Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Of Freedom Heidegger On Spinoza PDF
Of Freedom Heidegger On Spinoza PDF
James Luchte
Spinoza[3] and by Andre Garcia Düttman[4]) to the effect that the free man is the one who
thinks about, or fears, death the least.[5] Such fear he considers to be a passive emotion, or
affection, which is a bondage to pain, symptomatic of our impotence and servitude. Spinoza
writes,
Hope is nothing else but an inconstant pleasure, arising from the image of
something future or past, whereof we do not yet know the issue. Fear, on the other
hand, is an inconstant pain also arising from the image of something concerning
which we are in doubt. If the element of doubt be removed from these emotions,
hope becomes Confidence and fear become Despair. In other words, Pleasure or
Pain arising from the image of something concerning which we have hoped or
feared.[6]
The free man, in this light, is one who has not only cultivated the stronger active emotion of
acquiescence to the univocal chorus of necessity, but has also learned to disengage external
factors which are coincident with such passive emotions – to organise an ‘order of
undertakes a meditation upon ‘Spinozism’ in the context of his 1936 lecture course,
Schelling’s Treatise on Freedom,[7] would seem to take issue with Spinoza in his own
contention that the one who faces his or her ownmost possibility of death without evasion, is
the one who is most free – or, who will have found him or herself in a moment that discloses
Heidegger places a great emphasis upon the epistemic role of mood, and specifically,
in this context, upon anxiety – and with the usual stipulations, we could argue that he has a
unique, and seemingly more open relationship with the (negative) emotional aspect of
existence than does Spinoza. Of course, Spinoza, as Deleuze advertises, is a great seeker of
Joy and pleasant emotions (in moderation); yet, it is his aversion to the ‘sad passions’ and
‘pain’ which clearly distinguishes him from Heidegger. At the same time, however, Spinoza
does contend that ‘passions’ do disclose our weakness, and thus, play an epistemological role,
though one not pursued in the way Heidegger suggests. While this ‘question of taste’ may
seem to be irreconcilable, I would like to show that in essential respects, the philosophies of
ecstatic resoluteness and the un-thematised ontological difference in the concept of substance
as that which ‘is in itself and is conceived through itself’.[9] That which marks the
divergence in their philosophies lies in the temporality of substance (or, the lack thereof), and
thus of the relationship of finitude and freedom. We could suggest that it is thus in the
eternal substance, while Heidegger explicitly seeks to destroy the history of ontology, one of
the primary targets of which being the ‘ousiology’ of the metaphysical tradition. From the
remains un-thematised.
uncritically repeating (for whatever possible tactical reasons) an ontic metaphysics grounded
upon the principle of identity, and thus, for Heidegger, a generic sense of time. In this way,
Spinoza places the seat of freedom in that which is, contrary to the claims of his
Plato’s Timaeus. Of course, this is not to suggest that Spinoza endorsed transcendence per
se, but that he enacted what could be called a reverse panopticism, one which blocked out all
that which could tear Spinoza away from his ethical ‘theorisation’ of immanence. That
which is significant, with respect to the relationship of Heidegger and Spinoza, will be this
radical difference in ontological perspectives, and the subsequent implication with respect to
meaning of freedom, which, for both philosophers, nevertheless remains, as Deleuze points
out in Difference and Repetition,[10] dependent upon their respective preliminary ontological
investigations.
