*first few cases are copied from the previous batch
to make an intelligent decision as to the law
Manila Hotel Corp v. NLRC
Principle:
Under the rule of forum non conveniens, a
Philippine court or agency may assume
jurisdiction over the case if it chooses to do so
provided:
(1) that the Philippine court is one to which
the parties may conveniently resort to;
(2) that the Philippine court is in a position
to make an intelligent decision as to the law
and the facts; and
(3) that the Philippine court has or is likely
to have power to enforce its decision.
Facts:
1. Respondent Marcelo Santos was an overseas
worker employed as printer at the Mazoon
Printing Press, Sultanate of Oman. While in
Oman, he received a letter from Mr. Gerald
Shmidt, General Manager of Palace Hotel,
Beijing, China, offering him the same position as
printer with a higher monthly salary and increased
benefits as he was recommended by his friend
Nestor Buenio. Palace Hotel is a member of the
Manila Hotel Group. Santos signified his
acceptance in 1988.
2. In 1989, the Palace Hotel informed respondent
Santos by letter signed by Mr. Shmidt that his
employment at the Palace Hotel print shop will be
terminated due to business reverses brought
about by the political upheaval in China.
Issue:
WON NLRC is a convenient forum. NO
Ruling:
1. No. Under the rule of forum non conveniens, a
Philippine court or agency may assume
jurisdiction over the case if it chooses to do so
provided:
(1) that the Philippine court is one to which
the parties may conveniently resort to;
(2) that the Philippine court is in a position
and the facts; and
(3) that the Philippine court has or is likely
to have power to enforce its decision.
2. NLRC is not a convenient forum:
(1)The proper defendants, the Palace
Hotel and MHICL are not nationals of the
Philippines. Neither are they "doing
business in the Philippines." Likewise, the
main witnesses, Mr. Shmidt and Mr. Henk
are non-residents of the Philippines.
(2) The NLRC cannot determine the facts
surrounding the alleged illegal dismissal as
all acts complained of took place in Beijing.
Further, the employment contract was
executed in Oman, thus governed by
foreign laws, applying lex loci
celebracionis.
(3) Even assuming that a proper decision
could be reached by the NLRC, such would
not have any binding effect against the
employer, the Palace Hotel. The Palace
Hotel is a corporation incorporated under
the laws of China and was not even served
with summons. Further, defendant does
not have properties in the Philippines.
Jurisdiction over its person was not
acquired.
Saudi Arabian Airlines v. CA
Principle:
1. Choice-of-law problems seek to answer two
important questions:
(1) What legal system should control a
given situation where some of the
significant facts occurred in two or more
states; and
(2) to what extent should the chosen legal
system regulate the situation.
Before a choice can be made, it is necessary for
us to determine under what category a certain set
of facts or rules fall. This process is known as
"characterization", or the "doctrine of
qualification." It is the "process of deciding
whether or not the facts relate to the kind of
question specified in a conflicts rule." The purpose
of "characterization" is to enable the forum to
select the proper law.
2. An essential element of conflict rules is the
indication of a "test" or "connecting factor" or
"point of contact". Choice-of-law rules invariably
consist of a factual relationship (such as property
right, contract claim) and a connecting factor or
point of contact, such as the situs of the res, the
place of celebration, the place of performance, or
the place of wrongdoing.
3. In applying the principle of "State of the most
significant relationship", the following contacts are
to be taken into account and evaluated according
to their relative importance with respect to the
particular issue:
(a) the place where the injury occurred;
(b) the place where the conduct causing
the injury occurred;
(c) the domicile, residence, nationality
place of incorporation and place of
business of the parties; and
(d) the place where the relationship, if any,
between the parties is centered.
Facts:
1. An action for damages based on Art. 21 of the
Civil Code was filed by Milagros Morada against
petitioner.
2. Morada was employed as a flight attendant for
its airlines based in Jedda, Saudi Arabia.
3. While on a lay-over in Jakarta, Morada went to
a disco dance with fellow crew members who are
Saudi nationals. One of the Saudi nationals
attempted to rape Morada. Fortunately, a
roomboy and several security personnel heard
her cries for help and rescued her. Later, the
Indonesian police came and arrested the two.
4. Although she was already working in Manila,
SAUDI brought her back to Jeddah on the
pretense that she would merely testify in an
investigation of the charges she made against the
two SAUDIA crew members for the attack on her
person while they were in Jakarta.
5. As it turned out, she was the one made to face
trial for very serious charges: (1) adultery; (2)
going to a disco, dancing and listening to the
music in violation of Islamic laws; and (3)
socializing with the male crew, in contravention of
Islamic tradition.
6. SAUDI argues that the trial court has no
jurisdiction to hear and try Civil Case based on
Article 21 of the New Civil Code since the proper
law applicable is the law of the Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia inasmuch as this case involves what is
known in private international law as a 'conflicts
problem'. It alleges that the existence of a foreign
element qualifies the instant case for the
application of the law of the Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia, by virtue of the lex loci delicti commissi
rule.
Issue:
1. WON there is a conflict of law problem. YES
2.WON the Philippine law should apply. YES
Ruling:
THERE IS A CONFLICT OF LAW PROBLEM
1. A factual situation that cuts across territorial
lines and is affected by the diverse laws of two or
more states is said to contain a "foreign element".
The presence of a foreign element is inevitable
since social and economic affairs of individuals
and associations are rarely confined to the
geographic limits of their birth or conception.
2. The foreign element consisted in the fact that
Morada is a resident Philippine national, and that
SAUDIA is a resident foreign corporation. Also, by
virtue of the employment of Morada with the
petitioner Saudia as a flight stewardess, events
did transpire during her many occasions of travel
across national borders, particularly from Manila,
Philippines to Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, and vice
versa, that caused a "conflicts" situation to arise.
PHILIPPINE LAW SHOULD APPLY
3. Considering that the complaint in the court a
quo is one involving torts, the "connecting factor"
or "point of contact" could be the place or places
where the tortious conduct or lex loci actus
occurred. And applying the torts principle in a
conflicts case, the Philippines could be said as a
situs of the tort (the places where the alleged
tortious conduct took place).
4. It is in the Philippines where SAUDI allegedly
deceived Morada, a Filipina residing and working
here. According to her, she had honestly believed
that petitioner would, in the exercise of its rights
and in the performance of its duties, "act with
justice, give her her due and observe honesty and
good faith." Instead, SAUDI failed to protect her,
she claimed. That certain acts or parts of the injury
allegedly occurred in another country is of no
moment. What is important here is the place
where the over-all harm or the totality of the
alleged injury to the person, reputation, social
standing and human rights of complainant, had
lodged.
5. There is basis for the claim that over-all injury
occurred and lodged in the Philippines. There is
likewise no question that Morada is a resident
Filipina national, working with SAUDI, a resident
foreign corporation engaged here in the business
of international air carriage. Thus, the
"relationship" between the parties was centered
here, although it should be stressed that this suit
is not based on mere labor law violations.
