LIM V STA.
CRUS- LIM petitioner’s parents were also decreed to give a monthly support for the three
Petitioner – Edward Lim
Respondent - Ma. Cheryl Sta. Cruz-Lim
FACTS:
1978 : Petitioner and Respondent met in 1978 in Cebu, Petitioner resides in
Makati spent his sem break from college, at that time 26 yrs old. College
student and working in the family business, Respondent resides in Gingoog,
Cagayan de Oro was a boarder in petitioner’s uncle house, was a secretarial
student after less than year of courtship,
two became sweetheart in early 1979, same year December 8, respondent
marry the petitioner, Cheryl bore Edward three children, respondents Lester
Edward, Candice Grace and Mariano III. Cheryl, Edward and their children
resided at the house of petitioners in Forbes Park, Makati City, together with
Edwards as to customary among those Chinese descents.
During their stay in Forbes Park, all living expenses provided by petitioner’s
grandparents. Petitioner’s salary of ₱6,000.00 for working in the family
distillery went straight to respondent. Despite set up and living arrangement,
they both continued to insist that they live separately and independently from
petitioner’s family
In 1990, Cheryl abandoned the Forbes Park residence, bringing the children
with her (then all minors) and forcibly opened their cabinet and cleaned out
the contents thereof, which included petitioner’s passport, jewelry, and a land
title in petitioner’s name, AFTER a violent confrontation with Edward whom
she caught with the in-house midwife of his grandmother in what the trial
court described a very compromising situation. Respondent likewise filed a
criminal complaint for Concubinage and Physical Injuries against petitioner
which was eventually dismissed by the investigating prosecutor for lack of
merit.
Cheryl, for herself and her children, sued petitioners, Edward, Chua Giak and
Mariano (defendants) in RTC for support. RTC ordered Edward to provide
monthly support of P6,000 Thereafter, the trial court directed petitioner to
give a monthly support of ₱6,000.00 and, in case of his inability to do so,
minor children in the amount of ₱34,000.00
October 29, 1999, petitioner filed a petition & sought the declaration of
nullity of his marriage to respondent on the ground of the latter’s
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code.
3 yrs after, July 22, 2002, petitioner filed an amended petition including an
allegation of his own psychological incapacity, as both he and respondent
were diagnosed with personality disorders—dependent personality disorder
and histrionic personality disorder.
Following the exchange of pleadings between the parties, petitioner
presented evidence consisting testimony from a psychiatrist, Dr. Cecilia C.
Villegas ; and Maxima Adato, petitioner's co-employee in the distillery in
addition petitioner included the report result that the parties were suffering
from personality disorder
RTC declared the marriage - null and void as the two were psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations. (ON THE
GROUND ART. 36))
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE MARRIAGE IS NULL AND VOID ON
THE GROUND THAT BOTH ARE PSYCHOLOGICAL
INCAPACITATED UNDER ARTICLE 36?
RULING: No. OSG appealed to CA disagreeing and questioning RTC’s
ruling and the said ordered had been reversed and set aside on March 25
2002
- ruling in Santos v. Court of Appeals cites 3 factors characterizing
psychological incapacity to perform the essential marital obligations:
(1) gravity, (2) juridical antecedence, (3) incurability. We expounded
on the foregoing, to wit:
- The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be
incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage;
- it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage,
although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the
marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the
cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.
- It also states in Republic V CA, as the party alleging his own
psychological incapacity and that of his spouse, had the special
 albatross to prove that he and his wife were suffering from "the most
serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an
utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage."
- Rather, Petitioner present petitioner presented the Psychiatric Report
of Dr. Villegas
- *READ THE REPORT OF PSYCHODYNAMICS OF THE CASE”
- The report and testimony of Dr. Villegas shows that she link
particular acts of the parties to the DSM IV's list of criteria for the
specific personality disorders but the results made by her where not
supported by any psychological test properly administered by
clinical psychologists specifically trained in the tests use and
interpretation.
- The said report of Dr. Villegas was made only after maximum of 7
hours of interview without any separate psychological test cannot tie
the hands of the trial court and prevent it from making its own
factual finding on what happened in this case.
- The probative force of the testimony of an expert does not lie in a
mere statement of his theory or opinion
- -instead in the assistance that he can render to the courts in showing
the facts that serve as a basis for his criterion and the reasons upon
which the logic of his report is founded.
