Canon 4.
Participate in the Improvement of the Legal System: Support
Law Reforms and Administration of Justice
A LAWYER SHALL PARTICIPATE IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE
LEGAL SYSTEM BY INITIATING OR SUPPORTING EFFORTS IN LAW
REFORM AND IN THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE.
Canon 5. Participate in Legal Education Program
A LAWYER SHALL KEEP ABREAST OF LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS,
PARTICIPATE IN CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION PROGRAMS,
SUPPORT EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE HIGH STANDARDS IN LAW
SCHOOLS AS WELL AS IN THE PRACTICAL TRAINING OF LAW
STUDENTS AND ASSIST IN DISSEMINATING THE LAW AND
JURISPRUDENCE.
B.M. No. 850
RULE 1 PURPOSE
Section 1. Purpose of the MCLE
Continuing legal education is required of members of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) to ensure that throughout their career, they keep
abreast with law and jurisprudence, maintain the ethics of the profession
and enhance the standards of the practice of law.
RULE 2 MANDATORY CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION
Section 1. Constitution of the MCLE Committee
Within two (2) months from the approval of these Rules by the Supreme
Court En Banc, the MCLE Committee shall be constituted in accordance
with these Rules.
Section 2. Requirements of completion of MCLE
Members of the IBP not exempt under Rule 7 shall complete, every three
(3) years, at least thirty-six (36) hours of continuing legal education activities
approved by the MCLE Committee. Of the 36 hours:
(a) At least six (6) hours shall be devoted to legal ethics.
(b) At least (4) hours shall be devoted to trial and pretrial skills.
(c) At least five (5) hours shall be devoted to alternative dispute resolution.
(d) At least nine (9) hours shall be devoted to updates on substantive and
procedural laws, and jurisprudence.
(e) At least four (4) hours shall be devoted to legal writing and oral advocacy.
(f) At least two (2) hours shall be devoted to international law and
international conventions.
(g) The remaining six (6) hours shall be devoted to such subjects as may be
prescribed by the MCLE Committee.
RULE 3 COMPLIANCE PERIOD
Section 1. Initial compliance period
The initial compliance period shall begin not later than three (3) months from
the constitution of the MCLE Committee. Except for the initial compliance
period for members admitted or readmitted after the establishment of the
program, all compliance periods shall be for thirty-six (36) months and shall
begin the day after the end of the previous compliance period.
xxx
Section 4. Compliance Group 3. Members in Visayas and Mindanao shall
be permanently assigned to Compliance Group 3.
Section 5. Compliance period for members admitted or readmitted after
establishment of the program.
Members admitted or readmitted to the Bar after the establishment of the
program shall be permanently assigned to the appropriate Compliance
Group based on their Chapter membership on the date of admission or
readmission.
The initial compliance period after admission or readmission shall begin on
the first day of the month of admission or readmission and shall end on the
same day as that of all other members in the same Compliance Group.
(a) Where four (4) months or less remain of the initial compliance period
after admission or readmission, the member is not required to comply with
the program requirement for the initial compliance.
(b) Where more than four (4) months remain of the initial compliance period
after admission or readmission, the member shall be required to complete
a number of hours of approved continuing legal education activities equal to
the number of months remaining in the compliance period in which the
member is admitted or readmitted. Such member shall be required to
complete a number of hours of education in legal ethics in proportion to the
number of months remaining in the compliance period. Fractions of hours
shall be rounded up to the next whole number.
RULE 5 CATEGORIES OF CREDIT
Section 1. Classes of credits The credits are either participatory or non-
participatory.
Section 2. Claim for participatory credit
Participatory credit may be claimed for:
(a) Attending approved education activities like seminars, conferences,
symposia, in-house education programs, workshops, dialogues or round
table discussions.
(b) Speaking or lecturing, or acting as assigned panelist, reactor,
commentator, resource speaker, moderator, coordinator or facilitator in
approved education activities.
(c) Teaching in a law school or lecturing in a bar review class.
Section 3. Claim for non-participatory credit
Non-participatory credit may be claimed per compliance period for:
(a) Preparing, as an author or co-author, written materials published or
accepted for publication, e.g., in the form of an article, chapter, book, or
book review which contribute to the legal education of the author member,
which were not prepared in the ordinary course of the member's practice or
employment.
(b) Editing a law book, law journal or legal newsletter.
RULE 7 EXEMPTIONS
Section 1. Parties exempted from the MCLE
The following members of the Bar are exempt from the MCLE requirement:
(a) The President and the Vice President of the Philippines, and the
Secretaries and Undersecretaries of Executives Departments;
(b) Senators and Members of the House of Representatives;
(c) The Chief Justice and Associate Justices of the Supreme Court,
incumbent and retired members of the judiciary, incumbent members of the
Judicial and Bar Council and incumbent court lawyers covered by the
Philippine Judicial Academy program of continuing judicial education;
(d) The Chief State Counsel, Chief State Prosecutor and Assistant
Secretaries of the Department of Justice;
(e) The Solicitor General and the Assistant Solicitor General;
(f) The Government Corporate Counsel, Deputy and Assistant Government
Corporate Counsel;
(g) The Chairmen and Members of the Constitutional Commissions;
(h) The Ombudsman, the Overall Deputy Ombudsman, the Deputy
Ombudsmen and the Special Prosecutor of the Office of the Ombudsman;
(i) Heads of government agencies exercising quasi-judicial functions;
(j) Incumbent deans, bar reviews and professors of law who have teaching
experience for at least 10 years accredited law schools;
(k) The Chancellor, Vice-Chancellor and members of the Corps of
Professors and Professorial Lectures of the Philippine Judicial Academy;
and
(l) Governors and Mayors.
Section 2. Other parties exempted from the MCLE
1
The following Members of the Bar are likewise exempt:
(a) Those who are not in law practice, private or public.
(b) Those who have retired from law practice with the approval of the IBP
Board of Governors.
Section 3. Good cause for exemption from or modification of requirement
A member may file a verified request setting forth good cause for exemption
(such as physical disability, illness, post graduate study abroad, proven
expertise in law, etc.) from compliance with or modification of any of the
requirements, including an extension of time for compliance, in accordance
with a procedure to be established by the MCLE Committee.
Section 4. Change of status
The compliance period shall begin on the first day of the month in which a
member ceases to be exempt under Sections 1, 2, or 3 of this Rule and shall
end on the same day as that of all other members in the same Compliance
Group.
Section 5. Proof of exemption
Applications for exemption from or modification of the MCLE requirement
shall be under oath and supported by documents.
RULE 8 STANDARDS FOR APPROVAL OF EDUCATION ACTIVITIES
Section 1. Approval of MCLE program
Subject to the rules as may be adopted by the MCLE Committee, continuing
legal education program may be granted approval in either of two (2) ways:
(1) the provider of the activity is an approved provider and certifies that the
activity meets the criteria of Section 3 of this Rules; and (2) the provider is
specially mandated by law to provide continuing legal education.
Section 2. Standards for all education activities
All continuing legal education activities must meet the following standards:
(a) The activity shall have significant current intellectual or practical content.
(b) The activity shall constitute an organized program of learning related to
legal subjects and the legal profession, including cross profession activities
(e.g., accounting-tax or medical-legal) that enhance legal skills or the ability
to practice law, as well as subjects in legal writing and oral advocacy.
(c) The activity shall be conducted by a provider with adequate professional
experience.
(d) Where the activity is more than one (1) hour in length, substantive written
materials must be distributed to all participants. Such materials must be
distributed at or before the time the activity is offered.
(e) In-house education activities must be scheduled at a time and location
so as to be free from interruption like telephone calls and other distractions.
RULE 9 APPROVAL OF PROVIDERS
Section 1. Approval of providers
Approval of providers shall be done by the MCLE Committee.
RULE 11 GENERAL COMPLIANCE PROCEDURES
Section 1. Compliance card
Each member shall secure from the MCLE Committee a Compliance Card
before the end of his compliance period. He shall complete the card by
attesting under oath that he has complied with the education requirement or
that he is exempt, specifying the nature of the exemption. Such Compliance
Card must be returned to the address indicated therein not later than the
day after the end of the member's compliance period.
Section 2. Member record keeping requirement
Each member shall maintain sufficient record of compliance or exemption,
copy furnished the MCLE Committee. The record required to be provided to
the members by the provider pursuant to Section 3(c) of Rule 9 should be
sufficient record of attendance at a participatory activity. A record of non-
participatory activity shall also be maintained by the member, as referred to
in Section 3 of Rule 5.
RULE 12 NON-COMPLIANCE PROCEDURES
Section 1. What constitutes non-compliance
2
The following shall constitute non-compliance
(a) Failure to complete the education requirement within the compliance
period;
(b) Failure to provide attestation of compliance or exemption;
(c) Failure to provide satisfactory evidence of compliance (including
evidence of exempt status) within the prescribed period;
(d) Failure to satisfy the education requirement and furnish evidence of such
compliance within sixty (60) days from receipt of a non-compliance notice;
(e) Any other act or omission analogous to any of the foregoing or intended
to circumvent or evade compliance with the MCLE requirements.
Section 2. Non-compliance notice and 60-day period to attain compliance
A member failing to comply will receive a Non-Compliance Notice stating
the specific deficiency and will be given sixty (60) days from the date of
notification to explain the deficiency or otherwise show compliance with the
requirements. Such notice shall contain, among other things, the following
language in capital letters:
YOUR FAILURE TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE JUSTIFICATION FOR NON-
COMPLIANCE OR PROOF OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE MCLE
REQUIREMENT BY (INSERT DATE 60 DAYS FROM THE DATE OF
NOTICE), SHALL BE A CAUSE FOR LISTING AS A DELINQUENT
MEMBER.
The Member may use this period to attain the adequate number of credit
hours for compliance. Credit hours earned during this period may only be
counted toward compliance with the prior compliance period requirement
unless hours in excess of the requirement are earned, in which case, the
excess hours may be counted toward meeting the current compliance
period requirement.lawphil.net
RULE 13 CONSEQUENCES OF NON-COMPLIANCE
Section 1. Non-compliance fee
A member who, for whatever reason, is in non-compliance at the end of the
compliance period shall pay a non-compliance fee.
Section 2. Listing as delinquent member
Any member who fails to satisfactorily comply with Section 2 of Rule 12 shall
be listed as a delinquent member by the IBP Board of Governors upon the
recommendation of the MCLE Committee, in which case, Rule 139-A of the
Rules of Court shall apply.
RULE 14 REINSTATEMENT
Section 1. Process
The involuntary listing as a delinquent member shall be terminated when
the member provides proof of compliance with the MCLE requirement,
including payment of non-compliance fee. A member may attain the
necessary credit hours to meet the requirement for the period of non-
compliance during the period the member is on inactive status. These credit
hours may not be counted toward meeting the current compliance period
requirement. Credit hours attained during the period of non-compliance in
excess of the number needed to satisfy the prior compliance period
requirement may be counted toward meeting the current compliance period
requirement.lawphil.net
Section 2. Termination of delinquent listing administrative process
The termination of listing as a delinquent member is administrative in nature
but it shall be made with notice and hearing by the MCLE Committee.
RULE 15 MANDATORY CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION COMMITTEE
Section 1. Composition
The MCLE Committee shall be composed of five (5) members, namely: a
retired Justice of the Supreme Court, as Chair, and four (4) members,
respectively, nominated by the IBP, the Philippine Judicial Academy, a law
center designated by the Supreme Court and associations of law schools
and/or law professors.
The members of the Committee shall be of proven probity and integrity.
They shall be appointed by the Supreme Court for a term of three (3) years
and shall receive such compensation as may be determined by the Court.
B.M. No. 1922
RE. NUMBER AND DATE OF MCLE CERTIFICATE OF
COMPLETION/EXEMPTION REQUIRED IN ALL PLEADINGS/MOTIONS.
Sirs/Mesdames:
Quoted hereunder, for your information is a resolution of the Court En Banc
dated June 3, 2008
"Bar Matter No. 1922. – Re: Recommendation of the Mandatory Continuing
Legal Education (MCLE) Board to Indicate in All Pleadings Filed with the
Courts the Counsel’s MCLE Certificate of Compliance or Certificate of
Exemption. – The Court Resolved to NOTE the Letter, dated May 2, 2008,
of Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura, Chairperson, Committee
on Legal Education and Bar Matters, informing the Court of the diminishing
interest of the members of the Bar in the MCLE requirement program.
The Court further Resolved, upon the recommendation of the Committee on
Legal Education and Bar Matters, to REQUIRE practicing members of the
bar to INDICATE in all pleadings filed before the courts or quasi-judicial
bodies, the number and date of issue of their MCLE Certificate of
Compliance or Certificate of Exemption, as may be applicable, for the
immediately preceding compliance period. Failure to disclose the required
information would cause the dismissal of the case and the expunction of the
pleadings from the records.
Letter of Atty. Lim to Justice Roberto Abad, GR No. 191837, 20 July 2013
SC Resolution dated 14 January 2014
B.M. No. 1922 (Re: Recommendation of the Mandatory Continuing Legal
Education (MCLE) Board to Indicate in All Pleadings Filed with the Courts
the Counsel's MCLE Certificate of Compliance or Certificate of Exemption).-
The Court Resolved, upon the recommendation of the MCLE Governing
Board, to
(a) AMEND the June 3, 2008 resolution by repealing the phrase "Failure to
disclose the required information would cause the dismissal of the case and
the expunction of the pleadings from the records" and replacing it with
“Failure to disclose the required information would subiect the counsel to
appropriate penal and disciplinary action"; and
(b) PRESCRIBE the following rules for non-disclosure of current MCLE
compliance/exemption number in the pleadings:
(i) The lawyer shall be imposed a fine of P2,000.00 for the first offense,
P3,000.00 for the second offense and P4,000.00 for the third offense;
(ii) In addition to the fine, counsel may be listed as a delinquent member of
the Bar pursuant to section 2, Rule 13 of Bar Matter No. 850 and its
implementing rules and regulations; and
(iii) The non-compliant lawyer shall be discharged from the case and the
client/s shall be allowed to secure the services of a new counsel with the
concomitant right to demand the return of fees already paid to the non-
compliant lawyer."
MANAHAN VS. FLORES (2013)
FACTS: Respondent Atty. Flores was counsel for the defendant in Civil
Case No. 1863 captioned as Marsha Aranas plaintiff versus Arnold
Balmores defendant a suit for damages filed before the MTC of San Mateo,
Rizal and presided by herein complainant Judge Manahan. During the
proceedings, Judge Manahan issued an Order whereby she voluntarily
inhibited from hearing Civil Case No. 1863. The said Order reads in part:
More than mere contempt do his (Atty. Flores) unethical actuations, his traits
of dishonesty and discourtesy not only to his own brethren in the legal
profession, but also to the bench and judges, would amount to grave
misconduct, if not a malpractice of law, a serious ground for disciplinary
action of a member of the bar pursuant to Rules 139 a & b.
3
Upon receipt of the copy of the above Order, the OBC deemed the
pronouncements of Judge Manahan as a formal administrative Complaint
against Atty. Flores. The case was referred to the Executive Judge of the
RTC of Rizal for investigation, report and recommendation.
During the Preliminary Conference x x x, respondent Atty. Flores entered
his appearance and was given time to file a Pre-Trial Brief. x x x On May 24,
2010, respondent Atty. Flores filed his Pre-Trial Brief but without proof of
MCLE compliance hence it was expunged from the records without
prejudice to the filing of another Pre-Trial Brief containing the required
MCLE compliance. x x x Atty. Flores asked for ten (10) days to submit proof.
The preliminary conference was reset several times (August 11, September
8) for failure of respondent Atty. Flores to appear and submit his Pre-Trial
Brief indicating thereon his MCLE compliance. The court a quo likewise
issued Orders dated September 15 and October 20, 2010 giving respondent
Atty. Flores a last chance to submit his Pre-Trial Brief with stern warning
that failure to do so shall be considered a waiver on his part.