Hasegawa v. Kitamura
Principle:
1. Where the only issue in the case is that of
jurisdiction, choice-of-law rules are not only
inapplicable but also not yet called for; Before
determining which law should apply, first there
should exist a conflict of laws situation requiring
the application of the conflict of laws rules.
2. Also, when the law of a foreign country is
invoked to provide the proper rules for the solution
of a case, the existence of such law must be
pleaded and proved.
3. It should be noted that when a conflicts case,
one involving a foreign element, is brought before
a court or administrative agency, there are three
alternatives open to the latter in disposing of it:
(1) dismiss the case, either because of lack
of jurisdiction or refusal to assume
jurisdiction over the case;
(2) assume jurisdiction over the case and
apply the internal law of the forum; or
(3) assume jurisdiction over the case and
take into account or apply the law of some
other State or States.
4. The court's power to hear cases and
controversies is derived from the Constitution and
the laws. While it may choose to recognize laws
of foreign nations, the court is not limited by
foreign sovereign law short of treaties or other
formal agreements, even in matters regarding
rights provided by foreign sovereigns.
Facts:
1. Nippon Engineering Consultants Co., Ltd.
(Nippon), a Japanese consultancy firm providing
technical and management support in the
infrastructure projects of foreign governments,
entered into an Independent Contractor
Agreement (ICA) with respondent Minoru
Kitamura, a Japanese national permanently
residing in the Phil.
2. The agreement provides that Kitamura was to
extend professional services to Nippon for a year.
Nippon then assigned Kitamura to work as the
project manager of the Southern Tagalog Access
Road (STAR) Project in the Philippines, following
the company's consultancy contract with the
Philippine Government.
3. When the STAR Project was near completion,
the Department of Public Works and Highways
(DPWH) engaged the consultancy services of
Nippon, this time for the detailed engineering and
construction supervision of the Bongabon-Baler
Road Improvement (BBRI) Project. KITAMURA
was named as the project manager in the
contract’s appendix.
4. Kazuhiro Hasegawa, Nippon’s general
manager for its International Division, informed
Kitamura that the company had no more intention
of automatically renewing his ICA.
5. Threatened with impending unemployment,
Kitamura, through his lawyer, requested a
negotiation conference. As he was not able to
generate a positive response from the Nippon and
Hasegawa, Kitamura consequently initiated a
case for specific performance and damages with
the RTC of Lipa City.
6. For their part, Nippon and Hasegawa,
contending that the ICA had been perfected in
Japan and executed by Japanese nationals,
moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of
jurisdiction. They asserted that the claim for
improper pre-termination of respondent's ICA
could only be heard and ventilated in the proper
courts of Japan following the principles of lex loci
celebrationis and lex contractus.
Issue:
WON the Philippines has jurisdiction. YES
Ruling:
1. The power to exercise jurisdiction does not
automatically give a state constitutional authority
to apply forum law. While jurisdiction and the
choice of the lex fori will often coincide, the
"minimum contacts" for one do not always provide
the necessary "significant contacts" for the other.
The question of whether the law of a state can be
applied to a transaction is different from the
question of whether the courts of that state have
jurisdiction to enter a judgment.
2. In the instant case, Nippon and Hasegawa, in
their motion to dismiss, do not claim that the trial
court is not properly vested by law with jurisdiction
to hear the subject controversy for a case for
specific performance and damages is one not
capable of pecuniary estimation and is properly
cognizable by the RTC of Lipa City. What they
rather raise as grounds to question subject matter
jurisdiction are the principles of lex loci
celebrationis and lex contractus, and the "state of
the most significant relationship rule." Since these
three principles in conflict of laws make reference
to the law applicable to a dispute, they are rules
proper for the second phase, the choice of law.
They determine which state's law is to be applied
in resolving the substantive issues of a conflicts
problem.
3. It should be noted that when a conflicts case,
one involving a foreign element, is brought before
a court or administrative agency, there are three
alternatives open to the latter in disposing of it:
(1) dismiss the case, either because of lack
of jurisdiction or refusal to assume
jurisdiction over the case;
(2) assume jurisdiction over the case and
apply the internal law of the forum; or
(3) assume jurisdiction over the case and
take into account or apply the law of some
other State or States. The court's power to
hear cases and controversies is derived
from the Constitution and the laws. While it
may choose to recognize laws of foreign
nations, the court is not limited by foreign
sovereign law short of treaties or other
formal agreements, even in matters
regarding rights provided by foreign
sovereigns.
Cadalin v. POEA
Principle:
The courts of the forum will not enforce any
foreign claim obnoxious to the forum's public
policy.
Facts: This is a class action suit
1. The case arose when their overseas
employment contracts were terminated even
before their expiration.
2. They were all deployed at various projects
undertaken by Brown & Root in several countries
in the Middle East, such as Saudi Arabia, Libya,
United Arab Emirates and Bahrain, as well as in
Southeast Asia, in Indonesia and Malaysia.
3. In the State of Bahrain, where some of the
individual complainants were deployed, the Amir
of Bahrain, issued his Amiri Decree No. 23 in
1976, otherwise known as the Labour Law for the
Private Sector. Article 156 of the Amiri Decree No.
23 of 1976 provides: "A claim arising out of a
contract of employment shall not be actionable
after the lapse of one year from the date of the
expiry of the contract."
4. AIBC and BRII, insisting that the actions on the
claims have prescribed under the Amiri Decree
No. 23 of 1976, argue that there is in force in the
Philippines a "borrowing law," which is Section 48
of the Code of Civil Procedure and that where
such kind of law exists, it takes precedence over
the common-law conflicts rule.
Issue:
WON the Philippine law shall apply. YES
Ruling:
1. The applicable law on prescription is the
Philippine law. As a general rule, a foreign
procedural law will not be applied in the forum.
Procedural matters, such as service of process,
joinder of actions, period and requisites for
appeal, and so forth, are governed by the laws of
the forum. This is true even if the action is based
upon a foreign substantive law. A law on
prescription of actions is sui generis in Conflict of
Laws in the sense that it may be viewed either as
procedural or substantive, depending on the
characterization given such a law.
2. The characterization of a statute into a
procedural or substantive law becomes irrelevant
when the country of the forum has a "borrowing
statute." Said statute has the practical effect of
treating the foreign statute of limitation as one of
substance.
3. A "borrowing statute" directs the state of the
forum to apply the foreign statute of limitations to
the pending claims based on a foreign law. While
there are several kinds of "borrowing statutes,"
one from provides that an action barred by the
laws of the place where it accrued, will not be
enforced in the forum even though the local
statute has not run against it. Section 48 of the
Code of Civil Procedure is of this kind. Said
Section provides: "If by the laws of the state or
country where the cause of action arose, the
action is barred, it is also barred in the Philippines
Islands."
4. However, the courts of the forum will not
enforce any foreign claim obnoxious to the forum's
public policy. To enforce the one-year prescriptive
period of the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 as
regards the claims in question would contravene
the public policy on the protection to labor.
Bank of America v. CA
Principle:
Even if the foreign law should have been
applicable pursuant to our Conflict of Law rules,
such application cannot be had if such application
would contravene our own public policy.
