IN RE IPB 1973
the Constitution, ordained the integration of the Bar of the Philippines
FACTS:
[T]he Commission on Bar Integration submitted its Report with the “earnest
recommendation” — on the basis of the said Report and the proceedings had
in Administrative Case No. 526 of the Court, and “consistently with the views
and counsel received from its [the Commission’s] Board of Consultants, as
well as the overwhelming nationwide sentiment of the Philippine Bench and
Bar” — that “(the) Honorable (Supreme) Court ordain the integration of the
Philippine Bar as soon as possible through the adoption and promulgation of
an appropriate Court Rule.” The petition in Adm. Case No. 526 formally prays
the Court to order the integration of the Philippine Bar, after due hearing,
giving recognition as far as possible and practicable to existing provincial and
other local Bar associations.
ISSUES:
(1) Does the Court have the power to integrate the Philippine Bar?
(2) Would the integration of the Bar be constitutional?
(3) Should the Court ordain the integration of the Bar at this time?
HELD:
YES. On all issues.
RATIO:
[T]he Court is of the view that it may integrate the Philippine Bar in the
exercise of its power, under Article VIII, Sec. 13 of the Constitution, “to
promulgate rules concerning x x x the admission to the practice of law.”
The Court is fully convinced, after a thoroughgoing conscientious study of all
the arguments adduced in Adm. Case No. 526 and the authoritative
materials and the mass of factual data contained in the exhaustive Report of
the Commission on Bar Integration, that the integration of the Philippine Bar
is “perfectly constitutional and legally unobjectionable,” within the context of
contemporary conditions in the Philippines, has become an imperative
means to raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the
administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public
responsibility fully and effectively.
[T]he Court, by virtue of the power vested in it by Section 13 of Article VIII of
effective January 16, 1973.
IN RE: CUNANAN
FACTS OF THE CASE:
In the manner of the petitions for Admission to the Bar of unsuccessful
candidates of 1946 to 1953; Albino Cunanan et. al petitioners.
In recent years few controversial issues have aroused so much public
interest and concern as R.A. 972 popularly known as the “Bar Flunkers’ Act
of 1953.” Generally a candidate is deemed passed if he obtains a general
ave of 75% in all subjects w/o falling below 50% in any subject, although
for the past few exams the passing grades were changed depending on the
strictness of the correcting of the bar examinations (1946- 72%, 1947- 69%,
1948- 70% 1949-74%, 1950-1953 – 75%).
Believing themselves to be fully qualified to practice law as those
reconsidered and passed by the S.C., and feeling that they have been
discriminated against, unsuccessful candidates who obtained averages of a
few percentages lower than those admitted to the bar went to congress for,
and secured in 1951 Senate Bill no. 12, but was vetoed by the president after
he was given advise adverse to it. Not overriding the veto, the senate then
approved senate bill no. 372 embodying substantially the provisions of the
vetoed bill. The bill then became law on June 21, 1953
Republic Act 972 has for its object, according to its author, to admit to the
Bar those candidates who suffered from insufficiency of reading materials
and inadequate preparations. By and large, the law is contrary to public
interest since it qualifies 1,094 law graduates who had inadequate
preparation for the practice of law profession, as evidenced by their failure in
the exams.
ISSUES OF THE CASE:
Due to the far reaching effects that this law would have on the legal
profession and the administration of justice, the S.C. would seek to know if
it is CONSTITUTIONAL.
 An adequate legal preparation is one of the vital requisites for the practice
of the law that should be developed constantly and maintained firmly.
 The Judicial system from which ours has been derived, the act of admitting,
suspending, disbarring, and reinstating attorneys at law in the practice of the
profession is concededly judicial.
 The Constitution, has not conferred on Congress and the S.C. equal
responsibilities concerning the admission to the practice of law. The
primary power and responsibility which the constitution recognizes
continue to reside in this court.
 Its retroactivity is invalid in such a way, that what the law seeks to “cure”
are not the rules set in place by the S.C. but the lack of will or the defect in
judgment of the court, and this power is not included in the power granted by
the Const. to Congress, it lies exclusively w/in the judiciary.
 Reasons for UNCONSTITUTIONALITY:
1. There was a manifest encroachment on the constitutional
responsibility of the Supreme Court.
2. It is in effect a judgment revoking the resolution of the court, and only the
S.C. may revise or alter them, in attempting to do so R.A. 972 violated the
Constitution.
3. That congress has exceeded its power to repeal, alter, and
supplement the rules on admission to the bar (since the rules made by
congress must elevate the profession, and those rules promulgated are
considered the bare minimum.)