Meanwhile, respondent Atty. Flores filed a Manifestation in Court dated
September 14, 2010 stating among others, the following allegations:
4. When you took your oath as member of the Bar, you promised to serve
truth, justice and fair play. Do you think you are being truthful, just and fair
by serving a cheater?
5. Ignorance of the law excuses no one for which reason even Erap was
convicted by the Sandiganbayan. But even worse is a lawyer who violates
the law.
6. Last but not the least, God said Thou shall not lie. Again the Philippine
Constitution commands: Give every Filipino his due. The act of refusal by
the plaintiff is violative of the foregoing divine and human laws.
Respondent Atty. Flores later filed his Pre-Trial Brief bearing an MCLE
number which was merely superimposed without indicating the date and
place of compliance. During the preliminary conference on November 24,
2010, respondent Atty. Flores manifested that he will submit proof of
compliance of his MCLE on the following day. On December 1, 2010,
respondent Atty. Flores again failed to appear and to submit the said
promised proof of MCLE compliance. In its stead, respondent Atty. Flores
filed a Letter of even date stating as follows:
If only to give your Honor another chance to prove your pro plaintiff
sentiment, I am hereby filing the attached Motion which you may once more
assign to the waste basket of nonchalance.
With the small respect that still remains, I have asked the defendant to look
for another lawyer to represent him for I am no longer interested in this case
because I feel I cannot do anything right in your sala.
The Investigating Judge found Atty. Flores to have failed to give due respect
to the court by failing to obey court orders, by failing to submit proof of his
compliance with the Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE)
requirement, and for using intemperate language in his pleadings.
ISSUE: WON Atty. Flores should is guilty of violating the CPR
HELD: YES. There is no doubt that Atty. Flores failed to obey the trial court’s
order to submit proof of his MCLE compliance notwithstanding the several
opportunities given him. "Court orders are to be respected not because the
judges who issue them should be respected, but because of the respect and
consideration that should be extended to the judicial branch of the
Government. This is absolutely essential if our Government is to be a
government of laws and not of men. Respect must be had not because of
the incumbents to the positions, but because of the authority that vests in
them. Disrespect to judicial incumbents is disrespect to that branch the
Government to which they belong, as well as to the State which has
instituted the judicial system."
Atty. Flores also employed intemperate language in his pleadings. As an
officer of the court, Atty. Flores is expected to be circumspect in his
language. Rule 11.03, Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
enjoins all attorneys to abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing
language or behavior before the Courts. Atty. Flores failed in this respect.
At this juncture, it is well to remind respondent that:
While a lawyer owes absolute fidelity to the cause of his client full devotion
to his client's genuine interest and warm zeal in the maintenance and
defense of his client's rights, as well as the exertion of his utmost learning
and ability, he must do so only within the bounds of law. A lawyer is entitled
to voice his c1iticism within the context of the constitutional guarantee of
freedom of speech which must be exercised responsibly. After all, every
right carries with it the corresponding obligation. Freedom is not freedom
from responsibility, but freedom with responsibility. The lawyer's fidelity to
his client must not be pursued at the expense of truth and orderly
administration of justice. It must be done within the confines of reason and
common sense.9
However, we find the recommended penalty too harsh and not
commensurate with the infractions committed by the respondent. It appears
that this is the first infraction committed by respondent. Also, we are not
prepared to impose on the respondent the penalty of one-year suspension
for humanitarian reasons. Respondent manifested before this Court that he
has been in the practice of law for half a century. Thus, he is already in his
twilight years. Considering the foregoing, we deem it proper to fine
respondent in the amount of ₱5,000.00 and to remind him to be more
circumspect in his acts and to obey and respect court processes.
RIVERA-PASCUAL VS. SPOUSES LIM
FACTS: Subject of the present controversy is a parcel of land with an
approximate area of 4.4 hectares and located at Bignay, Valenzuela. The
property is covered by TCT No. V-73892, registered in the names of
Spouses Lim.
On September 8, 2004, Maria Consolacion Rivera-Pascual filed before the
Office of the Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (RARAD) for Region IV-
A a petition to be recognized as a tenant of a property located at Bignay,
Valenzuela City against Danilo Deato. At that time, the property, was
covered by TCT No. 24759 under Deato’s name. During the pendency of
the petition, Deato sold the property to Spouses Lim. The sale was
registered on December 21, 2004 leading to the issuance of TCT No. V-
73892 in favor of Spouses Lim. Considering this development, Consolacion
filed a motion on March 3, 2005 to implead Spouses Lim as respondents.
The petition, which was docketed as DARAB Case No. R-0400-0012-04,
was granted by Regional Adjudicator Minas, stating:
1) Declaring that petitioner is the tenant of the subject landholding by
succession from her deceased father;
2) Declaring respondents spouses George and Marilyn Lim to have
subrogated to the rights and substituted to the obligation of spouses Danilo
and Divina Deato;
3) Ordering the respondents and all persons claiming rights under them to
maintain petitioner in peaceful possession and cultivation of the agricultural
land subject hereof;
4) Declaring petitioner to have the right to exercise the right of redemption
of the subject parcel of agricultural land pursuant to Section 12 of RA 3844
as amended; andcralawlibrary
5) Dismissing the petition against Louie Cruz, Fire Force Agency and Danny
Boy Rivera for having no proximate tenurial relationship with the petitioner
hence beyond the jurisdictional ambit of this Office.
On July 7, 2006, the foregoing decision became final.
Upon Consolacion s motion for execution filed on January 7, 2008, RA
Minas issued a writ of execution.
On January 21, 2008, Consolacion filed a petition against Spouses Lim and
the RD of Valenzuela City praying for the issuance of an order directing
Spouses Lim to accept the amount of P 10M which she undertook to tender
during the initial hearing, declaring the property redeemed, and cancelling
TCT No. V-73892.8 Consolacion consigned with the RARAD the amount of
P 10M on March 3, 2008.
4
Consolacion’s petition, was given due course by RA Minas.
On appeal, the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board
(DARAB) issued a Decision reversing RA Minas Decision. On June 25,
2009, Consolacion filed a Petition for Review under Rule 43 of the Rules of
Court with the CA. On July 1, 2009, the CA resolved to require
Consolacion’s counsel to submit within 5 days from notice his MCLE
Certificate of Compliance or Exemption and an amended Verification and
Certification Against Non-Forum-Shopping. Apparently, Consolacion’s
counsel failed to indicate in the petition his MCLE Certificate of Compliance
or Exemption Number as required under Bar Matter No. 1922. Also, the jurat
of Consolacion’s verification and certification against non-forum-shopping
failed to indicate any competent evidence of Consolacion s identity apart
from her community tax certificate.
Considering the failure of Consolacion and her counsel to comply, the CA
issued a Resolution dismissing the petition.
On July 7, 2009, the counsel for the petitioner received the above-
mentioned Resolution. However, the counsel for the petitioner failed to
comply with the said Resolution which was due on July 19, 2009.
For failure of the counsel for the petitioner to comply with the Resolution
dated July 1, 2009, despite receipt of the notice thereof, the petition is
hereby DISMISSED.
Consolacion moved for reconsideration but this was denied by the CA in a
Resolution21 dated March 11, 2010.
ISSUE: WON CA’s summary dismissal of her petition on technical grounds
is unwarranted
HELD: NO. The Court finds no merit in the petition. The Court sees no
reversible error committed by the CA in dismissing Consolacion’s petition
before it on the ground of petitioner’s unexplained failure to comply with
basic procedural requirements attendant to the filing of a Petition for Review
under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. Notably, Consolacion and her counsel
remained obstinate despite the opportunity afforded to them by the CA to
rectify their lapses. While there was compliance, this took place, however,
after the CA had ordered the dismissal of Consolacion s petition and without
reasonable cause proffered to justify its belatedness. Consolacion and her
counsel claimed inadvertence and negligence but they did not explain the
circumstances thereof. Absent valid and compelling reasons, the requested
leniency and liberality in the observance of procedural rules appears to be
an afterthought, hence, cannot be granted. The CA saw no compelling need
meriting the relaxation of the rules. Neither does this Court see any.
The Court is aware of the exceptional cases where technicalities were
liberally construed. However, in these cases, outright dismissal is rendered
unjust by the presence of a satisfactory and persuasive explanation. The
parties therein who prayed for liberal interpretation were able to hurdle that
heavy burden of proving that they deserve an exceptional treatment. It was
never the Court s intent "to forge a bastion for erring litigants to violate the
rules with impunity."22ςrνll
This Court will not condone a cavalier attitude towards procedural rules. It
is the duty of every member of the bar to comply with these rules. They are
not at liberty to seek exceptions should they fail to observe these rules and
rationalize their omission by harking on liberal construction.
While it IS the negligence of Consolacion's counsel that led to this
unfortunate result, she is bound by such.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DISMISSED. The
Resolutions dated October 15, 2009 and March 11, 2010 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 109265 are AFFIRMED.
Canon 6. Canons Apply to Lawyers in Government Service
CANON 6 - THESE CANONS SHALL APPLY TO LAWYERS IN
GOVERNMENT SERVICES IN THE DISCHARGE OF THEIR TASKS.
RA 6713 (1989), SEC. 4
Section 4. Norms of Conduct of Public Officials and Employees. - (A) Every
public official and employee shall observe the following as standards of
personal conduct in the discharge and execution of official duties:
(a) Commitment to public interest. - Public officials and employees shall
always uphold the public interest over and above personal interest. All
government resources and powers of their respective offices must be
employed and used efficiently, effectively, honestly and economically,
particularly to avoid wastage in public funds and revenues.
(b) Professionalism. - Public officials and employees shall perform and
discharge their duties with the highest degree of excellence,
professionalism, intelligence and skill. They shall enter public service with
utmost devotion and dedication to duty. They shall endeavor to discourage
wrong perceptions of their roles as dispensers or peddlers of undue
patronage.
(c) Justness and sincerity. - Public officials and employees shall remain true
to the people at all times. They must act with justness and sincerity and shall
not discriminate against anyone, especially the poor and the
underprivileged. They shall at all times respect the rights of others, and shall
refrain from doing acts contrary to law, good morals, good customs, public
policy, public order, public safety and public interest. They shall not
dispense or extend undue favors on account of their office to their relatives
whether by consanguinity or affinity except with respect to appointments of
such relatives to positions considered strictly confidential or as members of
their personal staff whose terms are coterminous with theirs.
(d) Political neutrality. - Public officials and employees shall provide service
to everyone without unfair discrimination and regardless of party affiliation
or preference.
(e) Responsiveness to the public. - Public officials and employees shall
extend prompt, courteous, and adequate service to the public. Unless
otherwise provided by law or when required by the public interest, public
officials and employees shall provide information of their policies and
procedures in clear and understandable language, ensure openness of
information, public consultations and hearings whenever appropriate,
encourage suggestions, simplify and systematize policy, rules and
procedures, avoid red tape and develop an understanding and appreciation
of the socio-economic conditions prevailing in the country, especially in the
depressed rural and urban areas.
(f) Nationalism and patriotism. - Public officials and employees shall at all
times be loyal to the Republic and to the Filipino people, promote the use of
locally produced goods, resources and technology and encourage
appreciation and pride of country and people. They shall endeavor to
maintain and defend Philippine sovereignty against foreign intrusion.
(g) Commitment to democracy. - Public officials and employees shall
commit themselves to the democratic way of life and values, maintain the
principle of public accountability, and manifest by deeds the supremacy of
civilian authority over the military. They shall at all times uphold the
Constitution and put loyalty to country above loyalty to persons or party.
(h) Simple living. - Public officials and employees and their families shall
lead modest lives appropriate to their positions and income. They shall not
indulge in extravagant or ostentatious display of wealth in any form.
(B) The Civil Service Commission shall adopt positive measures to promote
(1) observance of these standards including the dissemination of
information programs and workshops authorizing merit increases beyond
regular progression steps, to a limited number of employees recognized by
their office colleagues to be outstanding in their observance of ethical
standards; and (2) continuing research and experimentation on measures
which provide positive motivation to public officials and employees in raising
the general level of observance of these standards.
COLLANTES VS. ROMERON (1991)
FACTS: This complaint for disbarment is related to the administrative case
which complainant Atty. Fernando T. Collantes, counsel for V & G Better
Homes Subdivision, Inc. filed against Atty. Vicente C. Renomeron of
Register of Deeds of Tacloban City, for the latter's irregular actuations with
regard to the application of V & G for registration of 163 pro forma Deeds of
Absolute Sale with Assignment of lots in its subdivision.
As early as January 15, 1987, V & G had requested the respondent to
register some 163 deeds of sale with assignment (in favor of the GSIS) of
5
lots of the V & G mortgaged to GSIS by the lot buyers. There was no action
from the respondent. Another request was made on February 16, 1987 for
him to approve or deny registration of the uniform deeds of absolute sale
with assignment. Still no action except to require V & G to submit proof of
real estate tax payment and to clarify certain details about the transactions.
Although V & G complied with the desired requirements, respondent
Renomeron suspended the registration of the documents pending
compliance by V & G with a certain "special arrangement" between them,
which was that V & G should provide him with a weekly round trip ticket from
Tacloban to Manila plus P2,000.00 as pocket money per trip, or, in lieu
thereof, the sale of respondent's Quezon City house and lot by V & G or
GSIS representatives.
On May 19, 1987, respondent confided to the complainant that he would act
favorably on the 163 registrable documents of V & G if the latter would
execute clarificatory affidavits and send money for a round trip plane ticket
for him.
The plane fare amounting to P800 (without the pocket money of P2,000)
was sent to respondent through his niece.
Because of V & G's failure to give him pocket money in addition to plane
fare, respondent imposed additional registration requirements. Fed up with
the respondent's extortionate tactics, complainant wrote him a letter on May
20, 1987 challenging him to act on all pending applications for registration
of V & G within twenty-four (24) hours.
On May 22, 1987, respondent formally denied registration of the transfer of
163 certificates of title to the GSIS on the uniform ground that the deeds of
absolute sale with assignment were ambiguous as to parties and subject
matter. On May 26, 1987, Atty. Collantes moved for a reconsideration of
said denial, stressing that:
... since the year 1973 continuously up to December 1986 for a period of
nearly fifteen (15) years or for a sum total of more than 2,000 same set of
documents which have been repeatedly and uniformly registered in the
Office of the Register of Deeds of Tacloban City under Attys. Modesto
Garcia and Pablo Amascual Jr., it is only during the incumbency of Atty.
Vicente C. Renomeron, that the very same documents of the same tenor
have been refused or denied registration ... (p. 15, Rollo.)
On May 27, 1987, respondent elevated the matter en consulta to the
Administrator, National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration
(NLTDRA) (now the Land Registration Authority [LRA]). In a Resolution
dated July 27,1987 (Consulta No. 1579), the NLTDRA ruled that the
questioned documents were registrable. Heedless of the NLTDRA's
opinion, respondent continued to sit on V & Gs 163 deeds of sale with
assignment.
Exasperated by respondent's conduct, the complainant filed with the
NLTDRA on June 4, 1987 administrative charges, against respondent
Register of Deeds.
Upon receipt of the charges, NLTDRA Administrator Teodoro Bonifacio
directed respondent to explain in writing why no administrative disciplinary
action should be taken against him. Respondent was further asked whether
he would submit his case on the basis of his answer, or be heard in a formal
investigation. In his answer dated July 9, 1987, respondent denied the
charges of extortion and of directly receiving pecuniary or material benefit
for himself in connection with the official transactions awaiting his action.
After due investigation of the charges, Secretary Ordoñez found respondent
guilty of grave misconduct.
ISSUE:
1) WON respondent is guilty of grave misconduct (YES)
2) WON respondent register of deeds, as a lawyer, may also be disciplined
by this Court for his malfeasances as a public official (YES)
HELD:
1) Our study and consideration of the records of the case indicate that ample
evidence supports the Investigating Officer's findings that the respondent
committed grave misconduct.
The respondent unreasonably delayed action on the documents presented
to him for registration and, notwithstanding representations by the parties
interested for expeditious action on the said documents, he continued with
his inaction.
