CRIMINAL PROCEDURE DIGESTED CASES

Criminal Procedure: Venue in criminal actions…

MANUEL S. ISIP, Petitioner, versus PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. G.R. No. 170298,
June 26, 2007

Manuel and his wife Marrietta were charged with several counts of Estafa and BP 22 for allegedly
defrauding Atty. Leonardo Jose and misappropriating several pieces of jewellery. According to the
complainant, all the transactions happened in his ancestral house in Cavite City while he was on leave
from his work at the Bureau of Customs, hence the case was filed before the Regional Trial Court of
Cavite City. In their defense, Manuel and Marrietta alleged that the transactions if indeed there was any,
happened in Manila, where Atty. Leonardo was then living in his condominium. After trial, the RTC
convicted them for estafa, which they appealed to the Court of Appeals. In the meantime, Marrietta
died. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the RTC, and held that the transactions occurred in
Cavite City, as shown by numerous pieces of evidence.
In his petition to the Supreme Court, Manuel argues that the RTC and CA should have dismissed the case
for lack of jurisdiction. Mere convenience suggests that all the transactions occurred in Manila, since he
and his late wife were residents of Manila. It does not follow that since complainant have an ancestral
house in Cavite City, the transactions occurred there.
The Supreme Court:
The concept of venue of actions in criminal cases, unlike in civil cases, is jurisdictional The place where
the crime was committed determines not only the venue of the action but is an essential element of
jurisdiction. It is a fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in criminal cases, the
offense should have been committed or any one of its essential ingredients should have taken place
within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. Territorial jurisdiction in criminal cases is the territory
where the court has jurisdiction to take cognizance or to try the offense allegedly committed therein by
the accused. Thus, it cannot take jurisdiction over a person charged with an offense allegedly
committed outside of that limited territory. Furthermore, the jurisdiction of a court over the criminal
case is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information. And once it is so shown, the court
may validly take cognizance of the case. However, if the evidence adduced during the trial shows that
the offense was committed somewhere else, the court should dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction

In the case at bar, we, like the RTC and the Court of Appeals, are convinced that the venue was properly
laid in the RTC of Cavite City. The complainant had sufficiently shown that the transaction covered by
Criminal Case No. 136-84 took place in his ancestral home in Cavite City when he was on approved leave
of absence from the Bureau of Customs. Since it has been shown that venue was properly laid, it is now
petitioner’s task to prove otherwise, for it is his claim that the transaction involved was entered into in
Manila. The age-old but familiar rule that he who alleges must prove his allegations applies.

In the instant case, petitioner failed to establish by sufficient and competent evidence that the
transaction happened in Manila. Petitioner argues that since he and his late wife actually resided in
Manila, convenience alone unerringly suggests that the transaction was entered into in Manila. We are
not persuaded. The fact that Cavite City is a bit far from Manila does not necessarily mean that the
transaction cannot or did not happen there. Distance will not prevent any person from going to a
distant place where he can procure goods that he can sell so that he can earn a living. This is true in the
case at bar. It is not improbable or impossible for petitioner and his wife to have gone, not once, but
twice in one day, to Cavite City if that is the number of times they received pieces of jewelry from
complainant. Moreover, the fact that the checks issued by petitioner’s late wife in all the transactions
with complainant were drawn against accounts with banks in Manila or Makati likewise cannot lead to
the conclusion that the transactions were not entered into in Cavite City.

It is axiomatic that when it comes to credibility, the trial court’s assessment deserves great weight, and
is even conclusive and binding, if not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance
of weight and influence. The reason is obvious. Having the full opportunity to observe directly the
witnesses’ deportment and manner of testifying, the trial court is in a better position than the appellate
court to evaluate properly testimonial evidence. It is to be pointed out that the findings of fact of the
trial court have been affirmed by the Court of Appeals. It is settled that when the trial court’s findings
have been affirmed by the appellate court, said findings are generally conclusive and binding upon this
Court. In the case at bar, we find no compelling reason to reverse the findings of the trial court, as
affirmed by the Court of Appeals, and to apply the exception. We so hold that there is sufficient
evidence to show that the particular transaction took place in Cavite City.