4. It is a class legislation
5. Art. 2 of R.A. 972 is not embraced in the title of the law, contrary to what
the constitution enjoins, and being inseparable from the provisions of art. 1,
the entire law is void.
HELD: Under the authority of the court:
1. That the portion of art. 1 of R.A. 972 referring to the examinations of
1946 to 1952 and all of art. 2 of the said law are unconstitutional and
therefore void and w/o force and effect.
2. The part of ART 1 that refers to the examinations subsequent to the
approval of the law (1953- 1955) is valid and shall continue in force. (those
petitions by the candidates who failed the bar from 1946 to 1952 are denied,
and all the candidates who in the examination of 1953 obtained a GEN Ave.
of 71.5% w/o getting a grade of below 50% in any subject are considered as
having passed whether they have filed petitions for admissions or not.)
16 07 2010
Cayetano vs. Monsod
201 SCRA 210
September 1991
Facts: Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon
C. Aquino to the position of chairman of the COMELEC. Petitioner opposed
the nomination because allegedly Monsod does not posses required
qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten
years. The 1987 constitution provides in Section 1, Article IX-C: There shall
be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six
Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at
the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a
college degree, and must not have been candidates for any elective position
in the immediately preceding elections. However, a majority thereof,
including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have
been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
Issue: Whether the respondent does not posses the required qualification of
having engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
Held: In the case of Philippine Lawyers Association vs. Agrava, stated: The
practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it
embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions
and special proceeding, the management of such actions and proceedings
on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In
general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters
connected with the law incorporation services, assessment and
condemnation services, contemplating an appearance before judicial body,
the foreclosure of mortgage, enforcement of a creditor’s claim in bankruptcy
and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and
in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law
practice. Practice of law means any activity, in or out court, which requires
the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience.
The contention that Atty. Monsod does not posses the required qualification
of having engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years is incorrect
since Atty. Monsod’s past work experience as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-
manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts,
and a lawyer-legislator of both rich and the poor – verily more than satisfy the
constitutional requirement for the position of COMELEC chairman, The
respondent has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years
does In the view of the foregoing, the petition is DISMISSED.
IN RE: PETITION TO SIGN IN THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS MICHAEL A.
MEDADO, PETITIONER. (CASE DIGEST)
IN RE: PETITION TO SIGN IN THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS MICHAEL A.
MEDADO, PETITIONER. (DIGEST)
B.M. No. 2540
September 24, 2013
TOPIC:
Admission to the Bar, Unauthorized Practice of Law, Canon 9, Signing of the
Roll of Attorneys
FACTS:
Michael A. Medado passed the Philippine bar exams in 1979. On 7 May
1980, he took the Attorney’s Oath at the PICC. He was scheduled to sign in
the Roll of Attorneys on 13 May 1980, but failed to do so allegedly because
he had misplaced the Notice to Sign the Roll of Attorneys. Several years
later, while rummaging through his things, he found said Notice. He then
realized that he had not signed in the roll, and that what he had signed at the
entrance of the PICC was probably just an attendance record.
He thought that since he already took the oath, the signing of the Roll of
Attorneys was not as important. The matter of signing in the Roll of Attorneys
was subsequently forgotten.
In 2005, when Medado attended MCLE seminars, he was required to provide
his roll number for his MCLE compliances to be credited. Not having signed
in the Roll of Attorneys, he was unable to provide his roll number.
About seven years later, in 2012, Medado filed the instant Petition, praying
that he be allowed to sign in the Roll of Attorneys. Medado justifies this lapse
by characterizing his acts as “neither willful nor intentional but based on a
mistaken belief and an honest error of judgment.
The Office of the Bar Confidant recommended that the instant petition be
denied for petitioner’s gross negligence, gross misconduct and utter lack of
merit, saying that petitioner could offer no valid justification for his negligence
in signing in the Roll of Attorneys.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner may be allowed to sign the Roll of Attorneys.
RULING:
Yes, the Supreme Court granted the petition subject to the payment of a fine
and the imposition of a penalty equivalent to suspension from the practice of
law.
Not allowing Medado to sign in the Roll of Attorneys would be akin to
imposing upon him the ultimate penalty of disbarment, a penalty reserved for
the most serious ethical transgressions. In this case, said action is not
warranted.
The Court considered Medado’s demonstration of good faith in filing the
petition himself, albeit after the passage of more than 30 years; that he has
shown that he possesses the character required to be a member of the
Philippine Bar; and that he appears to have been a competent and able legal
practitioner, having held various positions at different firms and companies.
However, Medado is not free from all liability for his years of inaction.
