SECTION 1. Execution upon judgments or final orders.

— Execution
shall issue as a matter of right, on motion, upon a judgment or order that
disposes of the action or proceeding upon the expiration of the period to
appeal therefrom if no appeal has been duly perfected. (1a)
If the appeal has been duly perfected and finally resolved, the
execution may forthwith be applied for in the court of origin, on motion of
the judgment obligee, 1submitting therewith certified true copies of the
judgment or judgments or final order or orders sought to be enforced
and 3of the entry thereof, 4with notice to the adverse party.
The appellate court may, on motion in the same case, when the interest
of justice so requires, direct the court of origin to issue the writ of
execution. (n)

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1. Execution is a matter of right of a final and immutable judgment.

(Abrigo vs. Flores, G.R. No. 160786, June 17, 2013, 698 SCRA 559)
2. Exceptions: (a) matters of life, liberty, honor or property; (b) the
existence of special or compelling circumstances; (c) the merits of the
case; (d) the cause not being entirely attributable to the fault or
negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the doctrine; (e) the
lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and
dilatory; or (f) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced by the
suspension. (Abrigo vs. Flores, G.R. No. 160786, June 17, 2013, 698
SCRA 559)

3. Under the doctrine of finality of judgment or immutability of

judgment, a decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable
and unalterable, and may no longer be modified in any respect, even
if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact
and law, and whether it be made by the court that rendered it or by the
Highest Court of the land. Any act which violates this principle must
immediately be struck down. (FGU Insurance Corporation vs. Regional
Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 66, G.R. No. 161282, February 23,
2011, 644 SCRA 50)

4. In addition, a final and executory judgment can no longer be

amended by adding thereto a relief not originally included. In short,
once a judgment becomes final, the winning party is entitled to a
writ of execution and the issuance thereof becomes a court's
ministerial duty. The lower court cannot vary the mandate of the
superior court or reexamine it for any other purpose other than
execution; much less may it review the same upon any matter decided on
appeal or error apparent; nor intermeddle with it further than to settle so
much as has been demanded.1

1
Tropical Homes v. Fortun, 251 Phil 83 (1989).
5. Exceptions to the Doctrine of Immutability of Judgment. – But like any
other rule, it has exceptions, namely: (1) the correction of clerical errors;
(2) the so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any
party (Briones-Vasquez vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 144882,
February 4, 2005, 450 SCRA 482); (3) void judgments; and (4)
whenever circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision
rendering its execution unjust and inequitable. ((FGU Insurance
Corporation vs. Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 66, G.R.
No. 161282, February 23, 2011, 644 SCRA 50)

6. The general rule is that after a judgment has gained finality, it becomes
the ministerial duty of the court to order its execution. No court should
interfere, by injunction or otherwise, to restrain such execution.
(Australian Professional Realty, Inc. vs. Municipality of Padre Garcia,
Batangas Province, 668 SCRA 253)
7. The remedy of a party from the trial court’s order granting the issuance
of a writ of possession is to file a petition to set aside the sale and cancel
the writ of possession, and the aggrieved party may then appeal from the
order denying or granting said petition. (Producers Bank of the
Philippines (now First Producers Holdings Corporation) vs. Excelsa
Industrial, Inc., 669 SCRA 470)

8. Execution of a judgment can only be issued against one who is a

party in the action, and not against one who, not being a party thereto,
did not have his day in court. (Atilano II vs. Asaoli, 680 SCRA 345)

9. An order of execution is not appealable. Rule 41 of the Revised Rules of

Court states that no appeal may be taken from an order of execution.

Exceptions to the Rule. – The general rule is that an order of execution is

not appealable; otherwise, a case would never end.2 There are, however,
exceptions to this rule, namely: (1) The writ of execution varies the
judgment; (2) There has been a change in the situation of the parties
making execution inequitable or unjust; (3) Execution is sought to be
enforced against property exempt from execution; (4) It appears that the
controversy has been submitted to the judgment of the court; (5) The
terms of the judgment are not clear enough and there remains room for
interpretation thereof; (6) It appears that the writ of execution has been
improvidently issued, or that it is defective in substance, or issued
against the wrong party, or that the judgment debt has been paid or
otherwise satisfied, or the writ issued without authority. 3 In these
exceptional circumstances, considerations of justice and equity dictate
that there be some remedy available to the aggrieved party. The remedy
may either be by appeal or by a special civil action of certiorari,

2 Buag v. Court of Appeals, 363 Phil. 216 (1999); Reburiano v. Court of Appeals, 361 Phil. 294
(1999); Imperial Insurance v. De Los Angeles, 197 Phil. 23 (1982); Corpus v. Alikpala, 130 Phil.
88 (1968).
3
Philippine Economic Zone Authority v. Borreta, G.R. No. 142669, 15 March 2006, 484 SCRA 664, 670
citing Reburiano v. Court of Appeals, supra.
 prohibition, or mandamus.4 (Philippine Gaming Corporation
(PAGCOR) vs. Reyes, G.R. No. 173634, July 22, 2010, 625 SCRA 241)

10. The office of a judgment nunc pro tunc is to record some act of the
court done at a former time which was not then carried into the record,
and the power of a court to make such entries is restricted to placing
upon the record evidence of judicial action which has been actually
taken. It may be used to make the record speak the truth, but not to
make it speak what it did not speak but ought to have spoken. If the
court has not rendered a judgment that it might or should have
rendered, or if it has rendered an imperfect or improper judgment,
it has no power to remedy these errors or omissions by ordering the
entry nunc pro tunc of a proper judgment. Hence a court in entering
a judgment nunc pro tunc has no power to construe what the
judgment means, but only to enter of record such judgment as had
been formerly rendered, but which had not been entered of record
as rendered. In all cases the exercise of the power to enter
judgments nunc pro tunc presupposes the actual rendition of a judgment,
and a mere right to a judgment will not furnish the basis for such an
entry. (15 R. C. L., pp. 622-623.)
A nunc pro tunc entry in practice is an entry made now of something
which was actually previously done, to have effect as of the former
date. Its office is not to supply omitted action by the court, but to
supply an omission in the record of action really had, but omitted
through inadvertence or mistake. (Perkins vs. Haywood, 31 N. E.,
670, 672.)

It is competent for the court to make an entry nunc pro tunc after the
term at which the transaction occurred, even though the rights of third
persons may be affected. But entries nunc pro tunc will not be ordered
except where this can be done without injustice to either party, and as
a nunc pro tunc order is to supply on the record something which
has actually occurred, it cannot supply omitted action by the court . .
. (15 C. J., pp. 972-973.)23 (Briones-Vasquez vs. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 144882, February 4, 2005)

11. Judgments. – A judgment based on compromise agreement is a judgment

based on the merits of the case. (Gadrinab vs. Salamanca, G.R. No.
194560, June 11, 2014, 726 SCRA 215

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Ocampo vs. Sanchez

G.R. No. L-6933, August 30, 1955
Ocampo owned two parcels of land in Quiapo, Manila. Ocampo
leased the lands to Uy. The contract of lease was not complied by Uy.
Ocampo sued for cancellation and rescission. Ocampo and Uy submitted a
4
Reburiano v. Court of Appeals, supra note 15.
compromise agreement during the pendency of the case which the court
approved. The court entered judgment approving the compromise. Ocampo
filed a motion in court praying for the issuance of writ of execution because
Uy was not complying with the compromise agreement. In a hearing motion,
the court ordered orally to Uy to comply with the compromise agreement.
The order was never put into writing.
HELD: Obviously a prevailing party in a civil action is entitled to a
writ of execution of the final judgment obtained by him within five
years from its entry (section 443, Code of Civil Procedure). But it has been
repeatedly held, and it is now well-settled in this jurisdiction, that when after
judgment has been rendered and the latter has become final, facts and
circumstances transpire which render its execution impossible or unjust, the
interested party may ask the court to modify or alter the judgment to
harmonize the same with justice and the facts. (Molina vs. De la Riva, 8
Phil., 569; Behn, Meyer & Co. vs. McMicking, 11 Phil., 276; Warner,
Barnes & Co. vs. Jaucian, 13 Phil., 4; Espiritu vs. Crossfield and Guash, 14
Phil., 588; Flor mata vs. Lichauco and Salinas, 36 Phil., 809). ....
Taking into consideration the oral order of the court of June 30, 1953,
the order of July 7, and the affidavit of Uy attached to his answer, it is
reasonable to conclude that the lower court acted in accordance with the
principle enunciated in the case of de la Costa vs. Cleofas cited above. In
view of the facts and circumstances which transpired after judgment, the
respondent Judge issued the above orders so as to harmonize the judgment"
with justice and the facts." These circumstances consisted in the dealings
and agreements of the parties subsequent to the judgment, curing the slight
deviations by respondent Uy from the literal terms of the original agreement
which would have led to the loss of his building. It should be noted that the
order of July 7, 1953 commences with the words "after mutual explanations
of the counsel for the parties etc." It appears that the orders given by the
respondent Judge based on said circumstances are in accordance with the
principles of the de la Costa case and do not warrant the issuance of the writ
of mandamus prayed for. Said orders do not substantially affect or prejudice
the rights of the petitioner.

Cabrias vs. Hon. Midpantao L. Adil

G.R. No. L-49648, March 18, 1985
Cabrias et al filed an action for forcible entry against Cabaña et al.
The court ruled in favor of Cabrias et al. Cabaña appealed to the Court of
First Instance which affirmed subsequently the decision of the lower court.
No appeal was further taken up. Cabrias did not wait for the sheriff to
deliver to them the contested lot because they occupied the adjacent lot
owned by Cabaña, destroying the house erected thereon, harvesting the
palay crops and the fruits of the mango and coconut trees and cutting
bamboo. Later, the judge suspended the sale by public auction and the
holding in abeyance the issuance of an alias writ of execution. Cabaña asked
the court to declare Cabrias in contempt of court. The court then ordered
Cabrias to vacate Lot 359.
HELD: There is also no merit in the petitioners' contention that the
respondent judge abused his discretion in issuing the questioned order of
October 2, 1978, holding in abeyance the issuance of an alias writ of
execution and suspending the public auction sale of the properties of the
defendants and their bondsmen to satisfy the judgment of the court. While it
may be conceded that a court cannot refuse to issue a writ of execution upon
a final and executory judgment, certain facts and circumstances transpired
after the judgment became final which would render the execution of the
said judgment unjust.