Landbank of the Philippines v. Belista

Facts: Spouses Ralla donated 8 parcels of lot located in Albay to their daughter, Rene Ralla Belista,
herein private respondent. Consequently, the 8 parcels of lot were placed by DAR under the coverage of
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program. Belista then claimed payment of just compensation over
said agricultural lands. DAR's evaluation of the subject farms was only at P227,582.58, while petitioner
Land Bank assessed the same at P317,259.31. Believing that her lots were grossly underestimated,
Belista filed a Petition for Valuation and Payment of Just Compensation against Landbank before the
Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (RARAD). The RARAD issued a Decision wherein the just
compensation for the subject areas was fixed at P2,540,211.58. Aggrieved, petitioner Landbank filed an
original Petition for Determination of Just Compensation at the the RTC. The RTC dismissed the case for
failure to exhaust administrative remedies and/or comply with Sections 5, 6, and 7, Rule XIX of the 2003
DARAB Rules of Procedure. Landbank lodged a MFR arguing that the DARAB Rules of Procedure does not
apply to Special Agrarian Courts but the court a quo still denied its MFR. Petitioner Landbank elevated
the case before the CA through a Petition for Review.

The CA ruled that under the 2003 DARAB Rules of Procedure, an appeal from the adjudicator's
resolution should be filed before the Department of
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) and not before the 1

G.R. No. 164631 June 26, 2009

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Petitioner,
vs.
RENE RALLA BELISTA, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
The antecedent facts and proceedings, as narrated by the CA, are as follows:
It appears that spouses Pablo Ralla and Carmen Munoz Ralla had donated their eight (8) parcels of lot
located in Ligao, Albay to their daughter, Rene Ralla Belista, the herein private respondent.
The eight (8) parcels of lot were placed by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR, for brevity) under
the coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (Presidential Decree No. 27 and Executive
Order No. 228). Consequently, private respondent claimed payment of just compensation over said
agricultural lands.
It further appears that the DAR's evaluation of the subject farms was only P227,582.58, while petitioner
Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP, for brevity) assessed the same at P317,259.31.
Believing that her lots were grossly underestimated, private respondent, on 11 November 2002, filed a
Petition for Valuation and Payment of Just Compensation against petitioning bank before the DARAB-
Regional Adjudicator for Region V (RARAD-V) docketed as DCN D-05-02-VC-005.
On 07 July 2003, the RARAD-V issued a Decision, in favor of herein private respondent, the fallo of which
reads:

Aggrieved, petitioner Bank, on 28 October 2003, filed an original Petition for Determination of Just
Compensation at the same sala of the RTC, docketed as Agrarian Case No. 03-06.
The court a quo motu propio dismissed the case when it issued the herein first assailed Order dated 12
November 2003 "for failure to exhaust administrative remedies and/or comply with Sections 5, 6, and 7,
Rule XIX, 2003 DARAB Rules of Procedure.

Petitioner LBP lodged a Motion for Reconsideration arguing, inter alia, "that the DARAB 2003 Rules of
Procedure does not apply to SAC nor its precursor DARAB Case and that the ground for dismissal of the
case is not among the instances when a court may dismiss a case on its motion."

