ROYAL INSTITUTION OF NAVAL ARCHITECTS FOYAE INSTITUTION OF NAVAL ARCHITECTS AUSTRALIAN BRANCH RAHOLA - 40 YEARS OW BY 17 august 1979 SydneyRAHOLA ~ 40 YEARS ON INTRODUCTION Knowledge is of two kinds. We know a subject ourselves or we know where we can find information upon it. Samuel Johnson In April - May 1939, a Finnish naval architect, Jaakko Rahola, published in Helsinki, in Inglish, A Doctoral Thesis titled "The Judging of The Stability of Ships and the Determination of the Minimum Amount of Stability Especially Considering The Vessels Navigating Finnish Waters. (1) Few naval architectural works have made such an impact. No single comparable work on this subject has since been published and Rahola's work stands as a classic. Much has happened in the intervening forty years, new ideas and concepts have been introduced, while many casualties due to stability deficiencies have occurred, often sadly with accompanying loss of life. Rahola's criteria or criteria based upon them, and his techniques are currently being used, and will no doubt remain in use for some time to come. It Seemed appropriate that the history of the development of stability criteria should be reviewed and account taken of the present status of our understanding of the amount of stability deemed sufficient for seagoing vessels. Ternino! . ‘Tt all depends what you mean by C.E.M, Joaa B.B.C, Brains Trust, 1942-1948 It is desirable to clarify terms which will feature frequently in the paper. ‘stability’ has a number of meanings both technical and non-technical. In the field of ships' statics and dynamics both longitudinal and transverse stability are included. For the purposes of tiis paper, references to stability will normally be to transverse: stability i.e. the ability of a ship to return to the upright when heeled to port or starboard by some transverse disturbing force. ‘Determining’ is the expression used by Rahola to mean the calculation of the stability characteristics of a particular vessel. ‘Judging’ is the term used by Rahola to refer to the assessment of the sufficiency or insufficiency of the stability determined for a vessel having regard to the intended service of that vessel. : ‘capsizing' occurs when a ship is unable to remain in an upright or near upright condition due to a loss or inadequacy of transverse stability.2 ‘sreakers' (breaking waves) are normally treated as being of 3 types (14) Spilling breakers occur where the ratio of wave height to water depth is about 0.78 on a gradually sloping botton of gradient less than 1/50, The spilling removes just enough energy to keep the height/depth ratio constant as the wave moves shoreward. Gurling breakers occur as the slop becomes steeper and the citical height to depth ratio increases towards 1.2, the breaking action becoming progressively more intense. Plunging breakers mark the limit of the above phenomenon, with the bottom becoming steeper and the height to depth ratio becoming close to 1,2. ‘This marks the Limit of breaking at the shore line, All similar waves surge up steeper slopes without breaking. Dr Jaakko Rahola FRets which are not frankly faced have a habit of stabbing the back. ee ack sip Harold Bowden Jaakko Rahola was born 1 June 1902 in Mantta, Finland. He graduated ‘Excellent’ as a naval architect from the Helsinki University of Technology in 1925, He then served as an engineer at the Navy shipyard (now Valmet oy Helsinki shipyard) from 1925 to 1933. From 1933 to 1940 he was the Chief of the Construction Bureau of the Finish Navy. In 1940 he was awarded his doctorate on the basis of his Thesis ‘The Judging of the Stability of Ships .......' During the period 1940-1944 he was the Chief of the Shipbuilding Bureau of the Navy (New Construction) and also from 1941 ato 1965 he was Professor at the Helsinki University of Technology, actively lecturing in Naval Architecture from 1941 to 1955. From 1945 to 1955 he was Head of the Mechanical Department of the University. From 1955 to 1965 Rahola was Rector of the Technical University. From 1944 to 1950 Rahola was leader in the shipbuilding branch of the gigantic war reparations programme imposed on Finland by the Soviet Union with whom Finland had been at war during 1939-1940 and 1941-1944. Under the war reparations programme more than 10 shipyards were built in Finaldn for delivering 508 ships (steam and motor ships, trawlers, lighters etc) to the Soviet Union. During 1965-1969 Rahola served as a Department leader at the Ministry for Trade and Industry. He retired in 1969 and died 10 september 1973, While at the University, Rahola prepared plans for the construction of towing and manoeuvring ship model basins which were completed in 1970, Apart from some articles in Finnish journals written either for naval readers or in popular style, Rahola did not publish further on the subject of his criteria. Only one reference in English is known to the Author (103). This apparent inactivity is explained Ly the fact that Rahola was from 1939+ active in the development and construction of Finnish Naval vessels + 4nhibited by conditions during the 5 years . of war + not in contact with a model basin + involved in the gigantic war reparation programme + involved in the change of site of the University from Helsinki to Otaniemi Rahola was greatly aided by a capable assistant Tauno Kaartti, a technician, who carried out many of the heeling tests on his behalf. It is said that had it not been for Kaartti there would have been no thesis and no criteria, the war would have intervened before the work as completed. Kaartti died about the same time as Rahola. Though the world of Naval Architecture outside Finland may xemenbex Rahola solely because of his criteria, in his home land he is held in high esteem and his record of achievements in other areas will long be xemembered. DEVELOPMENT OF CRITERIA BEFORE RANOLA Zt is the customary fate of new truths to begin as heresies and to end as superstitions, ‘T.H. Huxley The Coming of Age of the Origin of species The development of ideas as to the amount of stability required by a ship for survival has been roughly parallel with the evolution of our knowledge of the nature of stability, the principles involved and the methods of calculation used to determine the stability of any particular vessel. Our modern knowledge of stability principles may be said to date from the publication . in 1746 of Pierre Bouguer's book Traite du Navire (3). In his book Bouguer developed the concept of the metacentre and gave the Metacentric Theory of Stability to the world, Bouguer gave a method for finding a ship's centre of buoyancy by either practical test or by calculation. Bouguer also extended the idea of determination of the vertical centre of gravity by means of an inclining experiment, He attributed the idea of using an inclining experiment to determine stability to a French professor of Mathematics Father Paul Hoste (4). Three years later the celebrated mathematician Leonhard Euler published his Scientia Navalis Seu Tractatus dé Construendis Ac Dirigandis Navibus in St Petersburg (6). The fact that this book was published in latin obscured its value to shipbuilders. Im 1771, a Spanish scientist and mathematician Don Jorge Juan y Santacilla, who had accompanied Bouguer on an expedition to Peru in 1735 published a classic work Examen Maritimo Theorico Practico. (5) Santacilla went beyond Bouguer in suggesting that the longitudinal metacentre should be found and in giving a method, albeit more complicated than that of Bouguer for determining the height of the metacentres.Santacilla also suggested that an inclining experiment be conducted on a ship similar to a new design in order to reduce the labour of finding the centre of gravity of the latter by detailed calculation, Buler published his Theorie Complete de la Construction et de la Manoeuvre des Vaisseaux in Paris in 1776. (8) Euler's work was more analytical than that of Bouguer but his conclusions were generally similar. Euler defines a ‘measure of stability' as the moment of the forces with respect to the axis round which the inclination is made. Chapman, the great Swedish naval architect had meanwhile published his Tractat om Skepps-Byggeriet, (7) which was a valuable and practical work on shipbuilding based on his scientific training and which incorporated most of the developments to that time. Meanwhile in Britain little of this activity was known. Bouguer (3) had not been translated into English, Euler (8) was translated in 1790, and Chapman (7) in 1820, though 'A Supplement containing a Translation of what M, Bouguer has written . ‘, "brief and defective' (23) was contained in ‘the second edition of Mungo Murray's 'A Treatice on Shipbuilding and Navigation’. (9) George ADwood, fellow and tutor of Trinity College Cambridge developed the equation named after him in 1796 and 1798, (24) While these papers are believed to constitute the first work on theoretical naval architect in the United Kingdom, little notice seems to have been taken of them possibly because the shipbuilders of the time were not sufficiently well educated to appreciate his points and because of a feeling that theoretical researches had no practical benefit. In reviewing the work of the eighteenth century, one significant feature which was appreciated at that time and which has become increasingly important in more recent years is the relationship between stability and ship motions. Bouguer (3) developed a formula for the period of oscillation through a small angle, appreciated the connection between excessive stability and heavy rolling and noted the desirability of keeping weights amidships to minimise pitching. Daniel Bernoulli (10) laid the foundation for the theory of rolling, ‘treating inter alia the question of statical stability. In 1050 Canon Moseley (25) introduced the concept of dynanic stability, developing a formula well known to naval architects. Moseley attempted to relate the stability of ships to their rolling motion. Recent studies of dynamic stability have made us of Moseley's concept, it having been little used for a century. Progress in England was slow. ‘wo small naval vessels were inclined, one in 1830 and the other in 1632, ‘he capsize in dock of the steam transport. ‘Perseverance’ in 1855 highlighted the need for inclining experiments and the information they could provide. Barnes (26) built on the work of Chapman, and Santacilla in particular in developing the techniques of conducting inclining experiments.5. The next year, 1861, Barnes gave a further paper (27) which introduced @ method of calculation of cross curves of stability using wedges for any angle of inclination and incorporating the layer correction, Thus Barnes gave practical effect to the theoretical considerations developed by Bouguer and subsequently by Atwood. Barne's method remained the standard form of calculation until the introduction of the Ansler-Laffon integrator into the United Kingdom in 1978. ‘The Council of the Royal Institution of Naval Architects prepared a xeport on The Safety of Iron Ships which made some fifteen definite xecomendations together with some suggestions, One suggestion was that the roll period of a ship should be deternined before leaving port in order that the metacentric height on departure should be determined. It was recognised that this could only be done where the vessel was loaded, with consequent delay should re~stowing of the vessel become necessary. In 1868 Edward Reed, then Chief Constructor of the Navy read a paper (28) before the Institution in which curves of righting lever overlaid with a capsizing lever curve were used to demonstrate the way in which the reserve of stability is reduced. the particular application was to show that a proposal to send monitors to sea as full rigged sailing vessels was dangerous. It is believed that this was the first use of righting and capsizing lever curves to foretell the effects of various influences experienced at sea which tend to xeduce the stability of a vessel. In the course of the paper Reed discussed the problems involved in sending an iron-clad monitor ‘Cerberus’ with a height of deck above water of 3 feet, to Melbourne, A temporary side and upper deck were fitted for the voyage which as is well known was completed successfully. Early in the morning of 7 September 1870, H.M.S. ‘Captain’ one of the vessels against which Reed's 1863 paper was directed, and which had been the subject of bitter controversy between Reed, its designer Coles, the press, Parliament and in particular the First Lord of the Admiralty, capsized in a squall with the loss of all but 10 of her crew of about 500, Reed had left the admiralty a few months before the loss. Nathaniel Barnaby who succeeded Reed, read a paper (29) to the spring meeting of the Institution in 1871, examining the lessons to be drawn from the loss, in particular the influences of freeboard and beam on stability. ‘The continuation of the practice of drawing curves of righting lever for various conditions of loading was justified. Unfortunately though the evidence of what was to come had been clearly outlined by Reed in 1868, the significance of that evidence had just not been appreciated. Reed in 1685 published a comprehensive study on stability - 'a Treatise on The Stability of Ships" (2), which was intended to fulfil four roles: + 0 provide a general work in English, no such work being pre~existent, + To collect the works on stability scattered as they were ‘through various works at hone and abroad,6. as + To bring within easy reach of English naval architects the work of French investigators, who have played a leading role in this branch of science. + To fulfil a need for a comprehensive collection of the work on the subject of stability for all those called upon to have some such knowledge. Though infrequently read today, Reed's ‘Stability’ remains a classic in the field. In 1887, Archibald Denny in a paper (30) to the Institution, outlinea the information contained in the Technical Qualities Book provided since about 1884 to all vessels built by the Denny yard. ‘This work had been carried through under the supervision of his recently deceased brother, William Denny. These stability books were regarded as being a model of their kind and their influence can be seen in the stability books of today. It is therefore profitable to turn aside for a moment to look at their contents. ‘The books were divided into two Parts - Part I = General Notes (which are applicable to any ship and treat general principles) Part II - Special Notes and Diagrams (which apply to the ship in question) William Denny had laid down information on 7 basic technical qualities of a ship, with guidance on how information could be obtained on an eighth quality - 1. Deadweight capacity 2. Speed and power 3, Stability 4. Trim 5. Measurement capcities 6, Steadiness 7. Strength 8. ‘Turning and manoeuvring power ‘The homogeneous cargo was used as a basis as it was considered that @ vessel could not be more disadvantageously loaded as far as stability is concerned, except by carelessness. As to steadiness, it was reconmended that the wrights should be winged out to diminish rolling to some extent. It was also reconmended to owners that a vessel should be inclined at the start of each voyage to determine GM. . William Denny recommended that an ordinary ship, homogeneously loaded, should never have less than 0,8 ft GM and 0.8 ft righting arm at 30° and 45° inclination. ‘These limits were decided on after much consideration and study. Denny felt that this information on which his rule was based was meagre and would remain so till it became the practice 'to incline steamers before - proceeding to sea and thus find out what metacentric height is found to be safe in practice’.: 1 Denny's views on inclining experiments find an echo in the court's decision in the inquiry into the loss of R.N.L.I. "The Duchess of kent! (159) - 'T well know that no anount of simplification in apparatus or calculation can ever do away with the great care needed in performing the experimeiit, but I have always though that the experimental part could be performed after very little practice, by any careful and thoughtful nan". In the discussion, Mr Martell, Chief Ship surveyor to Lloyd's Register of Shipping drew attention to the practice of LR for some time past to encourage masters of relatively narrow ships to incline their vessels before departure in order to obtain the correct position of the centre of gravity. Advice was then Given on stowage of holds and tween decks to ensure 'a reasonable amount of stability' for the ship, Mr Benjamin did not agree that stability criteria as proposed by William and Archibald Denny could be applied to all vessels - a criticism which was also levelled at Rahola's criteria. Considerable discussion took place on the merits and demerits of providing ships masters with curves and diagraus - a matter which is still not entirely resolved. In 1895, Thornycroft and Barnaby in reporting to the Institution of Civil mgineers (31) on the development of torpedo boat destroyers remarked on @ noticeable change in the conditions of stability of H.M.S. 'Daring' at full speed. The vessel appeared to be more tender than at the still water condition. The change in the waterline lowered the metacentre. It was noted that vessels of small initial stability and of a form which, when driven at high speed, caused the water to pile up at the bow and stern and fall considerably amidships, have been known to become unstable when so driven. Hok gave two papers on stability to the Institution in 1892 (33) and 1893 (34) respectively. In the former paper Hlok calculated the vertical displacement of the centre of gravity with heel, then differentiated to obtain @ curve of righting arms. ie used as a check on accuracy the fact that the point of inflection of the curve of dynamic stability and the maximum ordinate of the dynamic stability curve correspond with the maximum righting arm and the point of vanishing stability respectively. Instead of quoting values of righting arm at 30° and 45° as Denny had done, tiok preferred to calculate the highest permissible point above which the centre of gravity will not pass, That is he assumed minimm values of vertical displacement of the centre of gravity e.g. 3 inches at 30°, 44 inches at 45°, In 1893 Hok aimed to shorten the several days normally taken to calculate the complete statical stability of a ship and the one day taken to calculate its dynamic stability. (zt is interesting that this latter calculation should be carried out at that time!). Because of the amount of labour involved Hok considered that many designers confined thenselves to investigating only the initial stability, leaving the complete investigation to be made during or after construction, thus losing the opportunity to obviate the possibility of the ship proving a failure, (Various incidents in recent times suggest that the practic did not die at the turn of the century).8. e Hok therefore presented an extremely rapid and effective method of investigating, stability for use by a designer before construction commenced, Pescod (35) proposed in 1903 that GM values should be based on the xighting arms and analysed the stability curves of several vessels. Benjamin in 1913 (37) proposed that stability should be assessed on the basis of two ordinates of the dynamical lever curve. The minimum ordinates should be 50mm at 30° and 200 mm at 60 degrees or at the capsizing angle if less than 60°, In 1928 in the course of the discussion of a paper by Schwarz, (38) Benjamin indicated firstly that rather than merely prescribing two ordinates of a nynamic stability curve, he was now prepared to nominate the form of the whole curve. Further he presented a new curve based on analysis of a nunber of vessels than in service, He considered that his 1913 curve may have been too severe and instead proposed ordinates of 50 mm at 30 degrees and 105 mm at 50 degrees or at the angle of capsizing if below 50°. Peskett in 1914.