Lee vs. De Guzman

G.R. No. 90926, July 6, 1990
Motorcars, Inc. offered a price quotation of 1 unit Toyota car to Lee
who paid P1,000 as deposit that is required in the price quotation. The
Toyota car was not delivered. Lee sued for the delivery of the Toyota car.
The trial court rendered judgment in favor of Motorcars, Inc. Appeal was
interposed by Motorcars, Inc. to the Court of Appeals which ordered
Motorcars, Inc. to deliver the car to Lee. The decision of the Court of
Appeals was affirmed in the Supreme Court. When the case was remanded
to the trial court for execution, Lee filed a motion for a writ of execution.
Instead of complying with the order of the court, Motorcars filed a motion to
quash writ of execution. The motion to quash was anchored on the ground
that it was impossible for Motorcars to comply because the manufacturer
Delta Motors already closed shop. The motion to quash was denied. Lee
filed a motion for the issuance of alias writ of execution. Motorcars opposed.
Lee filed a motion for contempt of court for the stance of the respondent
company in defying the order of the court was contumacious in nature. The
trial court issued the order which was favorably for Motorcars.
ISSUE: should respondent Motorcars be made liable to fulfill a
seemingly impossible obligation?
HELD: It is well-settled that when after a judgment has become
final and executory, facts and circumstances transpire which render its
execution impossible or unjust, the interested party may ask a
competent court to stay its execution or prevent its enforcement.

Bachrach Corporation vs CA
G.R. No. 128349, September 25, 1998
Bachrach Corporation leased from Philippine Ports Authority (PPA)
two specified areas in the Manila Port Area for a term of 99 years. During
her tenure, Pres. Cory Aquino transferred the management and
administration of the entire port area to the PPA. Shortly after takeover, PPA
issued a memorandum circular increasing the rental rates of Bachrach by
1,500%. Bachrach refused to pay the substantial increase. PPA sued
Bachrach for unlawful detainer. METC rendered a decision evicting
Bachrach from the place. Bachrach appealed to the Regional Trial Court
which affirmed the METC decision. Bachrach appealed to the Court of
Appeals. The appellate court upheld the decision of the RTC. A motion for
reconsideration was filed by Bachrach. However, the resolution of the
motion for reconsideration was put to a hold pending the submission of the
compromise agreement by the parties. When the parties failed to submit the
compromise agreement, the Court of appeals denied the motion for
reconsideration. The decision of the appellate court in the ejectment case
became final and executory.
Meanwhile that the motion for reconsideration was pending at that
time, Bachrach filed a complaint against PPA in the RTC for specific
performance for refusing to honor a compromise agreement said to have
been perfected between Bachrach and PPA during their conference that
superseded the ejectment case.
HELD: The rule indeed is, and has almost invariably been, that after
a judgment has gained finality, it becomes the ministerial duty of the
court to order its execution.5 No court, perforce, should interfere by
injunction or otherwise to restrain such execution. The rule, however,
concededly admits of exceptions; hence, when facts and circumstances later
transpire that would render execution inequitable or unjust, the interested
party may ask a competent court to stay its execution or prevent its
enforcement.6 So, also, a change in the situation of the parties can warrant an
injunctive relief.7

Phil Sinter Corp vs Cagayan Electric Power & Light Co Inc

G.R. No. 127371, April 25, 2002
381 SCRA 582
Cagayan Electric Power and Light Co., Inc. (CEPALCO) petitioned
the ERB for the discontinuation of all existing power supply within
CEPALCO’s franchise area. ERB granted the petition. This was affirmed in
the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court. To implement the decision,
CEPALCO wrote a letter to Philippine Sinter Corporation (PSC) which was
an entity operating in the franchise area of CEPALCO. To restrain the
execution of the ERB decision, PSC filed a complaint for injunction against
CEPALCO. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of PSC. The CA
affirmed reversed the decision of the trial court, dissolving the injunction.
ISSUE: Whether or not injunction lies against the final and executory
judgment of the ERB.

5
Section 1, Rule 39, Rules of Court; Nique vs. Zapatos, 219 SCRA 639;
Ortegas vs. Hidalgo, 198 SCRA 635; Esquivel vs. Alegre, 172 SCRA 315;
Rodriguez vs. Project 6 Market Service Cooperative, Inc., 247 SCRA 528.
6
Lee vs. De Guzman, Jr., 187 SCRA 276.
7
Luna vs. Court of Appeals, 137 SCRA 7; Heirs of Guminpin vs. Court of
Appeals, 120 SCRA 687.
 HELD: Remedial Law; Injunction; An injunction to stay a final and
executory decision is unavailing except only after a showing that acts and
circumstances exist which would render execution unjust or inequitable, or
that a change in the situation of the parties occurred. - In Bachrach
Corporation vs. Court of Appeals,8 this Court, through Mr. Justice Jose C.
Vitug, pertinently held:
The rule indeed is, and has almost invariably been, that after a
judgment has gained finality, it becomes the ministerial duty of the court to
order its execution. No court, perforce, should interfere by injunction or
otherwise to restrain such execution. The rule, however, concededly admits
of exceptions; hence, when facts and circumstances later transpire that
would render execution inequitable or unjust, the interested party may ask a
competent court to stay its execution or prevent its enforcement. So, also, a
change in the situation of the parties can warrant an injunctive relief.
Clearly, an injunction to stay a final and executory decision is
unavailing except only after a showing that facts and circumstances exist
which would render execution unjust or inequitable, or that a change in the
situation of the parties occurred. Here, no such exception exists as shown by
the facts earlier narrated. To disturb the final and executory decision of the
ERB in an injunction suit is to brazenly disregard the rule on finality of
judgments. In Camarines Norte Electric Cooperative, Inc. vs. Torres,9 we
underscored the importance of this principle, thus:
We have stated before, and reiterate it now, that administrative
decisions must end sometime, as fully as public policy demands that finality
be written on judicial controversies. Public interest requires that proceedings
already terminated should not be altered at every step, for the rule of non
quieta movere prescribes that what had already been terminated should not
be disturbed. A disregard of this principle does not commend itself to sound
public policy.

Natalia Realty Inc vs Court of Appeals

126462, G.R. No. November 12, 2002*

Spouses Morta vs Bagagan

AM MTJ-03-1513, November 12, 2003
415 SCRA 624
Morta et al sued Judge Baranda and his sheriff for gross ignorance of
the law, incompetence, bias and delay. Morta et al were plaintiffs for
damages with writ of preliminary injunction in civil case no. 481. The court
ruled in favor of Morta et al. The defendants appealed to the Regional Trial
Court. The appeal was dismissed on the ground that the claims for damages
were tenancy related problems which fall under the original and exclusive
jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudicatory Board

8
296 SCRA 487, 495 (1998).
9
286 SCRA 666, 681 (1998).
(DARAB). Morta et al filed a petition for review in the Court of Appeals
assailing the decision of the RTC. The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower
courts ruling that the cases fall within the original and exclusive jurisdiction
of DARAB. Thereafter, the First Division of this Supreme Court, acting on
the petition for review on certiorari filed by the plaintiffs, rendered its
decision dated June 10, 1999 in G.R. No. 123417 affirming the decision of
the Municipal Trial Court. Despite the decision in the Supreme Court, Morta
et al complained that the respondent judge still refused to issue a writ of
possession
Respondent judge explained that he had denied complainants Motion
for the issuance of a writ of possession because, by the time Civil Case Nos.
481 and 482 were finally decided by this Court on June 10, 1999, they had
already been ousted from the lots in question pursuant to the Decisions in
DARAB Case No. 2413 and Civil Case No. 1920. In Civil Case No. 1920,
respondent judge ordered complainants to vacate the disputed lots. A Writ of
Execution/Demolition was thereafter issued on January 29, 1998. On the
other hand, the DARAB Decision, which became final and executory on
October 27, 1998, directed them to cease and desist from disturbing the
peaceful possession of therein Petitioner Jaime Occidental.
ISSUE: Was the refusal of the judge to issue a writ of execution
proper?
HELD: It was held that “We agree with the OCA that respondent
judge acted correctly in not issuing a writ of execution/possession. His
action was consistent with the Decision of this Court in GR No. 123417
affirming that of the MTC as to damages. Besides, the latters Order directing
defendants not to molest complainants in their peaceful possession was
rendered moot when they were ousted from the disputed lots by virtue of the
final and executory judgments in Civil Case No. 1920 and DARAB Case
No. 2413. Indeed, the execution of a final judgment may be refused, as in
this case, when there has been a change in the situation of the parties that
would make its execution inequitable.10”

Sps Serrano vs Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 133883, December 10, 2003*

Lumapas vs. Lumapas

G.R. No. 130682, March 10, 2004
The Republic filed in 1951 an application with the RTC docketed as a
cadastral case claiming ownership over certain properties. Guillermo
Lumapas filed his answer. Guillermo Lumapas died in 1965 while the case
was pending. Gregorio Lumapas, claiming to be the only son of Guillermo
Lumapas, substituted in 1984 for the latter. In the same year 1984, the trial

