THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 108947. September 29, 1997]

ROLANDO SANCHEZ, FLORIDA MIERLY SANCHEZ, ALFREDO T. SANCHEZ and MYRNA T. SANCHEZ,
petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, ROSALIA S. LUGOD, ARTURO S. LUGOD, EVELYN
LUGOD-RANISES and ROBERTO S. LUGOD, respondents.

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J.:

Actions; Certiorari; Doctrinally entrenched is the general rule that certiorari is not a substitute for a lost
appeal; Exceptions.—Doctrinally entrenched is the general rule that certiorari is not a substitute for a
lost appeal. However, Justice Florenz D. Regalado lists several exceptions to this rule, viz.: “(1) where the
appeal does not constitute a speedy and adequate remedy (Salvadades vs. Pajarillo, et al., 78 Phil. 77),
as where 33 appeals were involved from orders issued in a single proceeding which will inevitably result
in a proliferation of more appeals (PCIB vs. Escolin, et al., L-27860 and 27896, Mar. 29, 1974); (2) where
the orders were also issued either in excess of or without jurisdiction (Aguilar vs. Tan, L-23600, June 30,
1970, Cf. Bautista, et al. vs. Sarmiento, et al., L-45137, Sept. 23, 1985); (3) for certain special
consideration, as public welfare or public policy (See Jose vs. Zulueta, et al.—16598, May 31, 1961 and
the cases cited therein); (4) where in criminal actions, the court rejects rebuttal evidence for the
prosecution as, in case of acquittal, there could be no remedy (People vs. Abalos, L-029039, Nov. 28,
1968); (5) where the order is a patent nullity (Marcelo vs. De Guzman, et al., L-29077, June 29, 1982);
and (6) where the decision in the certiorari case will avoid future litigations (St. Peter Memorial Park,
Inc. vs. Campos, et al., L-38280, Mar. 21, 1975).” Even in a case where the remedy of appeal was lost,
the Court has issued the writ of certiorari where the lower court patently acted in excess of or outside
its jurisdiction, as in the present case.

Same; Same; Requisites for Certiorari.—A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is
appropriate and allowable when the following requisites concur: (1) the writ is directed against a
tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2) such tribunal, board or officer
has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law. After a thorough review of the case at bar, we are convinced that all these
requirements were met.

Same; Succession; Settlement of Estates; Probate Courts; It is hornbook doctrine that in a special
proceeding for the probate of a will, the question of ownership is an extraneous matter which the
probate court cannot resolve with finality, a pronouncement that applies with equal force to an
intestate proceeding.—As a probate court, the trial court was exercising judicial functions when it issued
its assailed resolution. The said court had jurisdiction to act in the intestate proceedings involved in this
case with the caveat that, due to its limited jurisdiction, it could resolve questions of title only
provisionally. It is hornbook doctrine that “in a special proceeding for the probate of a will, the question
of ownership is an extraneous matter which the probate court cannot resolve with finality. This
pronouncement no doubt applies with equal force to an intestate proceeding as in the case at bar.”

Same; Same; Same; Same; A probate court or one in charge of proceedings whether testate or intestate
cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate and which are
claimed to belong to outside parties.—In the instant case, the trial court rendered a decision declaring
as simulated and fictitious all the deeds of absolute sale which, on July 26, 1963 and June 26, 1967, Juan
C. Sanchez and Maria Villafranca executed in favor of their daughter, Rosalia Sanchez Lugod; and
grandchildren, namely, Arturo S. Lugod, Evelyn S. Lugod and Roberto S. Lugod. The trial court ruled
further that the properties covered by the said sales must be subject to collation. Citing Article 1409 (2)
of the Civil Code, the lower court nullified said deeds of sale and determined with finality the ownership
of the properties subject thereof. In doing so, it clearly overstepped its jurisdiction as a probate court.
Jurisprudence teaches: “[A] probate court or one in charge of proceedings whether testate or intestate
cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate and which are
claimed to belong to outside parties. All that the said court could do as regards said properties is to
determine whether they should or should not be included in the inventory or list of properties to be
administered by the administrator. If there is no dispute, well and good, but if there is, then the parties,
the administrator, and the opposing parties have to resort to an ordinary action for a final
determination of the conflicting claims of title because the probate court cannot do so.”

Same; Same; Same; Same; Compromise Agreements; A court commits grave abuse of discretion when
it renders a decision in disregard of the parties’ compromise agreement merely on the ground that such
compromise agreement was not approved by the court.—Furthermore, the trial court committed grave
abuse of discretion when it rendered its decision in disregard of the parties’ compromise agreement.
Such disregard, on the ground that the compromise agreement “was not approved by the court,” is
tantamount to “an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act
in contemplation and within the bounds of law.”

Same; Same; Same; Same; Certiorari; An act done by a probate court in excess of its jurisdiction may be
corrected by certiorari.—The foregoing issues clearly involve not only the correctness of the trial court’s
decision but also the latter’s jurisdiction. They encompass plain errors of jurisdiction and grave abuse of
discretion, not merely errors of judgment. Since the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction, a petition for
certiorari is certainly a proper remedy. Indeed, it is wellsettled that “(a)n act done by a probate court in
excess of its jurisdiction may be corrected by certiorari.”

Contracts; Compromise Agreements; Words and Phrases; “Compromise Agreement,” Defined; Being a
consensual contract, a compromise agreement is perfected upon the meeting of the minds of the
parties—judicial approval is not required for its perfection.—Article 2028 of the Civil Code defines a
compromise agreement as “a contract whereby the parties, by making reciprocal concessions, avoid a
litigation or put an end to one already commenced.” Being a consensual contract, it is perfected upon
the meeting of the minds of the parties. Judicial approval is not required for its perfection. Petitioners’
argument that the compromise was not valid for lack of judicial approval is not novel; the same was
raised in Mayuga vs. Court of Appeals, where the Court, through Justice Irene R. Cortes, ruled: “It is
alleged that the lack of judicial approval is fatal to the compromise. A compromise is a consensual
contract. As such, it is perfected upon the meeting of the minds of the parties to the contract.
(Hernandez v. Barcelon, 23 Phil. 599 [1912]; see also De los Reyes v. De Ugarte, 75 Phil. 505 [1945].) And
from that moment not only does it become binding upon the parties (De los Reyes v. De Ugarte, supra),
it also has upon them the effect and authority of res judicata (Civil Code, Art. 2037), even if not judicially
approved (Meneses v. De la Rosa, 77 Phil. 34 [1946]; Vda. De Guilas v. David, 132 Phil. 241, L-24280, 23
SCRA 762 [May 27, 1968]; Cochingyan v. Cloribel, L-27070-71 [April 22, 1977], 76 SCRA 361).” (Italics
found in the original.)

Same; Same; To be valid, a compromise agreement is merely required under the law to be based on real
claims and actually agreed upon in good faith by the parties thereto.—In the case before us, it is
ineludible that the parties knowingly and freely entered into a valid compromise agreement. Adequately
assisted by their respective counsels, they each negotiated its terms and provisions for four months; in
fact, said agreement was executed only after the fourth draft. As noted by the trial court itself, the first
and second drafts were prepared successively in July, 1969; the third draft on September 25, 1969; and
the fourth draft, which was finally signed by the parties on October 30, 1969, followed. Since this
compromise agreement was the result of a long drawn out process, with all the parties ably striving to
protect their respective interests and to come out with the best they could, there can be no doubt that
the parties entered into it freely and voluntarily. Accordingly, they should be bound thereby. To be valid,
it is merely required under the law to be based on real claims and actually agreed upon in good faith by
the parties thereto.

Same; Same; Partition; Minority; Every act which is intended to put an end to indivision among co-heirs
and legatees or devisees is deemed to be a partition, although it should purport to be a sale, an
exchange, a compromise, or any other transaction.—In opposing the validity and enforcement of the
compromise agreement, petitioners harp on the minority of Florida Mierly, Alfredo and Myrna. Citing
Article 2032 of the Civil Code, they contend that the court’s approval is necessary in compromises
entered into by guardians and parents in behalf of their wards or children. However, we observe that
although denominated a compromise agreement, the document in this case is essentially a deed of
partition, pursuant to Article 1082 of the Civil Code which provides that “[e]very act which is intended to
put an end to indivision among co-heirs and legatees or devisees is deemed to be a partition, although it
should purport to be a sale, an exchange, a compromise, or any other transaction.”

Same; Same; Same; Same; Requisites for a Valid Partition.—For a partition to be valid, Section 1, Rule
74 of the Rules of Court, requires the concurrence of the following conditions: (1) the decedent left no
will; (2) the decedent left no debts, or if there were debts left, all had been paid; (3) the heirs and
liquidators are all of age, or if they are minors, the latter are represented by their judicial guardians or
legal representatives; and (4) the partition was made by means of a public instrument or affidavit duly
filed with the Register of Deeds. We find that all the foregoing requisites are present in this case. We
therefore affirm the validity of the parties’ compromise agreement/partition in this case.
Appeals; Pleadings and Practice; Estoppel; An issue raised for the first time on appeal and not raised
timely in the proceedings in the lower court is barred by estoppel.—The issue of minority was first
raised only in petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration of the Court of Appeals’ Decision; thus, it “is as if
it was never duly raised in that court at all.” Hence, this Court cannot now, for the first time on appeal,
entertain this issue, for to do so would plainly violate the basic rule of fair play, justice and due process.
We take this opportunity to reiterate and emphasize the well-settled rule that “(a)n issue raised for the
first time on appeal and not raised timely in the proceedings in the lower court is barred by estoppel.
Questions raised on appeal must be within the issues framed by the parties and, consequently, issues
not raised in the trial court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.”

Compromise Agreements; Succession; Settlement of Estates; Waiver; There is no legal obstacle to an

heir’s waiver of his/her hereditary share “even if the actual extent of such share is not determined until
the subsequent liquidation of the estate.”—The petitioners likewise assail as void the provision on
waiver contained in No. 8 of the aforequoted compromise, because it allegedly constitutes a
relinquishment by petitioners of “a right to properties which were not known.” They argue that such
waiver is contrary to law, public policy, morals or good custom. The Court disagrees. The assailed waiver
pertained to their hereditary right to properties belonging to the decedent’s estate which were not
included in the inventory of the estate’s properties. It also covered their right to other properties
originally belonging to the spouses Juan Sanchez and Maria Villafranca de Sanchez which have been
transferred to other persons. In addition, the parties agreed in the compromise to confirm and ratify
said transfers. The waiver is valid because, contrary to petitioners’ protestation, the parties waived a
known and existing interest—their hereditary right which was already vested in them by reason of the
death of their father. Article 777 of the Civil Code provides that “(t)he rights to the succession are
transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent.” Hence, there is no legal obstacle to an heir’s
waiver of his/her hereditary share “even if the actual extent of such share is not determined until the
subsequent liquidation of the estate.” At any rate, such waiver is consistent with the intent and letter of
the law advocating compromise as a vehicle for the settlement of civil disputes.

Same; Rescission; A party to a compromise cannot ask for a rescission after it has enjoyed its benefits.—
It is also significant that all the parties, including the then minors, had already consummated and availed
themselves of the benefits of their compromise. This Court has consistently ruled that “a party to a
compromise cannot ask for a rescission after it has enjoyed its benefits.” By their acts, the parties are
ineludibly estopped from questioning the validity of their compromise agreement. Bolstering this
conclusion is the fact that petitioners questioned the compromise only nine years after its execution,
when they filed with the trial court their Motion to Defer Approval of Compromise Agreement, dated
October 26, 1979.