(36) advanced the philosophy that an owner's ship must be as safe as possible consistently with its being convenient and economical to work. He recognised it as being highly desirable that passenger ships should be comfortable and that comfort is largely measured by metacentric height, It is desirable from the point of view of motion in a seaway to keep the metacentric height in the loaded condition no greater than is required to secure that the metacentric height in the light condition is not negative. Wall also in 1914 (39) expressed the view that for any particular vessel, the safety or otherwise depends entirely on the metacentric height she possesses, In different steamers the minimum safe value for this height will vary considerably on account of different proportions in the main body and erections, Jo determine the safe value of the metacentric height under stated conditions, the reserve dynamical stability was to be considered at the time when a ship on cojpletion of a roll to windward is struck by a squall. Wall made a number of assumptions as to wind, lateral areas etc. In addition he assumed the vessel to be disabled on account of a breakdown of its steering gear, the loss of the propeller in single screw steamers or of any other condition covered by ordinary insurance risks, The ship is considered to wallow and when on the crest of a wave to have only 80 per cent of its still water displacement. Wall found that 50 per cent reserve of dynamic stability gave a xeasonable angle of return roll, He proposed in addition that every ship should be inclined. Russo presented in 1916 (40) his tank for reproducing wave motions. This was significant from the stability viewpoint because he floated a small model in this tank. Under certain conditions this model capsized. Various discussers saw some correlation between the model and full scale behaviour. Baker and Keary (41) discussed the effect of longitudinal motion on stability, various types of vessel being examined. In discussion Barnaby . reminded the meeting of the numerical data given by Thornycroft and himself to the Institution of Civil Engineers - 1895 (31) in respect of loss of stability by 'Daring'. Baker and Keary's paper was illustrated during the discussion by references to experience gained when the ‘Agamemnon’ was laying the Atlantic telegraph.o. Biles (42) suggested that a lightship BM of 1 foot should be aimed at because experience had shown that during building, additions and alterations to a vessel would reduce stability to the extent that some vessels could be completed with zero or even negative lightship GM values. Biles recommended comparison with successful ships, ‘There are two important conditions to be examined ~ load departure and load arrival. ‘Two factors control stability ~ the question of passenger comfort and that of safety i.e. freedom from capsize, which was controlled by the action of the sea and the wind, the shift of weights and the action of the rudder. Tt was noted that the action of the rudder on stability had been first studied in 1877 during trials on H.M.S. 'Thunderer'. Anderson (43) proposed that the minimum GM in the seagoing condition should be related to the longitudinal vertical area above the waterline and be inverseley proportional to block coefficient and the longitudinal vertical area below the waterline. ‘The formula was not well received on at least two main grounds ~ it was non~dimensional and it was independent of size. The aim of the proposal was of course in the right direction. Frodsham Holt (44) endeavoured to establish a standard of safety. He postulated two conditions of seaworthiness - ‘The first condition essential to seaworthiness is that the ship shall never be unstable when upright, at the beginning or the end of any given voyage, or while at sea. ‘The second condition of seaworthiness is that the worst conjunction of wind and waves that can possibly be encountered during the given voyage shall not cause the ship to roll beyond the safe effective range of heel'. Holt proposed that there should therefore be both a maximum and minimum value of the metacentric height. A positive minimum value was essential at all times to guard against excessive heel produced by the wind, loose water, flooding of one coupartment or passenger movenent. A maximum value was needed to guard against excessive rolling which could immerse non-tight openings or cause cargo to shift. The Load Line Committee Report of 1916 had stressed the importance of closing openings through which flooding could occur. In association, with these proposals, Holt introduced a 'stability meter', which appeared to be a development of Mallock's earlier rolling indicator. While Holt's purpose vas applauded, a number of reservations were expressed, In particular the need for a maximum Gi was doubted and the influence of metacentric radius (BM) and righting arm values for greater angles of heel was stressed. Im 1929 the Final Report of the Special Committee on stability and: Loading of the Anerican Marine Standards Committee was published. (147) ‘The first Report had been distributed in October 1926 for comment, which comments had been reviewed and the final Report then prepared by the Committee,lo. . ‘The Committee had conmenced its activities with a complete survey of the literature published in English on ships' stability and loading, A list of some 212 publications dating from Bouguer in 1746 to Oswald Watts' ‘ship Stability and Trim made Easy' of 1926 is attached to the Report. The criteria laid down are based on achievement of various values of operating metacentric height which are related to available freeboard. Three Groups of vessels are provided for: Group I = Ocean and coastwise, including Gulf of Mexico and similar bodies of water. Group II - Partially protected waters, such as Long Island Sound, lower waters of Chesapeake Bay, Great Lakes, etc. Group III = smooth and protected waters, rivers, harbors, etc. In all groups the wind heel is limited to that which will immerse not more than one-half the freeboard and a maximum of 7° when the vessel is subjected ‘to a steady beam wind of about 55 miles per hour for Group I, 45 miles per hour for Group II and 37 miles per hour for Group III. Modification of the requirements may be permitted where it can be established before the laying of the keel that by a reasonable change in the design or proportion of a vessel, a period of roll equal to or greater than that which good practice indicates is suitable for the contemplated service, fannot be obtained, Suggested periods of roll are: Group I - About 10 seconds (600 miles fetch) Group II - About 7 seconds (200 miles fetch) Group III No limit ‘The Gi value to be selected is the greatest of those calculated on the basis of wind heel, passenger crowding and two compartment unsymmetrical flooding. These standards form the basis for those currently in use by the U.S, Coast Guard, (150) Professor Gleijses (45) discussed the manner in which metacentric height changes by means of variations of draught and breadth or their relative values. He did not give any values for judging the adequacy of the metacentric height values so produced, His paper was considered rather academic and failed to draw any discussion. The record of losses of British colliers during the twenties was not good. Professor Burrill while still a student had been awarded a research scholarship in 1927, He reported to the Institution by means of a paper (46) based on voyages undertaken 'to study the seaworthiness of collier types by actual observations at sea under winter conditions, recording and conditions of wind and sea,-and observing the angles of roll and pitch, and the amount and position of shipped water'. the investigation was limited to colliers between 200 ft and 300 ft in length. During the early months of 1928 and the winter of 1928-29 twenty-six voyages were made in eight ships of different types. ‘The metacentric height in loaded condition varied from 1.15 ft to 2.68 feet.n In his conclusion,s Burrill found that the safety of normal colliers of the types studied 'would not be materially increased by increasing the metacentric height above the average of the figures stated in his table, but that the lowest figure was perhaps a little too low. Any increase in safety could best be provided by increasing the frechoard and so increasing the range without increasing the initial stability. Sea conditions in the North Sea were described as ‘confused’. Regular waves when encountered were about 150 to 200 feet long, about 10 to 15 feet high from trough to crest, having a period of about 6 to 7 seconds. This led Burrill to suggest that an optimum rolling period would be about 9 to 10 seconds. Burrill recognised the shortcomings of Gi as a criterion of stability and proposed that a Stiffness Pactor(S) should be used. S, the measure of stiffness, is represented as the percentage of the total weight (displacement) of the vessel which would have to be moved across the deck to give a heel of 15°, This angle was chosen because it represented @ reasonable upper limit to the rolling angle expected in a fully loaded ship and also because the ‘wallsided formula’ can fairly be applied to this angle in normal ships. Further the criterion is such as may readily be applied and understood by ships' officers. For the vessels studied S values ranged from 1,03 to 2.03, with an average value of 1.4. (An optimum value of S for the normal ships studied would in fact be 1.4 to 1.5, corresponding to roll periods Of 9 to 10 seconds and Gu values of about 1.5 feet for a ship 200 ft long and 2.3 ft for a ship 300 ft long). Burrill's paper was well received, and extensively discussed. Professor Pierottet (47) presented 'simple and well-deteruined criteria which in my opinion should be applied to all ships whose service is not limited to sheltered waters, so as to ensure their having sufficient dynamical stability’. Pierottet felt that ‘the not~infrequent capsizing of ships, especially small ones, shows the need for some such criteria', Statistics indicated that in the period June 1931 to March 1934, the total number of people drowmed in ship capsizes was over 1,300. Pierottet recognised that the total reserve of stability being the area under the righting lever curve between the upright and the capsizing angle was useless as a criterion. What was needed was the ‘useful reserve! which is the reserve beyond the maximm angle of transverse inclination at which it is possible for all the weights exclusive of passengers to remain in position. In cargo and passenger ships this is assumed to be between 40° and 50°. This angle must not be exceeded even with all the extemal forces at their greatest all tending to capsize the ship. Pierottet considered as external causes of transverse inclination, wind, waves, rudder action and movement of passengers and crew. Accordingly Pierottet proposed a standard of stability based on these factors both for ships with and ships without subdivision, this standard to be administered by the Classification Societies.12. . The feelings of the meeting as to the question of responsibility were that the responsibility lay with the master e.g. Dr Bruhn - ‘Nearly every capsizing of a ship could have been prevented by the proper action of those in command of the vessel' or General Rota - 'The argument against such a new technical and legal rule (i.e. Pierottet's proposal) is that when the ship is in service the responsibility for her safety must rest in every case on the Master alone, and that he, therefore, must decide the most suitable disposition of the cargo, in consideration of its influence on the sea-going qualities and stability of his ship’. Pierottet replied - ‘Mtr Bruhn says that only the Master of the ship has in his power to add to, or reduce, the chance of the persons on boara being drowned by the capsizing of the vessel. ‘This is true, but the Master has the right to expect from the Naval Architect a ship of such qualities as to render his task possible and easy. ‘the fulfilling of this condition must rest with the designer and only when it is fulfilled can we consider the Master responsible for the safety of the ship’. Having shared the resonsibilities between the designer and the Master, it remains to tell each of then how he should fulfil his task. ‘This paper deals only with what concerns the designer; it is not addressed to Nasters, but to Naval Architects". With those views as to responsibility the Author can on y agree. Rahola's Proposals Sometimes a noble failure serves the world as faithfully as a distinguished success. Edward Dowden Rahola's thesis (1) was published in mglish in Helsinki in April-May 1939, His aim was simply stated: "The object of the present investigation is to find a procedure by means of which it may be possible to judge with adequate certainty the amount of the stability of a certain vessel which may come to navigate under the conditions prevailing on the lakes and the waters adjacent to our country, and to decide whether it is sufficient or not.' ‘The investigation was apparently prompted by some ship losses, according to Rahola - "Several capsizings and sinkings have happened in succession in this country (Pinland), which have made the question of studying the stability of our ships and the correct judging thereof an exceedingly important one". Rahola divided the fairways for Finnish vessels into two great classes - 'such where action of waves is essential or at any rate an important factor, and such where heavy seas do not appear to any extent’ Because of insufficient development of the theory of stability, Rahola proposed to treat the question of stability of vessels in calm water, differently from that of vessels on the high seas.13. The methods he derived were directed towards persons having ‘comparatively good' ship-theoretical knowledge, but since in the final analyses the question of judging the stability of a vessel rests with the officers of that vessel, a method for their use could not altogether be neglected. Rahola drew a clear distinction between determining and judging stability, Determining stability involves numerical calculation of the initial, statical and dynamic stability of a ship, ‘This problem was solved at least in calm water. Calculations for determining stability among waves were not then resolved, nor are they completely so now. When the magnitude of stability of a vessel was determined, then judging that stability could begin. Rahola described three methods for doing this: "1, The stability values for the vessel to be studied can be compared with the corresponding values for similar vessels that have sailed successfully for years. 2, As basis for the comparison may be used the stability factors of vessels that have capsized by reason of bad stability qualities. 3. One can theoretically determine by calculation the magnitude of those heeling moments to which the vessel may be subjected in the most unfavourable circumstances, and make the stability qualities of the vessel such as to allow the vessel to withstand these heeling monents without risk". Rahola considered that the first method required likeness in respect of similarity of: + shapes of hulls + relation of main dimensions relative heights of freeboards distribution of weights etc and that the courses for the vessels must be the same or similar. A large amount of comparative material is required and even given all this, and the stability qualities of successful vessels obtained, there still remained the question of how mich stability over and above that which would be sufficient exists. Danger lies in arbitrarily reducing stability in these circumstances, for example to alleviate heavy rolling. ‘The second method was viewed favourably not only by Rahola, but by other workers in the field, at least one of whom considered this the only way to determine the ‘least necessary curve of stability for a vessel driven by an engine’. The tendency in major maritime countries to examine the theoretical stability qualities of vessels which had accidents enabled Rahola to present in his book a review of some 30 capsized vessels and to analyse their stability characteristics.14, > ‘The third method of judging stability raises problems in determining the actual magnitude of all the heeling moments affecting the vessel, such as those due to rudder pressure, centrifugal forces, effect of waves etc. If sailing among waves is not taken into account, the difficulties are lessened. Rahola therefore considered the method suitable for determining the standard of stability of vessels on Finnish waters and lakes. Comparison may well be made between the three approaches to developing criteria postulated by Rahola and the three categories of stability criteria listed by Nadeinski and Jens: (32) 1. Criteria which are based on the comparison of certain heeling lever curves with the righting levers curves of the vessel, - Criteria which depend on the comparison of standard values of stability parameters with the actual values on the xighting lever curves, and 3. Criteria which use simple formulae for GM or freeboard as a function of certain geometric properties of the vessel. Rahola then examined the foundations for judging the minimum stability of ships. He first reviewed the general stability factors of a vessel, defining some terms which are necessary for his criteria. The angle of inclination at which the stability ara vanishes is called the 'capsizing angle’ or 'range of stability’. The heeling angle corresponding to the maximum stability arm is called the 'statical critical heeling angle’. ‘The heeling angle corresponding to the first intercept made by a heeling lever curve with the stability arm curve is called the ‘hynammical heeling angle‘. Rahola next reviewed the proposals which had been made over the years by various authors and autiorities for the use of the initial transverse netacentric height as a judging principle. Rahola treated the matter in considerable detail as it was the custom in Finland (as well as many other countries) to use GM for judging stability almost exclusively. From Rahola's considerations he concluded that it is impossible to form exact conclusions on the sufficiency of stability solely with the help of the amount of Gi. The next concept explored was the use of the main dimensions of a vessel as judging principles. Rahola concluded that there were other matters such as the correct amount and stowage of cargo which could seriously affect stability without involving the main dimensions. The use of the principal dimensions is of benefit solely to the designer since once completed, the principal dimensions are not frequently altered. The use of the stability arm curve as a judging principle was then assessed. Rahola examined the various proposals wiich had been made over the years as well as stability curves for a number of known casualties. There was even in the late thirties a significant amount of material available for study and Rahola conducted what he believed to be the first comparison of that material.1s. Before doing so he considered what characteristics of the stability arm curve should be specially considered. ‘the slope at or near the origin is controlled by ‘the initial metacentric height and is therefore included in the comparative study of the initial GM values, The statical critical heeling angle, ox the angle at which the stability arm curve reaches its maximum was considered by Rahola to be more important than is generally considered. When comparing stability arm curves it is necessary not only to compare the magnitude of the statical critical heeling angle but also to compare the ordinates of the stability arm curve at that angle and at lesser angles. Rahola concluded that the part of the stability am curve lying between the statical critical heeling angle and the capsizing angle was of lesser significance. (‘his has been questioned more recently as will be seen later). Since the statical critical heeling angle is normally approximately half the range of stability, if a minimum range or capsizing angle be specified, then a minimum statical critical heeling angle is also specified. Rahola studied the characteristics of stability am curves for ships of various types and size. Because of the wide variation in quality of the curves, Rahola concluded that no systematic method of comparison was possible but that a comparison on the basis of sufficiency or insufficiency as determined by accidents must be used, Rahola further concluded that the magnitude of the ordinates of the stability arm curve between 20° and 40° were important and that a capsizing angle of 60° was in many instances sufficient. Sumarising, Rahola developed 'a combined rule which the stability qualities of each seagoing vessel must comply with..... The rule would be in all its brevity as follows: 1 ‘The values of a vessel's stability arms mst be at the angle of 20° at least 0.140 m, and at the angle of 30° at least 0.200 m, 2 A vessel's statical critical heeling angle must be at least 35°." Rahola decided that in the light of the above it was unnecessary to specify a stability arm at 40° or a minim value for a capsizing angle as acceptable values would follow automatically from the use of the ‘minimum rule for statical stability’. Rahola did not propose this rule for general use because of ~ 1. ‘The unsuitability of the same standard both for large and small vessels. 