10
Philippine Sinter Corporation v. Cagayan Electric Power and Light Co.,
Inc., 381 SCRA 582, April 25, 2002; citing Bachrach Corporation v. Court
of Appeals, 357 Phil. 483, September 25, 1998.
court declared Gregorio Lumapas as the owner of the land and that he was
issued a certificate of title.
Gregorio Lumapas filed in 1985 an action for the recovery of
possession against Demetria Lumapas who was then in possession of the
subject land. For their part, Allan Lumapas et al filed a civil complaint for
recovery of possession with damages against Gregorio Lumapas.
Allan Lumapas et al claimed that they were brothers and sisters of
Guillermo Lumapas who died single, without issue. They claimed that
Gregorio Lumapas obtained OCT No. 0-6,151 through fraud, deceit and
gross misrepresentation and that the property had been titled to Guillermo
Lumapas long before OCT No. 0-6,151 was issued to Gregorio Lumapas, or
on April 21, 1953, through a homestead patent. The trial court rendered
judgment in favor of Gregorio Lumapas. The judgment was appealed to the
Court of Appeals.
The judgment was reversed in the Court of Appeals, which ordered
the following: (1) declaring that Gregorio Lumapas did not sufficiently
prove he was the son of Guillermo Lumapas; and, (2) Gregorio Lumapas
would maintain his possession of the land. The appellate court ruled that the
issue of whether the appellees-spouses Lumapas obtained OCT 0-6,151
through fraud and deceit should be raised in the appropriate proceedings, as
the said title could not be attacked collaterally. The decision of the Court of
Appeals became final and executory.
Gregorio Lumapas filed motion for a writ of execution. The Court
denied to issue the writ of execution: (1) Gregorio Lumapas had no right to
use surname of Lumapas without the consent of the putative father, Gregorio
Lumapas was therefore a non-entity in so far as the law was concerned for
there was in fact no such existing person; (2) Inasmuch as Gregorio Limpot,
the movant was not a legal heir of Guillermo Lumapas, therefore he did not
have the legal authority and personality to act for and in behalf of Gregorio
Limpot Lumapas, the non-existing person to whom the Court of Appeals
awarded the possession of the land in litigation; He was a mere pretender
who should not be allowed to benefit to benefit from his illegal maneuvers.
Allan Lumapas et al filed a petition in the RTC for the cancellation of
the certificate of title of Gregorio Lumapas. The RTC rendered a judgment
of cancellation of certificate of title in the name of Gregorio Lumapas and
that it further declared the only certificate of title to be the one earlier issued
in the name of Guillermo Lumapas.
After failure of the action of Gregorio Lumapas to annul the judgment
of the Court cancelling certificate of title in his name, Gregorio Lumapas
filed a petition for mandamus to compel RTC to issue a writ of execution to
enforce the decision of the appellate court declaring him entitled to the
rightful possession of the land. The court of appeals granted the writ of
mandamus.
Allan Lumapas et al filed petition for review on certiorari. They
alleged, inter alia, that the Gregorio Lumapas indulged in forum shopping
because his petition for mandamus in the CA was the third petition filed in
the Court of Appeals and in this Court. They further averred that the writ of
mandamus in effect reversed the decision of this Court in G.R. No. 132661,
and that the decision of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 41099 had been mooted
by the decision of the RTC in Special Case No. 96-50,022.
ISSUE: The only issue in this case is whether or not the trial court
may be compelled by a writ of mandamus to issue a writ of execution for the
enforcement of the decision of the Court of Appeals declaring that Gregorio
Lumapas was entitled to possession.
HELD: The petition is meritorious.
However, the appellate court in its decision ruled that, although the
respondent Gregorio Lumapas failed to prove his filiation to the deceased
Guillermo Lumapas, the fact that he had legal title over the subject land
entitled him to the possession thereof, pending the final determination of
the validity of the title issued to him in an appropriate proceeding:
The question now posed is if Gregorio failed to prove by
sufficient evidence his filiation to Guillermo Lumapas, does it follow
that he is not entitled to the possession of the said property?
Gregorio was able to obtain a title in his name over the
questioned property after the cadastral proceedings instituted by the
Republic of the Philippines. Originally, the respondent therein was
Guillermo who after his death, was substituted by Gregorio on the
ground that he is the son of the former. He was subsequently issued
OCT No. 0-6,151. This Torrens title is now a conclusive evidence of
his ownership of the subject land (Ching vs. CA, 181 SCRA 9). After
the expiration of the one-year period from the issuance of the decree
of registration, the said certificate of title became incontrovertible
(Section 38, Land Registration Act, now Section 32, P.D. 1259). In
fine, whether or not his title was obtained fraudulently as alleged by
appellants, is beyond the competence of this Court to determine. The
issue should have been raised during the proceeding before the
cadastral court. A Torrens title cannot be collaterally attacked, the
issue on the validity of title, i.e. whether or not it was fraudulently
issued can only be raised in an action expressedly instituted for that
purpose (Co vs. CA, 196 SCRA 705). Appellants prayer for the
cancellation of appellees title and the reconveyance of the same to
them, under the facts obtaining, is legally impossible. To sustain their
action would be inconsistent with the rule that the act of registration is
the operative act that conveys a parcel of land to its registered owner
under the Torrens system.
What we are saying is that, although appellee has not
sufficiently proved his filiation to the late Guillermo Lumapas, the fact
that he has a legal title over the subject land entitles him to the
possession thereof, pending the final determination of the validity of
the title issued to him in an appropriate proceeding.11
In fine, the right of the respondent to take possession of the property
subject to a resolutory condition, that is, the final determination in Cadastral
Case No. N-3 on the issue of whether respondent Gregorio Lumapas is the
legal heir of Guillermo Lumapas and of the validity of OCT No. 0-6,151.

11
Id. at 55-56. (Italics ours.)
Conformably to the decision of the appellate court in CA-G.R. CV No.
31820, the petitioners filed their petition therein for the cancellation of OCT
0-6,151 in Cadastral Case No. N-3. The case was docketed as Special Case
No. 96-50,022. The respondent failed to file an answer and was declared in
default. In its Decision dated July 23, 1997, the trial court nullified Original
Certificate of Title 0-6,151 under the name of the respondent Gregorio
Lumapas and declared Original Certificate of Title No. P-157 under the
name of Guillermo Lumapas as the only valid title over the property. The
decision of the RTC had become final and executory. The decision of the
RTC in Special Case No. 96-50,022 is a supervening cause or reason which
renders the final and executory decision of the appellate court in CA-G.R.
CV No. 31820 as unenforceable.12 The nullification of Original Certificate
of Title No. 0-6,151 under the name of the respondent left him without any
legal basis for his claim of right of possession over the property. Having
been declared the owners of the property, being the lawful heirs of
Guillermo Lumapas, the petitioners are entitled to the possession of the
property.13

Gutierrez vs Valiente
G.R. No. 166802, July 4, 2008
557 SCRA 211
The action involved a boundary dispute of two lots owned by
Gutierrez and Valiente. A portion of the land of Valiente was allegedly
encroached by Gutierrez. Valiente sued Gutierrez for quieting of title and
recovery of possession. The court issued an order on May 15, 2000 for the
relocation of the lots. The relocation survey revealed that Gutierrez was
occupying a 99 sq. m. portion of the land of Valiente. The court issued an
order on July 23, 2003 directing Gutierrez to reconvey to Valiente the
portion of the land in question. Valiente moved for the execution of the
order which the court granted. Sheriff gave notice to Gutierrez of the writ of
execution. Gutierrez filed a motion to quash writ of execution on the ground
that the reconveyance of the encroached portions exceeded the nature of
reliefs prayed for in the complaint.
ISSUE: Gutierrez questioned the validity of the orders.
HELD: Same; Same; Execution; Instances where a motion to quash
execution is proper. - A motion to quash execution is only proper where: (a)
the writ of execution varies the judgment; (b) there has been a change in the
situation of the parties making execution inequitable or unjust; (c) execution
is sought to be enforced against property exempt from execution; (d) it
appears that the controversy has never been submitted to the judgment of the
court; (e) the terms of the judgment are not clear enough and there remains
room for interpretation thereof; or (f) it appears that the writ of execution has
been improvidently issued, or that it is defective in substance or is issued
against the wrong party, or that the judgment debt has been paid or

12
Flores v. Court of Appeals, 259 SCRA 618 (1996).
13
Nazareno v. Court of Appeals, 326 SCRA 338 (2000).
otherwise satisfied, or the writ was issued without authority.14 None of these
instances apply here.
Same; Same; Judgments; A judgment which has acquired finality
becomes immutable and unalterable, hence, may no longer be modified in
any respect except only to correct clerical errors or mistakes. - A motion to
quash execution and a petition for certiorari and prohibition, are not and
should not be substitutes for a lost appeal.15 They are not procedural devises
to deprive the winning party of the fruits of the judgment in his or her favor.
Courts should frown upon any scheme to prolong litigations. A judgment
which has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable, hence, may
no longer be modified in any respect except only to correct clerical errors or
mistakes. Once a judgment or order becomes final, all the issues between the
parties are deemed resolved and laid to rest.16

Navarro vs. Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company

G.R. No. 165697, August 4, 2009
595 SCRA 149
Judgments; Immutability of Judgments; No other procedural law
principle is indeed more settled than that once a judgment becomes final, it
is no longer subject to change, revision, amendment or reversal, except only
for correction of clerical errors, or the making of nunc pro tunc entries
which cause no prejudice to any party, or where the judgment itself is void. -
While the Court agrees that an action to declare the nullity of contracts is not
barred by the statute of limitations, the fact that Clarita was barred by laches
from bringing such action at the first instance has already been settled by the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 55780. At this point in the
proceedings, the Court can no longer rule on the applicability of the
principle of laches vis--vis the imprescriptibility of Claritas cause of action
because the said decision is not the one on appeal before us. But more
importantly, the Court takes notice that the decision rendered in that case
had already become final without any motion for reconsideration being filed
or an appeal being taken therefrom. Thus, we are left with no other recourse
than to uphold the immutability of the said decision. No other procedural
law principle is indeed more settled than that once a judgment becomes
final, it is no longer subject to change, revision, amendment or reversal,
except only for correction of clerical errors, or the making of nunc pro tunc
entries which cause no prejudice to any party, or where the judgment itself is
void.17 The underlying reason for the rule is two-fold: (1) to avoid delay in
the administration of justice and thus make orderly the discharge of judicial
business, and (2) to put judicial controversies to an end, at the risk of
occasional errors, inasmuch as controversies cannot be allowed to drag on
indefinitely and the rights and obligations of every litigant must not hang in