Facts:
1. Parties:
Bank of America NT & SA (BANTSA) is an
international banking and financing
institution duly licensed to do business in
the Philippines, organized and existing
under and by virtue of the laws of the State
of California.
American Realty Corporation (ARC) is a
domestic corporation.
Bank of America International Limited
(BAIL), on the other hand, is a limited
liability company organized and existing
under the laws of England.
2. BANTSA and BAIL on several occasions
granted three major multi-million US Dollar loans
to three corporate borrowers, all of which are
existing under and by virtue of the laws of the
Republic of Panama and are foreign affiliates of
ARC.
3. When the borrowers failed to pay the loan, they
requested for the restructuring of their loan. As
additional security for the restructured loans, ARC
as third party mortgagor executed two real estate
mortgages over its parcels of land including
improvements in Bulacan.
4. Despite the restructuring agreement, the 3
corporate borrowers failed to pay, prompting
petitioner BANTSA to file civil actions for the
collection of the principal loan before foreign
courts in England and HongKong. ARC, being a
third party mortgagor, was not impleaded as
party-defendant.
5. During the pendency of the collection suit,
petitioner BANTSA filed before the Office of the
Provincial Sheriff of Bulacan an application for
extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage.
The mortgaged real properties were then sold at
public with ICCS as the highest bidder.
• This prompted ARC to institute an action for
damages, alleging that it was illegal for the Bank
of America to still foreclose the mortgage when it
already decided to collect the unpaid loan by filing
a collection suit before the courts in England and
Hongkong, invoking the rule enforced in the
Philippines which prohibits the splitting of a single
cause of action.
• The bank argued that in all the loan contracts
between the bank and the borrowers, it is
stipulated that any dispute that may arise out of
the transaction should be governed by the laws of
England. Under English law, splitting a single
cause of action is not prohibited and thus the
creditor may resort to both remedies: to file an
action for collection and, at the same time, enforce
the security.
Issue:
WON the Philippine law shall apply. YES
Ruling:
1. A foreign law must be properly pleaded and
proved as a fact. Thus, if the foreign law involved
is not properly pleaded and proved, our courts will
presume that the foreign law is the same as our
local or domestic or internal law. This is what we
refer to as the doctrine of processual presumption.
2. Even if the foreign law should have been
applicable pursuant to our Conflict of Law rules,
such application cannot be had if such application
would contravene our own public policy. In this
case, the public policy sought to be protected is
the principle proscribing the splitting up of a single
cause of action.
3. Additionally, prohibitive laws concerning
persons, their acts or property, and those which
have for their object public order, public policy and
good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by
laws or judgments promulgated, or by
determinations or conventions agreed upon in a
foreign country. Moreover, foreign law should not
be applied when its application would work
undeniable injustice to the citizens or residents of
the forum.
Del Socorro v. Van Wilsem
Principle:
1. Doctrine of Processual Presumption - if the
foreign law involved is not properly pleaded and
proved, our courts will presume that the foreign
law is the same as our local or domestic or internal
law.
2. When the foreign law, judgment or contract is
contrary to a sound and established public policy
of the forum, the said foreign law, judgment or
order shall not be applied.
Facts:
1. Del Socorro and Van Wilsem contracted
marriage in Holland. They were blessed with a son
who at the time of the filing of the instant petition
was 16 years of age.
2. Their marriage bond ended by virtue of a
Divorce Decree issued by the appropriate Court of
Holland. At that time, their son was only 18
months old. Thereafter, Del Socorro and her son
came home to the Philippines.
3. Van Wilsem made a promise to provide monthly
support to their son. However, since the arrival of
Del Socorro and her son in the Philippines, Van
Wilsem never gave support to the son.
4. Del Socorro sent a demand letter to Van
Wilsem for the support of their son, however, the
latter refused to receive the latter.
5. Del Socorro filed a complaint affidavit with the
Provincial Prosecutor against Van Wilsem for the
violation of the VAWC law for the latter’s unjust
refusal to support his minor child.
6. De Socorro invokes Article 19530 of the Family
Code, which provides the parent’s obligation to
support his child. She contends that
notwithstanding the existence of a divorce decree
issued in relation to Article 26 of the Family Code,
Van Wilsem is not excused from complying with
his obligation to support his minor child with
petitioner.
7. Van Wilsem argued that he is a foreign national
he is not subject to our national law (The Family
Code) in regard to a parent’s duty and obligation
to give support to his child. Consequently, he
cannot be charged of violating he VAWC law for
his alleged failure to support his child.
Issue:
1. WON Philippine law applies. YES
Ruling:
1. On this point, SC agrees with Van Wilsem that
petitioner cannot rely on Article 19534 of the New
Civil Code in demanding support from
respondent, who is a foreign citizen, since Article
1535 of the New Civil Code stresses the principle
of nationality. In other words, insofar as Philippine
laws are concerned, specifically the provisions of
the Family Code on support, the same only
applies to Filipino citizens. By analogy, the same
principle applies to foreigners such that they are
governed by their national law with respect to
family rights and duties
2. The obligation to give support to a child is a
matter that falls under family rights and duties.
Since Van Wilsem is a citizen of Holland or the
Netherlands, he is subject to the laws of his
country, not to Philippine law, as to whether he is
obliged to give support to his child, as well as the
consequences of his failure to do so.
3. This does not, however, mean that he is not
obliged to support his son altogether.
4. In international law, the party who wants to have
a foreign law applied to a dispute or case has the
burden of proving the foreign law. In the present
case, Van Wilsem hastily concludes that being a
national of the Netherlands, he is governed by
such laws on the matter of provision of and
capacity to support. While respondent pleaded the
laws of the Netherlands in advancing his position
that he is not obliged to support his son, he never
proved the same.
5. Foreign laws do not prove themselves in our
jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to
take judicial notice of them. Like any other fact,
they must be alleged and proved. It is incumbent
upon Van Wilsem to plead and prove that the
national law of the Netherlands does not impose
upon the parents the obligation to support their
child.
6. In view of respondent’s failure to prove the
national law of the Netherlands in his favor, the
doctrine of processual presumption shall govern.
Under this doctrine, if the foreign law involved is
not properly pleaded and proved, our courts will
presume that the foreign law is the same as our
local or domestic or internal law. Thus, since the
law of the Netherlands as regards the obligation
to support has not been properly pleaded and
proved in the instant case, it is presumed to be the
same with Philippine law, which enforces the
obligation of parents to support their children and
penalizing the non-compliance therewith.
6. Notwithstanding that the national law of Van
Wilsem states that parents have no obligation to
support their children or that such obligation is not
punishable by law, said law would still not find
applicability.
7. When the foreign law, judgment or contract is
contrary to a sound and established public policy
of the forum, the said foreign law, judgment or
order shall not be applied.
8. Applying the foregoing, even if the laws of the
Netherlands neither enforce a parent’s obligation
to support his child nor penalize the
noncompliance therewith, such obligation is still
duly enforceable in the Philippines because it
would be of great injustice to the child to be denied
of financial support when the latter is entitled
thereto.
