G.R. No. 47065 June 26, 1940 the opinion that section 1 of Commonwealth Act No.
the opinion that section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 454 is constitutional, a decision
PANGASINAN TRANSPORTATION CO., INC., petitioner,
vs.
THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION, respondent.
C. de G. Alvear for petitioner.
Evaristo R. Sandoval for respondent.
LAUREL, J.:
The petitioner has been engaged for the past twenty years in the business of
transporting passengers in the Province of Pangasinan and Tarlac and, to a certain
extent, in the Province of Nueva Ecija and Zambales, by means of motor vehicles
commonly known as TPU buses, in accordance with the terms and conditions of the
certificates of public convenience issued in its favor by the former Public Utility
Commission in cases Nos. 24948, 30973, 36830, 32014 and 53090. On August 26,
1939, the petitioner filed with the Public Service Commission an application for
authorization to operate ten additional new Brockway trucks (case No. 56641), on the
ground that they were needed to comply with the terms and conditions of its existing
certificates and as a result of the application of the Eight Hour Labor Law. In the
decision of September 26, 1939, granting the petitioner's application for increase of
equipment, the Public Service Commission ordered:
Y de acuerdo con que se provee por el articulo 15 de la ley No. 146 del
Commonwealth, tal como ha sido enmendada por el articulo 1 de la Ley No.
454, por la presente se enmienda las condiciones de los certificados de
convenciencia publica expedidos en los expedientes Nos. 24948, 30973,
36831, 32014 y la authorizacion el el expediente No. 53090, asi que se
consideran incorporadas en los mismos las dos siguientes condiciones:
Que los certificados de conveniencia publica y authorizacion arriba
mencionados seran validos y subsistentes solamente durante de veinticinco
(25) anos, contados desde la fecha de la promulgacion de esta decision.
Que la empresa de la solicitante porda ser adquirida por el Commonwealth
de Filipinas o por alguna dependencia del mismo en cualquier tiempo que lo
deseare previo pago del precio d costo de su equipo util, menos una
depreciacion razonable que se ha fijar por la Comision al tiempo de su
adquisicion.
Not being agreeable to the two new conditions thus incorporated in its existing
certificates, the petitioner filed on October 9, 1939 a motion for reconsideration which
was denied by the Public Service Commission on November 14, 1939. Whereupon,
on November 20, 1939, the present petition for a writ of certiorari was instituted in this
court praying that an order be issued directing the secretary of the Public Service
Commission to certify forthwith to this court the records of all proceedings in case No.
56641; that this court, after hearing, render a decision declaring section 1 of
Commonwealth Act No. 454 unconstitutional and void; that, if this court should be of
be rendered declaring that the provisions thereof are not applicable to valid and
subsisting certificates issued prior to June 8, 1939. Stated in the language of the
petitioner, it is contended:
1. That the legislative powers granted to the Public Service Commission by
section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 454, without limitation, guide or rule
except the unfettered discretion and judgment of the Commission, constitute
a complete and total abdication by the Legislature of its functions in the
premises, and for that reason, the Act, in so far as those powers are
concerned, is unconstitutional and void.
2. That even if it be assumed that section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 454,
is valid delegation of legislative powers, the Public Service Commission has
exceeded its authority because: (a) The Act applies only to future certificates
and not to valid and subsisting certificates issued prior to June 8, 1939,
when said Act took effect, and (b) the Act, as applied by the Commission,
violates constitutional guarantees.
Section 15 of Commonwealth Act No. 146, as amended by section 1 of
Commonwealth Act No. 454, invoked by the respondent Public Service Commission
in the decision complained of in the present proceedings, reads as follows:
With the exception to those enumerated in the preceding section, no public
service shall operate in the Philippines without possessing a valid and
subsisting certificate from the Public Service Commission, known as
"certificate of public convenience," or "certificate of convenience and public
necessity," as the case may be, to the effect that the operation of said
service and the authorization to do business will promote the public interests
in a proper and suitable manner.
The Commission may prescribed as a condition for the issuance of the
certificate provided in the preceding paragraph that the service can be
acquired by the Commonwealth of the Philippines or by any instrumentality
thereof upon payment of the cost price of its useful equipment, less
reasonable depreciation; and likewise, that the certificate shall valid only for
a definite period of time; and that the violation of any of these conditions
shall produce the immediate cancellation of the certificate without the
necessity of any express action on the part of the Commission.
In estimating the depreciation, the effect of the use of the equipment, its
actual condition, the age of the model, or other circumstances affecting its
value in the market shall be taken into consideration.
The foregoing is likewise applicable to any extension or amendment of
certificates actually force and to those which may hereafter be issued, to
permits to modify itineraries and time schedules of public services and to
authorization to renew and increase equipment and properties.
Under the first paragraph of the aforequoted section 15 of Act No. 146, as amended,
no public service can operate without a certificate of public convenience or certificate
of convenience and public necessity to the effect that the operation of said service
and the authorization to do business will "public interests in a proper and suitable
manner." Under the second paragraph, one of the conditions which the Public Service
Commission may prescribed the issuance of the certificate provided for in the first
paragraph is that "the service can be acquired by the Commonwealth of the
Philippines or by any instrumental thereof upon payment of the cost price of its useful
equipment, less reasonable depreciation," a condition which is virtually a restatement
of the principle already embodied in the Constitution, section 6 of Article XII, which
provides that "the State may, in the interest of national welfare and defense, establish
and operate industries and means of transportation and communication, and, upon
payment of just compensation, transfer to public ownership utilities and other private
enterprises to be operated by the Government. "Another condition which the
Commission may prescribed, and which is assailed by the petitioner, is that the
certificate "shall be valid only for a definite period of time." As there is a relation
between the first and second paragraphs of said section 15, the two provisions must
be read and interpreted together. That is to say, in issuing a certificate, the
Commission must necessarily be satisfied that the operation of the service under said
certificate during a definite period fixed therein "will promote the public interests in a
proper and suitable manner." Under section 16 (a) of Commonwealth Act. No. 146
which is a complement of section 15, the Commission is empowered to issue
certificates of public convenience whenever it "finds that the operation of the public
service proposed and the authorization to do business will promote the public
interests in a proper and suitable manner." Inasmuch as the period to be fixed by the
Commission under section 15 is inseparable from the certificate itself, said period
cannot be disregarded by the Commission in determining the question whether the
issuance of the certificate will promote the public interests in a proper and suitable
manner. Conversely, in determining "a definite period of time," the Commission will be
guided by "public interests," the only limitation to its power being that said period shall
not exceed fifty years (sec. 16 (a), Commonwealth Act No. 146; Constitution, Art. XIII,
sec. 8.) We have already ruled that "public interest" furnishes a sufficient standard.
(People vs. Fernandez and Trinidad, G. R. No. 45655, promulgated June 15, 1938;
People vs. Rosenthal and Osmeña, G. R. Nos. 46076 and 46077, promulgated June
12, 1939, citing New York Central Securities Corporation vs. U.S.A., 287 U.S. 12, 24,
25, 77 Law. ed. 138, 145, 146; Schenchter Poultry Corporation vs. I.S., 295, 540, 79
Law. ed. 1570, 1585; Ferrazzini vs. Gsell, 34 Phil., 697, 711-712.)
Section 8 of Article XIII of the Constitution provides, among other things, that no
franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for the operation of a public
utility shall be "for a longer period than fifty years," and when it was ordained, in
section 15 of Commonwealth Act No. 146, as amended by Commonwealth Act No.
454, that the Public Service Commission may prescribed as a condition for the
issuance of a certificate that it "shall be valid only for a definite period of time" and, in
section 16 (a) that "no such certificates shall be issued for a period of more than fifty
years," the National Assembly meant to give effect to the aforesaid constitutional
mandate. More than this, it has thereby also declared its will that the period to be
fixed by the Public Service Commission shall not be longer than fifty years. All that
has been delegated to the Commission, therefore, is the administrative function,
involving the use discretion, to carry out the will of the National Assembly having in
view, in addition, the promotion of "public interests in a proper and suitable manner."
The fact that the National Assembly may itself exercise the function and authority thus
conferred upon the Public Service Commission does not make the provision in
question constitutionally objectionable.
The theory of the separation of powers is designed by its originators to secure action
and at the same time to forestall overaction which necessarily results from undue
concentration of powers, and thereby obtain efficiency and prevent deposition.
Thereby, the "rule of law" was established which narrows the range of governmental
action and makes it subject to control by certain devices. As a corollary, we find the
rule prohibiting delegation of legislative authority, and from the earliest time American
legal authorities have proceeded on the theory that legislative power must be
exercised by the legislature alone. It is frankness, however, to confess that as one
delves into the mass of judicial pronouncement, he finds a great deal of confusion.
One thing, however, is apparent in the development of the principle of separation of
powers and that is that the maxim of delegatus non potest delegari or delegata
potestas non potest delegari, attributed to Bracton (De Legius et Consuetedinious
Angliae, edited by G. E. Woodbine, Yale University Press, 1922, vol. 2, p. 167) but
which is also recognized in principle in the Roman Law (D. 17.18.3), has been made
to adapt itself to the complexities of modern governments, giving rise to the adoption,
within certain limits, of the principle of "subordinate legislation," not only in the United
States and England but in practically all modern governments. (People vs. Rosenthal
and Osmeña, G. R. Nos. 46076 and 46077, promulgated June 12, 1939.) Accordingly,
with the growing complexity of modern life, the multiplication of the subjects of
governmental regulation, and the increased difficulty of administering the laws, there
is a constantly growing tendency toward the delegation of greater powers by the
legislature, and toward the approval of the practice by the court. (Dillon Catfish
Drainage Dist, v. Bank of Dillon, 141 S. E. 274, 275, 143 S. Ct. 178; State vs. Knox
County, 54 S. W. 2d. 973, 976, 165 Tenn. 319.) In harmony with such growing
tendency, this Court, since the decision in the case of Compañia General de Tabacos
de Filipinas vs. Board of Public Utility Commissioner (34 Phil., 136), relied upon by
the petitioner, has, in instances, extended its seal of approval to the "delegation of
greater powers by the legislature." (Inchausti Steamship Co. vs. Public Utility
Commissioner, 44 Phil., Autobus Co. vs. De Jesus, 56 Phil., 446;
People vs. Fernandez & Trinidad, G. R. No. 45655, promulgated June 15, 1938;
People vs. Rosenthal & Osmeña, G. R. Nos. 46076, 46077, promulgated June 12,
1939; and Robb and Hilscher vs. People, G. R. No. 45866, promulgated June 12,
1939.).
Under the fourth paragraph of section 15 of Commonwealth Act No. 146, as amended
by Commonwealth Act No. 454, the power of the Public Service Commission to
prescribed the conditions "that the service can be acquired by the Commonwealth of
the Philippines or by any instrumentality thereof upon payment of the cost price of its
useful equipment, less reasonable," and "that the certificate shall be valid only for a
definite period of time" is expressly made applicable "to any extension or amendment
of certificates actually in force" and "to authorizations to renew and increase
equipment and properties." We have examined the legislative proceedings on the
subject and have found that these conditions were purposely made applicable to
existing certificates of public convenience. The history of Commonwealth Act No. 454
reveals that there was an attempt to suppress, by way of amendment, the sentence
"and likewise, that the certificate shall be valid only for a definite period of time," but
the attempt failed:
 xxx xxx xxx
Sr. CUENCO. Señor Presidente, para otra enmienda. En la misma pagina,
lineas 23 y 24, pido que se supriman las palabras 'and likewise, that the
certificate shall be valid only for a definite period time.' Esta disposicion del
proyecto autoriza a la Comision de Servicios Publicos a fijar un plazo de
vigencia certificado de conveniencia publica. Todo el mundo sabe que bo se
puede determinar cuando los intereses del servicio publico requiren la
explotacion de un servicio publico y ha de saber la Comision de Servisios, si
en un tiempo determinado, la explotacion de algunos buses en cierta ruta ya
no tiene de ser, sobre todo, si tiene en cuenta; que la explotacion de los
servicios publicos depende de condiciones flutuantes, asi como del volumen
como trafico y de otras condiciones. Ademas, el servicio publico se concede
por la Comision de Servicios Publicos el interes publico asi lo exige. El
interes publico no tiene duracion fija, no es permanente; es un proceso mas
o menos indefinido en cuanto al tiempo. Se ha acordado eso en el caucus
de anoche.
EL PRESIDENTE PRO TEMPORE. ¿Que dice el Comite?
Sr. ALANO. El Comite siente tener que rechazar esa enmienda, en vista de
que esto certificados de conveniencia publica es igual que la franquicia:
sepuede extender. Si los servicios presentados por la compañia durante el
tiempo de su certificado lo require, puede pedir la extension y se le
extendera; pero no creo conveniente el que nosotros demos un certificado
de conveniencia publica de una manera que podria pasar de cincuenta
anos, porque seria anticonstitucional.
xxx xxx xxx
By a majority vote the proposed amendment was defeated. (Sesion de 17 de mayo
de 1939, Asamblea Nacional.)
The petitioner is mistaken in the suggestion that, simply because its existing
certificates had been granted before June 8, 1939, the date when Commonwealth Act
No. 454, amendatory of section 15 of Commonwealth Act No. 146, was approved, it
must be deemed to have the right of holding them in perpetuity. Section 74 of the
Philippine Bill provided that "no franchise, privilege, or concession shall be granted to
any corporation except under the conditions that it shall be subject to amendment,
alteration, or repeal by the Congress of the United States." The Jones Law,
incorporating a similar mandate, provided, in section 28, that "no franchise or right
shall be granted to any individual, firm, or corporation except under the conditions that
it shall be subject to amendment, alteration, or repeal by the Congress of the United
States." Lastly, the Constitution of the Philippines provided, in section 8 of Article XIII,
that "no franchise or right shall be granted to any individual, firm, or corporation,
except under the condition that it shall be subject to amendment, alteration, or repeal
by the National Assembly when the public interest so requires." The National
Assembly, by virtue of the Constitution, logically succeeded to the Congress of the
United States in the power to amend, alter or repeal any franchise or right granted
prior to or after the approval of the Constitution; and when Commonwealth Acts Nos.
146 and 454 were enacted, the National Assembly, to the extent therein provided, has
declared its will and purpose to amend or alter existing certificates of public
convenience.
Upon the other hand, statutes enacted for the regulation of public utilities, being a
proper exercise by the state of its police power, are applicable not only to those public
utilities coming into existence after its passage, but likewise to those already
established and in operation.
Nor is there any merit in petitioner's contention, that, because of the
establishment of petitioner's operations prior to May 1, 1917, they are not
subject to the regulations of the Commission. Statutes for the regulation of
public utilities are a proper exercise by the state of its police power. As soon
as the power is exercised, all phases of operation of established utilities,
become at once subject to the police power thus called into operation.
Procedures' Transportation Co. v. Railroad Commission, 251 U. S. 228, 40
Sup. Ct. 131, 64 Law. ed. 239, Law v. Railroad Commission, 184 Cal. 737,
195 Pac. 423, 14 A. L. R. 249. The statute is applicable not only to those
public utilities coming into existence after its passage, but likewise to those
already established and in operation. The 'Auto Stage and Truck
Transportation Act' (Stats. 1917, c. 213) is a statute passed in pursuance of
the police power. The only distinction recognized in the statute between
those established before and those established after the passage of the act
is in the method of the creation of their operative rights. A certificate of public
convenience and necessity it required for any new operation, but no such
certificate is required of any transportation company for the operation which
was actually carried on in good faith on May 1, 1917, This distinction in the
creation of their operative rights in no way affects the power of the
Commission to supervise and regulate them. Obviously the power of the
Commission to hear and dispose of complaints is as effective against
companies securing their operative rights prior to May 1, 1917, as against
those subsequently securing such right under a certificate of public
convenience and necessity. (Motor Transit Co. et al. v. Railroad Commission
of California et al., 209 Pac. 586.)
Moreover, Commonwealth Acts Nos. 146 and 454 are not only the organic acts of the
Public Service Commission but are "a part of the charter of every utility company
operating or seeking to operate a franchise" in the Philippines. (Streator Aqueduct Co.
v. et al., 295 Fed. 385.) The business of a common carrier holds such a peculiar
relation to the public interest that there is superinduced upon it the right of public
regulation. When private property is "affected with a public interest it ceased to
be juris privati only." When, therefore, one devotes his property to a use in which the
public has an interest, he, in effect, grants to the public an interest in that use, and
must submit to be controlled by the public for the common good, to the extent of the
interest he has thus created. He may withdraw his grant by discounting the use, but
so long as he maintains the use he must submit to control. Indeed, this right of
regulation is so far beyond question that it is well settled that the power of the state to
exercise legislative control over public utilities may be exercised through boards of
commissioners. (Fisher vs. Yangco Steamship Company, 31 Phil., 1, citing
Munn vs. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113; Georgia R. & Bkg. Co. vs. Smith, 128 U.S. 174;
Budd vs. New York, 143 U.S. 517; New York etc. R. Co. vs. Bristol 151 U.S. 556, 571;
Connecticut etc. R. Co. vs. Woodruff, 153 U.S. 689; Louisville etc. Ry principle that the genius of constitutional government is contrary to the vesting of
Co. vs. Kentucky, 161 U.S. 677, 695.) This right of the state to regulate public utilities unlimited power anywhere. Law is both a grant and a limitation upon power.
is founded upon the police power, and statutes for the control and regulation of
utilities are a legitimate exercise thereof, for the protection of the public as well as of The decision appealed from is hereby reversed and the case remanded to the Public
the utilities themselves. Such statutes are, therefore, not unconstitutional, either Service Commission for further proceedings in accordance with law and this decision,
impairing the obligation of contracts, taking property without due process, or denying without any pronouncement regarding costs. So ordered.
the equal protection of the laws, especially inasmuch as the question whether or not
private property shall be devoted to a public and the consequent burdens assumed is
ordinarily for the owner to decide; and if he voluntarily places his property in public Avanceña, C.J., Imperial, Diaz, Concepcion and Moran, JJ., concur.
service he cannot complain that it becomes subject to the regulatory powers of the
state. (51 C. J., sec. 21, pp. 9-10.) in the light of authorities which hold that a G.R. No. 1051 May 19, 1903
certificate of public convenience constitutes neither a franchise nor contract, confers
no property right, and is mere license or privilege. (Burgess vs. Mayor & Alderman of THE UNITED STATES, complainant-appellee,
Brockton, 235 Mass. 95, 100, 126 N. E. 456; Roberto vs. Commisioners of vs.
Department of Public Utilities, 262 Mass. 583, 160 N. E. 321; Scheible vs. Hogan, 113 FRED L. DORR, ET AL., defendants-appellants.
Ohio St. 83, 148 N. E. 581; Martz vs. Curtis [J. L.] Cartage Co. [1937], 132 Ohio St.
271, 7 N. E. [d] 220; Manila Yellow Taxicab Co. vs. Sabellano, 59 Phil., 773.)
F. G. Waite for appellants.
Solicitor-General Araneta for appellee.
Whilst the challenged provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 454 are valid and
constitutional, we are, however, of the opinion that the decision of the Public Service
Commission should be reversed and the case remanded thereto for further LADD, J.:
proceedings for the reason now to be stated. The Public Service Commission has
power, upon proper notice and hearing, "to amend, modify or revoke at any time any The defendants have been convicted upon a complaint charging them with the
certificate issued under the provisions of this Act, whenever the facts and offense of writing, publishing, and circulating a scurrilous libel against the
circumstances on the strength of which said certificate was issued have been Government of the United States and the Insular Government of the Philippine
misrepresented or materially changed." (Section 16, par. [m], Commonwealth Act No. Islands. The complaint is based upon section 8 of Act No. 292 of the Commission,
146.) The petitioner's application here was for an increase of its equipment to enable which is as follows:
it to comply with the conditions of its certificates of public convenience. On the matter
of limitation to twenty five (25) years of the life of its certificates of public convenience,
Every person who shall utter seditious words or speeches, write, publish, or
there had been neither notice nor opportunity given the petitioner to be heard or
circulate scurrilous libels against the Government of the United States or the
present evidence. The Commission appears to have taken advantage of the petitioner
Insular Government of the Philippine Islands, or which tend to disturb or
to augment petitioner's equipment in imposing the limitation of twenty-five (25) years
obstruct any lawful officer in executing his office, or which tend to instigate
which might as well be twenty or fifteen or any number of years. This is, to say the
others to cabal or meet together for unlawful purposes, or which suggest or
least, irregular and should not be sanctioned. There are cardinal primary rights which
incite rebellious conspiracies or riots, or which tend to stir up the people
must be respected even in proceedings of this character. The first of these rights is
against the lawful authorities, or to disturb the peace of the community, the
the right to a hearing, which includes the right of the party interested or affected to
safety and order of the Government, or who shall knowingly conceal such
present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof. In the language of
evil practices, shall be punished by a fine not exceeding two thousand
Chief Justice Hughes, in Morgan v. U.S., (304 U.S. 1, 58 S. Ct. 773, 999, 82 Law. ed.
dollars or by imprisonment not exceeding two years, or both, in the
1129), "the liberty and property of the citizen shall be protected by the rudimentary
discretion of the court.
requirements of fair play." Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present
his case and to adduce evidence tending to establish the rights which he asserts but
the tribunal must consider the evidence presented. (Chief Justice Hughes in The alleged libel was published as an editorial in the issue of the "Manila Freedom" of
Morgan vs. U.S., 298 U.S. 468, 56 S. Ct. 906, 80 :Law. ed. 1288.) In the language of April 6, 1902, under the caption of "A few hard facts."
this Court in Edwards vs. McCoy (22 Phil., 598), "the right to adduce evidence,
without the corresponding duty on the part of the board to consider it, is vain. Such The Attorney-General in his brief indicates the following passages of the article as
right is conspicuously futile if the person or persons to whom the evidence is those upon which he relies to sustain the conviction:
presented can thrust it aside without or consideration." While the duty to deliberate
does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a necessity which cannot
Sidney Adamson, in a late letter in "Leslie's Weekly," has the following to say
be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support its decision. A decision
of the action of the Civil Commission in appointing rascally natives to
with absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity, at least when directly attacked.
important Government positions:
(Edwards vs. McCoy, supra.) This principle emanates from the more fundamental
 "It is a strong thing to say, but nevertheless true, that the Civil
Commission, through its ex-insurgent office holders, and by its
continual disregard for the records of natives obtained during the
military rule of the Islands, has, in its distribution of offices,
constituted a protectorate over a set of men who should be in jail or
deported. . . . [Reference is then made to the appointment of one
Tecson as justice of the peace.] This is the kind of foolish work that
the Commission is doing all over the Islands, reinstating insurgents
and rogues and turning down the men who have during the
struggle, at the risk of their lives, aided the Americans."
xxx xxx xxx
There is no doubt but that the Filipino office holders of the Islands are in a
good many instances rascals.
xxx xxx xxx
The commission has exalted to the highest positions in the Islands Filipinos
who are alleged to be notoriously corrupt and rascally, and men of no
personal character.
xxx xxx xxx
Editor Valdez, of "Miau," made serious charges against two of the native
Commissioners — charges against Trinidad H. Pardo de Tavera, which, if true, would
brand the man as a coward and a rascal, and with what result? . . . [Reference is then
made to the prosecution and conviction of Valdez for libel "under a law which
specifies that the greater the truth the greater the libel."] Is it the desire of the people
of the United States that the natives against whom these charges have been made
(which, if true, absolutely vilify their personal characters) be permitted to retain their
seats on the Civil Commission, the executive body of the Philippine Government,
without an investigation?
xxx xxx xxx
It is a notorious fact that many branches of the Government organized by the
Civil Commission are rotten and corrupt. The fiscal system, upon which life,
liberty, and justice depends, is admitted by the Attorney-General himself to
be most unsatisfactory. It is a fact that the Philippine judiciary is far from
being what it should. Neither fiscals nor judges can be persuaded to convict
insurgents when they wish to protect them.
xxx xxx xxx
Now we hear all sorts of reports as to rottenness existing in the province [of
Tayabas], and especially the northern end of it; it is said that it is impossible
to secure the conviction of lawbreakers and outlaws by the native justices, or
a prosecution by the native fiscals.
xxx xxx xxx
The long and short of it is that Americans will not stand for an arbitrary
government, especially when evidences of carpetbagging and rumors of
graft are too thick to be pleasant.
We do not understand that it is claimed that the defendants succeeded in establishing
at the trial the truth of any of the foregoing statements. The only question which we
have considered is whether their publication constitutes an offense under section 8 of
Act No. 292, above cited.
Several allied offenses or modes of committing the same offense are defined in that
section, viz: (1) The uttering of seditious words or speeches; (2) the writing,
publishing, or circulating of scurrilous libels against the Government of the United
States or the Insular Government of the Philippine Islands; (3) the writing, publishing,
or circulating of libels which tend to disturb or obstruct any lawful officer in executing
his office; (4) or which tend to instigate others to cabal or meet together for unlawful
purposes; (5) or which suggest or incite rebellious conspiracies or riots; (6) or which
tend to stir up the people against the lawful authorities or to disturb the peace of the
community, the safety and order of the Government; (7) knowingly concealing such
evil practices.
The complaint appears to be framed upon the theory that a writing, in order to be
punishable as a libel under this section, must be of a scurrilous nature and directed
against the Government of the United States or the Insular Government of the
Philippine Islands, and must, in addition, tend to some one of the results enumerated
in the section. The article in question is described in the complaint as "a scurrilous
libel against the Government of the United States and the Insular Government of the
Philippine Islands, which tends to obstruct the lawful officers of the United States and
the Insular Government of the Philippine Islands in the execution of their offices, and
which tends to instigate others to cabal and meet together for unlawful purposes, and
which suggests and incites rebellious conspiracies, and which tends to stir up the
people against the lawful authorities, and which disturbs the safety and order of the
Government of the United States and the Insular Government of the Philippine
Islands." But it is "a well-settled rule in considering indictments that where an offense
may be committed in any of several different modes, and the offense, in any particular
instance, is alleged to have been committed in two or more modes specified, it is
sufficient to prove the offense committed in any one of them, provided that it be such
as to constitute the substantive offense" (Com. vs. Kneeland, 20 Pick., Mass., 206,
215), and the defendants may, therefore, be convicted if any one of the substantive
charges into which the complaint may be separated has been made out.
We are all, however, agreed upon the proposition that the article in question has no
appreciable tendency to "disturb or obstruct any lawful officer in executing his office,"
or to "instigate" any person or class of persons "to cabal or meet together for unlawful
purposes," or to "suggest or incite rebellious conspiracies or riots," or to "stir up the
people against the lawful authorities or to disturb the peace of the community, the
safety and order of the Government." All these various tendencies, which are
described in section 8 of Act No. 292, each one of which is made an element of a
certain form of libel, may be characterized in general terms as seditious tendencies.
This is recognized in the description of the offenses punished by this section, which is
found in the title of the act, where they are defined as the crimes of the "seditious
utterances, whether written or spoken."
Excluding from consideration the offense of publishing "scurrilous libels against the
Government of the United States or the Insular Government of the Philippine Islands,"
which may conceivably stand on a somewhat different footing, the offenses punished
by this section all consist in inciting, orally or in writing, to acts of disloyalty or
disobedience to the lawfully constituted authorities in these Islands. And while the
article in question, which is, in the main, a virulent attack against the policy of the Civil
Commission in appointing natives to office, may have had the effect of exciting among
certain classes dissatisfaction with the Commission and its measures, we are unable
to discover anything in it which can be regarded as having a tendency to produce
anything like what may be called disaffection, or, in other words, a state of feeling
incompatible with a disposition to remain loyal to the Government and obedient to the
laws. There can be no conviction, therefore, for any of the offenses described in the
section on which the complaint is based, unless it is for the offense of publishing a
scurrilous libel against the Government of the of the United States or the Insular
Government of the Philippine Islands.
Can the article be regarded as embraced within the description of "scurrilous libels
against the Government of the United States or the Insular Government of the
Philippine Islands?" In the determination of this question we have encountered great
difficulty, by reason of the almost entire lack of American precedents which might
serve as a guide in the construction of the law. There are, indeed, numerous English
decisions, most of them of the eighteenth century, on the subject of libelous attacks
upon the "Government, the constitution, or the law generally," attacks upon the
Houses of Parliament, the Cabinet, the Established Church, and other governmental
organisms, but these decisions are not now accessible to us, and, if they were, they
were made under such different conditions from those which prevail at the present
day, and are founded upon theories of government so foreign to those which have
inspired the legislation of which the enactment in question forms a part, that they
would probably afford but little light in the present inquiry. In England, in the latter part
of the eighteenth century, any "written censure upon public men for their conduct as
such," as well as any written censure "upon the laws or upon the institutions of the
country," would probably have been regarded as a libel upon the Government. (2
Stephen, History of the Criminal Law of England, 348.) This has ceased to be the law
in England, and it is doubtful whether it was ever the common law of any American
State. "It is true that there are ancient dicta to the effect that any publication tending to
"possess the people with an ill opinion of the Government" is a seditious libel ( per
Holt, C. J., in R. vs. Tuchin, 1704, 5 St. Tr., 532, and Ellenborough, C. J., in
R. vs. Cobbett, 1804, 29 How. St. Tr., 49), but no one would accept that doctrine now.
Unless the words used directly tend to foment riot or rebellion or otherwise to disturb
the peace and tranquility of the Kingdom, the utmost latitude is allowed in the
discussion of all public affairs." (11 Enc. of the Laws of England, 450.) Judge Cooley
says (Const. Lim., 528): "The English common law rule which made libels on the
constitution or the government indictable, as it was administered by the courts, seems
to us unsuited to the condition and circumstances of the people of America, and
therefore never to have been adopted in the several States."
We find no decisions construing the Tennessee statute (Code, sec. 6663), which is
apparently the only existing American statute of a similar character to that in question,
and from which much of the phraseology of then latter appears to have been taken,
though with some essential modifications.
The important question is to determine what is meant in section 8 of Act No. 292 by
the expression "the Insular Government of the Philippine Islands." Does it mean in a
general and abstract sense the existing laws and institutions of the Islands, or does it
mean the aggregate of the individuals by whom the government of the Islands is, for
the time being, administered? Either sense would doubtless be admissible.
We understand, in modern political science, . . . by the term government, that
institution or aggregate of institutions by which an independent society makes and
carries out those rules of action which are unnecessary to enable men to live in a
social state, or which are imposed upon the people forming that society by those who
possess the power or authority of prescribing them. Government is the aggregate of
authorities which rule a society. By "dministration, again, we understand in modern
times, and especially in more or less free countries, the aggregate of those persons in
whose hands the reins of government are for the time being (the chief ministers or