2. Any compromise in respect of the first minimum value must be balanced by greater stability arms at larger heeling angles. This is quite possible with large vessels with high freeboard, when stability requirements at larger heeling angles could be increased, with greater choice in metacentric height. Rabola next explored the use of variations of the stability arm curve as a judging principle, considering various proposals which had been made from time to time such as righting moment curves, shifting metacentric height curves, Pro metacentric height curves, stiffness etc. Rahola found no outstanding Benefit in using any of these.16. ‘The use of dynamical stability for judging stability as we saw above, has along history. Rahola noted the opposition to dynamic stability criteria which had been evidenced and reviewed the principal published work on the subject, ise. that by Benjamin (37) (38) and Picrottet (47). ‘The fundamental principle of judging a vessel's stability on the basis of its dynamic stability was accepted as being sound. ‘The outstanding problem lay in the choice of the limit angle, being the angle beyond which the vessel should not heel in the most unfavourable circumstances. Rahola then turned his attention to the practical demands to be made on the judging methods. the first problem of judging the stability of all types of vessels is to determine the value of the greatest heeling angle allowed and its method of selection. For seagoing vessels, the next problem is to determine the minimum amount of sufficient dynamic lever at the limit angle, based on an analysis of the stability curves of capsized vessels. For inner waters vessels this amount may be determined by calculation of the various heeling moments and then their summation and hence the determination of the vessel's sufficient dynamical lever on this basis. For seagoing vessels Rahola examined first various proposals which had been made and then reviewed physical considerations such as hatchways door sills, cargo movenent etc. From this Rahola determined that the limit angle should be equal to or less than the vessel's statical heeling angle, but in any case not greater than 40°, subject to non~inmersion of non-watertight hatches and to no movement of unsecured cargo. Having established the limit angle, Rahola treated various casualties on a similar basis to that used for the stability arm sufficiency analysis to determine that the dynamical lever corresponding to tie limit angle of the vessel would be regarded as sufficient if it were equal to or greater than 0.080 m Rahola then performed a similar exercise for the stability of the vessels on the Finnish inner waters, He decided that the limit angle could be a function of build, but with an absolute limit of 40°, He next studied the influences of rudder pressure, centrifugal force, wind pressure, passenger movement and waves. He then considered the determination of an adequate dynamical lever corresponding to the limit angle. Finally, Rahola gave some worked examples to show the application of his judging methods, concluding with a collection of some 34 examples of capsized and lost vessels for which details conments and reference to sources are given. I have surveyed the work of Rahola in some detail for a number of xeasons. ‘Though his name is used fairly widely, few naval architects have read his thesis and considered his arguments, largely, I feel, because the book is not generally available and may now be out of print. 1 think that far more weight is given to Rahola's conclusions than he himself was prepared to give. Further, it seemed desirable to outline the steps he took in reaching his conclusions to show that though his source material may be considered somewhat sparse from a statistical viewpoint, the care with which he analysed his material, compared with the theory, practice and other data, does engender confidence in the application of his standards.* le As will be seen, when the question of standards of stability was taken up after the war on an international basis, it was not suxprising to find that Rahola's criteria were prominent in the development, of the standards we are currently employing. Deve: tof Criteria Subsequent to Rahola The development of criteria after 1939 continued the general pattern of the period before 1939, i.e. the "judging of stability went hand in hand with the study of improved methods of ‘determining’ the stability of vessels. From time to time methods for simplifying the determination of stability during preliminary design were advanced. Only in more recent years, and it would seem, influenced by the activities of FAO and IMCO, was the emphasis directed towards the re-examination of the fundamentals of stability and the mechanics of capsizing in actual sea conditions. Associated with these developuents, was the developing study of oceanography, which provided essential working reference material on the sea, its behaviour and characteristics without which the study of stability could not be developed in required depth. Due no doubt to the war, the influence of Rahola's work does not seen to have been wide-spread, at least in the years immediately following 1939. Certainly by 1964 (132), a number of countries had criteria based on those Suggested by Rahola, A.R. Taylor (48) summarised the proportions of normal tugs of various types. He proposed a freeboard requirement based on 30 per cent reserve buoyancy and called for a minimum Gli of 12 inches in the light condition. Burgess (49) proposed a method of comparing stability in the design stages based on the relation between the movement of the centre of buoyancy during the heeling of a vessel and the corresponding movement of that of a prison having a transverse section of the same midship area and shape as the vessel under study, except that the depth of the prison is increased by one third of the mean deck sheer. Burgess' aim was to assist the designer in determining stability at the larger angles of heel so that an approximate stability curve may be drawn, It is likely that Burgess" system was overtaken by that of Prohaska. A useful analysis of the effects of proportions on stability was published in Sweden in 1943 (54). Unfortunately it was published only in Swedish and seemed to have no effect in mglish speaking circles probably for that reason as well as due to wartime conditions. Professor C.W. Prohaska in 1947 (50) presented the first of 3 papers dealing with ships stability particularly from the viewpoint of estimation in the early stages of design. By assuming the centre of gravity lies at the initial metacentre, Prohaska separated the influence of the metacentric height from cross curves, being left with residuary stability curves. By developing xesiduary stability curves (or MS curves) for some simple geometric forms ‘and so isolating the influence of shape, sheer and proportions, from a statistical analysis of ship data he was then able to develop curves which could be used for the simple and rapid determination of stability in the design stages. In the course of the work, Prohaska became aware of the possible large discrepancies which are possible in manual methods of determining righting lever curves.is. > In 1951 Prohaska published the results of a more thorough analysis of the influence of ship form on stability curves (51). His new method was found to require less expenditure of time than for the integrator method and had the advantage of enabling the parameters used in the calculation to be easily verified. Prohaska found that his proposals did not make it possible to draw definite conclusions as to the influence on stability of the different coefficients of fineness of the hull - possibly because the accuracy of the calculations was still not sufficiently high. With the introduction of the electronic computer as a tool, new horizons were opened, Accordingly Prohaska repeated his earlier approach but using the computer, presenting the results in a further paper (52). ‘The first part of the Paper presents design charts for intact stability and the second described an investigation into damage stability then in progress. In 1951 Skinner (53) sought to redirect thought on the subject of small mexcantile ships and to test opinion as to whether or not the 1930 Load Line Convention work of increasing freeboards in small flush~deck ships and those with short erections need be extended and can be extended econonically. skinner defined a small ship as one of less than 400 ft in length. Skinner drew attention Particularly to statistics of merchant ships reported abandoned, foundered and mining given by Manley (55, 56) which certainly gave cause for concern - especially for small ships. It was statistics of this type which later were to influence IMcO in the development of stability criteria for vessels of 100 m length and below. Skinner canvassed all the issues involved and a very full discussion ensued in which Professor Prohaska drew attention to the existence of Rahola's book (1). Auong his conclusions, Skinner found that 'range is a good criterion of stability which can be reasonably accurately calculated in the design stage by means of a formula’, The merits of using range as a criterion are again coming under study internationally. Skinner also recommended the provision of freeboards appropriate to stability and one compartment subdivision for small vessels, Steel (58), then Chief Ship Surveyor, Ministry of Transport and Civil aviation (now Marine Division, Department of Trade) presented a most useful paper on the practical aspects of stability, basing his coments in many instances on experiences with casualties and near casualties, The author suggested for small vessels that GZ values at 30 to 45 degrees inclination should be approximately 1 ft associated with Gi values of about 19 inches. Steel recognised that there is no short cut to adequate stability and that a great many factors need to be taken into account in assessing what is adequate for any particular ship - "there is no comprehensive short cut to adequate stability. ‘Type of ship, service, nature of cargo and all other factors have to be taken into account in the light of experience and casualties, not the least being a well maintained and operated ship and an informed and imaginative interpretation of GZ curves. Complete satisfaction about integrity and operation may well justify smaller margins of calculated stability. But it must not be overlooked. 1s. that good calculated stability provides a margin against unforeseen contingencies, weather extremes, and especially human failures, Which are comon and variable enough, It is therefore, advisable not to be too complacent about satisfying minimum standards, either as to calculated stability or to the associated factors'. The experience of this author would lend strong support to Steel's views. ‘The discussion on Steel's paper produced some interesting views, some of which at least run counter to the ideas held today. Professors Robb and Burrill were strongly against the production of GZ curves. Robb felt that 'it is surely no longer necessary to do this', while Burrill said 'in this connection, I am of the same mind as Professor Robb'. These views contrast with the views presently being advanced that the character of a Gz curve between 40° and 80° heel is of great significance for the safety of a vessel. Professor Palmer saw little merit in low GM values because the irregular wave patterns met at sea do not have characteristics which would lend themselves to long period rolling. Professor Prohaska like Professor Burrill saw the errors likely to be or conmonly made in stability calculations as a particular problem. Mr Hackenzie, a designer of small ships, gave an illuminating discussion on the difficulties of the small ship designer in matching stability requirements with those of cost, flexibility of operation, freeboard etc. Following the capsize of a number of tugs in Norway and other countries, experiments were conducted into the stability of tugs when pulled sideways. ‘These tests were unique and made a significant contribution to our knowledge of the forces to which a tug is subjected in the course of its working life (66). Yamagata (59) presented a paper which has served as a model to others. A large number of casualties and the world wide interest in establishing xegulations for stability led to a demand in Japan for appropriate legislation. A committee was formed in May 1953 to deternine standards, being spurred during their work by the loss of several ferry boats. ‘The Regulations for stability of ships were adopted in February 1957. +amagata desoribes the Regulations and ‘their background with particular reference to passenger ships. Paulling (60) discussed the deficiencies in transverse stability of a tuna vessel due to trim by the stern and while running at speed in a high following sea, On the basis of these deficiencies, Paulling recommended that free trimming should be permitted when computing cross curves and that an increase of freeboard amidships be examined to improve the seagoing stability in waves, particularly with a wave amidships. In his 1961 paper (61) Paulling investigated the stability of a ship in waves theoretically and experimentally. From his work, Paulling concluded ‘that the longitudinal seaway exerts a strong influence on a vessel's ability to withstand capsizing, where this is measured by a curve of righting arms versus angle of heel. ‘he effect of the seaway should be taken into account in judging stability particularly for vessels with large beam/draught and low freeboard/beam ratios,20, ’ Norrby (62) discussed the stability of coastal vessels. He analysed Rahola's proposals and sone variations from those criteria. He then turned to the question of the judging of stability on board, expressing the view that the Waster of a coaster usually found it difficult to judge stability in typical cases of loading if using static stability curves. le then turned his attention to a detailed investigation of judgment by means of the rolling period, suggesting appropriate diagrams for this purpose. ‘The same year a valuable paper on behaviour of ships in a following sea wasscontributed by Du Cane and Goodrich (64). While little numerical data was presented, the paper presents a detailed and qualitative review of the subject with appropriate supporting illustrations from both model and full scale experience. Sarchin and Goldberg (63) also in 1962 presented an analyses of US naval stability requirements both for intact and damage stability conditions ‘These requirements which are generally of static type have had wide usage throughout the world, A pargicular merit of this paper is the inclusion of some discussion as to the thoughts which underlie the requirements, In 1959 an offshore supply vessel, the ‘National ?ride' capsized in the Gulf of Mexico. As a result an investigation into the stability of such broad shallow draft vessels was undertaken, Regard was had to the work of Rahola and Paulling and based on Rahola's criteria and on a fixed set of standard Proportions sone curves of required GM were developed. These were issued by the Coast Guard in the form of a technical note (132). A paper by the officer who carried out the ‘National Pride' study was also published to elaborate on the principles involved (65). De Wit (67) presented to the FAO Meeting on Fishing Vessel: stability in Gdansk, October 1963, a worthwhile summary, comparison and discussion of stability criteria applicable to fishing vessels at that date. As will be discussed later, Boden and Halliday (102) presented a paper to the Australian Branch to the Institution dealing with an attempt to simplify the determination of the stability on a wave of a tuna vessel. In 1966, IMCO convened a Conference to draw up a new International Convention on Iead Lines (116). As was to be expected particular attention was paid to the freeboard of small vessels. Because of the work programme of the Sub-Committee on Subdivision and Stability, only-a general provision relating to intact stability was made. However the question of the influences of magnitude of freeboard, hatchway closing appliances, effectiveness and size of superstructures, freeing ports etc were canvassed. Murray Smith (68) gives a useful summary of the nature of the discussions and the decisions made, supplemented by some informative discussion by naval architects many of whome were active