January 22, 2008 February 2, 2008

EN BANC
A.M. NO. 08-1-16-SC
RULE ON THE WRIT OF HABEAS DATA
RESOLUTION
This Resolution shall take effect on February 2, 2008 following its publication in
three (3) newspapers of general circulation.
January 22, 2008.

THE RULE ON THE WRIT OF HABEAS DATA

SECTION 1. Habeas Data. — The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any
person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an
unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or
entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding
the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party.

SECTION 2. Who May File. — Any aggrieved party may file a petition for the writ
of habeas data. However, in cases of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances,
the petition may be filed by:
(a) Any member of the immediate family of the aggrieved party, namely: the
spouse, children and parents; or
(b) Any ascendant, descendant or collateral relative of the aggrieved party within
the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity, in default of those mentioned in
the preceding paragraph.

SECTION 3. Where to File. — The petition may be filed with the Regional Trial
Court where the petitioner or respondent resides, or that which has jurisdiction over
the place where the data or information is gathered, collected or stored, at the option
of the petitioner.
The petition may also be filed with the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals or the
Sandiganbayan when the action concerns public data files of government offices.

SECTION 4. Where Returnable; Enforceable. — When the writ is issued by a

Regional Trial Court or any judge thereof, it shall be returnable before such court or
judge.
When issued by the Court of Appeals or the Sandiganbayan or any of its justices, it
may be returnable before such court or any justice thereof, or to any Regional Trial
Court of the place where the petitioner or respondent resides, or that which has
jurisdiction over the place where the data or information is gathered, collected or
stored.
When issued by the Supreme Court or any of its justices, it may be returnable before
such Court or any justice thereof, or before the Court of Appeals or the
Sandiganbayan or any of its justices, or to any Regional Trial Court of the place where
the petitioner or respondent resides, or that which has jurisdiction over the place
where the data or information is gathered, collected or stored. ESacHC
The writ of habeas data shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines.

SECTION 5. Docket Fees. — No docket and other lawful fees shall be required
from an indigent petitioner. The petition of the indigent shall be docketed and acted
upon immediately, without prejudice to subsequent submission of proof of indigency
not later than fifteen (15) days from the filing of the petition.

SECTION 6. Petition. — A verified written petition for a writ of habeas data should
contain:
(a) The personal circumstances of the petitioner and the respondent;
(b) The manner the right to privacy is violated or threatened and how it affects the
right to life, liberty or security of the aggrieved party;
(c) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to secure the data or
information;
(d) The location of the files, registers or databases, the government office, and the
person in charge, in possession or in control of the data or information, if known;
(e) The reliefs prayed for, which may include the updating, rectification,
suppression or destruction of the database or information or files kept by the
respondent.
In case of threats, the relief may include a prayer for an order enjoining the act
complained of; and
(f) Such other relevant reliefs as are just and equitable.

SECTION 7. Issuance of the Writ. — Upon the filing of the petition, the court,
justice or judge shall immediately order the issuance of the writ if on its face it ought
to issue. The clerk of court shall issue the writ under the seal of the court and cause it
to be served within three (3) days from its issuance; or, in case of urgent necessity, the
justice or judge may issue the writ under his or her own hand, and may deputize any
officer or person to serve it.
The writ shall also set the date and time for summary hearing of the petition which
shall not be later than ten (10) work days from the date of its issuance.

SECTION 8. Penalty for Refusing to Issue or Serve the Writ. — A clerk of court
who refuses to issue the writ after its allowance, or a deputized person who refuses to
serve the same, shall be punished by the court, justice or judge for contempt without
prejudice to other disciplinary actions.

SECTION 9. How the Writ is Served. — The writ shall be served upon the
respondent by the officer or person deputized by the court, justice or judge who shall
retain a copy on which to make a return of service. In case the writ cannot be served
personally on the respondent, the rules on substituted service shall apply.