heads of departments)." (Bouvier, Law Dictionary, 891.) But the writer adds that the
terms "government" and "administration" are not always used in their strictness, and
that "government" is often used for "administration."
In the act of Congress of July 14, 1798, commonly known as the "Sedition Act," it is
made an offense to "write, print, utter, or published," or to "knowingly and willingly
assist or aid in writing, printing, uttering, or publishing any false, scandalous, and
malicious writing or writings against the Government of the United States, or either
House of the Congress of the United States, or the President of the United States,
with intent to defame the said Government, or either House of the said Congress, or
the said President, or to bring them, or either of them, into contempt or disrepute, or
to excite against them or either or any of them the hatred of the good people of the
United States," etc. The term "government" would appear to be used here in the
abstract sense of the existing political system, as distinguished from the concrete
organisms of the Government — the Houses of Congress and the Executive — which
are also specially mentioned.
Upon the whole, we are of the opinion that this is the sense in which the term is used
in the enactment under consideration.
It may be said that there can be no such thing as a scurrilous libel, or any sort of a
libel, upon an abstraction like the Government in the sense of the laws and
institutions of a country, but we think an answer to this suggestion is that the
expression "scurrilous libel" is not used in section 8 of Act No. 292 in the sense in
which it is used in the general libel law (Act No. 277) — that is, in the sense of written
defamation of individuals — but in the wider sense, in which it is applied in the
common law to blasphemous, obscene, or seditious publications in which there may
be no element of defamation whatever. "The word 'libel' as popularly used, seems to
mean only defamatory words; but words written, if obscene, blasphemous, or
seditious, are technically called libels, and the publication of them is, by the law of
England, an indictable offense." (Bradlaugh vs. The Queen, 3 Q. B. D., 607, 627, per
Bramwell L. J. See Com. vs. Kneeland, 20 Pick., 206, 211.)
While libels upon forms of government, unconnected with defamation of individuals,
must in the nature of things be of uncommon occurrence, the offense is by no means
an imaginary one. An instance of a prosecution for an offense essentially of this
nature is Republica vs. Dennie, 4 Yeates (Pa.), 267, where the defendant was
indicted "as a factious and seditious person of a wicked mind and unquiet and
turbulent disposition and conversation, seditiously, maliciously, and willfully intending,
as much as in him lay, to bring into contempt and hatred the independence of the
United States, the constitution of this Commonwealth and of the United States, to
excite popular discontent and dissatisfaction against the scheme of polity instituted,
and upon trial in the said United States and in the said Commonwealth, to molest,
disturb, and destroy the peace and tranquility of the said United States and of the said
Commonwealth, to condemn the principles of the Revolution, and revile, depreciate,
and scandalize the characters of the Revolutionary patriots and statesmen, to
endanger, subvert, and totally destroy the republican constitutions and free
governments of the said United States and this Commonwealth, to involve the said
United States and this Commonwealth in civil war, desolation, and anarchy, and to
procure by art and force a radical change and alteration in the principles and forms of
the said constitutions and governments, without the free will, wish, and concurrence
of the people of the said United States and this Commonwealth, respectively," the
charge being that "to fulfill, perfect, and bring to effect his wicked, seditious, and
detestable intentions aforesaid he . . . falsely, maliciously, factiously, and seditiously
did make, compose, write, and publish the following libel, to wit; 'A democracy is
scarcely tolerable at any period of national history. Its omens are always sinister and
its powers are unpropitious. With all the lights or experience blazing before our eyes,
it is impossible not to discover the futility of this form of government. It was weak and
wicked at Athens, it was bad in Sparta, and worse in Rome. It has been tried in
France and terminated in despotism. it was tried in England and rejected with the
utmost loathing and abhorrence. It is on its trial here and its issue will be civil war,
desolation, and anarchy. No wise man but discerns its imperfections; no good man
but shudders at its miseries; no honest man but proclaims its fraud, and no brave
man but draws his sword against its force. The institution of a scheme of polity so
radically contemptible and vicious is a memorable example of what the villainy of
some men can devise, the folly of others receive, and both establish, in despite of
reason, reflection, and sensation.'"
An attack upon the lawfully established system of civil government in the Philippine
Islands, like that which Dennie was accused of making upon the republican form of
government lawfully established in the United States and in the State of Pennsylvania
would, we think, if couched in scandalous language, constitute the precise offense
described in section 8 of Act No. 292 as a scurrilous libel against the Insular
Government of the Philippine Islands.
Defamation of individuals, whether holding official positions or not, and whether
directed to their public conduct or to their private life, may always be adequately
punished under the general libel law. Defamation of the Civil Commission as an
aggregation, it being "a body of persons definite and small enough for its individual
members to be recognized as such" (Stephen, Digest of the Criminal Law, art. 277),
as well as defamation of any of the individual members of the Commission or of the
Civil Governor, either in his public capacity or as a private individual, may be so
punished. The general libel law enacted by the Commission was in force when Act
No. 292, was passed. There was no occasion for any further legislation on the subject
of libels against the individuals by whom the Insular Government is administered —
against the Insular Government in the sense of the aggregate of such individuals.
There was occasion for stringent legislation against seditious words or libels, and that
is the main if not the sole purpose of the section under consideration. It is not
unreasonable to suppose that the Commission, in enacting this section, may have
conceived of attacks of a malignant or scurrilous nature upon the existing political
system of the United States, or the political system established in these Islands by the
authority of the United States, as necessarily of a seditious tendency, but it is not so
reasonable to suppose that they conceived of attacks upon the personnel of the
government as necessarily tending to sedition. Had this been their view it seems
probable that they would, like the framers of the Sedition Act of 1798, have expressly
and specifically mentioned the various public officials and collegiate governmental
bodies defamation of which they meant to punish as sedition.
The article in question contains no attack upon the governmental system of the
United States, and it is quite apparent that, though grossly abusive as respects both
the Commission as a body and some of its individual members, it contains no attack
upon the governmental system by which the authority of the United States is enforced
in these Islands. The form of government by a Civil Commission and a Civil Governor
is not assailed. It is the character of the men who are intrusted with the administration
of the government that the writer is seeking to bring into disrepute by impugning the
purity of their motives, their public integrity, and their private morals, and the wisdom
of their policy. The publication of the article, therefore, no seditious tendency being
apparent, constitutes no offense under Act No. 292, section 8.
The judgment of conviction is reversed and the defendants are acquitted, with
costs de oficio.
Arellano, C.J. Torres, Willard and Mapa, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-9657. November 29, 1956.]
LEOPOLDO T. BACANI and MATEO A. MATOTO, Plaintiffs-Appellees, vs.
NATIONAL COCONUT CORPORATION, ET AL., Defendants, NATIONAL
COCONUT CORPORATION and BOARD OF LIQUIDATORS, Defendants-
Appellants.
DECISION
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
Plaintiffs herein are court stenographers assigned in Branch VI of the Court of First
Instance of Manila. During the pendency of Civil Case No. 2293 of said court, entitled
Francisco Sycip vs. National Coconut Corporation, Assistant Corporate Counsel
Federico Alikpala, counsel for Defendant, requested said stenographers for copies of
the transcript of the stenographic notes taken by them during the
hearing. Plaintiffs complied with the request by delivering to Counsel Alikpala the
needed transcript containing 714 pages and thereafter submitted to him their bills for
the payment of their fees. The National Coconut Corporation paid the amount of P564
to Leopoldo T. Bacani and P150 to Mateo A. Matoto for said transcript at the rate of
P1 per page.
Upon inspecting the books of this corporation, the Auditor General disallowed the
payment of these fees and sought the recovery of the amounts paid. On January 19,
1953, the Auditor General required the Plaintiffs to reimburse said amounts on the
strength of a circular of the Department of Justice wherein the opinion was expressed
that the National Coconut Corporation, being a government entity, was exempt from
the payment of the fees in question. On February 6, 1954, the Auditor General issued
an order directing the Cashier of the Department of Justice to deduct from the salary
of Leopoldo T. Bacani the amount of P25 every payday and from the salary of Mateo
A. Matoto the amount of P10 every payday beginning March 30, 1954. To prevent
deduction of these fees from their salaries and secure a judicial ruling that the
National Coconut Corporation is not a government entity within the purview of section
16, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, this action was instituted in the Court of First
Instance of Manila.
Defendants set up as a defense that the National Coconut Corporation is a
government entity within the purview of section 2 of the Revised Administrative Code
of 1917 and, hence, it is exempt from paying the stenographers’ fees under Rule 130
of the Rules of Court. After trial, the court found for the Plaintiffs declaring (1)
“that Defendant National Coconut Corporation is not a government entity within the
purview of section 16, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court; chan roblesvirtualawlibrary(2)
that the payments already made by said Defendant to Plaintiffs herein and received
by the latter from the former in the total amount of P714, for copies of the
stenographic transcripts in question, are valid, just and legal; chan
roblesvirtualawlibraryand (3) that Plaintiffs are under no obligation whatsoever to
make a refund of these payments already received by them.” This is an appeal from
said decision.
Under section 16, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, the Government of the Philippines
is exempt from paying the legal fees provided for therein, and among these fees are
those which stenographers may charge for the transcript of notes taken by them that
may be requested by any interested person (section 8). The fees in question are for
the transcript of notes taken during the hearing of a case in which the National
Coconut Corporation is interested, and the transcript was requested by its assistant
corporate counsel for the use of said corporation.
On the other hand, section 2 of the Revised Administrative Code defines the scope of
the term “Government of the Republic of the Philippines” as
follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
“‘The Government of the Philippine Islands’ is a term which refers to the corporate
governmental entity through which the functions of government are exercised
throughout the Philippine Islands, including, save as the contrary appears from the
context, the various arms through which political authority is made effective in said
Islands, whether pertaining to the central Government or to the provincial or municipal
branches or other form of local government.”
The question now to be determined is whether the National Coconut Corporation may
be considered as included in the term “Government of the Republic of the Philippines”
for the purposes of the exemption of the legal fees provided for in Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court.
As may be noted, the term “Government of the Republic of the Philippines” refers to a
government entity through which the functions of government are exercised, including
the various arms through which political authority is made effective in the Philippines,
whether pertaining to the central government or to the provincial or municipal
branches or other form of local government. This requires a little digression on the
nature and functions of our government as instituted in our Constitution.
To begin with, we state that the term “Government” may be defined as “that institution
or aggregate of institutions by which an independent society makes and carries out
those rules of action which are necessary to enable men to live in a social state, or
which are imposed upon the people forming that society by those who possess the
power or authority of prescribing them” (U.S. vs. Dorr, 2 Phil., 332). This institution,
when referring to the national government, has reference to what our Constitution has
established composed of three great departments, the legislative, executive, and the
judicial, through which the powers and functions of government are exercised. These
functions are twofold:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary constitute and ministrant. The former
are those which constitute the very bonds of society and are compulsory in
nature; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarythe latter are those that are undertaken only by
way of advancing the general interests of society, and are merely optional. President
Wilson enumerates the constituent functions as follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
“‘(1) The keeping of order and providing for the protection of persons and property
from violence and robbery.
‘(2) The fixing of the legal relations between man and wife and between parents and
children.
‘(3) The regulation of the holding, transmission, and interchange of property, and the
determination of its liabilities for debt or for crime.
‘(4) The determination of contract rights between individuals.
‘(5) The definition and punishment of crime.
‘(6) The administration of justice in civil cases.
‘(7) The determination of the political duties, privileges, and relations of citizens.
‘(8) Dealings of the state with foreign powers:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary the
preservation of the state from external danger or encroachment and the advancement
of its international interests.’“ (Malcolm, The Government of the Philippine Islands, p.
19.)
The most important of the ministrant functions are:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary public
works, public education, public charity, health and safety regulations, and regulations
of trade and industry. The principles deter mining whether or not a government shall
exercise certain of these optional functions are:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary (1) that a
government should do for the public welfare those things which private capital would
not naturally undertake and (2) that a government should do these things which by its
very nature it is better equipped to administer for the public welfare than is any private
individual or group of individuals. (Malcolm, The Government of the Philippine
Islands, pp. 19-20.)
From the above we may infer that, strictly speaking, there are functions which our
government is required to exercise to promote its objectives as expressed in our
Constitution and which are exercised by it as an attribute of sovereignty, and those
which it may exercise to promote merely the welfare, progress and prosperity of the
people. To this latter class belongs the organization of those corporations owned or
controlled by the government to promote certain aspects of the economic life of our
people such as the National Coconut Corporation. These are what we call
government-owned or controlled corporations which may take on the form of a private
enterprise or one organized with powers and formal characteristics of a private
corporations under the Corporation Law.
The question that now arises is:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary Does the fact that these
corporation perform certain functions of government make them a part of the
Government of the Philippines?
The answer is simple:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary they do not acquire that status for
the simple reason that they do not come under the classification of municipal or public
corporation. Take for instance the National Coconut Corporation. While it was
organized with the purpose of “adjusting the coconut industry to a position
independent of trade preferences in the United States” and of providing “Facilities for
the better curing of copra products and the proper utilization of coconut by-products”,
a function which our government has chosen to exercise to promote the coconut
industry, however, it was given a corporate power separate and distinct from our
government, for it was made subject to the provisions of our Corporation Law in so far
as its corporate existence and the powers that it may exercise are concerned
(sections 2 and 4, Commonwealth Act No. 518). It may sue and be sued in the same
manner as any other private corporations, and in this sense it is an entity different
from our government. As this Court has aptly said, “The mere fact that the
Government happens to be a majority stockholder does not make it a public
corporation” (National Coal Co. vs. Collector of Internal Revenue, 46 Phil., 586-587).
“By becoming a stockholder in the National Coal Company, the Government divested
itself of its sovereign character so far as respects the transactions of the
corporation cralaw . Unlike the Government, the corporation may be sued without its
consent, and is subject to taxation. Yet the National Coal Company remains an
agency or instrumentality of government.” (Government of the Philippine Islands vs.
Springer, 50 Phil., 288.)
To recapitulate, we may mention that the term “Government of the Republic of the
Philippines” used in section 2 of the Revised Administrative Code refers only to that
government entity through which the functions of the government are exercised as an
attribute of sovereignty, and in this are included those arms through which political
authority is made effective whether they be provincial, municipal or other form of local
government. These are what we call municipal corporations. They do not include
government entities which are given a corporate personality separate and distinct
from the government and which are governed by the Corporation Law. Their powers,
duties and liabilities have to be determined in the light of that law and of their
corporate charters. They do not therefore come within the exemption clause
prescribed in section 16, Rule 130 of our Rules of Court.
“Public corporations are those formed or organized for the government of a portion of
the State.” (Section 3, Republic Act No. 1459, Corporation Law).
“‘The generally accepted definition of a municipal corporation would only include
organized cities and towns, and like organizations, with political and legislative
powers for the local, civil government and police regulations of the inhabitants of the
particular district included in the boundaries of the corporation.’ Heller vs. Stremmel,
52 Mo. 309, 312.”
“In its more general sense the phrase ‘municipal corporation’ may include both towns
and counties, and other public corporations created by government for political
purposes. In its more common and limited signification, it embraces only incorporated
villages, towns and cities. Dunn vs. Court of County Revenues, 85 Ala. 144, 146, 4
So. 661.” (McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, 2nd ed., Vol. 1, p. 385.)
“We may, therefore, define a municipal corporation in its historical and strict sense to
be the incorporation, by the authority of the government, of the inhabitants of a
particular place or district, and authorizing them in their corporate capacity to exercise
subordinate specified powers of legislation and regulation with respect to their local
and internal concerns. This power of local government is the distinctive purpose and
the distinguishing feature of a municipal corporation proper.” (Dillon, Municipal
Corporations, 5th ed., Vol. I, p. 59.)
It is true that under section 8, Rule 130, stenographers may only charge as fees
P0.30 for each page of transcript of not less than 200 words before the appeal is
taken and P0.15 for each page after the filing of the appeal, but in this case the
National Coconut Corporation has agreed and in fact has paid P1.00 per page for the
services rendered by the Plaintiffs and has not raised any objection to the amount
paid until its propriety was disputed by the Auditor General. The payment of the fees
in question became therefore contractual and as such is valid even if it goes beyond
the limit prescribed in section 8, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
As regards the question of procedure raised by Appellants, suffice it to say that the
same is insubstantial, considering that this case refers not to a money claim
disapproved by the Auditor General but to an action of prohibition the purpose of
which is to restrain the officials concerned from deducting from Plaintiffs’ salaries the
amount paid to them as stenographers’ fees. This case does not come under section
1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court relative to appeals from a decision of the Auditor
General.
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is affirmed, without pronouncement as to
costs.
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B.
L., Endencia and Felix, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-27275 November 18, 1967
C & C COMMERCIAL CORPORATION, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
NATIONAL WATERWORKS AND SEWERAGE AUTHORITY, defendant-appellant.
The Government Corporate Counsel for defendant-appellant.
Cesar R. Canonizado and E. Ignacio for plaintiff-appellee.
ANGELES, J.:
The main issue in this appeal is, whether or not the call for bids for the supply of steel
and centrifugal cast iron pipes for the waterworks projects in Manila and suburbs, and
in the cities of Davao and Iloilo, the National Waterworks & Sewerage Authority
(NAWASA) violated the provisions of Republic Act 912, section 1 of which provides as
follows:
Sec. 1. In construction or repair work undertaken by the Government,
whether done directly or through contract awards, Philippine made materials
and products, whenever available, practicable and usable, and will serve the
purpose as equally well as foreign made products or materials, shall be used
in said construction or repair work, upon the proper certification of the
availability, practicability, usability and durability of said materials or products
by the Director of the Bureau of Public Works and/or his assistants.
In the decision appealed from the Court of First Instance of Manila has permanently
enjoined the NAWASA from the procurement of the materials needed for the projects
involved which, according to the appellant, are designed to alleviate the sufferings of
the millions of inhabitants in said places where there is a crying need for more water
— an item so vital to human existence — and the delay occasioned by the injunctions
complained of, has in no little way, further aggravated the inconvenience of the
consuming public in said metropolitan areas where acute water crises have recurred
through the years. Nevertheless, it is vehemently contended by the appellee that the
declaration of an economic national policy as envisioned in the aforequoted provision
of the law which, like the original Flag Law1 is impressed with the clear nationalistic
policy of giving preference to locally produced materials and products, has been
violated; and if this is so, no amount of public clamor could justify the acts of the
NAWASA complained of, for above all the supremacy of the law must be upheld. We
have, therefore, examined the record of this case with these considerations foremost
in Our minds.
It appears that the case, originally commenced in the Court of First Instance of
Manila, on July 7, 1965, as a petition for declaratory relief for the purpose of securing
a judicial pronouncement on the interpretation of the word "practicable" as used in
Republic Act No. 912, i.e., whether it means that the cheapest materials among the
locally produced or manufactured products should be preferred and specified in
construction and repair works undertaken by the Government, was later converted
into, an action for prohibition with preliminary injunction through the process of
supplemental pleadings.
THE SAN PABLO WATERWORKS SYSTEM —
The corresponding complaint was filed on 19 July 1965, alleging that the NAWASA
had started to negotiate: for direct purchase of centrifugally cast iron pipes (CCI) for
the improvement of the San Pablo Waterworks System in violation of the provisions of
Republic Act 912 and the law on public biddings, excluding the C & C Commercial
Company, the plaintiff, which can supply instead asbestos cement pressure pipes
which are available, practicable and usable, and will serve the purpose of the said
project at a much lower cost.
On 6 August 1965, the NAWASA filed its answer to the complaint. On 10 August
1965, the Filipino Pipe and Foundry Corporation, with leave of court, also filed its
answer in intervention.
On 16 August 1965, as prayed for in the complaint, the court issued a writ of
preliminary injunction restraining the NAWASA from further negotiating the purchase
of the CCI pipes from the intervenor.
On 23 September 1965, the plaintiff and the NAWASA entered into a partial
stipulation of facts, on the basis of which and the additional evidence adduced at the
hearing, the court rendered a partial decision on 31 January 1966, dismissing the
complaint insofar as the San Pablo Waterworks System was concerned and
dissolving the preliminary injunction issued thereunder. This partial decision has
become final.
THE DAVAO METROPOLITAN WATERWORKS —
On 22 January 1965, the NAWASA called for bids for the furnishing of labor and the
supply of materials for the construction of the proposed improvement of the Davao
Metropolitan Waterworks System. In the call for bids, the bidders were required to
submit proposals for the supply of 24-inch steel pipes, asbestos, cement pressure
pipes, and cast iron pipes. The bidding was held on 23 February 1965. On 15 March
1965, the committee on award of the NAWASA recommended to the board of
directors that the bid be awarded to the lowest bidder, Tirso del Rosario, under his
proposal to supply steel pipes.
On 10 August 1965, the plaintiff filed a (First) supplemental complaint seeking to
restrain the NAWASA from proceeding with the award of the project in Davao,
alleging that in specifying steel pipes for the project, which is admittedly imported
material, without giving preference to locally produced asbestos cement pressure
pipes manufactured by the plaintiff, violates the provisions of Republic Act 912. On 14
August 1965, the court admitted the supplemental complaint; and as prayed for
therein on, 17 September 1965, the Court issued a writ of preliminary injunction.
THE ILOILO WATERWORKS SYSTEM —
As early as on 26 November 1962, the NAWASA called for bids for the supply of 18-
inch steel pipes for the improvement of the Iloilo Waterworks System. The bidding
was conducted on 27 December 1962. C & C Commercial Co. participated in the
bidding offering to supply the needed 18-inch steel pipes for the project, but lost in
the bidding. The lowest bidder for the supply of the specified 18-inch steel pipes was
the Regal Trading Corporation, and the bid was awarded to it.
On 8 September 1965, almost three (3) years after the date of the bidding, the C & C
Commercial Co. filed a (Second) supplemental complaint; seeking to restrain the
NAWASA from formalizing or implementing the award on the aforesaid Iloilo
project for the supply of 18-inch steel pipes, alleging that in specifying steel pipes for
the particular project, the NAWASA has violated the provisions of Republic Act 912
which requires the purchase of Philippine made materials and products which
are available, practicable and usable locally, like plaintiff's product — asbestos
cement pressure pipes — in construction and repair undertaken by the government.
On 24 September 1965, over the objection of the NAWASA, alleges second
supplemental complaint was admitted by the court. The record is not clear when the
restraining order under the second supplemental complaint was issued, although the
NAWASA alleges that a restraining order was issued under date of 10 September
1965, which fact has not been traversed by the plaintiff.
THE MANILA AND SUBURBS WATERWORKS SYSTEM —
On 13 September 1965, the NAWASA advertised for bids for the supply of 30 to 42-
inch steel pipes for the use and improvement of the interim waterworks project in the
City of Manila and suburbs, the bidding to take place on 14 December 1955. On 10
November 1965, the C & C Commercial Co. filed a (Third) Supplemental
complaint seeking to restrain the NAWASA and its representatives from holding the
balding under the aforementioned notice to bid, averring identical facts as those
alleged in the previous supplemental complaints, that the call for bid for steel pipes for
the Manila project and suburbs violates the provisions of Republic Act 912. Over the
objection of the defendant NAWASA, the supplemental complaint was admitted; and
as prayed for therein, on 20 November 1965, a writ of preliminary injunction was
issued restraining the NAWASA from holding the bidding scheduled on 14 December
1965, or on any subsequent date, until further orders from the court.
Pending the case in the court a quo, the NAWASA filed three separate motions
praying for the dissolution of the preliminary injunctive writs issued in connection with
the Davao, Iloilo and Manila projects, pleading to the court to consider the crying
need for a more adequate supply of water in those cities, particularly in the City of
Manila and its suburbs, where the lack of adequate supply of potable water has been
a recurrent crisis which affected to a dangerous extent, the health and the life of the
inhabitants, and that the continuation of the injunctive writs may bring about the
cancellation of the $20,200,000.00 loan of the NAWASA from the World Bank, which
would result from the failure of the NAWASA to comply with the formulated work
schedule of the waterworks projects, which under the agreement with the World
Bank, has to be completed in the month of October 1967; but the court failed to take
any action on the motions. Parodying Shakespeare, "Set honor in one eye, and death
in the other, and I will look on both indifferently."
After a trial of the case, on 15 August 1966, the court rendered a decision finding and
concluding that the act of the NAWASA in specifying steel pipes for the project of the
city of Manila and its suburbs, and in awarding the contracts for the supply of steel
pipes in the cases of the Davao and Iloilo Waterworks System, constituted a violation
of the provisions of Republic Act 912; the dispositive portion of the decision reads as
follows:
(a) On the supplemental complaint, making permanent the preliminary
injunction dated September 2, 1965, enjoining the defendant or its
representatives and agents from formalizing or implementing the award for
the construction of the Davao Waterworks Project in respect of the award of
pipes to be used therein; rescinding the award made in favor of Tirso del
Rosario; and ordering the reappraisal of the bids with a view to complying
with the provisions of Republic Act No 912;
(b) On the second supplemental complaint ordering the issuance of a
permanent injunction to enjoin the defendants or its agents and
representatives from formalizing the award of the contract for the furnishing
of 18" steel pipes for the Iloilo Waterworks System; ordering a new bidding
for the said project so as to include in the call for bids for the supply and
delivery of materials, asbestos cement pipes, as well as CCI pipes; and
rescinding the award of the contract in favor of the Regal Trading
Corporation;
(c) On the third supplemental complaint, making permanent the preliminary
injunction dated December 14, 1965, or any other subsequent date calling
for imported steel pipes from 30" to 42" diameter for the interim
Development of Waterworks System for Manila and suburbs; and ordering
the defendant to specify asbestos cement pressure pipes for the said
project; and
(d) Ordering the defendants to pay the costs.
From the decision, NAWASA appealed to this Court.
Appellant contends that the provisions of Republic Act 912, are applicable only to
construction or repair works undertaken by the Government. It argues, that since the
NAWASA, though a public corporation, is not a municipal corporation or agency of the
State empowered to regulate or administer the local affairs of a town or city,2 nor one
of the various arms of the government through which political authority is made
effective in the Islands, consequently, the NAWASA should not be included within the
meaning of the term "Government" as used in the law.3 It is to be noted, however, that
Section 2 of the Revised Administrative Code defining the term "Government" which
is heavily relied upon by the appellant recognizes an exception: "when a different
meaning for the word or phrase is given a particular statute or is plainly to be
collected from the context or connection where the term is used." In this context of the
law, the term "government" without any qualification as used in Republic Act 912,
should be construed in its implied sense and not in the strict signification of the term
"Government of the Philippines" as the political entity through which political authority
is exercised. A comparative analysis of Republic Act 912 and Commonwealth Act 138,
otherwise known as the "Flag Law" the latter "An Act to give Native Products and
Domestic Entities the Preference in the Purchase of Articles for the Government", and
the former "An Act to Require the Use, Under Certain Conditions, of Philippine Made
Materials or Products in Government Projects or Public Works Construction, Whether
Done Directly by the Government or Awarded thru Contracts", discloses that both
relate to the same subject matter and have the same nationalistic purpose or object:
to give preference to locally produced materials in purchases, works or projects of the
Government. The oberservation that Commonwealth Act 138 expressly
includes purchases by Government-owned companies, while Republic Act 912 merely
relates to construction or repair work done by the Government, is no argument for the
proposition that government-owned or controlled corporations have been excepted
from the operation of the latter law, for it is clear that Commonwealth Act 138 also
ordains that the Purchase and Equipment Division of government-owned companies
authorized to purchase or contract for materials and supplies for public use, buildings,
or public works, shall give preference to locally produced materials or products. Being
statutes in pari materia they should be construed together to attain the purpose of an
expressed national policy. Thus, it has been aptly stated:
On the presumption that whenever the legislature enacts a provision it has in
mind the previous statutes relating to the same subject matter, it is held that
in the absence of any express repeal or amendment therein, the new
provision was enacted in accord with the legislative policy embodied in those
prior statutes, and they all should be construed together. Provisions in an act
which are omitted in another act relating to the same subject matter will be
applied in a proceeding under the other act, when not inconsistent with its
purpose. Prior statutes relating to the same subject matter are to be
compared with the new provisions; and if possible by reasonable
construction, both are to be construed that effect is given to every provision
of each. Statutes in pari materia although in apparent conflict, are so far as
reasonably possible construed to be in harmony with each other.4
The main objective of the Government is to develop our domestic industries so that
the country will be economically self-sufficient. And both Commonwealth Act 138 and
Republic Act 912 aim to contribute to the realization of the aforesaid nationalistic
policy by requiring, the use of Philippine made products or materials,
whenever available, practicable and usable in government construction work or repair
projects. The alleged conflict between the two laws is more apparent than real, and
should not be allowed to defeat the purpose of these laws. We have to declare,
therefore, that the NAWASA, like any other corporation exercising proprietary or
governmental functions should be deemed embraced within the term "Government"
found in Republic Act 912, and in the repair or construction of their works or projects
or the purchase of materials therefor, local materials should be given preference
when available, practicable and usable.
The next issue for consideration is: Did the NAWASA violate the provisions of