participants in the deliberations of the Conference. . In 1968 Nadeinski and Jens presented a timely summary of the activities of INCO in respect to the study of stability of fishing vessels (32). The basis on which the INCO criteria (2) were developed is elaborated and a useful study of folling period determination is included. This paper was followed by one by Thomson and Tope (70). ‘his latter paper extended the details of Inco studies given by Nadeninsii and Jens by outlining the manner in which the development of the criteria for cargo and passenger vessels had been developed. he opinions of the authors ‘that it cannot be too strongly emphasised ‘that the recommended criteria should be taken as minima and do not represent design optima’ cannot be too strongly endorsed.2h. Experiments carried out in the Glasgow University model basin by Ferguson and Conn (71) showing the influence of forward motion on transverse stability have extended knowledge of this phenomenon which was observed by ‘Thornycroft and Barnaby (31) and studied by Baker and Keary (41). Mok and Hill (72) surveyed the history and development of offshore supply vessels, a new type of vessel which had arisen since the war to meet the needs of supplying off-shore oil drilling operations. ‘the development was not without its trauma, since in the period from 1956 to 1963, eight vessels categorised as off-shore supply vessels capsized in the Gulf of Mexico. ‘The design has continued to develop and INCO activity in regard to development of a code of safety for this class of vessel will be described later. The Second International Tug Conference established a Stability Panel to discuss the difficult question of stability of tugs (73). A comprehensive discussion took place, some of those participating expressing concern at the lack of regulatory requirements in this area of ships' stability. Further consideration to the question of tug stability - this time restricted to the offshore tugboat, was given in a paper by Storch. He comments that "the volume of tug casualties is overwhelming'. It is noted that of the figures quoted for the years 1965 to 1971 inclusive, founderings, capsizings or floodings account fox only 8 per cent of the total casualties, the highest figure for any one year being 12 per cent. tonetheless this does not absolve authorities, designers and operators from action to reduce even this Jow figure. Based on his investigations Storch recommends some design features to improve safety as well as three stability criteria covering the areas of righting oneryy, towline pull and weather. Fraser, Jones and Van Der Net have analysed the cost of stability for fishing vessels (74). ‘his is a particularly useful paper, the like of which should be published more often. The requirements for meeting various stability criteria are analysed, with particular reference to operation in waves. The cost of varying the hull design to meet these requirements is analysed. One factor seems to be neglected - the cost of losing the vessel if designed without adequate stability! At the 16th session of the IMCO Sub-Committee on Safety of Fishing Vessels, the Japanese delegation tabled a document which forus a useful basis for the whole question of fishing vessel stability. It is of note that a number of authors since 1974 have made some reference to this paper. Tsuchiya proposes that criteria should be not only geometric i.e. take account of minimum Gi, freeboard and Gz curve shape, but also take due account of weather, heel due to fishing operations, critical heeling angle beyond which righting moment will be lost, bulwark height, profile area on the water line, roll-damping characteristics of the boat etc. In 1974, Bovet, Johnson and Jones (69) surveyed the researches of the US Coast Guard into the question of ships’ stability. bovet et al first recapitulated on the Coast Guard criteria which had been in use for some decades before proceeding to examine specialised criteria for which need had arisen, e.g. off-shore supply vessels, sailing vessels, off-shore drilling riys, deck cargo barges and tugboats. The work of IMCO and the US Coast Guard was reviewed, in particular the computer simulation being undertaken on behald of the Coast Guard by the Department of Naval Architect, University of California, Berkeley. Several reports, including (75, 76, 77) have been published describing the experiments and the results achieved.22. o Stuart Welford (78) reviewed the development of the self-righting lifeboat. ‘These have a history of some 200 years, not without disaster unfortunately. The principles involved have significance for studies of the stability of all types of craft. This lends support to another articles in the same issue of ‘The Naval Architect' (79) where: Professor Kuo and Dr Odabasi canvass Alternative Approaches to Ship and Ocean Vehicle Stability Criteria, concluding that a fresh approach, rather than development of the existing static approach is necessary. Tt had become increasingly obvious that if any move was to be made away from the statical approach to criteria which had been used for so long, some mathematical treatment relating the characteristics of irregular seaways to the response characteristics of ships was to be necessary. As a result ‘the preponderance of papers on the subject of advanced ship stability tended to be mathematical, involving inter alia, a deal of statistical analyses as well as the stability theory of engineering systems. Practitioners of the ‘old school! could soon find themselves left well behind. Price (80) presented such a mathematical paper in 1975, analysing the xolling motion of a ship in an irregular seaway. ‘The small wooden fishing vessels in use on Canada's east coast evolved over the years as a result of tradition, local needs, preferences and sometimes prejudices. Because of concern over the suitability of some of these vessels in a modern fishing role, a program was initiated to determine the stability characteristics of these vessels, ‘he first part of a continuing study on the subject has been published (81). It could be said that a similar need exists in places other than Canada, 1975 saw a major conference on stability held in Glasgow (62) when 24 papers on all aspects of ship and ocean vehicle stability were presented and discussed. The aim of the conference was twofold - (a) to provide an opportunity for those involved in stability work, whether for design, operation, research or regulatory pruposes to discuss the available research findings at international level, and (b) to see how these results can be applied in practice. ‘The material presented set a benchmark from which all work thereafter could be directed. whe titles of the six sessions indicate the scope of the Conference = 1. Definition of stability 2. Environmental Conditions and Ewerimental studies 3. ‘Theoretical Studies 4, Correlation of Theory and Experiment 5. Application of Research Findings 6. Quiz Session on Stability The after effects of this conference will be felt for some time ‘to come.23. ‘he US Coast Guard sponsored a three task study of stability criteria fortowing and fishing vessels. Included in Task 1 are a literature study, a fleet census and characterisation, detailed stability calculations for Sl vessels and the selection of models and test programs for Task 2, Task 2 comprised a model test program covering both tripping and seakeeping of four models. Task 3 was the analyses, development and evaluation of intact stability criteria based on the model testing and analyses work done under Tasks 1 and 2. A series of Reports were issued (03,84,85,86). Vinje (87) reviewed some previous papers on electrical engineering and analogous fields and applied the results to the ship rolling problem in irregular following seas, giving a criterion for stability based on a linear damping coefficient and the time dependent part of the metacentric height. As a direct consequence of the loss of a number of UK fishing vessels in 1968 and the recommendations of the subsequent Committee of Enquiry into Trawler Safety, The Merchant Shipping Fishing Vessels (Safety Provisions) Act 1970 and the Fishing Vessels (Safety Provisions) Rules 1975 came into force. The introduction of statutory requirements for safety of fishing vessels for the firat time was an event of note in the UX maritime world. Accordingly JH. Cox, at the time Deputy Chief Ship Surveyor of the UK Board of Trade gave a most informative paper to the Institution (88) explaining the background and thinking which lay behind these requirements. ‘These Rules came into force prior to the 1977 Convention. They reflected INCO thinking at that time, but now are not in line with the Convention in som respects. In the same volume of the Transactions (89), Odabasi who had worked with Kuo at Strathclyde for some time but who is now with BSRA, gave a summary of the present treatment of stability, exploring the mathematical models which axe being applied with a view to determining intact stability fron considerations of the capsizing forces which can be experienced in a seaway. In a sutmary Odabasi assesses the position to which these researches arrive and indicates the further work necessary before these principles can safely be employed for design, operational or regulatory applications. Despite the advances on the theoretical basis of stability, the real world of losses continues to intrude a note of caution. Storch (90) analyses 13 specific cases of casualties among Alaskan king crab boats and reviews the general situation of these vessels so far as casualties are concerned. It would seem that the time is still some way off when stability may be determined without having regard to deductions made from casualty analyses. ‘The 1979 Spring Meetings of the Institution saw a clutch of 4 papers (91,92,93,94) on stability, These represented probably the uost significant over view of ship stability to be presented at one time to the Institution. Burcher (91) studied the influence of hull shape on stability. It is strange that seemingly little attention has ever been paid to this most important design question. Burcher's aim was to try to minimise the variations from acceptable statical stability which can occur in a seaway. Wright and Marshfield (92) developed a simple mathematical roll model and compared this with some regular beam-sea experiments, with the ultimate ain of developing a model by which behaviour in non-regular waves may be predicted, with particular interest in the likelihood of capsize.24, s + Dahle and xjaerland (93) endeavoured by means of model experinents to explore the mechanism by which the Norwegian research vessel 11/S lielland- Hansen capsized under the influence of a breaking wave which hit the vessel broadside. The vessel at the time of loss was in a ballast condition. Dahle and Kjaerland conclude that the Torremolinos Convention stability requirements are inadequate for this situation. They find that the GZ curve should be positive up to heeling angles of at least 80° to prevent vessels capsizing. (These tests of course ignore any practical considerations such as uovenent of masses within the vessel, but account will need to be taken of this when the basic theoretical considerations are agreed). Morrall (94) reports on the behaviour in rough water and breaking waves of two inshore fishing vessels having almost identical principal dimensions and displacement; but with different statical stability. Morrall too concludes that the margin of stability for small inshore fishing vessels as required by the IHCO criteria appears to be insufficient to prevent capsizing in certain possible sea conditions. Winch (95) considers small craft stability and the possibility of capsize. He discusses inter alia the 10R rule, the stability of catamaran and trimaran type vessels ~ particularly the question of range and righting levers at extended angles of heel. Considering the arguments which have been advanced in Australia on this question in connection with off-shore racing, trailer sailers etc the question is by no means academic. Riley and ilelmore (100) discuss the stability characteristics of a number of recently built Australian fishing vessels of 16 to 26 metres in length. Questions of free trim and fixed trim during heel both in still water and on @ longitudinal wave with crest amidships are examined. The stability characteristics of a 70 metre cargo vessel and 230 metre tanker are included for the study of the influence of scale. The question is asked, after analysing the data whether the IMCO criteria are more stringent than necessary for Australian vessels. The author will reserve his comment for the discussion later on in the year. The above review of the development of stability criteria is necessarily brief, but it is hoped sufficient to give an indication of the pattern of present study. The future promises nore interesting analyses yet. The Work of FAO in the Field of ships' stability ‘The United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) has long been active in the field of ship stability, in particular those aspects of the subject which apply to fishing vessels. In 1953, FAO held an International Fishing Boat Congress in Paris and Miami, The idea of having the Congress stemmed from Conmander A.C. Hardy, who presided at the Paris Session. Mr l.C. Hanson of the United States in addition to presiding over the Miami session, also delivered four papers. ‘The papers covered a wide range of topics covering fishing, fishing boats and research vessels throughout the world. (11) So successful was this Congress, that FAO organised a Second World Fishing Boat Congress held in Xome from 5 to 10 April 1959. ‘The papers again covered all aspects of fishing vessel design and operation and the published proceedings (12) prove both complementary and supplementary to those of the First Congress (11).25. In October 1963, FAO convened an international conference at Gdansk, at which the sole topic of discussion was fishing vessel stability. Some 19 papers were presented. . A Third World Fishing Boat Congress was convened in October 1965 in Gothenburg. Once again there was a wealth of information made available, particularly dealing with inshore and near water fishing and in the case of developing countries, some indigenous craft. Once again the papers and discussions have been published for ready access and usage (13). With the development of Ico activities in the field of ship stability, FAO which has observer status at INCO has participated in the work programmes and conferences. ‘The Work of IMCO in the Field of Ships' Stability ‘The Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO) is a specialised agency of the United Nations whose activities are entirely in the Maritime field. The United Nations convened a Naritine Conference in Geneva in 1948 which adopted the Convention on the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization. The Convention cane inte force in March 1958 and the Organization cane into being in January 1959, The Principal technical body within the IMcO structure which is xesponsible for safety is the Maritine Safety Committee. Under its umbrella @ number of technical Sub-Committees operate. Among these are the Sub-Committee on Subdivision Stability and Load Lines and the Sub-Committee on Safety of Fishing Vessels. The Sub-Committee on Subdivision and Stability Problems as it then was, was formed as a result of a decision of the Maritime Safety Committee at its 3rd session in November 1960, Its brief was to deal with Recommendations 6,7 and 8 of the SOLAS Conference 1960. (115) Recommendation 6 deals with watertight sub-division of passenger ships, Recommendation 7 with intact stability of passenger ships, cargo ships and fishing vessels, and Recommendation 8 with sub-division and damage stability ©f cargo ships. ‘The Third IMco Assembly resolved (130) that CO should continue its studies on the stability of fishing vessels with all possible speed. The Sub-Committee on Sub-division and Stability therefore at its third session in 1964 established a Panel of Experts on Stability of Fishing Vessels and arranged for cooperation between IMCO and the United Nations Food and Agriculture Oxganisation (FAO) in the work. At its twelfth session in February 1966 the Maritime Safety Committee xeviewed the way in which INCO was studying stability and amended the title of the Sub-Committee by deleting the word 'Problems' thus naming it the Sub~ Committee on Sub-division and Stability. The orking Groups on Intact stability ef Ships and on Watertight Sub-division and Damage Stability of Passenger and Cargo Ships would be amalgamated into the Sub-Committee at the end of 1966. The Panel of Experts on Stability of Fishing Vessels would be renamed the Vorking Group on Stability of Fishing Vessels but otherwise remain unaltered and continue to report to the Sub-Committee.26. . a At its 19th Session in February 1969 the Maritime Safety Committee changed the status of the Working Group on Stability of Fishing Vessels into that of a Sub-Committee, The Sub-Committee on Safety of Fishing Vessels was set up to study all aspects of safety, not only stability. At its 30th Session in March 1974, the Maritime Safety Committee agreed to change the title of the Sub-Committee on Sub-division and Stability to Sub-Committee on Sub-division Stability and Load Lines because of the increasing emphasis in its work on load lines matters. The activities of the two Sub-Committees and associated Groups will be outlined separately. THE SUB-COMMITTEE ON SUB-DIVISION, STABILITY AND LOAD LINES The Sub-Committee originally known as the Sub-Committee on Sub- division and Stability Problems had its first meeting from 28 to 31 May 1968 when the work was divided between two Working Groups, one on watertight sub-division and damage stability of passenger and cargo ships and the other on intact stability of ships. It is only the latter Working Group which is of concern in this paper. Im order to pursue the question of intact stability of ships, a questionnaire was sent to all IMCO members and to non=IHCO members who were contracting Governments to the 1948 and/or 1960 Conventions asking about their established stability standards or about their current practice where no standards have been established and about the forms of stability information supplied to masters for their guidance. At the third session of the Working Group on Intact Stability of ships held in May 1964, the USSR presented a document (132) which summarised the xeplies received by INCO in response to the questionnaire concerning standards of stability. Thirty-one replies were received, which taken together with the Published standards of the German Democratic Republic and Yugoslavia, meant that ‘the standards of 33 countries were analysed. ‘The 33 countries were classified into 3 Groups. The first group of 6 countries reported that they either had not for their own’ regulations on intact stability or they confined themselves to fulfilling the general provisions of the 1948 SOLAS Convention. The second group of 16 countries had regulations which satisfied the intact stability requirements of the 1943 Convention. Of these countries 5 applied in practice additionally some unofficial criteria such as the Rahola