The significance of Spinoza (and ‘Spinozism’) for Heidegger was long-standing and quite
profound – though, like many of his most significant references, nearly unsaid.[11] Of
philosophy that is most pronounced in many of his extant statements. It is these aspects
which come under focus in his 1936 lectures on Schelling’s The Essence of Human Freedom
in which Heidegger states that it is Spinoza who was the first to develop a completely modern
of the attempt by philosophy to establish an independent grounding, distinct from the then
At the same time, Heidegger, sounding like Nietzsche, states that the problem of
freedom enters centre stage in light of the various efforts of ‘system builders’, and he
attempts, over the period of the rest of the lecture course, to explore the possibility of a
‘system of freedom’. Yet, while there is an isomorphism in terms of the act or event structure
of their respective accounts of freedom, we will see that Heidegger nevertheless must reject
a theoretical entity, sub specie aeternitatus, and not a resolution amidst a situation of thrown
former’s attempt to outline a systematic philosophy which is founded upon freedom – or,
which does not at the very least eliminate freedom as a possibility, even as the supreme
possibility. Heidegger, in this context, specifies that, for Schelling, it is precisely in a revolt
against God, indeed, in active ‘evil’ or the self-assertion of human existence, that freedom is
disclosed as the law of one’s own being. Spinoza’s notion of acquiescence, in that it is
conceived amid the ambiguous ontological logos of substance – i.e., in its denial of the
self-interpretation of existence in light of eternity, failed to disclose the horror and ecstasy of
To be precise, while Spinoza regards divine Substance as our ownmost proper being,
pursuing the specific character of human freedom – that of mortal temporality – exposes the
negativity of an ontological difference of human existence from the being of beings,
including the divine being – a distinction that lay hidden away in Spinoza’s secret hope.
The criterion for this difference is, in this way, that of human finitude – indeed, of our very
inability to ever conceive of ‘infinity’ or the ‘eternal’ in any ‘positive’ sense. Substance,
conceived in this way, is, for Heidegger, not our ownmost proper Being.
In this light, the respective views of death (and, thus, temporality) of Heidegger and
Spinoza cast into relief a precise temporal difference – and may suggest a means – that of
destruktion, by which their perspectives could be made – as Heidegger had done with Leibniz
– congruent in their depiction of the ecstatic character of human existence. As with Leibniz,
Spinoza is trapped in the turret of an adopted language and protocol – that of system and its
treatments of the essence of reason, most notable, in our context, in his work on Kant in his
1927 lecture courses Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason and
Basic Problems of Phenomenology, and his third published work, Kant and the Problem of
fragmentary character of the Critical philosophy in light of the suggestion of unity in the
reference, by Kant, to a ‘common’ though ‘unknown root’ for the ‘stems’ of ‘concept’ and
‘intuition’. Heidegger underlines the significance of the A edition of the Critique of Pure
Reason and its emphasis upon the transcendental role of the imagination in the constitution of
pure knowledge.
Heidegger throws up a red flag over the second Edition revisions, which, he contends,
philosophy, is Reason itself. Such a suggestion should not surprise us in that Kant has
revisions, while not revising the section of schematism, make it clear however that
With a closer look at the historicity of the question, we find that it is the issue of
Kantian philosophy. The spectre of ‘Spinozism’, which concerns the question of the
authority of reason, erupted in the ‘Pantheism controversy’ at the instigation of Jacobi (and
Hamann) against Mendelssohn. In a sustained period of criticism, Jacobi, in his 1782 Etwas
das Leßing gesagt hat: Ein Commentar zu den Reisen der Päpste nebst Betrachtungen von
einem Dritten[14] and his 1785 Über die Lehre des Spinoza in Briefen an den Herrn Moses
Mendelssohn,[15] not only revealed private letters in which the late Lessing confesses his
‘Spinozism’, but also lays out the context for any acceptable notion of the Absolute in his
notion of feeling of Being (Gefühl), and the act of the salto mortale.[16]
This dispute sheds light upon the development of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, in
which he, in his foray into the controversy, ‘What is Orientation in Thinking?’ (1786),
rehearsed the basic shift in his thinking which became manifest in the revisions of the second
edition of the Critique of Pure Reason and in the Critique of Practical Reason (1787). Kant
came down on the side of Mendelssohn in the controversy, and with his essay on orientation,
as Heidegger suggests, he effectively ended the dispute. Spinoza’s substance will no longer
be a ‘thing’, neither an immanent God (Jacobi and Hamann), nor a festive nature (Rouseau
Reason.