Same; Contracts; It is a well-entrenched doctrine that “the law does not relieve a party from the effects
of an unwise, foolish, or disastrous contract, entered into with all the required formalities and with full
awareness of what he was doing” and “a compromise entered into and carried out in good faith will not
be discarded even if there was a mistake of law or fact.”—In hindsight, it is not at all farfetched that
petitioners filed said motion for the sole reason that they may have felt shortchanged in their
compromise agreement or partition with private respondents, which in their view was unwise and
unfair. While we may sympathize with this rueful sentiment of petitioners, we can only stress that this
alone is not sufficient to nullify or disregard the legal effects of said compromise which, by its very
nature as a perfected contract, is binding on the parties. Moreover, courts have no jurisdiction to look
into the wisdom of a compromise or to render a decision different therefrom. It is a well-entrenched
doctrine that “the law does not relieve a party from the effects of an unwise, foolish, or disastrous
contract, entered into with all the required formalities and with full awareness of what he was doing”
and “a compromise entered into and carried out in good faith will not be discarded even if there was a
mistake of law or fact, (McCarthy vs. Barber Steamship Lines, 45 Phil. 488) because courts have no
power to relieve parties from obligations voluntarily assumed, simply because their contracts turned out
to be disastrous deals or unwise investments.”

Succession; Settlement of Estates; Probate Courts; The Court of Appeals commits no grave abuse of
discretion in deeming the intestate proceedings closed and terminated even if there was as yet no order
of distribution of the estate where the facts show that the probate court had essentially finished said
intestate proceedings.—Corollarily, the petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals gravely abused its
discretion in deeming Special Proceedings Nos. 44-M and 1022 “CLOSED and TERMINATED,” arguing
that there was as yet no order of distribution of the estate pursuant to Rule 90 of the Rules of Court.
They add that they had not received their full share thereto. We disagree. Under Section 1, Rule 90 of
the Rules of Court, an order for the distribution of the estate may be made when the “debts, funeral
charges, and expenses of administration, the allowance to the widow, and inheritance tax, if any,” had
been paid. This order for the distribution of the estate’s residue must contain the names and shares of
the persons entitled thereto. A perusal of the whole record, particularly the trial court’s conclusion,
reveals that all the foregoing requirements already concurred in this case. The payment of the
indebtedness of the estates of Juan C. Sanchez and Maria Villafranca in the amount of P51,598.93 was
shouldered by Private Respondent Rosalia, who also absorbed or charged against her share the
advances of Rolando T. Lugod in the sum of P8,533.94, in compliance with Article 1061 of the Civil Code
on collation. Furthermore, the compromise of the parties, which is the law between them, already
contains the names and shares of the heirs to the residual estate, which shares had also been delivered.
x x x All the foregoing show clearly that the probate court had essentially finished said intestate
proceedings which, consequently, should be deemed closed and terminated. In view of the above
discussion, the Court sees no reversible error on the part of the Court of Appeals.

Same; Same; Collation; Collation mandated under Article 1061 of the Civil Code contemplates
properties conveyed inter vivos by the decedent to an heir by way of donation or other gratuitous
title.—Similarly, petitioners’ allegations of fraud in the execution of the questioned deeds of sale are
bereft of substance, in view of the palpable absence of evidence to support them. The legal presumption
of validity of the questioned deeds of absolute sale, being duly notarized public documents, has not
been overcome. On the other hand, fraud is not presumed. It must be proved by clear and convincing
evidence, and not by mere conjectures or speculations. We stress that these deeds of sale did not
involve gratuitous transfers of future inheritance; these were contracts of sale perfected by the
decedents during their lifetime. Hence, the properties conveyed thereby are not collationable because,
essentially, collation mandated under Article 1061 of the Civil Code contemplates properties conveyed
inter vivos by the decedent to an heir by way of donation or other gratuitous title.

Is a petition for certiorari, in lieu of appeal, the proper remedy to correct orders of a probate court
nullifying certain deeds of sale and, thus, effectively passing upon title to the properties subject of such
deeds? Is a compromise agreement partitioning inherited properties valid even without the approval of
the trial court hearing the intestate estate of the deceased owner?

The Case

These questions are answered by this Court as it resolves the petition for review on certiorari before us
assailing the November 23, 1992 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals[2] in CA-G.R. SP No. 28761 which
annulled the decision[3] of the trial court[4] and which declared the compromise agreement among the
parties valid and binding even without the said trial courts approval. The dispositive portion of the
assailed Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, for the reasons hereinabove set forth and discussed, the instant petition is GRANTED and
the challenged decision as well as the subsequent orders of the respondent court are ANNULLED and
SET ASIDE. The temporary restraining order issued by this Court on October 14, 1992 is made
PERMANENT. The compromise agreement dated October 30, 1969 as modified by the memorandum of
agreement of April 13, 1970 is DECLARED valid and binding upon herein parties. And Special Proceedings
No. 44-M and 1022 are deemed CLOSED and TERMINATED.

SO ORDERED. [5]

The Antecedent Facts

The facts are narrated by the Court of Appeals as follows:

[Herein private respondent] Rosalia S. Lugod is the only child of spouses Juan C. Sanchez and Maria
Villafranca while [herein private respondents] Arturo S. Lugod, Evelyn L. Ranises and Roberto S. Lugod
are the legitimate children of [herein private respondent] Rosalia.
[Herein petitioners] Rolando, Florida Mierly, Alfredo and Myrna, all surnamed Sanchez, are the
illegitimate children of Juan C. Sanchez.

Following the death of her mother, Maria Villafranca, on September 29, 1967, [herein private
respondent] Rosalia filed on January 22, 1968, thru counsel, a petition for letters of administration over
the estate of her mother and the estate of her father, Juan C. Sanchez, who was at the time in state of
senility (Annex B, Petition).

On September 30, 1968, [herein private respondent] Rosalia, as administratrix of the intestate estate of
her mother, submitted an inventory and appraisal of the real and personal estate of her late mother
(Annex C, Petition).

Before the administration proceedings in Special Proceedings No. 44-M could formally be terminated
and closed, Juan C. Sanchez, [herein private respondent] Rosalias father, died on October 21, 1968.

On January 14, 1969, [herein petitioners] as heirs of Juan C. Sanchez, filed a petition for letters of
administration (Special Proceedings No. 1022) over the intestate estate of Juan C. Sanchez, which
petition was opposed by (herein private respondent) Rosalia.[6]

On October 30, 1969, however, [herein private respondent] Rosalia and [herein petitioners] assisted by
their respective counsels executed a compromise agreement (Annex D, Petition) wherein they agreed to
divide the properties enumerated therein of the late Juan C. Sanchez.

On November 3, 1969, petitioner Rosalia was appointed by [the trial court], and took her oath as the
administratrix of her fathers intestate estate.

On January 19, 1970, [herein petitioners] filed a motion to require administratrix, [herein private
respondent] Rosalia, to deliver deficiency of 24 hectares and or to set aside compromise agreement
(Annex E, Petition).
Under date of April 13, 1970, (herein private respondent) Rosalia and [herein petitioners] entered into
and executed a memorandum of agreement which modified the compromise agreement (Annex F.
Petition)

On October 25, 1979, or nine years later, [herein petitioners] filed, thru counsel, a motion to require
[herein private respondent] Rosalia to submit a new inventory and to render an accounting over
properties not included in the compromise agreement (Annex G, Petition). They likewise filed a motion
to defer the approval of the compromise agreement (Annex H, Ibid), in which they prayed for the
annulment of the compromise agreement on the ground of fraud.

On February 4, 1980, however, counsel for [herein petitioners] moved to withdraw his appearance and
the two motions he filed, Annex G and H (Annex I, Petition).

On February 28, 1980, the [trial] court issued an order directing [herein private respondent] Rosalia to
submit a new inventory of properties under her administration and an accounting of the fruits thereof,
which prompted [herein private respondent] Rosalia to file a rejoinder on March 31, 1980 (Annex K,
Petition).

On May 12, 1980, [herein petitioners], thru new counsel, filed a motion to change administratrix (Annex
L, Petition) to which [herein private respondent] Rosalia filed an opposition (AnnexM, Ibid).

The parties were subsequently ordered to submit their respective position papers, which they did
(Annexes N and O, Petition). On September 14, 1989, former counsel of (herein petitioners) entered his
re-appearance as counsel for (herein petitioners).

On the bases of memoranda submitted by the parties, the [trial court], this time presided by Judge
Vivencio A. Galon, promulgated its decision on June 26, 1991, the dispositive portion of which states:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as follows by declaring and ordering:
1.That the entire intestate estate of Maria Villafranca Sanchez under Special Proceedings No.44-M
consists of all her paraphernal properties and one-half (1/2) of the conjugal properties which must be
divided equally between Rosalia Sanchez de Lugod and Juan C. Sanchez;

2.That the entire intestate estate of Juan C. Sanchez under Special Proceedings No. 1022 consists of all
his capital properties, one-half (1/2) from the conjugal partnership of gains and one-half (1/2) of the
intestate estate of Maria Villafranca under Special Proceedings No. 44-M;

3.That one-half (1/2) of the entire intestate estate of Juan C. Sanchez shall be inherited by his only
legitimate daughter, Rosalia V. Sanchez de Lugod while the other one-half (1/2) shall be inherited and be
divided equally by, between and among the six (6) illegitimate children, namely: Patricia Alburo, Maria
Ramuso Sanchez, Rolando Pedro T. Sanchez, Florida Mierly T. Sanchez, Alfredo T. Sanchez and Myrna T.
Sanchez;

4.That all the Deed (sic) of Absolute Sales executed by Juan C. Sanchez and Maria Villafranca in favor of
Rosalia Sanchez Lugod, Arturo S. Lugod, Evelyn S. Lugod and Roberto S. Lugod on July 26, 1963 and June
26, 1967 are all declared simulated and fictitious and must be subject to collation and partition among
all heirs;

5.That within thirty (30) days from finality of this decision, Rosalia Sanchez Lugod is hereby ordered to
prepare a project of partition of the intestate estate of Juan C. Sanchez under Special Proceedings No.
1022 and distribute and deliver to all heirs their corresponding shares. If she fails to do so within the
said thirty (30) days, then a Board of Commissioners is hereby constituted, who are all entitled to
honorarium and per diems and other necessary expenses chargeable to the estate to be paid by
Administratrix Rosalia S. Lugod, appointing the Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer
(CENRO) of Gingoog City as members thereof, with the task to prepare the project of partition and
deliver to all heirs their respective shares within ninety (90) days from the finality of said decision;

6.That within thirty (30) days from receipt of this decision, Administratrix Rosalia Sanchez Vda. de Lugod
is hereby ordered to submit two (2) separate certified true and correct accounting, one for the income
of all the properties of the entire intestate estate of Maria Villafranca under Special Proceedings No. 44-
M, and another for the properties of the entire intestate estate of Juan C. Sanchez under Special
Proceedings No. 1022 duly both signed by her and both verified by a Certified Public Accountant and
distribute and deliver to her six (6) illegitimate brothers and sisters in equal shares, one -half (1/2) of the
net income of the estate of Juan C. Sanchez from October 21, 1968 up to the finality of this decision;
7.For failure to render an accounting report and failure to give cash advances to the illegitimate children
of Juan C. Sanchez during their minority and hour of need from the net income of the estate of Juan C.
Sanchez, which adversely prejudiced their social standing and pursuit of college education, (the trial
court) hereby orders Rosalia Sanchez Vda. de Lugod to pay her six (6) illegitimate brothers and sisters
the sum of Five Hundred Thousand (P500,000.00) Pesos, as exemplary damages, and also the sum of
One Hundred Fifty Thousand (P150,000.00) Pesos for attorneys fees;

8.Upon release of this decision and during its pendency, should appeal be made, the Register of Deeds
and Assessors of the Provinces and Cities where the properties of Juan C. Sanchez and Maria Villafranca
are located, are all ordered to register and annotate in the title and/or tax declarations, the dispositive
portion of this decision for the protection of all heirs and all those who may be concerned.

SO ORDERED.

[Herein private respondent] Rosalia filed a motion for reconsideration dated July 17, 1991 (Annex P,
Petition) on August 6, 1991.

On August 13, 1991, [herein petitioners] filed a motion for execution and opposition to [herein private
respondent] Rosalias motion for reconsideration (Annex Q, Petition).