EDI-Staff Builders International v. NLRC
Principle:
Generally, foreign law may govern employment
contracts and waivers, quitclaims and other
agreement but it must be alleged and proved
before Philippine courts. Absent proof, Philippine
laws govern. Our rules on quitclaim or waiver shall
apply only to labor contracts of OFWs in the
absence of proof of the laws of the foreign country
agreed upon to govern said contracts. Otherwise,
the foreign laws shall apply.
Facts:
1. Parties:
EDI is an OFW recruitment and placement.
Expertise Search International (ESI) is
another recruitment agency, which
collaborated with EDI to process the
documentation and deployment of Eleazar
Gran to Saudi Arabia.
2. EDI deployed Gran to work for Omar Ahmed Ali
Bin Bechr Est. (OAB) in Saudi Arabia as
“Computer Specialist.” The terms of employment
offered included monthly salary of Saudi Riyal
(SR) 2,250.00 or USD 600.00. Gran accepted an
employment contract which said that the monthly
salary was for USD 850.00 for 2 years.
3. Upon arrival he questioned the discrepancy in
his salary. His POEA Info Sheet indicated USD
600 only.
4. After 5 months of work, Gran was terminated on
the following grounds:
- non-compliance to contract requirements
primarily on salary and contract duration
- non-compliance to pre-qualification
requirements
- insubordination or disobedience to top
management order and/or instructions
(non-submittal of daily activity reports
despite several instructions).
5. The employment contract signed by Gran
specifically states that Saudi Labor Laws will
govern matters not provided for in the contract
(e.g. specific causes for termination, termination
procedures, etc.). Being the law intended by the
parties (lex loci intentiones) to apply to the
contract, Saudi Labor Laws should govern all
matters relating to the termination of the
employment of Gran.
6. Upon arrival in the Philippines, Gran filed a
complaint against ESI/EDI, OAB, Country
Bankers Insurance Corp. and Western Guaranty
Corp. for underpayment of wages and illegal
dismissal.
Issue:
WON Saudi law applies. NO
Ruling:
1. In international law, the party who wants to have
a foreign law applied to a dispute or case has the
burden of proving the foreign law. The foreign law
is treated as a question of fact to be properly
pleaded and proved as the judge or labor arbiter
cannot take judicial notice of a foreign law. He is
presumed to know only domestic or forum law.
2. Unfortunately for EDI, it did not prove the
pertinent Saudi laws on the matter; thus, the
International Law doctrine of presumed-identity
approach or processual presumption comes into
play. Where a foreign law is not pleaded or, even
if pleaded, is not proved, the presumption is that
foreign law is the same as ours. Thus, we apply
Philippine labor laws in determining the issues
presented before us.
3. Applying Philippine law, the employer should
prove that the dismissal of employees is legal and
just. Failure to do so means that dismissal was not
justified and therefore illegal.
Manufacturers Hanover Trust v. Guerrero
Principle:
Foreign laws are not a matter of judicial notice.
Like any other fact, they must be alleged and
proven. Certainly, the conflicting allegations as to
whether New York law or Philippine law applies to
Guerrero's claims present a clear dispute on
material allegations which can be resolved only by
a trial on the merits. Under Section 24 of Rule 132,
the record of public documents of a sovereign
authority or tribunal may be proved by (1) an
official publication thereof or (2) a copy attested
by the officer having the legal custody thereof.
Such official publication or copy must be
accompanied, if the record is not kept in the
Philippines, with a certificate that the attesting
officer has the legal custody thereof.
Facts:
1. Guerrero filed a complaint for damages against
Manufacturers with the RTC of Manila for illegally
withholding taxes charged against interests on his
checking account with the Bank, returning a check
worth US$18,000.00 due to signature verification
problems, and unauthorized conversion of his
account.
2. Manufacturers filed a Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment seeking the dismissal of
Guerrero’s claims. The Bank contended that the
trial should be limited to the issue of actual
damages. Manufacturers alleged that Guerrero’s
account is governed by New York law and such
law does not permit any of Guerrero’s claims
except actual damages.
3. The affidavit of Alyssa Walden, a New York
attorney, supported the petitioner’s Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment.
4. Walden's affidavit, authenticated by the Phil.
Consular Office in NY, stated that Guerrero’s bank
account stipulated that the governing law is NY
law and that this law bars all of Guerrero’s claims
except actual damages.
Issue:
WON New York law applies. NO
Ruling:
1. Foreign laws are not a matter of judicial notice.
Like any other fact, they must be alleged and
proven. Certainly, the conflicting allegations as to
whether New York law or Philippine law applies to
Guerrero's claims present a clear dispute on
material allegations which can be resolved only by
a trial on the merits.
2. Under Section 24 of Rule 132, the record of
public documents of a sovereign authority or
tribunal may be proved by (1) an official
publication thereof or (2) a copy attested by the
officer having the legal custody thereof. Such
official publication or copy must be accompanied,
if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a
certificate that the attesting officer has the legal
custody thereof.
3. In another case, SC considered the testimony
under oath of an attorney-at-law of San Francisco,
California, who quoted verbatim a section of
California Civil Code and who stated that the
same was in force at the time the obligations were
contracted, as sufficient evidence to establish the
existence of said law.
4. The Bank, however, cannot rely on these cases
to support its cause. These cases involved
attorneys testifying in open court during the trial in
the Philippines and quoting the particular foreign
laws sought to be established. On the other hand,
the Walden affidavit was taken abroad ex parte
and the affiant never testified in open court. The
Walden affidavit cannot be considered as proof of
New York law on damages not only because it is
self-serving but also because it does not state the
specific New York law on damages.
5. The Walden affidavit states conclusions from
the affiant's personal interpretation and opinion of
the facts of the case vis a vis the alleged laws and
jurisprudence without citing any law in particular.
The citations in the Walden affidavit of various
U.S. court decisions do not constitute proof of the
official records or decisions of the U.S. courts.
While the Bank attached copies of some of the
U.S. court decisions cited in the Walden affidavit,
these copies do not comply with Section 24 of
Rule 132 on proof of official records or decisions
of foreign courts.
Asiavest Limited v. CA & Heras
Principle:
Foreign policies and laws, including the rules of
procedure, must be proven at all times in the
proceedings for recognition. While it is true that it
is the rule of the forum before which the case has
been lodged should apply in procedural matters,
the same cannot be done if the rule is not proven
in the action for recognition. As such, the rule on
presumption of identity or similarity of rules shall
apply.
Facts:
1. Heras guaranteed a debt of Compania
Hermanos.
2. Asiavest filed an action against Mr. Heras in a
Hong Kong court for sums of money, an action in
personam.
3. Heras left Hong Kong and resided in Quezon
City. The summons issued by the Hong Kong
court was served extraterritorially in the
Philippines. Thereafter, the Hong Kong court
proceeded to trial and judgment was rendered
against Heras.
4. Consequently, Asiavest filed an action for
enforcement of foreign judgment with the
Philippine court.
5. Heras filed an Answer seeking to repel the
judgment for want of jurisdiction, admitting,
however, the existence of such judgment.
