municipal

corporations are suable because their charters
grant them the competence to sue and be sued.
Nevertheless, they are generally not liable for torts
committed by them in the discharge of
governmental functions and can be held answerable
only if it can be shown that they were acting in a
proprietary capacity.

In the case at bar, the driver of the dump truck of

the municipality insists that "he was on his way to
the Naguilian river to get a load of sand and gravel
for the repair of San Fernando's municipal streets."
In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, the
regularity of the performance of official duty is
presumed pursuant to Section 3(m) of Rule 131 of
the Revised Rules of Court. Hence, We rule that the

Page 5 of 13
 driver of the dump truck was performing duties or
tasks pertaining to his office.We already stressed in
the case of Palafox, et. al. vs. Province of Ilocos
Norte, the District Engineer, and the Provincial
Treasurer that "the construction or maintenance of
roads in which the truck and the driver worked at
the time of the accident are admittedly
governmental activities."

After a careful examination of existing laws and

jurisprudence, We arrive at the conclusion that the
municipality cannot be held liable for the torts
committed by its regular employee, who was then
engaged in the discharge of governmental functions.
Hence, the death of the passenger tragic and
deplorable though it may be imposed on the
municipality no duty to pay monetary compensation.
6. G.R. No. 97882 Suits against
August 28, 1996 Public Officers

THE CITY OF ANGELES,

Hon. ANTONIO ABAD
SANTOS, in his capacity
as MAYOR of
Angeles City, and the
SANGGUNIANG
PANLUNGSOD OF THE
CITY OF ANGELES,
petitioners,
vs.

COURT OF APPEALS and

TIMOG SILANGAN
DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION,
respondents.

7. G.R. No. 91359, PRINCIPLE: Issue:

September 25, 1992 State's immunity Whether or not VMPSI’s complaint against the
[G.R. No. 91359. from suit. PC Chief and PC-SUSIA is a suit against the
September 25, State without its consent.
Veterans Manpower and Protective Services,
1992.]
Inc. vs. Court of Appeals

VETERANS HELD:
MANPOWER AND
PROTECTIVE Yes.
SERVICES,
INC., Petitioner, v. A public official may sometimes be held liable
in his personal or private capacity if he acts in
THE COURT OF bad faith, or beyond the scope of his authority
APPEALS, THE or jurisdiction, however, since the acts for
CHIEF OF which the PC Chief and PC-SUSIA are being

Page 6 of 13
 PHILIPPINE called to account in this case, were performed
CONSTABULARY as part of their official duties, without malice,
gross negligence, or bad faith, no recovery
and PHILIPPINE
may be had against them in their private
CONSTABULARY capacities.
SUPERVISORY Veterans Manpower and Protective Services,
UNIT FOR Inc. vs. Court of Appeals
SECURITY AND Furthermore, the Supreme Court agrees with
INVESTIGATION the Court of Appeals that the Memorandum of
AGENCIES (PC- Agreement dated May 12, 1986 does not
constitute an implied consent by the State to
SUSIA), Responde be sued.
nts.
Read: Merritt vs. Government of the Philippine
Franciso A. Lava, Islands
Jr. and Andresito The consent of the State to be sued must
X. Fornier emanate from statutory authority, hence, a
legislative act, not from a mere memorandum.
for Petitioner.
Without such consent, the trial court did not
acquired jurisdiction over the public
respondents.
Veterans Manpower and Protective Services,
Inc. vs. Court of Appeals
Petition for review is denied and the judgment
appealed from is affirmed in toto.

8. Republic v Purissima, 78 Consent to be SC held that a contract entered into by the Rice and
SCRA 470 (1977) sued; Corn Administration stipulating that in the event of
breach, action may be filed by the parties, cannot be
Express Consent; the basis of a money claim against the RCA, a
government entity under the Office of the President,
The Need for a since the RCA had no authority to bind the
Statute Giving government to be sued. Only a statute could.
Consent ---
• F: The Rice & Corn Administration (RCA)
entered into a contract w/ the Yellow Ball
Freight Lines in w/c they agreed that in the
event of breach, action may be filed w/ the
courts of Mla. In 1972, Yellow filed a money
claim against RCA. The case was assigned to
resp. Judge., who denied a motion to dismiss
filed by RCA relying on the stipulation in the
contract of the parties.

• HELD: The RCA is part of the govt, being in

fact an office under the Office of the Pres.
and therefore cannot be sued w/o the
consent of the State. The consent to be
effective.... must come from the State,
acting thru a duly enacted statute. Thus,
whatever counsel for def. RCA agreed to had
no binding force in the govt. That was clearly

Page 7 of 13
 beyond the scope of his authority.

Republic v Feliciano, the suit is not the SC held that the Proclamation of the President of
148 SCRa 424 really against the the Philippines (recognizing private rights to the
State. land) cannot be the source of consent, since the
Proclamation is not a legislative act. VV.