14
Reburiano v. Court of Appeals, 361 Phil. 294, 302 (1999); Limpin, Jr. v. Intermediate Appellate Court,
G.R. No. L-70987, January 30, 1987, 147 SCRA 516, 522-23.
15
Cf Conejos v. Court of Appeals, 435 Phil. 849, 855 (2002); Del Mar v. Court of Appeals, 429 Phil. 19, 30
(2002).
16
Cf Salva v. Court of Appeals, 364 Phil. 281, 294 (1999).
17
Yau v. Silverio, Sr., G.R. No. 158848, February 4, 2008, 543 SCRA 520.
suspense for an indefinite period of time. 18 As the Court declared in Yau v.
Silverio,19 Litigation must end and terminate sometime and somewhere, and
it is essential to an effective and efficient administration of justice that, once
a judgment has become final, the winning party be, not through a mere
subterfuge, deprived of the fruits of the verdict. Courts must therefore guard
against any scheme calculated to bring about that result. Constituted as they
are to put an end to controversies, courts should frown upon any attempt to
prolong them.
Same; Same; Jusst as a losing party has the right to file an appeal
within the prescribed period, the winning party also has the correlative right
to enjoy the finality of the resolution of his case by the execution and
satisfaction of the judgment. - Just as a losing party has the right to file an
appeal within the prescribed period, the winning party also has the
correlative right to enjoy the finality of the resolution of his case by the
execution and satisfaction of the judgment. Any attempt to thwart this rigid
rule and deny the prevailing litigant his right to savor the fruit of his victory
must immediately be struck down.20 Thus, in Heirs of Wenceslao Samper v.
Reciproco-Noble,21 we had occasion to emphasize the significance of this
rule, to wit: It is an important fundamental principle in our Judicial system
that every litigation must come to an end x x x Access to the courts is
guaranteed. But there must be a limit thereto. Once a litigants rights have
been adjudicated in a valid final judgment of a competent court, he should
not be granted an unbridled license to come back for another try. The
prevailing party should not be harassed by subsequent suits. For, if endless
litigations were to be encouraged, then unscrupulous litigants will multiply
in number to the detriment of the administration of justice.
Francisco vs. Gonzales
G.R. No. 177667, September 17, 2008
565 SCRA 638
Clodualdo and Michelle executed a compromise agreement that was
part of the partial decision in an action for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage. The subject of the compromise agreement covered the transfer of
ownership of a property by deed of donation to their children. Subsequently,
in another case, a judgment was rendered against Michelle. A writ of
execution was issued on the property now belonging to the children. The CA
affirmed the order of the trial court granting the writ of execution.
ISSUE: The children claim that they are the rightful owners of the
property in the nullity of marriage and their parents already waived in their
favor their rights over the property.
HELD: Judgments; Executions; The power of the court in executing
judgments extends only to properties unquestionably belonging to the

18
Social Security System v. Isip, G.R. No. 165417, April 4, 2007, 520 SCRA 310.
19
Supra note 26, at 531, citing Lim v. Jabalde, G.R. No. 36786, April 17, 1989, 172 SCRA 211
(1983).
20
Yau v. Silverio, Sr., supra note 26, at 531, citing Seven Brothers Shipping Corporation v. Oriental
Assurance Corporation, G.R. No. 140613. October 15, 2002.
21
G.R. No. 142594 June 26, 2007, 525 SCRA 515, citing Pacquing v. Court of Appeals, 200 Phil.
516 (1982).
judgment debtor alone. – The Court finds that it was grave error for the RTC
to proceed with the execution, levy and sale of the subject property. The
power of the court in executing judgments extends only to properties
unquestionably belonging to the judgment debtor alone,22 in the present
case to those belonging to Michele and Matrai. One man's goods shall not be
sold for another man's debts.23
Judgment; Execution; While the trial courts has the competence to
identify and to secure properties and interest therein held by the judgment
debtor for the satisfaction of a money judgment rendered against him, such
exercise of authority is premised on one important fact; that the properties
levied upon, or sought to be levied upon, are properties unquestionably
owned by the judgment debtor and are not exempt from execution. - While
the trial court has the competence to identify and to secure properties and
interest therein held by the judgment debtor for the satisfaction of a money
judgment rendered against him, such exercise of its authority is premised on
one important fact: that the properties levied upon, or sought to be levied
upon, are properties unquestionably owned by the judgment debtor and
are not exempt by law from execution.24 Also, a sheriff is not authorized to
attach or levy on property not belonging to the judgment debtor, and even
incurs liability if he wrongfully levies upon the property of a third person. A
sheriff has no authority to attach the property of any person under execution
except that of the judgment debtor.25
Valdez vs. Financiera Manila, Inc.
G.R. No. 183387, September 29, 2009
601 SCRA 291
Valdez sued Financiera for a sum of money and damages for failure of
Financiera and the corporate officers to pay his money market investments
on maturity date. Subsequently, compromise agreement were entered into
among the parties. The said compromise agreement was approved by the
court. The compromise agreement provided for the return of the money to
Valdez and the lifting of the writ of attachment on the properties of
Financiera. A writ of execution was issued by the Court. Financiera
delivered to Valdez certificates of payments and passbooks covering its
investments to SPPI. The writ was served to SPPI and there was transfer of
SPPI investments to Valdez. Then, Valdez filed a motion for rescission of
compromise agreement on the ground that no payment was expected from
Financiera. Motion was denied. Valdez filed for the issuance of a writ of
execution against Financiera but the motion was also denied. Subsequently,
Financiera filed an urgent motion for execution of the compromise
agreement on the ground that it had already conveyed its SPPI Investments

22
Go v. Yamane, G.R. No. 160762, May 3, 2006, 489 SCRA 107, 124.
23
Yao v. Perello, 460 Phil. 658, 662 (2003).
24
Abesamis v. Court of Appeals, 413 Phil. 646 (2001).
25
Johnson & Johnson (Phils.), Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
102692, September 23, 1996, 262 SCRA 298.
to Valdez. On the other hand, Valdez also filed a motion for execution of the
decision. Court granted the motion for execution of Valdez.
ISSUE: Was the court correct in denying the motion for execution of
Financiera for the enforcement of the compromise agreement and in granting
Valdez’s motion for execution of the trial court’s decision.
HELD: The court ruled in the affirmative.
In a case26 decided by this Court, it was held that:
Compromise agreements are contracts, whereby the parties
undertake reciprocal obligations to resolve their differences,27 thus,
avoiding litigation,28 or put an end to one already commenced.29
It is a cardinal rule in contract interpretation that the
ascertainment of the intention of the contracting parties is to be
discharged by looking to the words they used to project that intention
in their contract, that is, all the words, not just a particular word or
two, and words in context, not words standing alone.30
Article 1374 of the Civil Code requires that the various
stipulations of a contract shall be interpreted together, attributing to
the doubtful ones that sense which may result from all of them taken
jointly.31
It is clear from the above ruling that the substance of a compromise
agreement can be inferred from a careful perusal of all the stipulations in
their entirety and all the words used, as they are connected with one another.
The Compromise Agreement entered into by petitioner Valdez and the
other plaintiffs and respondent Financiera was for a valuable consideration
paid by the latter in order for the former to drop, dismiss and withdraw their
complaint; and to acknowledge that they had no more claims, demands,
complaints, or causes of action of any kind whatsoever against said
respondent. By dropping, dismissing and withdrawing their complaint,
petitioner Valdez and the other plaintiffs agreed to the lifting, cancellation
and dissolution of the Writ of Preliminary Attachment issued by the RTC
dated October 13, 1998, by virtue of which they had levied on, garnished
and attached certain real and personal properties of respondent Financiera.
Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR)
vs. Aumentado
G.R. No. 173634, July 22, 2010
625 SCRA 241
Aumentado was employed by PAGCOR as a table supervisor.
Subsequently, PAGCOR dismissed him from the service. Feeling aggrieved,
Aumentado filed a complaint for illegal dismissal in the Civil Service which