- Petition denied. CA decision affirmed.
**notes: Hindi puede ung report kahit galling siya sa psychiatrist kasi ung
results na galling sa psychiatrist ay gawa lang sa paguusap nila nung parties
wala kahit anong psychological test na ginawa ung psychiatrist**
**Bakit bawal? The parties could fake their answer para magresult sila na
psychological incapacitated sila**
**Bakit bawal kahit galling lang na sa psychiatrist: there is possibility that
they only contracted the psychiatrist and the psychiatrist did not produce a
results from a psychological test that would help her to establish a good
evidence that the parties is psychological incapacitated**
PADILLA RUMBAUA V RUMBAUA
PETITIONER: Rowena Padilla-Rambaua
RESPONDENT: Edward Rumbaua
FACTS:
- Respondent and petitioner were childhood neighbors in Dupax del
Norte, Nueva Vizcaya. Sometime in 1987, they met again and
became sweethearts but Edward’s family did not approve of their
relationship. After graduation from college in 1991, Edward
promised to marry Rowena as soon as he found a job. The job came
in 1993, when the Philippine Air Lines (PAL) accepted Edward as a
computer engineer. Edward proposed to Rowena that they first have
a “secret marriage” in order not to antagonize his parents. Rowena
agreed; they were married in Manila on February 23, 1993. Rowena
and Edward, however, never lived together; Rowena stayed with her
sister in Fairview, Quezon City, while Edward lived with his parents
in Novaliches.
- They saw each other every day during the first 6 months of their
marriage. At that point, Edward refused to live with Rowena for fear
that public knowledge of their marriage would affect his application
for a PAL scholarship.
- Seven months into their marriage, the couple’s daily meetings
became occasional visits to Rowena’s house in Fairview; they would
have sexual trysts in motels. Later that year, Edward enrolled at
FEATI University after he lost his employment with PAL.
- In 1994, the parties’ respective families discovered their secret
marriage. Edward’s mother tried to convince him to go to the United
States, but he refused.
- To appease his mother, he continued living separately from Rowena.
Edward forgot to greet Rowena during her birthday in 1992 and
likewise failed to send her greeting cards on special occasions.
Edward indicated as well in his visa application that he was single.
- In April 1995, Edward’s mother died then he blamed Rowena,
associating his mother’s death to the pain that the discovery of his
secret marriage brought.
- Pained by Edward’s action, Rowena severed her relationship with
Edward. They eventually reconciled through the help of Rowena’s
father, although they still lived separately.
- In 1997, Edward informed Rowena that he had found a job in Davao.
A year later, Rowena and her mother went to Edward’s house in
Novaliches and found him cohabiting with one Cynthia Villanueva
(Cynthia).
- When she confronted Edward about it, he denied having an affair
with Cynthia. Rowena apparently did not believe Edwards and
moved to to Nueva Vizcaya to recover from the pain and anguish
that her discovery brought.
- Rowena filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage
against Edward. Aside from her oral testimony, the petitioner also
presented a certified true copy of their marriage contract; and the
testimony, curriculum vitae, and psychological report of clinical
psychologist Dr. Nedy Lorenzo Tayag (Dr. Tayag).
- Dr. Tayag declared on the witness stand that she administered the
following tests on Rowena:
a Revised Beta Examination;
a Bender Visual Motor Gestalt Test;
a Rorschach Psychodiagnostic Test;
a Draw a Person Test; a Sach’s Sentence Completion Test;
and MMPI.
- She thereafter prepared a psychological report with his findings.
According to his evaluation, the character traits of Edward reveal
him to suffer Narcissistic Personality Disorder – declared to be
grave, severe and incurable. However, at the end of his findings,
Dr. Tayag incorporated his personal idea about love.
- Love, according to him, means:
“Love happens to everyone. It is dubbed to be boundless as
it goes beyond the expectations people tagged with it. In love, “age
does matter.” People love in order to be secure that one will share
his/her life with another and that he/she will not die alone.
Individuals who are in love had the power to let love grow or let love
die – it is a choice one had to face when love is not the love he/she
expected.”
RTC nullified the marriage of Rowena and Edward.