Republic Act 912?
Appellant vehemently denies the charge and decries the holding of the lower court
appealed from that in specifying steel pipes in the call for bids for the supply of
materials for the waterworks projects under consideration it had defied the mandate
of the law. Appellant insists that at the time it called for bids for the Davao project,
followed by the call for the supply of materials, for the Iloilo project, herein appellee's
plant was only capable of producing asbestos cement pressure pipes up to 12 inches
diameter; while at the time the call for bids for the supply of materials for the Interim
Project of Manila and suburbs was advertised, the largest size of asbestos cement
pipes available were of 24 inches being produced at the time by another local
manufacturer, the Eternit Corporation, which never protested against the bids in
question.
We have reexamined the record of the case with painstaking solicitude and, instead,
We find the facts indubitable and conclusive that the C & C Commercial Corporation
had not therefore and even up to the present time ever produced pipes larger than 12
inches in diameter. Said appellee corporation has implicitly admitted this as a fact;
and although it claims to have a complete plant that is equipped with the necessary
machinery, technicians and skilled laborers capable of producing pipes in the sizes
called for in those bids (18 to 42 inches in diameter) had the NAWASA specified them
in asbestos cement, the weakness of the argument is at once exposed by a mere
examination of the pertinent evidence adduced during the trial of the case on this
particular point. The claim is belied by Leopoldo del Rosario, a staff civil an engineer
of the NAWASA, who testified as follows:
Q. Engineer Del Rosario, what is the limitation of the local
asbestos cement pressure pipes that are locally manufactured in
the Philippines?
A. We based on NAWASA's experience, we have purchased
only sizes up to 12 inches, but on certification of the Bureau of
Public Works, a report has been submitted to us that asbestos
cement pressure pipes (is) being manufactured by one local
manufacturing company in the Philippines, the Eternit Corporation,
which is a pipe manufacturer. and we have recently purchased
pipes for the Manila interim project of sizes up to 24 inches non-
pressure pipes.
Q. Is there any other local manufacturer of asbestos cement
pressure pipes besides C & C Commercial Corporation?
A. None, sir, only the C & C Commercial Corporation.5
Q. Engineer del Rosario, as staff civil engineer and the
specification engineer, member-secretary of the Pre-Qualifications
Committee and the present chairman of all the bidding committees
of the NAWASA, do you know if C & C Commercial Corporation, the
plaintiff herein, is manufacturing asbestos cement pressure pipes
from sizes thirty inches and up in diameter?
A. The company does not manufacture size beyond twelve
inches.
Q. Why do you say that the C & C Commercial Corporation is
not manufacturing asbestos cement pressure. pipes beyond twelve
inches?
 A. Because we had bi-yearly inspection of all local plants here
as a matter of policy of the committee to determine the capacity or
capability of the local manufacturers to supply and even to bid. So
every six months the pre-qualifications, committee in collaboration
with the procurement inspect all the facilities of the chemical
producing plant, this cast iron and asbestos plant, the galvanized
iron pipe plant, these are regularly inspected every six months and
so the pre-qualifications would know what is available.6
And the foregoing testimony relative to the "non-availability" of appellee's products in
sizes above 12 inches in diameter was corroborated by Mrs. Clara Reyes Pastor,
herein appellee corporation's President, who declared as follows:
Q. Is it not a fact Mrs. Reyes, that the sizes of asbestos cement
pressure pipes locally manufactured by you and which you furnish
the NAWASA is only 12 inches in diameter? Yes or No ?
A. Yes, sir, because that is the only pipe required at the time I
delivered it.
Q. And the asbestos cement pressure pipes from sizes 12 to 42
inches that you have supplied the NAWASA in the past, they were
all imported by you?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. I heard you testify Mrs. Reyes, that in case you win in this
particular bidding, you intend to import equipments from abroad, is
that correct?
A. Not equipments, only mandril.
Q. So that presently what is the biggest size of mandril that you
have?
A. I have a 16-inch mandril the biggest of them all.7
From the foregoing testimony of witnesses, and in the light of other evidence
submitted by the parties, the following may be deduced: that it is the practice of the
NAWASA — which we find both practical and logical — to send out its own men to the
various local manufacturing plants for the purpose of knowing the availability of
materials needed for its projects; that at the time it specified 18 and 24 inches
diameter steel pipes for the Davao and Iloilo waterworks projects, there were no
locally produced materials in said sizes; and that with respect to those sizes that were
already available, the NAWASA has actually specified and used them in various other
construction and repair works even without the certification of the Director of Public
Works. We really do not see Our way clear how herein appellee could have charged
that the NAWASA had discriminated against its products under the circumstances
when its own president admits that it has supplied the NAWASA before locally
produced asbestos cement pressure pipes up to 12 inches diameter only and all
those with diameters above 12 inches were of foreign manufacture. The evidence,
therefore, is conclusive that locally produced asbestos pipes above 12 inches in
diameter were not available for purposes of claiming any preference under the
provisions of Republic Act 912. And this conclusion becomes even more cogent if We
are to consider the fact that C & C Commercial Corporation failed to produce the
necessary certification from the Director of Public Works to show that its products
were already certified as available, practicable and usable at the time that the call for
bids for the supply of materials for the Davao, Iloilo and Manila Interim projects were
made to give some semblance of the right it claims to have been violated.
Of course, appellee points out the fact that it has subsequently secured the necessary
certification from the Director of Public Works certifying to the availability, practicability
and durability of the asbestos cement pressure pipes produced from its plant. We
agree, and there should be no quarrel at all that with respect to pipes of 4 to 12
inches in diameter which it is actually producing now, the preference claimed under
the law may be allowed. Be that as it may, however, the certification referred to did
not in any way improve its position; for the stubborn fact still remains that at the time
said certification was issued on July 6,1966, C & C Commercial Corporation was
actually producing asbestos pipe up to 12 inches only, which its existing equipment or
machinery, when inspected by a representative of the Office that issued the
certification, was found capable of producing. Hence, We cannot subscribe to the
holding of the court below that locally produced asbestos cement pipes above 12
inches in diameter may be considered "'available" within the meaning of Republic Act
912 simply because the President of herein appellee corporation n had manifested or
promised that it can procure bigger mandrels worth $25,000.00 fom abroad and will
be able to produce pipes in the larger sizes called for in the questioned bids shortly
after their installation, for that would be giving the term "available" a very strained
meaning. It would really be unfair to require in order to be "available" within the
meaning of the law that herein appellee should have in stock the sizes of pipes called
for in the bids in the quantity needed by the appellant; but We cannot also believe, by
any stretch of the imagination, that the Director of Public Works would certify to the
availability, practicability, usability and durability of certain products even before the
machinery, equipment or tools needed to produce said products are actually bought
from abroad and installed in its plant by the manufacturer.
Statutes granting advantages to private persons have in many instances created
special privileges or monopolies for the grantees and thus have been viewed with
suspicion and strictly construed. This is altogether appropriate in the majority of
situations, for if public advantage is gained by the grant,it normally appears to be of
secondary significance compared with the advantage gained by the grantee.8 And
rights which exist only by virtue of such statutes come into being only after strict
compliance with all the conditions found in those statutes.9 These rules should apply
to the case at bar where the law invoked grants a preference to locally produced
products or materials. Since Republic Act 912 grants preference only upon the
certification of availability, practicability and usability of locally produced materials by
the Director of Public Works, that certification must be existing and effective before
any right arising therefrom may be claimed to have been violated. Notwithstanding
the clear nationalistic policy of the law aforementioned, We cannot, by any mistaken
sympathy towards herein appellee, recognize the existence of its right under the law
alleged to have been violated, which C & C Commercial Corporation has miserably
failed to prove in this case.
With respect to the Interim Project for the City of Manila and its suburbs, it would
seem that the decision appealed from had virtually become moot and academic by
reason of the passage of Republic Act 4858 which authorizes the President to allow
the procurement of supplies necessary for the rehabilitation of the project as an
exception to the restrictions and preferences provided for in Republic Act 912, and the
President appears to have authorized the General Manager of the NAWASA under
the said statutory power to purchase all the pipes and materials necessary for the
project by negotiated sales.
For all the foregoing, We find it unnecessary to discuss further the other errors
assigned by the appellant.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby set aside, with costs against the
appellee. The writs of preliminary injunctions issued by the lower court are set, aside,
and declared null and void.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes J.B.L., Dizon, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez and Castro,
JJ., concur.
Fernando, J., took no part.
G.R. No. L-45081 July 15, 1936
JOSE A. ANGARA, petitioner,
vs.
THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION, PEDRO YNSUA, MIGUEL CASTILLO, and
DIONISIO C. MAYOR, respondents.
Godofredo Reyes for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General Hilado for respondent Electoral Commission.
Pedro Ynsua in his own behalf.
No appearance for other respondents.
LAUREL, J.:
This is an original action instituted in this court by the petitioner, Jose A. Angara, for
the issuance of a writ of prohibition to restrain and prohibit the Electoral Commission,
one of the respondents, from taking further cognizance of the protest filed by Pedro
Ynsua, another respondent, against the election of said petitioner as member of the
National Assembly for the first assembly district of the Province of Tayabas.
The facts of this case as they appear in the petition and as admitted by the
respondents are as follows:
(1) That in the elections of September 17, 1935, the petitioner, Jose A.
Angara, and the respondents, Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo and Dionisio
Mayor, were candidates voted for the position of member of the National
Assembly for the first district of the Province of Tayabas;
(2) That on October 7, 1935, the provincial board of canvassers, proclaimed
the petitioner as member-elect of the National Assembly for the said district,
for having received the most number of votes;
(3) That on November 15, 1935, the petitioner took his oath of office;
(4) That on December 3, 1935, the National Assembly in session assembled,
passed the following resolution:
[No. 8]
RESOLUCION CONFIRMANDO LAS ACTAS DE AQUELLOS
DIPUTADOS CONTRA QUIENES NO SE HA PRESENTADO
PROTESTA.
Se resuelve: Que las actas de eleccion de los Diputados contra
quienes no se hubiere presentado debidamente una protesta antes
de la adopcion de la presente resolucion sean, como por la
presente, son aprobadas y confirmadas.
Adoptada, 3 de diciembre, 1935.
(5) That on December 8, 1935, the herein respondent Pedro Ynsua filed
before the Electoral Commission a "Motion of Protest" against the election of
the herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara, being the only protest filed after the
passage of Resolutions No. 8 aforequoted, and praying, among other-things,
that said respondent be declared elected member of the National Assembly
for the first district of Tayabas, or that the election of said position be
nullified;
(6) That on December 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission adopted a
resolution, paragraph 6 of which provides:
6. La Comision no considerara ninguna protesta que no se haya
presentado en o antes de este dia.
(7) That on December 20, 1935, the herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara, one of
the respondents in the aforesaid protest, filed before the Electoral
Commission a "Motion to Dismiss the Protest", alleging (a) that Resolution
No. 8 of Dismiss the Protest", alleging (a) that Resolution No. 8 of the
National Assembly was adopted in the legitimate exercise of its constitutional
prerogative to prescribe the period during which protests against the election
of its members should be presented; (b) that the aforesaid resolution has for
 its object, and is the accepted formula for, the limitation of said period; and
(c) that the protest in question was filed out of the prescribed period;
(8) That on December 27, 1935, the herein respondent, Pedro Ynsua, filed
an "Answer to the Motion of Dismissal" alleging that there is no legal or
constitutional provision barring the presentation of a protest against the
election of a member of the National Assembly after confirmation;
(9) That on December 31, 1935, the herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara, filed a
"Reply" to the aforesaid "Answer to the Motion of Dismissal";
(10) That the case being submitted for decision, the Electoral Commission
promulgated a resolution on January 23, 1936, denying herein petitioner's
"Motion to Dismiss the Protest."
The application of the petitioner sets forth the following grounds for the issuance of
the writ prayed for:
(a) That the Constitution confers exclusive jurisdiction upon the electoral
Commission solely as regards the merits of contested elections to the
National Assembly;
(b) That the Constitution excludes from said jurisdiction the power to
regulate the proceedings of said election contests, which power has been
reserved to the Legislative Department of the Government or the National
Assembly;
(c) That like the Supreme Court and other courts created in pursuance of the
Constitution, whose exclusive jurisdiction relates solely to deciding the
merits of controversies submitted to them for decision and to matters
involving their internal organization, the Electoral Commission can regulate
its proceedings only if the National Assembly has not availed of its primary
power to so regulate such proceedings;
(d) That Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly is, therefore, valid and
should be respected and obeyed;
(e) That under paragraph 13 of section 1 of the ordinance appended to the
Constitution and paragraph 6 of article 7 of the Tydings-McDuffie Law (No.
127 of the 73rd Congress of the United States) as well as under section 1
and 3 (should be sections 1 and 2) of article VIII of the Constitution, this
Supreme Court has jurisdiction to pass upon the fundamental question
herein raised because it involves an interpretation of the Constitution of the
Philippines.
On February 25, 1936, the Solicitor-General appeared and filed an answer in behalf
of the respondent Electoral Commission interposing the following special defenses:
(a) That the Electoral Commission has been created by the Constitution as
an instrumentality of the Legislative Department invested with the jurisdiction
to decide "all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of
the members of the National Assembly"; that in adopting its resolution of
December 9, 1935, fixing this date as the last day for the presentation of
protests against the election of any member of the National Assembly, it
acted within its jurisdiction and in the legitimate exercise of the implied
powers granted it by the Constitution to adopt the rules and regulations
essential to carry out the power and functions conferred upon the same by
the fundamental law; that in adopting its resolution of January 23, 1936,
overruling the motion of the petitioner to dismiss the election protest in
question, and declaring itself with jurisdiction to take cognizance of said
protest, it acted in the legitimate exercise of its quasi-judicial functions a an
instrumentality of the Legislative Department of the Commonwealth
Government, and hence said act is beyond the judicial cognizance or control
of the Supreme Court;
(b) That the resolution of the National Assembly of December 3, 1935,
confirming the election of the members of the National Assembly against
whom no protest had thus far been filed, could not and did not deprive the
electoral Commission of its jurisdiction to take cognizance of election
protests filed within the time that might be set by its own rules:
(c) That the Electoral Commission is a body invested with quasi-judicial
functions, created by the Constitution as an instrumentality of the Legislative
Department, and is not an "inferior tribunal, or corporation, or board, or
person" within the purview of section 226 and 516 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, against which prohibition would lie.
The respondent Pedro Ynsua, in his turn, appeared and filed an answer in his own
behalf on March 2, 1936, setting forth the following as his special defense:
(a) That at the time of the approval of the rules of the Electoral Commission
on December 9, 1935, there was no existing law fixing the period within
which protests against the election of members of the National Assembly
should be filed; that in fixing December 9, 1935, as the last day for the filing
of protests against the election of members of the National Assembly, the
Electoral Commission was exercising a power impliedly conferred upon it by
the Constitution, by reason of its quasi-judicial attributes;
(b) That said respondent presented his motion of protest before the Electoral
Commission on December 9, 1935, the last day fixed by paragraph 6 of the
rules of the said Electoral Commission;
(c) That therefore the Electoral Commission acquired jurisdiction over the
protest filed by said respondent and over the parties thereto, and the
resolution of the Electoral Commission of January 23, 1936, denying
petitioner's motion to dismiss said protest was an act within the jurisdiction of
the said commission, and is not reviewable by means of a writ of prohibition;
 (d) That neither the law nor the Constitution requires confirmation by the
National Assembly of the election of its members, and that such confirmation
does not operate to limit the period within which protests should be filed as
to deprive the Electoral Commission of jurisdiction over protest filed
subsequent thereto;
(e) That the Electoral Commission is an independent entity created by the
Constitution, endowed with quasi-judicial functions, whose decision are final
and unappealable;
( f ) That the electoral Commission, as a constitutional creation, is not an
inferior tribunal, corporation, board or person, within the terms of sections
226 and 516 of the Code of Civil Procedure; and that neither under the
provisions of sections 1 and 2 of article II (should be article VIII) of the
Constitution and paragraph 13 of section 1 of the Ordinance appended
thereto could it be subject in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions to a
writ of prohibition from the Supreme Court;
(g) That paragraph 6 of article 7 of the Tydings-McDuffie Law (No. 127 of the
73rd Congress of the united States) has no application to the case at bar.
The case was argued before us on March 13, 1936. Before it was submitted for
decision, the petitioner prayed for the issuance of a preliminary writ of injunction
against the respondent Electoral Commission which petition was denied "without
passing upon the merits of the case" by resolution of this court of March 21, 1936.
There was no appearance for the other respondents.
The issues to be decided in the case at bar may be reduced to the following two
principal propositions:
1. Has the Supreme Court jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and
the subject matter of the controversy upon the foregoing related facts, and in
the affirmative,
2. Has the said Electoral Commission acted without or in excess of its
jurisdiction in assuming to the cognizance of the protest filed the election of
the herein petitioner notwithstanding the previous confirmation of such
election by resolution of the National Assembly?
We could perhaps dispose of this case by passing directly upon the merits of the
controversy. However, the question of jurisdiction having been presented, we do not
feel justified in evading the issue. Being a case primæ impressionis, it would hardly
be consistent with our sense of duty to overlook the broader aspect of the question
and leave it undecided. Neither would we be doing justice to the industry and
vehemence of counsel were we not to pass upon the question of jurisdiction squarely
presented to our consideration.
The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government. It
obtains not through express provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each
department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its
jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. But it does not follow from the fact
that the three powers are to be kept separate and distinct that the Constitution
intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other. The
Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure
coordination in the workings of the various departments of the government. For
example, the Chief Executive under our Constitution is so far made a check on the
legislative power that this assent is required in the enactment of laws. This, however,
is subject to the further check that a bill may become a law notwithstanding the
refusal of the President to approve it, by a vote of two-thirds or three-fourths, as the
case may be, of the National Assembly. The President has also the right to convene
the Assembly in special session whenever he chooses. On the other hand, the
National Assembly operates as a check on the Executive in the sense that its consent
through its Commission on Appointments is necessary in the appointments of certain
officers; and the concurrence of a majority of all its members is essential to the
conclusion of treaties. Furthermore, in its power to determine what courts other than
the Supreme Court shall be established, to define their jurisdiction and to appropriate
funds for their support, the National Assembly controls the judicial department to a
certain extent. The Assembly also exercises the judicial power of trying
impeachments. And the judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter,
effectively checks the other departments in the exercise of its power to determine the
law, and hence to declare executive and legislative acts void if violative of the
Constitution.
But in the main, the Constitution has blocked out with deft strokes and in bold lines,
allotment of power to the executive, the legislative and the judicial departments of the
government. The overlapping and interlacing of functions and duties between the
several departments, however, sometimes makes it hard to say just where the one
leaves off and the other begins. In times of social disquietude or political excitement,
the great landmarks of the Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if not
entirely obliterated. In cases of conflict, the judicial department is the only
constitutional organ which can be called upon to determine the proper allocation of
powers between the several departments and among the integral or constituent units
thereof.
As any human production, our Constitution is of course lacking perfection and
perfectibility, but as much as it was within the power of our people, acting through
their delegates to so provide, that instrument which is the expression of their
sovereignty however limited, has established a republican government intended to
operate and function as a harmonious whole, under a system of checks and
balances, and subject to specific limitations and restrictions provided in the said
instrument. The Constitution sets forth in no uncertain language the restrictions and
limitations upon governmental powers and agencies. If these restrictions and
limitations are transcended it would be inconceivable if the Constitution had not
provided for a mechanism by which to direct the course of government along
constitutional channels, for then the distribution of powers would be mere verbiage,
the bill of rights mere expressions of sentiment, and the principles of good
government mere political apothegms. Certainly, the limitation and restrictions
embodied in our Constitution are real as they should be in any living constitution. In
the United States where no express constitutional grant is found in their constitution,
the possession of this moderating power of the courts, not to speak of its historical
origin and development there, has been set at rest by popular acquiescence for a
period of more than one and a half centuries. In our case, this moderating power is
granted, if not expressly, by clear implication from section 2 of article VIII of our
constitution.
The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. Who is to determine the
nature, scope and extent of such powers? The Constitution itself has provided for the
instrumentality of the judiciary as the rational way. And when the judiciary mediates to
allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other
departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but only
asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to
determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the
parties in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and
guarantees to them. This is in truth all that is involved in what is termed "judicial
supremacy" which properly is the power of judicial review under the Constitution.
Even then, this power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and controversies to
be exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited further to the
constitutional question raised or the very lis mota presented. Any attempt at
abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile
conclusions unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as its function is in this manner, the
judiciary does not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of
legislation. More than that, courts accord the presumption of constitutionality to
legislative enactments, not only because the legislature is presumed to abide by the
Constitution but also because the judiciary in the determination of actual cases and
controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice of the people as expressed through
their representatives in the executive and legislative departments of the governments
of the government.
But much as we might postulate on the internal checks of power provided in our
Constitution, it ought not the less to be remembered that, in the language of James
Madison, the system itself is not "the chief palladium of constitutional liberty . . . the
people who are authors of this blessing must also be its guardians . . . their eyes must
be ever ready to mark, their voice to pronounce . . . aggression on the authority of
their constitution." In the Last and ultimate analysis, then, must the success of our
government in the unfolding years to come be tested in the crucible of Filipino minds
and hearts than in consultation rooms and court chambers.
In the case at bar, the national Assembly has by resolution (No. 8) of December 3,
1935, confirmed the election of the herein petitioner to the said body. On the other
hand, the Electoral Commission has by resolution adopted on December 9, 1935,
fixed said date as the last day for the filing of protests against the election, returns
and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, notwithstanding the previous
confirmation made by the National Assembly as aforesaid. If, as contended by the
petitioner, the resolution of the National Assembly has the effect of cutting off the
power of the Electoral Commission to entertain protests against the election, returns
and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, submitted after December 3,
1935, then the resolution of the Electoral Commission of December 9, 1935, is mere
surplusage and had no effect. But, if, as contended by the respondents, the Electoral
Commission has the sole power of regulating its proceedings to the exclusion of the
National Assembly, then the resolution of December 9, 1935, by which the Electoral
Commission fixed said date as the last day for filing protests against the election,
returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, should be upheld.
Here is then presented an actual controversy involving as it does a conflict of a grave
constitutional nature between the National Assembly on the one hand, and the
Electoral Commission on the other. From the very nature of the republican
government established in our country in the light of American experience and of our
own, upon the judicial department is thrown the solemn and inescapable obligation of
interpreting the Constitution and defining constitutional boundaries. The Electoral
Commission, as we shall have occasion to refer hereafter, is a constitutional organ,
created for a specific purpose, namely to determine all contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly.
Although the Electoral Commission may not be interfered with, when and while acting
within the limits of its authority, it does not follow that it is beyond the reach of the
constitutional mechanism adopted by the people and that it is not subject to
constitutional restrictions. The Electoral Commission is not a separate department of
the government, and even if it were, conflicting claims of authority under the
fundamental law between department powers and agencies of the government are
necessarily determined by the judiciary in justifiable and appropriate cases.
Discarding the English type and other European types of constitutional government,
the framers of our constitution adopted the American type where the written
constitution is interpreted and given effect by the judicial department. In some
countries which have declined to follow the American example, provisions have been
inserted in their constitutions prohibiting the courts from exercising the power to
interpret the fundamental law. This is taken as a recognition of what otherwise would
be the rule that in the absence of direct prohibition courts are bound to assume what
is logically their function. For instance, the Constitution of Poland of 1921, expressly
provides that courts shall have no power to examine the validity of statutes (art. 81,
chap. IV). The former Austrian Constitution contained a similar declaration. In
countries whose constitutions are silent in this respect, courts have assumed this
power. This is true in Norway, Greece, Australia and South Africa. Whereas, in
Czechoslovakia (arts. 2 and 3, Preliminary Law to constitutional Charter of the
Czechoslovak Republic, February 29, 1920) and Spain (arts. 121-123, Title IX,
Constitutional of the Republic of 1931) especial constitutional courts are established
to pass upon the validity of ordinary laws. In our case, the nature of the present
controversy shows the necessity of a final constitutional arbiter to determine the
conflict of authority between two agencies created by the Constitution. Were we to
decline to take cognizance of the controversy, who will determine the conflict? And if
the conflict were left undecided and undetermined, would not a void be thus created
in our constitutional system which may be in the long run prove destructive of the
entire framework? To ask these questions is to answer them. Natura vacuum
abhorret, so must we avoid exhaustion in our constitutional system. Upon principle,
reason and authority, we are clearly of the opinion that upon the admitted facts of the
present case, this court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the
subject mater of the present controversy for the purpose of determining the character,
scope and extent of the constitutional grant to the Electoral Commission as "the sole
judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members
of the National Assembly."
Having disposed of the question of jurisdiction, we shall now proceed to pass upon
the second proposition and determine whether the Electoral Commission has acted
without or in excess of its jurisdiction in adopting its resolution of December 9, 1935,
and in assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed against the election of the
herein petitioner notwithstanding the previous confirmation thereof by the National
Assembly on December 3, 1935. As able counsel for the petitioner has pointed out,
the issue hinges on the interpretation of section 4 of Article VI of the Constitution
which provides:
"SEC. 4. There shall be an Electoral Commission composed of three Justice of the
Supreme Court designated by the Chief Justice, and of six Members chosen by the
National Assembly, three of whom shall be nominated by the party having the largest
number of votes, and three by the party having the second largest number of votes
therein. The senior Justice in the Commission shall be its Chairman. The Electoral
Commission shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of the members of the National Assembly." It is imperative, therefore,
that we delve into the origin and history of this constitutional provision and inquire into
the intention of its framers and the people who adopted it so that we may properly
appreciate its full meaning, import and significance.
The original provision regarding this subject in the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902
(sec. 7, par. 5) laying down the rule that "the assembly shall be the judge of the
elections, returns, and qualifications of its members", was taken from clause 1 of
section 5, Article I of the Constitution of the United States providing that "Each House
shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns, and Qualifications of its own
Members, . . . ." The Act of Congress of August 29, 1916 (sec. 18, par. 1) modified
this provision by the insertion of the word "sole" as follows: "That the Senate and
House of Representatives, respectively, shall be the sole judges of the elections,
returns, and qualifications of their elective members . . ." apparently in order to
emphasize the exclusive the Legislative over the particular case s therein specified.
This court has had occasion to characterize this grant of power to the Philippine
Senate and House of Representatives, respectively, as "full, clear and complete"
(Veloso vs. Boards of Canvassers of Leyte and Samar [1919], 39 Phil., 886, 888.)
The first step towards the creation of an independent tribunal for the purpose of
deciding contested elections to the legislature was taken by the sub-committee of five
appointed by the Committee on Constitutional Guarantees of the Constitutional
Convention, which sub-committee submitted a report on August 30, 1934,
recommending the creation of a Tribunal of Constitutional Security empowered to
hear legislature but also against the election of executive officers for whose election
the vote of the whole nation is required, as well as to initiate impeachment
proceedings against specified executive and judicial officer. For the purpose of
hearing legislative protests, the tribunal was to be composed of three justices
designated by the Supreme Court and six members of the house of the legislature to
which the contest corresponds, three members to be designed by the majority party
and three by the minority, to be presided over by the Senior Justice unless the Chief
Justice is also a member in which case the latter shall preside. The foregoing
proposal was submitted by the Committee on Constitutional Guarantees to the
Convention on September 15, 1934, with slight modifications consisting in the
reduction of the legislative representation to four members, that is, two senators to be
designated one each from the two major parties in the Senate and two
representatives to be designated one each from the two major parties in the House of
Representatives, and in awarding representation to the executive department in the
persons of two representatives to be designated by the President.
Meanwhile, the Committee on Legislative Power was also preparing its report. As
submitted to the Convention on September 24, 1934 subsection 5, section 5, of the
proposed Article on the Legislative Department, reads as follows:
The elections, returns and qualifications of the members of either house and
all cases contesting the election of any of their members shall be judged by
an Electoral Commission, constituted, as to each House, by three members