9. -- Implied Consent --

When State
commences
litigation

10. G.R. No. 215009 . In absence of Besides, case law states that the “absence of
January 23, 2017 opposition from opposition from government agencies is of no
REPUBLIC OF THE government controlling significance because the State cannot be
PHILIPPINES agencies is of no estopped by the omission, mistake or error of its
vs. controlling officials or agents. Neither is the Republic barred
CARMEN SANTORIO significance from assailing the decision granting the petition for
GALENO because the State reconstitution [or correction of title, as in this case]
cannot be if, on the basis of the law and the evidence on
estopped by the record, such petition has no merit.” Moreover, “in
omission, mistake civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must
or error of its produce a preponderance of evidence thereon, with
officials or agent plaintiff having to rely on the strength of his own
evidence and not upon the weakness of the
defendant’s.”
11. PEOPLE OF THE Natinal Territory Issue: Whether or not appellant is guilty of piracy
PHILIPPINES vs. when the acts were committed in along a river bank.
MAXIMO DELA PEÑA ET.
AL Ruling: Yes, the elements of piracy under PD 532
G.R. No. 219581, are all present.
January 31, 2018
Section 2(d) of PD 532 defines piracy as follows: Any
attack upon or seizure of any vessel, or the taking
away of the whole or part thereof or its cargo,
equipment, or the personal belongings of its
complement or passengers, irrespective of the value
thereof, by means of violence against or intimidation
of persons or force upon things, committed by any
person, including a passenger or member of the
complement of said vessel, in Philippine waters shall
be considered as piracy.

Under Section 2(a) of PD 532, "Philippine waters" is

defined as follows: [A]ll bodies of water, .x x x and
all other waters belonging to the Philippines x x x
and other submarine areas over which the
Philippines has sovereignty or jurisdiction.

It is clear that a river is considered part of Philippine

waters. The Information also clearly alleged that the

Page 8 of 13
 vessel's cargo, equipment, and personal belongings
of the passengers were taken by the appellant and
his armed companions. The appellant was able to
seize these items when he, along with armed
companions, boarded the victims' pump boat and
seized control of the same.

Ratio Decidendi: Positive identification prevails

over alibi since the latter can easily be fabricated and
is inherently unreliable.

Gist: This is an appeal assailing the Decision of the

CA which affirmed with modification the decision of
the RTC finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of piracy.

12. MAGALLONA v. ERMITA, Issue: Whether R.A. 9522 is constitutional for

G.R. 187167, August 16, converting internat waters into archipelagic
2011 waters. (Whether or not RA 9522, the
amendatory Philippine Baseline Law is
unconstitutional.)

Ruling:
1. UNCLOS III has nothing to do with
acquisition or loss of territory. it is just a
codified norm that regulates conduct of States.
On the other hand, RA 9522 is a baseline law
to mark out basepoints along coasts, serving
as geographic starting points to measure. it
merely notices the international community of
the scope of our maritime space.
2. If passages is the issue, domestically, the
legislature can enact legislation designating
routes within the archipelagic waters to
regulate innocent and sea lanes passages. but
in the absence of such, international law
norms operate.
the fact that for archipelagic states, their
waters are subject to both passages does not
place them in lesser footing vis a vis
continental coastal states. Moreover, RIOP is a
customary international law, no modern state
can invoke its sovereignty to forbid such
passage.
3. On the KIG issue, RA 9522 merely followed
the basepoints mapped by RA 3046 and in
fact, it increased the Phils.’ total maritime
space. Moreover, the itself commits the Phils.’
continues claim of sovereignty and jurisdiction
over KIG.
If not, it would be a breach to 2 provisions of
the UNCLOS III:
Art. 47 (3): ‘drawing of basepoints shall not

Page 9 of 13
 depart to any appreciable extent from the
general configuration of the archipelago’.
Art 47 (2): the length of baselines shall not
exceed 100 mm.
KIG and SS are far from our baselines, if we
draw to include them, we’ll breach the rules:
that it should follow the natural configuration
of the archipelago.
-----
No. The Court finds R.A. 9522 constitutional. It is a
Statutory Tool to Demarcate the Country’s Maritime
Zones and Continental Shelf Under UNCLOS III, not
to Delineate Philippine Territory. It is a vital step in
safeguarding the country’s maritime zones. It also
allows an internationally-recognized delimitation of
the breadth of the Philippine’s maritime zones and
continental shelf.

Additionally, The Court finds that the conversion of

internal waters into archipelagic waters will not risk
the Philippines as affirmed in the Article 49 of the
UNCLOS III, an archipelagic State has sovereign
power that extends to the waters enclosed by the
archipelagic baselines, regardless of their depth or
distance from the coast. It is further stated that the
regime of archipelagic sea lanes passage will not
affect the status of its archipelagic waters or the
exercise of sovereignty over waters and air space,
bed and subsoil and the resources therein.

The Court further stressed that the baseline laws are

mere mechanisms for the UNCLOS III to precisely
describe the delimitations. It serves as a notice to
the international family of states and it is in no way
affecting or producing any effect like enlargement or
diminution of territories.