CA reversed and set aside the RTC decision, and denied the nullification of
the parties’ marriage.
a. observed that Dr. Tayag’s psychiatric report did not mention the
cause of the respondent’s so-called “narcissistic personality
disorder;” it did not discuss the respondent’s childhood and thus
failed to give the court an insight into the respondent’s
developmental years. Dr. Tayag likewise failed to explain why she
came to the conclusion that the respondent’s incapacity was “deep-
seated” and “incurable.” Xxx
-The petitioner now argues :
a. the OSG certification requirement under Republic v. Molina
cannot be dispensed with because A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, which
relaxed the requirement, took effect only on March 15, 2003;
b. vacating the decision of the courts a quo and remanding the case
to the RTC to recall her expert witness and cure the defects in her
testimony, as well as to present additional evidence, would temper
justice with mercy; and
c. Dr. Tayag’s testimony in court cured the deficiencies in her
psychiatric report.
-The petitioner prays that the RTC’s and the CA’s decisions be reversed and
set aside, and the case be remanded to the RTC for further proceedings; in
the event we cannot grant this prayer, that the CA’s decision be set aside and
the RTC’s decision be reinstated.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT INVALIDATING THE TRIAL COURT’S
DECISION AND REMANDING THE CASE FOR FURTHER
PROCEEDINGS IS PROPER
RULING: NO. We resolve to deny the petition for lack of merit.
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is applicable
1. In Molina, the Court emphasized the role of the prosecuting
attorney or fiscal and the OSG; they are to appear as counsel for
the State in proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity
of marriages:
a. (8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or
fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for
the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the
Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be
quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his
reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case
may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along
with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court
such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date
the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court.
The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent
function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under
Canon 1095.
2. The amendment introduced under A.M. No. 02-11-10-
SC is procedural or remedial in character; it does not create or
remove any vested right, but only operates as a remedy in aid of
or confirmation of already existing rights. The settled rule is that
procedural laws may be given retroactive effect, as we held
in De Los Santos v. Vda. de Mangubat:
a. Procedural Laws do not come within the legal
conception of a retroactive law, or the general rule
against the retroactive operation of statues - they may be
given retroactiveeffect on actions pending and
undetermined at the time of their passage and this will
not violate any right of a person who may feel that he is
adversely affected, insomuch as there are no vested
rights in rules of procedure.
3. A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, as a remedial measure, removed the
mandatory nature of an OSG certification and may be applied
retroactively to pending matters. In effect, the measure cures in
any pending matter any procedural lapse on the certification
prior to its promulgation. Our rulings in Antonio v. Reyes
and Navales v. Navales have since confirmed and clarified that
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC has dispensed with the Molina guideline
on the matter of certification, although Article 48 mandates the
appearance of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal to ensure that no
collusion between the parties would take place. Thus, what is
important is the presence of the prosecutor in the case, not the
remedial requirement that he be certified to be present. From
this perspective, the petitioner’s objection regarding
the Molina guideline on certification lacks merit.
A Remand of the Case to the RTC is Improper
4. A remand of the case to the RTC for further proceedings
amounts to the grant of a new trial that is not procedurally proper
at this stage.
a. Section 1 of Rule 37 provides that an aggrieved party
may move the trial court to set aside a judgment or final
order already rendered and to grant a new trial within
the period for taking an appeal.
b. In addition, a motion for new trial may be filed only on
the grounds of (1) fraud, accident, mistake or excusable
negligence that could not have been guarded against by
ordinary prudence, and by reason of which the aggrieved
party’s rights have probably been impaired; or (2) newly
discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, the
aggrieved party could not have discovered and produced
at the trial, and that would probably alter the result if
presented.
5. In the present case, the petitioner cites the inadequacy of the
evidence presented by her former counsel as basis for a
remand. She did not, however, specify the inadequacy. That the
RTC granted the petition for declaration of nullity prima
facie shows that the petitioner’s counsel had not been negligent
in handling the case. Granting arguendo that the petitioner’s
counsel had been negligent, the negligence that would justify a
new trial must be excusable, i.e. one that ordinary diligence and
prudence could not have guarded against. The negligence that
the petitioner apparently adverts to is that cited in Uy v. First
Metro Integrated Steel Corporation where we explained:
a. Blunders and mistakes in the conduct of the proceedings
in the trial court as a result of the ignorance,
inexperience or incompetence of counsel do not qualify
as a ground for new trial. If such were to be admitted as
valid reasons for re-opening cases, there would never be
 an end to litigation so long as a new counsel could be
employed to allege and show that the prior counsel had
not been sufficiently diligent, experienced or
learned. This will put a premium on the willful and
intentional commission of errors by counsel, with a view
to securing new trials in the event of conviction, or an
adverse decision, as in the instant case.