criteria. ‘The third group of 11 countries applied official standard requirements as well as the more general provisions of the 1948 Convention, The report then analysed the requirements of these 11 countries, and compared them.2 The fourth session of the Sub-Committee agreed on basic parameters such as passenger mass and C.G. for studying movement of passengers, guidelines for the study of external forces as well as 3 practices recommended to Governments for their use. ‘hese three practices (133, 134) xelated to freeing ports, exterior hatch coamings and door sills on fishing vessels, and approximate determination of stability (for all types of vessels) by means of rolling period tests. At the fifth session of the Sub-Committee the Federal Republic of Germany and Poland presented a casualty analysis which showed that flush deck and short superstructure ships below 60 mm length formed the majority of casualties, capsizing often being due to shift of cargo, water on deck and/or inrush of water under deck. Suggested values for some parameters were given. ‘The Sub-Committee agreed that collection of intact stability casualty xecords was important and should be continued and that intact stability calculation: for representative vessels below 100 mm length should also be continued. It was agreed that in the first instance, simple stability criteria for vessels under 100 mm length should be formulated. A proposal for the composition of the stability data to be provided for the master was also accepted, it being agreed that this should be joined with the stability parameters when these had been agreed. ‘The question of accuracy of stability calculations was examined, it being decided that study of manual calculations should not be pursued further but that a study on computer calculations should be undertaken, A programme of work for the study of external forces, seeking the assistance from the World Meteorological Organisation, National Institute of Oceanography and National Physical Laboratory was developed. Further consideration of heeling moments due to wind pressure would be made when tests being conducted by the USSR were completed. At the Seventh session in December 1967 the Sub-Committee finalised its Recoumendation on Intact Stability for Passenger and Cargo Ships Under 100 Metres in Length and its Recommendation on Intact Stability of Fishing Vessels. These were adopted by the IMO Assembly in 1968 and published as Resolution A.167 (ES.IV) (120) and Resolution, a.168 (ES.IV) (121). A Joint Ad Hoc Group for the study of External Forces Affecting Ships was formed. A number of other organisations agreed to work with IMCO in the Group. In May 1968, a working proposed by the Ad Hoc Group was endorsed. A programme for systematic model tests to determine the influence of different parameters of the hull on the behaviour of ships in waves was discussed. No agreement was reached on a recommendation on the accuracy of intact stability calculations and it was felt that approval of computer programmes should be left to Administrations. At the request of the Maritime Safety Committee the problem of the acceptable minimum draught for ships in ballast was discussed and it was agreed to pursue the question further.28. . At the ninth session in January 1969, at the request of the Maritime Safety Committee, the Sub-Committee commenced study of the safety of drilling rigs and production platforms, air cushion vehicles, hydrofoils and similar craft, The Norwegian delegation had submitted a paper to the Sub-Committee on Safety of Fishing Vessels dealing with the accuracy of stability of fishing vessels and it was proposed to take account of the Norwegian proposals. In association with other Sub-Committees, the question of requirements for special purpose ships was explored. A particular problem which was to be resolved was the determination of the types of vessel to be categorised as special purpose ships. This occupied the attention of INCO Sub-Committees for some meetings. The Maritime Safety Committee at its twenty eighth session drew up definitions of special purpose personnel and special purpose ships for use by the various Sub-Committees in their consideration of requirements. The fifteenth session of the Sub-committee saw a wide range of Problems under discussion. Various types of craft e.g. navel craft (including hovercraft and hydrofoil craft), special purpose ships, offshore mobile units, cargo ships handling cargo at sea (e.g. offshore supply vessels) and roll-on/ roll-off vessels carrying lorries and drivers. ‘The Danish delegation gave details of the capsize of the coastal tanker ‘Edith Terkol' lost when in ballast but with the INCO stability standard more than achieved. It was agreed that a Working Party should be formed with the Joint ad Hoc Group for the Study of External Forces Affecting ships with the task of attempting to investigate the influence of environment on ship stability particularly in causing capsizing. Because of the relevance of the stability of ships in ballast condition, this topic was included in the work programme for the group. ‘The Sub-Committee at its sixteenth session in July 1974, agreed that the standards of intact stability given in A.167 (ES.IV) (120) were insufficient for supply vessels, having regard, inter alia, to their hull form and to their Severe conditions of service, and drew up a list of items which should be taken account of. Items on which further research was reconmended included the effects of trim, freeing ports and water in pipe deck cargo. At the nineteenth session in July 1976, the stability provisions for novel types of craft were agreed for transmission to the Sub-Committee on Ship Design and Bquipment for inclusion in a Code for Novel Types of Craft. This Code was adopted by the IMCO Assembly in November 1977 as “Gode of Safety In Dynamically Supported Craft' (131). The study of intact stability continued each session. various delegations undertook to carry out calculations, experiments and analyses with a view of developing a more rational basis for a new Code for intact stability of ships.29. Requirements for the intact stability of offshore supply vessels were completed and the Maritime safety Committee was requested to circulate these requirements to Member Governments as a matter of urgency. In the meantime, the stability requirements would be incorporated into a Code for Safety of Offshore Supply Vessels by the Sub-Committee on Ship Design and Equipment, while damage stability requirements for offshore supply vessels were being developed. The intact stability requirements were circulated to Menber Governnents in May 1977 (13 ‘The Maritime Safety Conmittee invited the attention of the Sub-Committee to the possibility of stability problems arising from segregated ballast tankers below 150 metres in length when in ballast condition having regard to minimm draught requirements being developed by IHCO. ‘The Sub-Committee accordingly sought voyage data from Member Governments as a first step to investigating this problen. ‘The Netherlands submitted for consideration, a proposal for simplified stability treatment of pontoons. At the twenty-second session ofthe Sub-Committee in October 1978, the Norwegian delegation showed a film of a model test of capsizing of a research vessel in breaking waves. This test highlighted the importance of the range of stability. A more complete treatment of this casualty and subsequent investigations was delivered at the 1979 spring Meetings (93) and is discussed later in this paper. ‘It was agreed that refinements to the existing INC criteria for passenger and cargo Ships (120) should include consideration of vessels above 100 m in length, special types of ships and ships of any type below 100 metres in length in ballast condition. Based on investigations following the ‘Edith Terkol' disaster, Denmark is developing a proposal based on a limiting lightship vertical centre of gravity, such limit to be such as to ensure that the TiiCO criteria are met in the various operational loading conditions. Tt was established that in general, tankers less than 150 m in length in ballast in moderate sea conditions will have no difficulty in meeting the IMCO criteria, It was recognised that the development of the criteria was based on analysis of casualties to ships in the loaded condition. This point is of equal relevance to vessels such as 'udith Terkol'. At the twenty-third session in June 1979, papers dealing with the general philosophy of stability of ships of all types and of capsizing in heavy weather conditions were examined. ‘The assistance of scientists in all countrics was invited in an effort to gain a better understanding of the mechanism of heeling and capsizing. Three proposals relating to the angle of vanishing stability were considered and coments sought. Suggested definitions for trim in performing stability calculations were agreed and a suggested amendment to Resolution A.167 (BS.IV) (120) relating to stability of ships in ballast condition was developed. Comparative calculations to assess the merits of several proposals for weahter criteria were agreed. The twenty-fourth session of the Sub-Committee will be held in December 1979.30. + THE SUB-COMMITTEE ON SAFETY OF FISHING VESSELS AND ITS PREDECESSORS Having xegard to Recommendation 7 of the SOLAS 1960 Convention, the Third IMCO Assembly in 1963 adopted Resolution A.52 (III) (130) stating that INCO should continue its studies with all possible speed, The Third session of the Sub-Committee on Sub-division and Stability Problens, in the light of that Resolution established a Panel of Experts on the Stability of Fishing Vessels, which would work in cooperation with FAO experts. The Panel which was a subsidiary body to the Working Group on Intact Stability of Ships met for the first time in July 1964, when it drew up terms of reference and developed a detailed work programme, Pishing vessels were to be grouped for case of study, casualty xecords prepared and anlysed, national stability requirements summarised and compared, intact stability calculations made and research work being carried out by members recorded and collated. A document ‘Advice to Fishermen‘ was prepared and circulated by IMCO (139). Zt was also agreed that the closest cooperation with the FAO experts was necessary. ‘The grouping of fishing vessels was agreed on the basis of size, form, operational range and severity of operational risk due to wind, sea conditions, icing etc. A document detailing ‘Recommended Practice for Freeing Ports for Fishing Vessels' and ‘Recommended Practice for Exterior Hatch Coamings and Door Sills on Fishing Vessels' was prepared and circulated to members (139). Also circulated was a document ‘Memorandum to Administrations on an Approximate Determination of ships* Stability by Means of the Rolling Period’ (134). Studies of National standards and practices to account for the xisk of icing and concerning shifting boards and other devices to retain cargo were initiated, Particular inguiry was generated into the development of a simple means of determining the decrease of righting arms when a fishing vessel was on a wave crest. The development of parameters for intact stability criteria was pursued, as was the question of simplified stability data for fishing vessels. An additional topic which came under review was that of the influences on the stability of forces exerted by particular fishing methods or fishing gear. Recommendation 3 of the 1966 Load Lines Convention (116) reconmended ‘that INcO should pursue studies on the Minimum Freeboard for Fishing Vessels with a view to establishing recommended international standards for minimum freeboard for fishing vessels. The Working Group resolved to pursue this question with despatch. (The status of the Panel had been changed to that of a Working Group by the Maritime Safety Committee in February 1966). ‘The Load Lines Conference in 1966 had a proposal before it for provision of requirements for freeboard for fishing vessels. The proposal Was rejected in favour of the Recommendation for further study. ‘The Working Group developed minimum requirements on icing which were circulated to Governents by the Maritime Safety Committee (136), and decided to continue its researches into this vital question.31. In respect of the forces exerted by particular methods of fishing, ‘the Group felt that these were generally far less than those imposed by wind and weather, It was considered that gear forces and maximum wind and sea forces would not occur at the same time and that if a vessel iad adequate stability to meet stress of weather, no further requirement was necessary. However, in view of the tendency to increase the weight of nets and the height of the hauling point the question would be kept under review. In order to study the question of freeboard, members were circulated for information, such information to be analysed in conjunction with the appropriate regulationsof the 1966 Convention. At the sixth meeting of the Group in October 1967 Recommended Stability Criteria for New Fishing Vessels were agreed as were Recommendations on icing, portable fish~hold division, and freeing ports, as well as suggestions to fishermen. These subsequently were adopted by the ICO Assembly (121) and until the conclusion of the Torremolinos Convention (118) were the basic INCO recoumendations on safety of fishing vessels. At the seventh session of the Group a formila for simplified criterion of stability for small fishing vessels, say below 30 m in length was proposed for further study. A proposal for unified definitions of main particulars and other properties of fishing vessels was examined. It was agreed at the eighth session that freeboard for new decked vessels operating in unrestricted service in weahter of unlimited severity should be such that the agreed stability standards should be complied with, and that a reasonable degree of safety for the men on deck, as well as for the vessel, in respect of the prevention of inrush of water and the influence of water trapped on deck must be provided. ‘The problem of effective operational control of loading associated with a freeboard mark should be given careful attention at the design and construction stage to ensure that safe loading can be achieved during operations. At the nineteenth session of the Maritime Safety Committee in February 1969, the Working Group on Stability of Fishing Vessels was separated from the Sub-Conmittee on Subdivision and Stability and re-named the Sub- Committee on Safety of Pishing Vessels, ‘The new Sub-Committee would henceforward be responsible for all aspects of the safety of fishing vessels. In October 1966, the Maritime Safety Committee at its fourteenth session agreed that IMCO should participate with ILO and FAO in the production of a practical safety code for fishing vessels and fishermen. At its nineteenth session, the Committee approved the final draft of the Code of ‘safety for Fishermen and Fishing Vessels, Part A - Safety and Health Practices for Skippers" and Crews (128) prepared by a joint FAO/ILO/INCO meeting of consultants.32. * ‘The Committee considered a draft of Part B of the Code ~ Safety and Health Requirements for the Construction and Equipment of Fishing Vessels. After consideration by interested INCO Sub-Committees this draft would be ‘transmitted to FAO and ILO for their contributions. ‘The first meeting of the new Sub-Committee (the Ninth Session) was held in October 1969. Studies on Part B of the Code were undertaken. The work on freeboard continued on the basis of three principles: + compliance with recommended stability standards + safe working conditions for the crew on deck = prevention of entry of water to enclosed spaces ‘The Norwegian delegation at the tenth session submitted a proposal for a ‘Code of Practice Concerning The Accuracy of Stability Information for Fishing Vessels’. The Sub-Committee submitted to the Maritime Safety Committee the "Recommendation for an Interim Simplified Stability Criterion For Decked Fishing Vessels Under 30 m In Length'. ‘This was subsequently adopted by the IMCO Assembly (123). At the eleventh session the Sub-Coumittee agreed on the text of a Recommendation on Construction of Fishing Vessels Affecting the Vessel's Stability and Crew Safety. This was subsequently adopted by the INCO Assembly (124). additionally, Unified Definitions of Main Particulars and Other Properities of Fishing Vessels were also transmitted to the Committee who circulated it to Member Governments. (137) At the twelfth session, the Code of Practice concerning the Accuracy of Stability Information for Fishing Vessels was completed and transmitted to the Maritime Safety Committee. It was adopted by the IMCO Assembly in 1973 (122). Amendments were also proposed to Resolution A.168 (ES-IV) (121) in respect of the construction of fish-hold divisions. ‘hese also were adopted by the Assembly (126). The twelfth session of the Sub-Committee commenced the task of @zawing up a draft Convention on Safety of Fishing Vessels, raising questions of fundamental principles as to the scope and content of such a Convention on which agreement was needed. Work on freeboard and stability in a seaway continued. . The Thirteenth session concluded discussion on the draft of Part B Of the Code of Safety for Fishermen and Fishing Vessels. The text was agreed at a joint FAO/IL0/IMCO meeting in February 1974 and published on behalf of the three organisations by IMcO (129) together - with a revised edition of Part A (128).33. The Sub-Comittee met for two weeks in October 1974 to advance preparation of the draft Convention to enable a Conference to be held in 1976. In the event the Conference was not held till March of 1977. A significant decision was taken by majority vote of the twenty delegations: present, that freeboard should be primarily governed by the IMCO stability criteria with account to be taken of such matters as + ice accretion + bow height + Severe wind forces + effect of water on deck + severe acceleration and deck wetness It was agreed to proceed with a study on guidelines for the design, construction and equipment of small fishing vessels after the conclusion of the Conference. ‘The examination of suitable stability criteria continued, the existing INCO criteria (121) being used as a basis for further development. At the eighteenth session in July 1975 final agreement was reached that there should be no Chapter in the draft Convention dealing with freeboard, and that stability criteria of the ICO type would be specified with general provisions only concerning bow height and the need to maintain stability under conditions of severe wind and rolling and with water on deck. Recommendations xelating to bow height, severe wind forces and rolling and water on deck should be attached in a separate Annex to the Convention to give guidance as to how ‘these provisions might be met. At the conclusion of the twentieth session held in March 1976, the draft Convention for the Safety of Fishing Vessels had been finalised, ready for submission to Governments for consideration prior to the Conference which was to be held in Spain from 7 March 1977 to 2 April 1977. Following the Conference the Sub-Committee resumed its activities at its twenty first session in September 