elected by the members of the party having the largest number of votes
therein, three elected by the members of the party having the second largest
number of votes, and as to its Chairman, one Justice of the Supreme Court
designated by the Chief Justice.
The idea of creating a Tribunal of Constitutional Security with comprehensive
jurisdiction as proposed by the Committee on Constitutional Guarantees which was
probably inspired by the Spanish plan (art. 121, Constitution of the Spanish Republic
of 1931), was soon abandoned in favor of the proposition of the Committee on
Legislative Power to create a similar body with reduced powers and with specific and
limited jurisdiction, to be designated as a Electoral Commission. The Sponsorship
Committee modified the proposal of the Committee on Legislative Power with respect
to the composition of the Electoral Commission and made further changes in
phraseology to suit the project of adopting a unicameral instead of a bicameral
legislature. The draft as finally submitted to the Convention on October 26, 1934,
reads as follows:
(6) The elections, returns and qualifications of the Members of the National
Assembly and all cases contesting the election of any of its Members shall
be judged by an Electoral Commission, composed of three members elected
by the party having the largest number of votes in the National Assembly,
three elected by the members of the party having the second largest number
of votes, and three justices of the Supreme Court designated by the Chief
Justice, the Commission to be presided over by one of said justices.
During the discussion of the amendment introduced by Delegates Labrador, Abordo,
and others, proposing to strike out the whole subsection of the foregoing draft and
inserting in lieu thereof the following: "The National Assembly shall be the soled and
exclusive judge of the elections, returns, and qualifications of the Members", the
following illuminating remarks were made on the floor of the Convention in its session
of December 4, 1934, as to the scope of the said draft:
xxx xxx xxx
Mr. VENTURA. Mr. President, we have a doubt here as to the scope of the
meaning of the first four lines, paragraph 6, page 11 of the draft, reading:
"The elections, returns and qualifications of the Members of the National
Assembly and all cases contesting the election of any of its Members shall
be judged by an Electoral Commission, . . ." I should like to ask from the
gentleman from Capiz whether the election and qualification of the member
whose elections is not contested shall also be judged by the Electoral
Commission.
Mr. ROXAS. If there is no question about the election of the members, there
is nothing to be judged; that is why the word "judge" is used to indicate a
controversy. If there is no question about the election of a member, there is
nothing to be submitted to the Electoral Commission and there is nothing to
be determined.
Mr. VENTURA. But does that carry the idea also that the Electoral
Commission shall confirm also the election of those whose election is not
contested?
Mr. ROXAS. There is no need of confirmation. As the gentleman knows, the
action of the House of Representatives confirming the election of its
members is just a matter of the rules of the assembly. It is not constitutional.
It is not necessary. After a man files his credentials that he has been elected,
that is sufficient, unless his election is contested.
Mr. VENTURA. But I do not believe that that is sufficient, as we have
observed that for purposes of the auditor, in the matter of election of a
member to a legislative body, because he will not authorize his pay.
Mr. ROXAS. Well, what is the case with regards to the municipal president
who is elected? What happens with regards to the councilors of a
municipality? Does anybody confirm their election? The municipal council
does this: it makes a canvass and proclaims — in this case the municipal
council proclaims who has been elected, and it ends there, unless there is a
contest. It is the same case; there is no need on the part of the Electoral
Commission unless there is a contest. The first clause refers to the case
referred to by the gentleman from Cavite where one person tries to be
elected in place of another who was declared elected. From example, in a
case when the residence of the man who has been elected is in question, or
in case the citizenship of the man who has been elected is in question.
However, if the assembly desires to annul the power of the commission, it
may do so by certain maneuvers upon its first meeting when the returns are
submitted to the assembly. The purpose is to give to the Electoral
Commission all the powers exercised by the assembly referring to the
elections, returns and qualifications of the members. When there is no
contest, there is nothing to be judged.
Mr. VENTURA. Then it should be eliminated.
Mr. ROXAS. But that is a different matter, I think Mr. Delegate.
Mr. CINCO. Mr. President, I have a similar question as that propounded by
the gentleman from Ilocos Norte when I arose a while ago. However I want
to ask more questions from the delegate from Capiz. This paragraph 6 on
page 11 of the draft cites cases contesting the election as separate from the
first part of the sections which refers to elections, returns and qualifications.
Mr. ROXAS. That is merely for the sake of clarity. In fact the cases of
contested elections are already included in the phrase "the elections, returns
and qualifications." This phrase "and contested elections" was inserted
merely for the sake of clarity.
Mr. CINCO. Under this paragraph, may not the Electoral Commission, at its
own instance, refuse to confirm the elections of the members."
Mr. ROXAS. I do not think so, unless there is a protest.
Mr. LABRADOR. Mr. President, will the gentleman yield?
THE PRESIDENT. The gentleman may yield, if he so desires.
Mr. ROXAS. Willingly.
Mr. LABRADOR. Does not the gentleman from Capiz believe that unless this
power is granted to the assembly, the assembly on its own motion does not
have the right to contest the election and qualification of its members?
Mr. ROXAS. I have no doubt but that the gentleman is right. If this draft is
retained as it is, even if two-thirds of the assembly believe that a member
has not the qualifications provided by law, they cannot remove him for that
reason.
Mr. LABRADOR. So that the right to remove shall only be retained by the
Electoral Commission.
Mr. ROXAS. By the assembly for misconduct.
Mr. LABRADOR. I mean with respect to the qualifications of the members.
Mr. ROXAS. Yes, by the Electoral Commission.
Mr. LABRADOR. So that under this draft, no member of the assembly has
the right to question the eligibility of its members?
Mr. ROXAS. Before a member can question the eligibility, he must go to the
Electoral Commission and make the question before the Electoral
Commission.
 Mr. LABRADOR. So that the Electoral Commission shall decide whether the
election is contested or not contested.
Mr. ROXAS. Yes, sir: that is the purpose.
Mr. PELAYO. Mr. President, I would like to be informed if the Electoral
Commission has power and authority to pass upon the qualifications of the
members of the National Assembly even though that question has not been
raised.
Mr. ROXAS. I have just said that they have no power, because they can only
judge.
In the same session, the first clause of the aforesaid draft reading "The election,
returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly and" was
eliminated by the Sponsorship Committee in response to an amendment introduced
by Delegates Francisco, Ventura, Vinzons, Rafols, Lim, Mumar and others. In
explaining the difference between the original draft and the draft as amended,
Delegate Roxas speaking for the Sponsorship Committee said:
xxx xxx xxx
Sr. ROXAS. La diferencia, señor Presidente, consiste solamente en obviar la
objecion apuntada por varios Delegados al efecto de que la primera clausula
del draft que dice: "The elections, returns and qualifications of the members
of the National Assembly" parece que da a la Comision Electoral la facultad
de determinar tambien la eleccion de los miembros que no ha sido
protestados y para obviar esa dificultad, creemos que la enmienda tien
razon en ese sentido, si enmendamos el draft, de tal modo que se lea como
sigue: "All cases contesting the election", de modo que los jueces de la
Comision Electoral se limitaran solamente a los casos en que haya habido
protesta contra las actas." Before the amendment of Delegate Labrador was
voted upon the following interpellation also took place:
El Sr. CONEJERO. Antes de votarse la enmienda, quisiera
El Sr. PRESIDENTE. ¿Que dice el Comite?
El Sr. ROXAS. Con mucho gusto.
El Sr. CONEJERO. Tal como esta el draft, dando tres miembros a la
mayoria, y otros tres a la minoria y tres a la Corte Suprema, ¿no cree Su
Señoria que esto equivale practicamente a dejar el asunto a los miembros
del Tribunal Supremo?
El Sr. ROXAS. Si y no. Creemos que si el tribunal o la Commission esta
constituido en esa forma, tanto los miembros de la mayoria como los de la
minoria asi como los miembros de la Corte Suprema consideraran la
cuestion sobre la base de sus meritos, sabiendo que el partidismo no es
suficiente para dar el triunfo.
El Sr. CONEJERO. ¿Cree Su Señoria que en un caso como ese, podriamos
hacer que tanto los de la mayoria como los de la minoria prescindieran del
partidismo?
El Sr. ROXAS. Creo que si, porque el partidismo no les daria el triunfo.
xxx xxx xxx
The amendment introduced by Delegates Labrador, Abordo and others seeking to
restore the power to decide contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications
of members of the National Assembly to the National Assembly itself, was defeated
by a vote of ninety-eight (98) against fifty-six (56).
In the same session of December 4, 1934, Delegate Cruz (C.) sought to amend the
draft by reducing the representation of the minority party and the Supreme Court in
the Electoral Commission to two members each, so as to accord more representation
to the majority party. The Convention rejected this amendment by a vote of seventy-
six (76) against forty-six (46), thus maintaining the non-partisan character of the
commission.
As approved on January 31, 1935, the draft was made to read as follows:
(6) All cases contesting the elections, returns and qualifications of the
Members of the National Assembly shall be judged by an Electoral
Commission, composed of three members elected by the party having the
largest number of votes in the National Assembly, three elected by the
members of the party having the second largest number of votes, and three
justices of the Supreme Court designated by the Chief Justice, the
Commission to be presided over by one of said justices.
The Style Committee to which the draft was submitted revised it as follows:
SEC. 4. There shall be an Electoral Commission composed of three Justices
of the Supreme Court designated by the Chief Justice, and of six Members
chosen by the National Assembly, three of whom shall be nominated by the
party having the largest number of votes, and three by the party having the
second largest number of votes therein. The senior Justice in the
Commission shall be its chairman. The Electoral Commission shall be the
sole judge of the election, returns, and qualifications of the Members of the
National Assembly.
When the foregoing draft was submitted for approval on February 8, 1935, the Style
Committee, through President Recto, to effectuate the original intention of the
Convention, agreed to insert the phrase "All contests relating to" between the phrase
"judge of" and the words "the elections", which was accordingly accepted by the
Convention.
The transfer of the power of determining the election, returns and qualifications of the
members of the legislature long lodged in the legislative body, to an independent,
impartial and non-partisan tribunal, is by no means a mere experiment in the science
of government.
Cushing, in his Law and Practice of Legislative Assemblies (ninth edition, chapter VI,
pages 57, 58), gives a vivid account of the "scandalously notorious" canvassing of
votes by political parties in the disposition of contests by the House of Commons in
the following passages which are partly quoted by the petitioner in his printed
memorandum of March 14, 1936:
153. From the time when the commons established their right to be the
exclusive judges of the elections, returns, and qualifications of their
members, until the year 1770, two modes of proceeding prevailed, in the
determination of controverted elections, and rights of membership. One of
the standing committees appointed at the commencement of each session,
was denominated the committee of privileges and elections, whose functions
was to hear and investigate all questions of this description which might be
referred to them, and to report their proceedings, with their opinion
thereupon, to the house, from time to time. When an election petition was
referred to this committee they heard the parties and their witnesses and
other evidence, and made a report of all the evidence, together with their
opinion thereupon, in the form of resolutions, which were considered and
agreed or disagreed to by the house. The other mode of proceeding was by
a hearing at the bar of the house itself. When this court was adopted, the
case was heard and decided by the house, in substantially the same manner
as by a committee. The committee of privileges and elections although a
select committee. The committee of privileges and elections although a
select committee was usually what is called an open one; that is to say, in
order to constitute the committee, a quorum of the members named was
required to be present, but all the members of the house were at liberty to
attend the committee and vote if they pleased.
154. With the growth of political parties in parliament questions relating to
the right of membership gradually assumed a political character; so that for
many years previous to the year 1770, controverted elections had been tried
and determined by the house of commons, as mere party questions, upon
which the strength of contending factions might be tested. Thus, for
Example, in 1741, Sir Robert Walpole, after repeated attacks upon his
government, resigned his office in consequence of an adverse vote upon the
Chippenham election. Mr. Hatsell remarks, of the trial of election cases, as
conducted under this system, that "Every principle of decency and justice
were notoriously and openly prostituted, from whence the younger part of
the house were insensibly, but too successfully, induced to adopt the same
licentious conduct in more serious matters, and in questions of higher
importance to the public welfare." Mr. George Grenville, a distinguished
member of the house of commons, undertook to propose a remedy for the
evil, and, on the 7th of March, 1770, obtained the unanimous leave of the
house to bring in a bill, "to regulate the trial of controverted elections, or
returns of members to serve in parliament." In his speech to explain his plan,
on the motion for leave, Mr. Grenville alluded to the existing practice in the
following terms: "Instead of trusting to the merits of their respective causes,
the principal dependence of both parties is their private interest among us;
and it is scandalously notorious that we are as earnestly canvassed to
attend in favor of the opposite sides, as if we were wholly self-elective, and
not bound to act by the principles of justice, but by the discretionary impulse
of our own inclinations; nay, it is well known, that in every contested election,
many members of this house, who are ultimately to judge in a kind of judicial
capacity between the competitors, enlist themselves as parties in the
contention, and take upon themselves the partial management of the very
business, upon which they should determine with the strictest impartiality."
155. It was to put an end to the practices thus described, that Mr. Grenville
brought in a bill which met with the approbation of both houses, and received
the royal assent on the 12th of April, 1770. This was the celebrated law since
known by the name of the Grenville Act; of which Mr. Hatsell declares, that it
"was one of the nobles works, for the honor of the house of commons, and
the security of the constitution, that was ever devised by any minister or
statesman." It is probable, that the magnitude of the evil, or the apparent
success of the remedy, may have led many of the contemporaries of the
measure to the information of a judgement, which was not acquiesced in by
some of the leading statesmen of the day, and has not been entirely
confirmed by subsequent experience. The bill was objected to by Lord North,
Mr. De Grey, afterwards chief justice of the common pleas, Mr. Ellis, Mr.
Dyson, who had been clerk of the house, and Mr. Charles James Fox,
chiefly on the ground, that the introduction of the new system was an
essential alteration of the constitution of parliament, and a total abrogation of
one of the most important rights and jurisdictions of the house of commons.
As early as 1868, the House of Commons in England solved the problem of insuring
the non-partisan settlement of the controverted elections of its members by abdicating
its prerogative to two judges of the King's Bench of the High Court of Justice selected
from a rota in accordance with rules of court made for the purpose. Having proved
successful, the practice has become imbedded in English jurisprudence
(Parliamentary Elections Act, 1868 [31 & 32 Vict. c. 125] as amended by
Parliamentary Elections and Corrupt Practices Act. 1879 [42 & 43 Vict. c. 75], s. 2;
Corrupt and Illegal Practices Preventions Act, 1883 [46 & 47 Vict. c. 51;, s. 70;
Expiring Laws Continuance Act, 1911 [1 & 2 Geo. 5, c. 22]; Laws of England, vol. XII,
p. 408, vol. XXI, p. 787). In the Dominion of Canada, election contests which were
originally heard by the Committee of the House of Commons, are since 1922 tried in
the courts. Likewise, in the Commonwealth of Australia, election contests which were
originally determined by each house, are since 1922 tried in the High Court. In
Hungary, the organic law provides that all protests against the election of members of
the Upper House of the Diet are to be resolved by the Supreme Administrative Court
(Law 22 of 1916, chap. 2, art. 37, par. 6). The Constitution of Poland of March 17,
1921 (art. 19) and the Constitution of the Free City of Danzig of May 13, 1922 (art.
10) vest the authority to decide contested elections to the Diet or National Assembly
in the Supreme Court. For the purpose of deciding legislative contests, the
Constitution of the German Reich of July 1, 1919 (art. 31), the Constitution of the
Czechoslovak Republic of February 29, 1920 (art. 19) and the Constitution of the
Grecian Republic of June 2, 1927 (art. 43), all provide for an Electoral Commission.
The creation of an Electoral Commission whose membership is recruited both from
the legislature and the judiciary is by no means unknown in the United States. In the
presidential elections of 1876 there was a dispute as to the number of electoral votes
received by each of the two opposing candidates. As the Constitution made no
adequate provision for such a contingency, Congress passed a law on January 29,
1877 (United States Statutes at Large, vol. 19, chap. 37, pp. 227-229), creating a
special Electoral Commission composed of five members elected by the Senate, five
members elected by the House of Representatives, and five justices of the Supreme
Court, the fifth justice to be selected by the four designated in the Act. The decision of
the commission was to be binding unless rejected by the two houses voting
separately. Although there is not much of a moral lesson to be derived from the
experience of America in this regard, judging from the observations of Justice Field,
who was a member of that body on the part of the Supreme Court (Countryman, the
Supreme Court of the United States and its Appellate Power under the Constitution
[Albany, 1913] — Relentless Partisanship of Electoral Commission, p. 25 et seq.), the
experiment has at least abiding historical interest.
The members of the Constitutional Convention who framed our fundamental law were
in their majority men mature in years and experience. To be sure, many of them were
familiar with the history and political development of other countries of the world.
When , therefore, they deemed it wise to create an Electoral Commission as a
constitutional organ and invested it with the exclusive function of passing upon and
determining the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National
Assembly, they must have done so not only in the light of their own experience but
also having in view the experience of other enlightened peoples of the world. The
creation of the Electoral Commission was designed to remedy certain evils of which
the framers of our Constitution were cognizant. Notwithstanding the vigorous
opposition of some members of the Convention to its creation, the plan, as
hereinabove stated, was approved by that body by a vote of 98 against 58. All that
can be said now is that, upon the approval of the constitutional the creation of the
Electoral Commission is the expression of the wisdom and "ultimate justice of the
people". (Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address, March 4, 1861.)
From the deliberations of our Constitutional Convention it is evident that the purpose
was to transfer in its totality all the powers previously exercised by the legislature in
matters pertaining to contested elections of its members, to an independent and
impartial tribunal. It was not so much the knowledge and appreciation of
contemporary constitutional precedents, however, as the long-felt need of determining
legislative contests devoid of partisan considerations which prompted the people,
acting through their delegates to the Convention, to provide for this body known as
the Electoral Commission. With this end in view, a composite body in which both the
majority and minority parties are equally represented to off-set partisan influence in its
deliberations was created, and further endowed with judicial temper by including in its
membership three justices of the Supreme Court.
The Electoral Commission is a constitutional creation, invested with the necessary
authority in the performance and execution of the limited and specific function
assigned to it by the Constitution. Although it is not a power in our tripartite scheme of
government, it is, to all intents and purposes, when acting within the limits of its
authority, an independent organ. It is, to be sure, closer to the legislative department
than to any other. The location of the provision (section 4) creating the Electoral
Commission under Article VI entitled "Legislative Department" of our Constitution is
very indicative. Its compositions is also significant in that it is constituted by a majority
of members of the legislature. But it is a body separate from and independent of the
legislature.
The grant of power to the Electoral Commission to judge all contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, is intended
to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the legislature.
The express lodging of that power in the Electoral Commission is an implied denial of
the exercise of that power by the National Assembly. And this is as effective a
restriction upon the legislative power as an express prohibition in the Constitution (Ex
parte Lewis, 45 Tex. Crim. Rep., 1; State vs. Whisman, 36 S.D., 260; L.R.A., 1917B,
1). If we concede the power claimed in behalf of the National Assembly that said body
may regulate the proceedings of the Electoral Commission and cut off the power of
the commission to lay down the period within which protests should be filed, the grant
of power to the commission would be ineffective. The Electoral Commission in such
case would be invested with the power to determine contested cases involving the
election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly but
subject at all times to the regulative power of the National Assembly. Not only would
the purpose of the framers of our Constitution of totally transferring this authority from
the legislative body be frustrated, but a dual authority would be created with the
resultant inevitable clash of powers from time to time. A sad spectacle would then be
presented of the Electoral Commission retaining the bare authority of taking
cognizance of cases referred to, but in reality without the necessary means to render
that authority effective whenever and whenever the National Assembly has chosen to
act, a situation worse than that intended to be remedied by the framers of our
Constitution. The power to regulate on the part of the National Assembly in procedural
matters will inevitably lead to the ultimate control by the Assembly of the entire
proceedings of the Electoral Commission, and, by indirection, to the entire abrogation
of the constitutional grant. It is obvious that this result should not be permitted.
We are not insensible to the impassioned argument or the learned counsel for the
petitioner regarding the importance and necessity of respecting the dignity and
independence of the national Assembly as a coordinate department of the
government and of according validity to its acts, to avoid what he characterized would
be practically an unlimited power of the commission in the admission of protests
against members of the National Assembly. But as we have pointed out hereinabove,
the creation of the Electoral Commission carried with it ex necesitate rei the power
regulative in character to limit the time with which protests intrusted to its cognizance
should be filed. It is a settled rule of construction that where a general power is
conferred or duty enjoined, every particular power necessary for the exercise of the
one or the performance of the other is also conferred (Cooley, Constitutional
Limitations, eight ed., vol. I, pp. 138, 139). In the absence of any further constitutional
provision relating to the procedure to be followed in filing protests before the Electoral
Commission, therefore, the incidental power to promulgate such rules necessary for
the proper exercise of its exclusive power to judge all contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, must be deemed by
necessary implication to have been lodged also in the Electoral Commission.
It is, indeed, possible that, as suggested by counsel for the petitioner, the Electoral
Commission may abuse its regulative authority by admitting protests beyond any
reasonable time, to the disturbance of the tranquillity and peace of mind of the
members of the National Assembly. But the possibility of abuse is not argument
against the concession of the power as there is no power that is not susceptible of
abuse. In the second place, if any mistake has been committed in the creation of an
Electoral Commission and in investing it with exclusive jurisdiction in all cases relating
to the election, returns, and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, the
remedy is political, not judicial, and must be sought through the ordinary processes of
democracy. All the possible abuses of the government are not intended to be
corrected by the judiciary. We believe, however, that the people in creating the
Electoral Commission reposed as much confidence in this body in the exclusive
determination of the specified cases assigned to it, as they have given to the
Supreme Court in the proper cases entrusted to it for decision. All the agencies of the
government were designed by the Constitution to achieve specific purposes, and
each constitutional organ working within its own particular sphere of discretionary
action must be deemed to be animated with the same zeal and honesty in
accomplishing the great ends for which they were created by the sovereign will. That
the actuations of these constitutional agencies might leave much to be desired in
given instances, is inherent in the perfection of human institutions. In the third place,
from the fact that the Electoral Commission may not be interfered with in the exercise
of its legitimate power, it does not follow that its acts, however illegal or
unconstitutional, may not be challenge in appropriate cases over which the courts
may exercise jurisdiction.
But independently of the legal and constitutional aspects of the present case, there
are considerations of equitable character that should not be overlooked in the
appreciation of the intrinsic merits of the controversy. The Commonwealth
Government was inaugurated on November 15, 1935, on which date the Constitution,
except as to the provisions mentioned in section 6 of Article XV thereof, went into
effect. The new National Assembly convened on November 25th of that year, and the
resolution confirming the election of the petitioner, Jose A. Angara was approved by
that body on December 3, 1935. The protest by the herein respondent Pedro Ynsua
against the election of the petitioner was filed on December 9 of the same year. The
pleadings do not show when the Electoral Commission was formally organized but it
does appear that on December 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission met for the first
time and approved a resolution fixing said date as the last day for the filing of election
protest. When, therefore, the National Assembly passed its resolution of December 3,
1935, confirming the election of the petitioner to the National Assembly, the Electoral
Commission had not yet met; neither does it appear that said body had actually been
organized. As a mater of fact, according to certified copies of official records on file in
the archives division of the National Assembly attached to the record of this case
upon the petition of the petitioner, the three justices of the Supreme Court the six
members of the National Assembly constituting the Electoral Commission were
respectively designated only on December 4 and 6, 1935. If Resolution No. 8 of the
National Assembly confirming non-protested elections of members of the National
Assembly had the effect of limiting or tolling the time for the presentation of protests,
the result would be that the National Assembly — on the hypothesis that it still
retained the incidental power of regulation in such cases — had already barred the
presentation of protests before the Electoral Commission had had time to organize
itself and deliberate on the mode and method to be followed in a matter entrusted to
its exclusive jurisdiction by the Constitution. This result was not and could not have
been contemplated, and should be avoided.
From another angle, Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly confirming the
election of members against whom no protests had been filed at the time of its
passage on December 3, 1935, can not be construed as a limitation upon the time for
the initiation of election contests. While there might have been good reason for the
legislative practice of confirmation of the election of members of the legislature at the
time when the power to decide election contests was still lodged in the legislature,
confirmation alone by the legislature cannot be construed as depriving the Electoral
Commission of the authority incidental to its constitutional power to be "the sole judge
of all contest relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the
National Assembly", to fix the time for the filing of said election protests. Confirmation
by the National Assembly of the returns of its members against whose election no
protests have been filed is, to all legal purposes, unnecessary. As contended by the
Electoral Commission in its resolution of January 23, 1936, overruling the motion of
the herein petitioner to dismiss the protest filed by the respondent Pedro Ynsua,
confirmation of the election of any member is not required by the Constitution before
he can discharge his duties as such member. As a matter of fact, certification by the
proper provincial board of canvassers is sufficient to entitle a member-elect to a seat
in the national Assembly and to render him eligible to any office in said body (No. 1,
par. 1, Rules of the National Assembly, adopted December 6, 1935).
Under the practice prevailing both in the English House of Commons and in the
Congress of the United States, confirmation is neither necessary in order to entitle a
member-elect to take his seat. The return of the proper election officers is sufficient,
and the member-elect presenting such return begins to enjoy the privileges of a
member from the time that he takes his oath of office (Laws of England, vol. 12, pp.
331. 332; vol. 21, pp. 694, 695; U. S. C. A., Title 2, secs. 21, 25, 26). Confirmation is
in order only in cases of contested elections where the decision is adverse to the
claims of the protestant. In England, the judges' decision or report in controverted
elections is certified to the Speaker of the House of Commons, and the House, upon
being informed of such certificate or report by the Speaker, is required to enter the
same upon the Journals, and to give such directions for confirming or altering the
return, or for the issue of a writ for a new election, or for carrying into execution the
determination as circumstances may require (31 & 32 Vict., c. 125, sec. 13). In the
United States, it is believed, the order or decision of the particular house itself is
generally regarded as sufficient, without any actual alternation or amendment of the
return (Cushing, Law and Practice of Legislative Assemblies, 9th ed., sec. 166).
Under the practice prevailing when the Jones Law was still in force, each house of the
Philippine Legislature fixed the time when protests against the election of any of its
members should be filed. This was expressly authorized by section 18 of the Jones
Law making each house the sole judge of the election, return and qualifications of its
members, as well as by a law (sec. 478, Act No. 3387) empowering each house to
respectively prescribe by resolution the time and manner of filing contest in the
election of member of said bodies. As a matter of formality, after the time fixed by its
rules for the filing of protests had already expired, each house passed a resolution
confirming or approving the returns of such members against whose election no
protests had been filed within the prescribed time. This was interpreted as cutting off
the filing of further protests against the election of those members not theretofore
contested (Amistad vs. Claravall [Isabela], Second Philippine Legislature, Record —
First Period, p. 89; Urguello vs. Rama [Third District, Cebu], Sixth Philippine
Legislature; Fetalvero vs. Festin [Romblon], Sixth Philippine Legislature, Record —
First Period, pp. 637-640; Kintanar vs. Aldanese [Fourth District, Cebu], Sixth
Philippine Legislature, Record — First Period, pp. 1121, 1122; Aguilar vs. Corpus
[Masbate], Eighth Philippine Legislature, Record — First Period, vol. III, No. 56, pp.
892, 893). The Constitution has repealed section 18 of the Jones Law. Act No. 3387,
section 478, must be deemed to have been impliedly abrogated also, for the reason
that with the power to determine all contest relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of members of the National Assembly, is inseparably linked the authority
to prescribe regulations for the exercise of that power. There was thus no law nor
constitutional provisions which authorized the National Assembly to fix, as it is alleged
to have fixed on December 3, 1935, the time for the filing of contests against the
election of its members. And what the National Assembly could not do directly, it could
not do by indirection through the medium of confirmation.
Summarizing, we conclude:
(a) That the government established by the Constitution follows
fundamentally the theory of separation of power into the legislative, the
executive and the judicial.
(b) That the system of checks and balances and the overlapping of functions
and duties often makes difficult the delimitation of the powers granted.
(c) That in cases of conflict between the several departments and among the
agencies thereof, the judiciary, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, is
the only constitutional mechanism devised finally to resolve the conflict and
allocate constitutional boundaries.
(d) That judicial supremacy is but the power of judicial review in actual and
appropriate cases and controversies, and is the power and duty to see that
no one branch or agency of the government transcends the Constitution,
which is the source of all authority.
(e) That the Electoral Commission is an independent constitutional creation
with specific powers and functions to execute and perform, closer for
purposes of classification to the legislative than to any of the other two
departments of the governments.
(f ) That the Electoral Commission is the sole judge of all contests relating to
the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly.
(g) That under the organic law prevailing before the present Constitution
went into effect, each house of the legislature was respectively the sole
judge of the elections, returns, and qualifications of their elective members.
(h) That the present Constitution has transferred all the powers previously
exercised by the legislature with respect to contests relating to the elections,
returns and qualifications of its members, to the Electoral Commission.
(i) That such transfer of power from the legislature to the Electoral
Commission was full, clear and complete, and carried with it ex necesitate
rei the implied power inter alia to prescribe the rules and regulations as to
the time and manner of filing protests.
( j) That the avowed purpose in creating the Electoral Commission was to
have an independent constitutional organ pass upon all contests relating to
the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly,
devoid of partisan influence or consideration, which object would be
frustrated if the National Assembly were to retain the power to prescribe