6. Thus, we find no justifiable reason to grant the petitioner’s
requested remand.
Petitioner failed to establish the respondent’s psychological incapacity
- Dr. Tayag’s testimony shows that she initially described the general
characteristics of a person suffering from a narcissistic personality
disorder, she did not really show how and to what extent the
respondent exhibited these traits. She mentioned the buzz words that
jurisprudence requires for the nullity of a marriage – namely,
gravity, incurability, existence at the time of the marriage,
psychological incapacity relating to marriage – and in her own
limited way, related these to the medical condition she generally
described. The testimony, together with her report, however, suffers
from very basic flaws, she was not able to rove that the PI existed at
the time of the celebration of the marriage.
WHEREFORE, in view of these considerations, we DENY the petition
and AFFIRM the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals dated June
25, 2004and January 18, 2005, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No. 75095.
VALERIO E. KALAW, Petitioner,
vs. MA. ELENA FERNANDEZ, Respondent.
Facts:
- In an earlier decision promulgated by the supreme court, it
dismissed the complaint for declaration of nullity of the marriage of
the parties upon finding that the petition had no merit.
- In the case, the petitioner failed to prove that his wife (respondent)
suffers from psychological incapacity. He presented the testimonies
of two supposed expert witnesses who concluded that respondent is
psychologically incapacitated, but the conclusions of these witnesses
were premised on the alleged acts or behavior of respondent which
had not been sufficiently proven. Petitioner’s experts heavily relied
on petitioner’s allegations of respondent’s constant mahjong
sessions, visits to the beauty parlor, going out with friends, adultery,
and neglect of their children. Petitioner’s experts opined that
respondent’s alleged habits, when performed constantly to the
detriment of quality and quantity of time devoted to her duties as
mother and wife, constitute a psychological incapacity in the form of
NPD.
- Indeed, the totality of the evidence points to the opposite conclusion.
A fair assessment of the facts would show that respondent was not
totally remiss and incapable of appreciating and performing her
marital and parental duties
- the Court finds no factual basis for the conclusion of psychological
incapacity. There is no error in the CA’s reversal of the trial court’s
ruling that there was psychological incapacity. Petition denied
- In his Motion for Reconsideration, the petitioner implores the Court
to take a thorough 2nd look into what constitutes psychological
incapacity; to uphold the findings of the trial court as supported by
the testimonies of three expert witnesses; and consequently to find
that the respondent, if not both parties, were psychologically
incapacitated to perform their respective essential marital obligation.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is psychological incapacity on the part of the
respondent.
RULING: YES. The Court in granting the Motion for Reconsideration held
that Fernandez was indeed psychologically incapacitated as they relaxed the
previously set forth guidelines with regard to this case.
*****Note: Molina guidelines were not abandoned, expert opinions were
just given much respect in this case.****
- Guidelines too rigid, thus relaxed IN THIS CASE
o The Court held that the guidelines set in the case of Republic
v. CA have turned out to be rigid, such that their application
to every instance practically condemned the petitions for
declaration of nullity to the fate of certain rejection. But
Article 36 of the Family Code must not be so strictly and too
literally read and applied given the clear intendment of the
drafters to adopt its enacted version of “less specificity”
obviously to enable “some resiliency in its application.”
Instead, every court should approach the issue of nullity “not
on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or
generalizations, but according to its own facts” in
recognition of the verity that no case would be on “all fours”
with the next one in the field of psychological incapacity as a
ground for the nullity of marriage; hence, every “trial judge
must take pains in examining the factual milieu and the
appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid substituting
its own judgment for that of the trial court.
o In the task of ascertaining the presence of psychological
incapacity as a ground for the nullity of marriage, the courts,
which are concededly not endowed with expertise in the
field of psychology, must of necessity rely on the opinions
of experts in order to inform themselves on the matter, and
thus enable themselves to arrive at an intelligent and
judicious judgment. Indeed, the conditions for the malady of
being grave, antecedent and incurable demand the in-
depth diagnosis by experts.