On September 3, 1991, [the trial court] issued an Omnibus Order (Annex S, Petition) declaring, among
other things, that the decision at issue had become final and executory.

[Herein private respondent] Rosalia then filed a motion for reconsideration of said Omnibus Order
(Annex T, Petition). Said [herein private respondent] was allowed to file a memorandum in support of
her motion (Annex V, Petition).

On June 26, 1991, [the trial court] issued and Order denying petitioner Rosalias motion for
reconsideration (Annex W, Petition).[7]
Thereafter, private respondents elevated the case to the Court of Appeals via a petition for certiorari
and contended:

The [trial court] has no authority to disturb the compromise agreement.

II

The [trial court] has arbitrarily faulted [herein private respondent] Rosalia S. Lugod for alleged failure to
render an accounting which was impossible.

III

The [trial court] acted without jurisdiction in derogation of the constitutional rights of [herein private
respondents] Arturo S. Lugod, Evelyn L. Ranises and Roberto S. Lugod when [the trial court] decided to
annul the deed of sale between the said [herein private respondents] and Juan C. Sanchez without
affording them their day in court.

IV

[The trial court judge] defied without rhyme or reason well-established and entrenched jurisprudence
when he determined facts sans any evidence thereon.

[The trial court] grossly misinterpreted [herein private respondent] Rosalia S. Lugods right to appeal.[8]
For claritys sake, this Court hereby reproduces verbatim the compromise agreement[9] of the parties:

COMPROMISE AGREEMENT

COME NOW, the parties in the above-entitled case, motivated by their mutual desire to preserve and
maintain harmonious relations between and among themselves, for mutual valuable considerations and
in the spirit of good will and fair play, and, for the purpose of this Compromise Agreement, agree to the
following:

1. That the deceased Juan C. Sanchez who died intestate on October 21, 1968 was legally married to
Maria Villafranca de Sanchez, who predeceased her on September 29, 1967, out of whose wedlock
Rosalia Sanchez Lugod, Oppositor herein, was born, thus making her the sole and only surviving
legitimate heir of her deceased parents;

2. That the said deceased Juan C. Sanchez, left illegitimate children, Intervenors-Oppositors and
Petitioners, respectively, herein namely;

(1) Patricio Alburo, born out of wedlock on March 17, 1926 at Cebu City, Philippines, to Emilia Alburo;

(2) Maria Ramoso Sanchez, born out of wedlock on May 9, 1937 at Gingoog, Misamis Oriental, now,
Gingoog City, to Alberta Ramoso;

(3) (a) Rolando Pedro Sanchez, born on May 19, 1947,

(b) Florida Mierly Sanchez, born on February 16, 1949,

(c) Alfredo Sanchez, born on July 21, 1950,and

(d) Myrna Sanchez, born on June 16, 1952, all born out of wedlock to Laureta Tampus in Gingoog City,
Philippines.

3. That the deceased Juan C. Sanchez left the following properties, to wit:

I. SEPARATE CAPITAL OF JUAN C. SANCHEZ

NATURE, DESCRIPTION AND AREA ASSESSED VALUE

(1) Agricultural Land. Covered by Tax. Decl. No. 06458, Cad. Lot No. 1041 C-2, located at Murallon,
Gingoog City and bounded on the North by Lot Nos. 1033, 1035, 1036, 1037, 1039, 1040, 1042 & 1043;
South by Lot No. 1080, 1088, 1087 & 1084; East by Lot Nos. 1089, 1061 & 2319; West by Lot Nos. 954,
1038, 1057 & 1056, containing an area of ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY THREE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED
SEVENTY TWO (183, 672) sq. ms. more or less.

P21,690.00

II. CONJUGAL PROPERTY OF JUAN C. SANCHEZ AND MARIA VILLAFRANCA DE SANCHEZ

(1) Agricultural Land. Covered by Tax Decl. No. 06447, Cad. Lot No. 2745, C-7 located at Agay-ayan,
Gingoog City and bounded on the North by Lot Nos. 2744, 2742, 2748; South by Lot No. 2739; East by
Lot No. 2746; West by Lot No. 2741, containing an area of FOURTEEN THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED
(14,700) sq. ms. more or less.

P1,900.00

(2) Agricultural Land. Covered by Tax Decl. No. 06449, Cad, Lot No. 3271 C-7 located at Panyangan,
Lanao, Gingoog City and bounded on the North by Lot No. 3270; South by Lot Nos. 2900 & 3462; East by
Panyangan River & F. Lumanao; and Part of Lot 3272; and West by Samay Creek, containing an area of
ONE HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED (104,600) sq. ms. more or less.
P11,580.00

(3) Agricultural Land. Covered by Tax Decl. No. 06449, Cad. Lot No. 2319, Case 2, located at Murallon,
Gingoog City and bounded on the North by Lot No. 1061; South by Hinopolan Creek; East by Lot No.
1044; and West by Lot No. 1041, containing an area of THREE THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED TWENTY FIVE
(3,225) sq. ms. more or less.

(4) Agricultural Land. Covered by Tax Decl. No. 06452, Cad. Lot No. 3272, C-7 Part 4 located at
Panyangan, Lunao, Gingoog City and bounded on the North by Lot Nos. 3270 & 3273; East by Panyangan
River; South by Panyangan River; and West by Lot Nos. 3270 & 3271, containing an area of FIFTY FIVE
THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED (55,600) sq. ms. more or less, being claimed by Damian Querubin.

P2.370.00

(5) Agricultural Land. Covered by Tax Decl. No. 06453, Cad. Lot No. 3270 Case 7, located at Sunog,
Lunao, Gingoog City and bounded on the North by Samay Creek & Lot 3267; South by Lot Nos. 3271 &
3272; East by Lot Nos. 3269 & 3273; and West by Samay Creek, containing an area of FOUR HUNDRED
EIGHT THREE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED (483,600) sq. ms. more or less.

P61,680.00

(6) Agricultural Land. Covered by Tax Decl. No. 06457, Cad. Lot No. 3273, C-7 Part 2 located at
Panyangan, Lunao, Gingoog City and bounded on the North by Lot No. 3269; South by Lot No. 3272; East
by Panyangan River; and West by Lot No. 3270, contaning an area of THIRTY FOUR THOUSAND THREE
HUNDRED (34,300) sq. ms. more or less, being claimed by Miguel Tuto.

P3,880.00

(7) Agricultural Land. Covered by Tax Decl. No. 12000, Cad. Lot No. 2806, Case 7 located at Agayayan,
Gingoog City and bounded on the North by Agayayan River; South by Victoriano Barbac; East by Isabelo
Ramoso; and West by Restituto Baol, contaning an area of SIX THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED SEVENTY SIX
(6,676) sq. ms. more or less.

P380.00

(8) Agricultural Land. Covered by Tax Decl. No. 12924, Cad. Lot No. 1206 C-1 located at Cahulogan,
Gingoog City and bounded on the NW., by Lot No. 1209; SW., by Lot No. 1207; East by National
Highway; and West by Lot No. 1207; containing an area of FOUR THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED THIRTEEN
(4,513) sq. ms. more or less.

P740.00

(9) Agricultural Land. Covered by Tax Decl. No. 12925, Cad. Lot No. 5554, located at Tinaytayan,
Pigsalohan, Gingoog City and bounded on the North by Lot Nos. 5559 & 5558; South by Lot No. 3486;
East by Lot No. 5555; and West by Lot No. 5355, containing an area of EIGHTEEN THOUSAND FIVE
HUNDRED TWENTY EIGHT (18,528) sq. ms. more or less.

P320.00

(10) Agricultural Land. Covered by Tax Decl. No. 12926, Cad. Lot No. 5555 C-7 located at Tinaytayan,
Pigsalojan, Gingoog City and bounded on the North by Tinaytayan Creek & Lot Nos. 5557 & 5558; South
by Lot Nos. 3486, 3487, 3488, 3491 & 3496; East by Cr. & Lot No. 3496; and West by Lot No. 5554,
containing an area of SEVENTY SEVEN THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED SEVENTY SIX (77,776) sq. ms. more
or less.

P1,350.00

(11) A Commercial Land. Covered by Tax Decl. No. 06454, Cad. Lot No. 61-C-1 located at Guno-Condeza
Sts., Gingoog City and bounded on the North by Lot 64; South by Road-Lot 613 Condeza St; East by Lot
Nos. 63, and 62; West by Road-Lot 614-Guno St., containing an area of ONE THOUSAND FORTY TWO
(1,042) sq. ms. more or less.
P9,320.00

(12) A Commercial Land. Covered by Tax Decl. No. 06484, Lot No. 5, Block 2, located at Cabuyoan,
Gingoog City and bounded on the North by Lot No. 4, block 2; South by Lot No. 8, block 2; East by Lot
No. 6, block 2, West by Subdivision Road, containing an area of FOUR HUNDRED (400) sq. ms. more or
less.

P12,240.00

(13) A Commercial Land. Covered by Tax Decl. No. 15798, Block No. 7-A-16-0 located at Cabuyoan,
Gingoog City and bounded on the North by Lot No. 7-A-16-0; South by Lot No. 7-16-0; East by Lot No. 7-
A-18-Road; West by Lot No. 8, PSU-120704-Julito Arengo vs. Restituto Baol, containing an area of TWO
HUNDRED SIXTEEN (216) sq. ms. more or less.

P1,050.00

(14) Agricultural Land. Covered by Tax, Decl. No. 06789, Cad. Lot No. 5157-C-7, located at Kiogat,
Agayayan, Gingoog City and bounded on the North by Lot No. 5158, 5159, 5156; South by SE-Steep
Bank; East by NW, by Lot No. 5158, Villafranca, containing an area of NINETY SIX THOUSAND TWO
HUNDRED (96,200) sq. ms. more or less.

P3,370.00

III. PERSONAL ESTATE (CONJUGAL)

NATURE AND DESCRIPTION LOCATION APPRAISAL

1. Fifty (50) shares of stock

Rural Bank of Gingoog, Inc.

at P100.00 per share P5,000.00

2. Four (4) shares of Preferred Stock

with San Miguel Corporation 400.00

4. That, the parties hereto have agreed to divide the above-enumerated properties in the following
manner, to wit:

(a) To Patricio Alburo, Maria Ramoso Sanchez, Roland Pedro T. Sanchez, Florida Mierly Sanchez, Alfredo
T. Sanchez and Myrna T. Sanchez, in equal pro-indiviso shares, considering not only their respective
areas but also the improvements existing thereon, to wit:

Agricultural Land. Covered by Tax Decl. No. 06453, Cad. Lot No. 3270 Case 7, located at Sunog, Lunao,
Gingoog City and bounded on the North by Samay Creek & Lot 3267; South by Lot Nos. 3271 and 3272;
East by Lot Nos. 3269 & 3273; and West by Samay Creek, containing an area of FOUR HUNDRED EIGHTY
THREE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED (483,600) sq. ms. and assessed in the sum of P61,680.00.