A mistake of law cannot be utilized as a lawful justification, because
everyone is presumed to know the law and its consequences.
Medado may have at first operated under an honest mistake of fact when he
thought that what he had signed at the PICC entrance before the oath-taking
was already the Roll of Attorneys. However, the moment he realized that
what he had signed was just an attendance record, he could no longer claim
an honest mistake of fact as a valid justification. At that point, he should have
known that he was not a full-fledged member of the Philippine Bar, as it was
the act of signing therein that would have made him so. When, in spite of this
knowledge, he chose to continue practicing law, he willfully engaged in the
unauthorized practice of law.
Knowingly engaging in unauthorized practice of law likewise transgresses
Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. At the heart of Canon 9
is the lawyer’s duty to prevent the unauthorized practice of law. This duty
likewise applies to law students and Bar candidates. As aspiring members of
the Bar, they are bound to conduct themselves in accordance with the ethical
standards of the legal profession.
Medado cannot be suspended as he is not yet a full-fledged lawyer.
However, the Court imposed upon him a penalty akin to suspension by
allowing him to sign in the Roll of Attorneys one (1) year after receipt of the
Resolution. He was also made to pay a fine of P32,000. Also, during the one-
year period, petitioner was not allowed to engage in the practice of law.
ALAN F. PAGUIA, Petitioner,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, SECRETARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, and
HON. HILARIO DAVIDE, JR. in his capacity as Permanent
Representative of the Philippines to the United Nations, Respondents.
G.R. No. 176278Q
FACTS:
Petitioner Alan F. Paguia (petitioner), as citizen and taxpayer, filed
this original action for the writ of certiorari to invalidate President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo’s nomination of respondent former Chief Justice Hilario G.
Davide, Jr. (respondent Davide) as Permanent Representative to the United
Nations (UN) for violation of Section 23 of Republic Act No. 7157 (RA 7157),
the Philippine Foreign Service Act of 1991. Petitioner argues that respondent
Davide’s age at that time of his nomination in March 2006, 70, disqualifies
him from holding his post. Petitioner grounds his argument on Section 23 of
RA 7157 pegging the mandatory retirement age of all officers and employees
of the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) at 65. Petitioner theorizes that
Section 23 imposes an absolute rule for all DFA employees, career or non-
career; thus, respondent Davide’s entry into the DFA ranks discriminates
against the rest of the DFA officials and employees.
ISSUE:
Petitioner’s lack of capacity to sue and mootness.
Ruling:
An incapacity to bring legal actions peculiar to petitioner also obtains.
Petitioner’s suspension from the practice of law bars him from performing
"any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal
procedure, knowledge, training and experience."Certainly, preparing a
petition raising carefully crafted arguments on equal protection grounds and
employing highly legalistic rules of statutory construction to parse Section 23
of RA 7157 falls within the proscribed conduct.
A supervening event has rendered this case academic and the relief
prayed for moot. Respondent Davide resigned his post at the UN on 1 April
2010.
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition.
SO ORDERED.
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR DISBARMENT OF TELESFORO
A. DIAO
v. SEVERINO G. MARTINEZ
A.C. No. 244
March 29, 1963
FACTS:
Two years following his admission to the Philippine Bar, lawyer Telesforo A.
Diao was charged by private complainant Severino G. Martinez for allegedly
falsifying his application to take the Bar Examinations specifically his
scholastic qualifications. The Solicitor General, having established in the
course of its investigation that at the time Diao filed his application to take the
Bar Examinations did not complete the required pre-legal education
prescribed by the Department of Private Education, recommended the
omission of his name from the roll of attorneys. Diao averred that he had
entered military service, took and passed the General Classification Test
which is equivalent to a high school diploma, and that he completed his
Associate in Arts degree at the Arellano University in 1949 and due to
confusion, was erroneously certified in his school records as a graduate of
Quisumbing College.
ISSUE:
 Whether or not Atty. Telesforo A. Diao should be disbarred from the
practice of law.
HELD:
Yes, Atty. Telesforo A. Diao should be disbarred from the practice of
law. His application disclosed that he began his law studies six months
before he obtained his pre-law degree thereby disqualifying him from taking
the bar tests under the rules, but with the aid of false pretenses, was allowed
to take it, passed it and thereafter admitted to the bar. The fact that he
hurdled the bar examinations is immaterial. The High Tribunal, through Chief
Justice Bengzon, enunciated that passing such examinations is not the
only qualification to become an attorney-at-law. Taking the prescribed
courses of legal study in the regular manner is equally essential.