As the court a quo denied its Motion for Reconsideration in an Order dated 28 November 2003,
petitioner LBP elevated the case before the Tribunal through the present Petition for Review, theorizing:
I. WHETHER OR NOT THE SAC A QUO ERRED IN DISMISSING THE CASE MOTU PROPIO ON THE GROUND
OF PLAINTIFF'S FAILURE TO EXHAUST ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES.
II. WHETHER OR NOT SECTIONS 5, 6, AND 7, RULE XIX OF THE DARAB 2003 RULES OF PROCEDURE APPLY
TO CASES FILED AND PENDING BEFORE THE DARAB OR ITS ADJUDICATORS PRIOR TO ITS EFFECTIVITY
AND TO CASES FILED AND PENDING WITH THE SPECIAL AGRARIAN COURTS.3
On May 26, 2004, the CA rendered its assailed Decision dismissing the petition.
The CA ruled that under Section 5, Rule XIX of the 2003 DARAB Rules of Procedure, an appeal from the
adjudicator's resolution shall be filed before the DARAB and not before the RTC; that petitioner's filing
of the case before the RTC without first seeking the intervention of the DARAB is violative of the
doctrine of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies. The CA found that petitioner's petition for
determination of just compensation was filed in the RTC on October 28, 2003 when the 2003 DARAB
Rules of Procedure was already in effect, i.e., on February 8, 2003, and under its transitory provision, it is
provided that the 2003 Rules shall govern all cases filed on or after its effectivity; and, since an appeal
from the adjudicator's resolution should first be filed with the DARAB, the RTC, sitting as a Special
Agrarian Court (SAC), did not err in dismissing petitioner's petition.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied in a Resolution dated July 28, 2004.
Petitioner is now before the Court raising the following arguments:
1. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN LAW IN DISMISSING THE PETITION FOR REVIEW CONSIDERING
THAT THE LBP DID NOT VIOLATE THE "DOCTRINE OF NON-EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES"
WHEN IT FILED THE ORIGINAL PETITION FOR DETERMINATION OF JUST COMPENSATION BEFORE THE
COURT A QUO WITHOUT FIRST SEEKING THE INTERVENTION OF THE DARAB.
2. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE APPLICABLE RULE IS THE 2003 DARAB RULES
OF PROCEDURE, DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE PETITION (FOR VALUATION AND PAYMENT OF JUST
COMPENSATION) WAS FILED BEFORE THE RARAD ON NOVEMBER 11, 2002.4

Petitioner contends that the petition for valuation and payment of just compensation was filed with the
DARAB- Regional Adjudicator for Region V (RARAD) on November 11, 2002, long before the effectivity of
the 2003 Rules of Procedure; that under the transitory provision of the 2003 DARAB Rules, all cases
pending with the Board and the adjudicators prior to the date of the Rules' effectivity shall be governed
by the DARAB Rules prevailing at the time of their filing; that clear from the transitory provision that it is
the proceeding of the DARAB which is governed by the 2003 DARAB Rules of Procedure, thus, it is the
date of filing of the petition with the DARAB or any of its adjudicators which is the reckoning date of the
applicability of the 2003 DARAB Rules and not the date of filing with the SAC; that under the 1994
DARAB Rules prevailing at the time of the filing of the respondent's claim for just compensation, the
Rules provided that the decision of the adjudicator on land valuation and preliminary determination of
just compensation shall not be appealable to the Board, but shall be brought
directly to the RTC; that it was in the observance of the 1994 DARAB Rules that petitioner brought the
adjudicator's decision to the RTC sitting as SAC.

In his Comment, respondent claims that petitioner's petition with the RTC is an original action and, since
the case was filed at a time when appeal to the DARAB Central Office was already provided in the 2003
DARAB Rules before resorting to judicial action, the RTC correctly dismissed the petition, which was
correctly affirmed by the CA.

The issue for resolution is whether it is necessary that in cases involving claims for just compensation
under Republic Act (RA) No. 6657 that the decision of the Adjudicator must first be appealed to the
DARAB before a party can resort to the RTC sitting as SAC.

The court rules in the negative.