rules and regulations regarding the manner of conducting said contests.
(k) That section 4 of article VI of the Constitution repealed not only section
18 of the Jones Law making each house of the Philippine Legislature
respectively the sole judge of the elections, returns and qualifications of its
elective members, but also section 478 of Act No. 3387 empowering each
house to prescribe by resolution the time and manner of filing contests
against the election of its members, the time and manner of notifying the
adverse party, and bond or bonds, to be required, if any, and to fix the costs
and expenses of contest.
(l) That confirmation by the National Assembly of the election is contested or
not, is not essential before such member-elect may discharge the duties and
enjoy the privileges of a member of the National Assembly.
(m) That confirmation by the National Assembly of the election of any
member against whom no protest had been filed prior to said confirmation,
does not and cannot deprive the Electoral Commission of its incidental
power to prescribe the time within which protests against the election of any
member of the National Assembly should be filed.
We hold, therefore, that the Electoral Commission was acting within the legitimate
exercise of its constitutional prerogative in assuming to take cognizance of the protest
filed by the respondent Pedro Ynsua against the election of the herein petitioner Jose
A. Angara, and that the resolution of the National Assembly of December 3, 1935 can
not in any manner toll the time for filing protests against the elections, returns and
qualifications of members of the National Assembly, nor prevent the filing of a protest
within such time as the rules of the Electoral Commission might prescribe.
In view of the conclusion reached by us relative to the character of the Electoral
Commission as a constitutional creation and as to the scope and extent of its
authority under the facts of the present controversy, we deem it unnecessary to
determine whether the Electoral Commission is an inferior tribunal, corporation, board
or person within the purview of sections 226 and 516 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
The petition for a writ of prohibition against the Electoral Commission is hereby
denied, with costs against the petitioner. So ordered.
Avanceña, C. J., Diaz, Concepcion, and Horrilleno, JJ., concur.
READ OPINION OF PUNO
Separate Opinions
PUNO, J.:
With all due respect, I would like to offer my humble views on the constitutional issues
presented by the petitioner, viz:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
A. Does Section 5(d) of Rep. Act No. 9189 allowing the registration of voters who are
immigrants or permanent residents in other countries by their mere act of executing
an affidavit expressing their intention to return to the Philippines, violate the residency
requirement in Section 1 of Article IV of the Constitution?
B. Does Section 18.5 of the same law empowering the COMELEC to proclaim the
winning candidates for national offices and party-list representatives including the
President and the Vice-President violate the constitutional mandate under Section 4,
Article VII of the Constitution that the winning candidates for President and Vice-
President shall be proclaimed as winners by Congress?
C. May Congress, through the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee created in
Section 25 of Rep. Act No. 9189, exercise the power to review, revise, amend, and
approve the Implementing Rules and Regulations that the Commission on Elections
shall promulgate without violating the independence of the COMELEC under Section
1, Article IX-A of the Constitution?
To start off, let me stress the significance of the case at bar. Rep. Act No. 9189, 1
otherwise known as "The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003" is a historic attempt
to translate to reality a long awaited dream: the enfranchisement of millions of
overseas Filipinos. Undoubtedly, the efforts of Congress to give flesh to section 2,
Article V of the 1987 Constitution mandating it to devise "a system for absentee voting
for qualified Filipinos abroad," deserves the highest commendation. However, Rep.
Act No. 9189 poses far reaching constitutional issues that merit more than an
invocation of abstract legal principles or a simplistic construction of the Constitution.
For one, the petition affects the value of the right of suffrage, a right that is the
cornerstone of our democratic government. It is the responsibility of this Court to
strike a balance between the need to expand the right of suffrage in favor of those
who cannot exercise it and the need to prevent the dilution of the right of suffrage of
those already exercising it. For another, the petition compels this Court to define the
extent and the limits of Congress’ oversight powers or legislative veto over
"subordinate legislations" or the rules and regulations promulgated by administrative
agencies of government. Undoubtedly, this oversight power is indispensable for
Congress to discharge its broad power to legislate. Thus, it again behooves this Court
to draw the precise parameters of the oversight power sought to be exercised by
Congress to preserve the delicate balance of powers allocated to the different
branches of our government in the Constitution.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
Prescinding from these premises, let me discuss the issues in seriatim.
A.
Does section 5 (d) of Rep. Act No. 9189 violate section 1, Article V of the 1987
Constitution?
Petitioner submits that section 5, par. (d) of Rep. Act No. 9189 is unconstitutional for it
allows immigrants or permanent residents of foreign countries to vote for President,
Vice-President, Senators, and party-list representatives by mere execution of an
affidavit stating that: (a) he shall resume actual, physical, permanent residence in the
Philippines not later than three (3) years from approval of his registration; and (b) that
he has not applied for citizenship in another country, viz.
Sec. 5. Disqualifications. — The following shall be disqualified from voting under this
Act.
x x x
(d) An immigrant or a permanent resident who is recognized as such in the host
country, unless he/she executes, upon registration, an affidavit prepared for the
purpose by the Commission declaring that he/she shall resume actual physical
permanent residence in the Philippines not later than three (3) years from approval of
his/her registration under this Act. Such affidavit shall also state that he/she has not
applied for citizenship in another country. Failure to return shall be cause for the
removal of the name of the immigrant or permanent resident front the National
Registry of Absentee Voters and his/her permanent disqualification to vote in
absentia. (Emphasis ours)
Petitioner also contends that section 2, Article V of the 1987 Constitution 2 limits the
authority of Congress to provide a system for absentee voting to those Filipinos who
are temporarily absent in the Philippines but otherwise satisfy the requirements under
section 1 thereof, including the one year residence in the Philippines and six months
residence in the place where they propose to vote. 3
Citing our ruling in Caasi v. Court of Appeals, 4 the petitioner avers that a Filipino who
is an acknowledged immigrant or permanent resident of a foreign country does not
possess the necessary residence requirements as he is deemed to have already
abandoned his domicile in the Philippines. He alleges that the challenged provision
amends or alters the residence requirements by granting "conditional" residence
qualification to an immigrant or permanent resident or through the execution of an
affidavit. 5
The majority, thru our esteemed colleague, Madam Justice Martinez, rules that
section 2, Article V of the 1987 Constitution mandating Congress to devise a system
for overseas absentee voting operates as an exception to the residence requirements
as the members of the Constitutional Commission manifested a clear intent "to
enfranchise as much as possible all Filipino citizens abroad who have not abandoned
their domicile of origin," viz: 6
By the doctrine of necessary implication in statutory construction, which may be
applied in construing constitutional provisions, the strategic location of Section 2
indicates that the Constitutional Commission provided for an exception to the actual
residency requirement of Section 1 with respect to qualified Filipinos abroad. The
same Commission has in effect declared that qualified Filipinos who are not in the
Philippines may be allowed to vote even though they do not satisfy residency
requirement in Section 1, Article V of the Constitution. 7 (emphases ours)
The majority further holds that if actual physical residence in the Philippines is
required, "there is no sense for the framers of the Constitution to mandate Congress
to establish a system for absentee voting." 8
The majority affirms our ruling in Caasi v. Court of Appeals 9 that an immigrant or
permanent resident of a foreign country is deemed to have relinquished his residence
in his country of origin. However, it rules that this presumption is overturned by the
execution of the affidavit required under the challenged provision of Rep. Act No.
9189. Allegedly, the affidavit is an explicit expression that an immigrant or permanent
resident has not relinquished his domicile in the Philippines, to wit:chanrob1es virtual
1aw library
Contrary to the claim of petitioner, the execution of the affidavit itself is not the
enabling or enfranchising act. The affidavit required in Section 5(d) is not only proof of
the intention of the immigrant or permanent resident to go back and resume
residence in the Philippines, but more significantly, it serves as an explicit expression
that he had not in fact abandoned his domicile of origin. Thus, it is not correct to say
that the execution of the affidavit under Section 5(d) violates the Constitution that
proscribes "provisional registration or a promise by a voter to perform a condition to
be qualified to vote in a political exercise."cralaw virtua1aw library
To repeat, the affidavit is required of immigrants and permanent residents abroad
because by their status in their host countries, they are presumed to have
relinquished their intent to return to this country; thus, without the affidavit, the
presumption of abandonment of Philippine domicile shall remain. 10 (emphases ours)
The majority further rules that "the act of the immigrant or permanent resident in
executing an affidavit pursuant to section 5(d) may be considered as an express
waiver of his status as an immigrant or permanent resident." Thus, the majority
concludes that section 5(d) of Rep. Act No. 9189 is not unconstitutional.
With all due respect, I disagree with the majority. But before discussing the reasons
for my dissent, let me put the issue in its proper historical perspective.
Suffrage is an attribute of citizenship 11 and is ancillary to the principle of
republicanism enshrined in section 1, Article II of the 1987 Constitution. 12 The right
of suffrage, however, is not absolute. No political system in the whole world has
literally practiced "universal" suffrage, even among its citizens. 13 The scarlet history
of the right of suffrage shows that restrictions have always been imposed on its
exercise.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
In England, for instance, suffrage originated as a political privilege granted to land
owners by the monarchs. 14 The grant arose from the theory that in the formation of
the state, the people agreed to surrender to the King all political sovereignty. In return,
the King extended suffrage to the freeholders as a vested right. The origin and
character of suffrage in England is chronicled by Chief Justice Holt in Ashby v. White,
Et Al., 15 viz:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
The election of knights belongs to the freeholders of the counties, and it is an original
right vested in and inseparable from the freehold, and can be no more severed from
the freehold than the freehold itself can be taken away. Before the statute of 8 Hen. 6,
ch. 7, any man that had a freehold, though never so small, had a right of voting; but
by that statute the right of election is confined to such persons as have lands or
tenements to the yearly value of forty shillings at least, because, as the statute says,
of the tumults and disorders which happened at elections by the excessive and
outrageous number of electors; but still the right of election is an original incident to
and inseparable from freehold. As for citizens and burgesses, they depend on the
same rights as the knights of shires differ only as to the tenure; but the right and
manner of their election is on the same foundation. 16
The economic theory of suffrage is also evident in the early history of the United
States. The 1787 U.S. Constitution, as originally adopted, did not expressly provide
the right to vote. 17 The States were left to determine who should have the right to
vote in national as well as local elections. Most States restricted the right of suffrage
to white males over twenty-one years of age with a certain amount of property. 18
Other States also required religious, 19 literacy, and moral qualifications. 20
Some legal scholars, however, contend that the right of suffrage is presumed from the
provision of the Constitution guaranteeing each state a "republican form of
government." 21 Veering away from the economic theory of suffrage prevalent in
England, these scholars argue that in forming the state, the people did not give up all
their sovereign powers but merely delegated the exercise of these powers to some
chosen representatives. The right of suffrage is one of these delegated powers,
viz:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
The people, in their original sovereign character are the fountainhead of
governmental authority, and all the powers necessary to be exercised in the
continued administration of a representative government originated and are delegated
by exertion of their sovereign will. These propositions, founded on necessity, and
illustrated by long continued practice, have become the received doctrines of the
American people . . . The people, in clothing a citizen with the elective franchise for
the purpose of securing a consistent and perpetual administration of the government
they ordain, charge him with the performance of a duty in the nature of a public trust,
and in that respect constitute him a representative of the whole people. This duty
requires that the privilege thus bestowed should be exercised, not exclusively for the
benefit of the citizen or class of citizens professing it, but in good faith and with an
intelligent zeal for the general benefit and welfare of the State . . . 22
As a privilege delegated by the people, a citizen acquires no indefeasible right to the
continuous exercise or enjoyment of the right of suffrage. "The people of the State, in
the exercise of their sovereign power, may disqualify, suspend or entirely withdraw it
from any citizen or class of them, providing always that representation of the people,
the essential characteristics of a republican government, be not disregarded or
abandoned." 23
Following the shift in its theoretical basis, the right of suffrage was extended to
broader classes of citizens. In 1870, the Fifteenth Amendment was enacted
prohibiting the federal government and the states from discriminating on the basis of
"race, color or previous conditions of servitude." In 1920, the Nineteenth Amendment
was ratified providing that the right of citizens to vote "shall not be denied or abridged
by the United States or by any State on account of sex." In 1964, the Twenty-fourth
Amendment was adopted providing that the right of any citizen to vote for President,
Vice-President or members of Congress "shall not be denied or abridged by the
United States or any State, by reason of failure to pay any poll tax or other tax." In
1971, the Twenty-sixth Amendment was passed providing that the right of any citizen
eighteen years or older to vote "shall not be denied or abridged by the United States
or by any State on account of age."cralaw virtua1aw library
In our jurisdiction, the right of suffrage has evolved from a mere statutory right to a
constitutional right. Our first election law was Act No. 1582, which took effect on
January 15, 1907. We had no elections during the Spanish occupation of the country.
Like its foreign counterparts, the qualifications for the exercise of the right of suffrage
set in section 14 of Act No. 1582 were elitist and gender-biased. The right of suffrage
was limited to male citizens twenty-three years of age or over with legal residence for
a period of six months immediately preceding the election in the municipality in which
they exercise the right of suffrage. Women were not allowed to vote for they were
regarded as mere extensions of the personality of their husbands or fathers, and that
they were not fit to participate in the affairs of government. 24 But even then, not all
male citizens were deemed to possess significant interests in election and the ability
to make intelligent choices. Thus, only those falling under any of the following three
classes were allowed to vote: (a) those who, prior to the August 13, 1898, held office
of municipal captain, governadorcillo, alcalde, lieutenant, cabeza de barangay, or
member of any ayuntamiento; (b) those who own real property with the value of five
hundred pesos or who annually pay thirty pesos or more of the established taxes; or
(c) those who speak, read and write English or Spanish.
But apart from possessing the necessary qualifications, a voter must not suffer from
any disqualification. We elaborated the reasons for setting disqualifications for the
exercise of the right of suffrage in People v. Corral, 25 viz:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library
The modern conception of suffrage is that voting is a function of government. The
right to vote is not a natural right but it is a right created by law. Suffrage is a privilege
granted by the State to such persons or classes as are most likely to exercise it for
the public good. In the early stages of the evolution of the representative system of
government, the exercise of the right of suffrage was limited to a small portion of the
inhabitants. But with the spread of democratic ideas, the enjoyment of the franchise in
the modern states has come to embrace the mass of the adult male population. For
reasons of public policy, certain classes of persons are excluded from the franchise.
Among the generally excluded classes are minors, idiots, paupers, and convicts.
The right of the State to deprive persons of the right of suffrage by reason of their
having been convicted of crime, is beyond question. "The manifest purpose of such
restrictions upon this right is to preserve the purity of elections. The presumption is
that one rendered infamous by conviction of felony, or other base offenses indicative
of moral turpitude, is unfit to exercise the privilege of suffrage or to hold office. The
exclusion must for this reason be adjudged a mere disqualification, imposed for
protection and not for punishment, the withholding of a privilege and not the denial of
a personal right." 26
On November 9, 1933, the Philippine Legislature enacted Act No. 4122 extending the
right of suffrage to Filipino women starting January 1, 1935. However, before they
could exercise their new right, the 1935 Constitution was adopted, once again,
limiting the right of suffrage to male citizens, viz:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Suffrage may be exercised by male citizens of the Philippines not otherwise
disqualified by law, who are twenty-one years of age or over and are able to read and
write, and who shall have resided in the Philippines for one year and in the
municipality wherein they propose to vote for at least six months preceding the
election. The National Assembly shall extend the right of suffrage to women, if in a
plebiscite which shall be held for that purpose within two years after the adoption of
this Constitution, not less than three hundred thousand women possessing the
necessary qualifications shall vote affirmatively on the question.
During the deliberations of the Constitutional Convention, it was conceded that
Filipino women were capable of exercising the right of suffrage. Their right, however,
was opposed on the following grounds: (1) there was no popular demand for suffrage
by Filipino women themselves; (2) woman suffrage would only disrupt family unity;
and (3) it would plunge women into the quagmire of politics, dragging them from the
pedestal of honor in which they had theretofore been placed. 27 Thus, in its report to
the President of the Convention on September 24, 1934, the Committee on Suffrage
said:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
The committee refrains from stating in this report the reasons on which it bases its
decision to withdraw the right of suffrage from the women and will merely say that the
principal idea in the minds of the members not in favor of extending suffrage to
women was that the sweet womanliness of the Philippine women should be projected
from political strife and passion in order that sweet home may not lose any of its
sweetness. 28
The proponents of woman suffrage in reply argued that it would be unfair to deprive
Filipino women of the right of suffrage already granted to them by the legislature
without giving them the chance to prove whether they deserved it or not. They also
submitted that the right would make them more interested in the management of the
affairs of government and that "it was necessary as a matter of justice to extend the
frontiers of our democracy to our women who had labored hard side by side with our
men for the progress and development of the country." 29 In a last ditch attempt to
save the cause of woman suffrage, women leaders distributed a petition to individual
delegates that reads:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
We, the undersigned, duly elected representatives of women who believe in the
justice and wisdom of the enfranchisement of the Filipino women, protest most
solemnly against women being deprived of the vote in the Constitution of the
Commonwealth and against any change in the existent Law, No. 4112, passed by the
Ninth Philippine Legislature on November ninth, 1933, and signed by Governor-
General Frank Murphy on December seventh, 1934.
We call the attention of the Constitutional Assembly and the Legislature to the plea for
liberty made before the Congress and the President of United States for thirty-seven
years by the Filipinos; a plea based on the fact that we are a liberty-loving people
equipped and capable of self-government. Such government cannot exist "half-slave
and half-free." The women of this Christian land, serene in the knowledge that in
peace or war they have never failed their men or their country, in this crucial hour of
the realization of the sacrifice and devotion of the years, insist upon their political
recognition and their share in the triumph of the cause of liberty.
It is not a matter of plebiscite nor specific numbers. It is a right earned, deserved and
therefore claimed. It is not a matter of sex. In a democratic government all qualified
citizens, men and women alike, can and should make their valuable contribution in
deciding what their community will undertake to do through its government, by what
means, and through what officials.
Under the law women suffer penalties, are summoned before the courts by law —
laws they have had no voice in making — and pay taxes. "Taxation without
representation is tyranny" and more so in 1934 than in 1776.
So confident of the unalterable righteousness of this cause, to you, gentlemen of the
Constitutional Assembly, we appeal for justice believing and knowing that our cause is
a just one, and that our rights have been won thru years of sacrifice, devotion and
service to our common cause — the cause of men and women alike — the welfare
and progress of our native land — the Philippines. 30
In the end, a compromise was reached limiting the right of suffrage to male citizens
and leaving the issue of women suffrage for the women to decide. In the plebiscite
held on April 30, 1937, more than three hundred thousand women voted for woman
suffrage. Thenceforth, Filipino women were allowed to vote, thus, paving the way for
women participation in the government.
To broaden the mass base of voters, the 1935 Constitution lowered the age
requirement from 23 years to 21 years. The literacy requirement was also relaxed. It
is to be noted that from the opening days of the Convention, there was a prevalent
sentiment among the delegates to bar illiterates from exercising the right of suffrage.
It was proposed that only those who can read and write English, Spanish, or other
local dialects should be allowed to vote. This proposal was defeated for the drafters
felt that while the ability to read and write was necessary, 31 the specification of any
language or dialect would be discriminatory against the Mohammedans:chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library
It is discriminatory against a respectable minority of the population of the Philippines.
It would serve to discriminate against the Mohammedan population of the Philippines
for which I am one of the humble representatives. It is the opinion of this Convention,
I think, to emancipate, to enfranchise our backward elements, especially the
Mohammedan population. And you would like to curtail that right and that privilege by
inserting a provision that only those who can read and write either English, Spanish,
or any of the local dialects shall be allowed to vote. This amendment would preclude
the Mohammedans because their Arabic writing is not included under local dialects.
Because when you say, local dialects, you refer to the dialect and not to the system of
writing. The system of writing is either Arabic or Roman. In view of this fact, Mr.
President, I hope that you will be liberal and tolerant enough to reject this proposed
amendment because it is unnecessary and because it is discriminatory. 32
Furthermore, the 1935 Constitution removed the property qualifications under Act No.
1582. We explained the reason for this removal in Maquera v. Borra, 33
viz:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
. . . property qualifications are inconsistent with the nature and essence of the
republican system ordained in our constitution and the principle of social justice
underlying the same, for said political system is premised upon the tenet that
sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them,
and this, in turn, implies necessarily that the right to vote and to be voted for shall not
be dependent upon the wealth of the individual concerned, whereas social justice
presupposes equal opportunity for all, rich and poor alike, and that, accordingly, no
person shall by reason of poverty, be denied the chance to be elected to the public
office. . . . 34
In sum, the 1935 Constitution gave a constitutional status to the right of suffrage.
Thus, suffrage is not anymore a privilege granted by the legislature, but a right
granted by the sovereign people to a definite portion of the population possessing
certain qualifications. To be sure, the right of suffrage was still subject to regulation by
the legislature but only in accordance with the terms of the Constitution.chanrob1es
virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
The march towards liberalization of the right of suffrage continued with the 1973
Constitution. The literacy requirement was removed while the age bar was further
lowered from 21 years to 18 years. Thus, section 1, Article VI of the 1973 Constitution
reads:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Section 1. Suffrage shall be exercised by citizens of the Philippines not otherwise
disqualified by law, who are eighteen years of age or over, and who shall have
resided in the Philippines for at least one year and in the place wherein they propose
to vote for at least six months preceding the election. No literacy, property or other
substantive requirement shall be imposed on the exercise of suffrage. The National
Assembly shall provide a system for the purpose of securing the secrecy and sanctity
of the vote. (Emphasis ours)
The rationale for these changes was expressed in the Explanatory Note of Resolution
No. 03 of the Committee on Suffrage and Electoral Reforms, viz:chanrob1es virtual
1aw library
In keeping with the trend for the broadening of the electoral base already begun with
the lowering of the voting age to 18 and in keeping with the committee’s desire to
continue the alienation and exclusion of millions of citizens from the political system
and from participation in the political life in the country, the requirement of literacy for
voting has been eliminated. It is noted that there are very few countries left in the
world where literacy remains a condition for voting. There is no Southeast Asian
country that imposes this requirement. The United States Supreme Court only a few
months ago declared unconstitutional any state law that would continue to impose
this requirement for voting.
Although there were more resolutions submitted proposing the increase of
educational requirements for voting than those advocating the elimination of the
literacy requirement, the committee felt that favoring the elimination of the
requirement would be more in keeping with its objective and that of the Constitutional
Convention encouraging popular participation and equalizing the privileges and rights
of the people. . .
According to the Bureau of Census and Statistics, the projection for the population of
the Philippines over 18 years old for 1970 is 17,659,000. Of this, 12,384,000 are
considered literates. However, the same Bureau admitted that there is no real
scientific literacy test in counting literates. All that is done is to ask each member of
the population the question whether he is able to read and write and to take his
answer at its face value.
These circumstances plus the well-known practice in all elections in which political
leaders spend their time in the barrios showing the prospective voters to write the
name of the candidates instead of explaining the political issues to them,
strengthened the conviction of the committee that present literacy requirement is
more of a joke, and worse, a deterrent to intelligent discussions of the issues. Finally,
the committee took note of the convincing argument that the requirement to read and
write was written into our constitution at a time when the only medium of information
was the printed word and even the public meetings were not as large and successful
because of the absence of amplifying equipment. It is a fact that today the vast
majority of the population learn about national matters much more from the audio-
visual media, namely, radio and television, and public meetings have become much
more effective since the advent of amplifying equipment.
In addition, the 1973 Constitution provided that no property or other substantive
requirement shall be imposed on the exercise of suffrage.
The 1987 Constitution further liberalized the right of suffrage. For the first time, it
required Congress to provide a system for absentee voting by qualified Filipinos
abroad and to design a procedure for the disabled and the illiterates to vote without
assistance from other persons. Be that as it may, four qualifications existing since the
1935 Constitution were retained: (1) Filipino citizenship; (2) age; (3) one year
residence in the Philippines; and (4) six months residence in the place where the
voter proposes to vote. The wisdom of these four qualifications has not been
questioned at any given time in the history of our suffrage. It is easy to see the
reason. Suffrage is a political right appertaining to citizenship. Each individual
qualified to vote is a particle of popular sovereignty, hence, the right of suffrage
cannot be extended to non-citizens. As an attribute of citizenship, suffrage is reserved
exclusively to Filipinos whose allegiance to the country is undivided. 35
It is also conceded that the right of suffrage can be exercised only by persons of a
certain age. Nobody could doubt the reason for preventing minors from taking part in
the political exercise. Voting is an act of choice and involves prescience. It requires
not only a familiarity of political realities but also the maturity to make reasoned
choices out of these realities. 36
But citizenship and age requirements are not enough. For the vote to be more
meaningful as an expression of sovereignty, the voter must possess more than a
passing acquaintance with the problems and prospects of the country. Thus,
residence is imposed as a qualification "to exclude a stranger and a newcomer,
unacquainted with the conditions and needs of the community and not identified with
the latter." 37 The residence requirement is also necessary for administrative
purposes such as the preparation of accurate list of voters. 38
I now come to the case at bar. The first issue is whether section 5(d) of Rep. Act No.
9189 extending the right of suffrage to Filipinos who are "immigrants" or "permanent
residents" of foreign countries is unconstitutional. To resolve this issue, the following
need to be addressed: (1) whether section 2, Article V of the Constitution dispenses
with the residence requirements prescribed in section 1 thereof; (2) whether an
"immigrant" or a "permanent resident" satisfies the residence requirements; (3)
whether the execution of an affidavit is sufficient proof of non-abandonment of
residence in the Philippines; and (4) whether the system provided in section 5(d) of
Rep. Act No. 9189 will dilute the right of suffrage of other Filipino voters who possess
the full residence qualifications under section 1, Article VI of the
Constitution.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
(1) Whether section 2 of Article V dispenses with the residence requirements
prescribed in section 1 of the same Article.
Section 1, Article V of the 1987 Constitution prescribes two residence qualifications:
(a) one year residence in the Philippines; and (2) six months residence in the locality
where the voter proposes to vote.
In its ordinary conception, residence connotes the actual relationship of an individual
to a specific place. To be a resident, physical presence of a person in a given area,
community or country is required. 39 Even before the adoption of the 1935
Constitution, jurisprudence has equated the first residence requirement (one year
residence in the Philippines) with domicile or legal residence. 40 Domicile in turn has
been defined as an individual’s permanent home or "the place to which, whenever
absent for business or for pleasure, one intends to return, and depends on facts and
circumstances in the sense that they disclose intent." 41 The domicile of a person is
determined by the concurrence of the following elements: (1) the fact of residing or
physical presence in a fixed place; and (2) animus manendi, or the intention of
returning there permanently. 42 The mere absence of an individual from his
permanent residence without the intention to abandon it does not result in a loss or
change of domicile. 43
The second residence requirement (six months residence in the place the voter
proposes to vote) refers to either the voter’s domicile or to his temporary residence.
44 A voter who is domiciled in a particular locality but has resided for six months in
another locality may register and vote in either locality, but not in both. To be sure, a
person fulfilling the first residence requirement also fulfills the second so long as the
voter registers in his established domicile. The second residence requirement is
relevant for two purposes: (1) the determination of the place where the voter will
register, and (2) the determination of the place where the voter will vote. It ought to be Madam President, may I suggest to the Committee to change the word "Filipinos" to
noted that as a general rule, a person should register and vote in the place where he QUALIFIED FILIPINO VOTERS. Instead of "VOTING BY FILIPINOS ABROAD," it
has established his domicile or the place where he has resided for six months. should be QUALIFIED FILIPINO VOTERS. If the Committee wants QUALIFIED
VOTERS LIVING ABROAD, would that not satisfy the requirement?
The intent of the members of the Constitutional Commission to apply the residence
requirements to absentee voters is evident from its deliberations. They precisely used THE PRESIDENT.
the phrase "QUALIFIED FILIPINOS ABROAD" to stress that the absentee voter must
have all the qualifications in section 1, Article VI of the; Constitution, viz:chanrob1es What does Commissioner Monsod say?
virtual 1aw library
MR. MONSOD.
MR. SUAREZ.
Madam President, I think I would accept the phrase "QUALIFIED FILIPINOS
May I just be recognized for a clarification. There are certain qualifications for the ABROAD" because "QUALIFIED" would assume that he has the qualifications and
exercise of the right of suffrage like having resided in the Philippines for at least one none of the disqualifications to vote.
year and in the place where they propose to vote for at least six months preceding the
elections. What is the effect of these mandatory requirements on the matter of the MR. TINGSON.
exercise of the right of suffrage by the absentee voters like Filipinos abroad?
That is right. So does the Committee accept?
THE PRESIDENT.
FR. BERNAS.
Would Commissioner Monsod care to answer?
"QUALIFIED FILIPINOS ABROAD" ?
MR. MONSOD.
THE PRESIDENT.
I believe the answer was already given by Commissioner Bernas, that the domicile
requirements as well as the qualifications and disqualifications would be the same. Does the Committee accept the amendment?