PATRICK A. CARONAN V. RICHARD A. CARONAN
a.k.a. “ATTY. PATRICK A. CARONAN”
A.C. No. 113116, Promulgated: July 12, 2016
FACTS:
The complainant Patrick A. Caronan and respondent Richard A.
Caronan are siblings born to Porferio R. Caronan Jr. and Norma A. Caronan.
Respondent is two years older than complainant being born on 1975. Both
finished their secondary education at the Makati High School. Respondent
enrolled at Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Maynila (PLM) in 1991 where he
stayed for a year before transferring to the Philippine Military Academy
(PMA) before being discharged in 1993. Complainant obtained degree in
Business Administration in 1997 at the University of Makati. Also in 1997,
Respondent moved to Nueva Vizcaya with wife Rosana and their 3 children.
He never went back to earn a college degree.
In 1999, respondent told complainant that he enrolled in a law school
in Nueva Vizcaya. In 2004, their mother informed complainant that
respondent enrolled at the St. Mary’s University’s College of Law in
Bayombong, Nueva Ecija using the complainant’s name and college records
from the University of Makati. Complainant brushed these aside for he did
not anticipate the consequences to him.
In 2009, after complainant was promoted as a Store Manager of the
7-11 store in Muntinlupa, he was ordered to report to the head office of
Philippine Seven Corporation (PSC) and was then requested at the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) in relation to an investigation involving
respondent, who at that points, was using the name “Atty. Patrick A.
Caronan”. He was asked to identify documents showing respondent’s use of
the “Patrick A. Caronan”. It was then complainant was informed in a case of
qualified theft and estafa in which respondent was involved.
Respondent’s use of the name “Atty. Patrick A. Caronan” continues
to perpetuate crimes and commit unlawful activities such as; almost
victimizing fellow church-member’s relatives, tricking someone into believing
that he was authorized to sell a parcel of land in Taguig City when in fact, he
was not. Further, he learned that respondent was arrested for gun-running
activities, illegal possession of explosives and violation of Batas Pambansa
Bilang (BP) 22. With this, complainant was eventually forced to resign from
PSC, hence, complainant filed the present Complaint-Affidavit to stop
respondent’s alleged use of the former’s name and identity, and illegal
practice of law.
On March 9, 2015, the IBP-CDB conducted the scheduled
mandatory conference where both parties failed to appear. IBP Investigating
Commissioner Jose Villanueva Cabrera issued his Report and
Recommendation, finding respondent guilty of illegally and falsely assuming
complainant’s name, identity and academic records.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the IBP erred in ordering that: (a) the name “Patrick
A. Caronan” be stricken off the Roll of Attorneys; and (b) the name “Richard
A. Caronan” be barred from being admitted to the Bar.
HELD:
The IBP is correct in ordering that the name “Patrick A. Caronan” be
stricken off the Roll of Attorneys. The respondent, Richard A. Caronan a.k.a.
“Atty. Patrick A. Caronan”, has failed to present any proof to prove his
identify. The respondent admitted, upon his arrest on August 31, 2012 that
he is married to Rosana Halili-Caronan. This diverges to the official NSO
records showing that “Patrick A. Caronan” is married to Myrna G. Tagpis, not
to Rosana Halili-Caronan. In addition, the photograph of the respondent
when he was arrested as “Richard A. Caronan” on August 16, 2012, shows
the same person as the one in the photograph in the IBP records of “Atty.
Patrick A. Caronan”.
The IBP also did not err in ordering that the name “Richard A.
Coronan” be barred from being admitted in the Bar. Under Section 6, Rule
138 of the Rules of the Court, no applicant for admission to the Bar
Examinations shall be admitted unless he had pursued and satisfactorily
completed a bachelor’s degree in arts or sciences. The respondent never
completed his college degree. He did enrol at the PLM in 1991, but left a
year later and entered the PMA where he was discharged in 1993 without
graduating. Clearly, respondent has not completed the requisite pre-law
degree.
The Court does not discount the possibility of the respondent
finishing his college degree and earn a law degree under his real name.
However, his false assumption of his brother’s name, identity, and
educational records renders him fit for admission to the Bar. Respondent
exhibited his dishonesty and utter lack of moral fitness. The acts of the
respondent do not have a place in the legal profession where one of the
primary duties of its members is to uphold its integrity and dignity.
IN RE: ARGONSINO
SYLLABUS:
Attorneys; Admission to the Bar; Practice of Law as a High Personal
Privilege; Good Moral Character
 The practice of law is a high personal privilege limited to citizens of good moral
character, with special educational qualifications, duly ascertained and certified.
 Requirement of good moral character is of greater importance so far as the
general public and the proper administration of justice is concerned.