(b) To Rosalia Sanchez Lugod all the rest of the properties, both real and personal, enumerated above
with the exception of the following:

(1) Two Preferred Shares of Stock in the San Miguel Corporation, indicated in San Miguel Corporation
Stock Certificate No. 30217, which two shares she is ceding in favor of Patricio Alburo;

(2) The house and lot designated as Lot No. 5, Block 2 together with the improvements thereon and
identified as parcel No. II-12, lot covered by Tax Decl. No. 15798 identified as Parcel No. II-13 in the
above enumerated, and Cad. Lot No. 5157-C-7 together with the improvements thereon, which is
identified as parcel No. II-14 of the above-enumeration of properties, which said Rosalia S. Lugod is
likewise ceding and renouncing in favor of Rolando Pedro, Florida Mierly, Alfredo and Myrna, all
surnamed Sanchez, in equal pro-indiviso shares;
5. That Rolando Pedro, Florida Mierly, Alfredo and Myrna, all surnamed Sanchez hereby acknowledge to
have received jointly and severally in form of advances after October 21, 1968 the aggregate sum of
EIGHT THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED THIRTY-THREE PESOS (P8,533.94) and NINETY-FOUR CENTAVOS;

6. That the parties hereto likewise acknowledge and recognize in the indebtedness of the deceased Juan
G. Sanchez and his deceased wife Maria Villafranca Sanchez to the Lugod Enterprises, Inc., in the sum of
P43,064.99;

7. That the parties hereto shall be responsible for the payment of the estate and inheritance taxes
proportionate to the value of their respective shares as may be determined by the Bureau of Internal
Revenue and shall likewise be responsible for the expenses of survey and segregation of their respective
shares;

8. That Patricio Alburo, Maria Ramoso Sanchez, Roland Pedro Sanchez, Florida Mierly Sanchez, Alfredo
Sanchez and Myrna Sanchez hereby waive, relinquish and renounce, jointly and individually, in a manner
that is absolute and irrevocable, all their rights and interests, share and participation which they have or
might have in all the properties, both real and personal, known or unknown and/or which may not be
listed herein, or in excess of the areas listed or mentioned herein, and/or which might have been, at one
time or another, owned by, registered or placed in the name of either of the spouses Juan C. Sanchez or
Maria Villafranca de Sanchez or both, and which either one or both might have sold, ceded, transferred,
or donated to any person or persons or entity and which parties hereto do hereby confirm and ratify
together with all the improvements thereon, as well as all the produce and proceeds thereof, and
particularly of the properties, real and personal listed herein, as well as demandable obligations due to
the deceased spouses Juan C. Sanchez, before and after the death of the aforementioned spouses Juan
C. Sanchez and Maria Villafranca de Sanchez, in favor of oppositor Rosalia S. Lugod;

9. That the expenses of this litigation including attorneys fees shall be borne respectively by the parties
hereto;

10. That Laureta Tampus for herself and guardian ad-litem of her minor children, namely: Florida Mierly,
Alfredo, and Myrna, all surnamed Sanchez, hereby declare that she has no right, interest, share and
participation whatsoever in the estate left by Juan C. Sanchez and/or Maria Villafranca de Sanchez, or
both, and that she likewise waives, renounces, and relinquishes whatever rigid, share, participation or
interest therein which she has or might have in favor of Rosalia S. Lugod;
11. That, the parties hereto mutually waive and renounce in favor of each other any whatever claims or
actions, arising from, connected with, and as a result of Special Proceedings Nos. 44-M and 1022 of the
Court of First Instance of Misamis Oriental, Rosalia S. Lugod, warranting that the parcel of land ceded to
the other parties herein contains 48 hectares and 36 acres.

12. That, Rosalia S. Lugod shall assume as she hereby assumes the payment to Lugod Enterprises, Inc., of
the sum of P51,598.93 representing the indebtedness of the estate of Juan C. Sanchez and Maria
Villafranca de Sanchez and the advances made to Rolando Pedro, Mierly, Alfredo, and Myrna all
surnamed Sanchez, mentioned in paragraphs 5 and 6 hereof and, to give effect to this Agreement, the
parties hereto agree to have letters of administration issued in favor of Rosalia S. Lugod without any
bond.

That Rosalia S. Lugod likewise agrees to deliver possession and enjoyment of the parcel of land herein
ceded to petitioners and intervenors immediately after the signing of this agreement and that the latter
also mutually agree among themselves to have the said lot subdivided and partitioned immediately in
accordance with the proportion of one sixth (1/6) part for every petitioner and intervenor and that in
the meantime that the partition and subdivision is not yet effected, the administrations of said parcel of
land shall be vested jointly with Laureta Tampos, guardian ad litem of petitioners and Maria Ramoso,
one of the intervenors who shall see to it that each petitioner and intervenor is given one sixth (1/6) of
the net proceeds of all agricultural harvest made thereon.

WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed that the foregoing compromise agreement be approved.

Medina, Misamis Oriental, October 30, 1969.

(Sgd.) (Sgd.)

PATRICIO ALBURO ROSALIA S. LUGOD

Intervenor-Oppositor Oppositor

(Sgd.)
MARIA RAMOSO SANCHEZ ASSISTED BY:

Intervenor-Oppositor

(Sgd.)

ASSISTED BY: PABLO S. REYES

R-101-Navarro Bldg.

(Sgd.) Don A. Velez St.

REYNALDO L. FERNANDEZ Cagayan de Oro City

Gingoog City

(Sgd.) (Sgd.)

ROLANDO PEDRO T. SANCHEZ ALFREDO T. SANCHEZ

Petitioner Petitioner

(Sgd.) (Sgd.)

FLORIDA MIERLY T. SANCHEZ MYRNA T. SANCHEZ

Petitioner Petitioner

(Sgd.)

LAURETA TAMPUS

For herself and as Guardian

Ad-Litem of the minors

Florida Mierly, Alfredo, and

Myrna, all surnamed Sanchez

ASSISTED BY:
TEOGENES VELEZ, JR.

Counsel for Petitioners

Cagayan de Oro City

The Clerk of Court

Court of First Instance

Branch III, Medina, Mis. Or.

Greetings:

Please set the foregoing compromise agreement for the approval of the Honorable Court today, Oct. 30,
1969.

(Sgd.) (Sgd.) (Sgd.)

PABLO S. REYES TEOGENES VELEZ, JR. REYNALDO L. FERNANDEZ

The Memorandum of Agreement dated April 13, 1970, which the parties entered into with the
assistance of their counsel, amended the above compromise. (It will be reproduced later in our
discussion of the second issue raised by the petitioners.)

The Court of Appeals, in a Resolution[10] dated September 4, 1992, initially dismissed private
respondents petition. Acting, however, on a motion for reconsideration and a supplemental motion for
reconsideration dated September 14, 1992 and September 25, 1992, respectively,[11] Respondent Court
thereafter reinstated private respondents petition in a resolution[12] dated October 14, 1992.
In due course, the Court of Appeals, as earlier stated, rendered its assailed Decision granting the
petition, setting aside the trial courts decision and declaring the modified compromise agreement valid
and binding.

Hence, this appeal to this Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

The Issues

In this appeal, petitioners invite the Courts attention to the following issues:

The respondent court grossly erred in granting the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 considering that
the special civil action of certiorari may not be availed of as a substitute for an appeal and that, in any
event, the grounds invoked in the petition are merely alleged errors of judgment which can no longer be
done in view of the fact that the decision of the lower court had long become final and executory.

II

Prescinding from the foregoing, the respondent court erred in annulling the decision of the lower court
for the reason that a compromise agreement or partition, as the court construed the same to be,
executed by the parties on October 30, 1969 was void and unenforceable the same not having been
approved by the intestate court and that the same having been seasonably repudiated by petitioners on
the ground of fraud.

III

The respondent court grossly erred in ignoring and disregarding findings of facts of the lower court that
the alleged conveyances of real properties made by the spouses Juan C. Sanchez and Maria Villafranca
just before their death in favor of their daughter and grandchildren, private respondents herein, are
tainted with fraud or made in contemplation of death, hence, collationable.

IV

In any event, the respondent court grossly erred in treating the lower courts declaration of fictitiousness
of the deeds of sale as a final adjudication of annulment.

The respondent court grossly erred in declaring the termination of the intestate proceedings even as the
lower court had not made a final and enforceable distribution of the estate of the deceased Juan C.
Sanchez.

VI

Prescinding from the foregoing, the respondent court grossly erred in not at least directing respondent
Rosalia S. Lugod to deliver the deficiency of eight (8) hectares due petitioners under the compromise
agreement and memorandum of agreement, and in not further directing her to include in the inventory
properties conveyed under the deeds of sale found by the lower court to be part of the estate of Juan C.
Sanchez.[13]

The salient aspects of some issues are closely intertwined; hence, they are hereby consolidated into
three main issues specifically dealing with the following subjects: (1) the propriety of certiorari as a
remedy before the Court of Appeals, (2) the validity of the compromise agreement, and (3) the presence
of fraud in the execution of the compromise and/or collation of the properties sold.

The Courts Ruling

The petition is not meritorious.

First Issue: Propriety of Certiorari

Before the Court of Appeals

Since private respondents had neglected or failed to file an ordinary appeal within the reglementary
period, petitioners allege that the Court of Appeals erred in allowing private respondents recourse to
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. They contend that private respondents invocation of certiorari was
procedurally defective.[14] They further argue that private respondents, in their petition before the
Court of Appeals, alleged errors of the trial court which, being merely errors of judgment and not errors
of jurisdiction, were not correctable by certiorari.[15] This Court disagrees.

Doctrinally entrenched is the general rule that certiorari is not a substitute for a lost appeal. However,
Justice Florenz D. Regalado lists several exceptions to this rule, viz.: (1) where the appeal does not
constitute a speedy and adequate remedy (Salvadades vs. Pajarillo, et al., 78 Phil. 77), as where 33
appeals were involved from orders issued in a single proceeding which will inevitably result in a
proliferation of more appeals (PCIB vs. Escolin, et al., L-27860 and 27896, Mar. 29, 1974); (2) where the
orders were also issued either in excess of or without jurisdiction (Aguilar vs. Tan, L-23600, Jun 30, 1970,
Cf. Bautista, et al. vs. Sarmiento, et al., L-45137, Sept. 231985); (3) for certain special consideration, as
public welfare or public policy (See Jose vs. Zulueta, et al. -16598, May 31, 1961 and the cases cited
therein); (4) where in criminal actions, the court rejects rebuttal evidence for the prosecution as, in case
of acquittal, there could be no remedy (People vs. Abalos, L029039, Nov. 28, 1968); (5) where the order
is a patent nullity (Marcelo vs. De Guzman, et al., L-29077, June 29, 1982); and (6) where the decision in
the certiorari case will avoid future litigations (St. Peter Memorial Park, Inc. vs. Campos, et al., L-38280,
Mar. 21, 1975).[16] Even in a case where the remedy of appeal was lost, the Court has issued the writ of
certiorari where the lower court patently acted in excess of or outside its jurisdiction,[17] as in the
present case.