The records indicate that the respondent eventually formally denied the
registration of the documents involved; that he himself elevated the question
on the registrability of the said documents to Administrator Bonifacio after
he formally denied the registration thereof, that the Administrator then
resolved in favor of the registrability of the said documents in question; and
that, such resolution of the Administrator notwithstanding, the respondent
still refused the registration thereof but demanded from the parties
interested the submission of additional requirements not adverted to in his
previous denial.
In relation to the alleged 'special arrangement,' although the respondent
claims that he neither touched nor received the money sent to him, on record
remains uncontroverted the circumstance that his niece, Ms. de la Cruz,
retrieved from him the amount of P800.00 earlier sent to him as plane fare,
not in the original denomination of P100.00 bills but in P50.00 bills. The
respondent had ample opportunity to clarify or to countervail this related
incident in his letter dated 5 September 1987 to Administrator Bonifacio but
he never did so.
Secretary Ordoñez recommended to President Corazon C. Aquino that
Renomeron be dismissed from the service, with forfeiture of leave credits
and retirement benefits, and with prejudice to re-employment in the
government service, effective immediately.
2) His misconduct as a public official also constituted a violation of his oath
as a lawyer.
The lawyer's oath (Rule 138, Section 17, Rules of Court; People vs. De
Luna, 102 Phil. 968), imposes upon every lawyer the duty to delay no man
for money or malice. The lawyer's oath is a source of his obligations and its
violation is a ground for his suspension, disbarment or other disciplinary
action (Legal Ethics, Ruben E. Agpalo, 1983 Edition, pp. 66-67).
As the late Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro said:
A person takes an oath when he is admitted to the Bar which is designed to
impress upon him his responsibilities. He thereby becomes an "officer of the
court" on whose shoulders rests the grave responsibility of assisting the
courts in the proper. fair, speedy, and efficient administration of justice. As
an officer of the court he is subject to a rigid discipline that demands that in
his every exertion the only criterion he that truth and justice triumph. This
discipline is what as given the law profession its nobility, its prestige, its
exalted place. From a lawyer, to paraphrase Justice Felix Frankfurter, are
expected those qualities of truth-speaking, a high sense of honor, full
candor, intellectual honesty, and the strictest observance of fiduciary
responsibility— all of which, throughout the centuries, have been
compendiously described as moral character.
Membership in the Bar is in the category of a mandate to public service of
the highest order.1âwphi1 A lawyer is an oath-bound servant of society
whose conduct is clearly circumscribed by inflexible norms of law and ethics,
and whose primary duty is the advancement of the quest of truth and justice,
for which he has sworn to be a fearless crusader. (Apostacy in the Legal
Profession, 64 SCRA 784, 789- 790; emphasis supplied.)
The Code of Professional Responsibility applies to lawyers in government
service in the discharge of their official tasks (Canon 6). Just as the Code of
Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials requires public officials
and employees to process documents and papers expeditiously (Sec. 5,
subpars. [c] and [d] and prohibits them from directly or indirectly having a
financial or material interest in any transaction requiring the approval of their
office, and likewise bars them from soliciting gifts or anything of monetary
value in the course of any transaction which may be affected by the
6
functions of their office (See. 7, subpars. [a] and [d]), the Code of
Professional Responsibility forbids a lawyer to engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct (Rule 1.01, Code of Professional
Responsibility), or delay any man's cause "for any corrupt motive or interest"
(Rule 103).
A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness
to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a
scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession. (Rule 7.03, Code
of Professional Responsibility.)
This Court has ordered that only those who are "competent, honorable, and
reliable" may practice the profession of law (Noriega vs. Sison, 125 SCRA
293) for every lawyer must pursue "only the highest standards in the practice
of his calling" (Court Administrator vs. Hermoso, 150 SCRA 269, 278).
The acts of dishonesty and oppression which Attorney Renomeron
committed as a public official have demonstrated his unfitness to practice
the high and noble calling of the law (Bautista vs. Judge Guevarra, 142
SCRA 632; Court Administrator vs. Rodolfo G. Hermoso, 150 SCRA 269).
He should therefore be disbarred.
ALI V. BUBONG – ADM. CASE NO. 4018
Facts: Atty. Mosib Ali Bubong was holding position in the Register of Deeds
of Marawi City. An administrative complaint was charged against him for
illegal exaction, indiscriminate issuance of TCTs and manipulating the
criminal complaint filed against the respondent’s relative for violation of Anti-
Squatting Law. The LRA absolved him but through the recommendation of
the Sec. of Justice, Pres. Ramos issued an administrative order dismissing
the respondent for gross misconduct for the imprudent issuance of TCTs
and manipulating the criminal case for violation of the Anti-Squatting Law.
Due to outcome of the administrative case against respondent, the petitioner
sought for the disbarment of the former because it has become obvious that
respondent had proven himself unfit to be further entrusted with duties of an
attorney and is a serious threat to the integrity of legal profession. The
respondent denied the allegations against him. After investigation, the IBP
recommended for the suspension of the respondent. Upon the death of the
petitioner, his heirs moved for the withdrawal of the deceased petition for
disbarment.
Issue: Whether or not respondent may be disbarred for grave misconduct
committed while he was in government service
Held: Yes. The CPR does not cease to apply to a lawyer simply because
he has joined the gov’t service. Canon 6.02 provides that a lawyer in gov’t
service shall not use his public position to promote or advance his private
interest, not allow the latter to interfere with his public duties. Thus, where a
lawyer’s misconduct as a government official is of such nature as to affect
his qualification as a lawyer or to show moral delinquency, then he may be
disciplined as a member of the bar.
The Code of Professional Responsibility does not cease to apply to a lawyer
simply because he has joined the government service. In fact, by the
express provision of Canon 6 thereof, the rules governing the conduct of
lawyers "shall apply to lawyers in government service in the discharge of
their official tasks." Thus, where a lawyer's misconduct as a government
official is of such nature as to affect his qualification as a lawyer or to show
moral delinquency, then he may be disciplined as a member of the bar on
such grounds.31 Although the general rule is that a lawyer who holds a
government office may not be disciplined as a member of the bar for
infractions he committed as a government official, he may, however, be
disciplined as a lawyer if his misconduct constitutes a violation of his oath a
member of the legal profession
Office of the Court Administrator vs. Ladaga 350 SCRA 326, January
26, 2001
Facts: Atty. Misael M. Ladaga as Branch Clerk of the Court of Makati
Regional Trial Court, requested the Court Administrator, Justice Benepayo,
to allow him to appear as counsel on behalf of his cousin who is more like a
sister to him who was charged with falsification. While waiting for the
approval, he already made severeal appearances for his cousin as his
cousin has not enough resources to pay for legal services of other lawyers.
On December 8, RTC Makati denied the request of the respondent and
directed the Office of the Court Administrator to file administrative charges
against him for violating R.A. 6713 which prohibits practice of law by public
officials. A Resolution was submitted to the Executive Judge of RTC Makati
and she recommended since it was the first time fir the respondent to do it,
without securing first the permission from the head of the office which is the
Court. The respondent is reprimanded and warned that any repetition would
yield to severe charges.
Issue: Whether or not the respondent engaged in the practice of law.
Ruling: No. For it to be considered that he is engaged in the private practice,
it must be frequent habitual exercise. However, a written permission in
necessary before doing it.
We agree with the recommendation of the investigating judge.
Respondent is charged under Sec. 7(b)(2) of the Code of Conduct and
Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees which prohibits civil
servants from engaging in the private practice of their profession. A similar
prohibition is found under Sec. 35, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court
which disallows certain attorneys from engaging in the private practice of
their profession. The said section reads:
SEC. 35. Certain attorneys not to practice. – No judge or other official or
employee of the superior courts or of the Office of the Solicitor General, shall
engage in private practice as a member of the bar or give professional
advise to clients.
However, it should be clarified that "private practice" of a profession,
specifically the law profession in this case, which is prohibited, does not
pertain to an isolated court appearance; rather, it contemplates a
succession of acts of the same nature habitually or customarily holding
one's self to the public as a lawyer.
In the case of People vs. Villanueva,7 we explained the meaning of the term
"private practice" prohibited by the said section, to wit:
We believe that the isolated appearance of City Attorney Fule did not
constitute private practice, within the meaning and contemplation of the
Rules. Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in
frequent or customary action, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other
words, it is frequent habitual exercise (State vs. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan.
864, 42 LRA, N.S. 768). Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute
has been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one's self out to
the public, as a lawyer and demanding payment for such services (State vs.
Bryan, 4 S. E. 522, 98 N. C. 644, 647). The appearance as counsel on one
occasion, is not conclusive as determinative of engagement in the private
practice of law. The following observation of the Solicitor General is
noteworthy:
"Essentially, the word private practice of law implies that one must have
presented himself to be in the active and continued practice of the legal
profession and that his professional services are available to the public for
a compensation, as a source of his livelihood or in consideration of his said
services."
For one thing, it has never been refuted that City Attorney Fule had been
given permission by his immediate superior, the Secretary of Justice, to
represent the complainant in the case at bar, who is a relative.8
Based on the foregoing, it is evident that the isolated instances when
respondent appeared as pro bono counsel of his cousin in Criminal Case
No. 84885 does not constitute the "private practice" of the law profession
contemplated by law.
Nonetheless, while respondent's isolated court appearances did not amount
to a private practice of law, he failed to obtain a written permission therefor
from the head of the Department, which is this Court as required by Section
12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules, thus:
7
Sec 12. No officer or employee shall engage directly in any private business,
vocation, or profession or be connected with any commercial, credit,
agricultural, or industrial undertaking without a written permission from the
head of the Department: Provided, That this prohibition will be absolute in
the case of those officers and employees whose duties and responsibilities
require that their entire time be at the disposal of the Government; Provided,
further, That if an employee is granted permission to engage in outside
activities, time so devoted outside of office hours should be fixed by the
agency to the end that it will not impair in any way the efficiency of the officer
or employee: And provided, finally, That no permission is necessary in the
case of investments, made by an officer or employee, which do not involve
real or apparent conflict between his private interests and public duties, or
in any way influence him in the discharge of his duties, and he shall not take
part in the management of the enterprise or become an officer of the board
of directors.9
Respondent entered his appearance and attended court proceedings on
numerous occasions, i.e., May 4-15, 1998, June 18, 1998, July 13, 1998
and August 5, 1998, as borne out by his own admission. It is true that he
filed leave applications corresponding to the dates he appeared in court.
However, he failed to obtain a prior permission from the head of the
Department. The presiding judge of the court to which respondent is
assigned is not the head of the Department contemplated by law.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Atty. Misael M. Ladaga
is hereby REPRIMANDED with a stern warning that any repetition of such
act would be dealt with more severely.
Pimentel vs. Fabros
FACTS: A complaint for disbarment was filed against Attys. Vitaliano C.
Fabros and Pacifico S. Paas by Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel Jr. for
"unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct" in relation to the
discharge of their duties as chairman and vice-chairman, respectively, of the
provincial board of canvassers, Province of Isabela (PBC-Isabela) in the
1995 elections.
Complainant alleged that: 8. Among the duties of the [PBC-Isabela] was to
canvass the results of the elections from the various municipalities and
component cities of the Province of Isabela and submit the Provincial
Certificate of Canvass to the Commission on Elections (COMELEC). This
Provincial Certificate of Canvass was to be submitted to the COMELEC
together with its supporting Statement of Votes per Municipality for the
Province of Isabela, and as required by law, these documents were
prepared under the control and supervision of the [PBC-Isabela] of which
herein respondents are officials.
9. In fact, with respect to the Provincial Certificate of Canvass of Isabela,
respondents were required to certify under oath that they duly canvassed
the votes cast for each candidate for Senator in the election held on May 8,
1995. And with respect to the Statement of Votes per Municipality, they were
required to certify that each entry made is true and correct.
11. It would appear, however, that the Statement of Votes per Municipality
(annex "B") prepared and certified to be true and correct by herein
respondents was actually a fraudulent statement which had been altered
and which contain false and untrue entries. By comparing the said
statements with the Municipal/City Certificates of Canvass of some of the
municipalities and component cities for the Province of Isabela, it is clearly
apparent that in nine (9) municipalities and one (1) city of the said province,
the votes of candidates Enrile, Honasan and Mitra were padded and
increased by some 27,755, 10,000 and 7,000, respectively'.
13. The anomalous, irregular and illegal padding of the votes in the
Provincial Certificate of Canvass for the Province of Isabela cannot be
attributed [to] mere computation or recording error, but was ostensibly the
result of a premeditated scheme knowingly implemented by herein
respondents.
14. The respondents, chairman and vice chairman of the [PBC-Isabela],
willfully, feloniously, unethically and in wanton and reckless regard of the
duties and responsibilities reposed upon them by virtue of their official
positions, signed the Provincial Certificate of Canvass (annex "A") and the
Statement of Votes per Municipality (annex "B") for the Province of Isabela,
well aware that the same contained false statements which has altered the
results of the senatorial elections in said province. Their submission of these
falsified documents to the COMELEC is an act constituting a gross violation
of the Omnibus Election Code and existing penal laws, and a serious breach
of public trust and of their oaths as duly licensed members of the Philippine
Bar.
15. For under section 27 of R.A. 6646 it is provided that any member of the
board of canvasser who tampers, increases, or decreases the votes
received by a candidate in any election shall be guilty of [an] election
offense.
16. And, under provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a
lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
xxx xxx xxx.1 (Emphasis ours)
In his comment, respondent Fabros reproduced the counter-affidavit he filed
with the COMELEC-Manila since the issues raised in the complaint were
identical to those brought before the Commission. He denied committing
any act which violated his oath as a lawyer. Specifically, he stated that: (1)
he neither consented nor allowed any member of PBC-Isabela to increase
the votes of Senators Enrile, Honasan and Mitra; (2) the canvassing was
done in public view; (3) he faithfully read the votes as reflected in the
municipal/city certificates of canvass, repeating the same twice or thrice and
(4) the canvassing proceeded in an orderly manner after counsels and
watchers were given the chance to examine the certificates of canvass.2
Aside from substantially echoing the statements of Fabros, respondent
Paas alleged that he was in no position to manipulate the figures since
Fabros did the reading throughout the canvass, while he attended to
maintaining the integrity of the envelopes containing the statement of votes.
Both attributed to human fatigue or simple negligence any error in the
figures since the board and its staff allegedly worked continuously to finish
the canvassing within 72 hours as directed.
Both respondents do not, however, deny that they authenticated the
provincial certificate of canvass and signed the statement of votes as "true
and correct." Their only excuse for any discrepancy was their alleged
reliance on the documents prepared by the secretary of PBC-Isabela,
Olympia Marquez.
On June 21, 2003, the IBP board of governors issued a resolution adopting
the report and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.
Respondents were found guilty of violating Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and were penalized with a fine of P10,000 each,
with a warning that a violation on similar grounds will be dealt with more
severely.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent violated the CPR
HELD: Yes. Based on the evidence presented, we find respondents guilty
of misconduct. The records reflect, and respondents admit, the discrepancy
between the questioned certificate of canvass and the statement of votes of
the Province of Isabela in the 1995 elections. While there was no question
that the municipal/city certificates of canvass were not tampered with, the
tabulation of the figures on the statement of votes was anomalous. For this,
respondents were responsible.7
As chairman and vice-chairman of PBC-Isabela, respectively, respondents
were mandated to receive the municipal/city certificates of canvass, and to
canvass them for the votes of the members of the Senate, among others.8
They were also required to determine the provisional total votes of each
candidate as of each adjournment. On final adjournment, they were tasked
to prepare a statement of votes with a certification of the same as official.9
In addition, they prepared the provincial certificate of canvass (in which the
padded figures were discovered) with the certification under oath as public
officers that the entries were true and correct.10
More than simply affixing their signatures for the purpose of identifying the
documents, respondents signed the documents certifying (and vouching) for
8
the correctness and accuracy of their contents. Even if they allegedly had
no participation in the misdeed, they nevertheless remained responsible for
it as officials of PBC-Isabela. Respondents must bear the consequences of
any misstatement or falsehood arising from such certification.11 They
cannot evade responsibility by pointing to other persons who supposedly
prepared the documents in question.12 They had the opportunity to check,
as they should have checked, the accuracy of the figures they were
certifying to.13 By certifying to false figures, they committed misconduct
subject to disciplinary action.14 In fact, by invoking the defenses of honest
mistake, oversight due to fatigue, even simple negligence, respondents
virtually admitted the existence of the discrepancies in the number of votes
reflected in the questioned documents.15
As public officers, respondents failed to live up to the high degree of
excellence, professionalism, intelligence and skill required of them.16 As
lawyers, they were found to have engaged in unlawful, dishonest, immoral
and deceitful conduct.17 They also violated their oath as officers of the court
to foist no falsehood on anyone. Furthermore, by express provision of
Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the avoidance of such
conduct is demanded of them as lawyers in the government service:
CANON 6 - These canons shall apply to lawyers in government service in
the discharge of their official tasks.