Sections 50 and 57 of RA No. 6657 provide:
Section 50. Quasi-judicial Powers of the DAR. – The DAR is hereby vested with primary jurisdiction to
determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over
all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform, except those falling under the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture (DA) and the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) x x x
Section 57. Special Jurisdiction. – The Special Agrarian Court shall have original and exclusive
jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners, and the
prosecution of all criminal offenses under this Act. x x x
The Special Agrarian Courts shall decide all appropriate cases under their special jurisdiction within
thirty (30) days from submission of the case for decision.
Thus, Special Agrarian Courts, which are Regional Trial Courts, are given original and exclusive
jurisdiction over two categories of cases, to wit: (1) "all petitions for the determination of just
compensation to landowners" and (2) "the prosecution of all criminal offenses under [R.A. No. 6657]."
The provisions of §50 must be construed in harmony with this provision by considering cases involving
the determination of just compensation and criminal cases for violations of R.A. No. 6657 as excepted
from the plenitude of power conferred on the DAR. Indeed, there is a reason for this distinction. The
DAR is an administrative agency which cannot be granted jurisdiction over cases of eminent domain (for
such are takings under R.A. No. 6657) and over criminal cases.
Court held:
In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, the landowner filed an action for determination of
just compensation without waiting for the completion of DARAB’s re-evaluation of the land. This,
notwithstanding, the Court held that the trial court properly acquired jurisdiction because of its
exclusive and original jurisdiction over determination of just compensation, thus –
… It is clear from Sec. 57 that the RTC, sitting as a Special Agrarian Court, has "original and exclusive
jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners." This
"original and exclusive" jurisdiction of the RTC would be undermined if the DAR would vest in
administrative officials original jurisdiction in compensation cases and make the RTC an appellate
court for the review of administrative decisions. Thus, although the new rules speak of directly
appealing the decision of adjudicators to the RTCs sitting as Special Agrarian Courts, it is clear from
Sec. 57 that the original and exclusive jurisdiction to determine such cases is in the RTCs. Any effort to
transfer such jurisdiction to the adjudicators and to convert the original jurisdiction of the RTCs into
an appellate jurisdiction would be contrary to Sec. 57 and, therefore, would be void. Thus, direct
resort to the SAC [Special Agrarian Court] by private respondent is valid.
At any rate, in Philippine Veterans Bank v. CA, we held that there is nothing contradictory between the
DAR’s primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and exclusive original
jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform, which includes the
determination of questions of just compensation, and the original and exclusive jurisdiction of regional
trial courts over all petitions for the determination of just compensation. The first refers to
administrative proceedings, while the second refers to judicial proceedings.1avvphi1
In accordance with settled principles of administrative law, primary jurisdiction is vested in the DAR to
determine in a preliminary manner the just compensation for the lands taken under the agrarian reform
program, but such determination is subject to challenge before the courts. The resolution of just
compensation cases for the taking of lands under agrarian reform is, after all, essentially a judicial
function.
Thus, the trial court did not err in taking cognizance of the case as the determination of just
compensation is a function addressed to the courts of justice.10
In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Celada,11 where the issue was whether the SAC erred in assuming
jurisdiction over respondent's petition for determination of just compensation despite the pendency of
the administrative proceedings before the DARAB, the Court stated that:
It would be well to emphasize that the taking of property under RA No. 6657 is an exercise of the power
of eminent domain by the State. The valuation of property or determination of just compensation in
eminent domain proceedings is essentially a judicial function which is vested with the courts and not
with administrative agencies. Consequently, the SAC properly took cognizance of respondent's petition
for determination of just compensation.12
The RTC dismissed petitioner's petition for determination of just compensation relying on Sections 5, 6
and 7 of Article XIX of the 2003 DARAB Rules of Procedure, to wit:
Section 5. Appeal. A party who disagrees with the resolution of the Adjudicator may bring the matter to
the Board by filing with the Adjudicator concerned a Notice of Appeal within fifteen (15) days from
receipt of the resolution. The filing of a Motion for Reconsideration of said resolution shall interrupt the
period herein fixed. If the motion is denied, the aggrieved party may file the appeal within the remaining
period, but in no case shall it be less than five (5) days.
Section 6. When Resolution Deemed Final. Failure on the part of the aggrieved party to contest the
resolution of the Adjudicator within the aforecited reglementary period provided shall be deemed a
concurrence by such party with the land valuation, hence said valuation shall become final and
executory.
Section 7. Filing of Original Action with the Special Agrarian Court for Final Determination. The party
who disagrees with the decision of the Board may contest the same by filing an original action with the
Special Agrarian Court (SAC) having jurisdiction over the subject property within fifteen (15) days from
his receipt of the Board's decision.
Notably, the above-mentioned provisions deviated from Section 11, Rule XIII of the 1994 DARAB Rules of
Procedure which provides:

Section 11. Land Valuation and Preliminary Determination and Payment of Just Compensation – The
decision of the Adjudicator on land valuation and preliminary determination and payment of just
compensation shall not be appealable to the Board, but shall be brought directly to the Regional Trial
Courts designated as Special Agrarian Courts within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the notice thereof.
Any party shall be entitled to only one motion for reconsideration.
where DARAB acknowledges that the decision of just compensation cases for the taking of lands under
RA 6657 is a power vested in the courts.13 Although Section 5, Rule XIX of the 2003 DARAB Rules of
Procedure provides that the land valuation cases decided by the adjudicator are now appealable to the
Board, such rule could not change the clear import of Section 57 of RA No. 6657 that the original and
exclusive jurisdiction to determine just compensation is in the RTC. Thus, Section 57 authorizes direct
resort to the SAC in cases involving petitions for the determination of just compensation.14 In
accordance with the said Section 57, petitioner properly filed the petition before the RTC and, hence,
the RTC erred in dismissing the case. Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law.15 Only a
statute can confer jurisdiction on courts and administrative agencies while rules of procedure cannot.16
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. The Decision dated May 26, 2004 and the
Resolution dated July 28, 2004, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 81096, are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court, Branch 3, Legaspi City, sitting as Special Agrarian Court, is directed to
hear without delay petitioner's petition for the determination of just compensation.
SO ORDERED.
Criminal Procedure RTC and that petitioner's filing of the case before the RTC without first seeking the
intervention of the DARAB is violative of the doctrine of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies.
Petitioner filed a MFR, but the same was denied, hence, this petition. Issue: Whether it is necessary that
in cases involving claims for just compensation under RA 6657, the RARAD’s Decision must first be
appealed to DARAB before a party can resort to the RTC sitting as a Special Agrarian Court. Held: No.
Petitioner properly filed the petition before the RTC and, hence, the RTC erred in dismissing the case.
Section 56 of RA 6657 provides that DAR is vested with primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate
agrarian reform matters and shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving the
implementation of agrarian reform, except those falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Department of Agriculture and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources. Section 57 of RA
6657 provides that the Special Agrarian Court shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over all
petitions for: a) Determination of just compensation to landowners; b) Prosecution of all criminal
offenses under this Act. Clearly, further exception to DAR's original and exclusive jurisdiction are all
petitions for determination of just compensation to landowners and prosecution of all criminal offenses
under RA 6657, which are within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC sitting as a Special
Agrarian Court. Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law. Only a statute can confer
jurisdiction on courts and administrative agencies while rules of procedure cannot.

People V Duca

It appears that Arturo Duca, together with his mother, Cecilia Duca, were
charged of the crime of Falsification of Official Document defined and penalized
under Article 172, in relation to Article 171, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code in an
Information which reads:

That on or about December 10, 2001 in the Municipality of San

Fabian, Province of Pangasinan, Philippines, within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the said accused confederating together and
mutually abiding each other, with intent to cause damage, did then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously cause the preparation of a
Declaration of Real Property over a bungalow type residential house
covered by Property Index No. 013-32-027-01-116131 of the Municipal
Assessors Office of San Fabian, Pangasinan by making it appear that the
signature appearing on the sworn statement of owner is that of Aldrin F.
Duca when the truth of the matter is not because the latter was abroad
at that time having arrived in the Philippines only on December 12,
2001, and it was accused Arturo F. Duca who affixed his own signature
thereon to the damage and prejudice of the undersigned private
complainant Pedro Calanayan.

Upon being arraigned, both the accused pleaded not guilty. Then trial on the merits
ensued.

The evidence for the prosecution shows that sometime in 1999, Pedro Calanayan
(hereinafter Calanayan), private complainant herein, filed an action for ejectment and
damages against Cecilia F. Duca, Ruel F. Duca, Arsenio F. Duca and Vangie F. Duca before
 the 4th Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of San Fabian-San Jacinto, Pangasinan,
docketed as Civil Case No. 960 (SF-99). The case was decided in favor of
Calanayan. There being no appeal interposed by the aforesaid defendants, the said
decision became final and executory. On November 22, 1999, a writ of execution was
issued by the MCTC to enforce the decision. On February 29, 2000, the money judgment
was likewise satisfied with the public auction of the lot owned by Cecilia Duca covered
by TCT No. 233647. On March 1, 2000, a certificate of sale was issued in favor of Jocelyn
Barque, the highest bidder in the auction sale.