A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is appropriate and allowable when the
following requisites concur: (1) the writ is directed against a tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial
or quasi-judicial functions; (2) such tribunal, board or officer has acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is
no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.[18] After a thorough
review of the case at bar, we are convinced that all these requirements were met.
As a probate court, the trial court was exercising judicial functions when it issued its assailed resolution.
The said court had jurisdiction to act in the intestate proceedings involved in this case with the caveat
that, due to its limited jurisdiction, it could resolve questions of title only provisionally.[19] It is
hornbook doctrine that in a special proceeding for the probate of a will, the question of ownership is an
extraneous matter which the probate court cannot resolve with finality. This pronouncement no doubt
applies with equal force to an intestate proceeding as in the case at bar.[20] In the instant case, the trial
court rendered a decision declaring as simulated and fictitious all the deeds of absolute sale which, on
July 26, 1963 and June 26, 1967, Juan C. Sanchez and Maria Villafranca executed in favor of their
daughter, Rosalia Sanchez Lugod; and grandchildren, namely, Arturo S. Lugod, Evelyn S. Lugod and
Roberto S. Lugod. The trial court ruled further that the properties covered by the said sales must be
subject to collation. Citing Article 1409 (2) of the Civil Code, the lower court nullified said deeds of sale
and determined with finality the ownership of the properties subject thereof. In doing so, it clearly
overstepped its jurisdiction as a probate court. Jurisprudence teaches:

[A] probate court or one in charge of proceedings whether testate or intestate cannot adjudicate or
determine title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate and which are claimed to belong to
outside parties. All that the said court could do as regards said properties is to determine whether they
should or should not be included in the inventory or list of properties to be administered by the
administrator. If there is not dispute, well and good, but if there is, then the parties, the administrator,
and the opposing parties have to resort to an ordinary action for a final determination of the conflicting
claims of title because the probate court cannot do so.[21]

Furthermore, the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion when it rendered its decision in
disregard of the parties compromise agreement.[22] Such disregard, on the ground that the
compromise agreement was not approved by the court,[23] is tantamount to an evasion of positive duty
or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation and within the bounds of
law.[24]

The foregoing issues clearly involve not only the correctness of the trial courts decision but also the
latters jurisdiction. They encompass plain errors of jurisdiction and grave abuse of discretion, not merely
errors of judgment.[25] Since the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction, a petition for certiorari is certainly
a proper remedy. Indeed, it is well-settled that (a)n act done by a probate court in excess of its
jurisdiction may be corrected by certiorari.[26]

Consistent with the foregoing, the following disquisition by respondent appellate court is apt:
As a general proposition, appeal is the proper remedy of petitioner Rosalia here under Rule 109 of the
Revised Rules of Court. But the availability of the ordinary course of appeal does not constitute sufficient
ground to [prevent] a party from making use of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari where appeal is
not an adequate remedy or equally beneficial, speedy and sufficient (Echauz vs. Court of Appeals, 199
SCRA 381). Here, considering that the respondent court has disregarded the compromise agreement
which has long been executed as early as October, 1969 and declared null and void the deeds of sale
with finality, which, as a probate court, it has no jurisdiction to do, We deem ordinary appeal is
inadequate. Considering further the [trial courts] granting of [herein petitioners] motion for execution of
the assailed decision,[27] [herein private respondent] Rosalias resort to the instant petition [for review
on certiorari] is all the more warranted under the circumstances.[28]

We thus hold that the questioned decision and resolutions of the trial court may be challenged through
a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. At the very least, this case is a
clear exception to the general rule that certiorari is not a substitute for a lost appeal because the trial
courts decision and resolutions were issued without or in excess of jurisdiction, which may thus be
challenged or attacked at any time. A void judgment for want of jurisdiction is no judgment at all. It
cannot be the source of any right nor the creator of any obligation. All acts performed pursuant to it and
all claims emanating from it have no legal effect. Hence, it can never become final and any writ of
execution based on it is void; x x x it may be said to be a lawless thing which can be treated as an outlaw
and slain at sight, or ignored wherever and whenever it exhibits its head. [29]

Second Issue: Validity of Compromise Agreement

Petitioners contend that, because the compromise agreement was executed during the pendency of the
probate proceedings, judicial approval is necessary to shroud it with validity. They stress that the
probate court had jurisdiction over the properties covered by said agreement. They add that Petitioners
Florida Mierly, Alfredo and Myrna were all minors represented only by their mother/natural guardian,
Laureta Tampus.[30]

These contentions lack merit. Article 2028 of the Civil Code defines a compromise agreement as a
contract whereby the parties, by making reciprocal concessions, avoid a litigation or put an end to one
already commenced. Being a consensual contract, it is perfected upon the meeting of the minds of the
parties. Judicial approval is not required for its perfection.[31] Petitioners argument that the
compromise was not valid for lack of judicial approval is not novel; the same was raised in Mayuga vs.
Court of Appeals,[32] where the Court, through Justice Irene R. Cortes, ruled:
It is alleged that the lack of judicial approval is fatal to the compromise. A compromise is a consensual
contract. As such, it is perfected upon the meeting of the minds of the parties to the contract.
(Hernandez v. Barcelon, 23 Phil. 599 [1912]; see also De los Reyes v. de Ugarte, 75 Phil. 505 [1945].) And
from that moment not only does it become binding upon the parties (De los Reyes v. De Ugarte, supra ),
it also has upon them the effect and authority of res judicata (Civil Code, Art. 2037), even if not judicially
approved (Meneses v. De la Rosa, 77 Phil. 34 [1946]; Vda. De Guilas v. David, 132 Phil. 241, L-24280, 23
SCRA 762 [May 27, 1968]; Cochingyan v. Cloribel, L-27070-71 [April 22, 1977], 76 SCRA 361). (Italics
found in the original.)

In the case before us, it is ineludible that the parties knowingly and freely entered into a valid
compromise agreement. Adequately assisted by their respective counsels, they each negotiated its
terms and provisions for four months; in fact, said agreement was executed only after the fourth draft.
As noted by the trial court itself, the first and second drafts were prepared successively in July, 1969; the
third draft on September 25, 1969; and the fourth draft, which was finally signed by the parties on
October 30, 1969,[33] followed. Since this compromise agreement was the result of a long drawn out
process, with all the parties ably striving to protect their respective interests and to come out with the
best they could, there can be no doubt that the parties entered into it freely and voluntarily.
Accordingly, they should be bound thereby.[34] To be valid, it is merely required under the law to be
based on real claims and actually agreed upon in good faith by the parties thereto.[35]

Indeed, compromise is a form of amicable settlement that is not only allowed but also encouraged in
civil cases.[36] Article 2029 of the Civil Code mandates that a court shall endeavor to persuade the
litigants in a civil case to agree upon some fair compromise.

In opposing the validity and enforcement of the compromise agreement, petitioners harp on the
minority of Florida Mierly, Alfredo and Myrna. Citing Article 2032 of the Civil Code, they contend that
the courts approval is necessary in compromises entered into by guardians and parents in behalf of their
wards or children.[37]

However, we observe that although denominated a compromise agreement, the document in this case
is essentially a deed of partition, pursuant to Article 1082 of the Civil Code which provides that [e]very
act which is intended to put an end to indivision among co-heirs and legatees or devisees is deemed to
be a partition, although it should purport to be a sale, an exchange, a compromise, or any other
transaction.
For a partition to be valid, Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, requires the concurrence of the
following conditions: (1) the decedent left no will; (2) the decedent left no debts, or if there were debts
left, all had been paid; (3) the heirs and liquidators are all of age, or if they are minors, the latter are
represented by their judicial guardian or legal representatives; and (4) the partition was made by means
of a public instrument or affidavit duly filed with the Register of Deeds.[38] We find that all the
foregoing requisites are present in this case. We therefore affirm the validity of the parties compromise
agreement/partition in this case.

In any event, petitioners neither raised nor ventilated this issue in the trial court. This new question or
matter was manifestly beyond the pale of the issues or questions submitted and threshed out before
the lower court which are reproduced below, viz.:

I Are the properties which are the object of the sale by the deceased spouses to their grandchildren
collationable?

II Are the properties which are the object of the sale by the deceased spouses to their legitimate
daughter also collationable?

III The first and second issues being resolved, how much then is the rightful share of the four (4)
recognized illegitimate children?[39]

Furthermore, the 27-page Memorandum dated February 17, 1990 filed by petitioners before the
Regional Trial Court [40] readily reveals that they never questioned the validity of the compromise. In
their comment before the Court of Appeals,[41] petitioners based their objection to said compromise
agreement on the solitary reason that it was tainted with fraud and deception, zeroing specifically on
the alleged fraud committed by private respondent Rosalia S. Lugod.[42] The issue of minority was first
raised only in petitioners Motion for Reconsideration of the Court of Appeals Decision;[43] thus, it is as if
it was never duly raised in that court at all.[44] Hence, this Court cannot now, for the first time on
appeal, entertain this issue, for to do so would plainly violate the basic rule of fair play, justice and due
process.[45] We take this opportunity to reiterate and emphasize the well-settled rule that (a)n issue
raised for the first time on appeal and not raised timely in the proceedings in the lower court is barred
by estoppel. Questions raised on appeal must be within the issues framed by the parties and,
consequently, issues not raised in the trial court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.[46]
The petitioners likewise assail as void the provision on waiver contained in No. 8 of the aforequoted
compromise, because it allegedly constitutes a relinquishment by petitioners of a right to properties
which were not known.[47] They argue that such waiver is contrary to law, public policy, morals or good
custom. The Court disagrees. The assailed waiver pertained to their hereditary right to properties
belonging to the decedents estate which were not included in the inventory of the estates properties. It
also covered their right to other properties originally belonging to the spouses Juan Sanchez and Maria
Villafranca de Sanchez which have been transferred to other persons. In addition, the parties agreed in
the compromise to confirm and ratify said transfers. The waiver is valid because, contrary to petitioners
protestation, the parties waived a known and existing interest -- their hereditary right which was already
vested in them by reason of the death of their father. Article 777 of the Civil Code provides that (t)he
rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent. Hence, there is no
legal obstacle to an heirs waiver of his/her hereditary share even if the actual extent of such share is not
determined until the subsequent liquidation of the estate.[48] At any rate, such waiver is consistent
with the intent and letter of the law advocating compromise as a vehicle for the settlement of civil
disputes.[49]

Finally, petitioners contend that Private Respondent Rosalia T. Lugods alleged fraudulent acts,
specifically her concealment of some of the decedents properties, attended the actual execution of the
compromise agreement.[50] This argument is debunked by the absence of any substantial and
convincing evidence on record showing fraud on her part. As aptly observed by the appellate court:

[Herein petitioners] accuse [herein private respondent] Rosalia of fraud or deception by alleging, inter
alia, that the parcel of land given to them never conformed to the stated area, i.e., forty-eight (48)
hectares, as stated in the compromise agreement. We find this argument unconvincing and
unmeritorious. [Herein petitioners] averment of fraud on the part of [herein private respondent] Rosalia
becomes untenable when We consider the memorandum of agreement they later executed with [herein
private respondent] Rosalia wherein said compromise agreement was modified by correcting the actual
area given to [herein petitioners] from forty-eight (48) hectares to thirty-six (36) hectares only. If the
actual area allotted to them did not conform to the 48 hectare area stated in the compromise
agreement, then why did they agree to the memorandum of agreement whereby their share in the
estate of their father was even reduced to just 36 hectares? Where is fraud or deception there?
Considering that [herein petitioners] were ably represented by their lawyers in executing these
documents and who presumably had explained to them the import and consequences thereof, it is hard
to believe their charge that they were defrauded and deceived by [herein private respondent] Rosalia.

If the parcel of land given to [herein petitioners], when actually surveyed, happened to be different in
area to the stated area of 48 hectares in the compromise agreement, this circumstance is not enough
proof of fraud or deception on [herein private respondent] Rosalias part. Note that Tax Declaration No.
06453 plainly discloses that the land transferred to [herein petitioners] pursuant to the compromise
agreement contained an area of 48 hectares (Annex A, Supplemental Reply). And when [herein
petitioners] discovered that the land allotted to them actually contained only 24 hectares, a conference
between the parties took place which led to the execution and signing of the memorandum of
agreement wherein [herein petitioners] distributive share was even reduced to 36 hectares. In the
absence of convincing and clear evidence to the contrary, the allegation of fraud and deception cannot
be successfully imputed to [herein private respondent] Rosalia who must be presumed to have acted in
good faith.[51]

The memorandum of agreement freely and validly entered into by the parties on April 13, 1970 and
referred to above reads:

MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT

The parties assisted by their respective counsel have agreed as they hereby agree:

1. To amend the compromise agreement executed by them on October 30, 1969 so as to include the
following:

a. Correction of the actual area being given to the petitioners and intervenors, all illegitimate children of
the late Juan C. Sanchez, forty-eight (48) hectares, thirty-six (36) acres as embodied in the
aforementioned compromise agreement to thirty-six (36) hectares only, thus enabling each of them to
get six (6) hectares each.

b. That the said 36-hectare area shall be taken from that parcel of land which is now covered by O.C.T.
No. 146 (Patent No. 30012) and the adjoining areas thereof designated as Lot A and Lot C as reflected on
the sketch plan attached to the record of this case prepared by Geodetic Engineer Olegario E. Zalles
pursuant to the Courts commission of March 10, 1970 provided, however, that if the said 36-hectare
area could not be found after adding thereto the areas of said lots A and C, then the additional area shall
be taken from what is designated as Lot B, likewise also reflected in the said sketch plan attached to the
records;
c. That the partition among the six illegitimate children of the late Juan C. Sanchez (petitioners and
intervenors) shall be effective among themselves in such a manner to be agreed upon by them, each
undertaking to assume redemption of whatever plants found in their respective shares which need
redemption from the tenants thereof as well as the continuity of the tenancy agreements now existing
and covering the said shares or areas.

d. The subdivision survey shall be at the expense of the said petitioners and intervenors prorata.

e. That the administratrix agrees to deliver temporary administration of the area designated as Lot 5 of
the Valles Sketch Plan pending final survey of the said 36-hectare area.