 All aspects of moral character and behavior may be inquired into in respect of
those seeking admission to the Bar.
 Requirement of good moral character to be satisfied by those who would seek
admission to the bar must be a necessity more stringent than the norm of
conduct expected from members of the general public.
 Good moral character is a requirement possession of which must be
demonstrated at the time of application for permission to take the bar
examinations and more importantly at the time of application for admission to
the bar and to take the attorney’s oath of office.
FACTS:
Al Argosino along with thirteen (13) other individuals were charged with the
crime of homicide in connection with the death of Raul Camaligan, which
stemmed from the infliction of severe physical injuries upon him in the course
of “hazing” conducted as part of university fraternity initiation rites.
Argosino and his co-accused then entered into plea bargaining with the
prosecution and as a result of such bargaining, pleaded guilty to the lesser
offense of homicide through reckless imprudence. This plea was accepted by
the trial court, and hence were sentenced to suffer imprisonment.
Argosino and his co-accused filed an application for probation with the lower
court. The application for probation was granted.
Argosino then filed a Petition for Admission to Take the 1993 Bar
Examinations. In this Petition, he disclosed the fact of his criminal conviction
and his then probation status. He was allowed to take the 1993 Bar
Examinations and passed the said Bar Examination. He was not, however,
allowed to take the lawyer’s oath of office.
Argosino filed a Petition to allow him to take the attorney’s oath of office and
to admit him to the practice of law.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Argosino should be admitted to the practice of law.
RULING:
No, Argosino should not be admitted to the practice of law.
The essentiality of good moral character in those who would be lawyers is
stressed in cases decided by the Court. It is settled that the practice of law is
not a natural, absolute or constitutional right to be granted to everyone who
demands it. Rather, it is a high personal privilege limited to citizens of good
moral character, with special educational qualifications, duly ascertained and
certified.
Argosino’s participation in the deplorable “hazing” activities certainly fell far
short of the required standard of good moral character. The deliberate (rather
than merely accidental or inadvertent) infliction of severe physical injuries
which proximately led to the death of Camaligan, certainly indicated serious
character flaws on the part of those who inflicted such injuries. Argosino and conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. Murder is, without doubt,
his co-accused had failed to discharge their moral duty to protect the life and such a crime. “Moral turpitude” includes everything contrary to justice,
well-being of a “neophyte” who had, by seeking admission to the fraternity honesty, modesty, or good morals.
involved, reposed trust and confidence in all of them that, at the very least,
he would not be beaten to death. Thus, participation in the prolonged and § In the Lontok case, on which Gutierrez relies, the respondent, Lontok,
mindless physical beatings inflicted upon Camaligan constituted evident
was granted absolute or unconditional pardon after conviction for the crime
rejection of that moral duty and was totally irresponsible behavior, which
makes impossible a finding that the participant was then possessed of good of crime of bigamy. It was held that such pardon releases the punishment
moral character. and blots out existence of guilt, so that in the eye of the law the offender is as
innocent as if he had never committed the offense.
Hence, Argosino should not be admitted to the practice of law lacking the § In the case at bar, the pardon granted was conditional, and merely
requirement of good moral character.
remitted the unexecuted portion of his term. It was not a full pardon which
could have blotted out the offense committed.
DISPOSITIVE:
§ The crime was qualified by treachery and aggravated by its having been
Petition to take Attorney’s Oath denied. committed in band, by taking advantage of his official position, and with the
use of a motor vehicle. The degree of moral turpitude warrants
disbarment. Admission of a candidate to the bar requires academic
IN RE GUTIERREZ
preparation and satisfactorytestimonials of good moral character. These
Facts: standards are neither dispensed with nor lowered after admission: the lawyer
must adhere to them or incur the risk of suspension or removal.
Gutierrez is a member of the Philippine Bar. While he was the
municipal mayor of Calapan, he and other co-conspirators murdered the
former municipal mayor of Calapan, for which they were held guilty and
sentenced to the penalty of death. Upon review by the Supreme court the
penalty was changed to reclusion perpetua. After serving a portion of the
sentence, Gutierrez was granted conditional pardon by the President. The
unexecuted portion of the prison term was remitted on condition that the shall
not again violate any of the penal laws of the Philippines.

The widow of the murdered victim then filed a complaint with the
Supreme Court asking that Gutierrez

be removed from the rule of lawyers pursuant to Rule 127, section 5.

Issue: W/N the conditional pardon to Gutierrez places him beyond the rule of
disbarment

Held: NO.

§ Under section 5 of Rule 127, a member of the bar may be removed or

suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court by reason of his