On October 19, 2001, Cecilia Duca filed an action for the Declaration of Nullity of
Execution and Damages with prayer for Writ of Injunction and Temporary Restraining
order against Sheriff IV Vinez Hortaleza and Police Officers Roberto Vical, Alejandre
Arevalo, Emilio Austria, Victor Quitales, Crisostomo Bonavente and Calanayan. The case
was docketed as Civil Case No. 2000-0304-D.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is hereby GRANTED. The assailed decision of the CA in CA-G.R.
CR No. 28312 is hereby SET ASIDE and the case isREMANDED to the CA for further proceedings. The CA
is ordered to decide the case with dispatch.

ROSALINDA PUNZALAN, RANDALL PUNZALAN and RAINIER PUNZALAN, petitioners, vs. DENCIO DELA
PEA and ROBERT CAGARA, respondents.

DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Assailed in this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court is the June 6, 2002
Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals and its May 23, 2003 Resolution which denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration.
The Punzalan and the Plata families were neighbors in Hulo Bliss, Mandaluyong City. At around
11:00 p.m. of August 13, 1997, Dencio dela Pea, a house boarder of the Platas, was in front of a store
near their house when the group of Rainier Punzalan, Randall Punzalan, Ricky Eugenio, Jose Gregorio,
Alex Toto Ofrin, and several others arrived. Ricky Eugenio shouted at Dela Pea, Hoy, kalbo, saan mo binili
and sumbrero mo?[2] Dela Pea replied, Kalbo nga ako, ay pinagtatawanan pa ninyo ako.[3] Irked by the
response, Jose Gregorio slapped Dela Pea while Rainier punched him in the mouth. The group then
ganged up on him. In the course of the melee, somebody shouted, Yariin na yan![4] Thereafter, Alex Toto
Ofrin kicked Dela Pea and tried to stab him with a balisong but missed because he was able to run. The
group chased him.
While Dela Pea was fleeing, he met Robert Cagara, the Platas family driver, who was carrying a gun.
He grabbed the gun from Cagara and pointed it to the group chasing him in order to scare them.
Michael Plata, who was nearby, intervened and tried to wrestle the gun away from Dela Pea. The gun
accidentally went off and hit Rainier Punzalan on the thigh. Shocked, Dela Pea, Cagara and Plata ran
towards the latters house and locked themselves in. The group ran after them and when they got to the
Platas house, shouted, Lumabas kayo dyan, putang ina ninyo! Papatayin namin kayo![5] Dela Pea,
Cagara, and Plata left the house through the back door and proceeded to the police station to seek
assistance.
As a result of the incident, Rainier Punzalan filed a criminal complaint against Michael Plata for
Attempted Homicide[6] and against Robert Cagara for Illegal Possession of Firearm. In turn, Plata, Cagara
and Dela Pea filed several counter-charges[7] for grave oral defamation, grave threats, robbery, malicious
mischief and slight physical injuries against the Punzalans, including one for Attempted Murder filed by
Dela Pea against Rainier and Randall Punzalan and fourteen others (I.S. No. 97-11528); and one for
Grave Threats filed by Dela Pea against Alex Toto Ofrin (I.S. No. 97-11520-21).
In their counter-affidavit,[8] the Punzalans argued that the charges against them were fabricated in
order to dissuade them from testifying in the Attempted Homicide and Illegal Possession of Firearm
cases instituted by Rainier against Plata and Cagara, respectively.
Subsequently, Robert Cagara also filed a complaint for Grave Oral Defamation, docketed as I.S. No.
97-11522, against Rosalinda Punzalan, mother of Rainier, alleging that on October 16, 1997 at the Office
of the Prosecutor of Mandaluyong City, Rosalinda approached him, and within hearing distance of other
people, told him, Hoy Robert, magkanong ibinigay ng mga Plata sa iyo sa pagtestigo? Dodoblehin ko at
ipapasok pa kita ng trabaho.[9] In her defense, Rosalinda denied having uttered the alleged defamatory
statements.
On July 28, 1998, the Assistant City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong City dismissed the complaint for
Grave Oral Defamation against Rosalinda Punzalan,[10] holding that Cagara failed to show that the
alleged defamatory statements would cast dishonor, discredit or contempt upon him. He also found that
the statements were uttered by Rosalinda in a state of distress and, hence, were not actionable.[11] The
charge of Attempted Murder against Rainier, Randall and 14 others was also dismissed by the Assistant