1978. ‘The Recommendations of the Conference were discussed and appropriate action agreed. a draft text of Guidelines for the design, construction and equipment of suall fishing vessels was considered, These Guidelines of course include stability provisions. The question of improved stability criteria was taken up. Theoretical studies on stability of fishing vessels were to be continued with a view to the replacement of the Convention Recommendations dealing with stability by specific requirements. At the twenty second session held early in July 1979 the Sub-Committee agreed on the final form of the Guidelines which after approval by the Maritime Safety Committee will be circulated to member Governments. The Guidelines are intended to apply to new decked fishing vessels of 12 metres Jength and over but less than 24 metres in length.34. > Stability provisions require that while full stability information should be developed, the criteria to be used should be decided by the Administration. Vessels should be designed to have adequate stability for the intended service. Freeboard at the maximum foreseeable operating draught should have regard to + Stability criteria + Safety for men on deck or in exposed areas + Safety in respect of entry of water and influence of water trapped on deck. Reference to the criteria contained in Chapter IV of Part B of the Code of Safety for Fishermen and Fishing Vessels may be used provided it is xemembered these criteria were developed for larger vessels and are regarded as a minimum for seagoing vessels. Where extreme gear loads are likely to apply, these should be given special attention. Reference to the Sections of the Code treating approximate formula for minimum initial GM, rolling period tests and inclining experiments is also made. It was agreed that there would be close co-ordination between the ‘Sub-Committee on Safety of Fishing Vessels and the Sub-Committee on Sub-division, Stability and Load Lines in respect of the continuing studies on intact stability. Intact Stability Provisions in International Conventions Men are never so likely to settle a question rightly as when they discuss it freely. Macaulay ‘The International Convention on The Safety of Life at Sea 1914 (111) made no provision concerning intact stability, ‘The Report of the 1927-1929 UK Load Line Committee which formed the working document for the International Load Line Conference 1930, included as Appendix 1, Rules for Determining the Maximm Load Lines of Merchant Ships. Rule 19 states: ‘Reservation respecting Stability - The Mules necessarily assume ‘that the nature and stowage of the cargo are such as to secure sufficient stability for the ship when laden". In 1929, the Second International Conference for the Safety of Life at Sea was held in London. Article 8 of Chapter I of the Convention (112), says ‘article 8 Stability Test Every new passenger ship shall be inclined upon its completion and the elements of its stability determined. ‘The operating personnel shall be supplied with such information on this subject as is necessary to permit efficient handling of the ship'.: 35. In 1930 the first International Ioad Line Conference inserted the following preamble to Part I, General of Annex I to the International Convention Respecting load Lines 193. (113), Rules for determining Maximum oad Lines of Merchant Ships: "the Rules necessarily assume that the nature and stowage of the cargo, ballast, etc, are such as to secure sufficient stability for the ship.' Following the 1939-1945 war, a further International Conference on Safety of Life at Sea was held in London in 1948. For the first time provisions for cargo ships were included. Regulation 18 of Chapter II of ‘the Convention (114) provided for both passenger and cargo ships to be inclined upon their completion and the elements of their stability determined. The master was to be supplied with such information as is necessary for him to efficiently handle his ship. A copy was to be forwarded to the Administration concerned. A provision was included for the inclining experiment to be ispensed with where basic data could be obrained from the inclining test of a sister ship and it could be shown that reliable stability information for the exempted ship could be so obtained. In 1960 when a further International Conference on Safety of Life at Sea was held in London the provisions for intact stability were expanded beyond ‘those adopted in 1948. Regulation 19 of Chapter II again provides for both passenger and cargo ships to be inclined upon completion and the elements of stability determined. ‘The master however, 'shall be supplied with such reliable information as is necessary to enable him by rapid and simple processes to obtain accurate guidance as to the stability of the ship under varying conditions of ‘Service’. Again a copy is to be furnished to the Adwinistration. Provision is made for the amendment of the data when the ship is altered so as to materially affect the stability information. Re-inclining may be necessary. ‘the sister ship provision remained unaltered. An additional provision was added to allow for the dispensation from an inclining experiment in the case of individual ships or a class of ships, especially designed for the carriage of liquids or ore in bulk, when reference to existing data for similar ships clearly indicates that due to the ships proportions and arrangements, more than sufficient metacentric height will be available in all probable loading conditions. ‘This latter provision was overtaken by events, The requirements of the International Convention on Load Lines 1966 (116) include subdivision and damage stability provisions for Type 'A' ships (designed to carry only liquid cargoes in bulk....) and Type '2-60' and 'B-100' ships. In order to establish that a completed vessel will meet these requirements an incling experiment is necessary. A similar situation would apply where type 'A‘ or Type 'B-60' or '3-100" vessels wish to operate under the provisions of the 'INcO Equivalent Grain Regulations’, tie up-to-date version of which forms the subject of INCO Resolution A.264(VIIZ) (119) and more recently of Chapter VI of the 1974 Convention (117).36. 5 ‘The International Convention on Load Lines 1966 (116) elaborated on the preamble to Chapter I, General as contained in the 1930 Convention. The assumption as to the nature and stowage of the cargo, ballast etc, has been extended to include 'the avoidance of excessive structural stresses'. Additionally it has been assumed that where appropriate, international xequirements relating to stability or sub-division have been complied with. ‘The Convention goes further and includes the provision of information to the master among the conditions of assignment, i.e. conditions which must be met before a load line assignment can be made. The information shall be sufficient to enable the master 'to arrange for the loading and ballasting of his ship in such a way as to avoid the creation of any unacceptable stresses in the ship's structure. + Where stability information is not already provided under an international convention, then sufficient information will be supplied on the same basis as is provided in the 1960 Convention. In 1974, an International Conference was convened to consolidate the 1960 Convention with the large number of outstanding amendments to that Convention which had been adopted by various Assemblies and recommended to Governments, but which had not then come into force. Regulation 19 of Chapter Ii-1 repeats Regulation 19 of Chapter II of the 1960 Convention without change. In 1977, the Torremolinos International Convention for the Safety of Fishing Vessels, 1977 (118) was agreed. The basic stability criteria for fishing vessels contained in Resolution A.168 (ES-IV) (121) were adopted with the initial metacentric height of 0.35 metres being retained for single decked vessels. For vessels with a complete superstructure and for vessels of 70 metres in length and over a reduction may be made at the discretion of the Administration with a lower Limit of 0.15 metre. Since no freeboard schene has been adopted for fishing vessels safety, including stahility must be controlled through operating loads. The requirement for these are spelled out in Regulation 33. Provision is made for flooding of fish-holds and for the Administration to adjust the criteria where additional external forces are imposed on the vessel by particular methods of fishing. Allowance must be made for the effects of severe wind and rolling, water on deck and ice accretion. Guidance methods of allowing for severe wind and rolling and water on deck are attached to the Convention, Requirements for carrying out an inclining test and for the provision, presentation and content of stability data are included. Strength requirements for portable fish-hold divisions are repeated from Resolutions A.168 (ES.IV) (121) and A.268(VIII) (126). A bow height requirement aimed at preventing, the excessive shipping of water has been introduced. A maximum permissible operating draught is to be approved by the Administration so that in the associated operating condition the stability criteria, construction, watertight integrity, and equipment provisions of Chapter II and the crew protection provisions of Chapter VI shall be satisfied.: 37. Finally, provision is made that vessels of 100 metres in length and over, where the total number of persons carried is 100 or more, shall meet in effect a one compartment standard. Guidance on the method of calculation is attached to the Convention. . Development of Stability Standards in Australia Section 1928 of the Navigation Act 1912 which was inserted by the Navigation Act No. 96 of 1953, gave effect to the stability provisions of the International Convention for Safety of Life at Sea 1948, Regulation 1@, Chapter II, This did not require that any standards of stability should be met. However, from the latter part of 1963, Rahola's criteria were used as a xeference when examining stability sulmissions made to the then Department of Shipping and Transport in accordance with 5.1923, Revised wording of 5.1928 was substituted by 5.16 of the Navigation Act No. 60 of 1967 and the stability requirements of Regulation 19 Chapter IZ of the International Convention for Safety of Life at Sea 1960 were then incorporated in regulation 7 of the Navigation (Construction) Regulations which came into force on 20 March 1968. Following requests from industry the Department's criteria for rope capsizing effects on tugs were developed and circulated in October 1968. Following adoption of Resolution A.167(ES.IV) (120) and A.168(ES.IV) (121) by IMco in late 1968, these criteria for passenger cargo and fishing vessels came into use in the Department's checking of stability submissions. In order to standardise stability submissions a document ‘Presentation of Stability Data' was circulated to industry in September 1971. Criteria based on the IMcO Criteria for passenger, cargo and fishing vessels were included, as well as requixements for sailing vessels, dredges, etc. During 1971, a Committee was formed to develop uniform marine requirenents, The work was divided between 5 Working Groups, of which Group 3 was charged with the task of developing standards for stability and subdivision. Group 3 met at regular intervals between December 1971 and October 1978, the Stability Section of the Recommended Uniform Requirements for the Survey and Manning of Coumercial Vessels being one of two documents finalised at the Group's last meeting. ‘The background and history of the Committee and its 5 Groups is described in more detail elsewhere (104). Folliving a submission in respect of an offshore supply vessel which could not meet the IMCO criteria, discussions were held with the Department ef Trade, London, An analysis of stability characteristics of a nunber of existing craft was carried out and equivalent criteria by which an angle of maximum righting lever as low as 20° could be accepted on the basis of increased dynamic stability, were developed. ‘hese criteria after study and comparison with the stability of australian designed vessels, were accepted for local usage.38. . In February 1973, the Department issued document ‘Requirements for the approval of Stability Data‘ to replace the earlier ‘Presentation of Stability Data'. In addition to matters of presentation, intact stability criteria based on the INCO criteria were given for passenger, cargo and fishing vessels. Provision was also made for dredgers and offshore supply vessels. ‘The Departmental requirements were again revised and issued as MsD Specification No.2/1976, 31 Narch 1976. This incorporated changes initiated by the Court of Marine Inquiry into the loss of N.V, ‘Blythe Star' as well as experience gained during stability refresher courses. In this revision, stability criteria for passenger cargo and fishing vessels, tugs, offshore supply vessels, dredgers on transfer or delivery voyages, and landing barges were included. Towards the end of 1976, a document prepared by Group 3 proposing stabilit: criteria for small passenger vessels was submitted to industry for comment. In the latter half of 1977, a document incorporating the stability provisions of the Torremolinos Convention and proposing stability criteria for fishing vessels was also submitted to industry for comment. By mid 1978, all the Stability Section containing criteria for a number of types of vessel, requirements for draught marks, conduct of inclining experiments and presentation of stability data was ready for submission to industry for comment. ‘Though the stability criteria for passenger vessels had been issued as a final document, and the criteria for fishing vessels had already been commented on by industry, in order to make the stability document complete, these requirements were included and again submitted to industry for further ‘comment. ‘The Stability Section comprises: Sub-Section 1 ~ Preliminary ‘his includes: onduct of inclining experiments Position of draught marks Presentation of data Sub-Section B ~ Simplified Presentation of stability Sub-Section C ~ Stability Criteria ‘This includes criteria for: Passenger vessels cargo vessels 24 metres and over in length Cargo vessels (small) Fishing vessels Dredgers Crane and derrick barges Hydrofoil boats Off-shore supply vessels rugs Sailing vessels Sail training vessels Catamarans and trimarans (sail powered) Catamarans and trimarans (powered) Landing barges39. ‘The stability Section was adopted by the Marine and Ports Council of Australia in May 1979. A review procedure is being set up to enable the requirements to be reviewed at regular intervals, to amend where experience suggests, to incorporate advances in marine technology and to give effect to appropriate portions of new Conventions, IMCO Codes or Resolutions etc. For this to be successful, constructive comments and proposals for amendment based on experience, analysis or experiment are necessary and will be welcomed by the seven marine authorities concerned. Other Activities in Australia in the Field of ships' Stability Because of the economics of performing stability calculations for a tuna vessel poised on waves, C.E.B. Boden sought moxe economic but precise ways of carrying out the computation. A paper by Boden and R.F. Halliday of Sydney University first presented to the Australian Branch of the Institution was published in the Transactions in 1964 (102). No further work on the system has been published. Jan-Olof Traung, Chief, Fishing Vessel Section, Department of Fisheries, FAO, visited Australia in March 1964 and again in March 1966 at the request of the Commonwealth Government, to advise on problems relating to the design and construction of fishing vessels. ‘The Department of Primary Industry arranged a Technical Meeting on Pishing Boats to coincide with Traung's visit to enable him to be chaixman of the Meeting. Nine papers (101) were presented by 6 local naval architects, xeviewing present activities in the field of fishing vessel design and considering the appropriate paths which could be followed in the future. The instrument developed by Boden and Halliday for studying the stability of a vessel in waves was demonstrated to the gathering. At the Institution's 1973 Symposium ‘Australian Ships, Their Design, construction and Operation", Professor P.T, Fink canvassed the issue of ‘Ship Research in Australia’? (96) While stability research was not specifically discussed, it was certainly embraced in the overall proposals. In August 1974 a National Fisheries Seminar on Fishing Boat Economics was held at the University of Adelaide (97). ‘Though the basic elements of design and the necessity for stability and seaworthiness of fishing vessels were stressed, no proposals were made as to the level of stability necessary for safe fishing activities, despite the prepondenance of fishermen at the Seminar. : At the Australian Symposiun on Small Ships in November 1975, professor Paulling reviewed the stability characteristics of small vessels (98). This was a particularly useful sumary of the subject of stability in waves. Attention was drawn to the enormous quantity of water which can enter a small opening in a short space of time - 10.5 tonnes of water entering through a two foot wide door with sill submerged two feet in some 40 seconds. This point would have been appreciated by the crew of 'Straitsman' the previous year!40. 1 Boden in his paper to the Fishexpo '76 Seminar (99) in discussing improved standards of safety for vessels and crews gave a useful overview of the problems of stability of Australian fishing vessels. le stressed, as had been done during the discussion of Paulling's paper the previous year, the dangers of reliance solely on metacentric height as a criterion of safe stability. Riley and Helnore in their paper (100) to be published later in the year, discuss the question of fishing vessel stability as currently practised, using by way of example some Australian vessels. Questions of free trim versus fixed trim, influence of waves, effects of snagged trawl and statutory requirements have been examined. Concurrent with the more recent researches are the development of statutory requirements forming part of the Uniform Requirements. This topic has been dealt with elsewhere in this paper. The short comings of the current IMCO criteria are well recognised and the appropriate Sub-Committee of IMC is studying the problem with urgency. Simplified stability. The aim of Science is to seek the simplest explanation of complex facts. We are apt to fall into the error of thinking that the facts are simple because simplicity is the goal of our quest. ‘The guiding motto is the life of every natural philosopher should be: ‘seek simplicity and distruct it" Alfred North Whitehead Concept of Nature Frequent advocacy has been directed towards simplifying the presentation of stability for the use of the master and officers of a ship and shore personnel responsible for loading ships. An early proposal in this area by Denny (30) has already been discussed. The ‘Technical Qualities Book' provided by the Denny brothers opened with the words - ‘Our purpose in offering these notes and diagrams to the owners of the steamers built by us, is to help them to understand and work their steamers to advantage, and to induce them to send us useful criticisms. Such criticisms will enable us to improve the various types of steamers we build, or may be called upon to build ......' ‘The discussion produced criticisms of the presentation of the data and particularly the confusion which could result in the minds of masters and officers when presented with the diagrams proposed by the benny brothers. ‘This type of argument has not been resolved in the intervening century and it frequently comes to the fore in casualty inquiries where overloading and instability are involved. As we have seen from the days of Bouguer onwards, attempts have been made to determine the stability of a vessel before departure, by inclining and/or by a rolling test. ‘The early Transactions of the Institution contain frequent papers on rolling. In 1867 the Council of the Institution presented a report on the safety of ships which included a number of recommendations including that of the use of rolling periods and inclining experiments to determine the Gi of a vessel before its departure on a voyage.al. ‘The US Study which followed the loss of the 'National Pride referred to previously (65, 152) produced simplified stability by which the safety of a design might be checked provided its characteristics fell within the limits laid down. Associated with this was a stability letter or information sheet which was to be mounted behind glass in the wheelhouse. This letter listed various safe loading patterns as well as unsafe combinations of loading which if followed could lead to disaster. ‘The responsibility for safe operation of the vessel, as was usual rested with the master of the vessel. Following the loss of the M.V. 