Cagayan de Oro City, April 13, 1970.

(Sgd.)

LAURETA TAMPOS

For herself and as Guardian

ad-litem of Rolando, Mierly,

Alfredo and Myrna, all

surnamed Sanchez

Assisted by:

(Sgd.)

TEOGENES VELEZ, Jr.

Counsel for Petitioners

(Sgd.)
ROSALIA S. LUGOD

Administratrix

Assisted by:

(Sgd.)

PABLO S. REYES

Counsel for Administratrix

(Sgd.)

MARIA RABOSO SANCHEZ

Intervenor[52]

Not only did the parties knowingly enter into a valid compromise agreement; they even amended it
when they realized some errors in the original. Such correction emphasizes the voluntariness of said
deed.

It is also significant that all the parties, including the then minors, had already consummated and availed
themselves of the benefits of their compromise.[53] This Court has consistently ruled that a party to a
compromise cannot ask for a rescission after it has enjoyed its benefits.[54] By their acts, the parties are
ineludibly estopped from questioning the validity of their compromise agreement. Bolstering this
conclusion is the fact that petitioners questioned the compromise only nine years after its execution,
when they filed with the trial court their Motion to Defer Approval of Compromise Agreement, dated
October 26, 1979.[55] In hindsight, it is not at all farfetched that petitioners filed said motion for the
sole reason that they may have felt shortchanged in their compromise agreement or partition with
private respondents, which in their view was unwise and unfair. While we may sympathize with this
rueful sentiment of petitioners, we can only stress that this alone is not sufficient to nullify or disregard
the legal effects of said compromise which, by its very nature as a perfected contract, is binding on the
parties. Moreover, courts have no jurisdiction to look into the wisdom of a compromise or to render a
decision different therefrom.[56] It is a well-entrenched doctrine that the law does not relieve a party
from the effects of an unwise, foolish, or disastrous contract, entered into with all the required
formalities and with full awareness of what he was doing[57] and a compromise entered into and
carried out in good faith will not be discarded even if there was a mistake of law or fact, (McCarthy vs.
Barber Steamship Lines, 45 Phil. 488) because courts have no power to relieve parties from obligations
voluntarily assumed, simply because their contracts turned out to be disastrous deals or unwise
investments.[58] Volenti non fit injuria.

Corollarily, the petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion in deeming
Special Proceedings Nos. 44-M and 1022 CLOSED and TERMINATED, arguing that there was as yet no
order of distribution of the estate pursuant to Rule 90 of the Rules of Court. They add that they had not
received their full share thereto.[59] We disagree. Under Section 1, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court, an
order for the distribution of the estate may be made when the debts, funeral charges, and expenses of
administration, the allowance to the widow, and inheritance tax, if any, had been paid. This order for
the distribution of the estates residue must contain the names and shares of the persons entitled
thereto. A perusal of the whole record, particularly the trial courts conclusion,[60] reveals that all the
foregoing requirements already concurred in this case. The payment of the indebtedness of the estates
of Juan C. Sanchez and Maria Villafranca in the amount of P51,598.93 was shouldered by Private
Respondent Rosalia, who also absorbed or charged against her share the advances of Rolando T. Lugod
in the sum of P8,533.94, in compliance with Article 1061 of the Civil Code on collation.[61] Furthermore,
the compromise of the parties, which is the law between them, already contains the names and shares
of the heirs to the residual estate, which shares had also been delivered. On this point, we agree with
the following discussion of the Court of Appeals:

But what the (trial court) obviously overlooked in its appreciation of the facts of this case are the
uncontroverted facts that (herein petitioners) have been in possession and ownership of their respective
distributive shares as early as October 30, 1969 and they have received other properties in addition to
their distributive shares in consideration of the compromise agreement which they now assail. Proofs
thereof are Tax Declarations No. 20984, 20985, 20986, 20987, 20988, 20989 and 20990 (Annexes B to H,
Supplemental Reply) in the respective names of (herein petitioners), all for the year 1972. (Herein
petitioners) also retained a house and lot, a residential lot and a parcel of agricultural land (Annexes I, J
and K, Ibid.) all of which were not considered in the compromise agreement between the parties.
Moreover, in the compromise agreement per se, it is undoubtedly stated therein that cash advances in
the aggregate sum of P8,533.94 were received by (herein petitioners) after October 21, 1968
(Compromise Agreement, par. 5)[62]

All the foregoing show clearly that the probate court had essentially finished said intestate proceedings
which, consequently, should be deemed closed and terminated. In view of the above discussion, the
Court sees no reversible error on the part of the Court of Appeals.

Third Issue: Fraud and Collation

Petitioners fault Respondent Court for not ordering Private Respondent Rosalia T. Lugod to deliver to
them the deficiency as allegedly provided under the compromise agreement. They further contend that
said court erred in not directing the provisional inclusion of the alleged deficiency in the inventory for
purposes of collating the properties subject of the questioned deeds of sale.[63] We see no such error.
In the trial court, there was only one hearing conducted, and it was held only for the reception of the
evidence of Rosalia S. Lugod to install her as administratix of the estate of Maria Villafranca. There was
no other evidence, whether testimonial or otherwise, received, formally offered to, and subsequently
admitted by the probate court below; nor was there a trial on the merits of the parties conflicting
claims.[64] In fact, the petitioners moved for the deferment of the compromise agreement on the basis
of alleged fraudulent concealment of properties -- NOT because of any deficiency in the land conveyed
to them under the agreements.[65] Hence, there is no hard evidence on record to back up petitioners
claims.

In any case, the trial court noted Private Respondent Rosalias willingness to reimburse any deficiency
actually proven to exist. It subsequently ordered the geodetic engineer who prepared the certification
and the sketch of the lot in question, and who could have provided evidence for the petitioners, to bring
records of his relocation survey.[66] However, Geodetic Engineer Idulsa did not comply with the courts
subpoena duces tecum and ad testificandum. Neither did he furnish the required relocation survey.[67]
No wonder, even after a thorough scrutiny of the records, this Court cannot find any evidence to
support petitioners allegations of fraud against Private Respondent Rosalia.

Similarly, petitioners allegations of fraud in the execution of the questioned deeds of sale are bereft of
substance, in view of the palpable absence of evidence to support them. The legal presumption of
validity of the questioned deeds of absolute sale, being duly notarized public documents, has not been
overcome.[68] On the other hand, fraud is not presumed. It must be proved by clear and convincing
evidence, and not by mere conjectures or speculations. We stress that these deeds of sale did not
involve gratuitous transfers of future inheritance; these were contracts of sale perfected by the
decedents during their lifetime.[69] Hence, the properties conveyed thereby are not collationable
because, essentially, collation mandated under Article 1061 of the Civil Code contemplates properties
conveyed inter vivos by the decedent to an heir by way of donation or other gratuitous title.

In any event, these alleged errors and deficiencies regarding the delivery of shares provided in the
compromise, concealment of properties and fraud in the deeds of sale are factual in nature which, as a
rule, are not reviewable by this Court in petitions under Rule 45.[70] Petitioners have failed to convince
us that this case constitutes an exception to such rule. All in all, we find that the Court of Appeals has
sufficiently addressed the issues raised by them. Indeed, they have not persuaded us that said Court
committed any reversible error to warrant a grant of their petition.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals is
AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J. (Chairman), Romero, Melo and Francisco, JJ., concur.

THIRD DIVISION

THE HEIRS OF MARCELINO G.R. No. 169454

DORONIO, NAMELY: REGINA

AND FLORA, BOTH SURNAMED

DORONIO, Present:

Petitioners,

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,

Chairperson,

- versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,

CHICO-NAZARIO,

NACHURA, and

HEIRS OF FORTUNATO REYES, JJ.

DORONIO, NAMELY: TRINIDAD

ROSALINA DORONIO-BALMES,
MODING DORONIO, FLORENTINA

DORONIO, AND ANICETA Promulgated:

ALCANTARA-MANALO,

Respondents. December 27, 2007

x--------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

REYES, R.T., J.:

For Our review on certiorari is the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) reversing that[2] of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 45, Anonas, Urdaneta City, Pangasinan, in an action for reconveyance
and damages. The CA declared respondents as rightful owners of one-half of the subject property and
directed petitioners to execute a registerable document conveying the same to respondents.

The Facts

Spouses Simeon Doronio and Cornelia Gante, now both deceased, were the registered owners of a
parcel of land located at Barangay Cabalitaan, Asingan, Pangasinan covered by Original Certificate of
Title (OCT) No. 352.[3] The courts below described it as follows:

Un terreno (Lote 1018), situada en el municipio de Asingan, Linda por el NE; con propriedad de Gabriel
Bernardino; con el SE con propriedad de Zacarias Najorda y Alejandro Najorda; por el SO con propriedad
de Geminiano Mendoza y por el NO con el camino para Villasis; midiendo una extension superficial mil
ciento cincuenta y dos metros cuadrados.[4]

The spouses had children but the records fail to disclose their number. It is clear, however, that
Marcelino Doronio and Fortunato Doronio, now both deceased, were among them and that the parties
in this case are their heirs. Petitioners are the heirs of Marcelino Doronio, while respondents are the
heirs of Fortunato Doronio.

On April 24, 1919, a private deed of donation propter nuptias[5] was executed by spouses Simeon
Doronio and Cornelia Gante in favor of Marcelino Doronio and the latters wife, Veronica Pico. One of
the properties subject of said deed of donation is the one that it described as follows:

Fourth A piece of residential land located in the barrio of Cabalitian but we did not measure it, the area
is bounded on the north by Gabriel Bernardino; on the east by Fortunato Doronio; on the south by
Geminiano Mendoza and on the west by a road to Villasis. Constructed on said land is a house of light
materials also a part of the dowry. Value 200.00.[6]

It appears that the property described in the deed of donation is the one covered by OCT No. 352.
However, there is a significant discrepancy with respect to the identity of the owner of adjacent
property at the eastern side. Based on OCT No. 352, the adjacent owners are Zacarias Najorda and
Alejandro Najorda, whereas based on the deed of donation, the owner of the adjacent property is
Fortunato Doronio. Furthermore, said deed of donation remained a private document as it was never
notarized.[7]

Both parties have been occupying the subject land for several decades[8] although they have different
theories regarding its present ownership. According to petitioners, they are now the owners of the
entire property in view of the private deed of donation propter nuptias in favor of their predecessors,
Marcelino Doronio and Veronica Pico.

Respondents, on the other hand, claim that only half of the property was actually incorporated in the
said deed of donation because it stated that Fortunato Doronio, instead of Zacarias Najorda and
Alejandro Najorda, is the owner of the adjacent property at the eastern side. Respondents posit that the
donors respected and segregated the possession of Fortunato Doronio of the eastern half of the land.
They are the ones who have been possessing said land occupied by their predecessor, Fortunato
Doronio.
Eager to obtain the entire property, the heirs of Marcelino Doronio and Veronica Pico filed, on January
11, 1993, before the RTC in Urdaneta, Pangasinan a petition For the Registration of a Private Deed of
Donation[9] docketed as Petition Case No. U-920. No respondents were named in the said petition[10]
although notices of hearing were posted on the bulletin boards of Barangay Cabalitaan, Municipalities of
Asingan and Lingayen.[11]

During the hearings, no one interposed an objection to the petition.[12] After the RTC ordered a general
default,[13] the petition was eventually granted on September 22, 1993. This led to the registration of
the deed of donation, cancellation of OCT No. 352 and issuance of a new Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. 44481 in the names of Marcelino Doronio and Veronica Pico.[14] Thus, the entire property
was titled in the names of petitioners predecessors.