- Personal examination by party not required; totality of evidence
must be considered
- We have to stress that the fulfillment of the constitutional mandate
for the State to protect marriage as an inviolable social institution
only relates to a valid marriage. No protection can be accorded to a
marriage that is null and void
- ab initio, because such a marriage has no legal existence.
o There is no requirement for one to be declared
psychologically incapacitated to be personally examined by
a physician, because what is important is the presence of
evidence that adequately establishes the party’s
psychological incapacity. Hence, “if the totality of evidence
presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological
incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person
concerned need not be resorted to.”
o Verily, the totality of the evidence must show a link, medical
or the like, between the acts that manifest psychological
incapacity and the psychological disorder itself. If other
evidence showing that a certain condition could possibly
result from an assumed state of facts existed in the record,
the expert opinion should be admissible and be weighed as
an aid for the court in interpreting such other evidence on the
causation.
o Indeed, an expert opinion on psychological incapacity
should be considered as conjectural or speculative and
without any probative value only in the absence of other
evidence to establish causation. The expert’s findings under
such circumstances would not constitute hearsay that would
justify their exclusion as evidence.
- Expert opinion considered as decisive evidence as to
psychological and emotional temperaments
o The findings and evaluation by the RTC as the trial court
deserved credence because it was in the better position to
view and examine the demeanor of the witnesses while they
were testifying. The position and role of the trial judge in the
appreciation of the evidence showing the psychological
incapacity were not to be downplayed but should be
accorded due importance and respect.
o The Court considered it improper and unwarranted to give to
such expert opinions a merely generalized consideration and
treatment, least of all to dismiss their value as inadequate
basis for the declaration of the nullity of the marriage.
Instead, we hold that said experts sufficiently and
competently described the psychological incapacity of the
respondent within the standards of Article 36 of the Family
Code. We uphold the conclusions reached by the two expert
 witnesses because they were largely drawn from the case
records and affidavits, and should not anymore be disputed
after the RTC itself had accepted the veracity of the
petitioner’s factual premises.
o The Court also held that the courts must accord weight to
expert testimony on the psychological and mental state of the
parties in cases for the declaration of the nullity of
marriages, for by the very nature of Article 36 of the Family
Code the courts, “despite having the primary task and
burden of decision-making, must not discount but, instead,
must consider as decisive evidence the expert opinion on
the psychological and mental temperaments of the parties.”
- Willfully exposing children to gambling constitutes neglect of
parental duties
o The frequency of the respondent’s mahjong playing should
not have delimited our determination of the presence
or absence of psychological incapacity. Instead, the
determinant should be her obvious failure to fully appreciate
the duties and responsibilities of parenthood at the time she
made her marital vows. Had she fully appreciated such
duties and responsibilities, she would have known that
bringing along her children of very tender ages to her
mahjong sessions would expose them to a culture of
gambling and other vices that would erode their moral fiber.
Nonetheless, the long-term effects of the respondent’s
obsessive mahjong playing surely impacted on her family
life, particularly on her very young children.
o The fact that the respondent brought her children with her to
her mahjong sessions did not only point to her neglect of
parental duties, but also manifested her tendency to expose
them to a culture of gambling. Her willfully exposing her
children to the culture of gambling on every occasion of her
mahjong sessions was a very grave and serious act of
subordinating their needs for parenting to the gratification of
her own personal and escapist desires.
o The respondent revealed her wanton disregard for her
children’s moral and mental development. This disregard
violated her duty as a parent to safeguard and protect her
children.
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the Motion for Reconsideration;
REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision promulgated on September 19,
2011; and REINSTATES the decision rendered by the Regional Trial Court
declaring the marriage between the petitioner and the respondent on
November 4, 1976 as NULL AND VOID AB JN/TIO due to the
psychological incapacity of the parties pursuant to Article 36 of the Family
Code.
MALLILIN v. JAMESOLAMIN
G.R. No. 192718
Facts:
 Robert Malilin and Luz Jamesolamin were married on September 6,
1972 and begot three children. The petitioner filed a complaint for
nullity of marriage on the grounds that the respondent allegedly
suffered from psychological and mental incapacity at the time of the
marriage celebration, unpreparedness to enter into such marital life,
and to comply with its essential obligations and responsibilities. .
Such incapacity became even more apparent during their marriage
when Luz exhibited clear manifestation of immaturity,
irresponsibility, deficiency of independent rational judgment, and
inability to cope with the heavy and oftentimes demanding obligation
of a parent.
 He testified that Luz was already living in California, USA, and
married an American. While they were still together though, Robert
disclosed that respondent did not perform responsibilities of being a
housewife like keeping the house in order, preparing meals, washing
clothes and taking care of the children. He also stated that she dated
several men and contracted loans without his knowledge.