As lawyers in the government service, respondents were under an even
greater obligation to observe the basic tenets of the legal profession
because public office is a public trust.18
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondents Atty. Vitaliano C. Fabros and
Atty. Pacifico S. Paas GUILTY of misconduct and imposes on them a FINE
in the amount of P10,000 each, with a WARNING that the commission in
the future of a similar act will be dealt with more severely.
BERENGUER vs. FLORIN A.C. No. 5119
FACTS: Petitioner Berenguers are the registered owners of a 58.0649-
hectare land in Bibingcahan, Sorsogon, Sorsogon. The Berenguers applied
for the exclusion of their land with the DAR and for a notice to lift coverage
based on the ground that their landholdings have been used exclusively for
livestock. The DAR Secretary, without acting on the application for
exclusion, cancelled the Berenguers’ certificates of title on the land and
issued Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOAs) in favor of the
members of the Baribag Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries Development
Cooperative (BARIBAG).
The Berenguers filed a notice of appeal with the Secretary of DAR. While
the case was pending appeal, BARIBAG filed a petition for the
implementation of the Order before the Regional Agrarian Reform
Adjudicator (RARAD). This was granted by Florin, as RARAD. Florin
directed the issuance and implementation of the Writ of Possession. The
Berenguers filed a motion for reconsideration, claiming that they were
denied due process as they were not furnished with a copy of BARIBAG’s
petition for implementation. Florin denied the motion for reconsideration for
lack of merit.
The Berenguers appealed to the DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB).
BARIBAG, on other hand, filed a Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of
Possession. BARIBAG filed a Motion for the Appointment of a Special
Sheriff. DAR Acting Secretary Conrado S. Navarro denied the Berenguers’
appeal. Florin issued a Resolution, which granted BARIBAG’s Motion for the
appointment of a Special Sheriff and ordered the issuance of the writ of
possession prayed for.
The Berenguers filed a motion to set aside the Resolution arguing that: the
DARAB already acquired jurisdiction over case when they seasonably filed
an appeal before it; and that Florin should have waited until the DARAB has
decided the appeal. Florin denied the said motion prompting the Berenguers
to move for her inhibition on ground of partiality. Florin issued on a Writ of
Possession23 in favor of BARIBAG. Florin directed the full implementation
of the writ of possession in spite of the Berenguers’ protestations. Hence,
this petition for the disbarment of respondents Florin, Jornales, in his
capacity as Assistant Regional Director for DAR, and Vega, in his capacity
as DAR Legal Officer V.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners are guilty of violating the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
HELD: Yes. Respondent ATTY.ISABEL E. FLORIN is found guilty of
violating the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, she is
penalized with SUSPENSION from the practice of law for three (3) months
effective upon notice hereof. The complaint against Atty. Marcelino Jornales
and Atty. Pedro Vega is DISMISSED for lack of sufficient evidence.
Judicial errors tainted with fraud, dishonesty, gross ignorance, bad faith or
deliberate intent to do injustice will be administratively sanctioned. In this
case, it appears, however, that this is the first time that Florin has been made
administratively liable. Although there is no showing that malice or bad faith
attended the commission of the acts complained of, the same does not
negate the fact that Florin executed an act that would cause an injustice to
the Berenguers. To SC justices mind, the act of issuing the writ of execution
and writ of possession is not simply an honest error in judgment but an
obstinate disregard of the applicable laws and jurisprudence.
Lahm III vs Mayor (2012)
FACTS: In June 27, 2007, the respondent filed his Comment 2 to the
complaint. In a Resolution 3 dated July 18, 2007, the Court referred the case
to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation. The antecedent facts, as summarized in the Report and
Recommendation 4 dated September 19, 2008 of Commissioner Romualdo
A. Din, Jr. of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, are as follows: On
September 5, 2006 a certain David Edward Toze filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal before the Labor Arbitration Branch of the National Labor
Relations Commission against the members of the Board of Trustees of the
International School, Manila the case was raffled to the sala of the
respondent. Impleaded as among the party-respondents are the
complainants in the instant case. On September 7, 2006, David Edward
Toze filed a Verified Motion for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining
Order and/or Preliminary Injunction Against the Respondents.
On September 7, 2006, David Edward Toze filed a Verified Motion for the
Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction
Against the Respondents. The said Motion was set for hearing on
September 12, 2006 at 10:00 in the morning. A day after, on September 8,
2006, the counsel for the complainants herein entered its appearance and
asked for additional time to oppose and make a comment to the Verified
Motion for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or
Preliminary Injunction Against the Respondents of David Edward Toze.
Thereafter, the respondent issued an Order dated September 14, 2006 that
directs the parties in the said case to maintain the status quo ante. On
account of the Order dated September 14, 2006, David Edward Toze was
immediately reinstated and assumed his former position as superintendent
of the International School Manila.
Petitioners argue that the respondent labor arbiter does not have the
authority to issue a temporary restraining order and/or a preliminary
injunction which prompted them to file herein complaint before the IBP.
Accordingly, the Investigating Commissioner recommended that:
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended that the respondent be
SUSPENDED for a period of six (6) months with a warning that a repetition
of the same or similar incident will be dealt with more severe penalty. 6
On December 11, 2008, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No.
XVIII-2008-644 7 which adopted and approved the recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner. The said resolution further pointed out that the
Board of Governors had previously recommended the respondent's
suspension from the practice of law for three years in Administrative Case
(A.C.) No. 7314 entitled "Mary Ann T. Flores v. Atty. Jovencio Ll. Mayor, Jr.".
9
The respondent sought to reconsider the foregoing disposition, 8 but it was
denied by the IBP Board of Governors in its Resolution No. XIX-2011-476
dated June 26, 2011.
ISSUE: Whether or not the suspension meted to the respondent was proper
(due to his ignorance of the NLRC rules of procedure which is a violation of
his duty as a labor arbiter?)
HELD: We agree with the IBP Board of Governors that the respondent
should be sanctioned.
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides that a lawyer may be
removed or suspended from the practice of law, inter alia, for gross
misconduct and violation of the lawyer's oath. Thus:
Section 27. Attorneys removed or suspended by Supreme Court on what
grounds. — A member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his
office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other
gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of
his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the
oath which he is required to take before the admission to practice, or for a
wilful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or
wilful appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to
do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either
personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
A lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any misconduct showing any
fault or deficiency in his moral character, honesty, probity or good
demeanor. 9 Gross misconduct is any inexcusable, shameful or flagrant
unlawful conduct on the part of a person concerned with the administration
of justice; i.e., conduct prejudicial to the rights of the parties or to the right
determination of the cause. The motive behind this conduct is generally a
premeditated, obstinate or intentional purpose. 10 EHaASD
Intrinsically, the instant petition wants this Court to impose disciplinary
sanction against the respondent as a member of the bar. However, the
grounds asserted by the complainants in support of the administrative
charges against the respondent are intrinsically connected with the
discharge of the respondent's quasi-judicial functions.
Nonetheless, it cannot be discounted that the respondent, as a labor arbiter,
is a public officer entrusted to resolve labor controversies. It is well settled
that the Court may suspend or disbar a lawyer for any conduct on his part
showing his unfitness for the confidence and trust which characterize the
attorney and client relations, and the practice of law before the courts, or
showing such a lack of personal honesty or of good moral character as to
render him unworthy of public confidence. 11
Thus, the fact that the charges against the respondent were based on his
acts committed in the discharge of his functions as a labor arbiter would not
hinder this Court from imposing disciplinary sanctions against him.
The Code of Professional Responsibility does not cease to apply to a lawyer
simply because he has joined the government service. In fact, by the
express provision of Canon 6 thereof, the rules governing the conduct of
lawyers "shall apply to lawyers in government service in the discharge of
their official tasks." Thus, where a lawyer's misconduct as a government
official is of such nature as to affect his qualification as a lawyer or to show
moral delinquency, then he may be disciplined as a member of the bar on
such grounds.
In Atty. Vitriolo v. Atty. Dasig, 13 we stressed that: A member of the Bar who
assumes public office does not shed his professional obligations. Hence,
the Code of Professional Responsibility, promulgated on June 21, 1988,
was not meant to govern the conduct of private practitioners alone, but of
all lawyers including those in government service. xxx Otherwise said, a
lawyer in government service is a keeper of the public faith and is burdened
with high degree of social responsibility, perhaps higher than her brethren
in private practice. Indubitably, the respondent failed to live up to his duties
as a lawyer in consonance with the strictures of the lawyer's oath and the
Code of Professional Responsibility, thereby occasioning sanction from this
Court.
In stubbornly insisting that he has the authority to issue writs of preliminary
injunction and/or temporary restraining order contrary to the clear import of
the 2005 Rules of Procedure of the NLRC, the respondent violated Canon
1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which mandates lawyers to
"obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal processes".
All told, we find the respondent to have committed gross ignorance of the
law, his acts as a labor arbiter in the case below being inexcusable thus
unquestionably resulting into prejudice to the rights of the parties therein.
Having established the foregoing, we now proceed to determine the
appropriate penalty to be imposed.
Under Rule 140 22 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-
SC, gross ignorance of the law is a serious charge, 23 punishable by a fine
of more than P20,000.00, but not exceeding P40,000.00, suspension from
office without salary and other benefits for more than three but not
exceeding six months, or dismissal from the service. 24
In Tadlip v. Atty. Borres, Jr., the respondent-lawyer and provincial
adjudicator, found guilty of gross ignorance of the law, was suspended from
the practice of law for six months. Additionally, in parallel cases, 25 a judge
found guilty of gross ignorance of the law was meted the penalty of
suspension for six months.
Here, the IBP Board of Governors recommended that the respondent be
suspended from the practice of law for six months with a warning that a
repetition of the same or similar incident would be dealt with more severe
penalty. We adopt the foregoing recommendation.
This Court notes that the IBP Board of Governors had previously
recommended the respondent's suspension from the practice of law for
three years in A.C. No. 7314, entitled "Mary Ann T. Flores v. Atty. Jovencio
Ll. Mayor, Jr.". This case, however, is still pending.
It cannot be gainsaid that since public office is a public trust, the ethical
conduct demanded upon lawyers in the government service is more
exacting than the standards for those in private practice. Lawyers in the
government service are subject to constant public scrutiny under norms of
public accountability. They also bear the heavy burden of having to put aside
their private interest in favor of the interest of the public; their private
activities should not interfere with the discharge of their official functions. 26
At this point, the respondent should be reminded of our exhortation in
Republic of the Philippines v. Judge Caguioa, 27 thus: Ignorance of the law
is the mainspring of injustice. Judges are called upon to exhibit more than
just a cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules. Basic rules
should be at the palm of their hands. Their inexcusable failure to observe
basic laws and rules will render them administratively liable. Where the law
involved is simple and elementary, lack of conversance with it constitutes
gross ignorance of the law. "Verily, for transgressing the elementary
jurisdictional limits of his court, respondent should be administratively liable
for gross ignorance of the law."
"When the inefficiency springs from a failure to consider so basic and
elemental a rule, a law or a principle in the discharge of his functions, a
judge is either too incompetent and undeserving of the position and title he
holds or he is too vicious that the oversight or omission was deliberately
done in bad faith and in grave abuse of judicial authority." 28 (citations
omitted)
DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, finding respondent Atty. Jovencio Ll. Mayor,
Jr. guilty of gross ignorance of the law in violation of his lawyer's oath and
of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the Court resolved to SUSPEND
respondent from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months, with a
WARNING that commission of the same or similar offense in the future will
result in the imposition of a more severe penalty.
Huyssen vs. Gutierrez (2006)
FACTS: Respondent Atty. Gutierrez, a Bureau of Immigration and
Deportation officer, received US$20,000 from complainant Huyssen.
10
Accused of falsely representing that it was needed in complainant’s
application for visa and failing to return the same, respondent denied
misappropriating the said amount, claiming that he gave it to a certain Atty.
Mendoza who assisted complainant and children in their application for visa.
He failed however to substantiate such denial. Atty. Gutierrez had many
alibis on why the money could not immediately be returned to the
complainant, and promised her several times that he would repay her out of
his personal funds. He even issued personal post-dated checks on this, but
which later bounced. (REFER TO ALEX'S FOR A MORE DETAILED SET
OF FACTS).
IBP Recommendation: Considering that respondent was able to perpetrate
the fraud by taking advantage of his position with the Board of Special
Inquiry of the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation, makes it more
reprehensible as it has caused damage to the reputation and integrity of
said office. It is submitted that respondent has violated Rule 6.02 of Canon
6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which reads:
"A lawyer in the government service shall not use his public position to
promote or advance his private interests, nor allow the latter to interfere with
his public duties."
On 4 November 2004, the IBP Board of Governors approved 6 the
Investigating Commissioner's report with modification, thus:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it hereby ADOPTED and
APPROVED, with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of
this Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation fully
supported by the evidence on record and applicable laws and rules, and
considering respondent's violation of Rule 6.02 of Canon 6 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, Atty. Fred L. Gutierrez is hereby DISBARRED
from the practice of law and ordered to return the amount with legal interest
from receipt of the money until payment. This case shall be referred to the
Office of the Ombudsman for prosecution for violation of Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Acts and to the Department of Justice for appropriate
administrative action.
ISSUE: Whether or not Respondent violated CANON 6 of the CPR?
HELD: YES. We agree with the IBP Board of Governors that respondent
should be severely sanctioned.
Lawyers in government service in the discharge of their official task have
more restrictions than lawyers in private practice. Want of moral integrity is
to be more severely condemned in a lawyer who holds a responsible public
office.
Considering that respondent was able to perpetrate the fraud by taking
advantage of his position with the Board of Special Inquiry of the Bureau of
Immigration and Deportation, makes it more reprehensible as it has caused
damage to the reputation and integrity of said office. It is submitted that
respondent has violated Rule 6.02 of Canon 6 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which reads:
"A lawyer in the government service shall not use his public position to
promote or advance his private interests, nor allow the latter to interfere with
his public duties."
Also, the act of issuing a bouncing check shows moral turpitude.
Respondent's acts are more despicable, for not only did he misappropriate
the money of complainant; worse, he had the gall to prepare receipts with
the letterhead of the BID and issued checks to cover up his misdeeds.
Time and again, we have declared that the practice of law is a noble
profession. It is a special privilege bestowed only upon those who are
competent intellectually, academically and morally.
A lawyer must at all times conduct himself, especially in his dealings with
his clients and the public at large, with honesty and integrity in a manner
beyond reproach. More importantly, possession of good moral character
must be continuous as a requirement to the enjoyment of the privilege of
law practice; otherwise, the loss thereof is a ground for the revocation of
such privilege.
As a lawyer, who was also a public officer, respondent miserably failed to
cope with the strict demands and high standards of the legal profession.
Section 27 Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court mandates that a lawyer
may be disbarred or suspended for, among other acts, gross misconduct in
office.
DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, Atty. Gutierrez is hereby DISBARRED from
the practice of law and ordered to return the amount he received from the
complainant with legal interest from his receipt of the money until payment.
