LIANG VS PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES GR no. 125865
January 28, 2000
Petitioner: Jeffrey Liang
Respondent: People of the
Philippines
FACTS:
Petitioner is an economist working
with the Asian Development Bank
(ADB). Sometime in 1994, for
allegedly uttering defamatory words
against fellow ADB worker Joyce
Cabal, he was charged before the
MeTC of Mandaluyong City with two
counts of oral defamation. Petitioner
was arrested by virtue of a warrant
issued by the MeTC. After fixing
petitioner’s bail, the MeTC released
him to the custody of the Security
Officer of ADB. The next day, the
MeTC judge received an “office of
protocol” from the DFA stating that
petitioner is covered by immunity
from legal process under section 45
of the Agreement between the ADB
and the Philippine Government
regarding the Headquarters of the
ADB in the country. Based on the
said protocol communication that
petitioner is immune from suit, the
MeTC ad judge sdwithout notice to
the prosasdecution dismissed the
criminal cases. The latter filed a
motion for reconsideration which
was opposed by the DFA. When its
motion was denied, the prosecution
filed a petition for certiorari and
mandamus with the RTC of Pasig
City which set aside the MeTC
rulings and ordered the latter court
to enforce the warrant of arrest it
earlier issued. After the motion for
reconsideration was denied, the
petitioner elevated the case to the
SC via a petition for review arguing
that he is covered by immunity
under the Agreement and that no
preliminary investigation was held
before the criminal case.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the petitioner’s
case is covered with immunity from
legal process with regard to Section
45 of the Agreement between the
ADB and the Philippine Gov’t.
(2) Whether or not the conduct of
preliminary investigation was
imperative.
HELD:
(1) NO. The petitioner’s case is not
covered by the immunity. Courts
cannot blindly adhere to the
communication from the DFA that
the petitioner is covered by any
immunity. It has no binding effect in
courts. The court needs to protect
the right to due process not only of
the accused but also of the
prosecution. Secondly, the
immunity under Section 45 of the
Agreement is not absolute, but
subject to the exception that the
acts must be done in “official
capacity”. Hence, slandering a
person could not possibly be
covered by the immunity agreement
because our laws do not allow the
commission of a crime, such as
defamation, in the name of official
duty.
(2) NO. Preliminary Investigation is
not a matter of right in cases
cognizable by the MeTC such as this
case. Being purely a statutory right,
preliminary investigation may be
invoked only when specifically
granted by law. The rule on criminal
procedure is clear that no
preliminary investigation is required
in cases falling within the
jurisdiction of the MeTC.
Hence, SC denied the petition.
NORMA A. DEL SOCORRO v.
ERNST JOHAN BRINKMAN VAN
WILSEM, GR No. 193707, 2014-
12-10
Facts:
Before the Court is a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court seeking to reverse
and set aside the Orders[1] dated
February 19, 2010 and September
1, 2010, respectively, of the Regional
Trial Court... of Cebu City (RTC-
Cebu), which dismissed the criminal
case entitled People of the
Philippines v. Ernst Johan
Brinkman Van Wilsem, docketed as
Criminal Case No. CBU-85503, for
violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
9262, otherwise known as the Anti-
Violence Against
Women and Their Children Act of
2004.
Petitioner Norma A. Del Socorro and
respondent Ernst Johan Brinkman
Van Wilsem contracted marriage in
Holland on September 25, 1990.[2]
On January 19, 1994, they were
blessed with a son named Roderigo
Norjo Van Wilsem, who at the time
of the filing of the... instant petition
was sixteen (16) years of age.[3]
Unfortunately, their marriage bond
ended on July 19, 1995 by virtue of
a Divorce Decree issued by the
appropriate Court of Holland.[4] At
that time, their son was only
eighteen (18) months old.[5]
Thereafter, petitioner and her son...
came home to the Philippines.[6]
According to petitioner, respondent
made a promise to provide monthly
support to their son in the amount
of Two Hundred Fifty (250) Guildene
Not long thereafter, respondent
came to the Philippines and
remarried in Pinamungahan, Cebu,
and since then, have been residing
thereat.