Heidegger makes much of the revisions of the Critique of Pure Reason, specifying not
only the rationalist i.e. ‘Spinozist’ domestication of imagination and temporality in the
constitution of knowledge, but also the exclusion of temporality and imagination from the
own purported limitation of knowledge to make room for faith, it is clear that this limitation
does not in itself limit the authority of reason in practical matters, and this was noticed by
those, such as Jacobi and Hamann, who expressed their outrage at the time over what they
It would seem, in this way, that Kant, while pretending to dispel the taint of
philosophy of Spinoza at a deeper, more subterranean level. We could argue that ‘Spinoza’ is
been given a purely regulative significance in the first instance – becomes with the revisions,
the principle of authority in the dismissal of imagination. This dismissal finds, contrary to
many commentators, its final statement in the tragic failure of the imagination in the
facelessness of the sublime in the Critique of Judgment. The question arises as to the
transformation of the meaning of freedom in light of these shifts, revisions in thought – and
philosophy, and its exclusion from the practical philosophy, was a central thematic in
Heidegger’s Early Philosophy,[20] the 1920’s radical phenomenology was an attempt not
only to disclose the specific temporal be-ing of human existence, but also to cultivate an
intimately.[21] There lurks in the temporal problematic the supposition that Reason, or
Spinoza’s God, as an a-temporal (eternal) substance, is not, and does not express, properly,
As I will explore below, that which is deemed our own, Heidegger contends, is
disclosed through the negativity that specifies us over against beings which enter our world
and any “Being” which (whether through emanation, creation or expression) is said to
produce our ‘world’. In this way, an acquiescence to such a God, or Nature – to such a
effectively is a transcendent, un-worlded dogmatic being (one in which freedom means the
transcendence of temporality conceived as generic (eg. digital) time. This is a law or logic
that is expressly not our own, but instead serves merely to cover over, conceal – and forbid –
While we will explore these issues in more detail in the following pages, suffice it to
say for now that we could very well argue that, of all the metaphysicians since Plato, it is
Spinoza who is the greatest target of Heidegger’s destruktion of the history of ontology. But,
as the latter is not meant to be merely an elimination, but a setting free of an original impulse
for an ontology, we will see that there is much that is akin between Heidegger and Spinoza,
to the extent that the former could be seen as a radicalisation of the latter, especially if we
succeed in dismantling the ousiological[23] theory of Being, which imprisons his philosophy
One way to understand Spinoza is in his own meta-criticism of Descartes. In contrast to the
latter’s schema of two heterogeneous substances, of thought (res cogitans) and extension
(res extensa), and of their incomprehensible relation, Spinoza demonstrates logically that
there is only one Substance and every being in the world is merely a modulation or mode of
status as a mode though our epistemic access to reality through the attributes of thought and
extension. In this way, for Spinoza, there is only one substance, but there are, for human
beings, two parallel ways in which we can have access to the modalities of the fundamental
substance. Yet, in a Promethean nod to Heidegger, these latter attributes are what is peculiar
to human beings, to finite beings, as God, or Nature possesses infinite attributes in its
substance. We, as finite beings, are merely modes of substance, and thought and extension
limited attributes – freedom, Being (as intimated as the feeling (Gefuhl) of Being by the early
German and English[24] Romantics) lies only in the absolute, in the apprehension of infinity,
of infinite attributes. A confusion lies in these words – as this ecstasy beyond entities, could
very well be in the moment amidst a radical finitude of Being – and the necessary
engagement with death as one’s ownmost possibility. Once again, the modernist will to
system is ironic – it seeks freedom, but merely in the ‘against’ and the ‘almost’ – it thus
forbids a more profound sense of freedom in keeping with the limitation of its attributes.