THE PRESIDENT. MR. REGALADO.

Are we leaving it to the legislature to devise the system? Madam President.

FR. BERNAS. THE PRESIDENT.

I think there is a very legitimate problem raised there. Commissioner Regalado is recognized.

THE PRESIDENT. MR. REGALADO.

Yes. When Commissioner Bengzon asked me to read my proposed amendment, I

MR. BENGZON.
I believe Commissioner Suarez is clarified.
FR. BERNAS.
But I think it should be further clarified with regard to the residence requirement or the
place where they vote in practice; the understanding is that it is flexible. For instance,
one might be a resident of Naga or domiciled therein, but he satisfies the requirement
of residence in Manila, so he is able to vote in Manila.
MR. TINGSON.
specifically stated that the National Assembly shall prescribe a system which will
enable qualified citizens, temporarily absent from the Philippines, to vote. According
to Commissioner Monsod, the use of the phrase "absentee voting" already took into
account as its meaning. That is referring to qualified Filipino citizens temporarily
abroad.
MR. MONSOD.
Yes, we accepted that. I would like to say that with respect to registration we will leave
it up to the legislative assembly, for example, to require where the registration is. If it
is, say, members of the diplomatic corps who may be continuously abroad for a long
time, perhaps, there can be a system of registration in the embassies. However, we
do not like to preempt the legislative assembly.
THE PRESIDENT.
Just to clarify, Commissioner Monsod’s amendment is only to provide a system.
MR. MONSOD.
Yes.
THE PRESIDENT.
The Commissioner is not stating here that he wants new qualifications for these
absentee voters.
MR. MONSOD.
That is right. They must have the qualifications and none of the disqualifications.
THE PRESIDENT.
It is just to devise a system by which they can vote.
MR. MONSOD.
That is right, Madam President. 45
In the course of the deliberations, Fr. Bernas perceived a problem that may arise from
the meaning of the second residence requirement on the place of registration and
voting. As noted, a qualified voter normally registers and votes in the place where he
is domiciled or has resided for six months. Fr. Bernas feared that the second
residence requirement may pose a constitutional obstacle to absentee voting "unless
the vote of the person who is absent is a vote which will be considered as cast in the
place of his domicile," viz:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
MR. OPLE.
With respect to Section 1, it is not clear whether the right of suffrage, which here has
a residential restriction, is not denied to citizens temporarily residing or working
abroad. Based on the statistics of the government agencies, there ought to be about
two million such Filipinos at this time. Commissioner Bernas had earlier pointed out
that these provisions are really lifted from the two previous Constitutions of 1935 and
1973, with the exception of the last paragraph. They could not therefore have
foreseen at that time the phenomenon now described as the Filipino labor force
explosion overseas.
According to government data, there are now about 600,000 contract workers and
employees, and although the major portions of these expatriate communities of
workers are found in the Middle East, they are scattered in 177 countries in the world.
In previous hearings of the Committee on Constitutional Commissions and Agencies,
the Chairman of the Commission on Elections, Ramon Felipe, said that there was no
insuperable obstacle to making effective the right of suffrage for Filipinos overseas.
Those who have adhered to their Filipino citizenship notwithstanding strong
temptations are exposed to embrace a more convenient foreign citizenship. And
those who on their own or under pressure of economic necessity here, find that they
have detached themselves from their families to work in other countries with definite
tenures of employment. Many of them are on contract employment for one, two, or
three years. They have no intention of changing their residence on a permanent
basis, but are technically disqualified from exercising the right of suffrage in their
countries of destination by residential requirement in Section 1 . . .
x x x
I, therefore, ask the Committee whether at the proper time, they might entertain an
amendment that will make this exercise of the right to vote abroad for Filipino citizens
an effective, rather than merely a nominal right under this proposed Constitution.
FR. BERNAS.
Certainly, the Committee will consider that. But more than just saying that, I would like
to make a comment on the meaning of "residence" in the Constitution because I think
it is a concept that has been discussed in various decisions of the Supreme Court,
particularly in the case of Faypon v. Quirino, a 1954 case which dealt precisely with
the meaning of "residence" in the Election Law. . .
x x x
In other words, "residence" in this provision refers to two residence qualifications:
"residence" in the Philippines and "residence" in the place where he will vote. As far
as the residence in the Philippines is concerned, the word "residence" means
domicile, but as far as residence where he will actually cast his ballot is concerned,
the meaning seems to be different. He could have a domicile somewhere else and yet
he is allowed to vote there. So that there may be serious constitutional obstacles to
absentee voting, unless the vote of the person who is absent is a vote which will be
considered as cast in the place of his domicile. 46 (Emphasis supplied)
Following the observation of Father Bernas and to obviate the constitutional problem,
the members of the Constitutional Commission then discussed the system of
registration of qualified Filipinos abroad who will be allowed to vote. It was agreed
that their registration abroad would be considered as registration in a particular
locality in the Philippines where he is domiciled, and the vote cast abroad would be
considered cast in that particular locality, to wit:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
MR. REGALADO.
I just want to make a note on the statement of Commissioner Suarez that this
envisions Filipinos residing abroad. The understanding in the amendment is that the
Filipino is temporarily abroad. He may or may not be actually residing abroad; he may
just be there on a business trip. It just so happens that the day before the elections he
has to fly to the United States, so that he could not cast his vote. He is temporarily
abroad but not residing there. He stays in a hotel for two days and comes back. This
is not limited only to Filipinos temporarily residing abroad. But as long as he is
temporarily abroad on the date of the elections, then he can fall within the prescription
of Congress in that situation.
MR. SUAREZ.
I thank the Commissioner for his further clarification. Precisely, we need this
clarification on record.
MR. MONSOD.
Madam President, to clarify what we mean by "temporarily abroad," it need not be on
very short trips. One can be abroad on a treaty traders visa. Therefore, when we talk
about registration, it is possible that his residence is in Angeles and he would be able
to vote for the candidates in Angeles, but Congress or the Assembly may provide the
procedure for registration, like listing one’s name, in a registry list in the embassy
abroad. That is still possible under this system.
FR. BERNAS.
Madam President, just one clarification if Commissioner Monsod agrees with this.
Suppose we have a situation of a child of a diplomatic officer who reaches the voting
age while living abroad and he has never registered here. Where will he register? Will
he be a registered voter of a certain locality in the Philippines?
MR. MONSOD.
Yes, it is possible that the system will enable that child to comply with the registration
requirements in an embassy in the United States and his name is then entered in the
official registration book in Angeles City, for instance.
FR. BERNAS.
In other words, he is not a registered voter of Los Angeles, but a registered voter of a
locality here.
MR. MONSOD.
That is right. He does not have to come home to the Philippines to comply with the
registration procedure here.
FR. BERNAS.
So, he does not have to come home. 47 (emphases ours)
It is crystal clear from the foregoing deliberations, that the majority erred in ruling that
section 2 of Article V of the Constitution dispensed with the residence requirements
provided under section 1 of the same Article.
(2) Whether an "immigrant" or a "permanent resident" of a foreign country has lost his
domicile in the Philippines.
The next question is whether an "immigrant" or a "permanent resident" of a foreign
country has abandoned his domicile in the Philippines. I respectfully submit that he
has.
There are three classes of domicile, namely: domicile of origin, domicile of choice,
and domicile by operation of law. At any given point, a person can only have one
domicile.
Domicile of origin is acquired by every person at birth and continues until replaced by
the acquisition of another domicile. More specifically, it is the domicile of the child’s
parents or of the persons upon whom the child is legally dependent at birth. Although
also referred to as domicile of birth, domicile of origin is actually the domicile of one’s
parents at the time of birth and may not necessarily be the actual place of one’s birth.
48 Domicile of choice is a domicile chosen by a person to replace his or her former
domicile. An adult may change domicile at will. The choice involves an exercise of
free will and presumes legal capacity to make a choice. While intention is a principal
feature on domicile of choice, a mere intention without the fact of actual presence in
the locality cannot bring about the acquisition of a new domicile. Domicile of choice
generally consists of a bodily presence in a particular locality and a concurrent intent
to remain there permanently or at least indefinitely. 49 Domicile by operation of law is
a domicile that the law attributes to a person independent of a person’s residence or
intention. It applies to infants, incompetents, and other persons under disabilities that
prevent them from acquiring a domicile of choice. 50
In Romualdez-Marcos v. COMELEC, 51 we ruled that domicile of origin is not easily
lost. To successfully effect a change of domicile, one must demonstrate an actual
removal or an actual change of domicile; a bona fide intention of abandoning the
former place of residence and establishing a new one; and acts which correspond
with purpose. 52 This change of domicile is effected by a Filipino who becomes an
"immigrant" or a "permanent resident" of a foreign country. Thus, we held in Caasi v.
Court of Appeals, 53 viz:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Miguel’s application for immigrant status and permanent residence in the U.S. and his
possession of a green card attesting to such status are conclusive proof that he is a
permanent resident of the U.S. despite his occasional visits to the Philippines. The
waiver of such immigrant status should be as indubitable as his application for it.
Absent clear evidence that he made an irrevocable waiver of that status or that he
surrendered his green card to the appropriate U.S. authorities before he ran for mayor
. . . 54
The doctrine in Caasi is by no means new. Our election laws have continuously
regarded "immigrants" or "permanent residents" of a foreign country to have lost their
domiciles in the Philippines and hence are not qualified to run for public office. 55
There is no reason not to apply the Caasi ruling in disputes involving the qualification
of voters. In essence, both cases concern fulfillment of the residence requirements.
Section 5(d) of Rep. Act No. 9189 itself reinforces the applicability of the Caasi
doctrine. As observed by the majority, Rep. Act No. 9189 disqualifies an immigrant or
a permanent resident who is recognized as such in another country "because
immigration or permanent residence in another country implies renunciation of one’s
residence in his country of origin." 56
We now slide to the legal significance of the affidavit to be executed by "immigrants"
or "permanent residents" to remove them from the class of disqualified
voters.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
3. Whether the execution by an immigrant or a permanent resident of the affidavit
under section 5(d) of Rep. Act No. 9189 is sufficient proof of non-abandonment of
residence in the Philippines.
Again, with due respect, I submit that the majority ruling on the nature of the affidavit
to be executed by an "immigrant" or a "permanent resident" is inconsistent. On one
hand, it theorizes that the act "serves as an explicit expression that he had not in fact
abandoned his domicile of origin." 57 This concedes that while an "immigrant" or a
"permanent resident" has acquired a new domicile in a foreign country by virtue of his
status as such, Rep. Act No. 9189 would consider him not to have abandoned his
domicile in the Philippines. On the other hand, the majority also theorizes that the
affidavit constitutes an "express waiver of his status as an immigrant or permanent
resident," and upon fulfillment of the requirements of registration, "he may still be
considered as a ‘qualified citizen of the Philippines abroad’ for purposes of exercising
his right of suffrage." 58 This presupposes that the "immigrant" or "permanent
resident" abandoned his domicile in the Philippines, but seeks to reacquire this
domicile by the execution of the affidavit.
The first theory is untenable. Its inevitable result would be the establishment of two
domiciles, i.e., domicile in the Philippines and domicile in a foreign country where he
is considered an "immigrant" or a "permanent resident." This ruling will contravene the
principle in private international law that a person can be domiciled only in one place
at a given time. 59
The second theory is equally untenable. A person who has abandoned his domicile of
origin by establishing a domicile of choice cannot just revert back to his domicile of
origin. 60 He must satisfy the same requisites for acquiring a new domicile, i.e., an
actual removal or an actual change of domicile; a bona fide intention of abandoning
the former place of residence and establishing a new one; and acts which correspond
with the purpose. An existing domicile cannot be lost by abandonment alone, even if
there is an intent to acquire a new one; the existing domicile continues until a new
one is in fact gained. To abandon domicile, a person must choose a new domicile,
actually reside in the place chosen, and intend that it be the principal and permanent
residence. That is, there can be no change of domicile without the concurrence of act
and intent. 61
The doctrine established in England that the domicile of origin is revived upon the
abandonment of a domicile of choice has long been rejected in the United States. 62
Even in England, "the mobility of modern society has fostered both criticism of the
rule and recommendation for its change." 63 Thus, the prevailing view at present is
that if a domicile of choice is abandoned without acquiring a new domicile of choice,
"the domicil[e] of origin is not thereby revived, but the last domicil[e] of choice
continues to be the domicil[e]." 64
In his Separate Opinion, our esteemed colleague, Mr. Justice Azcuna, opines that the
execution of the affidavit is the operative act that revives the domicile of origin, and
"the requirement of resuming actual physical presence within three (3) years is only a
test of such intention." He further opines that "if the affiant does not resume the
residence physically within said period, then the intent expressed in the affidavit is
defective and the law will deem it inoperative."cralaw virtua1aw library
With due respect, I submit that the affidavit merely proves the intent to return but not
the other requisites for reacquiring the domicile of origin. Intent, which is not coupled
with actual physical transfer, is not sufficient either to abandon the former domicile or
to establish a new domicile. 65 Thus, the view that domicile could be established as
soon as the old is abandoned even though the person has not yet arrived at the new
domicile, has not been accepted. In his latest work on the subject, Scoles, an
acknowledged expert in Conflict of Laws stated as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library
The element of physical presence is essential to confirm the requisite attitude of mind
contemplated by the concept of domicile. As a consequence, a person who is to
acquire a domicile of choice at a place must actually be present at that place during
the time in which the intention to make it his home exists. For most people, intention
is confirmed by the physical presence of considerable duration looking toward an
indefinite period of time. However, in light of the function that domicile serves, i.e., to
identify a settled relationship with a place for a particular legal purpose, it is
sometimes necessary to make a determination when the physical presence has been
very brief. Consequently, no particular length of time is necessary in order to satisfy
the requirement of physical presence if that stay at a place verifies the intention to
make it a home.
x x x
In the case of the individual who has clearly manifested an intention to change a new
home and center of social activities, the question sometimes arises why that person’s
domicile should not change as soon as the old is abandoned even though the
individual has not yet arrived at the new. Although this has sometimes been
suggested as a possibility, it is contrary to the clear weight of authority, probably
because physical presence is ordinarily the principal confirming evidence of the
intention of the person. 66 (emphases ours)
Beale, another acknowledged expert on the subject, shares the same view,
viz:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
One or two authorities under special circumstances have held that a domicil[e] might
be acquired in a certain place while the person is on his way toward the place with an
intent to live there and during his journey toward that place, although he had not yet
actually reached that place. In two taxation cases in Massachusetts, where upon the
taxing day the person in question was actually on his journey from a former residence
in the state to an intended second residence, whether in the same state or in another
state, he was held to be taxable in the second residence in the ground that under
those peculiar circumstances his domicil[e] would shift at the moment of abandoning
the first residence. These, however, were disapproved and overruled. In one other
case, a similar intimation has been made. In Matter of Grant, it appeared that a
decedent had left a United States reservation in the State of New York with intention
to go to the District of Columbia, and there establish his residence, but he had died en
route. Fowler, Surrogate, intimated that he was already domiciled in the District of
Columbia. It is not too much to say, however, that there is absolutely no good
authority for the opinion thus expressed, and that is legally impossible for a man to
acquire a domicil[e] before he is present at the place where the domicil[e] is
established. 67 (Emphasis ours)
Beale also states that with the rejection of the English "automatic reversion" doctrine,
physical presence is required before the person can reacquire his domicile of origin,
viz:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
The doctrine in England is that the domicil[e] of origin revives upon the abandonment
of a domicil[e] of choice. . . Inspite of a few English cases to the contrary, this has
become thoroughly established as the doctrine of the English courts, the court being
especially emphatic in cases where a person has left his domicil[e] of choice without
intent to return and has started to return to his domicil[e] of origin. Here, evidence
must of course be introduced to show a definitive abandonment of domicil[e] of choice
by actually leaving the country without intent to return. The English doctrine has been
approved in this country in several cases, in most of which the approval was a mere
dictum, but in the United States, generally, the opposite view is held, and upon the
abandonment of a domicil[e] of choice there is no change of domicil[e] until a new
domicil[e] is obtained. . .
On the other hand, a few American cases follow the English decision in so far as to
declare that a domicil[e] of origin revives when a person having abandoned a
domicil[e] of choice is on his way to make a home at his domicil[e] of origin, but the
better opinion in this country does not allow the reacquisition of the domicil[e] of origin
until the fact of presence at the place of domicil[e] of origin exists, as well as the intent
to return there. 68 (Emphasis ours)
To stress, the burden of establishing a change in domicile is upon the party who
asserts it. 69 A person’s declarations as to what he considers his home, residence, or
domicile are generally admissible "as evidence of his attitude of mind." 70 However,
whatever the context, "their accuracy is suspect because of their self-serving nature,
particularly when they are made to achieve some legal objective." 71
In the case at bar, the burden rests on an "immigrant" or a "permanent resident" to
prove that he has abandoned his domicile in the foreign country and reestablished his
domicile in the Philippines. A self-serving affidavit will not suffice, especially when
what is at stake is a very important privilege as the right of suffrage. I respectfully
submit that what makes the intent expressed in the affidavit effective and operative is
the fulfillment of the promise to return to the Philippines. Physical presence is not a
mere test of intent but the "principal confirming evidence of the intention of the
person." 72 Until such promise is fulfilled, he continues to be a domiciliary of another
country. Until then, he does not possess the necessary requisites and therefore,
cannot be considered a qualified voter.
(4) Whether counting the votes of immigrants or permanent residents who fail to
return to the Philippines will dilute the valid votes of our fully qualified electors.
The only consequence imposed by Rep. Act No. 9189 to an "immigrant" or a
"permanent resident" who does not fulfill his promise to return to the Philippines is the
removal of his name from the National Registry of Absentee Voters and his
permanent disqualification to vote in absentia. But his vote would be counted and
accorded the same weight as that cast by bona fide qualified Filipino voters. I
respectfully submit that this scheme diminishes the value of the right of suffrage as it
dilutes the right of qualified voters to the proportionate value of their votes. The one
person, one vote principle is sacrosanct in a republican form of government. The
challenged provision which allows the value of the valid votes of qualified voters to be
diminished by the invalid votes of disqualified voters violates the sovereignty of our
people. The validation by the majority of this unconstitutional provision may result in
the anomaly where the highest public officials of our land will owe their election to
"immigrants" or "permanent residents" who failed to fulfill their promise to return to our
country or who repudiated their domicile here.
The majority downplays the effect of the challenged provision on those who are
already qualified prior to the enactment of Rep. Act No. 9189. It is opined that the
removal of an "immigrant" or a "permanent resident" from the list of the National
Registry of Absentee Voters and his permanent disqualification "would suffice to serve
as deterrence to non-compliance with his/her undertaking under the affidavit." The
majority misses the point. Without section 5(d) of Rep. Act No. 9189, an "immigrant"
or a "permanent resident" has no right to vote. Thus, even assuming that he becomes
qualified after executing the affidavit, he does not stand to lose anything when he is
subsequently disqualified for his failure to comply with his undertaking under the
affidavit. He will just return to his original status.
B.
Is section 18.5 of Rep. Act No. 9189 in relation to section 4 of the same Act in
contravention of section 4, Article VII of the Constitution?
Petitioner contends that section 18.5 in relation to section 4 of Rep. Act No. 9189
violates section 4, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution giving Congress the power to
canvass the votes and proclaim the winning candidates for President and Vice-
President, viz:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
x x x
The returns of every election for President and Vice-President, duly certified by the
board of canvassers of each province or city, shall be transmitted to the Congress,
directed to the President of the Senate. Upon receipt of the certificates of canvass,
the President of the Senate shall, not later than thirty days after the day of the
election, open all certificates in the presence of the Senate and the House of
Representatives in joint public session, and the Congress, upon determination of the
authenticity and due execution thereof in the manner provided by law, canvass the
votes.
The person having the highest number of votes shall be proclaimed elected, but in
case two or more shall have an equal and highest number of votes, one of them shall
forthwith be chosen by the vote of a majority of all the Members of both Congress,
voting separately.
The Congress shall promulgate its rules for the canvassing of the certificates.
x x x

Section 4 of Rep. Act No. 9189 allows all qualified Filipinos overseas to vote for
President, Vice-President, Senators and party-list representatives while section 18.5
thereof empowers the COMELEC to order the proclamation of winning candidates,
viz:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
SEC. 18. On-Site Counting and Canvassing. —
x x x this Act within sixty (60) days from effectivity of this Act. The Implementing Rules and
18.5 The canvass of votes shall not cause the delay of the proclamation of a winning
candidate if the outcome of the election will not be affected by the results thereof.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Commission is empowered to order the
proclamation of winning candidates despite the fact the scheduled election has not
taken place in a particular country or countries, if the holding of elections therein has
been rendered impossible by events, factors and circumstances peculiar to such
country or countries, in which events, factors and circumstances are beyond the
control or influence of the Commission.
On its face, section 18.5 of Rep. Act No. 9189 appears to be repugnant to section 4,
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. It gives the impression that Congress abdicated to
COMELEC its constitutional duty to canvass and proclaim the winning candidates for
President and Vice-President. I agree with the majority that the impugned provision
should be given a reasonable interpretation that would save it from a constitutional
infirmity. To be sure, Congress could have not allowed the COMELEC to exercise a
power exclusively bestowed upon it by the Constitution. Thus, section 18.5 of Rep.
Act No. 9189 empowering the COMELEC to proclaim the winning candidates should
be construed as limited to the positions of Senators and party-list representatives. In
like manner, I agree with the majority that section 18.4 of Rep. Act No. 9189 which
provides:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
18.4. . . . Immediately upon the completion of the canvass, the chairman of the
Special Board of Canvassers shall transmit via facsimile, electronic mail, or any other
means of transmission equally safe and reliable the Certificates of Canvass and the
Statements of Votes to the Commission, . . . (Emphasis supplied)
should be construed in harmony with section 4, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
Hence, with respect to the position of the President and the Vice-President, the
Certificates of Canvass and the Statements of Votes must be submitted to Congress
and directed to the Senate President.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
C.
Does Congress, through the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee created in
section 25 of Rep. Act No. 9189, have the power to review, revise, amend and
approve the Implementing Rules and Regulations that the Commission on Elections
shall promulgate without violating the independence of the COMELEC under section
1, Article IX-A of the Constitution?
Both the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) and the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) agree with the petitioner that sections 19 and 25 of Rep. Act No. 9189
are unconstitutional on the ground that they violate the independence of the
COMELEC. 73 The impugned provisions require the public respondent COMELEC to
submit its Implementing Rules and Regulations to the Joint Congressional Oversight
Committee for review, revision, amendment, or approval, viz:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library
Sec. 19. Authority of the Commission to Promulgate Rules. — The Commission shall
issue the necessary rules and regulations to effectively implement the provisions of
Regulations shall be submitted to the Joint Oversight Committee created by virtue of
this Act for prior approval.
In the formulation of the rules and regulations, the Commission shall coordinate with
the Department of Foreign Affairs, Department of Labor and Employment, Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration, Overseas Workers’ Welfare Administration and
the Commission on Filipino Overseas. Non-government organizations and accredited
Filipino organizations or associations abroad shall be consulted.
x x x
Sec. 25. Joint Congressional Oversight Committee. — A joint Congressional
Oversight Committee is hereby created, composed of the Chairman of the Senate
Committee on Constitutional Amendments, Revision of Codes and Laws, and seven
(7) other Senators designated by the Senate President, and the Chairman of the
House Committee on Suffrage and Electoral Reforms, and seven (7) other members
of the House of Representatives designated by the Speaker of the House of
Representatives: Provided, That, of the seven (7) members to be designated by each
House of Congress, four (4) should come from the majority and the remaining three
(3) from the minority.
The Joint Congressional Oversight Committee shall have the power to monitor and
evaluate the implementation of this Act. It shall review, revise, amend and approve
the Implementing Rules and Regulations promulgated by the Commission.
(emphases supplied)
Public respondents aver that as an independent constitutional body, the COMELEC is
not under the control of the executive or the legislative 74 in the performance of its
constitutional function to "enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to
the conduct of an election." 75 Public respondent COMELEC asserts that its right to
formulate rules and regulations flows from its power to enforce and administer
election laws and regulations. 76 This power is exclusive and its exercise is not
subject to the review, revision, or approval of Congress. 77 The Solicitor General
shares the same view that the role of the legislature ends with the finished task of
legislation. 78 He opines that nothing in Article VI of the 1987 Constitution suggests
that Congress is empowered to enforce and administer election laws concurrent with
the COMELEC. 79
Along the same lines, public respondent COMELEC assails section 17.1 of Rep. Act
No. 9189 subjecting the implementation of voting by mail to prior review and approval
of the Joint Oversight Committee. It maintains that the development of a system for
voting by mail involves the "administration of election laws" and falls squarely within
its exclusive functions. 80 Section 17.1 of Rep. Act No. 9189 reads:chanrob1es virtual
1aw library
Sec. 17. Voting by mail. —
17.1. For the May, 2004 elections, the Commission shall authorize voting by mail in
not more than three (3) countries, subject to the approval of the Congressional
Oversight Committee. Voting by mail may be allowed in countries that satisfy the
following conditions:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
(a) Where the mailing system is fairly well-developed and secure to prevent occasion
of fraud;
(b) Where there exists a technically established identification system that would
preclude multiple or proxy voting; and
(c) Where the system of reception and custody of mailed ballots in the embassies,
consulates and other foreign service establishments concerned are adequate and
well-secured.
Thereafter, voting by mail in any country shall be allowed only upon review and
approval of the Joint Oversight Committee. (emphases supplied)
The majority sustains the petitioner as it holds that" [b]y vesting itself with the powers
to approve, review, amend and revise the IRR for The Overseas Voting Act of 2003,
Congress went beyond the scope of its constitutional authority. Congress trampled
upon the constitutional mandate of independence of the COMELEC."cralaw virtua1aw
library
I agree with the majority but wish to add my humble thoughts on this all important
constitutional issue — the extent of the exercise by Congress of its oversight powers
in the implementation of Rep. Act No. 9189. The resolution of the issue entails a two-
tiered discussion of the following: (1) whether Congress has oversight functions over
constitutional bodies like the COMELEC; and (2) assuming that it has, whether
Congress exceeded the permissible exercise of its oversight functions.
Before proceeding, we must focus on the exact place of the power of congressional
oversight in our constitutional canvass. This will involve an exposition of two
principles basic to our constitutional democracy: separation of powers and checks
and balances.
Separation of powers and checks and balances
The principle of separation of powers prevents the concentration of legislative,
executive, and judicial powers to a single branch of government by deftly allocating
their exercise to the three branches of government. This principle dates back from the
time of Aristotle 81 but the "modern" concept owes its origin in the seventeenth and
eighteenth century writings of political philosophers including Locke and Montesquieu.
Their writings were mainly reactions to the ruinous struggle for power by the
monarchs and the parliaments in Western Europe. 82
In his Second Treatise of Civil Government, 83 John Locke advocated the proper
division of the legislative, executive and federative powers of the commonwealth. He
defined legislative power as "that which has a right to direct how the force of the
commonwealth shall be employed for preserving the community and the members of
it." 84 He viewed executive power as involving "the execution of the municipal laws of
the society within its self, [and] upon all that are parts of it" 85 and federative power
as concerned with "the management of the security and interest of the public without"
including "the power of war and peace, leagues and alliances, and all the
transactions, with all persons and communities without the commonwealth." 86
Locke expostulated that executive powers should not be placed in one person or
group of persons exercising legislative power because "it may be too great a
temptation to human frailty, apt to grasp at power, for the same persons, who have
the power to execute them, whereby they may exempt themselves from obedience to
the laws they make, and suit the law, both in its making, and execution, to their own
private advantage, and thereby come to have a distinct interest from the rest of the
community, contrary to the end of society and government." 87 But while the
executive and the federative are two distinct powers, Locke conceded that they are
intricately related and thus may be exercised by the same persons. 88
Locke mothered the modern idea of division of power but it was Montesquieu who
refined the concept. In his famed treatise, The Spirit of the Laws, 89 Montesquieu
authoritatively analyzed the nature of executive, legislative and judicial powers and
with a formidable foresight counselled that any combination of these powers would
create a system with an inherent tendency towards tyrannical actions,
thus:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
In every government there are three sorts of power: the legislative; the executive in
respect to things dependent on the law of nations; and the executive in regard to
matters that depend on the civil law. By virtue of the legislative power, the prince or
magistrate enacts temporary or perpetual laws, and amends or abrogates those that
have been already enacted. By the second, he makes peace or war, sends or
receives embassies, establishes the public security, and provides against invasions.
By the third, he punishes criminals, or determines the disputes that arise between
individuals. The latter we shall call the judiciary power, and the other, simply the
executive power of the state.
The political liberty of the subject is a tranquility of mind arising from the opinion each
person has of his safety. In order to have this liberty, it is requisite the government be
so constituted as one man need not be afraid of another.
When the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person, or in the
same body of magistrates, there can be no liberty; because apprehensions may arise,
lest the same monarch or senate should enact tyrannical laws, to execute them in a
tyrannical manner.
Again, there is no liberty, if the judiciary power be not separated from the legislative
and the executive. Were it joined with the legislative, the life and liberty of the subject
would be exposed to arbitrary control; for the judge would be then the legislator. Were
it joined to the executive power, the judge might behave with violence and
oppression.
There would be an end of everything, were the same man or the same body, whether
of the nobles or of the people, to exercise those three powers, that of enacting laws,
that of executing the public resolutions, and that of trying the causes of individuals."
90
At the time of the American Revolution, the more influential political leaders in the
new states subscribed to Montesquieu’s concept of separation of powers. 91 Some
constitutions of the early state governments even referred to the principle. But the
concept espoused at that particular time was a lot different. As then understood,
separation of powers requires a watertight compartmentalization of the executive,
judicial, and legislative functions and permits no sharing of government powers
between and among the three branches of government. The Massachusetts
Constitution of 1780, for instance, provides:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
In the government of this commonwealth, the legislative department shall never
exercise the executive and judicial powers, or either of them; the executive shall
never exercise the legislative and judicial powers, or either of them; the judicial shall
never exercise the legislative and executive powers, or either of them: to the end that
it may be a government of laws and not of men. 92
The 1787 U.S. Constitution did not contain a similar provision like that found in the
Massachusetts Constitution or any principle proclaiming the adherence of the
Framers to the principle of separation of powers. But legal scholars are of the view
that the Framers essentially followed Montesquieu’s recommendation for the division
of powers, noting that the U.S. Constitution vests "all legislative powers" in the
Congress of the United States, 93 the "executive power" in the President, 94 and the
"judicial power" in one Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as Congress may
provide. 95
These legal scholars also note that the U.S. Constitution allows the "sharing" of the
three great powers between and among the three branches. The President, for
instance, shares in the exercise of legislative power through his veto power, and the
courts through their power to make rules of judicial procedure and especially through
their right to interpret laws and invalidate them as unconstitutional. Congress shares
in the exercise of executive power through its confirmation of appointments and
assent to treaties, and in the judicial power through its power to create inferior courts
and regulate the number and pay of judges. 96 Thus, they postulate that the Framers
established a government guided not by strict separation of powers but one of checks
and balances to prevent the separate branches from "running wild" and to avert
deadlocks and breakdowns, viz:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
The Framers expected the branches to battle each other to acquire and defend
power. To prevent the supremacy of one branch over any other in these battles,
powers were mixed; each branch was granted important power over the same area of
activity. The British and Conference experience has led the Framers to avoid
regarding controversy between the branches as a conflict between good and evil or
right or wrong, requiring definitive, institutionally permanent resolution, Rather, they
viewed such conflict as an expression of the aggressive and perverse part of human
nature that demanded outlet but has to be kept from finding lasting resolution so that
liberty could be reserved. 97
Even then, some legal luminaries were of the view that the concept of checks and
balances is diametrically opposed to the principle of separation of powers. James
Madison, however, explained that Montesquieu’s concept of separation of powers did
not require a strict division of functions among the three branches of government.
Madison defended the Constitution as having sufficient division of functions among
the three branches of government to avoid the consolidation of power in any one
branch and also stressed that a rigid segregation of the three branches would
undermine the purpose of the separation doctrine. 98 He noted that unless the three
branches "be so far connected and blended as to give to each a constitutional control
over the others, the degree of separation which the maxim requires as essential to a
free government, can never in practice be duly maintained." 99 Madison’s view has
since then been the accepted interpretation of the concept of separation of powers
under the Constitution. Thus, in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 100 the
U.S. Supreme Court held that" [I]n designing the structure of our Government and
dividing and allocating the sovereign power among the three co-equal branches, the
Framers of the Constitution sought to provide a comprehensive system but the
separate powers were not intended to operate with absolute independence." In
Buckley v. Valeo, 101 the Court ruled that the Constitution by no means contemplates
total separation of each of these essential branches of government and the framers
viewed the principle of separation of powers as a vital check against tyranny. It
likewise warned that the "hermetic sealing off of the three branches of Government
from one another would preclude the establishment of a Nation capable of governing
itself effectively." 102 Thus, in Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 103 the
Court rejected the "archaic view of separation of powers as requiring three airtight
departments of government." In determining whether an act disrupts the proper
balance between the coordinate branches, the Court suggested that the proper
inquiry should focus on the extent to which it prevents the other branch from
accomplishing its constitutionally assigned functions. 104
In this jurisdiction, our adherence to the principle of separation powers was succinctly
discussed by Justice Laurel in Angara v. Electoral Commission 105 decided in 1936,
less than a year after the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution. Justice Laurel
emphasized that" [T]he separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system
of government. It obtains not through express provision but by actual division in our
Constitution." 106 Thus:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of the matters within
its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. But it does not follow from the
fact that the three powers are to be kept separate and distinct that the Constitution
intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other. The
Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure
coordination in the workings of the various departments of the government. For
example, the Chief Executive under our Constitution is so far made a check on the
legislative power that this assent is required in the enactment of laws. This, however,
is subject to the further check that a bill may become a law notwithstanding the
refusal of the President to approve it, by a vote of two-thirds or three-fourths, as the
case may be, of the National Assembly. The President has also the right to convene
the Assembly in special session whenever he chooses. On the other hand, the
National Assembly operates as a check on the Executive in the sense that its consent
though its Commission on Appointments is necessary in the appointment of certain
officers; and the concurrence of a majority of all its members is essential to the
conclusion of treaties. Furthermore, in its power to determine what courts other than
the Supreme Court shall be established, to define their jurisdiction and to appropriate
funds for their support, the National Assembly controls the judicial department to a
certain extent. The Assembly also exercises the judicial power of trying
impeachments. And the judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter,
effectively checks the other departments in the exercise of its power to determine the
law, and hence to declare executive and legislative acts void if violative of the
Constitution. 107
In Planas v. Gil, 108 Justice Laurel further discussed the intricate interplay of the
principle of separation of powers and checks and balances, viz:chanrob1es virtual
1aw library
The classical separation of governmental powers, whether viewed in the light of
political philosophy of Aristotle, Locke or Montesquieu, or to the postulations of
Mabini, Madison, or Jefferson, is a relative theory of government. There is more
truism and actuality in interdependence than in independence and separation of
powers, for as observed by Justice Holmes in a case of Philippine origin, we cannot
lay down "with mathematical precision and divide the branches in watertight
compartments" not only because "the ordinances of the Constitution do not establish
and divide fields of black and white" but also because "even more specific to them are
found to terminate in a penumbra shading gradually from one extreme to the other."
109
It is now beyond debate that the principle of separation of powers (1) allows the
"blending" of some of the executive, legislative, or judicial powers in one body; (2)
does not prevent one branch of government from inquiring into the affairs of the other
branches to maintain the balance of power; (3) but ensures that there is no
encroachment on matters within the exclusive jurisdiction of the other branches.
For its part, this Court checks the exercise of power of the other branches of
government through judicial review. It is the final arbiter of disputes involving the
proper allocation and exercise of the different powers under the Constitution.
Thus:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. Who is to determine the
nature, scope and extent of such powers? The Constitution itself has provided for the
instrumentality of the judiciary as the rational way. And when the judiciary mediates to
allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other
departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but only
asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to
determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the
parties in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and
guarantees to them. This is in truth all that is involved in what is termed "judicial
supremacy" which properly is the power of judicial review under the Constitution. 110
The power of judicial review is, however, limited to "actual cases and controversies to
be exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited further to the
constitutional question raised or the very lis mota presented," for "any attempt at
abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile
conclusions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation." 111 Courts are also
enjoined to accord the presumption of constitutionality to legislative enactments, "not
only because the legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution but also
because the judiciary in the determination of actual cases and controversies must
reflect the wisdom and justice of the people as expressed through their
representatives in the executive and legislative departments of the government." 112
The role of the judiciary in mapping the metes and bounds of powers of the different
branches of government was redefined in the 1987 Constitution which expanded the
jurisdiction of this Court to include the determination of "grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality
of the Government." 113 The expansion was made because of the dissatisfaction with
the practice of this Court in frequently invoking the "political question" 114 doctrine
during the period of martial law to dodge its duty. 115 Be that as it may, the expanded
power "definitely does not do away with the political question doctrine itself." 116
Thus, in Marcos v. Manglapus, 117 the Court held:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Under the Constitution, judicial power includes the duty to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. [Art. VIII, Sec. 1.]
Given this wording, we cannot agree with the Solicitor General that the issue
constitutes a political question which is beyond the jurisdiction of the Court to decide.
The present Constitution limits resort to the political question doctrine and broadens
the scope of judicial inquiry into areas which the Court, under previous constitutions,
would have normally left to the political departments to decide. But nonetheless there
remain issues beyond the Court’s jurisdiction the determination of which is exclusively
for the President, for Congress or for the people themselves through a plebiscite or
referendum. We cannot, for example, question the President’s recognition of a foreign
government, no matter how premature or improvident such action may appear. We
cannot set aside a presidential pardon though it may appear to us that the beneficiary
is totally undeserving of the grant. Nor can we amend the Constitution under the
guise of resolving a dispute brought before us because the power is reserved to the
people. 118
Since then, the Court has used its expanded power to check acts of the House of
Representatives, 119 the President, 120 and even of independent bodies such as the
Electoral Tribunal, 121 the Commission on Elections 122 and the Civil Service
Commission. 123
Congress checks the other branches of government primarily through its law making
powers. Congress can create administrative agencies, define their powers and duties,
fix the terms of officers and their compensation. 124 It can also create courts, define
their jurisdiction and reorganize the judiciary so long as it does not undermine the
security of tenure of its members. 125 The power of Congress does not end with the
finished task of legislation. Concomitant with its principal power to legislate is the
auxiliary power to ensure that the laws it enacts are faithfully executed. As well
stressed by one scholar, the legislature "fixes the main lines of substantive policy and
is entitled to see that administrative policy is in harmony with it; it establishes the
volume and purpose of public expenditures and ensures their legality and propriety; it
must be satisfied that internal administrative controls are operating to secure
economy and efficiency; and it informs itself of the conditions of administration of
remedial measure." 126
Concept and bases of congressional oversight