26 Alonzo v. Sps. Jaime and Perlita San Juan, G.R. No. 137549, February 11, 2005, 451 SCRA 45.
27 Regal Films, Inc. v. Concepcion, 414 Phil. 807, 812 (2001).
28 Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority (MCIAA) v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 139495,
November 27, 2000, 346 SCRA 126.
29 Sanchez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 108947, September 29, 1997, 279 SCRA 647, cited in San
Antonio v. Court of Appeals, 371 SCRA 536 (2001).
30 Limson v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 135929, April 20, 2001, 357 SCRA 209; China Banking
Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 121158, December 5, 1996, 265 SCRA 327.
31 The Insular Life Assurance Company, Ltd. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126850, April 28, 2004,
428 SCRA 79.
ruled his reinstatement. The ruling of the Civil Service was affirmed in the
CA and SC. PAGCOR and Aumentado entered into an amicable settlement
and, for monetary consideration, Aumentado executed a quitclaim.
PAGCOR filed a manifestation of quitclaim in order to prevent the
reinstatement of Aumentado but the manifestation was denied.
ISSUE: Whether an order of execution proper.
HELD: The general rule is that an order of execution if anot
appealable; Exceptions to the Rule. – The general rule is that an order of
execution is not appealable; otherwise, a case would never end.32 There are,
however, exceptions to this rule, namely: (1) The writ of execution varies
the judgment; (2) There has been a change in the situation of the parties
making execution inequitable or unjust; (3) Execution is sought to be
enforced against property exempt from execution; (4) It appears that the
controversy has been submitted to the judgment of the court; (5) The terms
of the judgment are not clear enough and there remains room for
interpretation thereof; (6) It appears that the writ of execution has been
improvidently issued, or that it is defective in substance, or issued against
the wrong party, or that the judgment debt has been paid or otherwise
satisfied, or the writ issued without authority.33 In these exceptional
circumstances, considerations of justice and equity dictate that there be some
remedy available to the aggrieved party. The remedy may either be by
appeal or by a special civil action of certiorari, prohibition, or mandamus.34
Same; Same; Same; The execution of a quitclaim after a decision has
become final and executory is a supervening event which could affect the
execution of the decision. - PAGCOR and respondent executed the quitclaim
after the entry of judgment. The execution of a quitclaim after a decision has
become final and executory is a supervening event which could affect the
execution of the decision. The quitclaim between PAGCOR and respondent
brought about a change in their situation because the validity of the
quitclaim would determine whether respondent is entitled to reinstatement.
The validity of the quitclaim will also determine if the execution of CSC
Resolution No. 98-1996 will be inequitable or unjust.
Kukan International Corporation vs. Reyes
G.R. No. 182729, September 29, 2010
631 SCRA 596
The plaintiff sued Kukan, Inc. for a sum of money. Kukan, Inc., after
the joinder of issues, stopped appearing in court prompting it to be declared
in default. Meantime, Kukan International Corporation was organized and
registered. A decision was rendered. Kukan International Corporation was
made to answer for the judgment debt in the execution although it was never
impleaded as a party.

32 Buag v. Court of Appeals, 363 Phil. 216 (1999); Reburiano v. Court of Appeals, 361 Phil. 294
(1999); Imperial Insurance v. De Los Angeles, 197 Phil. 23 (1982); Corpus v. Alikpala, 130 Phil.
88 (1968).
33
Philippine Economic Zone Authority v. Borreta, G.R. No. 142669, 15 March 2006, 484 SCRA 664, 670
citing Reburiano v. Court of Appeals, supra.
34
Reburiano v. Court of Appeals, supra note 15.
 HELD: It was found that the judgment debt cannot be executed
against Kukan International Corporation.
Courts; Judgments; Execution; While the court which rendered the
judgment has a general supervisory control over its process of execution,
which power carries with it the right to determine every question of fact and
law which may be involved in the execution, the same does not, however,
extend as to authorize the alteration or amendment of a final and executory
decision, save for certain recognized exceptions, among which is the
correction of clerical errors. - In Carpio v. Doroja,35 the Court ruled that the
deciding court has supervisory control over the execution of its judgment: A
case in which an execution has been issued is regarded as still pending so
that all proceedings on the execution are proceedings in the suit. There is no
question that the court which rendered the judgment has a general
supervisory control over its process of execution, and this power carries with
it the right to determine every question of fact and law which may be
involved in the execution. We reiterated the above holding in Javier v. Court
of Appeals36 in this wise: “The said branch has a general supervisory control
over its processes in the execution of its judgment with a right to determine
every question of fact and law which may be involved in the execution.” The
court’s supervisory control does not, however, extend as to authorize the
alteration or amendment of a final and executory decision, save for certain
recognized exceptions, among which is the correction of clerical errors. Else,
the court violates the principle of finality of judgment and its immutability,
concepts which the Court, in Tan v. Timbal,37 defined: As we held in
Industrial Management International Development Corporation vs. NLRC:
It is an elementary principle of procedure that the resolution of the court in a
given issue as embodied in the dispositive part of a decision or order is the
controlling factor as to settlement of rights of the parties. Once a decision
or order becomes final and executory, it is removed from the power or
jurisdiction of the court which rendered it to further alter or amend it.
It thereby becomes immutable and unalterable and any amendment or
alteration which substantially affects a final and executory judgment is
null and void for lack of jurisdiction, including the entire proceedings
held for that purpose. An order of execution which varies the tenor of
the judgment or exceeds the terms thereof is a nullity. (Emphasis
supplied.) Republic v. Tango38 expounded on the same principle and its
exceptions: Deeply ingrained in our jurisprudence is the principle that a
decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable.
As such, it may no longer be modified in any respect even if the
modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law and
whether it will be made by the court that rendered it or by the highest court
of the land. x x x The doctrine of finality of judgment is grounded on the
fundamental principle of public policy and sound practice that, at the risk of
occasional error, the judgment of courts and the award of quasi-judicial

35
G.R. No. 84516, December 5, 1989, 180 SCRA 1, 7.
36
G.R. No. 97795, February 16, 2004, 423 SCRA 11, 33.
37
G.R. No. 141926, July 14, 2004, 434 SCRA 381, 386.
38
G.R. No. 161062, July 31, 2009, 594 SCRA 560, 568.
agencies must become final on some definite date fixed by law. The only
exceptions to the general rule are the correction of clerical errors, the so-
called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party, void
judgments, and whenever circumstances transpire after the finality of the
decision which render its execution unjust and inequitable. None of the
exceptions obtains here to merit the review sought. (Emphasis added.)
Filipinas Palmoil Processing, Inc.vs. Dejapa
G.R. No. 167332, February 7, 2011, sc.judiciary.gov.ph

FGU Insurance Corporation vs.

Regional Trial Court of Makati City
Branch 66, G.R. No. 161282, February 23, 2011
644 SCRA 50
Appliances were transported from plant site of Concepcion Industries,
Inc. in Alabang to Central Luzon Appliances. The appliances were carried in
an Isuzu truck of G.P. Sarmiento which met an accident. The FGU Insurance
Company paid for damage and in exchange it was subrogated over the
Appliances which FGU Insurance Company sold back to Central Luzon
Appliances. The Court ruled in favor of FGU Insurance Company. When it
was time for the execution, GPS opposed claiming that there was unjust
enrichment and at the same time asked for the hearing on the merits of the
execution. Court ruled in favor of the hearing on the merits. FGU Insurance
argues that the decision is already final and executory and accordingly, a
writ of execution should issue. Thus, FGU Insurance filed a petition for
mandamus.
HELD: Remedial Law; Judgments; Execution; Fundamental is the
rule that where the judgment of a higher court has become final and
executory and has been returned to the lower court, the only function of the
latter is the ministerial act of carrying out the decision and issuing the writ
of execution. – Fundamental is the rule that where the judgment of a higher
court has become final and executory and has been returned to the lower
court, the only function of the latter is the ministerial act of carrying out the
decision and issuing the writ of execution.39 In addition, a final and
executory judgment can no longer be amended by adding thereto a relief not
originally included. In short, once a judgment becomes final, the winning
party is entitled to a writ of execution and the issuance thereof becomes a
court's ministerial duty. The lower court cannot vary the mandate of the
superior court or reexamine it for any other purpose other than execution;
much less may it review the same upon any matter decided on appeal or
error apparent; nor intermeddle with it further than to settle so much as has
been demanded.40
Same; Same; Same; Doctrine of Finality of Judgment or Immutability
of Judgment; Under the doctrine, a decision that has acquired finality
becomes immutable and unalterable, and may no longer be modified in any
respect, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions

39
Ruben Sia v. Erlinda Villanueva, G.R. No. 152921, October 9, 2006, 504 SCRA 43.
40
Tropical Homes v. Fortun, 251 Phil 83 (1989).
of fact and law; and whether it be made by the court that rendered it or by
the Highest Court of the land – Under the doctrine of finality of judgment or
immutability of judgment, a decision that has acquired finality becomes
immutable and unalterable, and may no longer be modified in any respect,
even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact
and law, and whether it be made by the court that rendered it or by the
Highest Court of the land. Any act which violates this principle must
immediately be struck down.
Same; Same; Same; Exceptions to the Doctrine of Immutability of
Judgment. – But like any other rule, it has exceptions, namely: (1) the
correction of clerical errors; (2) the so-called nunc pro tunc entries which
cause no prejudice to any party; (3) void judgments; and (4) whenever
circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision rendering its
execution unjust and inequitable.41 The exception to the doctrine of
immutability of judgment has been applied in several cases in order to serve
substantial justice. The early case of City of Butuan vs. Ortiz42 is one where
the Court held as follows:
Obviously a prevailing party in a civil action is entitled to a writ
of execution of the final judgment obtained by him within five years
from its entry (Section 443, Code of Civil Procedure). But it has been
repeatedly held, and it is now well-settled in this jurisdiction, that
when after judgment has been rendered and the latter has become
final, facts and circumstances transpire which render its execution
impossible or unjust, the interested party may ask the court to modify
or alter the judgment to harmonize the same with justice and the facts
(Molina vs. De la Riva, 8 Phil. 569; Behn, Meyer & Co. vs.
McMicking, 11 Phil. 276; Warner, Barnes & Co. vs. Jaucian, 13 Phil.
4; Espiritu vs. Crossfield and Guash, 14 Phil. 588; Flor Mata vs.
Lichauco and Salinas, 36 Phil. 809). In the instant case the respondent
Cleofas alleged that subsequent to the judgment obtained by Sto.
Domingo, they entered into an agreement which showed that he was
no longer indebted in the amount claimed of P995, but in a lesser
amount. Sto. Domingo had no right to an execution for the amount
claimed by him. (De la Costa vs. Cleofas, 67 Phil. 686-693).
Shortly after City of Butuan v. Ortiz, the case of Candelario v.
Caizares43 was promulgated, where it was written that:
After a judgment has become final, if there is evidence of an
event or circumstance which would affect or change the rights of the
parties thereto, the court should be allowed to admit evidence of such
new facts and circumstances, and thereafter suspend execution thereof
and grant relief as the new facts and circumstances warrant. We,
therefore, find that the ruling of the court declaring that the order for
the payment of P40,000.00 is final and may not be reversed, is
erroneous as above explained.