The question of freedom culminates, in the Ethics[25] of Spinoza, with a notion of
eternity which is that of the rational intuition, of the intellectual love of God (or Nature) as a
system, or systasis, of necessity. Freedom is not that of the Will,[26] but is the originary
event which is beyond the transient modifications of substance, and, is thus beyond a
conception of time as mere duration[27] – indeed, with Augustine, Spinoza could himself
declare that such a sense of time is not sufficiently real, but is merely an illusion, a ladder to
be thrown down once we have expressed our own active affections and have thrown away
Freedom, therefore, in the context of the ‘third kind of knowledge’ (sub specie
aeternitatus), is the affirmation of an imminent necessity arising from the singular nature of
the ‘thing’ itself. But, what is this thing? Is it the objectified ‘object’ for a
ourselves as the questioners, explorers and thinkers? Or, is it merely God, Allah, etc.?
however, we should return to the beginning, to the initial condition of existence, amidst this
plane of modular dispersion, so as to fathom the difficulty and rarity (and perhaps
impossibility ala romantic irony in the sense of Schlegel) of any attainment of freedom in the
world. That which is required is the unfolding of the system of Spinoza in order for us to
ascertain our place within the whole, and thus, to locate the pathway upon which we must
embark from a state of fear and weakness toward one of freedom, or, as Deleuze suggests,
beatitude.[28]
This pathway corresponds to the three kinds of knowledge, each of which discloses a
specific orientation of the being of the self, which Spinoza contends, is desire (conatus). The
first kind of knowledge, is that of the ‘order of passions’, of the phantoms of the imagination
(a reference which immediately returns us to our thinking on Kant). The imagination is
characterised by inadequate ideas which are contrived by the random projection of partial
encounters. Deleuze mentions that this kind of knowledge is that of the ‘order of nature’ and
even comprises such ‘universalist’ ideas as the civil state and religion and their respective
knowledge with that of the virtual God, and whose essence is disclosed through these
notions. The second kind of knowledge comprises an ‘order of reason’, in which the
understanding increasingly begins to exercise control over the imagination and places its
rhapsodies and passions into order. In other words, our being becomes determined, as
The third kind of knowledge comprises the ‘order of essences’, and fathoms the
singularity of each mode, including our own body, as an expression of the divine, sub specie
though active, affection of a merely temporal mode in its acquiescence to the eternal
substance, or God. This knowledge regards the singular essence of God which we find in
ourselves, through our own internal resources – a significant correspondence with Leibniz –
in distinction to both random encounters and the general relations of some Deleuzian
‘external’ world.
Freedom, in this way, is a state of being that is the unfolding, according to Spinoza, of
one’s own essence in an active affection. This activity is indicative of an increase, as Deleuze
writes, of our power of active being. Yet, as we have seen, we do not begin in such a state of
freedom, but in dependency and passivity, as in infancy and childhood. Of course, even in
Thus an infant believes that of its own free will it desires milk, an angry child
believes that it freely desires vengeance, a timid child believes that it freely desires
to run away; further, a drunken man believes that he utters from the free decision
of his mind words which, when he is sober, he would willingly have withheld: thus,
too, a delirious man, a garrulous woman, a child, and others of like complexion,
believe that they speak from the free decision of their mind, when they are in reality
unable to restrain their impulse to talk.[29]
In this way, for Spinoza, we begin, lost in the stems, distracted by the fragmentation of the
passions which cause us sadness and pain. This is our situation and predicament, and it is the
topos from which we strive to achieve a freedom that is implicit in our being, as the not-yet
(but already always) ‘origin’ and source for our being – for Spinoza, our true, active being is
that of God, the eternal substance. In this light, that which is, is God in his positive,
immanent and univocal Being which is explicated as a world and which implicates the eternal
Substance as its source and truth. The negative, the nothing, fear, despair, all ‘sad passions’
are, for Spinoza, tainted with illusion, superstition and ignorance – with mere ‘belief’ in
Plato’s sense, imaginary. Freedom comes when this veil is torn asunder to disclose the
If we consider this pathway toward freedom closely, and in a way which respects the
indigenous situation of this perspective, one which as Deleuze mentions, may perhaps be
attained only near the end of life, it is understandable why Spinoza would state that the man
who thinks least of death is the most free. But, such a view, even as it seems to deny our own