To date, all the parties, including
their son, Roderigo, are presently
living in Cebu City.[11]
On August 28, 2009, petitioner,
through her counsel, sent a letter
demanding for support from
respondent. However, respondent
refused to receive the letter.[12]
Because of the foregoing
circumstances, petitioner filed a
complaint-affidavit with the
Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu City
Respondent submitted his counter-
affidavit
Upon motion and after notice and
hearing, the RTC-Cebu issued a
Hold Departure Order against
respondent.[16] Consequently,
respondent was arrested and,
subsequently, posted bail.
Petitioner also filed a
Motion/Application of Permanent
Protection Order
Subsequently,... respondent filed a
Motion to Dismiss
On February 19, 2010, the RTC-
Cebu issued the herein assailed
Order,[21] dismissing the instant
criminal case against respondent
Thereafter, petitioner filed her
Motion for Reconsideration
On September 1, 2010, the lower
court issued an Order[25] denying
petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration
Issues:
Whether or not a foreign national
has an obligation to support his
minor child under Philippine law
Whether or not a foreign national
can be held criminally liable under
R.A. No. 9262 for his unjustified
failure to support his minor child
Ruling:
We find the petition meritorious.
Nonetheless, we do not fully agree
with petitioner's contentions.
To determine whether or not a
person is criminally liable under
R.A. No. 9262, it is imperative that
the legal obligation to support
exists.
we agree with respondent that
petitioner cannot rely on Article
195[34] of the New Civil Code in
demanding support from
respondent, who is a foreign citizen
The obligation to give support to a
child is a matter that falls under
family rights and duties. Since the
respondent is a citizen of Holland or
the Netherlands, we agree with the
RTC-Cebu that he is subject to the
laws of his country, not to Philippine
law, as to whether... he is obliged to
give support to his child, as well as
the consequences of his failure to do
so.[37]
It cannot be gainsaid, therefore, that
the respondent is not obliged to
support petitioner's son under
Article 195 of the Family Code as a
consequence of the Divorce
Covenant obtained in Holland.
This does not, however, mean that
respondent is not obliged to
support... petitioner's son
altogether.
In view of respondent's failure to
prove the national law of the
Netherlands in his favor, the
doctrine of processual presumption
shall govern. Under this doctrine, if
the foreign law involved is not
properly pleaded and proved, our
courts will presume that the foreign
law is... the same as our local or
domestic or internal law.[44] Thus,
since the law of the Netherlands as
regards the obligation to support
has not been properly pleaded and
proved in the instant case, it is
presumed to be the same with
Philippine law, which... enforces the
obligation of parents to support
their children and penalizing the
non-compliance therewith.
The Divorce Covenant presented by
respondent does not completely
show that he is not liable to give
support to his son after the divorce
decree was issued.
We likewise agree with petitioner
that notwithstanding that the
national law of respondent states
that parents have no obligation to
support their children or that such
obligation is not punishable by law,
said law would still not find
applicability,... Additionally,
prohibitive laws concerning persons,
their acts or property, and those
which have for their object public
order, public policy and good
customs shall not be rendered
ineffective by laws or judgments
promulgated, or by determinations
or conventions agreed upon in a...
foreign country.
The public policy sought to be
protected in the instant case is the
principle imbedded in our
jurisdiction proscribing the splitting
up of a single cause of action.
SUZETTE NICOLAS Y SOMBILON
v. ALBERTO ROMULO, GR No.
175888, 2009-02-11
Facts:
Respondent Lance Corporal (L/CPL)
Daniel Smith is a member of the
United States Armed Forces. He was
charged with the crime of rape
committed against a Filipina,
petitioner herein, sometime on
November 1, 2005
Pursuant to the Visiting Forces
Agreement (VFA) between the
Republic of the Philippines and the
United States, entered into on
February 10, 1998, the United
States, at its request, was granted
custody of defendant Smith pending
the proceedings.
United States Government faithfully
complied with its undertaking to
bring defendant Smith to the trial
court every time his presence was...
required.
RTC of Makati, following the end of
the trial, rendered its Decision,
finding defendant Smith guilt
As a result, the Makati court
ordered Smith detained at the
Makati jail until further orders.
Smith was taken out of the Makati
jail by a contingent of Philippine law
enforcement agents, purportedly
acting under orders of the
Department of the Interior and Local
Government, and brought to a
facility for detention under the
control... of the United States
government, provided for under new
agreements between the Philippines
and the United States, referred to as
the Romulo-Kenney Agreement... in
accordance with the Visiting Forces
Agreement signed between our two
nations, Lance Corporal Daniel J.