6. He argues that, being not a resident of Hong
Kong, he should have been served with the
summons, personally. Therefore, the Hong Kong
court did not validly acquire jurisdiction over his
person.
7. Asiavest, however, counters that when it comes
to rules of procedure, it should be the rules of the
forum before which the case has been lodged – in
this case, the Hong Kong courts. Absent showing
of any defect, the judgment should be presumed
as valid, and the burden to repel the foreign
judgment rests on the party assailing it.
Issue:
WON the Hongkong judgment can be recognized.
NO
Rulings:
1. Foreign policies and laws, including the rules of
procedure, must be proven at all times in the
proceedings for recognition.
2. While it is true that it is the rule of the forum
before which the case has been lodged should
apply in procedural matters, the same cannot be
done if the rule is not proven in the action for
recognition[pp.
3. As such, the rule on presumption of identity or
similarity of rules shall apply. The Hong Kong
rules should be regarded as the same with the
Philippines.
4. As an action in personam, the summons should
have been served on Mr. Heras who was not
anymore a resident of Hong Kong during the
service of summons, as he left Hong Kong already
for good. The only exception to this is when the
spouse or a representative is within the
jurisdiction of the summoning government, which
is not the case at hand. Even though the rule is
that when a defendant is temporarily out of the
country, extraterritorial service can be done, such
rule will not apply because Heras was not out of
Hong Kong temporarily, he was out of Hong Kong
permanently. Applying Philippine law on the
matter, the extraterritorial service of summons
served upon him was invalid and the judgment
cannot be enforced.
*MDE’s digests starts here
Aznar v. Garcia
Principle:
The recognition of the renvoi theory implies that
the rules of the conflict of laws are to be
understood as incorporating not only the ordinary
or internal law of the foreign state or country, but
its rules of the conflict of laws as well. According
to this theory 'the law of a country' means the
whole of its law.
Facts:
1. In the will of Edward Christensen, he
recognized that he has only one child, Maria Lucy.
He directed his executor, Aznar, to give Helen
Christensen, a person not related to him as he
claims, P3,600. The remaining properties of the
estate shall go to Maria Lucy.
2. Opposition was filed by Helen, insofar as it
deprives her of her legitime as an acknowledged
natural child, she having been declared by SC in
G.R. Nos. L-11483-84 an acknowledged natural
child of the deceased Edward E. Christensen.
3. The legal grounds of opposition are (a) that the
distribution should be governed by the laws of the
Philippines, and (b) that said order of distribution
is contrary thereto insofar as it denies to Helen,
one of two acknowledged natural children, one-
half of the estate in full ownership.
4. Helen alleged that the law that should govern
the estate of the deceased Christensen should not
be the internal law of California alone, but the
entire law thereof because several foreign
elements are involved, that the forum is the
Philippines and even if the case were decided in
California, Section 946 of the California Civil
Code, which requires that the domicile of the
decedent should apply, should be applicable.
Issue:
WON Philippine Law will apply. YES.
Ruling:
1. He never lost his Californian citizenship.
However, he is domiciled in the Philippines
because nagdugay siya diri and wala siyay
properties sa California that would indicate nga
iya ra I abandon ang pinas.
2. Art 16 of our Civil Law provides that intestate
and testamentary successions, both with respect
to the order of succession and to the amount of
successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of
testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the
national law of the person whose succession is
under consideration, whatever may be the nature
of the property and regardless of the country
where said property may be found.
3. Art 946 of the Civil Code of California, in the
treatment of disposition of personal property,
provides that if there is no law to the contrary, in
the place where personal property is situated, it is
deemed to follow the person of its owner, and is
governed by the law of his domicile.
4. The court in deciding to grant more
successional rights to Helen said in effect that
there are two rules in California on the matter: the
internal law which should apply to Californians
domiciled in California; and the conflict rule which
should apply to Californians domiciled outside of
California
5. The conflict of law rule in California, Article 946,
Civil Code, refers back the case, when a decedent
is not domiciled in California, to the law of his
domicile, the Philippines in the case at bar. The
court of domicile cannot and should refer the case
back to California, as such action would leave the
issue incapable of determination, because the
case will then be tossed back and forth between
the two states.
6. The recognition of the renvoi theory implies that
the rules of the conflict of laws are to be
understood as incorporating not only the ordinary
or internal law of the foreign state or country, but
its rules of the conflict of laws as well. According
to this theory 'the law of a country' means the
whole of its law.
Bellis v. Bellis
Principle:
The renvoi doctrine is usually pertinent where the
decedent is a national of one country, and a
domicile of another.
Facts:
1. Amos G. Bellis, born in Texas, was "a citizen of
the State of Texas and of the United States."
A. By his first wife, Mary E. Mallen, whom
he divorced, he had five legitimate children:
Edward, George, Henry, Bellis and Bellis
B. By his second wife, Violet Kennedy, who
survived him, he had three legitimate
children: Edwin, Walter and Dorothy
C. And finally, he had three illegitimate
children: Amos Jr., Maria Cristina and
Miriam Palma.
2. Amos made a will saying that $240,000 will go
to his first wife, $120,000 to his 3 illegitimate
children, and the rest to be given to the rest of his
surviving children and his 2nd wife.
3. Amos died a resident in San Antonio, Texas.
4. His will was admitted to probate in the CFI of
Manila.
5. Maria Cristina and Miriam Bellis filed their
respective oppositions to the project of partition on
the ground that they were deprived of their
legitimes as illegitimate children and, therefore,
compulsory heirs of the deceased.
6. CFI – Applied the law of Texas which did not
provide for legitimes.
Issue:
WON Philippine Law applies.
Ruling:
1. The renvoi doctrine is usually pertinent where
the decedent is a national of one country, and a
domicile of another.
2. In the present case, it is not disputed that the
decedent was both a national of Texas and a
domicile thereof at the time of his death. So that
even assuming Texas has a conflict of law rule
providing that the domiciliary system (law of the
domicile) should govern, the same would not
result in a reference back (renvoi) to Philippine
law, but would still refer to Texas law.
3. Appellants' position is therefore not rested on
the doctrine of renvoi. As stated, they never
invoked nor even mentioned it in their arguments.
Rather, they argue that their case falls under the
circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of
Article 17 in relation to Article 16 of the Civil Code.
Llorente v. CA
Principle:
Whether the will is intrinsically valid and who shall
inherit from Lorenzo are issues best proved by
foreign law which must be pleaded and proved.
Whether the will was executed in accordance with
the formalities required is answered by referring to
Philippine law.
Facts:
1. The deceased Lorenzo Llorente was an
enlisted serviceman of the U.S. Navy and a
naturalized American citizen. Lorenzo married
Paula Llorente in the Philippines. Before the
outbreak of the Pacific War, Lorenzo departed for
the United States and Paula stayed in the conjugal
home in Camarines Sur.
2. When Lorenzo returned to the Philippines to
visit his wife, he discovered that his wife Paula
was pregnant and was "living in" and having an
adulterous relationship with his brother, Ceferino
Llorente.
3. Lorenzo returned to the United States and
secured divorce with the Superior Court of the
State of California in and for the County of San
Diego.