'Lairdsfield' on 6 February 1970, (160) the court found that the stability at the time of the loss was totally inadequate due to bad loading and stowage of cargo. ‘The Court recommended that the presentation of data on small ships should be simplified. ‘The U.K. Department of Trade, Marine Division have not found this xecommendation easy to adopt. In Novenber 1971, the Marine Division issued Merchant Shipping Notice No. 627 (155) accepting the Court's recommendation that stability data be prepared in tabular form rather than curves, with a table listing the minimum Gi at any draught from light to loaded necessary to comply with the IMCO criteria. Additionally the Department suggested that a table giving the maximum permissible deadweight moment above the keel at regular intervals of draught ‘should be given. The Marine Division published a booklet (156) which indicated ‘econmended methods of presenting Stability Information to comply with The Merchant Shipping (lead Line) Rules 1968, This booklet included a suggested method of complying with Marine Notice No. 627. Following experience with the use of simplified information, the Department issued a further Notice in November 1978 (157) elaborating on accepted means of providing the information and stressing the need to keep openings closed while at sea. ‘he responsibility of owners is also stressed. ‘the Author views simplified stability data with mixed feelings, With the increasing sophistication of vessels, the need for increasing the knowledge of the master and his officers as to the potential of their vessel is strong. ‘Accordingly the Author supports the view of the Group which developed uniform certificate requirements for Australian mariners, that the need to increase the knowledge of officers, rather than to downgrade the quality of the information supplied on board was to be preferred. vans in the discussion of Nadeinski and Jens' paper (32) and ‘Thomson and Tope's paper (70) and subsequently in his own paper ‘Designing Ships of the Future' (105) canvasses the use of an envelope type of stability diagran for the uso of the master and officers which would provide a quick reference to the limitations of a ship. So far as is known his proposal has not been used in practice for merchant ships. Pribert, Chief ship Surveyor for the Danish Government has proposed a method of stability control by limitation of the lightship KG of a vessel. ‘The various developments of this idea have been submitted to INCO by the Danish Governuent for discussion, but so far, no finality has been reached. (140, 141, 142, 143).42. . This proposal is based on achievenent of stability at least equal to the Moo criteria, While it does appear to have sone merit, it would seem that strict loading instructions would be necessary to be used in service by the master and officers. In this respect, there may be little difference between the application of this method, the U.S. Coast Guard stability letters and the U.K. approach, The U.S. additionally have explored the prospect of using simplified criteria for deck and derrick barges, but these are again in similar vein to those discussed by the U.K, Department of Trade (157). ‘The Netherlands have submitted a proposal to IHCO (144, 145) in respect of a simplified approach to the stability of pontoons. The approach is developed on sound theoretical bases, the curve of righting arms being assumed in the form of a cubic equation. On the limited samples available to the Author for checking, the proposal seems to be practical. A method of determining the initial stability of a vessel which has been canvassed for well over a century is the use of the rolling period. Following a number of losses, as referred to above, the Council of the Institution made recommendations for the use of the rolling period for determining the stability of a ship before it goes to sea. As indicated earlier in this paper, it was not the view of all naval architects even at that time, that initial stability was a sufficient as well as a necessary criterion for safety. Denholm Young in discussing Frodsham Holt's paper on stability (44) described how he had studied the stability of a tug in 1906 by means of the rolling period. Norrby (62) studied the question of small ship stability with a view to giving the master 'the opportunity of judging the stability directly on the basis Of behaviour of the ship during loading, unloading or at sea, without needing to carry out any laborious calculations based on theoretical cases of loading'. Norrby recognised the role of the designer and stated that ‘the conflict between good seaworthy characteristics and good stability depends to a great extent on the design of the ship and cannot be completely left by the ship designer to be solved by the master in each case. This is an echo of the discussion which took place during the presentation of Pierottet's paper (47) described earlier. Norrby recognised the problens of using @{ only in judging stability, using by way of illustration, a stability curve somewhat reminiscent of that of "Blythe Star" at the time of her loss. Norrby presented a rolling period method based on Rahola's criteria for use in port and at sea for determining stability. (Ico criteria could now be substituted). Nadeinsky and Jens (32) discuss the question of the use of the rolling period for determining stability. As has been observed, both the INcO stability Standards (120, 121) give guidance as to the use of the rolling period method. For optimum usage, accurate constants appropriate to ship type and loadin patterns must be used. ‘hese can best be determined from comparative rolling tests and stability calculations.43. de Beer (107) has studied the rolling motion of a fishing vessel under various conditions of loading. He concludes his report on these tests - ‘finally it can be stated that the metacentric height of a fishing vessel at sea under different conditions (loading and weather) can be determined by measuring rolling periods, with an accuracy of + or ~ 12 per cent considering the following important points". de Beer give 5 important points and states that the 12 per cent accuracy applies to measurements done with wind force up to 5 Beaufort. de Beer proposes to continue his researches with other vessels. ‘The major problem with the use of the rolling period would be in the necessity of having a vessel in the condition whose corresponding stability must be determined. If the result is unsatisfactory a re~stowing operation must be carried out. Questions of Responsibility ‘the question of division of responsibility for stability of a vessel between the master and the designer of that vessel has been co canvassed briefly above. Reference has been made both in papers presented (e.g. 30, 47, 62) and in the discussions thereon. The Navigation Act 1912 has this to say - 's,207(1) ...2+ a ship shall not be deemed seaworthy under this Act unless - (a) she is in a fit state as to ..., stowage of ballast or cargo, +... and (b) she is not overloaded. *s,208(1) Every person who sends any ship to sea in an unseaworthy state, so that the life of any person is likely to be thereby endangered, shall, unless he proves he used all reasonable means to insure the seaworthiness of the ship, be guilty of an indictable offence. (2) Every master who sends any ship to sea in an unseaworthy state, so that the life of any person is likely to be thereby endangered shall be guilty of an indictable offence'. ‘The SOLAS 60 and SOLAS 74 Conventions (115, 117) seek the provision of "(accurate and) reliable information .... to enable (the master) by rapid and simple process to obtain accurate guidance as to the stability of the ship under varying conditions of service « The Draft code of Safety for special Purpose Ships (146) in sub-paragraph 2.2.1(b) (i) states that ~ ‘compliance with the stability criteria does not ensure immunity against capsizing regardless of the circumstances or absolve the master from his responsibilities. Masters shall therefore exercise prudence and good seamanship ....' ‘The preparation of the accurate and reliable information must start with the inclining experiment, The views of William Denny (30) relating to the carrying out of an inclining experiment lave been quoted above. ‘The comments of the Court in respect of the loss of the R.N.L.I. 'The Duchess of Kent! (159) are relevant.44, . It was then found that the original (hydrostatic and stability) calculations were in error .... The principal error in calculation related to the displacement and the position of the metacentre. ... The Court takes the opportunity to stress the importance of accuracy in such calculations and the necessity for extreme care in the conduct and analysis of the results of inclining experiments. This applies, of course, to all vessels. An inclining experiment is made to find the vertical position of the vessel's centre of gravity. Great care and elaborate precautions are needed to ensure the necessary accuracy since the angles of heel must of necassity be small. Again on the local scene the opportunity was taken to stress the importance placed on the accuracy of the stability data to be supplied to a ship (158). ‘The proposition was advanced to the consultant who had prepared the data for the capsized vessel, that the consultants owed a professional duty to the owners, to persons who were to sail in the ship, to be careful in calculations to be frank with the Department and to warn any person likely to use that ship of any characteristics which might render it dangerous, to assume the worst conditions at sea. ‘he witness agreed that ‘we have a responsibility .... to supply sufficient and accurate information to enable the stability of the vessel to be calculated at any time". During the discussion on Pierottet's paper there was an exchange between Foster King who had been a member of the British Load Lines Committee and Pierottet on the division of responsibility for stability. Referring to the 1930 Load Lines Conference, Foster King said: "the discussion bore good fruit, however, in the fact thats since then, practically every ship has been inclined and furnished with stability data, although the responsibility for proper loading shall remain upon the master's shoulders. ‘xt is scarcely possible for regulations to go beyond that point, because it must be freely admitted that any hollow vessel can be made stable or unstable by varying the weight disposition'. Pierottet's view was, (xeferring to the 1930 Load Lines rules) - I would prefer this to be amended to read as follows: 1. ‘The rules assume that the ship has such proportions as to secure sufficient stability when the vessel is laden with homogeneous cargo 2. The rules assume that the master is able to load a vessel in such a manner as not to compromise the safety of the ship. 3. The responsibility for fulfilling the first condition must rest upon the designer, that of the second upon the master, ‘The division of responsibility between the designer and the master is already recognised when the Registration Societies deal with the strength of ships‘. (It will be recalled that Picrottet had proposed that his stability standards should be administered by the Classification Societies).if 45. A recent case resulting from a casualty abroad raises some significant issues which will bear serious thought by all who prepare, use, or approve stability and loading data. A dredger ‘Cape de 1a Hague’ capsized off Calais in 1973 with the loss of twelve lives. Representatives of the dependents of those lost instituted legal action, suggesting 'in effect that a regulating authority responsible for the assignment of freeboard and approval of stability curves etc, should not escape legal responsibility for the consequences; and that it is no excuse|that the original calculations have been carried out by a classification society'. ‘The Cap de 1a Hague is believed to have capsized because the assigned freeboard and underlying stability calculations were based on Wnrealistic cargo specific gravity assumptions' (171). A later advice stated that the managing director of the dredging company and a senior official of the classification society had been found guilty of|unintentional homicide and suspended prison sentences and fines had been inposed. The verdict is subject to appeal still pending so far as is known (172). the question of the responsibility of owners has been considered from time|to time also. The Report of the Court of Inquiry into the loss of the Lairdsfield (160) discussed the responsibility of owners at some length. In the case of the appeal of the owners of the ‘Lady Gwendolen’ in the case of the collision between ‘The Freshfield' and the ‘Lady Gwendolen‘ (161) Lord Justice Sellers had this to say ~ "zt is no use for the plaintiffs that their main business was that of brewers and that the ownership of three ships was incidental to their business and solely for distributing their product to Liverpool and to Manchester." In their capacity as shipowners they mist be judged by the standard of conduct of the ordinary reasonable shipowner in the management and control of a vessel or fleet of vessels. A primary concern of a shipowner must be sagety|of lige at sea, That involves a seaworthy ship, properly manned, but it also requires safe navigation .....' Lord Justice Willmer said ~ . It seems to me that any company which embarks on the business of ship owning mist accept the obligation to ensure eff cient management of its ships if it is to enjoy the very considerable benefits conferred by the statutory right to In the case of the loss of the 'Brentwood' (173) which capsized, the ownerg were found to be at fault for not furnishing the master with sufficient information about minimum freeboard and trim for the vessel (and other data) to enable the master to exercise sound judgement in loading in the ligh' of his skill and experience. 'A stability report prepared by a naval architect had been placed aboard in|a drawer, without the master being aware of its existence but this was not considered by the tourt to be sufficient loading instructions for the maste46. a 5 ‘The question of professional negligence is becoming contentious in professional life in Australia. attention is drawn to two recent views on this important subject (109, 110). In so far as the design and manufacture of small craft is concerned, without doubt the trade practices legislation is applicable as in other fields. ‘None the less, the views of a U.S. lawyer on the subject of the legal responsibilities and liabilities of the small boat designer and manufacturer have been found profitable. Casualties of Relevance and Interest Failure is instructive. The person who really thinks learns quite as much from his failures as from his successes. John Dewey A number of books and articles are written every year dealing with ships which suffer casualties or disappear. Many of these are by laymen and the technical content is suspect. Such a change cannot be levelled at two books xecently published, one by the well known K.C, Barnaby (15) and the other by the equally well known Alan Villiers (16). Barnaby analyses a number of casualties of differing types, discusses what happened and endeavours to draw conclusions from the events. Villiers considers only vessels lost without trace, including many which achieved notoriety including 'Waratah', ‘Joyita’, 'Samkey' There is available a fund of information on casualties and incidents from which lessons may be learned in respect of the need for stability margins and the order of magnitude of those margins which are necessary for safe ship operations, A number of these casualties and incidents would be examined briefly. ‘The ‘agamemnon' built in 1852 was the first battleship designed as a screw steamer. In 1859 she assisted in laying the Atlantic cable. In discussing Baker and Keary's paper (41) Sir William Smith (of Smith correction fame) quoted from a life of his father written by Charles Bright - ‘three or four gigantic waves were seen approaching the ship, coming slowly on, (i.e. at the group velocity, half the wave velocity), through the mist nearer and nearer, rolling on like hills of green water, with a cloud of foam which seemed to double their height. ‘The Agamemnon rose heavily to the first and then went down quickly into the deep trough of the sea, falling over in the act, so as nearly to capsize on the portside'. The direction of the wave relative to the ship is not stated. ‘The trawlers ‘Blue Crusader’ and ‘Boston Pionair' were lost early in 1965 (162, 163), the findings of the Court being that "Blue Cruisader' was (probably) suddenly overwhelmed by the sea' and that ‘Boston Pionair' was ‘overwhelmed by a wave or succession of waves.a7. Willara J. Pierson, Professor of Oceanography in the School of Engineering and Science of New York University has studied the behaviour of the sea in the area in which the vessels were lost (174). He feels that both casualty Reports suggest the vessels were ‘caught unaware in «xtreme se: whis fate is by. no means the prerogative of small vessels. on December 12, 1973, ‘the barge carrier ‘Munchen! 