embodiment, at once indicates that we will never overcome these negative emotions, this
apparent duality, i.e., it highlights the ironic impossibility of a science, which would, as with
Marx, negate negativity. But, at the same time, despite this gesture toward the irreducible
finitude of human existence, Spinoza, in keeping with his apophatic onto-theology, creates
the microcosm of the ‘order of encounters’ as a mirror stage of the purposive ordered
In this way, we may never get beyond repression and substitution in respect of our
fear of death, as in the case of Lucretius, for instance, or others, such as the early
Wittgenstein, who merely state that we will never live to see death and thus we should not
fear it, nor do we have any rational grounds to do so. Yet, the question remains – and I
believe that this is the primary significance of Heidegger’s criticisms of Spinoza, and more
generally, of rationalism – of the eigentlich being of the self amidst its radically temporal
existence (Bataille’s wild ipse), not only with respect to the problematic character of
substance as the meaning of being, but also with respect to the issues of negativity and
Spinoza. Again – substance is not what we are. But, what are we? How? Why? That?
Heidegger would agree with Spinoza’s basic intuition that freedom (or, in this context,
eternity), is not to be regarded as bound up with the events of duration, but is, in this way,
beyond ‘beings’ or ‘modes’ (the ‘ontic’). At the same time, however, while he agrees with
the notion of a common root of Being, Heidegger would not endorse the sentiment that such a
root is that of God, or Nature, which, at the end of the day, is, from his perspective,
ontologically the same as a mode, or a particular being, a sameness which is expressed in any
ontological univocity of being. As I have suggested, for Heidegger, substance is not what we
are, as finite beings. But, how do we know this, what is the epistemic source for such a
determination of difference, of the ontological difference between beings and the be-ing of
human existence?
As indicated, the epistemic source is that of mood, in this case, anxiety in the face of
death (recall the Jacobist Gefuhl for the Romantics). A contrast between Heidegger and
Spinoza on this epistemic issue will disclose not only the specificity of their respective
ontologies, but also that of their conceptions of time (or, temporality, in the case of
phenomenology, is not speaking primarily of fear, as in the ‘fear of death’. He speaks instead
of anxiety. More specifically, fear is a mood in which that which is feared is a threat that
may happen or not (can be doubted). In this way, fear in Heidegger is the same as fear in
Spinoza’s Ethics, as this emotion is always accompanied by hope (that some event, etc. will
not occur). In this way, we find a striking parallel between Heidegger and Spinoza with
respect to the inauthenticity of fear and of the unreality of its associated conception of time.
However, as stated, fear is not Heidegger’s primary concern, nor is it his epistemic
source for the differentiation of our own being from that of entities. This is indicated, as I
have mentioned, in anxiety, and again, we can find an analogue of this indication in
Spinoza. For Heidegger, anxiety is a sense of a threat to our being that is insurmountable, of
our own possibility of impossibility. In the absence of any hope, anxiety thus shares a family
resemblance with Spinoza’s emotion of Despair. That which is crucial here is that Heidegger
contends that anxiety reveals to us the Nothing, which has the sense of the negativity of
ourselves (finite transcendence), in our difference from generic beings and from any
of its sense of time, discloses the truth of that which is there in its ultimate necessity. In his
disclose the specificity of our own human being, which, we are told, is, in each case, my
own. It will be in this moment (similar again to acquiescence) that the decision is made –
that binding commitments are affirmed. Heidegger has, in this way, in his discovery of
‘eternity’ in the negative, exposed a radical leap by Spinoza away from the truth, and into the
consoling fiction of his notion of divine substance, of God, one which is meant to be
imminent, to be our true being, but becomes, in its lack of be-ing, perhaps the symbol of our
substance, Heidegger offers us a glimpse of negativity, a look into the personal being of
finite, human existence which decides its own binding commitments, chooses its makeshift
projection of ‘world’ amid the ecstasies of temporality, a freely chosen, but thrown world
which provides a clearing into which beings may and do enter (a temporalised ‘order of
which existence is regarded as transcending as such. In this light, it is not emotion (or,
mood), albeit negative, which precludes our freedom, but our inability or unwillingness to
face, for instance, the anxiety of being-towards-death, and follow this event to where it takes
Epilogue: On Necessity
Hannah Arendt speaks of a gale that blows from Heidegger’s philosophy, a wind that is