41
Villa v. GSIS, G.R. No. 174642, October 31, 2009.
42
113 Phil 636 (1961).
43
114 Phil 672 (1962).
 These rulings were reiterated in the cases of Abellana vs. Dosdos,44
The City of Cebu vs. Mendoza45 and PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc. v
Antonio Milan.46 In these cases, there were compelling circumstances which
clearly warranted the exercise of the Courts equity jurisdiction.
Same; Same; Same; The Court is not precluded from rectifying errors
of judgment if blind and stubborn adherence to the doctrine of immutability
of final judgment would involve the sacrifice of justice for technicality. - If,
indeed, there was an actual delivery of the refrigerators and FGU profited
from the sale after the delivery, there would be an unjust enrichment if the
realized profit would not be deducted from the judgment amount. The Court
is not precluded from rectifying errors of judgment if blind and stubborn
adherence to the doctrine of immutability of final judgments would involve
the sacrifice of justice for technicality.47

Sofio vs. Valenzuela

G.R. No. 157810, February 15, 2012
666 SCRA 55
FACTS: Respondents Alberto, Gloria, Remedios, and Cesar, all
surnamed Valenzuela, are brothers and sisters. They are the co-owners of a
parcel of agricultural land designated as Lot No. 970-B and located in
Barangay Ayungon, Valladolid, Negros Occidental, containing an aggregate
area of 10.0959 hectares. Alberto had been planting sugarcane in the entire
property, but poor drainage had led him to abandon his cultivation in 1978
of an .80-hectare portion of the property. Unknown to the respondents,
petitioner Rolando Sofio,2 a son of their tenant in another lot, had obtained
permission to farm the abandoned area for free from Socorro Valenzuela, the
respondents’ mother who was then still managing the property. She had
acceded to the request on condition that Rolando would return the portion
once the owners needed it.3 In succeeding years, Alberto had also left other
portions of the property uncultivated because of the low price of sugar.
Apparently, Rolando had also taken over the vacated portions to plant palay.
He shared the cultivation with his brother, co-petitioner Rufio Sofio.4
Emancipation patents (EPs) were issued to Rolando and Rufio covering their
respective areas of tillage. On October 5, 1990, the respondents brought in
the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) a
complaint against the petitioners,9 Seeking the cancellation of the EPs,
recovery of possession, and damages, alleging that the petitioners’
cultivation of their land had been illegal because they had not consented to
it.10 PARAD ordered the cancellation of the EPs. DARAB, on appeal,
reversed the ruling of the PARAD. CA granted the petition for review; set
aside the DARAB decision; and reinstated the PARAD decision. The
decision of May 27, 1998 became final and executory on October 27, 1998
after the petitioners neither moved for reconsideration nor appealed
by certiorari to the Court. The respondents later filed an ex parte motion for

44
121 Phil 241 (1965).
45
160 Phil. 869 (1975).
46
G.R. No. 151215, April 5, 2010.
47
Heirs of Maura So et. al. v. Lucila Jomoc Obliosca et. al., G.R. No. 147082, January 28, 2008.
execution,17 which the PARAD granted on November 27, 2001. The writ of
execution was issued on January 23, 2002. On February 6, 2002, the
petitioners, represented by new counsel, filed in the PARAD a motion for
relief from judgment, motion for reconsideration of the order dated
November 27, 2001, and motion to recall writ of execution dated January 23,
2002.19 They alleged therein that they had learned of the May 27, 1998
decision of the CA only on December 11, 2001 through their receipt of the
November 27, 2001 order of the PARAD granting the respondents’ ex
parte motion for execution. On March 19, 2002, the PARAD denied the
motion for relief from judgment for lack of merit but deferred action on the
other motions. The PARAD held that he had no authority to grant the motion
for relief from judgment due to its subject matter being a judgment of the
CA, a superior court. The petitioners then filed in the CA a motion to recall
entry of judgment with motion for leave of court to file a motion for
reconsideration. Finding the negligence of the petitioners’ former counsel
being matched by their own neglect (of not inquiring about the status of the
case from their former counsel and not even taking any action against said
counsel for neglecting their case), the CA denied on February 13, 2003 the
motion to recall entry of judgment.
ISSUE: The petitioners insist that the CA’s denial of their motion to
recall entry of judgment denied them fair play, justice, and equity; that
pursuant to Ramos v. Court of Appeals,23 a final and executory judgment
may be amended under compelling circumstances; and that a compelling
circumstance applicable to them was that their former counsel, Atty. Romulo
A. Deles, had been guilty of gross negligence for not filing their appellee’s
brief in the CA, and for not filing a motion for reconsideration against the
May 27, 1998 decision of the CA.
HELD: The petition to set aside the CA’s denial of the motion to
recall entry of judgment was denied.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Judgments; Immutability of Final
Judgements. A decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and
unalterable and may no longer be modified in any respect even if the
modification is intended to correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law and
whether it will be made by the court that rendered it or by the highest court
of the land. The reason is that litigations must end and terminate sometime
and somewhere; and it is essential for the effective and efficient
administration of justice that once a judgment has become final the winning
party should not be deprived of the fruits of the verdict. – A decision that has
acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable and may no longer be
modified in any respect even if the modification is intended to correct
erroneous conclusions of fact or law and whether it will be made by the
court that rendered it or by the highest court of the land.48 This doctrine of
finality and immutability of judgments is grounded on fundamental
considerations of public policy and sound practice to the effect that, at the
risk of occasional error, the judgments of the courts must become final at

48
Peña v. Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), G.R. No. 159520, September 19, 2006, 502
SCRA 383, 403.
some definite date set by law.4950 The reason is that litigations must end and
terminate sometime and somewhere; and it is essential for the effective and
efficient administration of justice that once a judgment has become final the
winning party should not be deprived of the fruits of the verdict. Given this
doctrine, courts must guard against any scheme calculated to bring about
that result, and must frown upon any attempt to prolong controversies. The
only exceptions to the general rule are: (a) the correction of clerical errors;
(b) the so-called nunc pro tunc entries that cause no prejudice to any party;
(c) void judgments; and (d) whenever circumstances transpire after the
finality of the judgments rendering execution unjust and inequitable. 28 None
of the exceptions obtains here.
Same; Same; Same; Judgment Nunc Pro Tunc; Judgment nunc pro
tunc is one placing in proper form on the record, the judgment that had been
previously rendered, to make it speak the truth, so as to make it show what
the judicial action really was, not to correct judicial errors, such as to
render a judgment which the court ought to have rendered, in place of the
one it did erroneously render, nor to supply nonaction by the court, however
erroneous the judgment may have been. – We stress that a judgment nunc
pro tunc has been defined and characterized thuswise: The object of a
judgment nunc pro tunc is not the rendering of a new judgment and the
ascertainment and determination of new rights, but is one placing in proper
form on the record, the judgment that had been previously rendered, to
make it speak the truth, so as to make it show what the judicial action
really was, not to correct judicial errors, such as to render a judgment which
the court ought to have rendered, in place of the one it did erroneously
render, nor to supply nonaction by the court, however erroneous the
judgment may have been. (Wilmerding vs. Corbin Banking Co., 28 South.,
640, 641; 126 Ala., 268.)[30] Based on such definition and characterization,
the petitioners’ situation did not fall within the scope of a nunc pro
tunc amendment, considering that what they were seeking was not mere
clarification, but the complete reversal in their favor of the final judgment
and the reinstatement of the DARAB decision.
Attorneys; Legal Ethics; Any act performed by the counsel within the
scope of his general or implied authority is still regarded as an act of the
client. - Although the petitioners’ former counsel was blameworthy for the
track their case had taken, there is no question that any act performed by the
counsel within the scope of his general or implied authority is still regarded
as an act of the client. In view of this, even the negligence of the former
counsel should bind them as his clients.51 To hold otherwise would result to
the untenable situation in which every defeated party, in order to salvage his
cause, would simply claim neglect or mistake on the part of his counsel as a
ground for reversing the adverse judgment. There would then be no end to
litigation, for every shortcoming of the counsel could become the subject of

49
Bañares II v. Balising, G.R. No. 132624, March 13, 2000, 328 SCRA 36, 49-50.
50
Union Bank of the Philippines v. Pacific Equipment Corporation, G.R. No. 172053, October 6, 2008,
567 SCRA 573, 581.
51
Multi-Trans Agency Phils. Inc. v. Oriental Assurance Corp., G.R. No. 180817, June 23, 2009, 590 SCRA
675, 689-690.
challenge by his client through another counsel who, if he should also be
found wanting, would similarly be disowned by the same client through yet
another counsel, and so on ad infinitum.52 This chain of laying blame could
render court proceedings indefinite, tentative and subject to reopening at any
time by the mere replacement of the counsel.53
Same; Same; Same; When the counsel’s mistake is so great and so
serious that the client is prejudiced and is denied his day in court, or when
the counsel is guilty of gross negligence resulting in the client’s deprivation
of his property without due process of law; the client is not included by his
counsel’s mistakes and the case can be reopened in order to give the client
another chance to present his case. - Nonetheless, the gross negligence of
counsel alone would not even warrant a deviation from the principle of
finality of judgment, for the client must have to show that such negligence
resulted in the denial of due process to the client. 54 When the counsel’s
mistake is so great and so serious that the client is prejudiced and is denied
his day in court, or when the counsel is guilty of gross negligence resulting
in the client’s deprivation of his property without due process of law, the
client is not concluded by his counsel’s mistakes and the case can be
reopened in order to give the client another chance to present his case.55 As
such, the test herein is whether their former counsel’s negligence deprived
the petitioners of due process of law. For one to properly claim gross
negligence on the part of his counsel, he must show that the counsel was
guilty of nothing short of a clear abandonment of the client’s cause.
Considering that the Court has held that the failure to file the appellant’s
brief can qualify as simple negligence but cannot amount to gross negligence
that justifies the annulment of the proceedings,56 the failure to file an
appellee’s brief may be similarly treated.