 In turn Luz filed her answer with a counterclaim, averring that it was
Robert who manifested psychological incapacity.
 On September 20, 2002, the Regional Trial Court had rendered a
decision declaring the marriage null and void on the ground of
psychological incapacity on the part of Luz as she failed to comply
with the essential marital obligations but the Court of Appeals, in its
November 20, 2009 Decision, reversed the RTC decision.
Issue:
Whether or not the totality of the evidence adduced proves that Luz
was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
obligations of marriage warranting the annulment of their marriage
under Article 36 of the Family Code.
Held:
 The Supreme Court stated that Robert’s evidence failed to establish
the psychological incapacity of Luz. Other than his self-serving
testimony, no other witness corroborated his allegations on her
behavior. As the Court has repeatedly stressed, psychological
incapacity contemplates "downright incapacity or inability to take
cognizance of and to assume the basic marital obligations," not
merely the refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will, on the part
of the errant spouse.
 There was also nothing in the records that would indicate that Luz
had either been interviewed or was subjected to a psychological
examination.
 On interpretations given by the NAMT of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, yes, they are given great respect by our courts, but they
are neither controlling nor decisive.
 Lastly, on petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage, the burden
of proof to show the nullity of marriage lies with the plaintiff. Unless
the evidence presented clearly reveals a situation where the parties,
or one of them, could not have validly entered into a marriage by
reason of a grave and serious psychological illness existing at the
time it was celebrated, the Court is compelled to uphold the
indissolubility of the marital tie.
 The petition is DENIED.
DISSENT
Judge Leonen voted to grant the petition for the reason that
there is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been
to confine the meaning of “psychological incapacity” to the most
serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of
an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage.
Believing that marriage involves two persons only, necessarily,
these two are in the best position to testify on the other’s
behavior during their marriage. Put in this context, Robert’s
testimony cannot be disregarded for being self-serving.
The constitution describes marriage as “inviolable” while the
law portrays it as a “permanent union.” Nevertheless, the state’s
interest in any and all marriages entered into by individuals
should not amount to an unjustified intrusion into one’s right to
autonomy and human dignity.
To end, it is a pure and simple cruelty to give the couple a false
status considering they now separated and living their own lives.
LEONILO ANTONIO Petitioner,
vs. MARIE IVONNE F. REYES, Respondent.
Facts:
 Leonilo Antonio and Marie Reyes met in August 1989 when 26 and
36 years old respectively. They got married a year after. On 8 March
1993, petitioner filed a petition to have his marriage to respondent
declared null and void because of the latter’s psychological
incapacity. The following are his allegations:
o (1) She concealed the fact that she previously gave birth to
an illegitimate son and instead introduced the boy as the
adopted child of her family.
o (2) She fabricated a story that her brother-in-law, Edwin
David, attempted to rape and kill her when in fact, no such
incident occurred.
o (3) She misrepresented herself as a psychiatrist to her
obstetrician, Dr. Consuelo Gardiner, and told some of her
friends that she graduated with a degree in psychology, when
she was neither.
 o (4) She claimed to be a singer or a free-lance voice talent
affiliated with Blackgold Recording Company which is not
true.
o (5) She invented friends named Babes Santos and Via
Marquez, and under those names, sent lengthy letters to
petitioner claiming to be from Blackgold and touting her as
the "number one moneymaker" in the commercial industry
worth P2 million. Petitioner later found out that respondent
herself was the one who wrote and sent the letters to him.
o (6) She represented herself as a person of greater means,
thus, she altered her payslip to make it appear that she
earned a higher income. She bought a sala set from a public
market but told petitioner that she acquired it from a famous
furniture dealer. She spent lavishly on unnecessary items and
ended up borrowing money from other people on false
pretexts.
o (7) She exhibited insecurities and jealousies over him to the
extent of calling up his officemates to monitor his
whereabouts. When he could no longer take her unusual
behavior, he separated from her in August 1991.
 He tried to attempt a reconciliation but since her behavior did not
change, he finally left her for good in November 1991. Dr. Lopez, a
clinical psychologist, stated based on the tests they conducted that
petitioner was essentially a normal, introspective, shy and
conservative type of person. On the other hand, they observed that
respondent’s persistent and constant lying to petitioner was abnormal
or pathological.