The case shall be referred to the Office of the Ombudsman for criminal
prosecution for violation of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Acts and to the
Department of Justice for appropriate administrative action.
Rule 6.01 Primary Duty: That Justice is Done
PEOPLE VS PINEDA (1967)
FACTS: Respondents Tomas Narbasa, Tambac Alindo and Rufino Borres
stand indicted before the Court of First Instance of Lanao del Norte, as
principals, in five (5) separate cases, four for murder and one for frustrated
murder. The indictments are bottomed upon the following alleged pivotal
facts:
On the night of July 29, 1965, the occupants of the home of the spouses
Teofilo Mendoza and Valeriana Bontilao de Mendoza in Puga-an. City of
Iligan, were asleep. It was then that guns (rifle, caliber 22) and pali-untod
(home-made gun) were fired in rapid succession from outside the house.
Teofilo Mendoza fell dead. Thereafter, defendants below destroyed the door
of the house, entered therein and let loose several shots killing Neceforo
Mendoza, Epifania Mendoza and Marcelo Mendoza — all minor children of
the couple — and wounding Valeriana Bontilao de Mendoza.
Two of the three defendants in the five criminal cases heretofore listed —
Tomas Narbasa and Tambac Alindo — moved for a consolidation thereof
"into one (1) criminal case." Their plea is that "said cases arose out of the
same incident and motivated by one impulse."
Giving the nod to defendant's claim, respondent Judge, in an order dated
May 13, 1966, directed the City Fiscal to unity all the five criminal cases,
and to file one single information in Case 1246. He also ordered that the
other four cases, Nos. 1247, 1248, 1249 and 1250 "be dropped from the
docket."
The City Fiscal balked at the foregoing order, sought reconsideration
thereof, upon the ground that "more than one gun was used, more than one
shot was fired and more than one victim was killed." The defense opposed.
On May 31, 1966, respondent Judge denied the motion to reconsider. He
took the position that the acts complained of "stemmed out of a series of
continuing acts on the part of the accused, not by different and separate
sets of shots, moved by one impulse and should therefore be treated as one
crime to the series of shots killed more than one victim"; and that only one
information for multiple murder should be filed, to "obviate the necessity of
trying five cases instead of one."
Primarily to annul respondent Judge's orders of May 13, 1966 and May 31,
1966, as having been issued without or in excess of jurisdiction and/or with
grave abuse of discretion, the People came to this Court on certiorari with a
prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction, and for other reliefs.
ISSUE: Whether or not the hesitation of the City Fiscal of Iligan to
consolidate the five criminal charges for murder was proper?
HELD: Yes. Upon the facts and the law, we hold that the City Fiscal of Iligan
City correctly presented the five separate informations — four for murder
and one for frustrated murder.
The impact of respondent Judge's orders is that his judgment is to be
substituted for that of the prosecutor's on the matter of what crime is to be
11
filed in court. The question of instituting a criminal charge is one addressed
to the sound discretion of the investigating Fiscal. The information he lodges
in court must have to be supported by facts brought about by an inquiry
made by him. It stands to reason then to say that in a clash of views between
the judge who did not investigate and the fiscal who did, or between the
fiscal and the offended party or the defendant, those of the Fiscal's should
normally prevail. In this regard, he cannot ordinarily be subject to dictation.
We are not to be understood as saying that criminal prosecution may not be
blocked in exceptional cases. A relief in equity "may be availed of to stop a
purported enforcement of a criminal law where it is necessary (a) for the
orderly administration of justice; (b) to prevent the use of the strong arm of
the law in an oppressive and vindictive manner; (c) to avoid multiplicity of
actions; (d) to afford adequate protection to constitutional rights; and (e) in
proper cases, because the statute relied upon is unconstitutional or was
'held invalid.'" 15 Nothing in the record would as much as intimate that the
present case fits into any of the situations just recited.
And at this distance and in the absence of any compelling fact or
circumstance, we are loathe to tag the City Fiscal of Iligan City with abuse
of discretion in filing separate cases for murder and frustrated murder,
instead of a single case for the complex crime of robbery with homicide and
frustrated homicide under the provisions of Article 294 (1) of the Revised
Penal Code or, for that matter, for multiple murder and frustrated murder.
We state that, here, the Fiscal's discretion should not be controlled.
Upon the record as it stands, the writ of certiorari prayed for is hereby
granted; the orders of respondent Judge of May 13, 1966 and May 31, 1966
are hereby set aside and declared null and void, and, in consequence, the
writ of preliminary injunction heretofore issued is made permanent insofar
as it stops enforcement of the said orders; and the respondent Judge, or
whoever takes his place, is hereby directed to reinstate Criminal Cases
1246, 1247, 1248, 1249 and 1250 as they were commenced, and to take
steps towards the final determination thereof.
SUMMARY: [Connection of the case in Rule 6.01]
PROSECUTION OF OFFENSES; FISCAL NOT COMPELLED TO FILE A
PARTICULAR CHARGE; REASONS THEREFORE. — A prosecuting
attorney is under no compulsion to file a particular criminal information
where he is not convinced that he has evidence to prop up the averments
thereof, or that the evidence at hand points to a different conclusion,
notwithstanding the possibility of abuses on his part, because he should not
be unduly compelled to work against his conviction and, in case of doubt,
should be given the benefit thereof. A contrary rule may result in courts
being unnecessarily swamped with unmeritorious cases and, worse still, a
criminal suspect's right to due process may be transgressed.
FISCAL'S OPINION ON WHAT CRIME IS TO BE CHARGED NORMALLY
PREVAILS. — As the question of instituting a criminal charge is addressed
to the sound discretion of the investigating fiscal, in a clash of views as what
crime is to be charged, between the judge who did not investigate and the
fiscal who did, or between the fiscal and the offended party or the defendant,
those of the fiscal's should normally prevail.
CONCLUSION: Fiscal didn't file and consolidate the case for murder as per
Judge's order because he believes that the Judge had an error of
judgement. He ensured that justice should prevail and the proper
information should be filed separately for each suspect.
Rule 6.02 Not Use Public Position for Private Interest
Misamin vs. San Juan (1976)
FACTS: Respondent, as noted in the Report of the Solicitor-General,
"admits having appeared as counsel for the New Cesar's Bakery in the
proceeding before the NLRC while he held office as captain in the Manila
Metropolitan Police. However, he contends that the law did not prohibit him
from such isolated exercise of his profession. He contends that his
appearance as counsel, while holding a government position, is not among
the grounds provided by the Rules of Court for the suspension or removal
of attorneys. The respondent also denies having conspired with the
complainant Misamin's attorney in the NLRC proceeding in order to trick the
complainant into signing an admission that he had been paid his separation
pay. Likewise, the respondent denies giving illegal protection to members of
the Chinese community in Sta. Cruz, Manila." 1
Then came a detailed account in such Report of the proceedings: "Pursuant
to the resolution of this Honorable Court of March 21, 1975, the Solicitor
General's Office set the case for investigation on July 2 and 3, 1975. The
counsel for the complainant failed to appear, and the investigation was reset
to August 15, 1975. At the latter date, the same counsel for complainant
was absent. In both instances, the said counsel did not file written motion
for postponement but merely sent the complainant to explain the reason for
his absence. When the case was again called for hearing on October 16,
1975, counsel for complainant failed once more to appear. The complainant
who was present explained that his lawyer was busy 'preparing an affidavit
in the Court of First Instance of Manila.' When asked if he was willing to
proceed with the hearing in the absence of his counsel, the complainant
declared, apparently without any prodding, that he wished his complaint
withdrawn. He explained that he brought the present action in an outburst
of anger believing that the respondent San Juan took active part in the unjust
dismissal of his complaint with the NLRC. The complainant added that after
reexamining his case, he believed the respondent to be without fault and a
truly good person." 2
The Report of the Solicitor-General did not take into account respondent's
practice of his profession notwithstanding his being a police official, as "this
is not embraced in Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court which
provides the grounds for the suspension or removal of an attorney. The
respondent's appearance at the labor proceeding notwithstanding that he
was an incumbent police officer of the City of Manila may appropriately he
referred to the National Police Commission and the Civil Service
Commission. As a matter of fact, separate complaints on this ground have
been filed and are under investigation by the Office of the Mayor of Manila
and the National Police Commission." 3 As for the charges that respondent
conspired with complainant's counsel to mislead complainant to admitting
having received his separation pay and for giving illegal protection to aliens,
it is understandable why the Report of the Solicitor General recommended
that they be dismissed for lack of evidence
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent be disbarred due to allegedly using
his government position in advancing the case he is handling?
HELD: No. The Court adopted the report of the Solicitor General that the
case be dismissed for lack of evidence.
The conclusion arrived at by the Solicitor-General that the complaint cannot
prosper is in accordance with the settled law. As far back as in re Tionko, 4
decided in 1922, the authoritative doctrine was set forth by Justice Malcolm
in this wise: "The serious consequences of disbarment or suspension should
follow only where there is a clear preponderance of evidence against the
respondent. The presumption is that the attorney is innocent of the charges
preferred and has performed his duty as an officer of the court in accordance
with his oath." 5 The Tionko doctrine has been subsequently adhered to. 6
This resolution does not in any wise take into consideration whatever
violations there might have been of the Civil Service Law in view of
respondent practicing his profession while holding his position of Captain in
the Metro Manila police force. That is a matter to be decided in the
administrative proceeding as noted in the recommendation of the Solicitor-
General. Nonetheless, while the charges have to be dismissed, still it would
not be inappropriate for respondent member of the bar to avoid all
appearances of impropriety. Certainly, the fact that the suspicion could be
entertained that far from living true to the concept of a public office being a
public trust, he did make use, not so much of whatever legal knowledge he
possessed, but the influence that laymen could assume was inherent in the
office held not only to frustrate the beneficent statutory scheme that labor
be justly compensated but also to be at the beck and call of what the
complainant called alien interest, is a matter that should not pass unnoticed.
Respondent, in his future actuations as a member of the bar, should refrain
from laying himself open to such doubts and misgivings as to his fitness not
only for the position occupied by him but also for membership in the bar. He
is not worthy of membership in an honorable profession who does not even
take care that his honor remains unsullied.
12
DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, this administrative complaint against
respondent Miguel A. San Juan is dismissed for not having been duly
proved. Let a copy of this resolution be spread on his record.
Vitriolo vs Dasig (2003)
FACTS: Almost all complainants in the instant case are high-ranking officers
of the CHED. In their sworn Complaint-Affidavit filed with this Court on
December 4, 1998, complainants allege that respondent, while she was OIC
of Legal Affairs Service, CHED, committed acts that are grounds for
disbarment under Section 27, 2 Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
a) Sometime in August 1998 and during the effectivity of Respondent's
designation as Officer-in-Charge of Legal Affairs Service, CHED, she
demanded from Betty C. Mangohon, a teacher of Our Lady of Mariazel
Educational Center in Novaliches, Quezon City, the amount of P20,000.00
and later reduced to P5,000.00 for the facilitation of her application for
correction of name then pending before the Legal Affairs Service, CHED . .
b) Likewise, sometime in July to August 1998 and during the effectivity of
Respondent's designation as Officer-in-Charge of Legal Affairs Service,
CHED, she demanded from Rosalie B. Dela Torre, a student, the amount of
P18,000.00 to P20,000.00 for facilitation of her application for correction of
name then pending before the Legal Affairs Service, CHED . . .
c) Likewise, sometime in September 1998 and during the effectivity of
Respondent's designation as Officer-in-Charge of Legal Affairs Service,
CHED, she demanded from Rocella G. Eje, a student, the amount of
P5,000.00 for facilitation of her application for correction of name then
pending before the Legal Affairs Service, CHED . . . In addition, Respondent
even suggested to Ms. Eje to register her birth anew with full knowledge of
the existence of a prior registration . . .
d) Likewise, sometime in August to September 1998 and during the
effectivity of Respondent's designation as Officer-in-Charge of Legal Affairs
Service, CHED, she demanded from Jacqueline N. Ng, a student, a
considerable amount which was subsequently confirmed to be P15,000.00
and initial fee of P5,000.00 more or less for facilitation of her application for
correction of name then pending before the Legal Affairs Service, CHED . .
. In addition, the Respondent even suggested to Ms. Ng to hire a lawyer who
shall be chosen by Respondent Dasig to facilitate the application for
correction of name. 3
Complainants likewise aver that respondent violated her oath as attorney-
at-law by filing eleven (11) baseless, groundless, and unfounded suits
before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City, which were
subsequently dismissed. 4
Further, complainants charge respondent of transgressing subparagraph b
(22), Section 36 5 of Presidential Decree No. 807, for her willful failure to
pay just debts owing to "Borela Tire Supply" and "Nova's Lining Brake &
Clutch" as evidenced by the dishonored checks she issued, 6 the complaint
sheet, and the subpoena issued to respondent. 7
Complainants also allege that respondent instigated the commission of a
crime against complainant Celedonia R. Coronacion and Rodrigo
Coronacion, Jr., when she encouraged and ordered her son, Jonathan
Dasig, a guard of the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology, to draw his
gun and shoot the Coronacions on the evening of May 14, 1997. As a result
of this incident, a complaint for grave threats against the respondent and
her son, docketed as Criminal Case No. 86052, was lodged with the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 36. 8
Finally, complainants allege that respondent authored and sent to then
President Joseph Estrada a libelous and unfair report, which maligned the
good names and reputation of no less than eleven (11) CHED Directors
calculated to justify her ill motive of preventing their re-appointment and with
the end view of securing an appointment for herself.
In its report and recommendation, dated April 5, 2002, the IBP Commission
on Bar Discipline stated as follows:
From the foregoing evidence on record, it can be concluded that respondent
in violation of her oath as a government official and as a member of the Bar,
indeed made unlawful demands or attempted to extort money from certain
people who had pending applications/requests before her office in exchange
for her promise to act favorably on said applications/requests. Clearly,
respondent unlawfully used her public office in order to secure financial
spoils to the detriment of the dignity and reputation of the Commission on
Higher Education.
For the foregoing reasons, it is recommended that respondent be
suspended from the practice of law for the maximum period allowable of
three (3) years with a further warning that similar action in the future will be
a ground for disbarment of respondent.
ISSUE: Whether or not ther respondent attorney-at-law, as Officer-in-
Charge (OIC) of Legal Services, CHED, may be disciplined by this Court for
her malfeasance, considering that her position, at the time of filing of the
complaint, was "Chief Education Program Specialist, Standards
Development Division, Office of Programs and Standards, CHED."?
HELD: YES. Generally speaking, a lawyer who holds a government office
may not be disciplined as a member of the Bar for misconduct in the
discharge of his duties as a government official. 14 However, if said
misconduct as a government official also constitutes a violation of his oath
as a lawyer, then he may be disciplined by this Court as a member of the
Bar.
In this case, the record shows that the respondent, on various occasions,
during her tenure as OIC, Legal Services, CHED, attempted to extort from
Betty C. Mangohon, Rosalie B. Dela Torre, Rocella G. Eje, and Jacqueline
N. Ng sums of money as consideration for her favorable action on their
pending applications or requests before her office. The evidence remains
unrefuted, given the respondent's failure, despite the opportunities afforded
her by this Court and the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline to comment on
the charges. We find that respondent's misconduct as a lawyer of the CHED
is of such a character as to affect her qualification as a member of the Bar,
for as a lawyer, she ought to have known that it was patently unethical and
illegal for her to demand sums of money as consideration for the approval
of applications and requests awaiting action by her office.
The Attorney's Oath is the source of the obligations and duties of every
lawyer and any violation thereof is a ground for disbarment, suspension, or
other disciplinary action. The Attorney's Oath imposes upon every member
of the bar the duty to delay no man for money or malice. Said duty is further
stressed in Rule 1.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. 16
Respondent's demands for sums of money to facilitate the processing of
pending applications or requests before her office violates such duty, and
runs afoul of the oath she took when admitted to the Bar. Such actions
likewise run contrary to Rule 1.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
A member of the Bar who assumes public office does not shed his
professional obligations. Hence, the Code of Professional Responsibility,
promulgated on June 21, 1988, was not meant to govern the conduct of
private practitioners alone, but of all lawyers including those in government
service. This is clear from Canon 6 17 of said Code. Lawyers in government
are public servants who owe the utmost fidelity to the public service. Thus,
they should be more sensitive in the performance of their professional
obligations, as their conduct is subject to the ever-constant scrutiny of the
public.