Abrigo vs. Flores

G.R. No. 160786, June 17, 2013
698 SCRA 559
Francisco and Gaudencia inherited a parcel of land from their
deceased parents. After the death of Francisco, his widow and Gaudencia
entered into an extrajudicial partition, the western half of the land was
assigned to Francisco’s heirs while the eastern half to Gaudencia. There was
no actual ground partition until the time of Gaudencia’s death. The heirs of
Gaudencia were in actual possession of the entire area of the land, building
improvements on the western half of the land. The heirs of Francisco filed
for judicial partition of the land. The court rendered judgment directing the
partition of the land. The heirs of Gaudencia went on to appeal. The
appellate court affirmed on appeal the partition. No further proceedings were
taken, so an entry of judgment was issued by the court. Francisco’s heirs

52
Camitan v. Fidelity Investment Corporation, G.R. No. 163684, April 16, 2008, 551 SCRA 540.
53
Juani v. Alarcon, G.R. No. 166849, September 5, 2006, 501 SCRA 135, 154.
54
Pasiona, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 165471, July 21, 2008, 559 SCRA 137, 147.
55
Juani v. Alascon, supra, note 33.
56
Redeña v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 146611, February 6, 2007, 514 SCRA 389, 402.
filed a motion for execution to implement the decision of the court. The
parties agreed to get the services of a geodetic engineer to cause the survey
and subdivision of the land. The heirs of Gaudencia asked to defer the
demolition of the improvements on the ground that they have become one of
the co-owners of the western half portion, Jimmy Flores who was a co-
plaintiff sold his share in the western half. The court denied to defer the
demolition.
ISSUE: The legal issue is whether or not the sale by respondent
Jimmy Flores of his 1/4 share in the western portion of the 402-square meter
lot constituted a supervening event that rendered the execution of the final
judgment against petitioners inequitable.
HELD: The court found the contention was devoid of merit.
Execution of Judgments; Execution is a matter of right of a final and
immutable judgment; Exceptions: (a) matters of life, liberty, honor or
property; (b) the existence of special or compelling circumstances; (c) the
merits of the case; (d) the cause not being entirely attributable to the fault or
negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the doctrine; (e) the
lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory;
or (f) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced by the suspension. –
Once a judgment becomes immutable and unalterable by virtue of its
finality, its execution should follow as a matter of course. A supervening
event, to be sufficient to stay or stop execution, must alter or modify the
situation of the parties under the decision as to render the execution
inequitable, impossible or unfair. The supervening event cannot rest on
unproved or uncertain facts.
Although it is true that there are recognized exceptions to the
execution as a matter of right of a final and immutable judgment, one of
which is a supervening event, such circumstance did not obtain herein. To
accept their contention would be to reopen the final and immutable judgment
in order to further partition the western portion thereby adjudicated to the
heirs and su
ccessors-in-interest of Francisco Faylona for the purpose of segregating the
¼ portion supposedly subject of the sale by Jimmy Flores. The reopening
would be legally impermissible, considering that the November 20, 1989
decision, as modified by the CA, could no longer be altered, amended or
modified, even if the alteration, amendment or modification was meant to
correct what was perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or of law
and regardless of what court, be it the highest Court of the land, rendered
it.57 This is pursuant to the doctrine of immutability of a final judgment,
which may be relaxed only to serve the ends of substantial justice in order to
consider certain circumstances like: (a) matters of life, liberty, honor or
property; (b) the existence of special or compelling circumstances; (c) the
merits of the case; (d) the cause not being entirely attributable to the fault or
negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the doctrine; (e) the

57
Session Delights Ice Cream and Fast Foods v. Court of Appeals (Sixth Division), G.R. No. 172149,
February 8, 2010, 612 SCRA 10, 19-20.
lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory;
or (f) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced by the suspension.58
A supervening event is an exception to the execution as a matter of
right of a final and immutable judgment rule, only if it directly affects the
matter already litigated and settled, or substantially changes the rights or
relations of the parties therein as to render the execution unjust, impossible
or inequitable. – We deem it highly relevant to point out that a supervening
event is an exception to the execution as a matter of right of a final and
immutable judgment rule, only if it directly affects the matter already
litigated and settled, or substantially changes the rights or relations of the
parties therein as to render the execution unjust, impossible or inequitable.59
A supervening event consists of facts that transpire after the judgment
became final and executory, or of new circumstances that develop after the
judgment attained finality, including matters that the parties were not aware
of prior to or during the trial because such matters were not yet in existence
at that time.60 In that event, the interested party may properly seek the stay
of execution or the quashal of the writ of execution,61 or he may move the
court to modify or alter the judgment in order to harmonize it with justice
and the supervening event.62 The party who alleges a supervening event to
stay the execution should necessarily establish the facts by competent
evidence; otherwise, it would become all too easy to frustrate the conclusive
effects of a final and immutable judgment.

Bases Conversion Development Authority vs. Reyes

G.R. No. 194247, June 19, 2013
699 SCRA 217
FACTS: Petitioner filed a complaint before the RTC, seeking to
expropriate the land of Respondent. The RTC observed that the land was
already reclassified from agricultural to residential long time ago. Since
respondent signified their willingness to accept the just compensation, the
RTC ruled that there was nothing left to do but to terminate the proceedings
through summary judgment. RTC dismissed the complaint.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was also denied.
Petitioner filed a notice of appeal to CA. Respondent moved to dismiss the
appeal averring that an appeal from summary judgment raises only questions
of law; hence, the proper recourse to assail its propriety should be a petition
for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court and not an
ordinary appeal under Rule 41. The CA ruled dismissing the appeal for
being wrong mode of appeal. It found that the errors raised in petitioner’s

58
Meneses v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, G.R. No. 156304, October 23, 2006, 505 SCRA 90, 97;
Barnes v. Padilla, G.R. No. 160753, September 30, 2004, 439 SCRA 675, 686-687.
59
Javier v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 96086, July 21, 1993, 224 SCRA 704, 712.
60
Natalia Realty, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126462, November 12, 2002, 391 SCRA 370, 387.
61
Dee Ping Wee v. Lee Hiong Wee, G.R. No. 169345, August 25, 2010, 629 SCRA 145, 168; Ramirez v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 85469, March 18, 1992, 207 SCRA 287, 292; Chua Lee A.H. v. Mapa, 51 Phil.
624, 628 (1928); Li Kim Tho v. Go Siu Kao, 82 Phil. 776, 778 (1949).
62
Serrano v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 133883, December 10, 2003, 417 SCRA 415, 424-425; Limpin,
Jr. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, No. L-70987, January 30, 1987, 147 SCRA 516, 522-523.
appeal essentially pertained to the propriety of the RTC’s grant of
respondents’ motion for summary judgment and thus, involved only
questions of law of which the CA had no jurisdiction. Petition for
reconsideration was also denied.

ISSUE: The CA rendered a Resolution, dismissing petitioner’s appeal

for being the wrong mode to assail the RTC’s summary judgment. It found
that the errors raised in petitioner’s appeal essentially pertained to the
propriety of the RTC’s grant of respondents’ motion for summary judgment
and thus, involved only questions of law of which the CA had no
jurisdiction. Hence, considering its dismissal of petitioner’s appeal, it held
that the assailed RTC Orders fixing the amount of just compensation had
already become final and executory.
HELD: The petition was granted.
Same; Same; Judgments; Immutability of Judgments; A final judgment
may no longer be altered, amended or modified, even if the alteration,
amendment or modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an
erroneous conclusion of fact or law and regardless of what court, be it the
highest Court of the land, rendered it, except in the interest of substantial
justice and where there are special and compelling reasons for such actions.
– In fine, given the special and compelling reasons as above discussed, the
Court finds it appropriate to relax the rules of procedure in the interest of
substantial justice. In Twin Towers Condominium Corp. v. CA,63 the Court
held that the merits of the case may be regarded as a special or compelling
reason to relax procedural rules. Likewise, in Apo Fruits Corporation v.
Land Bank of the Philippines,64 special and compelling reasons constitute
recognized exceptions to the rules on immutability of judgment, viz.:
As a rule, a final judgment may no longer be altered,
amended or modified, even if the alteration, amendment or
modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be
erroneous conclusion of fact or law and regardless of what
court, be it the highest Court of the land, rendered it. In the past,
however, we have recognized exceptions to this rule by
reversing judgments and recalling their entries in the
interest of substantial justice and where special and
compelling reasons for such actions. (Emphasis supplied)
Accordingly, the case is hereby remanded to the RTC for further
proceedings in order to determine the proper amount of just compensation
due to respondents.

The Plaza, Inc. vs. Ayala Land, Inc.