On April 28, 1994, the heirs of Fortunato Doronio filed a pleading before the RTC in the form of a
petition in the same Petition Case No. U-920. The petition was for the reconsideration of the decision of
the RTC that ordered the registration of the subject deed of donation. It was prayed in the petition that
an order be issued declaring null and void the registration of the private deed of donation and that TCT
No. 44481 be cancelled. However, the petition was dismissed on May 13, 1994 on the ground that the
decision in Petition Case No. U-920 had already become final as it was not appealed.

Determined to remain in their possessed property, respondent heirs of Fortunato Doronio (as plaintiffs)
filed an action for reconveyance and damages with prayer for preliminary injunction[15] against
petitioner heirs of Marcelino Doronio (as defendants) before the RTC, Branch 45, Anonas, Urdaneta City,
Pangasinan. Respondents contended, among others, that the subject land is different from what was
donated as the descriptions of the property under OCT No. 352 and under the private deed of donation
were different. They posited that spouses Simeon Doronio and Cornelia Gante intended to donate only
one-half of the property.

During the pre-trial conference, the parties stipulated, among others, that the property was originally
covered by OCT No. 352 which was cancelled by TCT No. 44481. They also agreed that the issues are: (1)
whether or not there was a variation in the description of the property subject of the private deed of
donation and OCT No. 352; (2) whether or not respondents had acquired one-half of the property
covered by OCT No. 352 by acquisitive prescription; (3) whether or not the transfer of the whole
property covered by OCT No. 352 on the basis of the registration of the private deed of donation
notwithstanding the discrepancy in the description is valid; (4) whether or not respondents are entitled
to damages; and (5) whether or not TCT No. 44481 is valid.[16]
RTC Decision

After due proceedings, the RTC ruled in favor of petitioner heirs of Marcelino Doronio (defendants). It
concluded that the parties admitted the identity of the land which they all occupy;[17] that a title once
registered under the torrens system cannot be defeated by adverse, open and notorious possession or
by prescription;[18] that the deed of donation in consideration of the marriage of the parents of
petitioners is valid, hence, it led to the eventual issuance of TCT No. 44481 in the names of said
parents;[19] and that respondent heirs of Fortunato Doronio (plaintiffs) are not entitled to damages as
they are not the rightful owners of the portion of the property they are claiming.[20]

The RTC disposed of the case, thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby renders judgment DISMISSING the herein
Complaint filed by plaintiffs against defendants.[21]

Disagreeing with the judgment of the RTC, respondents appealed to the CA. They argued that the trial
court erred in not finding that respondents predecessor-in-interest acquired one-half of the property
covered by OCT No. 352 by tradition and/or intestate succession; that the deed of donation dated April
26, 1919 was null and void; that assuming that the deed of donation was valid, only one-half of the
property was actually donated to Marcelino Doronio and Veronica Pico; and that respondents acquired
ownership of the other half portion of the property by acquisitive prescription.[22]

CA Disposition

In a Decision dated January 26, 2005, the CA reversed the RTC decision with the following disposition:
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision dated June 28, 2002 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Declaring the
appellants as rightful owners of one-half of the property now covered by TCT No. 44481, the appellees
are hereby directed to execute a registerable document conveying the same to appellants.

SO ORDERED.[23]

The appellate court determined that (t)he intention to donate half of the disputed property to appellees
predecessors can be gleaned from the disparity of technical descriptions appearing in the title (OCT No.
352) of spouses Simeon Doronio and Cornelia Gante and in the deed of donation propter nuptias
executed on April 24, 1919 in favor of appellees predecessors.[24]

The CA based its conclusion on the disparity of the following technical descriptions of the property
under OCT No. 352 and the deed of donation, to wit:

The court below described the property covered by OCT No. 352 as follows:

Un terreno (Lote 1018), situada en el municipio de Asingan, Linda por el NE; con propriedad de Gabriel
Bernardino; con el SE con propriedad de Zacarias Najorda y Alejandro Najorda; por el SO con propriedad
de Geminiano Mendoza y por el NO con el camino para Villasis; midiendo una extension superficial mil
ciento cincuenta y dos metros cuadrados.

On the other hand, the property donated to appellees predecessors was described in the deed of
donation as:

Fourth A piece of residential land located in the barrio of Cabalitian but we did not measure it, the area
is bounded on the north by Gabriel Bernardino; on the east by Fortunato Doronio; on the south by
Geminiano Mendoza and on the west by a road to Villasis. Constructed on said land is a house of light
materials also a part of the dowry. Value 200.00.[25] (Emphasis ours)

Taking note that the boundaries of the lot donated to Marcelino Doronio and Veronica Pico differ from
the boundaries of the land owned by spouses Simeon Doronio and Cornelia Gante, the CA concluded
that spouses Simeon Doronio and Cornelia Gante donated only half of the property covered by OCT No.
352.[26]

Regarding the allegation of petitioners that OCT No. 352 is inadmissible in evidence, the CA pointed out
that, while the OCT is written in the Spanish language, this document already forms part of the records
of this case for failure of appellees to interpose a timely objection when it was offered as evidence in the
proceedings a quo. It is a well-settled rule that any objection to the admissibility of such evidence not
raised will be considered waived and said evidence will have to form part of the records of the case as
competent and admitted evidence.[27]

The CA likewise ruled that the donation of the entire property in favor of petitioners predecessors is
invalid on the ground that it impairs the legitime of respondents predecessor, Fortunato Doronio. On
this aspect, the CA reasoned out:

Moreover, We find the donation of the entire property in favor of appellees predecessors invalid as it
impairs the legitime of appellants predecessor. Article 961 of the Civil Code is explicit. In default of
testamentary heirs, the law vests the inheritance, x x x, in the legitimate x x x relatives of the deceased, x
x x. As Spouses Simeon Doronio and Cornelia Gante died intestate, their property shall pass to their
lawful heirs, namely: Fortunato and Marcelino Doronio. Donating the entire property to Marcelino
Doronio and Veronica Pico and excluding another heir, Fortunato, tantamounts to divesting the latter of
his rightful share in his parents inheritance. Besides, a persons prerogative to make donations is subject
to certain limitations, one of which is that he cannot give by donation more than what he can give by
will (Article 752, Civil Code). If he does, so much of what is donated as exceeds what he can give by will
is deemed inofficious and the donation is reducible to the extent of such excess.[28]

Petitioners were not pleased with the decision of the CA. Hence, this petition under Rule 45.

Issues

Petitioners now contend that the CA erred in:

1. DECLARING ADMISSIBILITY OF THE ORIGINAL CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. 352 DESPITE OF LACK
OF TRANSLATION THEREOF.
2. (RULING THAT) ONLY HALF OF THE DISPUTED PROPERTY WAS DONATED TO THE PREDECESSORS-
IN-INTEREST OF THE HEREIN APPELLANTS.

3. (ITS) DECLARATION THAT THE DONATION PROPTER NUPTIAS IS INNOFICIOUS, IS PREMATURE,

AND THUS IT IS ILLEGAL AND UNPROCEDURAL.[29]

Our Ruling

OCT No. 352 in Spanish Although Not

Translated into English or Filipino Is

Admissible For Lack of Timely Objection

Petitioners fault the CA for admitting OCT No. 352 in evidence on the ground that it is written in Spanish
language. They posit that (d)ocumentary evidence in an unofficial language shall not be admitted as
evidence, unless accompanied with a translation into English or Filipino.[30]

The argument is untenable. The requirement that documents written in an unofficial language must be
accompanied with a translation in English or Filipino as a prerequisite for its admission in evidence must
be insisted upon by the parties at the trial to enable the court, where a translation has been impugned
as incorrect, to decide the issue.[31] Where such document, not so accompanied with a translation in
English or Filipino, is offered in evidence and not objected to, either by the parties or the court, it must
be presumed that the language in which the document is written is understood by all, and the document
is admissible in evidence.[32]

Moreover, Section 36, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Evidence provides:

SECTION 36. Objection. Objection to evidence offered orally must be made immediately after the offer is
made.
Objection to a question propounded in the course of the oral examination of a witness shall be made as
soon as the grounds therefor shall become reasonably apparent.

An offer of evidence in writing shall be objected to within three (3) days after notice of the offer unless a
different period is allowed by the court.

In any case, the grounds for the objections must be specified. (Emphasis ours)

Since petitioners did not object to the offer of said documentary evidence on time, it is now too late in
the day for them to question its admissibility. The rule is that evidence not objected may be deemed
admitted and may be validly considered by the court in arriving at its judgment.[33] This is true even if
by its nature, the evidence is inadmissible and would have surely been rejected if it had been challenged
at the proper time.[34]

As a matter of fact, instead of objecting, petitioners admitted the contents of Exhibit A, that is, OCT No.
352 in their comment[35] on respondents formal offer of documentary evidence. In the said comment,
petitioners alleged, among others, that Exhibits A, B, C, D, E, F and G, are admitted but not for the
purpose they are offered because these exhibits being public and official documents are the best
evidence of that they contain and not for what a party would like it to prove.[36] Said evidence was
admitted by the RTC.[37] Once admitted without objection, even though not admissible under an
objection, We are not inclined now to reject it.[38] Consequently, the evidence that was not objected to
became property of the case, and all parties to the case are considered amenable to any favorable or
unfavorable effects resulting from the said evidence.[39]

Issues on Impairment of Legitime

Should Be Threshed Out in a Special

Proceeding, Not in Civil Action for

Reconveyance and Damages

On the other hand, petitioners are correct in alleging that the issue regarding the impairment of legitime
of Fortunato Doronio must be resolved in an action for the settlement of estates of spouses Simeon
Doronio and Cornelia Gante. It may not be passed upon in an action for reconveyance and damages. A
probate court, in the exercise of its limited jurisdiction, is the best forum to ventilate and adjudge the
issue of impairment of legitime as well as other related matters involving the settlement of estate.[40]

An action for reconveyance with damages is a civil action, whereas matters relating to settlement of the
estate of a deceased person such as advancement of property made by the decedent, partake of the
nature of a special proceeding. Special proceedings require the application of specific rules as provided
for in the Rules of Court.[41]

As explained by the Court in Natcher v. Court of Appeals:[42]

Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure defines civil action and special proceedings, in this
wise:

x x x a) A civil action is one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or
the prevention or redress of a wrong.

A civil action may either be ordinary or special. Both are governed by the rules for ordinary civil actions,
subject to specific rules prescribed for a special civil action.

xxxx

c) A special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right or a particular
fact.

As could be gleaned from the foregoing, there lies a marked distinction between an action and a special
proceeding. An action is a formal demand of ones right in a court of justice in the manner prescribed by
the court or by the law. It is the method of applying legal remedies according to definite established
rules. The term special proceeding may be defined as an application or proceeding to establish the
status or right of a party, or a particular fact. Usually, in special proceedings, no formal pleadings are
required unless the statute expressly so provides. In special proceedings, the remedy is granted
generally upon an application or motion.
Citing American Jurisprudence, a noted authority in Remedial Law expounds further:

It may accordingly be stated generally that actions include those proceedings which are instituted and
prosecuted according to the ordinary rules and provisions relating to actions at law or suits in equity,
and that special proceedings include those proceedings which are not ordinary in this sense, but is
instituted and prosecuted according to some special mode as in the case of proceedings commenced
without summons and prosecuted without regular pleadings, which are characteristics of ordinary
actions x x x. A special proceeding must therefore be in the nature of a distinct and independent
proceeding for particular relief, such as may be instituted independently of a pending action, by petition
or motion upon notice.

Applying these principles, an action for reconveyance and annulment of title with damages is a civil
action, whereas matters relating to settlement of the estate of a deceased person such as advancement
of property made by the decedent, partake of the nature of a special proceeding, which concomitantly
requires the application of specific rules as provided for in the Rules of Court.