Respondent's attempts to extort money from persons with applications or
requests pending before her office are violative of Rule 1.01 18 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility, which prohibits members of the Bar from
engaging or participating in any unlawful, dishonest, or deceitful acts.
Moreover, said acts constitute a breach of Rule 6.02 19 of the Code which
bars lawyers in government service from promoting their private interests.
Promotion of private interests includes soliciting gifts or anything of
monetary value in any transaction requiring the approval of his office or
which may be affected by the functions of his office. Respondent's conduct
in office falls short of the integrity and good moral character required from
all lawyers, specially from one occupying a high public office. For a lawyer
in public office is expected not only to refrain from any act or omission which
13
might tend to lessen the trust and confidence of the citizenry in government,
she must also uphold the dignity of the legal profession at all times and
observe a high standard of honesty and fair dealing. Otherwise said, a
lawyer in government service is a keeper of the public faith and is burdened
with high degree of social responsibility, perhaps higher than her brethren
in private practice.
For her violation of the Attorney's Oath as well as of Rule 1.01 and Rule
1.03 of Canon 1 20 and Rule 6.02 of Canon 6 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, particularly for acts of dishonesty as well as gross
misconduct as OIC, Legal Services, CHED, we find that respondent
deserves not just the penalty of three years' suspension from membership
in the Bar as well as the practice of law, as recommended by the IBP Board
of Governors, but outright disbarment. Her name shall be stricken off the list
of attorneys upon finality of this decision.
DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Felina S. Dasig is found
liable for gross misconduct and dishonesty in violation of the Attorney's Oath
as well as the Code of Professional Responsibility, and is hereby ordered
DISBARRED.
Huyssen v. Gutierrez
FACTS: A Complaint for disbarment was filed by Huyssen against
respondent Atty. Fred L. Gutierrez. Allegations are as follows:
- that in 1995, while respondent was still connected with the Bureau of
Immigration and Deportation (BID), she (petitioner herein) and her three
sons, who are all American citizens, applied for Philippine Visas under
Section 13[g] of the Immigration Law
- Respondent told the petitioner that their visa applications will be acted
favorably if they deposit a certain sum of money for a period of one year
which could be withdrawn after one year.
- Complainant deposited with respondent on six different occasions from
April 1995 to April 1996the total amount of US$20,000, believing it was
required by law.
- Respondent prepared receipts/vouchers as proofs that he received the
amounts deposited by the complainant but refused to give her copies of
official receipts despite her demands
- Complainant demanded the deposited sum after a year but respondent
failed to return.
- Thus, the World Mission for Jesus (of which complainant was a member)
sent a demand letter to respondent for the immediate return of the money
- In a letter (March 9, 1999), respondent promised to release the amount not
later than 9 March1999. But he failed to do so. - World Mission for Jesus
sent another demand letter - In a letter explaining the alleged reasons for
the delay in the release of deposited amount (19 March 1999), he enclosed
two blank checks postdated to 6 April and 20 April 1999 andauthorized
complainant to fill in the amounts.
- When the complainant deposited the postdated checks on their due dates,
the same were dishonored because the respondent had stopped payment
on the same.
- In a letter (25 April 1999) respondent explained again for stopping
payments and gave complainant five postdated checks with the assurance
that said checks would be honoured
- Complainant deposited the five postdated checks on their due dates but
they were all dishonored for having been drawn against insufficient funds or
payment thereon was ordered stopped by the respondent.
- Hence, complainant referred the matter to a lawyer who sent two demand
letters to respondent, which remained unheeded.
Respondent claimed having never physically received the money
mentioned in the complaint, thus he could not have appropriated or
pocketed the same. He said the amount was used as payment for services
rendered for obtaining the permanent visas in the Philippines
Investigating Commissioner: Considering that respondent was able to
perpetrate the fraud by taking advantage of his position with the Board of
Special Inquiry of the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation, makes it more
reprehensible as it has caused damage to the reputation and integrity of
said office. It is submitted that respondent has violated Rule 6.02 of Canon
6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which reads:
“A lawyer in the government service shall not use his public position to
promote or advance his private interests, nor allow the latter to interfere with
his public duties.”
IBP Governors: Disbarred Respondent
ISSUE: Whether the respondent’s conduct violated the Code of Professional
Responsibility and merits the penalty of disbarment?
RULING: Yes, the respondent should be disbarred.
The defense of denial proferred by respondent is not convincing. It is settled
that denial, which is inherently a weak defense, to be believed must be
buttressed by a strong evidence of non-culpability. The evidence,
respondent’s letters to the complainant, shows that he made it appear that
the US$20,000 was officially deposited with the Bureau of Immigration and
Deportation. If this is true, how come only Petty Cash Vouchers were issued
by respondent to complainant to prove his receipt of the said sum and official
receipts therefore were never issued by the said Bureau? Also, why would
respondent issue his personal checks to cover the return of the money to
complainant if said amount was really officially deposited with the Bureau of
Immigration? All these actions of respondent point to the inescapable
conclusion that respondent received the money from complainant and
appropriated the same for his personal use.
Lawyers in government service in the discharge of their official task have
more restrictions than lawyers in private practice. Want of moral integrity is
to be more severely condemned in a lawyer who holds a responsible public
office.
Considering that respondent was able to perpetrate the fraud by taking
advantage of his position with the Board of Special Inquiry of the Bureau of
Immigration and Deportation, makes it more reprehensible as it has caused
damage to the reputation and integrity of said office. It is submitted that
respondent has violated Rule 6.02 of Canon 6 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which reads:
"A lawyer in the government service shall not use his public position to
promote or advance his private interests, nor allow the latter to interfere with
his public duties."
Also, the act of issuing a bouncing check shows moral turpitude.
Respondent's acts are more despicable, for not only did he misappropriate
the money of complainant; worse, he had the gall to prepare receipts with
the letterhead of the BID and issued checks to cover up his misdeeds.
Time and again, we have declared that the practice of law is a noble
profession. It is a special privilege bestowed only upon those who are
competent intellectually, academically and morally.
A lawyer must at all times conduct himself, especially in his dealings with
his clients and the public at large, with honesty and integrity in a manner
beyond reproach. More importantly, possession of good moral character
must be continuous as a requirement to the enjoyment of the privilege of
law practice; otherwise, the loss thereof is a ground for the revocation of
such privilege.
As a lawyer, who was also a public officer, respondent miserably failed to
cope with the strict demands and high standards of the legal profession.
Section 27 Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court mandates that a lawyer
may be disbarred or suspended for, among other acts, gross misconduct in
office.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Gutierrez is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of
law and ordered to return the amount he received from the complainant with
legal interest from his receipt of the money until payment. The case shall be
referred to the Office of the Ombudsman for criminal prosecution for
violation of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Acts and to the Department of
Justice for appropriate administrative action.
Ramos v. Imbang
14
FACTS: In 1992, the complainant Diana Ramos sought the assistance of
respondent Atty. Jose R. Imbang in filing civil and criminal actions against
the spouses Roque and Elenita Jovellanos. She gave respondent P8,500
as attorney's fees but the latter issued a receipt for P5,000 only.
The complainant tried to attend the scheduled hearings of her cases against
the Jovellanoses. Oddly, respondent never allowed her to enter the
courtroom and always told her to wait outside. He would then come out after
several hours to inform her that the hearing had been cancelled and
rescheduled. This happened six times and for each “appearance” in court,
respondent charged her P350.
After six consecutive postponements, the complainant became suspicious.
She personally inquired about the status of her cases in the trial courts of
Biñan and San Pedro, Laguna. She was shocked to learn that respondent
never filed any case against the Jovellanoses and that he was in fact
employed in the Public Attorney's Office (PAO).
HELD: Attorney Imbang is disbarred and his name stricken from the roll of
attorneys.
Lawyers are expected to conduct themselves with honesty and integrity.
More specifically, lawyers in government service are expected to be more
conscientious of their actuations as they are subject to public scrutiny. They
are not only members of the bar but also public servants who owe utmost
fidelity to public service.
Government employees are expected to devote themselves completely to
public service. For this reason, the private practice of profession is
prohibited. Section 7(b)(2) of the Code of Ethical Standards for Public
Officials and Employees provides:
Section 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. -- In addition to acts and
omissions of public officials and employees now prescribed in the
Constitution and existing laws, the following constitute prohibited acts and
transactions of any public official and employee and are hereby declared
unlawful:
(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto, public officials
and employees during their incumbency shall not:
(1) Engage in the private practice of profession unless authorized by the
Constitution or law, provided that such practice will not conflict with their
official function.
Thus, lawyers in government service cannot handle private cases for they
are expected to devote themselves full-time to the work of their respective
offices.
In this instance, respondent received P5,000 from the complainant and
issued a receipt on July 15, 1992 while he was still connected with the PAO.
Acceptance of money from a client establishes an attorney-client
relationship. Respondent's admission that he accepted money from the
complainant and the receipt confirmed the presence of an attorney-client
relationship between him and the complainant. Moreover, the receipt
showed that he accepted the complainant's case while he was still a
government lawyer. Respondent clearly violated the prohibition on private
practice of profession.
Aggravating respondent's wrongdoing was his receipt of attorney's fees.
The PAO was created for the purpose of providing free legal assistance to
indigent litigants. Section 14(3), Chapter 5, Title III, Book V of the Revised
Administrative Code provides:
Sec. 14. Xxx The PAO shall be the principal law office of the Government
in extending free legal assistance to indigent persons in criminal, civil, labor,
administrative and other quasi-judicial cases.
As a PAO lawyer, respondent should not have accepted attorney's fees from
the complainant as this was inconsistent with the office's mission.
Respondent violated the prohibition against accepting legal fees other than
his salary.
Every lawyer is obligated to uphold the law. This undertaking includes the
observance of the above-mentioned prohibitions blatantly violated by
respondent when he accepted the complainant's cases and received
attorney's fees in consideration of his legal services. Consequently,
respondent's acceptance of the cases was also a breach of Rule 18.01 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility because the prohibition on the
private practice of profession disqualified him from acting as the
complainant's counsel.
Aside from disregarding the prohibitions against handling private cases and
accepting attorney's fees, respondent also surreptitiously deceived the
complainant. Not only did he fail to file a complaint against the Jovellanoses
(which in the first place he should not have done), respondent also led the
complainant to believe that he really filed an action against the
Jovellanoses. He even made it appear that the cases were being tried and
asked the complainant to pay his “appearance fees” for hearings that never
took place. These acts constituted dishonesty, a violation of the lawyer's
oath not to do any falsehood.
Respondent's conduct in office fell short of the integrity and good moral
character required of all lawyers, specially one occupying a public office.
Lawyers in public office are expected not only to refrain from any act or
omission which tend to lessen the trust and confidence of the citizenry in
government but also uphold the dignity of the legal profession at all times
and observe a high standard of honesty and fair dealing. A government
lawyer is a keeper of public faith and is burdened with a high degree of social
responsibility, higher than his brethren in private practice.
There is, however, insufficient basis to find respondent guilty of violating
Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Respondent did not
hold the money for the benefit of the complainant but accepted it as his
attorney's fees. He neither held the amount in trust for the complainant (such
as an amount delivered by the sheriff in satisfaction of a judgment obligation
in favor of the client) nor was it given to him for a specific purpose (such as
amounts given for filing fees and bail bond). Nevertheless, respondent
should return the P5,000 as he, a government lawyer, was not entitled to
attorney's fees and not allowed to accept them.
Tiong v. Florendo
Facts: Atty. George Florendo has been serving as the lawyer of spouses
Elpidio and Ma. Elena Tiong. Elpidio, a US citizen is oftentimes away. For
two years, he suspected that his wife and Atty. Florendo were having an
affair. Finally, in 1995, he was able to listen to a telephone conversation
where he heard Atty. Florendo say "I love you, I'll call you later" to Ma. Elena.
When confronted, his wife initially denied any amorous involvement with
respondent but eventually broke down and confessed to their love affair that
began in 1993. Respondent likewise admitted the relationship.
Atty. Florendo, Elena and Elpidio met at the Mandarin Restaurant in Baguio
City and, in the presence of a Notary Public, respondent and Ma. Elena
executed and signed an affidavit attesting to their illicit relationship and
seeking their respective spouses' forgiveness. The affidavit stated “xxx We
committed adultery against our spouses from May 1993 to May 13, 1995
and we hereby ask forgiveness and assure our spouses that this thing will
never happen again with us or any other person. We assure that we will no
longer see each other nor have any communication directly or indirectly xxx”
Notwithstanding, complainant instituted a disbarment çase charging
respondent of gross immorality and grave misconduct.Respondent admitted
the material allegations of the complaint but interposed the defense of
pardon
ISSUE: whether the pardon extended by complainant in the Affidavit is
sufficient to warrant the dismissal of the present disbarment case against
respondent for gross immoral conduct - NO.
Held: Possession of good moral character is not only a condition for
admission to the Bar but is a continuing requirement to maintain one's good
standing in the legal profession. It is the bounden duty of law practitioners
to observe the highest degree of morality in order to safeguard the integrity
15
of the Bar.[9] Consequently, any errant behaviour on the part of a lawyer,
be it in his public or private activities, which tends to show him deficient in
moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor, is sufficient to warrant
his suspension or disbarment.
In this case, respondent admitted his illicit relationship with a married
woman not his wife, and worse, that of his client. Contrary to respondent's
claim, their consortium cannot be classified as a mere "moment of
indiscretion"[10] considering that it lasted for two (2) years and was only
aborted when complainant overheard their amorous phone conversation on
March 13, 1995.
Respondent's act of having an affair with his client's wife manifested his
disrespect for the laws on the sanctity of marriage and his own marital vow
of fidelity. It showed his utmost moral depravity and low regard for the ethics
of his profession.[11] Likewise, he violated the trust and confidence reposed
on him by complainant which in itself is prohibited under Canon 17[12] of
the Code of Professional Responsibility. Undeniably, therefore, his illicit
relationship with Ma. Elena amounts to a disgraceful and grossly immoral
conduct warranting disciplinary action from the Court.[13] Section 27, Rule
138 of the Rules of Court provides that an attorney may be disbarred or
suspended from his office by the Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other
gross misconduct in office, grossly immoral conduct, among others.
A case of suspension or disbarment is sui generis and not meant to grant
relief to a complainant as in a civil case but is intended to cleanse the ranks
of the legal profession of its undesirable members in order to protect the
public and the courts. It is not an investigation into the acts of respondent
as a husband but on his conduct as an officer of the Court and his fitness to
continue as a member of the Bar. Hence, the Affidavit dated March 15, 1995,
which is akin to an affidavit of desistance, cannot have the effect of abating
the instant proceedings.
WHEREFORE, respondent ATTY. GEORGE M. FLORENDO is hereby
found GUILTY of Gross Immorality and is SUSPENDED from the practice
of law for SIX (6) MONTHS effective upon notice hereof, with a STERN
WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar offense will be dealt with
more severely.
In Re Avecilla
Facts: In July 2003, the respondent Atty. Victor Avecilla and Luis Biraogo
sent a letter to the Chief Justice Davide,requesting for documents re:
expenditure of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF).
The respondent and Biraogo asserted their contributions to the JDF through
the docket and legal fees theypaid in G.R No. 72954, to show that they have
an interest in how the JDF was being spent.
(Flashback: In 1985, respondent Avecilla and Biraogo filed a petition, G.R.
No. 72954 , assailing B.P Blg . 883(w/c called for a snap election in 1986 )
The court En banc dismissed said petition. The rollo of said petition was
then entrusted to the Judicial Records Office (JRO).)