untimely, in its standing out from the ‘experience’ of the present, as an intimation of the
primordial.[30] It is in this light that we may come to terms with his pathos of distance from
Spinoza. The question is that of the meaning of necessity, and of its determination from
within the context of a specific ontology. Spinoza lays out his distinction of freedom and
necessity:
That thing is called free, which exists solely by the mere necessity of its own nature,
and of which the action is determined by itself alone. On the other hand, that thing is
necessary, or rather constrained, which is determined by something external to itself
to a fixed and definite method of action.[31]
It is significant that Spinoza gives us two senses of necessity in this definition, that, on the
one hand, of the ‘necessity’ of one’s own nature, a sense of necessity disclosed with respect
to freedom as self-determination. On the other hand, there is the ‘necessary’ as that which
compels or constrains the self from its actualisation of freedom. To this extent, since the
‘necessary’ places a limit upon the possibility of the self determination of ‘necessity’, it must
be for Spinoza, deemed to be false (though thrown for Heideger). In the wake of this denial,
mathematical deduction and the logical procedures which construct a judgment of necessity
It could be argued that Spinoza asserts the priority of the attribute of pure rational
thought, mirrored though it is in the dimension of body with the construction of an ‘order of
encounters’ – and its ultimate, ironic, and ethical quieting of our emotional being. It may be
that Spinoza is a victim of his own era and task, of being the ‘against’, the alternative, hunted,
despised. In such a torment, one would seek to grasp hold of something solid, a differing,
though singular principle, one presented in the form of an ethics, one that sought the
hedonistic resignation of fate. In the storm, he elaborated the attributes that were available to
him – as his Tractatus would suggest that ‘God’ will only be revealed through the limitations
of an era. Such a note, however, opens questions which exceed the limitations of the current
study.
From the perspective of Heidegger, the question and sense of necessity undergoes a
metamorphosis to the extent that the gale of the wind blows away the dead language of
‘substance’ and the field of its metaphysical lexicon. To this extent, Heidegger’s
destructuring’, or, in other words, of a retrieval of the originary situation of questioning in the
wake of the dissemination of the ‘gift of death’ (Derrida). In this way, we could juxtapose a
logical conception of necessity to that of an existential, the latter, Heidegger would contend,
being primordial in relation to the former conception. In this light, logic and mathematical
Such an overwhelming horizon for the disclosure of the truth of Being cannot be
contained by the ‘necessity’ of the logical concept and mathematical deduction. It is in this
way that acquiescence to an ontical substance, as a resting place from the breathless linear
succession of common time, cannot be the pathway of freedom. Indeed, there is a depth of
radical freedom that always already underlies the procedures of judgment, a freedom that is
makeshift, revisable shelter for an ecstatic openness to others and the myriad beings in the
Spinoza seeks to use the dead language of logic to quarantine his emotional, personal
being, in a leap into the infinity of substance, of hope – indeed, in a negative mirror image of
the tomb of logic, as an impossible escape into the Unlimited. Heidegger, on the contrary,
would indicate that we must not seek freedom in the impossible other-world of eternity, but
that we must comprehend that we are by necessity free to love and hate and to chose a
‘world’ – not to mention free to radically question the world of the present, sub specie
temporis.[33] It is our radical openness to the other, to the event of radical possibility, which
I will close with a return to still living language in Leonard Cohen’s ‘The Partisan’,
Amid the thrownness of existence, the wind of becoming blows through the graves, and it is
in the face of becoming and the artefacts of death – standing in-between natality and fatality –
that a clearing (Lichtung) emerges, the topos in which we can decide, to choose our world,
one that is inscribed with the makeshift self-expression of our own be-ing. In our courage to
face the futurity of our being-toward-death, we thus come to ourselves from out of the
In this way, it could be contended that Spinoza does not give us an adequate
disclose the true radicality and depths of human existence. Contrary to Deleuze, therefore,
the issue is not that of a choice between immanence and transcendence, but to apprehend the
unavoidable and ‘positive’ negativity of the ‘middle world’ of finite transcendence which
concerns the intimacy of our own be-ing, and with Foucault, to undertake a ‘critical ontology
of ourselves’.[34] It is in this way that we affirm the desire which is our being, and do not
take the path of renunciation for an ‘eternal’ that is only a prison-house of graves.