G.R. No. 209537, April 20, 2015
756 SCRA 350

63
G.R. No. 164195, October 12, 2010, 632 SCRA 727, 760, citing Equitable Banking Corp. v. Sadac, G.R.
No. 164772, June 8, 2006, 490 SCRA 380, 416-417.
64
G.R. No. 123552, February 27, 2003, 398 SCRA 203, 212. (Citations omitted).
 Ayala Land, Inc. leased a portion of its property of The Plaza. During
the existence of the lease, Ayala Land, Inc. engaged in a redevelopment of
its property that affected the business of The Plaza which compelled it to
commence an action for damages. Eventually the parties entered into a
compromise agreement.
HELD: The Compromise Judgment, covering the surrender of the
possession of the subject premises, as well as the demolition period of the
Building and/or removal of the materials salvaged therefrom, is, by nature,
“immediately executory, unless a motion is filed to set aside the compromise
on the ground of fraud, mistake, or duress in which event an appeal may be
taken from the order denying the motion. – The Compromise Judgment,
covering the surrender of the possession of the subject premises, as well
as the demolition period of the Building and/or removal of the materials
salvaged therefrom, is, by nature, “immediately executory, unless a motion
is filed to set aside the compromise on the ground of fraud, mistake, or
duress in which event an appeal may be taken from the order denying the
motion.”65 With no such motion having been filed, the RTC is bound to
issue a writ of execution to carry out the said judgment to its full force and
effect. In Far Eastern Surety & Insurance Co., Inc., v. Vda. de Hernandez,66
the duty of courts dealing with final and executory judgments was explained
as follows:
[T]he court cannot refuse to issue a writ of execution
upon a final and executory judgment, or quash it, or order its
stay, for, as a general rule, the parties will not be allowed, after
final judgment, to object to the execution by raising new issues
of fact or of law, except when there had been a change in the
situation of the parties which makes such execution inequitable
or when it appears that the controversy has never been
submitted to the judgment of the court; or when it appears that
the writ of execution has been improvidently issued, or that it is
defective in substance, or is issued against the wrong party, or
that judgment debt has been paid or otherwise satisfied; or
when the writ has been issued without authority.44

Lomondot vs. Balindong

G.R. No. 192463, July 13, 2015
762 SCRA 494
Lomondot filed an action for recovery of possession against
Pangandamun. There was a judgment declaring that Pangandamun entered
the property illegally. Judgment became final and executory and an entry of
judgment was subsequently issued. Lomondot filed a motion for the issuance
of a writ of execution.
HELD: The SDC Decision dated January 31, 2005 ordered
respondents to vacate the portions or areas they had illegally encroached as
indicated in Exhibits "A" and "K" and to remove whatever improvements

65
Piano v. Cayanong, 117 Phil. 415, 421 (1963).
66
160-A Phil. 406 (1975).
44
Id. at 410-411.
thereat introduced. Thus, petitioners had established that they are recovering
possession of 100 sq. meters of their land which was occupied by respondent
Pangandamun's house as indicated in Exhibit "K-1", and 200 sq. meter
portion being occupied by Diaca as indicated in Exhibit "K-2". Such
decision had become final and executory after we affirmed the same and an
entry of judgment was made. Such decision can no longer be modified or
amended. In Dacanay v. Yrastorza, Sr.,31 we explained the concept of a
final and executory judgment, thus:
Once a judgment attains finality, it becomes immutable and
unalterable. A final and executory judgment may no longer be
modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct
what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law and
regardless of whether the modification is attempted to be made by the
court rendering it or by the highest court of the land. This is the
doctrine of finality of judgment. It is grounded on fundamental
considerations of public policy and sound practice that, at the risk of
occasional errors, the judgments or orders of courts must become final
at some definite time fixed by law. Otherwise, there will be no end to
litigations, thus negating the main role of courts of justice to assist in
the enforcement of the rule of law and the maintenance of peace and
order by settling justiciable controversies with finality.32
However, the SDC later found that while the decision has become
final and executory and a writ of execution has been issued, there are
instances when a writ of execution cannot be enforced as when there is a
supervening event that prevents the sheriff to execute the writ of execution.
It found that respondents' claim that their buildings are not within the area
claimed by petitioners is a supervening event and ordered a survey of the
land, hence, denied the motion for a writ of demolition.
We do not agree.
It is settled that there are recognized exceptions to the execution as a
matter of right of a final and immutable judgment, and one of which is a
supervening event.
In Abrigo v. Flores,67 we said:
We deem it highly relevant to point out that a supervening event is an
exception to the execution as a matter of right of a final and immutable
judgment rule, only if it directly affects the matter already litigated and
settled, or substantially changes the rights or relations of the parties therein
as to render the execution unjust, impossible or inequitable. A supervening
event consists of facts that transpire after the judgment became final and
executory, or of new circumstances that develop after the judgment attained
finality, including matters that the parties were not aware of prior to or
during the trial because such matters were not yet in existence at that time.
In that event, the interested party may properly seek the stay of execution or
the quashal of the writ of execution, or he may move the court to modify or
alter the judgment in order to harmonize it with justice and the supervening
event. The party who alleges a supervening event to stay the execution

67
G.R. No. 160786, June 17, 2013, 698 SCRA 559.
should necessarily establish the facts by competent evidence; otherwise, it
would become all too easy to frustrate the conclusive effects of a final and
immutable judgment.34
In this case, the matter of whether respondents' houses intruded
petitioners' land is the issue in the recovery of possession complaint filed by
petitioners in the SDC which was already ruled upon, thus cannot be
considered a supervening event that would stay the execution of a final and
immutable judgment. To allow a survey as ordered by the SDC to determine
whether respondents' houses are within petitioners' land is tantamount to
modifying a decision which had already attained finality.
We find that the SDC committed grave abuse of discretion when it
denied petitioners' motion for the issuance a writ of demolition. The issuance
of a special order of demolition would certainly be the necessary and logical
consequence of the execution of the final and immutable decision.68

----------

Reburiano vs Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 102965, January 21, 1999
301 SCRA 342
Pepsi-Cola Bottling sued Reburiano. Judgment was rendered ordering
Reburiano to pay the cost of the bottle. Meantime, during the time that the
case was pending, Pepsi-Cola Bottling amended its articles of incorporation
to shorten its life. The judgment became final and executory. A writ of
execution was issued. Reburiano moved to quash the writ alleging that
Pepsi-Cola Bottling already lost its juridical personality and therefore the
decision was a patent nullity. The court denied the motion to quash of
Reburiano.
ISSUE: Was the motion to quash meritorious?
HELD: There may, to be sure, be instances when an error may be
committed in the course of execution proceedings prejudicial to the rights of
a party. These instances, rare though they may be, do call for correction by a
superior court, as where
1) the writ of execution varies the judgment;
2) there has been a change in the situation of the parties making
execution inequitable or unjust;
3) execution is sought to be enforced against property exempt from
execution;
4) it appears that the controversy has never been submitted to the
judgment of the court;
5) the terms of the judgment are not clear enough and there remains
room for interpretation thereof; or,

34
Abrigo v. Flores, supra, at 571-572. (Italics in the original)
68
Id. at 572.
 6) it appears that the writ of execution has been improvidently
issued, or that it is defective in substance, or is issued against the
wrong party, or that the judgment debt has been paid or otherwise
satisfied, or the writ was issued without authority;
In these exceptional circumstances, considerations of justice and
equity dictate that there be some mode available to the party aggrieved of
elevating the question to a higher court. That mode of elevation may be
either by appeal (writ of error or certiorari) or by a special civil action of
certiorari, prohibition, or mandamus.
In this case, petitioners anchored their Motion to Quash on the claim
that there was a change in the situation of the parties. However, a perusal of
the cases which have recognized such a ground as an exception to the
general rule shows that the change contemplated by such exception is one
which occurred subsequent to the judgment of the trial court. Here, the
change in the status of private respondent took place in 1983, when it was
dissolved, during the pendency of its case in the trial court. The change
occurred prior to the rendition of judgment by the trial court.

Philippine Economic Zone Authority (PEZA) vs. Borreta

G.R. No. 142669, March 15, 2006
484 SCRA 664
Carrantes was found guilty as charged of Sec. 301 in relation to Sec.
213 of PD 1086. Decision became final and executory after the Court of
Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC. Trial court issued a writ of
demolition. Carantes voluntarily demolished one of the structures. Upon
manifestation filed with the trial court, Carrantes averred that the writ should
be limited only to the structure built “in or about the month of April 1991”
as alleged in the information and should not include the one built by his
father sometime in 1970 and those where building permits were issued by
the City Engineer of Baguio. The trial court, acting on the manifestation,
modified the Appellate Court’s final and executory decision, holding (1) The
issuance of the building permit by the City Engineer in favor of Carantes
operates to legalize the construction of the subject structure; and 2. The
CAR-CALC No. 22 issued to Carantes by the DENR vested in him a right
over the area occupied by him. The court issued no writ of demolition
afterwards.
ISSUE: Whether there was merit for the court to refuse the writ of
demolition?
HELD: Same; Judgments; When a judgment is final and executory, it
becomes immutable and unadulterable. The judgment may no longer be
modified in any respect, except to correct clerical errors or to make nunc
pro tunc entries. - It is settled that when a judgment is final and executory, it
becomes immutable and unalterable.69 The judgment may no longer be
modified in any respect, except to correct clerical errors or to make nunc pro
tunc entries. The court which rendered judgment has the ministerial duty to
69
Mayon Estate Corp. v. Altura, G.R. No. 134462, October 18, 2004, 440 SCRA 377.
issue a writ of execution. The parties may not object to the execution by
raising new issues of fact or law, except under the following circumstances:
1) the writ of execution varies the judgment; 2) there has been a change in
the situation of the parties making execution inequitable or unjust; 3)
execution is sought to be enforced against property exempt from execution;
4) it appears that the controversy has been submitted to the judgment of the
court; 5) the terms of the judgment are not clear enough and there remains
room for interpretation thereof; or 6) it appears that the writ of execution has
been improvidently issued, or that it is defective in substance, or issued
against the wrong party, or that the judgment debt has been paid or
otherwise satisfied, or the writ was issued without authority.70 We find that
none of these exceptions is present in this case. We, therefore, hold that the
trial court gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in issuing the challenged Orders modifying the final and
executory Decision of the Court of Appeals.

70
Reburiano v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 102965, January 21, 1999, 301 SCRA 342.