SECTION 10. Return; Contents. — The respondent shall file a verified written return
together with supporting affidavits within five (5) work days from service of the writ,
which period may be reasonably extended by the Court for justifiable reasons.
The return shall, among other things, contain the following:
(a) The lawful defenses such as national security, state secrets, privileged
communication, confidentiality of the source of information of media and others;
(b) In case of respondent in charge, in possession or in control of the data or
information subject of the petition:
(i) a disclosure of the data or information about the petitioner, the nature of such
data or information, and the purpose for its collection;
(ii) the steps or actions taken by the respondent to ensure the security and
confidentiality of the data or information; and
(iii) the currency and accuracy of the data or information held; and
(c) Other allegations relevant to the resolution of the proceeding. HScAEC
A general denial of the allegations in the petition shall not be allowed.

SECTION 11. Contempt. — The court, justice or judge may punish with
imprisonment or fine a respondent who commits contempt by making a false return,
or refusing to make a return; or any person who otherwise disobeys or resists a lawful
process or order of the court.

SECTION 12. When Defenses may be Heard in Chambers. — A hearing in

chambers may be conducted where the respondent invokes the defense that the release
of the data or information in question shall compromise national security or state
secrets, or when the data or information cannot be divulged to the public due to its
nature or privileged character.

SECTION 13. Prohibited Pleadings and Motions. — The following pleadings and
motions are prohibited:
(a) Motion to dismiss;
(b) Motion for extension of time to file opposition, affidavit, position paper and
other pleadings;
(c) Dilatory motion for postponement;
(d) Motion for a bill of particulars;
(e) Counterclaim or cross-claim;
(f) Third-party complaint;
(g) Reply;
(h) Motion to declare respondent in default;
(i) Intervention;
(j) Memorandum;
(k) Motion for reconsideration of interlocutory orders or interim relief orders; and
(l) Petition for certiorari, mandamus or prohibition against any interlocutory
order.

SECTION 14. Return; Filing. — In case the respondent fails to file a return, the
court, justice or judge shall proceed to hear the petition ex parte, granting the
petitioner such relief as the petition may warrant unless the court in its discretion
requires the petitioner to submit evidence.

SECTION 15. Summary Hearing. — The hearing on the petition shall be summary.
However, the court, justice or judge may call for a preliminary conference to simplify
the issues and determine the possibility of obtaining stipulations and admissions from
the parties.

SECTION 16. Judgment. — The court shall render judgment within ten (10) days
from the time the petition is submitted for decision. If the allegations in the petition
are proven by substantial evidence, the court shall enjoin the act complained of, or
order the deletion, destruction, or rectification of the erroneous data or information
and grant other relevant reliefs as may be just and equitable; otherwise, the privilege
of the writ shall be denied.
Upon its finality, the judgment shall be enforced by the sheriff or any lawful officer as
may be designated by the court, justice or judge within five (5) work days.
SECTION 17. Return of Service. — The officer who executed the final judgment
shall, within three (3) days from its enforcement, make a verified return to the court.
The return shall contain a full statement of the proceedings under the writ and a
complete inventory of the database or information, or documents and articles
inspected, updated, rectified, or deleted, with copies served on the petitioner and the
respondent.
The officer shall state in the return how the judgment was enforced and complied with
by the respondent, as well as all objections of the parties regarding the manner and
regularity of the service of the writ.

SECTION 18. Hearing on Officer's Return. — The court shall set the return for
hearing with due notice to the parties and act accordingly.

SECTION 19. Appeal. — Any party may appeal from the judgment or final order to
the Supreme Court under Rule 45. The appeal may raise questions of fact or law or
both.
The period of appeal shall be five (5) work days from the date of notice of the
judgment or final order.
The appeal shall be given the same priority as habeas corpus and amparo cases.

SECTION 20. Institution of Separate Actions. — The filing of a petition for the writ
of habeas data shall not preclude the filing of separate criminal, civil or administrative
actions.

SECTION 21. Consolidation. — When a criminal action is filed subsequent to the

filing of a petition for the writ, the latter shall be consolidated with the criminal
action.
When a criminal action and a separate civil action are filed subsequent to a petition
for a writ of habeas data, the petition shall be consolidated with the criminal action.
After consolidation, the procedure under this Rule shall continue to govern the
disposition of the reliefs in the petition.