Clearly, matters which involve settlement and distribution of the estate of the decedent fall within the
exclusive province of the probate court in the exercise of its limited jurisdiction.

Thus, under Section 2, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court, questions as to advancement made or alleged to
have been made by the deceased to any heir may be heard and determined by the court having
jurisdiction of the estate proceedings, and the final order of the court thereon shall be binding on the
person raising the questions and on the heir.

While it may be true that the Rules used the word may, it is nevertheless clear that the same provision
contemplates a probate court when it speaks of the court having jurisdiction of the estate proceedings.

Corollarily, the Regional Trial Court in the instant case, acting in its general jurisdiction, is devoid of
authority to render an adjudication and resolve the issue of advancement of the real property in favor of
herein petitioner Natcher, inasmuch as Civil Case No. 71075 for reconveyance and annulment of title
with damages is not, to our mind, the proper vehicle to thresh out said question. Moreover, under the
present circumstances, the RTC of Manila, Branch 55, was not properly constituted as a probate court so
as to validly pass upon the question of advancement made by the decedent Graciano Del Rosario to his
wife, herein petitioner Natcher.

We likewise find merit in petitioners contention that before any conclusion about the legal share due to
a compulsory heir may be reached, it is necessary that certain steps be taken first.[43] The net estate of
the decedent must be ascertained, by deducting all payable obligations and charges from the value of
the property owned by the deceased at the time of his death; then, all donations subject to collation
would be added to it. With the partible estate thus determined, the legitime of the compulsory heir or
heirs can be established; and only then can it be ascertained whether or not a donation had prejudiced
the legitimes.[44]

Declaration of Validity of Donation

Can Be Challenged by an Interested

Party Not Impleaded in Petition for

Quieting of Title or Declaratory Relief

or Where There is No Res Judicata.

Moreover, This Court Can Consider

a Factual Matter or Unassigned Error

in the Interest of Substantial Justice.

Nevertheless, petitioners cannot preclude the determination of validity of the deed of donation on the
ground that (1) it has been impliedly admitted by respondents; (2) it has already been determined with
finality by the RTC in Petition Case No. U-920; or (3) the only issue in an action for reconveyance is who
has a better right over the land.[45]

The validity of the private deed of donation propter nuptias in favor of petitioners predecessors was one
of the issues in this case before the lower courts. The pre-trial order[46] of the RTC stated that one of
the issues before it is (w)hether or not the transfer of the whole property covered by OCT No. 352 on
the basis of the private deed of donation notwithstanding the discrepancy in the description is valid.
Before the CA, one of the errors assigned by respondents is that THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT
FINDING THAT THE PRIVATE DEED OF DONATION DATED APRIL 26, 1919 WAS NULL AND VOID.[47]
The issue of the validity of donation is likewise brought to Us by petitioners as they stated in their
Memorandum[48] that one of the issues to be resolved is regarding the alleged fact that THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THE DONATION INVALID. We are thus poised to
inspect the deed of donation and to determine its validity.

We cannot agree with petitioners contention that respondents may no longer question the validity of
the deed of donation on the ground that they already impliedly admitted it. Under the provisions of the
Civil Code, a void contract is inexistent from the beginning. The right to set up the defense of its illegality
cannot be waived.[49] The right to set up the nullity of a void or non-existent contract is not limited to
the parties as in the case of annullable or voidable contracts; it is extended to third persons who are
directly affected by the contract.[50]

Consequently, although respondents are not parties in the deed of donation, they can set up its nullity
because they are directly affected by the same.[51] The subject of the deed being the land they are
occupying, its enforcement will definitely affect them.

Petitioners cannot also use the finality of the RTC decision in Petition Case No. U-920[52] as a shield
against the verification of the validity of the deed of donation. According to petitioners, the said final
decision is one for quieting of title.[53] In other words, it is a case for declaratory relief under Rule 64
(now Rule 63) of the Rules of Court, which provides:

SECTION 1. Who may file petition. Any person interested under a deed, will, contract or other written
instrument, or whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order or regulation, or ordinance, may,
before breach or violation thereof, bring an action to determine any question of construction or validity
arising under the instrument or statute and for a declaration of his rights or duties thereunder.
An action for the reformation of an instrument, to quiet title to real property or remove clouds
therefrom, or to consolidate ownership under Article 1607 of the Civil Code, may be brought under this
rule.

SECTION 2. Parties. All persons shall be made parties who have or claim any interest which would be
affected by the declaration; and no declaration shall, except as otherwise provided in these rules,
prejudice the rights of persons not parties to the action. (Emphasis ours)

However, respondents were not made parties in the said Petition Case No. U-920. Worse, instead of
issuing summons to interested parties, the RTC merely allowed the posting of notices on the bulletin
boards of Barangay Cabalitaan, Municipalities of Asingan and Lingayen, Pangasinan. As pointed out by
the CA, citing the ruling of the RTC:

x x x In the said case or Petition No. U-920, notices were posted on the bulletin boards of barangay
Cabalitaan, Municipalities of Asingan and Lingayen, Pangasinan, so that there was a notice to the whole
world and during the initial hearing and/or hearings, no one interposed objection thereto.[54]

Suits to quiet title are not technically suits in rem, nor are they, strictly speaking, in personam, but being
against the person in respect of the res, these proceedings are characterized as quasi in rem.[55] The
judgment in such proceedings is conclusive only between the parties.[56] Thus, respondents are not
bound by the decision in Petition Case No. U-920 as they were not made parties in the said case.

The rules on quieting of title[57] expressly provide that any declaration in a suit to quiet title shall not
prejudice persons who are not parties to the action.

That respondents filed a subsequent pleading[58] in the same Petition Case No. U-920 after the decision
there had become final did not change the fact that said decision became final without their being
impleaded in the case. Said subsequent pleading was dismissed on the ground of finality of the
decision.[59]
Thus, the RTC totally failed to give respondents their day in court. As a result, they cannot be bound by
its orders. Generally accepted is the principle that no man shall be affected by any proceeding to which
he is a stranger, and strangers to a case are not bound by judgment rendered by the court.[60]

Moreover, for the principle of res judicata to apply, the following must be present: (1) a decision on the
merits; (2) by a court of competent jurisdiction; (3) the decision is final; and (4) the two actions involve
identical parties, subject matter and causes of action.[61] The fourth element is not present in this case.
The parties are not identical because respondents were not impleaded in Petition Case No. U-920. While
the subject matter may be the same property covered by OCT No. 352, the causes of action are
different. Petition Case No. U-920 is an action for declaratory relief while the case below is for recovery
of property.

We are not persuaded by petitioners posture that the only issue in this action for reconveyance is who
has a better right over the land; and that the validity of the deed of donation is beside the point.[62] It is
precisely the validity and enforceability of the deed of donation that is the determining factor in
resolving the issue of who has a better right over the property. Moreover, notwithstanding procedural
lapses as to the appropriateness of the remedies prayed for in the petition filed before Us, this Court
can brush aside the technicalities in the interest of justice. In some instances, this Court even suspended
its own rules and excepted a case from their operation whenever the higher interests of justice so
demanded.[63]

Moreover, although respondents did not directly raise the issue of validity of the deed of donation at
the commencement of the case before the trial court, it was stipulated[64] by the parties during the
pre-trial conference. In any event, this Court has authority to inquire into any question necessary in
arriving at a just decision of a case before it.[65] Though not specifically questioned by the parties,
additional issues may also be included, if deemed important for substantial justice to be rendered.[66]

Furthermore, this Court has held that although a factual issue is not squarely raised below, still in the
interest of substantial justice, this Court is not prevented from considering a pivotal factual matter. The
Supreme Court is clothed with ample authority to review palpable errors not assigned as such if it finds
that their consideration is necessary in arriving at a just decision.[67]

A rudimentary doctrine on appealed cases is that this Court is clothed with ample authority to review
matters, even if they are not assigned as errors on appeal, if it finds that their consideration is necessary
at arriving at a just decision of the case.[68] Also, an unassigned error closely related to an error
properly assigned or upon which the determination of the question raised by the error properly
assigned is dependent, will be considered by the appellate court notwithstanding the failure to assign it
as an error.[69]

Donation Propter Nuptias of Real

Property Made in a Private Instrument

Before the New Civil Code Took Effect

on August 30, 1950 is Void

We now focus on the crux of the petition, which is the validity of the deed of donation. It is settled that
only laws existing at the time of the execution of a contract are applicable to it and not the later
statutes, unless the latter are specifically intended to have retroactive effect.[70] Accordingly, the Old
Civil Code applies in this case as the donation propter nuptias was executed in 1919, while the New Civil
Code took effect only on August 30, 1950.

Under the Old Civil Code, donations propter nuptias must be made in a public instrument in which the
property donated must be specifically described.[71] Article 1328 of the Old Civil Code provides that
gifts propter nuptias are governed by the rules established in Title 2 of Book 3 of the same Code. Article
633 of that title provides that the gift of real property, in order to be valid, must appear in a public
document.[72] It is settled that a donation of real estate propter nuptias is void unless made by public
instrument.[73]

In the instant case, the donation propter nuptias did not become valid. Neither did it create any right
because it was not made in a public instrument.[74] Hence, it conveyed no title to the land in question
to petitioners predecessors.

Logically, then, the cancellation of OCT No. 352 and the issuance of a new TCT No. 44481 in favor of
petitioners predecessors have no legal basis. The title to the subject property should, therefore, be
restored to its original owners under OCT No. 352.

Direct reconveyance to any of the parties is not possible as it has not yet been determined in a proper
proceeding who among the heirs of spouses Simeon Doronio and Cornelia Gante is entitled to it. It is still
unproven whether or not the parties are the only ones entitled to the properties of spouses Simeon
Doronio and Cornelia Gante. As earlier intimated, there are still things to be done before the legal share
of all the heirs can be properly adjudicated.[75]

Titled Property Cannot Be Acquired

By Another By Adverse Possession

or Extinctive Prescription

Likewise, the claim of respondents that they became owners of the property by acquisitive prescription
has no merit. Truth to tell, respondents cannot successfully invoke the argument of extinctive
prescription. They cannot be deemed the owners by acquisitive prescription of the portion of the
property they have been possessing. The reason is that the property was covered by OCT No. 352. A title
once registered under the torrens system cannot be defeated even by adverse, open and notorious
possession; neither can it be defeated by prescription.[76] It is notice to the whole world and as such all
persons are bound by it and no one can plead ignorance of the registration.[77]

The torrens system is intended to guarantee the integrity and conclusiveness of the certificate of
registration, but it cannot be used for the perpetration of fraud against the real owner of the registered
land.[78] The system merely confirms ownership and does not create it. Certainly, it cannot be used to
divest the lawful owner of his title for the purpose of transferring it to another who has not acquired it
by any of the modes allowed or recognized by law. It cannot be used to protect a usurper from the true
owner, nor can it be used as a shield for the commission of fraud; neither does it permit one to enrich
himself at the expense of another.[79] Where such an illegal transfer is made, as in the case at bar, the
law presumes that no registration has been made and so retains title in the real owner of the land.[80]

Although We confirm here the invalidity of the deed of donation and of its resulting TCT No. 44481, the
controversy between the parties is yet to be fully settled. The issues as to who truly are the present
owners of the property and what is the extent of their ownership remain unresolved. The same may be
properly threshed out in the settlement of the estates of the registered owners of the property, namely:
spouses Simeon Doronio and Cornelia Gante.

WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. A new one is entered:
(1) Declaring the private deed of donation propter nuptias in favor of petitioners predecessors NULL
AND VOID; and

(2) Ordering the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan to:

(a) CANCEL Transfer Certificate of Title No. 44481 in the names of Marcelino Doronio and Veronica Pico;
and

(b) RESTORE Original Certificate of Title No. 352 in the names of its original owners, spouses Simeon
Doronio and Cornelia Gante.

SO ORDERED.