Broadly defined, the power of oversight embraces all activities undertaken by
Congress to enhance its understanding of and influence over the implementation of
legislation it has enacted. 127 Clearly, oversight concerns post-enactment measures
undertaken by Congress: (a) to monitor bureaucratic compliance with program
objectives, (b) to determine whether agencies are properly administered, (c) to
eliminate executive waste and dishonesty, (d) to prevent executive usurpation of
legislative authority, and (d) to assess executive conformity with the congressional
perception of public interest. 128
The power of oversight has been held to be intrinsic in the grant of legislative power
itself and integral to the checks and balances inherent in a democratic system of
government. 129 Among the most quoted justifications for this power are the writings
of John Stuart Mill and Woodrow Wilson. In his Consideration of Representative
Government, 130 Mill wrote that the duty of the legislature is "to watch and control the
government; to throw the light of publicity on its acts; to compel a full exposition and
justification of all of them which any one considers objectionable; and to censure
them if found condemnable." 131 Wilson went one step farther and opined that the
legislature’s informing function should be preferred to its legislative function. He
emphasized that" [E]ven more important than legislation is the instruction and
guidance in political affairs which the people might receive from a body which kept all
national concerns suffused in a broad daylight of discussion." 132
Over the years, Congress has invoked its oversight power with increased frequency
to check the perceived "exponential accumulation of power" by the executive branch.
133 By the beginning of the 20th century, Congress has delegated an enormous
amount of legislative authority to the executive branch and the administrative
agencies. Congress, thus, uses its oversight power to make sure that the
administrative agencies perform their functions within the authority delegated to them.
134
The oversight power has also been used to ensure the accountability of regulatory
commissions like the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Federal Reserve
Board, often referred to as representing a "headless fourth branch of government."
135 Unlike other ordinary administrative agencies, these bodies are independent from
the executive branch and are outside the executive department in the discharge of
their functions. 136
Categories of congressional oversight functions
The acts done by Congress purportedly in the exercise of its oversight powers may
be divided into three categories, namely: scrutiny, investigation and supervision. 137
a. Scrutiny
Congressional scrutiny implies a lesser intensity and continuity of attention to
administrative operations. 138 Its primary purpose is to determine economy and
efficiency of the operation of government activities. In the exercise of legislative
scrutiny, Congress may request information and report from the other branches of
government. It can give recommendations or pass resolutions for consideration of the
agency involved.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
Legislative scrutiny is based primarily on the power of appropriation of Congress.
Under the Constitution, the "power of the purse" belongs to Congress. 139 The
President may propose the budget, but still, Congress has the final say on
appropriations. Consequently, administrative officials appear every year before the
appropriation committees of Congress to report and submit a budget estimate and a
program of administration for the succeeding fiscal year. During budget hearings,
administrative officials defend their budget proposals.
The power of appropriation carries with it the power to specify the project or activity to
be funded. 140 Hence, the holding of budget hearing has been the usual means of
reviewing policy and of auditing the use of previous appropriation to ascertain
whether they have been disbursed for purposes authorized in an appropriation act.
The consideration of the budget is also an opportunity for the lawmakers to express
their confidence in the performance of a Cabinet Secretary or to manifest their disgust
or disfavor of the continuance in office of a bureaucrat. 141 Congress can even curtail
the activities of the administrative agencies by denial of funds. 142 In the United
States, for instance, Congress brought to end the existence of the Civilian
Conservation Corps, the National Youth Administration and the National Resources
Planning Board, simply by denying them any appropriation. 143
But legislative scrutiny does not end in budget hearings. Congress can ask the heads
of departments to appear before and be heard by either House of Congress on any
matter pertaining to their departments. Section 22, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
provides:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
The heads of departments may, upon their own initiative, with the consent of the
President, or upon the request of either House, as the rules of each House shall
provide, appear before and be heard by such House on any matter pertaining to their
departments. Written questions shall be submitted to the President of the Senate or
the Speaker of the House of Representatives at least three days before their
scheduled appearance. Interpellations shall not be limited to written questions, but
may cover matters related thereto. When the security of the State or the public
interest so requires and the President so states in writing, the appearance shall be
conducted in executive session.
This provision originated from the Administrative Code 144 and was later elevated to
the level of a constitutional provision due to its "great value in the work of the
legislature." 145 In drafting the 1935 Constitution, some delegates opposed the
provision arguing that it is a feature of a parliamentary system and its adoption would
make our government a "hybrid system." 146 But mainly attacked was the provision
authorizing the department secretaries on their own initiative to appear before the
legislature, with the right to be heard on any matter pertaining to their departments. It
was pointed out that this would "give a chance to the department secretaries to lobby
for items in the appropriation bill or for provisions of other bills in which they had
special interest, permitting them to bear influence and pressure upon Members of the
law-making body, in violation of the principle of separation of powers underlying the
Constitution." 147 Despite the objections, the provision was adopted to "prevent the
raising of any question with respect to the constitutionality of the practice" and "to
make open and public the relations between the legislative and the executive
departments." 148 As incorporated in the 1935 Constitution, the provision
reads:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
The heads of departments upon their own initiative or upon the request of the
National Assembly on any matter pertaining to their departments unless the public
interest shall require otherwise and the President shall state so in writing. 149
The whole tenor of the provision was permissive: the department heads could appear
but the legislative was not obliged to entertain them; reciprocally, the legislature could
request their appearance but could not oblige them especially if the President
objected. 150 The rule radically changed, however, with the adoption of the 1973
Constitution, establishing a parliamentary system of government. In a parliamentary
system, the administration is responsible to the Parliament and hence, the Prime
Minister and the Cabinet Members may be "required to appear and answer questions
and interpellations" to give an account of their stewardship during a "question hour,"
viz:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Sec. 12 (1) There shall be a question hour at least once a month or as often as the
Rules of the Batasang Pambansa may provide, which shall be included in its agenda,
during which the Prime Minister, the Deputy Prime Minister or any Minister may be
required to appear and answer questions and interpellations by Members of the
Batasang Pambansa. Written questions shall be submitted to the Speaker at least
three days before a scheduled question hour. Interpellations shall not be limited to the
written questions, but may cover matters related thereto. The agenda shall specify the
subjects of the question hour. When the security of the State so requires and the
President so states in writing, the question hour shall be conducted in executive
session.
The "question hour" was retained despite the reversion to the presidential system in
1981. During the deliberations of the 1987 Constitution, the report of the legislative
‘committee called for the adoption of the "question hour" or the following
reasons:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
. . . Its purposes are to elicit concrete information from the administration, to request
its intervention, and when necessary, to expose abuses and seek redress. The
procedure provides the opposition with a means of discovering the government’s
weak points and because of the publicity it generates, it has a salutary influence on
the administration. On the whole, because of the detailed facts elicited during the
interpellation or in the written answers, it will help members to understand the
complicated subject matter of bills and statutory measures laid before the Assembly. It
may be added that the popularity of this procedure can be attributed to the fact that in
making use of his right to ask questions, the member is a completely free agent of the
people. The only limits on his actions are the rules governing the admissibility of
questions concerned with matters of form and not with the merits of the issue at hand.
The fact that we also impose a time limit means that the government is obliged to
furnish the information asked for and this obligation is what gives the procedure its
real strength. . . . 151
This proposal was vigorously opposed on the ground of separation of powers.
CONCOM Delegate Christian Monsod pointed out that the provision was historically
intended to apply to members of the legislature who are in the executive branch
typical in a parliamentary form of government. In fine, the "question hour" was
conducted on a peer basis. But since the delegates decided to adopt a presidential
form of government, cabinet members are purely alter egos of the President and are
no longer members of the legislature. To require them to appear before the legislators
and account for their actions "puts them on unequal terms with the legislators" and
"would violate the separation of powers of the executive and the legislative branches."
152 Delegate Monsod, however, recognized that a mechanism should be adopted
where Cabinet members may be summoned and may, even on their own initiative,
appear before the legislature. This, he said, would promote coordination without
subordinating one body to another. He thus suggested that the original tenor of the
provision in the 1935 Constitution be retained. 153
After much deliberation, delegate Monsod’s suggestion prevailed. Thus, the President
may or may not consent to the appearance of the heads of departments; and even if
he does, he may require that the appearance be in executive session. Reciprocally,
Congress may refuse the initiative taken by a department secretary.
Likewise, Congress exercises legislative scrutiny thru its power of confirmation.
Section 18, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides for the organization of a
Commission on Appointments consisting of the President of the Senate as ex officio
Chairman, twelve Senators and twelve members of the House of Representatives,
elected by each House on the basis of proportional representation from the political
parties or organizations registered under the party-list system. Consent of the
Commission on Appointments is needed for the nominees of the President for the
following positions: (a) heads of executive departments, (b) ambassadors, other
public ministers and consuls, (c) officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel
or naval captain, and (d) other officers whose appointments are vested with the
President under the Constitution. 154
Through the power of confirmation, Congress shares in the appointing power of the
executive. Theoretically, it is intended to lessen political considerations in the
appointment of officials in sensitive positions in the government. It also provides
Congress an opportunity to find out whether the nominee possesses the necessary
qualifications, integrity and probity required of all public servants.
In the United States, apart from the appropriation and confirmation powers of the U.S.
Congress, legislative scrutiny finds expression in the Legislative Reorganization Act of
1946 charging all House and Senate Standing Committees with continuous vigilance
over the execution of any and all laws falling within their respective jurisdictions "with
a view to determining its economy and efficiency." 155 Pursuant to this law, each
committee was authorized to hire a certain number of staff employees. All Senate
committees were likewise given the power to subpoena witnesses and documents.
156
b. Congressional investigation
While congressional scrutiny is regarded as a passive process of looking at the facts
that are readily available, congressional investigation involves a more intense digging
of facts. 157 The power of Congress to conduct investigation is recognized by the
1987 Constitution under section 21, Article VI, viz:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committee may
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of
procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be
respected.
But even in the absence of an express provision in the Constitution, congressional
investigation has been held to be an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the
legislative function. In the United States, the lack of a constitutional provision
specifically authorizing the conduct of legislative investigations did not deter its
Congresses from holding investigation on suspected corruption, mismanagement, or
inefficiencies of government officials. Exercised first in the failed St. Clair expedition in
1792, the power to conduct investigation has since been invoked in the Teapot Dome,
Watergate, Iran-Contra, and Whitewater controversies. 158 Subsequently, in a series
of decisions, the Court recognized "the danger to effective and honest conduct of the
Government if the legislative power to probe corruption in the Executive branch were
unduly unhampered." 159
In Eastland v. United States Servicemen’s Fund, 160 the U.S. Supreme Court ruled
that the scope of the congressional power of inquiry "is penetrating and far-reaching
as the potential power to enact and appropriate under the Constitution." 161 It
encompasses everything that concerns the administration of existing laws as well as
proposed or possibly needed statutes. 162 In the exercise of this power,
congressional inquiries can reach all sources of information and in the absence of
countervailing constitutional privilege or self-imposed restrictions upon its authority,
Congress and its committees, have virtually, plenary power to compel information
needed to discharge its legislative functions from executive agencies, private persons
and organizations. Within certain constraints, the information so obtained may be
made public. 163 In McGrain v. Daugherty, 164 it held that "a legislative body cannot
legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions
which the legislation is intended to effect change." 165 But while the congressional
power of inquiry is broad, it is not unlimited. No inquiry is an end in itself; it must be
related to, and in furtherance of, a legitimate task of Congress." 166 Moreover, an
investigating committee has only the power to inquire into matters within the scope of
the authority delegated to it by its parent body. 167 But once its jurisdiction and
authority, and the pertinence of the matter under inquiry to its area of authority are
established, a committee’s investigative purview is substantial and wide-ranging. 168
American jurisprudence upholding the inherent power of Congress to conduct
investigation has been adopted in our jurisdiction in Arnault v. Nazareno 169 decided
in 1950, when no provision yet existed granting Congress the power to conduct
investigation. In the said case, the Senate passed Resolution No. 8 creating a special
committee to investigate the Buenavista and the Tambobong Estates Deal wherein
the government was allegedly defrauded P5,000,000.00. The special committee
examined various witnesses, among whom was Jean L. Arnault. Due to the refusal of
Arnault to answer a question which he claimed to be "self-incriminatory," 170 the
Senate passed a resolution citing Arnault in contempt. The Senate committed him to
the custody of the Sergeant-at-Arms and ordered his imprisonment until he shall have
answered the question. Arnault filed a petition before this Court contending that (a)
the Senate has no power to punish him for contempt; (b) the information sought to be
obtained by the Senate is immaterial and will not serve any intended or purported
legislation; and (c) the answer required of him will incriminate him.chanrob1es virtua1
1aw 1ibrary
Upholding the power of the Senate to punish Arnault for contempt, the Court ruled as
follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Although there is no provision in the Constitution expressly investing either House of
Congress with power to make investigations and exact testimony to the end that it
may exercise its legislative functions advisedly and effectively, such power is so far
incidental to the legislative function as to be implied. In other words, the power of
inquiry — with process to enforce it — is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the
legislative function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the
absence of information respecting the conditions which legislation is intended to affect
or change; and where the legislative body does not itself possess the requisite
information — which is not frequently true — recourse must be had to others who do
possess it. Experience has shown that mere requests for such information are often
unavailing, and also that information which is volunteered is not always accurate or
complete; so some means of compulsion is essential to obtain what is needed. . . The
fact that the Constitution expressly gives the Congress the power to punish its
Members for disorderly behaviour, does not by necessary implication exclude the
power to punish for contempt any other person. 171
The Court further ruled that the power of the Senate to punish a witness for contempt
does not terminate upon the adjournment of the session. 172 It held that the
investigation was within the power of the Senate since the "transaction involved a
questionable and allegedly unnecessary and irregular expenditure of no less than
P5,000,000.00 of public funds, of which the Congress is the constitutional guardian."
173 The investigation was also found to be "in aid of legislation." As result of the yet
unfinished investigation, the Court noted that the investigating committee has
recommended, and the Senate has approved three bills. 174
The Court further held that once an inquiry is admitted or established to be within the
jurisdiction of a legislative body to make, the investigating committee has the power to
require a witness to answer any question pertinent to that inquiry, subject to his
constitutional right against self-incrimination. The inquiry must be material or
necessary to the exercise of a power in it vested by the Constitution. Hence, a
witness can not be coerced to answer a question that obviously has no relation to the
subject of the inquiry. But the Court explained that "the materiality of the question
must be determined by its direct relation to the subject of the inquiry and not by its
indirect relation to any proposed or possible legislation." The reason is that the
necessity or lack of necessity for legislative action and the form and character of the
action itself are determined by the sum total of the information to be gathered as a
result of the investigation, and not by a fraction of such information elicited from a
single question. 175
Finally, the Court ruled that the ground on which Arnault invoked the right against self-
incrimination "is too shaky, infirm, and slippery to afford him safety." 176 It noted that
since Arnault himself said that the transaction was legal, and that he gave the
P440,000.00 to a representative of Burt in compliance with the latter’s verbal
instruction, there is therefore no basis upon which to sustain his claim that to reveal
the name of that person would incriminate him. 177 It held that it is not enough for the
witness to say that the answer will incriminate him for he is not the sole judge of his
liability, thus:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
. . . [T]he danger of self-incrimination must appear reasonable and real to the court,
from all the circumstances and from the whole case, as well as from his general
conception of the relations of the witness . . . The fact that the testimony of the
witness may tend to show that he has violated the law is not sufficient to entitle him to
claim the protection of the constitutional provision against self-incrimination, unless he
is at the same time liable to prosecution and punishment for such violation. The
witness cannot assert his privilege by reason of some fanciful excuse, for protection
against an imaginary danger, or to secure immunity to a third person. 178
As now contained in the 1987 Constitution, the power of Congress to investigate is
circumscribed by three limitations, namely: (a) it must be in aid of its legislative
functions, (b) it must be conducted in accordance with duly published rules of
procedure, and (c) the persons appearing therein are afforded their constitutional
rights.
In Bengzon, Jr. v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, 179 this Court held that the senate
committee exceeded the permissible exercise of legislative investigation. The case
started with a speech by Senator Enrile suggesting the need to determine possible
violation of law in the alleged transfer of some properties of former Ambassador
Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez to the Lopa Group of Companies. The Senate Blue
Ribbon Committee decided to investigate the transaction purportedly in aid of
legislation. When the Blue Ribbon Committee summoned the petitioners to appear,
they asked this Court for a restraining order on the ground, among others, that the
investigation was not in aid of legislation and that their appearance before the
investigating body could prejudice their case before the Sandiganbayan. Ruling in
favor of the petitioner, we held as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Verily, the speech of Senator Enrile contained no suggestion of contemplated
legislation; he merely called upon the Senate to look into a possible violation of Sec. 5
of RA No. 3019, otherwise known as "The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act." In
other words, the purpose of the inquiry to be conducted by respondent Blue Ribbon
Committee was to find out whether or not the relatives of President Aquino,
particularly, Mr. Ricardo Lopa, had violated the law in connection with the alleged sale
of the 36 or 39 corporations belonging to Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez to the Lopa
Group. There appears to be, therefore, no intended legislation involved.
The conduct of legislative investigation is also subject to the rules of each House. In
the House of Representatives, 180 an inquiry may be initiated or conducted by a
committee motu proprio on any matter within its jurisdiction upon a majority vote of all
its Members 181 or upon order of the House of Representatives 182
through:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
(1) the referral of a privilege speech containing or conveying a request or demand for
the conduct of an inquiry, to the appropriate committee, upon motion of the Majority
Leader or his deputies; or
(2) the adoption of a resolution directing a committee to conduct an inquiry reported
out by the Committee on Rules after making a determination on the necessity and
propriety of the conduct of an inquiry by such committee: Provided, That all
resolutions directing any committee to conduct an inquiry shall be referred to the
Committee on Rules; or
(3) the referral by the Committee on Rules to the appropriate committee, after making
a determination on the necessity and propriety of the conduct of inquiry by such
committee, of a petition filed or information given by a Member of the House
requesting such inquiry and endorsed by the Speaker: Provided, That such petition or
information shall be given under oath, stating the facts upon which it is based, and
accompanied by supporting affidavits. 183
The committee to which a privilege speech, resolution, petition or information
requesting an inquiry is referred may constitute and appoint sub-committees
composed of at least one-third (1/3) of the committee for the purpose of performing
any and all acts which the committee as a whole is authorized to perform, except to
punish for contempt. In case a privilege speech is referred to two or more
committees, a joint inquiry by the said committees shall be conducted. The inquiries
are to be held in public except when the committee or sub-committee deems that the
examination of a witness in a public hearing may endanger national security. In which
case, it shall conduct the hearing in an executive session. 184
The Rules further provide that "the filing or pendency of a case before any court,
tribunal or quasi-judicial or administrative bodies shall not stop or abate any inquiry
conducted to carry out a specific legislative purpose." 185 In exercise of
congressional inquiry, the committee has the power "to issue subpoena and
subpoena duces tecum to a witness in any part of the country, signed by the
chairperson or acting chairperson and the Speaker or acting Speaker." 186
Furthermore, the committee may, by a vote of two-thirds (2/3) of all its members
constituting a quorum, punish for contempt any person who: (a) refuses, after being
duly summoned, to obey such summons without legal excuse; (b) refuses to be sworn
or placed under affirmation; (c) refuses to answer any relevant inquiry; (d) refuses to
produce any books, papers, documents or records that are relevant to the inquiry and
are in his/her possession; (e) acts in a disrespectful manner towards any member of
the Committee or commits misbehavior in the presence of the committee; or (f)
unduly interferes in the conduct of proceedings during meetings. 187
Nevertheless, any person called to be a witness may be represented by a counsel
188 and is entitled to all rights including the right against self-incrimination. 189
c. Legislative supervision
The third and most encompassing form by which Congress exercises its oversight
power is thru legislative supervision. "Supervision" connotes a continuing and
informed awareness on the part of a congressional committee regarding executive
operations in a given administrative area. 190 While both congressional scrutiny and
investigation involve inquiry into past executive branch actions in order to influence
future executive branch performance, congressional supervision allows Congress to
scrutinize the exercise of delegated law-making authority, and permits Congress to
retain part of that delegated authority.
Congress exercises supervision over the executive agencies through its veto power. It
typically utilizes veto provisions when granting the President or an executive agency
the power to promulgate regulations with the force of law. These provisions require
the President or an agency to present the proposed regulations to Congress, which
retains a "right" to approve or disapprove any regulation before it takes effect. Such
legislative veto provisions usually provide that a proposed regulation will become a
law after the expiration of a certain period of time, only if Congress does not
affirmatively disapprove of the regulation in the meantime. Less frequently, the statute
provides that a proposed regulation will become law if Congress affirmatively
approves it. 191
The legislative veto was developed initially in response to the problems of
reorganizing the U.S. Government structure during the Great Depression in early 20th
century. When U.S. President Hoover requested authority to reorganize the
government in 1929, he coupled his request with a proposal for legislative review. He
proposed that the Executive "should act upon approval of a joint Committee of
Congress or with the reservation of power of revision by Congress within some limited
period adequate for its consideration." 192 Congress followed President Hoover’s
suggestion and authorized reorganization subject to legislative review. 193 Although
the reorganization authority reenacted in 1933 did not contain a legislative veto
provision, the provision returned during the Roosevelt administration and has since
been renewed several times. 194 Over the years, the provision was used extensively.
Various American Presidents submitted to Congress some 115 Reorganization Plans,
23 of which were disapproved pursuant to legislative veto provisions. 195
During World War II, Congress and the President applied the legislative veto
procedure to resolve the delegation problem involving national security and foreign
affairs. The legislative veto offered the means by which Congress could confer
additional authority to the President while preserving its own constitutional role.
During this period, Congress enacted over 30 statutes conferring powers on the
Executive with legislative veto provisions. 196
After World War II, legislative veto provisions have been inserted in laws delegating
authority in new areas of governmental involvement including the space program,
international agreements on nuclear energy, tariff arrangements, and adjustment of
federal pay rates. 197 It has also figured prominently in resolving a series of major
constitutional disputes between the President and Congress over claims of the
President to broad impoundment, war and national emergency powers. 198 Overall,
295 congressional veto-type procedures have been inserted in 196 different statutes
since 1932 when the first veto provision was enacted into law. 199
Supporters of legislative veto stress that it is necessary to maintain the balance of
power between the legislative and the executive branches of government as it offers
lawmakers a way to delegate vast power to the executive branch or to independent
agencies while retaining the option to cancel particular exercise of such power without
having to pass new legislation or to repeal existing law. 200 They contend that this
arrangement promotes democratic accountability as it provides legislative check on
the activities of unelected administrative agencies. 201 One proponent thus
explains:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
It is too late to debate the merits of this delegation policy: the policy is too deeply
embedded in our law and practice. It suffices to say that the complexities of modern
government have often led Congress — whether by actual or perceived necessity —
to legislate by declaring broad policy goals and general statutory standards, leaving
the choice of policy options to the discretion of an executive officer. Congress
articulates legislative aims, but leaves their implementation to the judgment of parties
who may or may not have participated in or agreed with the development of those
aims. Consequently, absent safeguards, in many instances the reverse of our
constitutional scheme could be effected: Congress proposes, the Executive disposes.
One safeguard, of course, is the legislative power to enact new legislation or to
change existing law. But without some means of overseeing post enactment activities
of the executive branch, Congress would be unable to determine whether its policies
have been implemented in accordance with legislative intent and thus whether
legislative intervention is appropriate. 202
Its opponents, however, criticize the legislative veto as undue encroachment upon the
executive prerogatives. They urge that any post-enactment measures undertaken by
the legislative branch should be limited to scrutiny and investigation; any measure
beyond that would undermine the separation of powers guaranteed by the
Constitution. 203 They contend that legislative veto constitutes an impermissible
evasion of the President’s veto authority and intrusion into the powers vested in the
executive or judicial branches of government. 204 Proponents counter that legislative
veto enhances separation of powers as it prevents the executive branch and
independent agencies from accumulating too much power. 205 They submit that
reporting requirements and congressional committee investigations allow Congress to
scrutinize only the exercise of delegated law-making authority. They do not allow
Congress to review executive proposals before they take effect and they do not afford
the opportunity for ongoing and binding expressions of congressional intent. 206 In
contrast, legislative veto permits Congress to participate prospectively in the approval
or disapproval of "subordinate law" or those enacted by the executive branch
pursuant to a delegation of authority by Congress. They further argue that legislative
veto "is a necessary response by Congress to the accretion of policy control by forces
outside its chambers." In an era of delegated authority, they point out that legislative
veto "is the most efficient means Congress has yet devised to retain control over the
evolution and implementation of its policy as declared by statute." 207
In Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha, 208 the U.S. Supreme Court
resolved the validity of legislative veto provisions. The case arose from the order of
the immigration judge suspending the deportation of Chadha pursuant to § 244(c)(1)
of the Immigration and Nationality Act. The United States House of Representatives
passed a resolution vetoing the suspension pursuant to § 244(c)(2) authorizing either
House of Congress, by resolution, to invalidate the decision of the executive branch
to allow a particular deportable alien to remain in the United States. The immigration
judge reopened the deportation proceedings to implement the House order and the
alien was ordered deported. The Board of Immigration Appeals dismissed the alien’s
appeal, holding that it had no power to declare unconstitutional an act of Congress.
The United States Court of Appeals for Ninth Circuit held that the House was without
constitutional authority to order the alien’s deportation and that § 244(c)(2) violated
the constitutional doctrine on separation of powers.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
On appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court declared § 244(c)(2) unconstitutional. But the
Court shied away from the issue of separation of powers and instead held that the
provision violates the presentment clause and bicameralism. It held that the one-
house veto was essentially legislative in purpose and effect. As such, it is subject to
the procedures set out in Article I of the Constitution requiring the passage by a
majority of both Houses and presentment to the President. Thus:chanrob1es virtual
1aw library
Examination of the action taken here by one House pursuant to § 244(c)(2) reveals
that it was essentially legislative in purpose and effect. In purporting to exercise
power defined in Art I, § 8, cl 4, to "establish a uniform Rule of Naturalization," the
House took action that had the purpose and effect of altering the legal rights, duties,
and relations of persons, including the Attorney General, Executive Branch officials
and Chadha, all outside the Legislative Branch. Section 244(c)(2) purports to
authorize one House Congress to require the Attorney General to deport an individual
alien whose deportation otherwise would be canceled under § 244. The one-House
veto operated in these cases to overrule the Attorney General and mandate Chadha’s
deportation; absent the House action, Chadha would remain in the United States.
Congress has acted and its action altered Chadha’s status.
The legislative character of the one-House veto in these cases is confirmed by the
character of the congressional action it supplants. Neither the House of
Representatives nor the Senate contends that, absent the veto provision in § 244(c)
(2), either of them, or both of them acting together, could effectively require the
Attorney General, in exercise of legislatively delegated authority, had determined the
alien should remain in the United States. Without the challenged provision in § 244(c)
(2), this could have been achieved, if at all, only by legislation requiring deportation.
Similarly, a veto by one House of Congress under § 244(c)(2) cannot be justified as
an attempt at amending the standards set out in § 244(a)(1), or as a repeal of § 244
as applied to Chadha. Amendment and repeal of statutes, no less than enactment,
must conform with Art I.
The nature of the decision implemented by one-House veto in these cases further
manifests its legislative character. After long experience with the clumsy, time-
consuming private bill procedure, Congress made a deliberate choice to delegate to
the Executive Branch, and specifically to the Attorney General, the authority to allow
deportable aliens to remain in this country in certain specified circumstances. It is not
disputed that this choice to delegate authority is precisely the kind of decision that can
be implemented only in accordance with the procedures set out in Art I. Disagreement
with the Attorney General’s decision on Chadha’s deportation — that is, Congress’
decision to deport Chadha — no less than Congress’ original choice to delegate to
the Attorney General the authority to make decision, involves determinations of policy
that Congress can implement in only one way; bicameral passage followed by
presentment to the President. Congress must abide by its delegation of authority until
that delegation is legislatively altered or revoked. 209
Two weeks after the Chadha decision, the Court upheld, in memorandum decision,
two lower court decisions invalidating the legislative veto provisions in the Natural
Gas Policy Act of 1978 210 and the Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act of
1980. 211 Following this precedence, lower courts invalidated statutes containing
legislative veto provisions although some of these provisions required the approval of
both Houses of Congress and thus met the bicameralism requirement of Article I.
Indeed, some of these veto provisions were not even exercised. 212
Given the concept and configuration of the power of congressional oversight, the next
level of inquiry is whether congress exceeded its permissible exercise in the case at
bar. But before proceeding, a discussion of the nature and powers of the Commission
on Elections as provided in the 1987 Constitution is decisive to the issue.
Congressional Oversight and COMELEC
The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) is a constitutional body exclusively
charged with the enforcement and administration of "all laws and regulations relative
to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall," 213 and is
invested with the power to decide all questions affecting elections save those
involving the right to vote. 214
Given its important role in preserving the sanctity of the right of suffrage, 215 the
COMELEC was purposely constituted as a body separate from the executive,
legislative, and judicial branches of government. 216 Originally, the power to enforce
our election laws was vested with the President and exercised through the
Department of the Interior. According to Dean Sinco, 217 however, the view ultimately
emerged that an independent body could better protect the right of suffrage of our
people. Hence, the enforcement of our election laws, while an executive power, was
transferred to the COMELEC.
The shift to a modified parliamentary system with the adoption of the 1973
Constitution did not alter the character of COMELEC as an independent body. 218
Indeed, a "definite tendency to enhance and invigorate the role of the Commission on
Elections as the independent constitutional body charged with the safeguarding of
free, peaceful and honest elections" has been observed. 219 The 1973 Constitution
broadened the power of the COMELEC by making it the sole judge of all election
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the national
legislature and elective provincial and city officials. 220 Thus, the COMELEC was
given judicial power aside from its traditional administrative and executive functions.
The trend towards strengthening the COMELEC continued with the 1987 Constitution.
Today, the COMELEC enforces and administers all laws and regulations relative to
the conduct of elections, plebiscites, initiatives, referenda and recalls. Election
contests involving regional, provincial and city elective officials are under its exclusive
original jurisdiction while all contests involving elective municipal and barangay
officials are under its appellate jurisdiction. 221
Several safeguards have been put in place to protect the independence of the
COMELEC from unwarranted encroachment by the other branches of government.
While the President appoints the Commissioners with the concurrence of the
Commission on Appointments, the Commissioners are not accountable to the
President in the discharge of their functions. They have a fixed tenure and are
removable only by impeachment. 222 To ensure that not all Commissioners are
appointed by the same President at any one time, a staggered system of appointment
was devised. Thus, of the Commissioners first appointed, three shall hold office for
seven years, three for five years, and the last three for three years. 223
Reappointment and temporary designation or appointment is prohibited. 224 In case
of vacancy, the appointee shall only serve the unexpired term of the predecessor. 225
The COMELEC is likewise granted the power to promulgate its own rules of
procedure, 226 and to appoint its own officials and employees in accordance with
Civil Service laws. 227
The COMELEC exercises quasi-judicial powers but it is not part of the judiciary. This
Court has no general power of supervision over the Commission on Elections except
those specifically granted by the Constitution. 228 As such, the Rules of Court are not
applicable to the Commission on Elections. 229 In addition, the decisions of the
COMELEC are reviewable only by petition for certiorari on grounds of grave abuse of
discretion, 230 viz:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Conceived by the charter as the effective instrument to preserve the sanctity of
popular suffrage, endowed with independence and all the needed concomitant
powers, it is but proper that the Court should accord the greatest measure of
presumption of regularity to its course of action and choice of means in performing its
duties, to the end that it may achieve its designed place in the democratic fabric of
our government. Ideally, its members should be free from all suspicions of partisan
inclinations, but the fact that actually some of them have had stints in the arena of
politics should not, unless the contrary is shown, serve as basis for denying to its
actuations the respect and consideration that the Constitution contemplates should be
accorded to it, in the same manner that the Supreme Court itself which from time to
time may have members drawn from the political ranks or even from the military is at
all times deemed insulated from every degree or form of external pressure and
influence as well as improper internal motivations that could arise from such
background or orientation.
We hold, therefore, that under the existing constitutional and statutory provisions,
the certiorari jurisdiction of the Court over orders, rulings and decisions of the
Comelec is not as broad as it used to be and should be confined to instances of grave
abuse of discretion amounting to patent and substantial denial of due process. 231
The COMELEC is, however, subject to congressional scrutiny especially during
budget hearings. But Congress cannot abolish the COMELEC as it can in case of
other agencies under the executive branch. The reason is obvious. The COMELEC is
not a mere creature of the legislature; it owes its origin from the Constitution.
Furthermore, the salary of the Chairman and the Commissioners cannot be
decreased during their tenure. 232 Enjoying fiscal autonomy, the COMELEC has a
wider discretion in the disbursement and allocation of approved appropriations. To
safeguard the COMELEC from undue legislative interference, the 1987 Constitution
provides that its approved annual appropriations are to be automatically and regularly
released. 233 Also, Congress has no power to call the commissioners of the
COMELEC to a question hour. The Constitution provides that the question hour is
limited to heads of departments under the Executive branch, and the deliberations
during the drafting of the 1987 Constitution clearly reflect this sentiment. Be that as it
may, the COMELEC is mandated to "submit to the President and the Congress a
comprehensive report on the conduct of each election, plebiscite, initiative,
referendum and recall." 234 This provision allows Congress to review and assess the
effectivity of election laws and if necessary, enact new laws or amend existing
statutes.
Be that as it may, I respectfully submit that the legislative veto power or congressional
oversight power over the authority of COMELEC to issue rules and regulations in
order to enforce election laws is unconstitutional.
As aforediscussed, the Constitution divided the powers of our government into three
categories, legislative, executive, and judicial. Although not "hermetically sealed" from
one another, the powers of the three branches are functionally identifiable. In this
respect, legislative power is generally exercised in the enactment of the law;
executive power, in its execution; and judicial power, in its interpretation. In the
absence of specific provision in the Constitution, it is fundamental under the principle
of separation of powers that one branch cannot exercise or share the power of the
other.
In addition, our Constitution created other offices aside from the executive, the
legislative and the judiciary and defined their powers and prerogatives. Among these
bodies especially created by the Constitution itself is the COMELEC.
The COMELEC occupies a distinct place in our scheme of government. As the
constitutional body charged with the administration of our election laws, it is endowed
with independence in the exercise of some of its powers and the discharge of its
responsibilities. The power to promulgate rules and regulations in order to administer
our election laws belongs to this category of powers as this has been vested
exclusively by the 1987 Constitution to the COMELEC. It cannot be trenched upon by
Congress in the exercise of its oversight powers.
In Gallardo v. Tabamo, Jr., 235 this Court traced the origin of COMELEC’s power to
promulgate rules and regulations. It was initially a statutory grant. Both the 1935 and
the 1973 Constitutions did not explicitly grant the COMELEC the power to promulgate
rules and regulations. The power was vested by Congress to the COMELEC in the
Omnibus Election Code, 236 viz:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Sec. 52. Powers and functions of the Commission on Elections. — In addition to the
powers and functions conferred upon it by the Constitution, the Commission shall
have the exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to
the conduct of elections for the purpose of ensuring free, orderly and honest
elections, and shall:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
x x x
(c) Promulgate rules and regulations implementing the provisions of this Code or
other laws which the Commission is required to enforce and administer.
x x x
This statutory power was elevated to a constitutional status with the insertion of the
word "regulations" in section 2(1) of Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution,
viz:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
While under the 1935 Constitution it had "exclusive charge of the enforcement and
administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections," exercised "all other
functions . . . conferred upon it by law" and had the power to deputize all law
enforcement agencies and instrumentalities of the Government for the purpose of
insuring free, orderly and honest elections, and under the 1973 Constitution it had,
inter alia, the power to (a)" [E]nforce and administer all laws relative to the conduct of
elections" (b)" [D]eputize, with the consent or at the instance of the Prime Minister,
law enforcement agencies and instrumentalities of the Government, including the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, for the purpose of ensuring free, orderly, and honest
elections," and (c)" [P]erform such other functions as may be provided by law," it was
not expressly vested with the power to promulgate regulations relative to the conduct
of an election. That power could only originate from a special law enacted by
Congress; this is the necessary implication of the above constitutional provision
authorizing the Commission to" [P]erform such other functions as may be provided by
law."cralaw virtua1aw library
The present Constitution, however, implicitly grants the Commission the power to
promulgate such rules and regulations. The pertinent portion of Section 2 of Article IX-
C thereof reads as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"SEC. 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and
functions:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
(1) Enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an
election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall." (Emphasis supplied)
x x x following conditions:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
The word regulations is not found in either the 1935 or 1973 Constitutions. It is thus
clear that its incorporation into the present Constitution took into account the
Commission’s power under the Omnibus Election Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 881),
which was already in force when the said Constitution was drafted and ratified,
to:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
x x x consulates and other foreign service establishments concerned are adequate and
"Promulgate rules and regulations implementing the provisions of this Code or other
laws which the Commission is required to enforce and administer. . . ."cralaw
virtua1aw library
Hence, the present Constitution upgraded to a constitutional status the aforesaid
statutory authority to grant the Commission broader and more flexible powers to
effectively perform its duties and to insulate it further from legislative intrusions.
Doubtless, if its rule-making power is made to depend on statutes, Congress may
withdraw the same at any time. Indeed, the present Constitution envisions a truly
independent Commission on Elections committed to ensure free, orderly, honest,
peaceful and credible elections, and to serve as the guardian of the people’s sacred
right of suffrage — the citizenry’s vital weapon in effecting a peaceful change of
government and in achieving and promoting political stability. 237
The elevation of the COMELEC’s power to promulgate rules and regulations in the
1987 Constitution is suffused with significance. Heretofore, it was Congress that
granted COMELEC the power to promulgate rules and regulations, and hence,
Congress can withdraw or restrict it by the exercise of its veto or oversight power.
Under the 1987 Constitution, the power to promulgate rules and regulations has been
directly granted by the Constitution and no longer by Congress. Undoubtedly, the
power was granted to COMELEC to strengthen its independence, hence, its exercise
is beyond invasion by Congress. Under any lens, sections 19 and 25 of Rep. Act No.
9189 constitute undue restrictions on the constitutional power of the COMELEC to
promulgate rules and regulations for such rules are made subject to the prior review
and approval of Congress. The impugned provisions can result in the denial of this
constitutionally conferred power because Congress can veto the rules and regulations
the COMELEC has promulgated. Thus, I respectfully submit that sections 19 and 25
of Rep. Act No. 9189 granting Congress the power to review, revise, amend and
approve the implementing rules and regulations of the COMELEC, otherwise known
as subordinate legislations in other countries, are unconstitutional.
I now come to section 17.1 of Rep. Act No. 9189 which provides:chanrob1es virtual
1aw library
Sec. 17. Voting by mail. —
17.1. For the May, 2004 elections, the Commission shall authorize voting by mail in
not more than three (3) countries, subject to the approval of the Congressional
Oversight Committee. Voting by mail may be allowed in countries that satisfy the
(d) Where the mailing system is fairly well-developed and secure to prevent occasion
of fraud;
(e) Where there exists a technically established identification system that would
preclude multiple or proxy voting; and
(f) Where the system of reception and custody of mailed ballots in the embassies,
well-secured.
Thereafter, voting by mail in any country shall be allowed only upon review and
approval of the Joint Oversight Committee. (emphases supplied)
From the law itself, it is clear that Congress has already set the necessary standards
to guide the COMELEC in identifying the countries where voting by mail may be
allowed, viz: (1) the countries must have a mailing system which is fairly developed
and secure to prevent occasion of fraud; (2) there exists a technically established
identification that would preclude multiple or proxy voting; and (3) where the system
of reception and custody of mailed ballots in the embassies, consulates and other
foreign service establishments concerned are adequate and well-secured.
Since the legislative standards have been defined, all that remains is their
enforcement. Our Constitution has specifically given the COMELEC the power to
enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election.
The power is exclusive and it ought to be self-evident that it cannot be subject to
review and revision or veto by Congress in the exercise of its oversight power. Again,
the reason for the exclusivity is to insulate COMELEC from the virus of partisan
politics. In the exercise of this exclusive power, the Commission must be accorded
considerable latitude. Unless the means and methods adopted by COMELEC are
clearly illegal or constitute grave abuse of discretion, they should not be interfered
with. 238 Thus:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
There are no ready-made formulas for solving public problems. Time and experience
are necessary to evolve patterns that will serve the ends of good government. In the
matter of the administration of the laws relative to the conduct of elections, as well as
in the appointment of election inspectors, we must not by any excessive zeal take
away from the Commission on Elections the initiative which by constitutional and legal
mandates properly belongs to it. Due regard to the independent character of the
Commission, as ordained in the Constitution, requires that the power of this court to
review the acts of that body should, as a general proposition, be used sparingly, but
firmly in appropriate cases. We are not satisfied that the present suit is one of such
cases. 239
 I so vote.
I join the majority in holding that section 17.1 of Rep. Act No. 9189 is unconstitutional
for it allows Congress to negate the exclusive power of the COMELEC to administer
and enforce election laws and regulations granted by the Constitution itself.