 In opposing the petition, respondent claimed that she performed her
marital obligations by attending to all the needs of her husband. She
asserted that there was no truth to the allegation that she fabricated
stories, told lies and invented personalities. Respondent presented
Dr. Antonio Efren Reyes, a psychiatrist, to refute the allegations
anent her psychological condition.
 Dr. Reyes testified that the series of tests conducted by his assistants
led him to conclude that respondent was not psychologically
incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations. He
postulated that regressive behavior, gross neuroticism, psychotic
tendencies, and poor control of impulses, which are signs that might
point to the presence of disabling trends, were not elicited from
respondent.
 RTC ruled in favor of the petitioner. CA reversed RTC’s judgment.
Hence, this petition
ISSUE: Whether or Not Marie Reyes is psychologically incapacitated
RULING:
 Yes, Psychological Incapacity is attendant. The guidelines
established in the Molina case is properly established in the case at
bar.
 The SC also emphasized what fraud means as contemplated in Art 45
(3) of the FC vis a vis Art 46 of the FC. In PI, the misrepresentation
done by Marie points to her inadequacy to cope with her marital
obligations, kindred to psychological incapacity. In Art 45 (3),
marriage may be annulled if the consent of either party was obtained
by fraud, and Article 46 which enumerates the circumstances
constituting fraud under the previous article, clarifies that “no other
misrepresentation or deceit as to character, health, rank, fortune or
chastity shall constitute such fraud as will give grounds for action for
the annulment of marriage.”
 These provisions of Art 45 (3) and Art 46 cannot be applied in the
case at bar because the misrepresentations done by Marie is not
considered as fraud but rather such misrepresentations constitute her
aberrant behaviour which further constitutes PI. Her
misrepresentations are not lies sought to vitiate Leo’s consent to
marry her. Her misrepresentations are evidence that Marie cannot
simply distinguish fiction/fantasy from reality which is so grave and
it falls under the fourth guideline laid down in the Molina Case.
 indeed, a person unable to distinguish between fantasy and reality
would similarly be unable to comprehend the legal nature of the
marital bond, much less its psychic meaning, and the corresponding
obligations attached to marriage, including parenting. One unable to
adhere to reality cannot be expected to adhere as well to any legal or
emotional commitments
 ***NOTES:
- The petitioner, aside from his own testimony, presented a psychiatrist and clinical
psychologist who attested that constant lying and extreme jealousy of Reyes is
abnormal and pathological and corroborated his allegations on his wife's behavior,
which amounts to psychological incapacity.
- The factual findings of the trial court are deemed binding on the SC, owing to the
great weight accorded to the opinion of the primary trier of facts. As such, it must be
considered that respondent had consistently lied about many material aspects as to
her character and personality. Her fantastic ability to invent and fabricate stories and
personalities enabled her to live in a world of make-believe. This made her
psychologically incapacitated as it rendered her incapable of giving meaning and
significance to her marriage.
ROBERTO DOMINGO, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and DELIA SOLEDAD AVERA represented by
her Attorney-in-Fact MOISES R. AVERA, respondents.
Facts:
 Private respondent Delia Soledad A. Domingo filed the petition On
May 29, 1991, entitled “Declaration of Nullity of Marriage and
Separation of Property” against Roberto Domingo. The petition,
which was filed before Pasig RTC, alleged the following:
 Delia and Domingo married on November 29, 1976;
 Later on found out, without the knowledge of Delia, Domingo had a
previous marriage with Emerina dela Paz on April 25, 1969 which
marriage is valid and still existing;
 She came to know of the prior marriage only sometime in 1983
when Emerina sued them for bigamy;
 Since 1979, respondent Delia has been working in Saudi Arabia and
is only able to stay in the Philippines when she would avail of the
one-month annual vacation leave granted by her employer;
 Roberto has been unemployed and completely dependent upon her
for support and subsistence;
 Her personal properties amounting to P350,000.00 are under the
possession of Roberto, who disposed some of the said properties
without her knowledge and consent;
 While Delia was on her vacation, she discovered that he was
cohabiting with another woman.
 Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the
declaration of their marriage, which is void ab initio, is superfluous
and unnecessary. He further suggested that private respondent should
have filed an ordinary civil action for the recovery of the properties
alleged to have been acquired by their union.
 RTC and CA dismissed the petitioner’s motion for lack of merit.