Smith, United States Marine Corps,
be returned... to U.S. military
custody at the U.S. Embassy in
Manila.
He will be guarded round the clock Sec. 5[5]). They argue that to... allow
by U.S. military personnel. The the transfer of custody of an
Philippine police and jail... accused to a foreign power is to
authorities, under the direct provide for a different rule of
supervision of the Philippine procedure for that accused, which
Department of Interior and Local also violates the equal protection
Government (DILG) will have access clause of the Constitution (Art. III,
to the place of detention to ensure Sec. 1.).
the United States is in compliance
Ruling:
with the terms of the VFA.
This Court finds that it is, for two
Clark and Subic and the other
reasons.
places in the Philippines covered by
the RP-US Military Bases Agreement First, as held in Bayan v. Zamora,[5]
of 1947 were not Philippine the VFA was duly concurred in by
territory, as they were excluded from the Philippine Senate and has been
the cession and retained by the US. recognized as a treaty by the United
States as attested and certified by
Accordingly, the Philippines had no
the duly authorized representative of
jurisdiction over these bases except
the United States... government.
to the extent allowed by the United
States. The fact that the VFA was not
submitted for advice and consent of
RP-US Military Bases Agreement
the United States Senate does not
was never advised for ratification by
detract from its status as a binding
the United States Senate, a disparity
international agreement or treaty
in treatment, because the
recognized by the said State. For
Philippines... regarded it as a treaty
this is a matter of internal United
and had it concurred in by our
States law.
Senate.
The second reason has to do with
Subsequently, the United States
the relation between the VFA and
agreed to turn over these bases to
the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty of
the Philippines; and with the
August 30, 1951. This earlier
expiration of the RP-US Military
agreement was signed and duly
Bases Agreement in 1991, the
ratified with the concurrence of both
territory covered by these bases
the Philippine Senate and the
were finally ceded to the Philippines.
United States Senate.
whether or not the presence of US
Clearly, therefore, joint RP-US
Armed Forces in Philippine territory
military exercises for the purpose of
pursuant to the VFA is allowed
developing the capability to resist an
"under a treaty duly concurred in by
armed attack fall squarely under the
the Senate xxx and recognized as a
provisions of the RP-US Mutual
treaty by the other... contracting
Defense Treaty. The VFA, which is
State."
the instrument agreed upon to
Issues: provide for the joint RP-US
military... exercises, is simply an
whether or not the presence of US
implementing agreement to the
Armed Forces in Philippine territory
main RP-US Military Defense Treaty.
pursuant to the VFA is allowed
"under a treaty duly concurred in by The Preamble of the VFA states
the Senate xxx and recognized as a
Reaffirming their obligations under
treaty by the other... contracting
the Mutual Defense Treaty of August
State."
30, 1951;
Petitioners contend that these
Accordingly, as an implementing
undertakings violate another
agreement of the RP-US Mutual
provision of the Constitution,
Defense Treaty, it was not necessary
namely, that providing for the
to submit the VFA to the US Senate
exclusive power of this Court to
for advice and consent, but merely
adopt rules of procedure for all
to the US Congress under the Case-
courts in the Philippines (Art. VIII,
Zablocki Act within 60 days of its
ratification. It is for this reason
that... the US has certified that it
recognizes the VFA as a binding
international agreement, i.e., a
treaty, and this substantially
complies with the requirements of
Art. XVIII, Sec. 25 of our
Constitution.
The provision of Art. XVIII, Sec. 25
of the Constitution, is complied with
by virtue of the fact that the
presence of the US Armed Forces
through the VFA is a presence
"allowed under" the RP-US Mutual
Defense Treaty.
The VFA provides that in cases of
offenses committed by the members
of the US Armed Forces in the
Philippines, the following rules
apply:
The custody of any United States
personnel over whom the
Philippines is to exercise jurisdiction
shall immediately reside with United
States military authorities, if they so
request, from the commission of the
offense until completion of all
judicial proceedings.
this Court finds no violation of the
Constitution.