SECTION 22. Effect of Filing of a Criminal Action. — When a criminal action has
been commenced, no separate petition for the writ shall be filed. The reliefs under the
writ shall be available to an aggrieved party by motion in the criminal case.
The procedure under this Rule shall govern the disposition of the reliefs available
under the writ of habeas data.

SECTION 23. Substantive Rights. — This Rule shall not diminish, increase or
modify substantive rights.

SECTION 24. Suppletory Application of the Rules of Court. — The Rules of Court
shall apply suppletorily insofar as it is not inconsistent with this Rule.

SECTION 25. Effectivity. — This Rule shall take effect on February 2, 2008
following its publication in three (3) newspapers of general circulation.
Published in The Philippine Star on January 25, 2008.
[A.M. No. P-02-1535. March 28, 2003.]
FERNANDO FAJARDO, complainant, vs. Sheriff RODOLFO V. QUITALIG,
Municipal Trial Court in Cities, San Carlos City, Pangasinan, respondent.
SYNOPSIS
Respondent was charged by complainant with conduct prejudicial to the best interest
of the service and/or dereliction of duty for delay in enforcing a writ of execution in
relation to an ejectment case. The Office of the Court Administrator found respondent
to have been negligent in the performance of his duty as a sheriff. aEIADT
The Supreme Court ruled that a review of the records of this case revealed that
respondent enforced the Writ of Execution dated March 2, 2000 only on August 24,
2000, as shown by his August 25, 2000 Report of Service. Within 30 days from
receipt thereof and every 30 days thereafter until the judgment is fully satisfied, a
sheriff is required by the Rules of Court to render a report on the action on a writ of
execution. Evidently, respondent was not only remiss in his implementation of the
Writ, but likewise derelict in his submission of the returns thereof. In sum, respondent
was guilty of dereliction of his duty as a sheriff, because he failed to (1) execute the
Writ within 30 days from receipt thereof, (2) submit his Report of Service within the
same period, (3) make periodic reports to the MTCC until the judgment was fully
satisfied, and (4) furnish the parties with copies of the Reports.
The Supreme Court found respondent guilty of dereliction of duty and ordered him to
pay a fine of P5,000.00.
SYLLABUS
1. POLITICAL LAW; ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; PUBLIC OFFICERS AND
EMPLOYEES; COURT PERSONNEL; SHERIFFS; MUST SEE TO IT THAT THE
FINAL STAGE IN THE LITIGATION PROCESS IS CARRIED OUT WITHOUT
UNNECESSARY DELAY. — As frontline officials of the justice system, sheriffs
must always strive to maintain public trust in the performance of their duties. Having
the foresworn duty to uphold the majesty of the law, they must see to it that the final
stage in the litigation process is carried out without unnecessary delay.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; DERELICTION OF DUTY; DELAY IN THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF WRIT OF EXECUTION AND FAILURE TO SUBMIT
THE RETURNS THEREOF; A CASE OF; CASE AT BAR. — A review of the
records of this case reveals that respondent enforced the Writ of Execution dated
March 7, 2000 only on August 24, 2000, as shown by his August 25, 2000 Report of
Service. Within 30 days from receipt thereof and every 30 days thereafter until the
judgment is fully satisfied, a sheriff is required by the Rules of Court to render a
report on the action taken on a writ of execution. . . . Evidently, respondent was not
only remiss in his implementation of the Writ, but likewise derelict in his submission
of the returns thereof. [T]he actuations of respondent constitute disrespect, if not
outright defiance, of the MTCC's authority. In the absence of instructions to the
contrary, a sheriff has the duty to execute a Writ with reasonable celerity and
promptness in accordance with its mandate.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; FAILURE TO MAKE A RETURN OF A WRIT
WITHIN THE REQUIRED PERIOD IS NONFEASANCE; PENALTY. — In several
cases, the Court has said that the failure to make a return of a writ within the required
period is nonfeasance. In Bautista v. De Castro, the provincial sheriff of Zambales and
his deputy were suspended without pay for 30 and 15 days, respectively, for
dereliction of duty. In Barola v. Abogatal, a sheriff who had received a writ of
execution on January 15, 1978, but made a return thereof only on May 22, 1978, was
fined a month's salary. In Lapeña v. Pamarang, a sheriff whose Return was four days