3. Thereafter, Lorenzo married Alicia Llorente in
Manila. Apparently, Alicia had no knowledge of
the first marriage even if they resided in the same
town as Paula, who did not oppose the marriage
or cohabitation.
4. Lorenzo and Alicia lived together as husband
and wife and produced three children - Raul, Luz
and Beverly.
5. Lorenzo executed a Last Will and Testament.
In the will, Lorenzo bequeathed all his property to
Alicia and their three children. The trial court
admitted the will to probate. Before the
proceedings could be terminated, Lorenzo died.
6. Paula filed with the same court a petition for
letters of administration over Lorenzo's estate in
her favor. Alicia also filed in the testate proceeding
a petition for the issuance of letters testamentary.
Issue:
WON the divorce shall be recognized without
evidence being offered.
Ruling:
1. The divorce obtained by Lorenzo H. Llorente
from his first wife Paula was valid and recognized
in this jurisdiction as a matter of comity.
2. First, there is no such thing as one American
law. The "national law" indicated in Article 16 of
the Civil Code cannot possibly apply to general
American law. There is no such law governing the
validity of testamentary provisions in the United
States. Each State of the union has its own law
applicable to its citizens and in force only within
the State. It can therefore refer to no other than
the law of the State of which the decedent was a
resident.
3. Second, there is no showing that the application
of the renvoi doctrine is called for or required by
New York State law.
4. The hasty application of Philippine law and the
complete disregard of the will, already probated
as duly executed in accordance with the
formalities of Philippine law, is fatal, especially in
light of the factual and legal circumstances here
obtaining.
5. The clear intent of Lorenzo to bequeath his
property to his second wife and children by her is
glaringly shown in the will he executed. We do not
wish to frustrate his wishes, since he was a
foreigner, not covered by our laws on "family
rights and duties, status, condition and legal
capacity.”
6. Whether the will is intrinsically valid and who
shall inherit from Lorenzo are issues best proved
by foreign law which must be pleaded and proved.
Whether the will was executed in accordance with
the formalities required is answered by referring to
Philippine law. In fact, the will was duly probated.
7. As a guide however, the trial court should note
that whatever public policy or good customs may
be involved in our system of legitimes, Congress
did not intend to extend the same to the
succession of foreign nationals. Congress
specifically left the amount of successional rights
to the decedent's
national law
Llamanzares v. COMELEC
San Luis v. San Luis
Principle:
1. For purposes of fixing venue under the Rules of
Court, the "residence" of a person is his personal,
actual or physical habitation, or actual residence
or place of abode, which may not necessarily be
his legal residence or domicile provided he
resides therein with continuity and consistency.
2. Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen
and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce
is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry
under Philippine law.
Facts:
1. This case involves the settlement of the estate
of Felicisimo T. San Luis, who was the former
governor of the Province of Laguna.
2. During his lifetime, Felicisimo contracted three
marriages.
A. His first marriage was with Virginia Sulit
out of which were born six children. Virginia
predeceased Felicisimo. Two of the
children are Edgar and Rodolfo.
B. He then married Merry Lee Corwin, with
whom he had a son. However, Merry Lee,
an American, filed a divorce, to which a
Divorce Decree was issued.
C. He then married Felicidad San Luis. He
had no children with her but lived with her
for 18 years from the time of their marriage
up to his death
3. Felicidad sought the dissolution of their
conjugal partnership assets and the settlement of
Felicisimo’s estate. She filed a motion for letters
of administration before the RTC of Makati City.
4. Felicidad alleged:
A. That she is the widow of Felicisimo;
B. that, at the time of his death, the
decedent was residing at 100 San Juanico
Street, New Alabang Village, Alabang,
Metro Manila;
C. that the decedent’s surviving heirs are
Felicidad as legal spouse, his six children
by his first marriage, and son by his second
marriage;
D. that the decedent left real properties,
both conjugal and exclusive, valued at
₱30,304,178.00 more or less;
that the decedent does not have any
unpaid debts.
5. Rodolfo filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds
of improper venue and failure to state a cause of
action. Rodolfo claimed that the petition for letters
of administration should have been filed in the
Province of Laguna because this was Felicisimo’s
place of residence prior to his death. Furthermore,
he claimed that Felicidad has no legal personality
to file the petition because she was only a
mistress of Felicisimo since the latter, at the time
of his death, was still legally married to Merry Lee.
6. Motion was dismissed. Regardless, Felicidad
filed her answer, saying that while Felicisimo
exercised the powers of his public office in
Laguna, he regularly went home to their house in
New Alabang Village, Alabang, Metro Manila.
Further, she presented the decree of absolute
divorce issued by the Family Court of the First
Circuit, State of Hawaii to prove that the marriage
of Felicisimo to Merry Lee had already been
dissolved.
7. RTC (gireraffle ug lain court kay ni inhibit ang
judge) – Dismiss. It held that, at the time of his
death, Felicisimo was the duly elected governor
and a resident of the Province of Laguna. Hence,
the petition should have been filed in Sta. Cruz,
Laguna and not in Makati City. It also ruled that
Felicidad was without legal capacity to file the
petition for letters of administration because her
marriage with Felicisimo was bigamous, thus, void
ab initio. It found that the decree of absolute
divorce dissolving Felicisimo’s marriage to Merry
Lee was not valid in the Philippines and did not
bind Felicisimo who was a Filipino citizen.
8. CA – Reverse. The term "place of residence" of
the decedent, for purposes of fixing the venue of
the settlement of his estate, refers to the personal,
actual or physical habitation, or actual residence
or place of abode of a person as distinguished
from legal residence or domicile. It noted that
although Felicisimo discharged his functions as
governor in Laguna, he actually resided in
Alabang, Muntinlupa. Thus, the petition for letters
of administration was properly filed in Makati City.
It also held that Felicisimo had legal capacity to
marry respondent by virtue of paragraph 2, Article
26 of the Family Code and the rulings in Van Dorn
v. Romillo, Jr. and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera. It found
that the marriage between Felicisimo and Merry
Lee was validly dissolved by virtue of the decree
of absolute divorce issued by the Family Court of
the First Circuit, State of Hawaii. As a result, under
paragraph 2, Article 26, Felicisimo was
capacitated to contract a subsequent marriage
with respondent.
Issue:
1. WON venue was properly laid. YES
2. WON Felicidad has legal capacity to file the
petition for letters of administration.
Ruling:
Venue is Properly Laid
1. Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court,
the petition for letters of administration of the
estate of Felicisimo should be filed in the Regional
Trial Court of the province "in which he resides at
the time of his death."
2. The word "resides" should be viewed or
understood in its popular sense, meaning, the
personal, actual or physical habitation of a person,
actual residence or place of abode. It signifies
physical presence in a place and actual stay
thereat. In this popular sense, the term means
merely residence, that is, personal residence, not
legal residence or domicile.
3. Residence simply requires bodily presence as
an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile
requires bodily presence in that place and also an
intention to make it one’s domicile. No particular
length of time of residence is required though;
however, the residence must be more than
temporary.