13. Issue: Whether or not the requisites of statehood,

or at least so much thereof as may be necessary for
the acquisition of an international personality, must
be satisfied for a "foreign country" to fall within the
exemption of Section 122 of the National Internal
Revenue Code

Held:

 Supreme Court affirmed Court of tax

Appeal’s Ruling.
 If a foreign country is to be identified with a
state, it is required in line with Pound's
formulation that it be a politically organized
sovereign community independent of outside

Page 10 of 13
 control bound by ties of nationhood, legally
supreme within its territory, acting through a
government functioning under a regime of
law.
 it is thus a sovereign person with the people
composing it viewed as an organized
corporate society under a government with
the legal competence to exact obedience to
its commands.
 The stress is on its being a nation, its people
occupying a definite territory, politically
organized, exercising by means of its
government its sovereign will over the
individuals within it and maintaining its
separate international personality.
 State is a territorial society divided into
government and subjects, claiming within its
allotted area a supremacy over all other
institutions. Moreover, similarly would point
to the power entrusted to its government to
maintain within its territory the conditions of
a legal order and to enter into international
relations. With the latter requisite satisfied,
international law does not exact
independence as a condition of statehood.
 Collector of Internal Revenue v. De Lara:
There can be no doubt that California as a
state in the American Union was lacking in
the alleged requisite of international
personality. Nonetheless, it was held to be a
foreign country within the meaning of
Section 122 of the National Internal Revenue
Code.
 This Court did commit itself to the doctrine
that even a tiny principality, that of
Liechtenstein, hardly an international
personality in the traditional sense, did fall
under this exempt category.

14. Republic v Sandoval, Herein public • HELD: 1. The principle of immunity from suit
220 SCRA 124 (1993) officials, having is based on the very essence of sovereignty,
been found to and on the practical ground that there can
have acted beyond be no legal right as against the authority that
the scope of their makes the law on which the right depends.
authority, may be It also rests on reasons of public policy --
held liable for that public service would be hindered, and
damages. the public endangered, if the sovereign
authority could be subjected to law suits at
the instance of every citizen and
consequently controlled in the uses and
dispositions of the means required for the
proper administration of the government.

Page 11 of 13
• 2. This is not a suit against the State with its
consent. Firstly, the recommendation made
by the Mendiola Commission regarding
indemnification of the heirs and the victims
of the incident by the government does not
in any way mean that liability automatically
attaches to the State. The Commission was
merely a fact-finding body and its
recommendation was not final and
executory. Secondly, whatever acts or
utterances that President Aquino may have
done or said, the same are not tantamount
to the State having waived its immunity from
suit. Although consent to be sued may be
given impliedly, such consent was not given
in this case.
• 3. Some instances when a suit against the
State is proper are: (1) when the Republic is
sued by name; (2) when the suit is against
an unincorporated govt. agency; (3) when
the suit is on its face against a govt. officer
but the case is such that the ultimate liability
will belong not to the officer but to the govt.

• In this case, while the Republic is sued by

name, the ultimate liability does not pertain
to the govt. Although the military officers
were discharging their official functions when
the incident occurred, their functions ceased
to be official the moment they exceeded
their authority. Immunity from suit cannot
institutionalize irresponsibility and non-
accountability nor grant a privileged status
not claimed by any other official of the
Republic. The principle of state immunity
from suit does not apply, as in this case,
when the relief demanded by the suit
requires no affirmative official action on the
part of the State nor the affirmative
discharge of any obligation w/c belongs to
the State in its political capacity, even
though the officers or agents who are made
defendants claim to hold or act only by virtue
of a title of the state and as its agents and
servants. They are therefore liable for
damages. Adapted.

Page 12 of 13
State Immunity:
a. Basis
b. Suits against Foreign states
c. Basic Principles
a. Suits strictly against officers of the state
b. Suits against government agencies
c. Suits against municipal corporations
d. Waiver of immunity
e. Suability vs. liability
f. Enforcement of state liability
g. Exemption from legal requirements and principle

When suit is not against the state:

1. When the purpose of the suit is to compel an officer charged with the duty of making
payments pursuant to an appropriation made by law in favor of the plaintiff to make such
payment. For in this case, the suit is not really against the State, the State having acknowledged
its liability to the plaintiff through the enactment of an appropriation law. Rather, the suit is
intended to compel performance of a ministerial duty. (Begoso v PVA, 32 SCRA 466 and Del
Mar v PVA, 51 SCRA 340 both involving the War Widow Benefits Law due the veterans.)

2. When from the allegations in the complaint, it is clear that the respondent is a public
officer sued in a private capacity.

3. When the action is not in personam with the government as the named defendant, but
an action in rem that does not name the government in particular.

In Republic v Feliciano (148 SCRA 424), a suit against the government for the recovery
of possession and ownership of land based on a possessory information was disallowed by the
SC on the ground that a suit for the recovery of property is an action "in personam" which seeks
to bring the State to court just like any private person who is claimed to usurp a piece of
property.

Page 13 of 13