late was fined P2,000. Casal v. Concepcion Jr. ordered the dismissal of respondent
sheriff from the service and the forfeiture of all his benefits, with prejudice to his
reemployment in any branch or service of the government including government-
owned and controlled corporations. After the lapse of two years from the issuance of
the original Writ in a simple ejectment case, he not only failed to exert reasonable
efforts to fully implement its subsequent issuances, but likewise failed to account for
the amounts he got from complainant. Furthermore, he abandoned his work during the
time that the charges against him were being investigated. In Concerned Citizen v.
Torio, the respondent therein was suspended for a year without pay when he failed to
act promptly on the Writs of Execution issued from 1998-2001. And in Lumbre v.
Dela Cruz, respondent, after being found guilty of an inexcusable seven-month delay
in carrying out a lawful Writ of Execution was fined P5,000. cdrep
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J p:
As frontline officials of the justice system, sheriffs must always strive to maintain
public trust in the performance of their duties. Hence, they must see to it that the final
stage in the litigation process is completed without unnecessary delay. STHAaD
The Case and the Facts
In a Sworn Complaint 1 dated April 11, 2000, Sheriff Rodolfo V. Quitalig of the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of San Carlos City was charged by Reverend
Fernando Fajardo with conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and/or
dereliction of duty.
The factual antecedents of the case are summarized by the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) as follows:
"Complainant, who is one of the plaintiffs in [Civil Case No. MTCC-2266 entitled
'Spouses Fernando Fajardo and Evangeline Perez vs. Maria Datuin], alleged that the
complaint for ejectment which they filed on July 17, 1997 was finally decided on July
29, 1999 against the defendant. The decision was appealed to the Regional Trial Court
but it was dismissed on November 29, 1999, and the decision became final and
executory. His lawyer filed a Motion for Execution, and on March 7, 2000, the Court
issued a Writ of Execution which was brought by the respondent Sheriff to the
defendant Maria Datuin on March 9, 2000.
"Complainant claimed that after the Writ of Execution was served, defendant asked
for a period of two (2) weeks for her to remove her personal properties on the land.
After two (2) weeks he went to Sheriff Quitalig so that the Writ of Execution may be
implemented but he was told that a restraining order was issued, but when he asked
for it, the respondent told him that he left it in the office.
"Complainant stated that on March 24, 2000, he and his lawyer went to the court to
verify whether a restraining order has really been issued but they found out that there
was none; so he told the respondent to implement the Writ of Execution. Respondent,
accompanied by a policeman and the barangay captain went to the place where the
Writ of Execution is to be implemented at 10:00 that morning but when they reached
the place, respondent did not do anything except to ask the defendant to bring out her
personal properties. His reason is that an employee of the Probation Office, Mr.
Leonardo Martinez, talked to him. At 5:30 p.m., the restraining order was brought to
the place, and the respondent told him that the writ of execution can no longer be
implemented.
"Complainant asserted that respondent favored, or showed partiality in favor of the
defendant to his prejudice." 2
In his Comment 3 dated October 3, 2000, respondent denied the charge. He asked for
the dismissal of the case, because he had already implemented the Writ on August 24,
2000 as evidenced by his August 25, 2000 Report of Service. 4 He also pointed out
that he had made an inventory of the personal properties recovered from the subject
premises. That he had done so was attested to by defendant's mother, Rufina Datuin,
and witnessed by the barangay captain and two councilors. DIESaC
The OCA's Finding and Recommendation
In its October 29, 2001 Report, 5 the OCA found respondent to have been negligent in
the performance of his duty as a sheriff. It said thus:
"Respondent was negligent in the performance of his duty as sheriff. The Writ of
Execution was issued on March 7, 2000, and was served on the judgment obligor on
March 9, 2000. Respondent admitted that the judgment obligor promised to vacate the