Notes
[1] I would like to thank Joan Stambaugh and Frank Edler for their insightful readings of this
J’ai change’ cent fois de nom, (I have changed names a hundred times)
j’ai perdu femme et enfants (I have lost wife and children)
mais j’ai tant d’amis; (But I have so many friends)
j’ai la France entie`re. (I have all of France)
[4] Address to the 3rd Annual Joint Conference of the Society for European Philosophy and
[5] It is questionable whether we ever fear death, since for Spinoza, fear is always tied to
hope, as with Heidegger. In this sense, it is despair in the face of death which is at issue.
[6] Spinoza, Benedict (1955) Ethics, translated by R.H.M. Elwes, New York: Dover
[7] Heidegger, Martin (1985) Schelling’s Treatise on the Essence of Human Freedom,
[8] In respect of the actions of Heidegger, it would seem necessary to critically re-assess his
relationship with the Nazis through a detailed and inclusive investigation which takes
seriously his poetics of resistance, not only in light of his seminal turn to Hölderlin in 1934,
but also with regard to Edler’s poetic analysis of Heideger’s Rectoral Address. We must take
seriously his statement in his 1966 interview with Der Spiegel that he sought to remain in
Germany to ‘stand in the storm’. Such a critical reassessment, which is evident in the work
of Edler, Zimmerman, and others must also bring to light the subversive significance of the
a glass darkly’. Without such an inclusive and thorough reassessment of Heidegger’s relation
with the Nazis, it will be impossible to comprehend the significance of his middle and later
thought since any such analysis will always already be postponed by the plethora of
dismissals (of the relevance and credibility of Heidegger’s poetic subversion), moral
overt and covert, during the period of 1930-1945. The irony, of course, behind much of the
ire surrounding this issue, is that the critics of Heidegger have merely repeated Plato’s
dismissal of poetry from the polis of truth, if only through collateral damage. For more on
the theme of poetic resistance, see Roth, Michael (1996) The Poetics of Resistance:
[11] At first glance, it may seem strange to juxtapose Spinoza and Heidegger, the first an
‘excommunicated’ Jew living in Amsterdam in the mid-1600’s (and then, The Hague), the
other a German (and a dissident ‘Nazi’), living at the time of his lectures on Schelling, that is
1936, near Freiburg. Although, as we will see, Heidegger’s documented interest in Spinoza
and ‘Spinozism’ had already arisen at least as early as the 1920’s, it is interesting that in his
lectures, after his first mentions of Spinoza, Heidegger seems necessitated or compelled to
explain to his audience (among whom were the panoptic Nazi auditors) that the latter is not
properly a ‘Jewish thinker’, citing of course, his expulsion from the Jewish community at the
age of 23. It should be remembered that well before this time, Heidegger already had a quite
severe falling out with leading Nazi officials and academic operators, such as Alfred
Baumler, who had not only prevented him from being elected President of the Berlin
Academy of Sciences, but had also placed Heidegger under surveillance. Strangely enough,
in a long report that would remove from Heidegger any hope of being elected President of the
Academy of Sciences, it was stated that Heidegger was a schizophrenic, and that his
[12] ‘Under the Aspect of Time (“sub specie temporis”): Heidegger, Wittgenstein, and the
Place of the Nothing,’ Philosophy Today, Volume 53, Number 2 (Spring, 2009)
[13] Of course, it could be argued that any time Heidegger considers the principle of reason,
Spinoza will remain an elephant in the room, who is not only implicated as one of the great
rationalist system-builders, but whose own methodology of absolute unity was appropriated
by the early German Romantics and German idealists in their attempt to counter the skeptical
attacks upon the Kantian philosophy from such neo-Humean philosophers as Schulze and
Maimon.