Prosecutor because complainant Dela Peas claim that he accidentally shot Rainier forms part of the
defense of Michael Plata in the Attempted Homicide case previously filed by Rainier against the latter.[12]
Dela Pea and Cagara separately appealed to the Department of Justice. On March 23, 2000, then
Justice Secretary Artemio Tuquero issued a Resolution modifying the July 28, 1998 Joint Resolution of
the Assistant City Prosecutor by ordering, among others (1) that the charge of Grave Oral Defamation
against Rosalinda Punzalan be downgraded to Slight Oral Defamation; (2) that the charge of Attempted
Murder against Rainier, Randall and 14 others be downgraded to Attempted Homicide; and (3) that the
charge of Grave Threats against Alex Toto Ofrin be downgraded to Other Light Threats. The dispositive
portion of the Resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, the resolution is hereby MODIFIED. The City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong City is directed to
file information for three (3) counts of slight oral defamation against Rosalinda Punzalan; information
for two (2) counts [of] other light threats against Alexander Toto Ofrin; information for attempted
homicide against Alexander Toto Ofrin, Rainier Punzalan, Jose Gregorio Lanuzo, Avelino Serrano, Lito
dela Cruz, Emmanuel Nobida, Randall Punzalan, Mark Catap, Ricky Eugenio, Alejandro Diez, Vicente
Joven Manda, Herson Mendoza, Mark Labrador, Alex Pascua, Edwin Vivar and Raymond Poliquit;
information for malicious mischief and theft against Rainier Punzalan, Mark Catap, Alejandro Diez, Jose
Gregorio Lanuzo, Alexander Toto Ofrin, Herson Mendoza, Emmanuel Nobida, Edwin Vivar, Avelino
Bobby Serrano, and John Does; and to report action taken within 10 days from receipt hereof.
SO ORDERED.[13]
Petitioners, Rosalinda, Rainier and Randall Punzalan, together with their co-respondents, filed
separate motions for reconsideration. On June 6, 2000, the Secretary of Justice set aside the March 23,
2000 Resolution and directed the withdrawal of the Informations against the movants. He ruled, among
others, that the Oral Defamation case should be dismissed because the alleged defamatory statements
were uttered without malice as Rosalinda was then in a state of shock and anger. Anent the Attempted
Homicide case filed by Dela Pea against Rainier, the Secretary held that the allegations in support
thereof should first be threshed out in the trial of the Attempted Homicide case filed by Rainier against
Michael Plata. He added that Dela Pea failed to prove that Rainier, Randall and his companions intended
to kill him. The dispositive portion thereof reads:
Wherefore, in view of the foregoing, the appealed resolution is REVERSED. The resolution dated March
23, 2000 is set aside and the City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong City is directed to withdraw the separate
informations for slight oral defamation, other light threats, attempted homicide, malicious mischief and
theft against all respondents and to report the action taken within ten (10) days from receipt hereof.
SO ORDERED.[14]
Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration of the foregoing Resolution, but the same was
denied in a Resolution dated October 11, 2000.[15]
On January 11, 2001, respondents filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals praying
that the City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong be directed to file one count of Slight Oral Defamation against
Rosalinda; one count of Attempted Homicide against Rainier, Randall and 14 others; and two counts of
Other Light Threats against Alex Toto Ofrin.[16]
On June 6, 2002, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is granted and the questioned Resolutions of public
respondent dated 06 June 2000 and 11 October 2000 are set aside insofar as it directed the withdrawal
of informations for slight oral defamation against Rosalinda Punzalan and attempted homicide against
the respondents Alexander Toto Ofrin, Rainier Punzalan, Jose Gregorio Lanuzo, Avelino Serrano, Lito de
la Cruz, Emmanuel Nobido, Randall Punzalan, Mark Catap, Ricky Eugenio, Alejandro Diez, Vicente Joven
Manda, Herson Mendoza, Mark Labrador, Alex Pascua, Edwin Vivar, and Raymond Poliquit.
The resolution dated 06 June 2000 and 11 October 2000 is hereby affirmed insofar as it directed the
withdrawal of information for two (2) counts of other light threats against Alexander Toto Ofrin.
SO ORDERED.[17]