This is not to maintain that the Implementing Rules and Regulations promulgated by
the COMELEC, or the system it devised to implement voting by mail cannot be G.R. No. L-37878 November 25, 1932
challenged. If they are illegal or constitute grave abuse of discretion, the courts can
strike them down in an appropriate case. This power is vested to the courts under MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, petitioner,
section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution defining the scope of judicial power, and more vs.
specifically under section 5, Article VIII empowering this Court to review, revise, PASAY TRANSPORTATION COMPANY, INC., ET AL., respondents.
reverse, modify or affirm on appeal or certiorari, "all cases in which the
constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement, law,
Ross, Lawrence & Selph for petitioner.
presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in
Rivera & Francisco for respondent Pasay Transportation Co.
question." Again, this power is exclusive and is not meant to be shared by any other
P. A. Remigio for respondent E. B. Gutierrez. A. M. Zarate for respondent Raymundo
branch or agency of the government.
Transportation Co.
Vicente Ampil for respondent J. Ampil.
In sum, it is my humble view that in the case at bar, Congress exceeded the
permissible exercise of its oversight powers for the following reasons: (1) it restricts
the COMELEC’s constitutional grant of power to promulgate rules and regulations;
and (2) it invades COMELEC’s exclusive constitutional domain to enforce and
administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite,
initiative, referendum, and recall. MALCOLM, J.:

I wish to stress, however, that granting the petition will not invalidate the entire Rep.
The preliminary and basic question presented by the petition of the Manila Electric
Act No. 9189. It does not also mean that all overseas Filipinos cannot vote. The law
Company, requesting the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of
affects two classes of overseas Filipinos: (1) those who remain a domiciliary of the
arbitrators, to fix the terms upon which certain transportation companies shall be
Philippines but were absent at the time of the elections either briefly or for a long time;
permitted to use the Pasig bridge of the Manila Electric Company and the
and (2) those who are now considered domiciled in foreign countries. To the first class
compensation to be paid to the Manila Electric Company by such transportation
of overseas Filipinos belong the contract workers, students, members of the
companies, relates to the validity of section 11 of Act No. 1446 and to the legal right of
diplomatic corps and their families, businessmen, and the like. To the second class
the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators, to act on the
belong Filipinos who are considered immigrants or permanent residents of foreign
petition. Act No. 1446 above referred to is entitled. "An Act granting a franchise to
countries. The constitutional challenge in the case at bar appertains only to the
Charles M. Swift to construct, maintain, and operate an electric railway, and to
inclusion of the second category of overseas Filipinos in the coverage of Rep. Act No.
construct, maintain, and operate an electric light, heat, and power system from a point
9189. Likewise, the challenge on the exercise of Congressional oversight power over
in the City of Manila in an easterly direction to the town of Pasig, in the Province of
the COMELEC does not taint the core of the law. It merely affects the procedure in
Rizal." Section 11 of the Act provides: "Whenever any franchise or right of way is
adopting the mechanisms to implement the law. It cannot void the whole law.
granted to any other person or corporation, now or hereafter in existence, over
portions of the lines and tracks of the grantee herein, the terms on which said other
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, I dissent from the majority’s ruling upholding the
person or corporation shall use such right of way, and the compensation to be paid to
constitutionality of section 5 (d) of Rep. Act No. 9189, which allows an immigrant or a
the grantee herein by such other person or corporation for said use, shall be fixed by
permanent resident of a foreign country to vote for President, Vice-President,
the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators, the decision of a
Senators and Party-List Representatives after executing the required affidavit. I
majority of whom shall be final."
concur, however, with the majority’s ruling upholding the constitutionality of section
18.5 of Rep. Act No. 9189 with respect to the authority given to the COMELEC to
proclaim the winning candidates for Senators and Party-List Representatives but not When the petition of the Manila Electric Company was filed in this court, it was
as to the power to canvass the votes and proclaim the winning candidates for ordered that the petitioner be required to serve copies on the Attorney-General and
President and Vice-President. I also concur with the majority with respect to the the transportation companies affected by the petition. Thereafter, the Attorney-
unconstitutionality of sections 17.1, 19 and 25 of Rep. Act No. 9189 subjecting the General disclaimed any interest in the proceedings, and opposition was entered to
implementation of voting by mail, and the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the petition by a number of public utility operators. On the submission of memoranda
Rep. Act No. 9189 to be promulgated by COMELEC, to prior review and approval by after an oral hearing, the petition was made ready for resolution.
Congress.
Examining the statutory provision which is here invoked, it is first noted that power is
attempted to be granted to the members of the Supreme Court sitting as a board of
arbitrators and to the Supreme Court as an entity. It is next seen that the decision of a
majority of the members of the Supreme Court is made final. And it is finally observed
that the franchise granted the Manila Electric Company by the Government of the
Philippine Islands, although only a contract between the parties to it, is now made to
effect the rights of persons not signatories to the covenant.
The law calls for arbitration which represents a method of the parties' own choice. A
submission to arbitration is a contract. The parties to an arbitration agreement may
not oust the courts of jurisdiction of the matters submitted to arbitration. These are
familiar rules which find support in articles 1820 and 1821 of the Civil Code. Citation
of authority is hardly necessary, except that it should be recalled that in the
Philippines, and in the United States for that matter, it has been held that a clause in a
contract, providing that all matters in dispute between the parties shall be referred to
arbitrators and to them alone, is contrary to public policy and cannot oust the courts of
jurisdiction (Wahl and Wahl vs. Donaldson, Sims & Co. [1903], 2 Phil., 301;
Puentebella vs. Negros Coal Co. [1927], 50 Phil., 69; Vega vs. San Carlos Milling Co.
[1924], 51 Phil., 908; District of Columbia vs. Bailey [1897], 171 U. S., 161.)
We would not be understood as extending the principles governing arbitration and
award too far. Unless the arbitration agreement is such as absolutely to close the
doors of the courts against the parties, the courts should look with favor upon such
amicable arrangements. We can also perceive a distinction between a private
contract for submission to arbitration and agreements to arbitrate falling within the
terms of a statute enacted for such purpose and affecting others than the parties to a
particular franchise. Here, however, whatever else may be said in extenuation, it
remains true that the decision of the board of arbitrators is made final, which if literally
enforced would leave a public utility, not a party to the contract authorized by Act No.
1446, without recourse to the courts for a judicial determination of the question in
dispute.
Counsel for the petitioner rely principally on the case of Tallassee Falls Mfg. Co. vs.
Commissioner's Court [1908], 158 Ala., 263. It was there held that an Act of a state
legislature authorizing the commissioners' court of a certain county to regulate and fix
the rate of toll to be charged by the owners of a bridge is not unconstitutional as
delegating legislative power to the courts. But that is not the question before us. Here
the question is not one of whether or not there has been a delegation of legislative
authority to a court. More precisely, the issue concerns the legal right of the members
of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators the decision of a majority of
whom shall be final, to act in that capacity.
We run counter to this dilemma. Either the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as
a board of arbitrators, exercise judicial functions, or the members of the Supreme
Court, sitting as board of arbitrators, exercise administrative or quasi judicial
functions. The first case would appear not to fall within the jurisdiction granted the
Supreme Court. Even conceding that it does, it would presuppose the right to bring
the matter in dispute before the courts, for any other construction would tend to oust
the courts of jurisdiction and render the award a nullity. But if this be the proper
construction, we would then have the anomaly of a decision by the members of the
Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators, taken therefrom to the courts and
eventually coming before the Supreme Court, where the Supreme Court would review
the decision of its members acting as arbitrators. Or in the second case, if the
functions performed by the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of
arbitrators, be considered as administrative or quasi judicial in nature, that would
result in the performance of duties which the members of the Supreme Court could
not lawfully take it upon themselves to perform. The present petition also furnishes an
apt illustration of another anomaly, for we find the Supreme Court as a court asked to
determine if the members of the court may be constituted a board of arbitrators, which
is not a court at all.lawphil.net
The Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands represents one of the three divisions of
power in our government. It is judicial power and judicial power only which is
exercised by the Supreme Court. Just as the Supreme Court, as the guardian of
constitutional rights, should not sanction usurpations by any other department of the
government, so should it as strictly confine its own sphere of influence to the powers
expressly or by implication conferred on it by the Organic Act. The Supreme Court
and its members should not and cannot be required to exercise any power or to
perform any trust or to assume any duty not pertaining to or connected with the
administering of judicial functions.
The Organic Act provides that the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands shall
possess and exercise jurisdiction as heretofore provided and such additional
jurisdiction as shall hereafter be prescribed by law (sec. 26). When the Organic Act
speaks of the exercise of "jurisdiction" by the Supreme Court, it could not only mean
the exercise of "jurisdiction" by the Supreme Court acting as a court, and could hardly
mean the exercise of "jurisdiction" by the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a
board of arbitrators. There is an important distinction between the Supreme Court as
an entity and the members of the Supreme Court. A board of arbitrators is not a
"court" in any proper sense of the term, and possesses none of the jurisdiction which
the Organic Act contemplates shall be exercised by the Supreme Court.lawph!l.net
In the last judicial paper from the pen of Chief Justice Taney, it was said:
The power conferred on this court is exclusively judicial, and it cannot be
required or authorized to exercise any other. . . . Its jurisdiction and powers
and duties being defined in the organic law of the government, and being all
strictly judicial, Congress cannot require or authorize the court to exercise
any other jurisdiction or power, or perform any other duty. . . . The award of
execution is a part, and an essential part of every judgment passed by a
court exercising judicial power. It is no judgment, in the legal sense of the
term, without it. Without such an award the judgment would be inoperative
and nugatory, leaving the aggrieved party without a remedy. It would be
merely an opinion, which would remain a dead letter, and without any
operation upon the rights of the parties, unless Congress should at some
future time sanction it, and pass a law authorizing the court to carry its
opinion into effect. Such is not the judicial power confided to this court, in the
exercise of its appellate jurisdiction; yet it is the whole power that the court is
allowed to exercise under this act of Congress. . . . And while it executes
firmly all the judicial powers entrusted to it, the court will carefully abstain
 from exercising any power that is not strictly judicial in its character, and
which is not clearly confided to it by the Constitution. . . . (Gordon vs. United
States [1864], 2 Wall., 561; 117 U. S., 697 Appendix.)
Confirming the decision to the basic question at issue, the Supreme Court holds that
section 11 of Act No. 1446 contravenes the maxims which guide the operation of a
democratic government constitutionally established, and that it would be improper
and illegal for the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators, the
decision of a majority of whom shall be final, to act on the petition of the Manila
Electric Company. As a result, the members of the Supreme Court decline to proceed
further in the matter.
Avanceña, C.J., Street, Villamor, Ostrand, Villa-Real, Abad Santos, Hull, Vickers,
Imperial and Butte, JJ., concur.
A.M. No. 88-7-1861-RTC October 5, 1988
IN RE: DESIGNATION OF JUDGE RODOLFO U. MANZANO AS MEMBER OF THE
ILOCOS NORTE PROVINCIAL COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE.
PADILLA, J.:
On 4 July 1988, Judge Rodolfo U. Manzano, Executive Judge, RTC, Bangui, Ilocos
Norte, Branch 19, sent this Court a letter which reads:
Hon. Marcelo Fernan
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court
of the Philippines
Manila
Thru channels: Hon. Leo Medialdea
Court Administrator
Supreme Court of the Philippines
Sir:
By Executive Order RF6-04 issued on June 21, 1988 by the
Honorable Provincial Governor of Ilocos Norte, Hon. Rodolfo C.
Farinas, I was designated as a member of the Ilocos Norte
Provincial Committee on Justice created pursuant to Presidential
Executive Order No. 856 of 12 December 1986, as amended by
Executive Order No. 326 of June 1, 1988. In consonance with
Executive Order RF6-04, the Honorable Provincial Governor of
Ilocos Norte issued my appointment as a member of the
Committee. For your ready reference, I am enclosing herewith
machine copies of Executive Order RF6-04 and the appointment.
Before I may accept the appointment and enter in the discharge of
the powers and duties of the position as member of the Ilocos
(Norte) Provincial Committee on Justice, may I have the honor to
request for the issuance by the Honorable Supreme Court of a
Resolution, as follows:
(1) Authorizing me to accept the appointment and
to as assume and discharge the powers and
duties attached to the said position;
(2) Considering my membership in the
Committee as neither violative of the
Independence of the Judiciary nor a violation of
Section 12, Article VIII, or of the second
paragraph of Section .7, Article IX (B), both of the
Constitution, and will not in any way amount to an
abandonment of my present position as
Executive Judge of Branch XIX, Regional Trial
Court, First Judicial Region, and as a member of
the Judiciary; and
(3) Consider my membership in the said
Committee as part of the primary functions of an
Executive Judge.
May I please be favored soon by your action on this request.
Very respectfully yours,
(Sgd) RODOLFO U. MANZANO
Judge
An examination of Executive Order No. 856, as amended, reveals that Provincial/City
Committees on Justice are created to insure the speedy disposition of cases of
detainees, particularly those involving the poor and indigent ones, thus alleviating jail
congestion and improving local jail conditions. Among the functions of the Committee
are—
3.3 Receive complaints against any apprehending officer, jail
warden, final or judge who may be found to have committed abuses
in the discharge of his duties and refer the same to proper authority
for appropriate action;
 3.5 Recommend revision of any law or regulation which is believed
prejudicial to the proper administration of criminal justice.
It is evident that such Provincial/City Committees on Justice perform administrative
functions. Administrative functions are those which involve the regulation and control
over the conduct and affairs of individuals for; their own welfare and the promulgation
of rules and regulations to better carry out the policy of the legislature or such as are
devolved upon the administrative agency by the organic law of its existence (Nasipit
Integrated Arrastre and Stevedoring Services Inc., vs. Tapucar, SP-07599-R, 29
September 1978, Blacks Law Dictionary).
Furthermore, under Executive Order No. 326 amending Executive Order No. 856, it is
provided that—
of such structure. As public officials, they are trustees of an orderly society. Even as
non-members of Provincial/City Committees on Justice, RTC judges should render
assistance to said Committees to help promote the laudable purposes for which they
exist, but only when such assistance may be reasonably incidental to the fulfillment of
their judicial duties.
ACCORDINGLY, the aforesaid request of Judge Rodolfo U. Manzano is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes, Medialdea and
Regalado, JJ., concur.

Section 6. Supervision.—The Provincial/City Committees on Justice

shall be under the supervision of the Secretary of justice Quarterly
accomplishment reports shall be submitted to the Office of the
Secretary of Justice.

Under the Constitution, the members of the Supreme Court and other courts
established by law shag not be designated to any agency performing quasi- judicial or
administrative functions (Section 12, Art. VIII, Constitution).

Considering that membership of Judge Manzano in the Ilocos Norte Provincial

Committee on Justice, which discharges a administrative functions, will be in violation
of the Constitution, the Court is constrained to deny his request.

Former Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando in his concurring opinion in the case of
Garcia vs. Macaraig (39 SCRA 106) ably sets forth:

2. While the doctrine of separation of powers is a relative theory not

to be enforced with pedantic rigor, the practical demands of
government precluding its doctrinaire application, it cannot justify a
member of the judiciary being required to assume a position or
perform a duty non-judicial in character. That is implicit in the
principle. Otherwise there is a plain departure from its command.
The essence of the trust reposed in him is to decide. Only a higher
court, as was emphasized by Justice Barredo, can pass on his
actuation. He is not a subordinate of an executive or legislative
official, however eminent. It is indispensable that there be no
exception to the rigidity of such a norm if he is, as expected, to be
confined to the task of adjudication. Fidelity to his sworn
responsibility no less than the maintenance of respect for the
judiciary can be satisfied with nothing less.

This declaration does not mean that RTC Judges should adopt an attitude of
monastic insensibility or unbecoming indifference to Province/City Committee on
Justice. As incumbent RTC Judges, they form part of the structure of government.
Their integrity and performance in the adjudication of cases contribute to the solidity