(Back in 2003) C.J. Davide instructed Atty. Teresita Dimaisip, then JRO
Chief, to forward the rollo of G.R. No.72954 to verify the claim of the
respondent and Mr. Biraogo.
The rollo of G.R. No. 72954 could not be found in the archives, accdg. to
Dimaisip, but based on the tracercard of G.R. No. 72954, the rollo was
borrowed in 1991 by respondent Avecilla, and was never returned.
The tracer card of G.R. No. 72954 bears the name of the respondent and
the signature of Atty.Banzon who, on behalf of the respondent, received the
rollo
After being told to make a report by C.J. Davide, Atty. Dimaisip reported the
ff in a a Memorandum:
When the rollo of G.R. No. 72954 was borrowed, the respondent was
employed with the S.C. as staffof retired Justice Gancayco.
That upon contacting him, respondent acknowledged having borrowed the
subject rollo
Respondent turned over said rollo in August 2003, almost twelve (12) years
after it was borrowed. C.J. Davide directed the Office of the Chief Attorney
(OCAT), to make a report on the incident. The OCATreported that the
respondent may be administratively charged, as a lawyer and member of
the bar. OCAT ’s observations:
J. Gancayco retired on 20 August 1991. Respondent (Gancayco’s staff er)
was nearing the end of histenure when he borrowed the subject rollo on 13
September 1991. (by custom, staff are given an extension after retirement
of their boss). This indicates that the rollo was borrowed for a personal
agenda.
Although he can’t be sanctioned as an employee, he can be
administratively sanctioned as a lawyerand officer of the court The Court
En banc directed respondent to show cause
Respondent’s explanation:
Somebody signed the tracer card and took the rollo in his name.
Respondent said that it might havebeen Atty. Banzon. ]
For an unknown reason, the subject rollo ended up in his box of personal
papers
He denounced any ill-motive, saying that until he was contacted by Atty.
Dimaisip, he never checkedhis box, and that he cooperated in the return of
said item.
OCAT found this Explanation to be unsatisfactory.
OBC found respondent to be accountable and recommended that he be
suspended from practicing law for one year.
ISSUE: Whether Atty. Victor Avecilla has violated Canon 6 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility? -- YES.
HELD: First. Despite the denial of the respondent, the undisputed fact
remains that it was from his possession that the missing rollo was retrieved
about twelve (12) years after it was borrowed from the JRO. This fact, in the
absence of any plausible explanation to the contrary, is sufficient affirmation
that, true to what the tracer card states, it was the respondent who borrowed
the rollo of G.R. No. 72954.
Second. The respondent offered no convincing explanation how the subject
rollo found its way into his box of personal papers and effects. The
respondent can only surmise that the subject rollo may have been
inadvertently placed in his personal box by another member of the staff of
Justice Gancayco.
Third. If anything, the respondent’s exceptional stature as a lawyer and
former confidante of a Justice of this Court only made his excuse
unacceptable, if not totally unbelievable. As adequately rebuffed by the
OCAT in its Report.
The act of the respondent in borrowing a rollo for unofficial business entails
the employment of deceit not becoming a member of the bar.1awphi1 It
presupposes the use of misrepresentation and, to a certain extent, even
abuse of position on the part of the respondent because the lending of rollos
are, as a matter of policy, only limited to official purposes.
As a lawyer then employed with the government, the respondent clearly
violated Rule 6.02, Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, to
wit:
Rule 6.02 - A lawyer in the government service shall not use his public
position to promote or advance his private interests, nor allow the latter to
interfere with his public duties.
16
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing premises, the respondent is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months. The respondent is
also STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of a similar offense in the future
will be dealt with more severely.
Rule 6.03 Not to accept Employment after Government Service
Rule 6.03. A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept
engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which he had
intervened while in said service.
R.A. No. 6713 Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials
and Employees.
Section 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. - In addition to acts and
omissions of public officials and employees now prescribed in the
Constitution and existing laws, the following shall constitute prohibited acts
and transactions of any public official and employee and are hereby
declared to be unlawful:
(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto. - Public officials
and employees during their incumbency shall not:
(1) Own, control, manage or accept employment as officer, employee,
consultant, counsel, broker, agent, trustee or nominee in any private
enterprise regulated, supervised or licensed by their office unless expressly
allowed by law;
(2) Engage in the private practice of their profession unless authorized by
the Constitution or law, provided, that such practice will not conflict or tend
to conflict with their official functions; or
(3) Recommend any person to any position in a private enterprise which has
a regular or pending official transaction with their office.
These prohibitions shall continue to apply for a period of one (1) year after
resignation, retirement, or separation from public office, except in the case
of subparagraph (b) (2) above, but the professional concerned cannot
practice his profession in connection with any matter before the office he
used to be with, in which case the one-year prohibition shall likewise apply.
Query of Atty. Karen M. Silverio, Buffe
FACTS: This administrative matter started as a letter-query dated March 4,
2008 of Atty. Karen M. Silverio-Buffe (Atty. Buffe) addressed to the Office of
the Court Administrator, which query the latter referred to the Court for
consideration. The query, as originally framed, related to Section 7 (b) (2) of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6713, as amended (or the Code of Conduct and
Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees). This provision places
a limitation on public officials and employees during their incumbency, and
those already separated from government employment for a period of one
(1) year after separation, in engaging in the private practice of their
profession.
The query arose because Atty. Buffe previously worked as Clerk of Court VI
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 81 of Romblon; she resigned from
her position effective February 1, 2008. Thereafter (and within the one-year
period of prohibition mentioned in the above-quoted provision), she
engaged in the private practice of law by appearing as private counsel in
several cases before RTC-Branch 81 of Romblon.
Atty. Buffe alleged that Section 7 (b) (2) of R.A. No. 6713 gives preferential
treatment to an incumbent public employee, who may engage in the private
practice of his profession so long as this practice does not conflict or tend
to conflict with his official functions. Retired, resigned, or has been
separated from government service like her, is prohibited from engaging in
private law practice on any matter before the officer where she used to work,
for a period of 1 year from the date of her separation from government
employment.
Atty. Buffe further alleged that the intention of the above prohibition is to
remove the exercise of clout, influence or privity to insider information, which
the incumbent public employee may use in the private practice of his
profession. However, this situation did not obtain in her case, since she had
already resigned as Clerk of Court of RTC-Branch 18 of Romblon. She
advanced the view that she could engage in the private practice of law
before RTC-Branch 81 of Romblon, so long as her appearance as legal
counsel shall not conflict or tend to conflict with her former duties as former
Clerk of Court of that Branch.
With respect to lawyers in the judiciary, the OCAT pointed to Section 5,
Canon 3 of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel — the rule that deals
with outside employment by an incumbent judicial employee and which
limits such outside employment to one that "does not require the practice of
law". The prohibition to practice law with respect to any matter where they
have intervened while in the government service is reiterated in Rule 6.03,
Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which governs the
conduct of lawyers in the government service.
Judge Geronimo of RTC Branch 81 reported the appearances of Atty. Buffe.
The recorded appearances was Manifested by Atty. Buffe as acknowledging
the fact. She also made known her intent to elevate the dismissal of the
above cases "so that eventually, the Honorable Supreme Court may put to
rest the legal issue/s presented in the above petitions which is, why is it that
R.A. No. 6713, Sec. 7 (b) (2) and last par. thereof, apparently contains an
express prohibition (valid or invalid) on the private practice of undersigned's
law profession, before Branch 81, while on the other hand not containing a
similar, express prohibition in regard to undersigned's practice of profession,
before the same court, as a public prosecutor — within the supposedly
restricted 1-year period?"
ISSUE: W/N Atty. Buffe is liable of violation of Rule 6.03 and her
appearances as private counsel before RTC Branch 18 of Romblon, to
which she was formerly a Clerk of Court, a violation also of the prohibition
provided by R.A. 6713
HELD/RATIO: YES. Atty. Buffe violated the prohibition.
Section 7 of R.A. No. 6713 generally provides for the prohibited acts and
transactions of public officials and employees. Subsection (b) (2) prohibits
them from engaging in the private practice of their profession during their
incumbency. As an exception, a public official or employee can engage in
the practice of his or her profession under the following conditions: first, the
private practice is authorized by the Constitution or by the law; and second,
the practice will not conflict, or tend to conflict, with his or her official
functions.
The Section 7 prohibitions continue to apply for a period of one year after
the public official or employee's resignation, retirement, or separation from
public office, except for the private practice of profession under subsection
(b) (2), which can already be undertaken even within the one-year
prohibition period. As an exception to this exception, the one-year prohibited
period applies with respect to any matter before the office the public officer
or employee used to work with. The Section 7 prohibitions are predicated
on the principle that public office is a public trust; and serve to remove any
impropriety, real or imagined, which may occur in government transactions
between a former government official or employee and his or her former
colleagues, subordinates or superiors. The prohibitions also promote the
observance and the efficient use of every moment of the prescribed office
hours to serve the public.
As per Atty. Buffe’s situation, her admission that she immediately engaged
in private practice of law within the one-year period of prohibition stated in
Section 7 (b) (2) of R.A. No. 6713. We find it noteworthy, too, that she is
aware of this provision and only objects to its application to her situation;
she practices it to be unfair that she cannot practice before her old office —
Branch 81 — for a year immediately after resignation, as she believes that
her only limitation is in matters where a conflict of interest exists between
her appearance as counsel and her former duties as Clerk of Court. She
believes that Section 7 (b) (2) gives preferential treatment to incumbent
public officials and employees as against those already separated from
government employment.
17
Atty. Buffe apparently misreads the law. As the OCAT aptly stated, she
interprets Section 7 (b) (2) as a blanket authority for an incumbent clerk of
court to practice law. We reiterate what we have explained above, that the
general rule under Section 7 (b) (2) is to bar public officials and employees
from the practice of their professions; it is unlawful under this general rule
for clerks of court to practice their profession. By way of exception, they can
practice their profession if the Constitution or the law allows them, but no
conflict of interest must exist between their current duties and the practice
of their profession. As we also mentioned above, no chance exists for
lawyers in the Judiciary to practice their profession, as they are in fact
expressly prohibited by Section 5, Canon 3 of the Code of Conduct for Court
Personnel from doing so. Under both the general rule and the exceptions,
therefore, Atty. Buffe's basic premise is misplaced
A worrisome aspect of Atty. Buffe's approach to Section 7 (b) (2) is her
awareness of the law and her readiness to risk its violation because of the
unfairness she perceives in the law. We find it disturbing that she first
violated the law before making any inquiry. She also justifies her position by
referring to the practice of other government lawyers known to her who, after
separation from their judicial employment, immediately engaged in the
private practice of law and appeared as private counsels before the RTC
branches where they were previously employed. Again we find this a
cavalier attitude on Atty. Buffe's part and, to our mind, only emphasizes her
own willful or intentional disregard of Section 7 (b) (2) of R.A. No. 6713.
Considering Atty. Buffe's ready admission of violating Section 7 (b) (2), the
principle of res ipsa loquitur finds application, making her administratively
liable for violation of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 and Canon 7 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Atty. Buffe had no qualms about the
simultaneous use of various fora in expressing her misgivings about the
perceived unfairness of Section 7 of R.A. 6713. She formally lodged a query
with the Office of the Court Administrator, and soon after filed her
successive petitions for declaratory relief. Effectively, she exposed these
fora to the possibility of embarrassment and confusion through their possibly
differing views on the issue she posed
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we find Atty. Karen M. Silverio-Buffe
GUILTY of professional misconduct for violating Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 and
Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. She is hereby FINED
in the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00), and STERNLY
WARNED that a repetition of this violation and the commission of other acts
of professional misconduct shall be dealt with more severely
R.A. No. 3019 ANTI-GRAFT AND CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT
Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts or
omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following
shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby
declared to be unlawful:
(d) Accepting or having any member of his family accept employment in a
private enterprise which has pending official business with him during the
pendency thereof or within one year after its termination.
PNB v. Cedo
FACTS: Complainant Philippine National Bank (PNB) charged respondent
Atty. Telesforo S. Cedo, former Asst. Vice-President of the Asset
Management Group of complainant bank, with violation of Canon 6, Rule
6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility by appearing as counsel for
individuals who had transactions with complainant bank in which respondent
during his employment with aforesaid bank, had intervened
Complainant averred that while respondent was still in its employ, he
participated in arranging the sale of steel sheets (denominated as Lots 54-
M and 55-M) in favor of Milagros Ong Siy for P200,000. He even "noted" the
gate passes issued by his subordinate, Mr. Emmanuel Elefan, in favor of
Mrs. Ong Siy authorizing the pull-out of the steel sheets from the DMC Man
Division Compound. When a civil action arose out of this transaction
between Mrs. Ong Siy and complainant bank before the Regional Trial Court
of Makati, Branch 146, respondent who had since left the employ of
complainant bank, appeared as one of the counsels of Mrs. Ong Siy.
While the respondent was still the Asst. Vice President of complainant's
Asset Management Group, he intervened in the handling of the loan account
of the spouses Ponciano and Eufemia Almeda with complainant bank by
writing demand letters to the couple. When a civil action ensued between
complainant bank and the Almeda spouses as a result of this loan account,
the latter were represented by the law firm "Cedo, Ferrer, Maynigo &
Associates" of which respondent is one of the Senior Partners.
In his comment, Cedo admitted that he appeared as counsel for Mrs. Ong
Siy but only with respect to the execution pending appeal of the RTC
decision. He alleged that he did not participate in the litigation of the case
before the trial court. With respect to the case of the Almeda spouses,
respondent alleged that he never appeared as counsel for them. He
contended that while the law firm "Cedo, Ferrer, Maynigo & Associates" is
designated as counsel of record, the case is actually handled only by Atty.
Pedro Ferrer. Respondent averred that he did not enter into a general
partnership with Atty. Pedro Ferrer nor with the other lawyers named
therein.
They are only using the aforesaid name to designate a law firm maintained
by lawyers, who although not partners, maintain one office as well as one
clerical and supporting staff. Each one of them handles their own cases
independently and individually receives the revenues therefrom which are
not shared among them
During IBP investigation, it was discovered that respondent was previously
fined by this Court in the amount of P1,000.00 in connection with G.R. No.
94456 entitled "Milagros Ong Siy vs. Hon. Salvador Tensuan, et al." for
forum shopping, where respondent appeared as counsel for petitioner
Milagros Ong Siy "through the law firm of Cedo Ferrer Maynigo and
Associates."
IBP further found that the charges herein against respondent were fully
substantiated. Respondent's averment that the law firm handling the case
of the Almeda spouses is not a partnership deserves scant consideration in
the light of the attestation of complainant's counsel, Atty. Pedro Singson,
that in one of the hearings of the Almeda spouses' case, respondent
attended the same with his partner Atty. Ferrer, and although he did not
enter his appearance, he was practically dictating to Atty. Ferrer what to say
and argue before the court.
IBP recommended suspension of respondent from the practice of law for 3
years.
ISSUE: W/N Cedo violated Canon 6 of the CPR.
HELD/RATIO: YES. In the similar case of Pasay Law and Conscience
Union, Inc. vs. Paz, (95 SCRA 24 [1980]) where a former Legal Officer and
Legal Prosecutor of PARGO who participated in the investigation of the Anti-
Graft case against Mayor Pablo Cuneta later on acted as counsel for the
said Mayor in the same anti-graft case, this Court, citing Nombrado vs.
Hernandez (26 SCRA 13 [1968]) ruled:
“... even if respondent did not use against his client any information or
evidence acquired by him as counsel it cannot be denied that he did become
privy to information regarding the ownership of the parcel of land which was
later litigated in the forcible entry case, for it was the dispute over the land
that triggered the mauling incident which gave rise to the criminal action for
physical injuries.
'Communications between attorney and client are, in a great number of
litigations, a complicated affair, consisting of entangled relevant and
irrelevant, secret and well-known facts. In the complexity of what is said in
the course of dealings between an attorney and client, inquiry of the nature
suggested would lead to the revelation, in advance of the trial, of other
matters that might only further prejudice the complainant's cause.'