premises on March 29, 2000, but he was not able to implement the Writ of Execution
because on March 24, 2000, RTC, Branch 56, San Carlos, Pangasinan issued a
Temporary Restraining Order. The Temporary Restraining Order did not ripen into an
injunction so it lapsed after twenty (20) days from the date it was issued, but the Writ
of Execution was implemented only [on] August 24, 2000 which is more than four (4)
months from the date the restraining order lapsed. It is the duty of the sheriff to
enforce a writ of execution without delay once it is given to him unless restrained.
"The Writ of Execution was finally and/or implemented only on August 24, 2000, as
shown in the Report submitted by the respondent in court. Complainant claimed that
the respondent was reluctant to implement the Writ of Execution because a certain
Leonardo Martinez intervened. This allegation of the complainant was not denied by
the respondent in his Comment. Respondent just stated in his Comment that he
implemented the Writ of Execution on August 24, 2000, and made inventory of the
personal properties pulled out from the building and signed by defendant's mother and
Barangay Captain Nestor Poquiz. Respondent's deliberate refusal to traverse or refute
the charges is an admission that the allegations are true and he cannot deny them." 6
(Citation omitted)
The OCA recommended that respondent be ordered to pay a fine of P5,000 and
warned that a repetition of the same or a similar offense would be dealt with more
severely. 7
This Court's Ruling
We agree with the OCA's findings and recommendation.
Respondent's Administrative Liability
As frontline officials of the justice system, sheriffs must always strive to maintain
public trust in the performance of their duties. Having the forsworn duty to uphold the
majesty of the law, they must see to it that the final stage in the litigation process is
carried out without unnecessary delay. 8
A review of the records of this case reveals that respondent enforced the Writ of
Execution dated March 7, 2000 only on August 24, 2000, as shown by his August 25,
2000 Report of Service. Within 30 days from receipt thereof and every 30 days
thereafter until the judgment is fully satisfied, a sheriff is required by the Rules of
Court to render a report on the action taken on a writ of execution. Section 14 of Rule
39 of the Rules provides the manner in which the execution is to be implemented, as
follows:
"SEC. 14. Return of Writ of Execution. The writ of execution shall be returnable
to the court issuing it immediately after the judgment has been satisfied in part or in
full. If the judgment cannot be satisfied in full within thirty days (30) days after his
receipt of the writ, the officer shall report to the court and state the reason therefore.
Such writ shall continue in effect during the period within which the judgment may be
enforced by motion. The officer shall make a report to the court every thirty (30) days
on the proceedings taken thereon until the judgment is satisfied in full, or its
effectivity expires. The returns or periodic reports shall set forth the whole of the
proceedings taken, and shall be filed with the court and copies thereof promptly
furnished the parties."
Evidently, respondent was not only remiss in his implementation of the Writ, but
likewise derelict in his submission of the returns thereof.
Respondent should have immediately implemented and made a return of the Writ after
duly serving it upon the defendant on March 9, 2000. Nonetheless, because of the
request of the defendant and her promise that she would vacate the premises on March
23, 2000, he allowed her to remain there. However, when he came back on March 24,
2000, he was unable to enforce the Writ because of a TRO issued by the RTC of San
Carlos, Pangasinan. He averred that he was finally able to execute the Writ on August
24, 2000 and to submit his Return thereof on the next day.
We find respondent's explanation to be utterly wanting. He is guilty of dereliction of
his duty as a sheriff, because he failed to (1) execute the Writ within 30 days from his
receipt thereof, (2) submit his Report of Service within the same period, (3) make
periodic reports to the MTCC until the judgment was fully satisfied, and (4) furnish
the parties with copies of the Reports. IcSHTA
By his own words, respondent admitted his dereliction of duty. First, as we have said
earlier, he should have immediately executed the Writ when he served it upon the
defendant on March 9, 2000.