4. In election cases, "residence" and "domicile"
are treated as synonymous terms, that is, the fixed
permanent residence to which when absent, one
has the intention of returning. However, for
purposes of fixing venue under the Rules of Court,
the "residence" of a person is his personal, actual
or physical habitation, or actual residence or place
of abode, which may not necessarily be his legal
residence or domicile provided he resides therein
with continuity and consistency.
5. In the instant case, while petitioners established
that Felicisimo was domiciled in Sta. Cruz,
Laguna, respondent proved that he also
maintained a residence in Alabang, Muntinlupa.
From the foregoing, we find that Felicisimo was a
resident of Alabang, Muntinlupa for purposes of
fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate.
Felicidad has legal personality
6. In Van Dorn v. Romillo and Pilapil v. Ibay-
Somera, the SC recognized the validity of a
divorce decree obtained abroad.
7. Sec 26 Par 2 of the Family Code provides that
where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry
under Philippine law.
8. Marriage, being a mutual and shared
commitment between two parties, cannot possibly
be productive of any good to the society where
one is considered released from the marital bond
while the other remains bound to it. Such is the
state of affairs where the alien spouse obtains a
valid divorce abroad against the Filipino spouse,
as in this case.
9. Applying the above doctrine in the instant case,
the divorce decree allegedly obtained by Merry
Lee which absolutely allowed Felicisimo to
remarry, would have vested Felicidad with the
legal personality to file the present petition as
Felicisimo’s surviving spouse.
10. The case was remanded to the trial court for
further reception on the divorce decree obtained
by Merry Lee and the marriage of Felicidad and
Felicisimo.
11. Even assuming that Felicisimo was not
capacitated to marry respondent in 1974,
nevertheless, we find that the latter has the legal
personality to file the subject petition for letters of
administration, as she may be considered the co-
owner of Felicisimo as regards the properties that
were acquired through their joint efforts during
their cohabitation.
Van Dorn v. Romillo
Principle:
Aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided they are
valid according to their national law.
Facts:
1. Alice Reyes Van Dorn (Phil Citizen) married
Richard Upton (US Citizen) in Hongkong. After
their marriage, they established their residence in
the Philippines, and they begot two children.
2. They were divorced in Nevada, and Alice has
remarried to Theodore Van Dorn.
3. Richard filed a suit against Alice stating that
Alice's business in Ermita, Manila, (the Galleon
Shop, for short), is conjugal property of the
parties, and asking that Alice be ordered to render
an accounting of that business, and that private
respondent be declared with right to manage the
conjugal property.
4. Alice moved to dismiss the case on the ground
that the cause of action is barred by previous
judgment in the divorce proceedings before the
Nevada Court wherein Richard had
acknowledged that he and petitioner had "no
community property"
5. RTC – Denied. The property involved is located
in the Philippines so that the Divorce Decree has
no bearing in the case.
6. Van Dorn - contends that Richard is estopped
from laying claim on the alleged conjugal property
because of the representation he made in the
divorce proceedings before the American Court
that they had no community of property; that the
Galleon Shop was not established through
conjugal funds, and that respondent's claim is
barred by prior judgment.
7. Upton – avers that the Divorce Decree issued
by the Nevada Court cannot prevail over the
prohibitive laws of the Philippines and its declared
national policy; that the acts and declaration of a
foreign Court cannot, especially if the same is
contrary to public policy, divest Philippine Courts
of jurisdiction to entertain matters within its
jurisdiction.
Issue:
WON divorce is valid and binding in this
jurisdiction, the same being contrary to local law
and public policy. YES
Ruling:
1. It is true that owing to the nationality principle
embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only
Philippine nationals are covered by the policy
against absolute divorces the same being
considered contrary to our concept of public police
and morality.
1. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad,
which may be recognized in the Philippines,
provided they are valid according to their national
law.
2. In this case, the divorce in Nevada released
Richard Upton from the marriage from the
standards of American law, under which divorce
dissolves the marriage.
3. Thus, pursuant to his national law, Upton is no
longer the husband of Alice. He would have no
standing to sue in the case below as Alice's
husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal
assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own
country's Court, which validly exercised
jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does
not repudiate, he is estopped by his own
representation before said Court from asserting
his right over the alleged conjugal property.
4. Alice should not be obliged to live together with,
observe respect and fidelity, and render support
to Richard. The latter should not continue to be
one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal
property. She should not be discriminated against
in her own country if the ends of justice are to be
served.
Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera
Principle:
A divorce granted outside the Philippines and its
legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines
insofar as parties are concerned in view of the
nationality principle in our civil law on the matter
of status of persons.
Facts:
1. Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipino citizen,
and Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a German national,
were married in Germany. The marriage started
auspiciously enough, and the couple lived
together for some time in Malate, Manila where
their only child.
2. Thereafter, marital discord set in, with mutual
recriminations between the spouses, followed by
a separation de facto between them.
3. After about three and a half Erich initiated a
divorce proceeding against petitioner in Germany
on the ground of failure of marriage, which was
granted.
4. On the other hand, Pilapil filed an action for
legal separation, support, and separation of
property in the Ph.
5. After that, Erich filed two complaints for adultery
before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that, while
still married, Pilapil "had an affair with two men.
6. Pilapil filed a petition with the SOJ asking that
the aforesaid resolution of respondent fiscal be
set aside and the cases against her be dismissed,
and it was given due course.
7. Despite this, the judge merely rescheduled the
arraignment. Ni plea guilty ang laki, pero si Pilapil
kay ni refuse to be arraign, resulting in direct
contempt. Pero later on, ni plea siya ug not guilty.
Ni file sad siyag motion to quash on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction pero gi deny.
8. Pilapil filed this special civil action for certiorari
and prohibition, with a prayer for a temporary
restraining order, seeking the annulment of the
order of the lower court denying her motion to
quash. The petition is anchored on the main
ground that the court is without jurisdiction "to try
and decide the charge of adultery, which is a
private offense that cannot be prosecuted de
officio (sic), since the purported complainant, a
foreigner, does not qualify as an offended spouse
having obtained a final divorce decree under his
national law prior to his filing the criminal
complaint."
Issue:
WON the petition is metitorious. YES.
Ruling:
1. Under Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code,
the crime of adultery, as well as four other crimes
against chastity, cannot be prosecuted except
upon a sworn written complaint filed by the
offended spouse. It has long since been
established, with unwavering consistency, that
compliance with this rule is a jurisdictional, and not
merely a formal, requirement.
2. The law specifically provides that in
prosecutions for adultery and concubinage the
person who can legally file the complaint should
be the offended spouse, and nobody else.
3. Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to
the offended spouse to institute the action, it
necessarily follows that such initiator must have
the status, capacity or legal representation to do
so at the time of the filing of the criminal action.
4. Hence, as cogently argued by Pilapil, Article
344 of the Revised Penal Code thus presupposes
that the marital relationship is still subsisting at the
time of the institution of the criminal action for,
adultery. This is a logical consequence since the
raison d'etre of said provision of law would be
absent where the supposed offended party had
ceased to be the spouse of the alleged offender at
the time of the filing of the criminal case.