Whatever may be said as to whether or not respondent utilized against his
former client information given to him in a professional capacity, the mere
fact of their previous relationship should have precluded him from appearing
as counsel for the other side in the forcible entry case.”
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The foregoing disquisition on conflicting interest applies with equal force and
effect to respondent in the case at bar. Having been an executive of
complainant bank, respondent now seeks to litigate as counsel for the
opposite side, a case against his former employer involving a transaction
which he formerly handled while still an employee of complainant, in
violation of Canon 6 of the Canons of Professional Ethics
"It is unprofessional to represent interests, except by express conflicting
consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. Within the
meaning of this canon, a lawyer represents conflicting interests when, in
behalf of one client, it is his duty to contend for that which duty to another
client requires him to oppose."
ACCORDINGLY, this Court resolves to SUSPEND respondent ATTY.
TELESFORO S. CEDO from the practice of law for THREE (3) YEARS,
effective immediately.
PCGG v. Sandiganbayan
FACTS: In 1976 the General Bank and Trust Company (GENBANK)
encountered financial difficulties. GENBANK had extended considerable
financial support to Filcapital Development Corporation causing it to incur
daily overdrawings on its current account with Central Bank. Despite the
mega loans GENBANK failed to recover from its financial woes.
The Central Bank issued a resolution declaring GENBANK insolvent and
unable to resume business with safety to its depositors, creditors and the
general public, and ordering its liquidation. A public bidding of GENBANK’s
assets was held where Lucio Tan group submitted the winning bid. Solicitor
General Estelito Mendoza filed a petition with the CFI praying for the
assistance and supervision of the court in GENBANK’s liquidation as
mandated by RA 265.
After EDSA Revolution I Pres Aquino established the PCGG to recover the
alleged ill-gotten wealth of former Pres Marcos, his family and cronies.
Pursuant to this mandate, the PCGG filed with the Sandiganbayan a
complaint for reversion, reconveyance, restitution against respondents
Lucio Tan, at.al. PCGG issued several writs of sequestration on properties
allegedly acquired by them by taking advantage of their close relationship
and influence with former Pres. Marcos.
The abovementioned respondents Tan, et. al are represented as their
counsel, former Solicitor General Mendoza. PCGG filed motions to
disqualify respondent Mendoza as counsel for respondents Tan et. al. with
Sandiganbayan. It was alleged that Mendoza as then Sol Gen and counsel
to Central Bank actively intervened in the liquidation of GENBANK which
was subsequently acquired by respondents Tan et. al., which subsequently
became Allied Banking Corporation.
The motions to disqualify invoked Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which prohibits former government lawyers from accepting
“engagement” or employment in connection with any matter in which he had
intervened while in the said service.
The Sandiganbayan issued a resolution denyting PCGG’s motion to
disqualify respondent Mendoza. It failed to prove the existence of an
inconsistency between respondent Mendoza’s former function as SolGen
and his present employment as counsel of the Lucio Tan group. PCGGs
recourse to this court assailing the Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan.
ISSUE: Whether Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
applies to respondent Mendoza. The prohibition states: “A lawyer shall not,
after leaving government service, accept engagement or employment in
connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in the said
service.”
HELD/RATIO: The case at bar does not involve the “adverse interest”
aspect of Rule 6.03. Respondent Mendoza, it is conceded, has no adverse
interest problem when he acted as SOlGen and later as counsel of
respondents et.al. before the Sandiganbayan.
 However there is still the issue of whether there exists a “congruent-interest
conflict” sufficient to disqualify respondent Mendoza from representing
respondents et. al. The key is unlocking the meaning of “matter” and the
metes and bounds of “intervention” that he made on the matter. Beyond
doubt that the “matter” or the act of respondent Mendoza as SolGen
involved in the case at bar is “advising the Central Bank, on how to proceed
with the said bank’s liquidation and even filing the petition for its liquidation
in CFI of Manila.
The Court held that the advice given by respondent Mendoza on the
procedure to liquidate GENBANK is not the “matter” contemplated by Rule
6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. ABA Formal Opinion No.
342 is clear in stressing that “drafting, enforcing or interpreting government
or agency procedures, regulations and laws, or briefing abstract principles
of law are acts which do not fall within the scope of the term “matter” and
cannot disqualify.
Respondent Mendoza had nothing to do with the decision of the Central
Bank to liquidate GENBANK. He also did not participate in the sale of
GENBANK to Allied Bank. The legality of the liquidation of GENBANK is not
an issue in the sequestration cases. Indeed, the jurisdiction of the PCGG
does not include the dissolution and liquidation of banks. Thus, the Code
6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility cannot apply to respondent
Mendoza because his alleged intervention while SolGen is an intervention
on a matter different from the matter involved in the Civil case of
sequestration. In the metes and bounds of the “intervention”.
The applicable meaning as the term is used in the Code of Professional
Ethics is that it is an act of a person who has the power to influence the
subject proceedings. The evil sought to be remedied by the Code do not
exist where the government lawyer does not act which can be considered
as innocuous such as “ drafting, enforcing, or interpreting government or
agency procedures, regulations or laws or briefing abstract principles of
law.” The court rules that the intervention of Mendoza is not significant and
substantial. He merely petitions that the court gives assistance in the
liquidation of GENBANK. The role of court is not strictly as a court of justice
but as an agent to assist the Central Bank in determining the claims of
creditors. In such a proceeding the role of the SolGen is not that of the usual
court litigator protecting the interest of government.
Petition assailing the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan is denied.
Relevant Dissenting Opinion of Justice Callejo:
Rule 6.03 is a restatement of Canon 36 of the Canons of Professional
Ethics: “ A lawyer, having once held public office or having been in the public
employ, should not after his retirement accept employment in connection
with any matter which he has investigated or passed upon while in such
office or employ.”
Indeed, the restriction against a public official from using his public position
as a vehicle to promote or advance his private interests extends beyond his
tenure on certain matters in which he intervened as a public official. Rule
6.03 makes this restriction specifically applicable to lawyers who once held
public office.” A plain reading shows that the interdiction 1. applies to a
lawyer who once served in the government and 2. relates to his accepting
“engagement or employment” in connection with any matter in which he had
intervened while in the service.
R.A. No. 9485 - Anti-Red Tape Act of 2007
SECTION 1. Short Title. - This Act shall be known as the "Anti-Red Tape
Act of 2007".
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. - It is hereby declared the policy of the State
to promote integrity, accountability, proper management of public affairs and
public property as well as to establish effective practices aimed at the
prevention of graft and corruption in government. Towards this end, the
State shall maintain honesty and responsibility among its public officials and
employees, and shall take appropriate measures to promote transparency
in each agency with regard to the manner of transacting with the public,
19
which shall encompass a program for the adoption of simplified procedures
that will reduce red tape and expedite transactions in government.
SEC. 3. Coverage. - This Act shall apply to all government offices and
agencies including local government units and government-owned or -
controlled corporations that provide frontline services as defined in this Act.
Those performing judicial, quasi-judicial and legislative functions are
excluded from the coverage of this Act.
SEC. 4. Definition of Terms. - As used in this Act, the following terms are
defined as follows:
(a) "Simple Transactions" refer to requests or applications submitted by
clients of a government office or agency which only require ministerial
actions on the part of the public officer or employee, or that which present
only inconsequential issues for the resolution by an officer or employee of
said government office.
(b) "Complex Transactions" refer to requests or applications submitted by
clients of a government office which necessitate the use of discretion in the
resolution of complicated issues by an officer or employee of said
government office, such transaction to be determined by the office
concerned.
(c) "Frontline Service" refers to the process or transaction between clients
and government offices or agencies involving applications for any privilege,
right, permit, reward, license, concession, or for any modification, renewal
or extension of the enumerated applications and/or requests which are
acted upon in the ordinary course of business of the agency or office
concerned.
(d) "Action" refers to the written approval or disapproval made by a
government office or agency on the application or request submitted by a
client for processing.
(e) "Officer or Employee" refers to a person employed in a government office
or agency required to perform specific duties and responsibilities related to
the application or request submitted by a client for processing.
(f) "Irrevelant requirement" refer to any document or performance of an act
not directly material to the resolution of the issues raised in the request or
needed in the application submitted by the client.
(g) "Fixer" refers to any individual whether or not officially involved in the
operation of a government office or agency who has access to people
working therein, and whether or not in collusion with them, facilitates speedy
completion of transactions for pecuniary gain or any other advantage or
consideration.
SEC. 5 Reengineering of Systems and Procedures. - All offices and
agencies which provide frontline services are hereby mandated to regularly
undertake time and motion studies, undergo evaluation and improvement of
their transaction systems and procedures and re-engineer the same if
deemed necessary to reduce bureaucratic red tape and processing time.
SEC. 6. Citizen's Charter. - All government agencies including departments,
bureaus, offices, instrumentalities, or government-owned and/or controlled
corporations, or local government or district units shall set up their
respective service standards to be known as the Citizen's Charter in the
form of information billboards which should be posted at the main entrance
of offices or at the most conspicuous place, and in the form of published
materials written either in English, Filipino, or in the local dialect, that detail:
(a) The procedure to obtain a particular service;
(b) The person/s responsible for each step;
(c) The maximum time to conclude the process;
(d) The document/s to be presented by the customer, if necessary;
(e) The amount of fees, if necessary; and
(f) The procedure for filing complaints.
SEC. 7. Accountability of the Heads of Offices and Agencies. - The head of
the office or agency shall be primarily responsible for the implementation of
this Act and shall be held accountable to the public in rendering fast,
efficient, convenient and reliable service. All transactions and processes are
deemed to have been made with the permission or clearance from the
highest authority having jurisdiction over the government office or agency
concerned.
SEC. 8. Accessing Frontline Services. - The following shall be adopted by
all government offices and agencies:
(a) Acceptance of Applications and Request - (1) All officers or employees
shall accept written applications, requests, and/or documents being
submitted by clients of the office or agencies.
(2) The responsible officer or employee shall acknowledge receipt of such
application and/or request by writing or printing clearly thereon his/her
name, the unit where he/she is connected with, and the time and date of
receipt.
(3) The receiving officer or employee shall perform a preliminary
assessment of the request so as to promote a more expeditious action on
requests.
(b) Action of Offices - (1) All applications and/or requests submitted shall be
acted upon by the assigned officer or employee during the period stated in
the Citizen's Charter which shall not be longer than five working days in the
case of simple transactions and ten (10) working days in the case of
complex transactions from the date the request or application was received.
Depending on the nature of the frontline services requested or the mandate
of the office or agency under unusual circumstances, the maximum time
prescribed above may be extended. For the extension due to nature of
frontline services or the mandate of the office or agency concerned the
period for the delivery of frontline services shall be indicated in the Citizen's
Charter. The office or agency concerned shall notify the requesting party in
writing of the reason for the extension and the final date of release for the
extension and the final date of release of the frontline service/s requested.
(2) No application or request shall be returned to the client without
appropriate action. In case an application or request is disapproved, the
officer or employee who rendered the decision shall send a formal notice to
the client within five working days from the receipt of the request and/or
application, stating therein the reason for the disapproval including a list of
specific requirement/s which the client failed to submit.
(c) Denial of Request for Access to Government Service - Any denial of
request for access to government service shall be fully explained in writing,
stating the name of the person making the denial and the grounds upon
which such denial is based. Any denial of request is deemed to have been
made with the permission or clearance from the highest authority having
jurisdiction over the government office or agency concerned.
(d) Limitation of Signatories - The number of signatories in any document
shall be limited to a maximum of five signatures which shall represent
officers directly supervising the office or agency concerned.
(e) Adoption of Working Schedules to Serve Clients - Heads of offices and
agencies which render frontline services shall adopt appropriate working
schedules to ensure that all clients who are within their premises prior to the
end of official working hours are attended to and served even during lunch
break and after regular working hours.
(f) Identification Card - All employees transacting with the public shall be
provided with an official identification card which should be visibly worn
during office hours.
(g) Establishment of Public Assistance/Complaints Desk - Each office or
agency shall establish a public assistance/complaints desk in all their
offices.
SEC. 9. Automatic Extension of Permits and Licenses. - - If a government
office or agency fails to act on an application and/or request for renewal of
a license, permit or authority subject for renewal within the prescribed
period, said permit, license or authority shall automatically be extended until
a decision or resolution is rendered on the application for renewal: Provided,
That the automatic extension shall not apply when the permit, license, or
authority covers activities which pose danger to public health, public safety,
public morals or to public policy including, but not limited to, natural resource
extraction activities.
SEC. 10. Report Card Survey. - All offices and agencies providing frontline
services shall be subjected to a Report Card Survey to be initiated by the
Civil Service Commission, in coordination with the Development Academy
of the Philippines, which shall be used to obtain feedback on how provisions
in the Citizen's Charter are being followed and how the agency is
performing.
The Report Card Survey shall also be used to obtain information and/or
estimates of hidden costs incurred by clients to access frontline services
which may include, but is not limited to, bribes and payment to fixers.
A feedback mechanism shall be established in all agencies covered by this
Act and the results thereof shall be incorporated in their annual report.
20
SEC. 11. Violations. - After compliance with the substantive and procedural
due process, the following shall constitute violations of this Act together with
their corresponding penalties:
(a) Light Offense - (1) Refusal to accept application and/or request within
the prescribed period or any document being submitted by a client;
(2) Failure to act on an application and/or request or failure to refer back to
the client a request which cannot be acted upon due to lack of requirement/s
within the prescribed period;
(3) Failure to attend to clients who are within the premises of the office or
agency concerned prior to the end of official working hours and during lunch
(4) Failure to render frontline services within the prescribed period on any
application and/or request without due cause;
(5) Failure to give the client a written notice on the disapproval of an
application or request; and
(6) Imposition of additional irrelevant requirements other than those listed in
the first notice.
Penalties for light offense shall be as follows:
First Offense - Thirty (30) days suspension without pay and mandatory
attendance in Values Orientation Program;
Second Offense - Three (3) months suspension without pay; and
Third Offense - Dismissal and perpetual disqualification from public service.
(b) Grave Offense - Fixing and/or collusion with fixers in consideration of
economic and/or other gain or advantage.
Penalty - Dismissal and perpetual disqualification from public service.
SEC. 12. Criminal Liability for Fixers. - In addition to Sec. 11 (b), fixers, as
defined in this Act, shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment not exceeding
six years or a fine not less than Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) but
not more than Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000.00) or both fine
and imprisonment at the discretion of the court.
SEC. 13. Civil and Criminal Liability, Not Barred. - The finding of
administrative liability under this Act shall not be a bar to the filing of criminal,
civil or other related charges under existing laws arising from the same act
or omission as herein enumerated.
SEC. 14. Administrative Jurisdiction. - The administrative jurisdiction on any
violation of the provisions of this Act shall be vested in either the Civil
Service Commission (CSC), the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission
(PAGC) or the Office of the Ombudsman as determined by appropriate laws
and issuances.
SEC. 15. Immunity; Discharge of Co-Respondent/Accused to be a Witness.
- Any public official or employee or any person having been charged with
another under this Act and who voluntarily gives information pertaining to
an investigation or who willingly testifies therefore, shall be exempt from
prosecution in the case/s where his/her information and testimony are given.
The discharge may be granted and directed by the investigating body or
court upon the application or petition of any of the respondent/accused-
informant and before the termination of the investigation: Provided, That:
(a) There is absolute necessity for the testimony of the respondent/accused-
informant whose discharge is requested;
(b) There is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of
the offense committed, except the testimony of said respondent/accused-
informant;
(c) The testimony of said respondent/accused-informant can be
substantially corroborated in its material points;
(d) The responden/accused-informant has not been previously convicted of
a crime involving moral turpitude; and
(e) Said responden/accused-informant does not appear to be the most
guilty.
Evidence adduced in support of the discharge shall automatically form part
of the records of the investigation. Should the investigating body or court
deny the motion or request for discharge as a witness, his/her sworn
statement shall be inadmissible as evidence.