Nothing in the Constitution
prohibits such agreements
recognizing immunity from
jurisdiction or some aspects of
jurisdiction (such as custody), in
relation to long-recognized subjects
of such immunity like Heads of
State, diplomats and members of
the armed forces contingents of... a
foreign State allowed to enter
another State's territory. On the
contrary, the Constitution states
that the Philippines adopts the
generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law
of the land.
Applying, however, the provisions of
VFA, the Court finds that there is a
different treatment when it comes to
detention as against custody. The
moment the accused has to be
detained, e.g., after conviction, the
rule that governs is the following
provision of the
VFA:
The confinement or detention by
Philippine authorities of United
States personnel shall be carried out
in facilities agreed on by appropriate
Philippines and United States
authorities. United States personnel
serving sentences in the Philippines
shall have the right to... visits and
material assistance.
It is clear that the parties to the VFA
recognized the difference between
custody during the trial and
detention after conviction, because
they provided for a specific
arrangement to cover detention.
not only that the detention shall...
be carried out in facilities agreed on
by authorities of both parties, but
also that the detention shall be "by
Philippine authorities."
Therefore, the Romulo-Kenney
Agreements of December 19 and 22,
2006, which are agreements on the
detention of the accused in the
United
States Embassy, are not in accord
with the VFA itself because such
detention is not "by Philippine
authorities."
Next, the Court addresses the recent
decision of the United States
Supreme Court in Medellin v. Texas
( 552 US ___ No. 06-984, March 25,
2008), which held that treaties
entered into by the United States
are not automatically part of their
domestic law unless these... treaties
are self-executing or there is an
implementing legislation to make
them enforceable.
First, the VFA is a self-executing
Agreement, as that term is defined
in Medellin itself, because the
parties intend its provisions to be
enforceable, precisely because the
Agreement is intended to carry out
obligations and undertakings under
the RP-US
Mutual Defense Treaty.
Secondly, the VFA is covered by
implementing legislation, namely,
the Case-Zablocki Act, USC Sec.
112(b), inasmuch as it is the very
purpose and intent of the US
Congress that executive agreements
registered under this Act within 60
days from their ratification be... as held by the US Supreme Court in
immediately implemented. Weinberger v. Rossi,[13] an
executive agreement is a "treaty"
VFA differs from the Vienna
within the meaning of that word in
Convention on Consular Relations
international law and constitutes
and the Avena decision of the
enforceable domestic law vis-à-vis
International Court of Justice (ICJ),
the United States. Thus, the
subject matter of the Medellin
decision. The Convention and the US Supreme Court in Weinberger
ICJ decision are not self-executing enforced the provisions of the
and are not... registrable under the executive agreement granting
Case-Zablocki Act, and thus lack preferential employment to Filipinos
legislative implementing authority. in the US Bases here.
inally, the RP-US Mutual Defense Accordingly, there are three types of
Treaty was advised and consented to treaties in the American system:
by the US Senate
Art. II, Sec. 2 treaties - These are
Principles: advised and consented to by the US
Senate in accordance with Art. II,
The rule in international law is that
Sec. 2 of the US Constitution.
a foreign armed forces allowed to
enter one's territory is immune from Executive-Congressional
local jurisdiction, except to the Agreements: These are joint
extent agreed upon. The Status of agreements of the President and
Forces Agreements involving foreign Congress and need not be submitted
military units around the world vary to the Senate.
in terms and conditions,... according
Sole Executive Agreements. - These
to the situation of the parties
are agreements entered into by the
involved, and reflect their bargaining
President. They are to be submitted
power. But the principle remains,
to Congress within sixty (60) days of
i.e., the receiving State can exercise
ratification under the provisions of
jurisdiction over the forces of the
the Case-Zablocki Act, after which
sending State only to the extent
they are recognized by the Congress
agreed upon by the parties.
and may be... implemented.
As a result, the situation involved is
not one in which the power of this
Court to adopt rules of procedure is
curtailed or violated, but rather one
in which, as is normally
encountered around the world, the
laws (including rules of procedure)
of one State do not extend or apply

 except to the extent agreed

upon - to subjects of another
State due to the recognition of
extraterritorial immunity
given to such bodies as
visiting foreign armed forces.

It was not the intention of the

framers of the 1987 Constitution, in
adopting Article XVIII, Sec. 25, to
require the other contracting State
to convert their system to achieve
alignment and parity with ours. It
was simply required that the treaty
be recognized as a treaty by the...
other contracting State.