[14] Jacobi, F. H., (1782) Etwas das Leßing gesagt hat. Ein Commentar zu den Reisen der
Päpste nebst Betrachtungen von einem Dritten. Berlin: George Jacob Decker.
[15] Jacobi, F. H. (1785) Über die Lehre des Spinoza in Briefen an den Herrn Moses
[16] It should be noted that this controversy did not go unnoticed in the United Kingdom,
this period), who had developed their own interest in Spinoza and ‘Spinozism’.
[17] For an in depth treatment of the relation of imagination and Kant’s practical philosophy,
see Schalow, Frank (1986) Imagination and Existence: A Retrieval of the Kantian Ethic,
[18] Another ‘Spinoza’ is perhaps significant beyond this particular controversy, for in its
aftermath, and the redefinition of Reason by Hölderlin, Schlegel, Novalis, and Herder, as an
organic, aesthetical and historical reason, he provided (well over one hundred years after his
death) some of the tools to overcome the apparent subjectivism of the Kantian-Fichtean
course, with the eruption of Romanticism and German Idealism, ‘Spinozism’ underwent a
radical transfiguration, which perhaps, transformed his ideas beyond anything we could
Struggle against Subjectivism, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press; (2003) The
Harvard University Press; (1987) The Fate of Reason, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University
Press; see also, Frank, Manfred, The Philosophical Foundations of Early German
[19] Heidegger, Martin (1997) Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, translated by Richard
[21] This may not be the sense of ‘immanence’ in the sense of Deleuze, whose interpretation
relies upon a notion of a univocity of Being which is positive and merely affirmative, and is
incessantly infused with metaphorical borrowings from set theory, geometry, and physics,
[22] Indeed, Spinoza himself confesses to this eventuality in Ethics, Part II, Prop. X: ‘The
being of substance does not appertain to the essence of man – in other words, substance does
not constitute the actual being of man.’ The actual being of man is that of unnecessary
existence, and in this way, the achievement of freedom in the salto mortale of substance lies
in the denial of our actuality so as to obtain our true essence, which is Mind (Ethics, Part II,
Prop. XI., Corrol., which ‘is part of the infinite intellect of God.’
[23] Schürmann, Reiner (1987) Heidegger: On Being and Acting, From Principles to
[24] Deleuze, Gilles (1983) Cinema I, London: Mecca. Deleuze comments that English
romantics Blake and Coleridge undertook in their poetry the assimilation of misery between
[25] Spinoza, Benedict (1955) The Ethics, translated by R.H.M. Elwes, New York: Dover.
[27] This is a reference to the treatment of Bergson in Deleuze’s Cinema, in the sense of the
criticism of Bergson, of singularities, expressed, for instance, in the close-up, in the face, as
[30] Epigram to Safranski, Rüdiger (1999) Heidegger: Between God and Evil.
[33] Luchte, J. (2009) ‘Under the Aspect of Time (‘sub specie temporis): Heidegger,
Wittgenstein, and the Place of the Nothing’, Philosophy Today, Vol. 53, No. 1.
[34] Foucault, Michel (1991) ‘What is Enlightenment?’, The Foucault Reader, New York:
Penguin.