ISSUE:
- Whether or not a petition for judicial declaration of a void marriage
is necessary. If in the affirmative, whether the same should be filed
only for purposes of remarriage.
- Whether or not SP No. 1989-J is the proper remedy of private
respondent to recover certain real and personal properties allegedly
belonging to her exclusively.
Ruling:
Yes. The nullification of a marriage for the purpose of contracting
another cannot be accomplished merely on the basis of the perception of
both parties or of one that their union is defective. Were this so, this
inviolable social institution would be reduced to a mockery and would
rest on a very shaky foundation.
On the other hand, the clause “on the basis solely of a final judgment
declaring such marriage void” in Article 40 of the Code denotes that such
final judgment declaring the previous marriage void is not only for
purpose of remarriage.
Yes. The prayer for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage may be
raised together with the other incident of their marriage such as the
separation of their properties. The Family Code has clearly provided the
effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage, one of which is the
separation of property according to the regime of property relations
governing them.
 Hence, SC denied the instant petition. CA’s decision is affirmed
*** NOTES ***
Reverting to the case before us, petitioner's interpretation of Art. 40 of the Family Code
is, undoubtedly, quite restrictive. Thus, his position that private respondent's failure to
state in the petition that the same is filed to enable her to remarry will result in the
dismissal of SP No. 1989-J is untenable. His misconstruction of Art. 40 resulting from
the misplaced emphasis on the term "solely" was in fact anticipated by the members of
the Committee.
Dean Gupit commented the word "only" may be misconstrued to refer to "for purposes of
remarriage." Judge Diy stated that "only" refers to "final judgment." Justice Puno
suggested that they say "on the basis only of a final judgment." Prof. Baviera suggested
that they use the legal term "solely" instead of "only," which the Committee approved.
LENI O. CHOA, Petitioner,
vs. ALFONSO C. CHOA, respondent.
Facts:
March 15, 1981, petitioner and respondent were married. Out of this union,
two children were born, Cheryl Lynne and Albryan. On October 27, 1993,
respondent filed before the RTC of Negros Occidental, a Complaint for the
annulment of his marriage to petitioner. Afterwards he filed an Amended
Complaint dated November 8, 1993 for the declaration of nullity of his
marriage to petitioner based on her alleged psychological incapacity.
case went to trial with respondent presenting his evidence in chief. After his
last witness testified, he submitted his Formal Offer of Exhibits dated
February 20, 1998. Instead of offering any objection to it, petitioner filed a
Motion to Dismiss (Demurrer to Evidence) dated May 11, 1998. The lower
court then allowed a number of pleadings to be filed thereafter.
Finally, the RTC issued its December 2, 1998 Order9 denying petitioners
Demurrer to Evidence. It held that [respondent] established a quantum of
evidence that the [petitioner] must controvert.
After her Motion for Reconsideration was denied in the March 22, 1999
Order,12 petitioner elevated the case to the CA by way of a Petition for
Certiorari
ISSUE: Whether or not Alfonso Chua presented quantum evidence for the
declaration of nullity of his marriage with Leni on the ground of
psychological incapacity.
RULING:
The court held that documents presented by Alfonso during the trial of the
case do not in any way show the alleged psychological incapacity of his wife.
The evidence was insufficient and shows grave abuse of discretion bordering
on absurdity. Alfonso testified and complained about three aspects of Leni’s
personality namely lack of attention to children, immaturity, and lack of an
intention of procreative sexuality and none of these three, singly or
collectively, constitutes psychological incapacity.
The law provides that: “Psychological incapacity must be characterized by
(a) juridical antecedence, (b) gravity and (c) incurability.” In the case at bar,
the evidence adduced by respondent merely shows that he and his wife could
not get along with each other. There was absolutely no showing of the
gravity or juridical antecedence or incurability of the problems besetting their
marital union.
Psychological incapacity must be characterized by gravity, juridical
antecedence, and incurability. It must be more than just a difficulty, a refusal
or neglect in the performance of marital obligations. A mere showing of
irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities does not constitute
psychological incapacity.Furthermore, the testimonial evidence from other
witnesses failed to identify and prove root cause of the alleged psychological
incapacity.
It just established that the spouses had an incompatibility or a defect that
could possibly be treated or alleviated through psychotherapy. The totality of
evidence presented was completely insufficient to sustain a finding of
psychological incapacity more so without any medical, psychiatric or
psychological examination
***