261 m LOA and 45519 tonnes deadweight sent out on SOS while on a voyage from Rotterdam to Savannah and New Orleans. she had 28 people on board, and a cargo of 83 barges carrying steel and steel products. She was deeply loaded and reported a 5@ degree list. Despite a wide search by sea and air terminating on 22 December 1978, the only findings were 3 of the cargo barges, 4 empty rubber rafts, lifebuoys, a radio buoy, 2 lifejackets and 2 lifeblets. There was no sign of the lifeboats. A little known wartime casualty occurred about noon of 17 December 1944, about 500 miles east of Luzon, Vessels of tne U.S. Pacific Fleet were caught dn the centre of a typhoon of extreme violence. Three destroyers U.S.S- “yonaghan' ‘Hull' and "Spence' capsized and sank. Serious damage was sustained by other vessels and some 146 aircraft were damaged beyond repair by fires, being washed up or by being washed overboard. Several surviving destroyers reported rolling 70° or more while about 790 officers and men were lost or Killed. ‘Monaghan’ lost 156 men out of 162, 'Hull' 201 from 263 and Spence! almost all of 341 crew. whe Commander of U.S.S. 'Hull' described the sinking in these words (19) ~ a ‘whe ship remained over on her side at an angle of 80 degrees or more as the water flooded into her upper structures. I remained on the port wing of the bridge until the water flooded up to me, then I slipped into the water as the ship rolled over on her way down'. on 22 August 1962, the motor vessel 'Druid' fell on her beammends in the Ribble estuary with the loss of three crew. The Court found (164) that ‘the ship was overwhelmed by a coincidence of adverse factors arising from a highly confused sea which over came her stability. ‘he Court considered that while the stability standards in use at the tine of her construction were adequate {the study of the behaviour of small ships operating in waves their own length should be advanced, - particularly in respect of their being passed with a wove crest amidships in shallow water. The court also recommended that the question of doublt bottom tanks should be investigated for this type of vessel as a means of lowering the centre of gravity. This view is of interest, because the Norwegian Government following the report of a commission of inquiry into the loss of two coasters of tparagraph' single decked type nad expressed the view that there were problems in the stowage of these vessels occasioned by the high double Jottoms fitted to enjoy a tonnage advantage. The ‘Blythe Star’ also probably came inte this category having been built in France originally for Norwegian owners.48. A number of local fishing vessels have been lost in following sea conditions, often when negotiating river mouth bars, ‘The performance of vessels on river mouth bars triggered the work of Boden and Halliday (102) and was also the subject of a paper at Southport in 1966 (101) On 24 dune 1968, the fishing vessel 'Tijuana' capsized in Moreton Bay between 2200 and 2300, the three persons on board losing their lives. The upturned imll was sighted by a passing steamer about 0810 on 25 June. ‘The Board accepted the Shipping Inspectors report (165) on the loss. As is often the case there was almost nothing stowed below except food, all the gear being either on deck or on the wheelhouse where were also the fresh water tanks. After recovering the vessel was inclined and reconstruction showed that while the stability in still water was acceptable, it was inadequate in the wind and following sea conditions prevailing on the night of 24 June, particularly if any broaching occurred. A unique loss ogcurred at Lakes Entrance on 18 March 1978. The fishing vessel ‘Shark' crossing the bar at the entrance to the Lakes in rough south easterly conditions, ran down the face of a large wave, broached uncontrollably and was overturned and sunk by that wave and the following wave. (166). The three crew members lost their lives. what was unique was that ‘the accident was observed from a lookout over looking the entrance by several persons themselves fishing vessel skippers or crews. ‘The vessel ran down the wave at a slight angle to the wave rather than square, ‘The bow went into the trough, the ship broached violently to port at the same time heeling to starboard, That wave and/or the next wave hit her approximately amidships and overturned her. A casualty which has become something of a ‘cause celebre' in the naval architectural world is the loss of the ‘Edith Terkol' The ‘Edith Terkol' was a small Danish tanker capsized in the Ballic near Gotland. She was on a ballast voyage and steamed south in a stern quartering sea. In between she rolled rather heavily and suddenly she capsized. ‘The weather had a strength of Beaufort 6-7. Only two persons survived (82). ‘The vessel had a length of 58.6 metres and a displacement loaded of about 1600 tonnes. ‘The vessel was recovered and inclined and model tests carried out. It was determined that at the time of capsize the vessel had more stability than the INCO criteria required. ‘he model tests showed that in the ballasted condition even with the righting arms increased above the IMCO criteria by 30 per cent the model would still capsize in irregular waves which corresponded to those of the day of capsize on the loaded conditions it was found that reducing stability to 75 per cent the IMCO criteria was not sufficient to cause a capsize. Similar tests are being carried out in Norway with a model of the M/S ‘Welland Hansen* to study the mechanics of the capsize and draw from the tests xecomendations for the avoidance of similar accidents for the future. "Helland Hansen’ was in ballast when capsized in 80-90 m depth of water by a breaking wave which hit the vessel broadside.49. It is events such as these which are spurring INCO in its studies of stability in ballast condition. While the necessity to keep openings closed at sea is well recognised, the number of casualties which arise from this cause in port is worthy of note. An early casualty was the capsize of the Orient liner ‘Austral’ in Syaney Harbour on 11 Wovenber 1902, ‘Fort \iillian' in the Great Lakes, "Sea Speed Dora' in Jedda both capsized while working cargo through entry of water, while 'Straitsnan' capsized while under way in the River Yarra, again through shipside openings being opened. A famous case which had wide political as well as technical and personal repercussions was the loss of H.M.S. Captain (17, 18). This loss which was foretold by Reed in his 1868 paper (28) very clearly demonstrated the influence of freeboard on stability. Capsizes due to the influence of rudder movement are difficult to dissociate from inadequate stability. A famous case is the loss in Germany on 7 gune 1937 of the whaler Rau III during turning trials. Rahola (1) has xeviewed this case in some detail. More recently the fishing vessel ‘Northern Pearl' was capsized and Jost in the Gulf of Carpentaria under the influence of the automatic pilot on 7 april 1979 (175). The press: report stated that a malfunction in the automatic pilot screwed the boat hard to port. Water poured into the galley and wheelhouse (engineroom?) and it took only 10 seconds to lay xight over. The vessel kept turning before the engines stopped. It is believed the vessel completed about 24 turns. ‘The wind plus overloading and bad stowage is believed xesponsible for the loss of a small Papua Hew Guinea coaster ‘Julie Ross‘ in Port Moresby larbour on 25 September 1977. The Commission of Inquiry found that the vessel was overloaded and incorrectly loaded and that when inclined by an external force (the wind) she heeled to starboard, did not have sufficient right moment to return to the upright, continued to heel over and finally capsized. ‘two cases of loss due to passenger movement are worthy of study. One which will be well known to many of you, is the loss of the M.V. 'Rodney* in ‘Sydney Harbour on 13 February 1938. The Court found (168) that the capsize was due to an excessibe numbex of passengers being on the upper deck of the vessel immediately before the vessel capsized, the majority of these passengers having moved to the starboard side of the vessel causing her to list dangerously. ‘At the same time the master gave the vessel port helm thus increasing the list. Tt is surprising to find an expert witness at the inquiry expressing the view that the ‘Rodney was sound in design but that with 60 passengers on both the upper and lower decks, all moving to one side, the vessel would capsize'. (176).50. . Finally, a charter vessel ‘Dixie Lee II' capsized during a sudden severe thunderstorm in the Chesapeeke Bay near Norfolk Virgina with 27 persons on board. ‘Twelve persons died and one is mining believed dead. (169) Even though the 'Dixie Lee IZ" met the Coast Guard's stability requirements for wind and passenger heel, tie boat was unable to survive the high winds generated by the storm, This case demonstrates that wind and Passenger heel cannot be regarded separately. Despite the fact that INCO requirements (120) make no allowance for such a combination of heeling effects, the Uniform Requirements - Stability Section do make allowance for the effects of combined heeling moments. Conclusion Do I contradict myself? Very well then I contradict myself ( am large, I contain multitudes) walt Whitman Song of Myself I have endeavoured to give you a brief survey of the development of criteria for the stability of ships. The world of ship design owes a great deal to the work of Jaakko Rahola. Much work had been done prior to Rahola but I feel that if he achieved nothing else, he drew together the threads of earlier work, examined various ways of selling up criteria and concluded that the study of sufficiency of stability based on casualty analysis held out most promise of success. ‘That Rahola was right in this, is I feel borne out by the fact that a large proportion of the work which has been done sine 1939 has been based on the same approach. At some tine in the near future, an alternative approach using theories of irregular seas and ship response to various capsizing influences, a new approach will develop. ‘That time is not yet. Acknowledgements I am particularly indebted to Mr John Holmstrom, Naval Architect of the Helsinki University of Technology for information concerning Professor Rahola. ‘Thanks are due to colleagues and associates who have helped with advice, data, drawings and information used in the preparation of this paper. While this paper is given with permission of the Department of Transport, the statements of fact and opinions expressed remain the responsibility of the Author and do not necessarily conform with those of the Department.A. 10. ul. 12. 13. 1a. 1s. 1s. a7. 1s. 19. 51. (BIBLIOGRAPHY) REFERENCES BOOKS Rahola, J. The Judging of the Stability of Ships and The Determination of the Minimum Amount of Stability Especially Considering the Vessels Navigating Finnish Waters. Helsinki, 1939. Reed, Sir Edward J. The Stability of Ships, Charles Griffen and Company, London, 1885. Bouguer Pierre, Traite du Navire, de la Construction, et de Ses Mouvemens, Paris, 1746. Hoste Paul. Theorie de 1a Construction des vaisseaux, Lyon, 1697. Juan y Santacilla, Don Jorge, Examen Maritimo Theorico Practico, Madrid, 1771. Euler Leonhard, Scientia Navalis seer Tractabus de Construendes ac Dirigendes Navilius, Petripoli, 1749. Chapman Frederic, Tractal om Skepps-Byggeriet, Stockholm, 1775. Euler Leonhard, Theorie Complete de la Construction et de 1a Manoeuvre des Vaisseaux, Paris, 1776. Murray, Mungo, A Treatise on Shipbuilding and Navigation, 2nd Edition, Tondon, 1765. Bernoulli Daniel, Hydrostatical and Mechanical Principles, or Memoir on the Means of Diminishing Rolling and Pitching, Paris, 1757. ‘Traung Jan-Olof (Editor), Fishing Boats of the World, Fishing News ~ Arthur J. Heighway Publications Ltd, London, 1955. raung Jan-Olof (Editor), Fishing Boats of the World: 2, Fishing News (Books) Ltd, London, 1960. Traung Jan-Olof (Editor), Fishing Boats of the World: 3, Fishing News (Books) td, London, 1967. van Dorn William G., Oceanography and Seamanship, Dodd, Mead and Company, New York, 1974. Barnaby, K.C., Some Ship Disasters and Their Causes, Hutchinson of London, 1968. Villiers Alan, Posted Missing, The Story of Ships Lost Without Trace in Recent Years, Hadder and Stoughton, London, 1975. Hawkey Arthur, H.M.S. ‘Captain’, G. Bell and Sons, London, 1963. Parkes Oscar, British Battleships, ‘Warrior’ 1860 to ‘vanguard’ 1950, ‘A History of Design, Construction and Armament, Seeley Service and Co. Ltd, London, 1956. US Government Printing Office, Dictionary of American Fighting Ships, Volume III, G-H, Washington, 1968.B. 21. 22 23. 24, 25. 26, 27, 28, 29. 30, a1. 32. 3a, 34 35, 52. PAPERS Stoot, W.F., Some Aspects of Naval Architecture in the Eighteenth Century, Transactions of the Royal Institution of Naval Architects, London, Volume 101, 1959, Page 31. Stoot, W.F. Ideas and Personalities in the Development of Naval Architecture, Transactions of the Royal Institution of Naval Architects, London, Volume 101, 1959, Page 215. Robb A.M., Presidential Address, Transactions of the Institution of Engineers and Shipbuilders in Scotland, Glasgow, Volume 98, 1954-55, Page 1. Atwood, George, A Disquisition on the Stability of Ships, Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London, 1798. Moseley, Canon, C., On Dynamical Stability and The Oscillation of Floating Bodies, Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London, 1850. Barnes, F.K., An Account of Experiments Performed on Board of Some of Her Majesty's Ships for the Purpose of Ascertaining the Heights of their Centres of Gravity, Transactions of the Royal Institution of Naval Architects, London, Volume 1, 1860, Page 39. Barnes, F.K., A New Method of Calculating the Statical and Dynamical Stabilities of a Ship, Transactions of the Royal Institution of Naval Architects, London, Volume 2, 1861, Page 163. Reed, E.J., On the Stability of Monitors under Canvas, Transactions of the Royal Institution of Naval Architects, London, Volume 9, 1868, Page 198. Barnaby Nathaniel, On the Relative Influence of Breadth of Beam and Height of Freeboard in Lengthening Out the Curves of Stability, Transactions of the Royal Institution of Naval architects, London, Volume 12, 1871, Page 62. Denny, A., The Practical Application of Stability Calculations, Transactions of the Royal Institution of Naval Architects, London, Volume 28, 1887, Page 375. Thornyeroft, J.I., and Barnaby, S.W., Torpedo-Boat Destroyers, Proceedings of the Institution of Civil Engineers, 1895, Paper No.2879, Page 51. 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Schwarz, T., Die Lukenverschlusse unde die Sicherheit der Schiffe, J.d-S.B.7.G. 1928, Page 250. Wall, A.T., Safe Stability and The Economical Use of Water Ballast in Ships, Transactions of the Royal Institution of Naval Architects, London, Volume 56, 1914, Page 208. Russo Colonol G., R.I-N. An Experimental Tank Reproducing Wave Motions, ‘Transactions of the Royal Institution of Naval Architects, London, 1916, Volume 58, Page 95. Baker, G.S. and Keary Miss E.M., The Effect of the Longitudinal Motion of a Ship on its Statical Transverse Stability, Transactions of the Royal Institution of Naval architects, tondon, 1918, Volume 60, Page 74. Biles Sir John H., Stability of Large Ships, Transactions of the Royal Institution of Naval Architects, London, 1922, Volume 64, Page 325. Anderson John, The Influence of Form Upon the Stability and Propulsion of Passenger Ships, Transactions of the Royal Institution of Naval Architects, London, Volume 65, 1923, Page 191. Holt, C. Frodsham, Stability and Seaworthiness, Transactions of the Royal Institution of Naval Architects, London, Volume 67, 1925, Page 307. Gleijeses Professor M., Breadth, Draught and Initial stability of Ships, ‘Transactions of the Royal Institution of Naval Architects, London, Volume 71, 1929, Page 300. Burrill, L.C., Seaworthiness of Collier Types, Transactions of the Royal Institution of Naval Architects, London, Volume 73, 1931, Page 75. Pierottet Professor Ernesto, A Standard Stability for Ships, Transactions of the Royal Institution of Naval Architects, London, Volume 7, 1935, Page 208. Taylor A.R., A Note on Tug Design, Transactions of the Royal Institution of Naval Architects, London, Volume 84, 1942, Page 115. Burgess, N.H., Stability Coefficients, Transactions of the Royal Institution of Naval Architects, London, Volume 85, 1943, Page 83. Prohaska, C.W. Residuary Stability, Transactions of the Royal Institution of Naval Architects, London, Volume 89, 1947, Page 342. Prohaska, C.W., Influence of Ship Form on Transverse Stability, ‘Transactions of the Royal Institution of Naval Architects, London, Volume 93, 1951, Page 258. Prohaska, C.W., Results of Some Systematic Stability Calculations, ‘Transactions of the Institution of Engineers and Shipbuilders in Scotland, Volume 104, 1960-61, Page 211.53+ 54. 55. 56. 52. 58. 59. 60 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 63. 69 54. Skinner, H.E., The Safety of Small Ships, Transactions of the Royal Institution of Naval Architects, London, Volume 93, 1951, Page 174. Ambjorn Gustav, Fartygs Proportioner Och Deras Inverkan Pa Stabiliteten (ships' Proportions and Their Effects on Stability), Transactions of Chalmers University of Technology, Gothenburg, Sweden, No.21, 1943. Manley, C.W., A Fifty Years' Survey of Casualties to Merchant Ships Reported Abandoned Foundered or Missing, Transactions of the Royal Institution of Naval Architects, London, Volume 92, 1950, Page 59 Manley, C.V., A Further Examination of Casualties to Merchant Ships Reported Abandoned Foundered or Missing, Transactions of the Royal Institution of Naval Architects, London, Volume 93, 1951, Page 95. Manley, C.V., Losses of Small Ships, Transactions of the Royal Institution of Naval Architects, London, Volume 100, 1958, Page 233. Steel, H.E., The Practical Approach to Stability of Ships, Transactions of the Royal Institution of Naval Architects, London, Volume 98, 1956 Page 381. Yamagata, M., Standard of Stability adopted in Japan, Transactions of the Royal Institution of Naval Architects, Volume 101, 1959, Page 417. Paulling, J-R., Transverse Stability of Tuna Clippers, Fishing Boats ‘of the World: 2, Fishing News (Books) Ltd, London, 1960, Page 489. Paulling, J.R., The Transferse Stability of a Ship in a Longitudinal Seaway, Journal of Ship Research, New York, Volume 4, Number 4, March 1961, Page 37. Norrby Ralph, The Stability of Coastal Vessels, Transactions of the Royal Institution of Naval Architects, London, Volume 104, 1962, Page 517. Sarchin, T.H. and Goldberg, L.L., Stability and Buoyancy Criteria for US Naval Surface Ships, Transactions of the Society of Naval Architects and Marine Engineers, New York, Volume 70, 1962, Page 418. Du Cane Peter and Goodrich, G.J., The Following Sea Broaching and Surging, Transactions of the Royal Institution of Naval Architects, London, Volume 104, 1962, Page 109. Bleakley Wilfred R., Stability of Offshore Supply Vessels, Proceedings of the Merchant Marine Council, US Coast Guard, Volume 21, No.9, September 1964, Page 151. Getz, J-R. and Bakke, E., Stability of Tugs, The Effect of Athwartship ‘owrope Pull, The Ship Research Institute of Norway, Meddelelse No.25, February 1959. . De Wit, J.G., Report on the Problems of the Stability Required by Fishing Vessels, FAO, Fisheries Division, Fishing Boat Section, February 1961. Murray-Smith, D.R., The 1966 International Conference on Load Lines, ‘Transactions of the Royal Institution of Naval Architects, London, Volume III, 1969, Page 1. Bovet, D.M., Johnson, R.E. and Jones, E-L., Recent Coast Guard Research into Vessel Stability, Marine Technology, October 1974, Page 329.