Second, he should have immediately reported to the MTCC that he was unable to
enforce the Writ because another court had issued a TRO enjoining him from doing
so. Third, he should have informed the parties, particularly the plaintiff or his counsel,
about his inability to enforce the Writ. Fourth, he should have immediately enforced it
twenty days after its issuance.
Fifth, he should have made periodic Reports to the MTCC until the judgment was
fully satisfied and the parties furnished a copy thereof. Sixth, within thirty days from
his receipt of the Writ, he should have promptly made his Return, a copy of which he
should have immediately furnished the parties.
Clearly, the actuations of respondent constitute disrespect, if not outright defiance, of
the MTCC's authority. In the absence of instructions to the contrary, a sheriff has the
duty to execute a Writ with reasonable celerity and promptness in accordance with its
mandate.
In several cases, 9 the Court has said that the failure to make a return of a writ within
the required period is nonfeasance. In Bautista v. De Castro, 10 the provincial sheriff
of Zambales and his deputy were suspended without pay for 30 and 15 days,
respectively, for dereliction of duty. In Barola v. Abogatal, 11 a sheriff who had
received a writ of execution on January 15, 1978, but made a return thereof only on
May 22, 1978, was fined a month's salary. In Lapeña v. Pamarang, 12 a sheriff whose
Return was four days late was fined P2,000.
Casal v. Concepcion Jr. 13 ordered the dismissal of respondent sheriff from the
service and the forfeiture of all his benefits, with prejudice to his reemployment in
any branch or service of the government including government-owned and controlled
corporations. After the lapse of two years from the issuance of the original Writ in a
simple ejectment case, he not only failed to exert reasonable efforts to fully
implement its subsequent issuances, but likewise failed to account for the amounts he
got from complainant. Furthermore, he abandoned his work during the time that the
charges against him were being investigated.
In Concerned Citizen v. Torio, 14 the respondent therein was suspended for a year
without pay when he failed to act promptly on the Writs of Execution issued from
1998-2001. And in Lumbre v. Dela Cruz, 15 respondent, after being found guilty of an
inexcusable seven-month delay in carrying out a lawful Writ of Execution was fined
P5,000. Justifying the penalty, the Court said:
"When a writ of execution is placed in the hands of a sheriff, it is his duty, in the
absence of contrary instructions, to have it implemented forthwith. The sheriff is
primarily responsible for the speedy and efficient service of all court processes and
writs originating from the court and its branches, including such as may be properly
delegated to him by other courts. The delay of more than seven months, from the time
the writ of execution was issued by the court on 07 August 1998 to the time when
respondent sheriff posted the notice of sale or levy on 23 March 1999, is an
inordinately long period for respondent to act thereon. The importance of the role
played by all court personnel in the administration of justice is never to be taken
lightly. It is the sheriffs particularly who are depended on, and who must properly
attend to, the proper implementation of court decrees and orders, and they are
expected to do so with utmost diligence and dispatch." 16
WHEREFORE, Sheriff Rodolfo V. Quitalig is found guilty of dereliction of duty and
is ORDERED to pay a FINE of five thousand pesos (P5,000). Considering that he has
already retired from the service, this amount is hereby ordered deducted from his
retirement benefits. aCTcDH
SO ORDERED.
Puno, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona and Carpio-Morales, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1. Rollo, pp. 1-2.
2. Id., pp. 16-17.
 3. Id., pp. 12-15. Attached with the Comment were the Writ of Execution, the
Report of Service of the Writ of Execution and the Inventory of the Personal
Properties.
4. Id., p. 14.
5. Id., pp. 16-18; signed by Court Administrator Presbitero J. Velasco Jr.
6. Id., pp. 17-18.
7. Id., p. 18.
8. Concerned Citizen v. Torio, AM No. P-01-1490, July 11, 2002.
9. Sibulo v. Ramirez, 154 SCRA 101, September 17, 1987; Smith Bell &
Company v. Saur, 96 SCRA 667, March 31, 1980.
10. 97 SCRA 336, April 30, 1980.
11. 114 SCRA 582, June 29, 1982.
12. Supra.
13. 243 SCRA 369, April 6, 1995.
14. Supra.
15. AM No. MTJ-01-1379, September 10, 2002.
16. Ibid., per Ynares-Santiago, J.