5. In these cases, therefore, it is indispensable
that the status and capacity of the complainant to
commence the action be definitely established
and, as already demonstrated, such status or
capacity must indubitably exist as of the time he
initiates the action.
6. In the present case, the fact that Erich obtained
a valid divorce in his country, the Federal Republic
of Germany, is admitted. Said divorce and its legal
effects may be recognized in the Philippines
insofar as Erich is concerned in view of the
nationality principle in our civil law on the matter
of status of persons.
7. Erich, being no longer the husband of Pilapil,
had no legal standing to commence the adultery
case under the imposture that he was the
offended spouse at the time he filed suit.
Republic v. Manalo
Silverio v. Republic
Philippine Export and Foreign Loan Guarantee
Corporation v. Eusebio Construction
Principle:
1. The rule followed by most legal systems,
however, is that the intrinsic validity of a contract
must be governed by the lex contractus or "proper
law of the contract." This is the law voluntarily
agreed upon by the parties (the lex loci voluntatis)
or the law intended by them either expressly or
implicitly (the lex loci intentionis).
2. The two rules that now seem to have emerged
as "kings of the hill" are
(1) the parties may choose the governing
law; and
(2) in the absence of such a choice, the
applicable law is that of the State that "has
the most significant relationship to the
transaction and the parties."
Facts:
Note - This case is an offshoot of a service
contract entered into by a Filipino construction
firm with the Iraqi Government for the construction
of the Institute of Physical Therapy-Medical
Center, Phase II, in Baghdad, Iraq, at a time when
the Iran-Iraq war was ongoing.
1. Philippine Export and Foreign Loan Guarantee
Corporation1 (Philguarantee) sought
reimbursement from the respondents of the sum
of money it paid to Al Ahli Bank of Kuwait pursuant
to a guarantee it issued for respondent V.P.
Eusebio Construction, Inc. (VPECI).
2. Before that, the State Organization of Buildings
(SOB), Ministry of Housing and Construction,
Baghdad, Iraq, awarded the construction of the
Institute of Physical Therapy–Medical
Rehabilitation Center, Phase II, in Baghdad, Iraq,
(hereinafter the Project) to Ajyal Trading and
Contracting Company (hereinafter Ajyal), a firm
duly licensed with the Kuwait Chamber of
Commerce.
3. Eduardo and Iluminada Santos, in behalf of 3-
Plex International, Inc. (hereinafter 3-Plex), a local
contractor engaged in construction business,
entered into a joint venture agreement with Ajyal
wherein the former undertook the execution of the
entire Project, while the latter would be entitled to
a commission of 4% of the contract price.
4. 3-Plex, not being accredited by or registered
with the Philippine Overseas Construction Board
(POCB), assigned and transferred all its rights
and interests under the joint venture agreement to
VPECI, a construction and engineering firm duly
registered with the POCB.
5. The SOB required the contractors to submit (1)
a performance bond and (2) an advance payment
bond.
6. To comply with these requirements, 3-Plex and
VPECI applied for the issuance of a guarantee
with Philguarantee, a government financial
institution empowered to issue guarantees for
qualified Filipino contractors to secure the
performance of approved service contracts
abroad.
7. Letters of Guarantee were issued by
Philguarantee to the Rafidian Bank of Baghdad,
but they were not accepted by the SOB because
it requires a letter-guarantee from Rafidian Bank.
8. Rafidain Bank then issued a performance bond
in favor of SOB on the condition that another
foreign bank, not Philguarantee, would issue a
counter-guarantee to cover its exposure. Al Ahli
Bank of Kuwait was, therefore, engaged to
provide a counter-guarantee to Rafidain Bank, but
it required a similar counter-guarantee in its favor
from the petitioner. Thus, three layers of
guarantees had to be arranged.
9. Philguarantee issued in favor of Al Ahli Bank of
Kuwait Letter of Guarantees. There letters were
secured by a (1) Deed of Undertaking executed
by VPECI, Sps Eusebio, 3-Plex and Sps Santos,
and (2) a surety bond issued by First Integrated
Bonding and Insurance Company (FIBICI).
10. SOB and VPECI & Ajyal executed the service
contract for the construction of the Project. Under
the contract, the Joint Venture would supply
manpower and materials, and SOB would refund
to the former.
11. Because of delays, The Project was not
completed as scheduled, but upon foreseeing the
impossibility of meeting the deadline, and upon
the request of Al Ahli Bank, the joint venture
contractor worked for the renewal or extension of
the Performance Bond and Advance Payment
Guarantee. Therefore, the letters of guarantee
were extended.
12. After pila ka years, the status of the Project
was 51% accomplished, meaning the structures
were already finished. The remaining 47%
consisted in electro-mechanical works and the
2%, sanitary works, which both required
importation of equipment and materials.
13. Al Ahli Bank of Kuwait sent a telex call to the
Philguarantee demanding full payment of its
performance bond counter-guarantee.
14. VPECI requested Iraq Trade and Economic
Development Minister Mohammad Fadhi Hussein
to recall the telex call on the performance
guarantee for being a drastic action in
contravention of its mutual agreement with the
latter that (1) the imposition of penalty would be
held in abeyance until the completion of the
project; and (2) the time extension would be open,
depending on the developments on the
negotiations for a foreign loan to finance the
completion of the project.
15. It also wrote SOB protesting the call for lack of
factual or legal basis, since the failure to complete
the Project was due to (1) the Iraqi government's
lack of foreign exchange with which to pay its
(VPECI's) accomplishments and (2) SOB's
noncompliance for the past several years with the
provision in the contract that 75% of the billings
would be paid in US dollars.
16. VPECI advised Philguarantee not to pay yet
Al Ahli Bank because efforts were being exerted
for the amicable settlement of the project.
17. Philguarantee informed VPECI that it would
remit to Al Ahli Bank, and reiterated the joint and
solidary obligation of the respondents to
reimburse the petitioner for the advances made
on its counter-guarantee. Nibayad dayon sila.
18. Philguarantee sent respondents separate
letters demanding full pursuant to their joint and
solidary obligations under the deed of undertaking
and surety bond. When the respondents failed to
pay, the Philguarantee filed a civil case for
collection of a sum of money.
19. RTC – Ruled against Philguarantee and held
that it has no valid cause of action against
respondents. It opined that at the time the call was
made on the guarantee which was executed for a
specific period, the guarantee had already lapsed
or expired. There was no valid renewal or
extension of the guarantee for failure of the
petitioner to secure respondents' express consent
thereto.
20. CA – Affirmed. the delay or the non-
completion of the Project was caused by factors
not imputable to the respondent contractor. It was
rather due mainly to the persistent violations by
SOB of the terms and conditions of the contract,
particularly its failure to pay 75% of the
accomplished work in US Dollars. Indeed, where
one of the parties to a contract does not perform
in a proper manner the prestation which he is
bound to perform under the contract, he is not
entitled to demand the performance of the other
party. A party does not incur in delay if the other
party fails to perform the obligation incumbent
upon him.
21. Philguarantee - maintains that the payments
by SOB of the monthly billings in purely Iraqi
Dinars did not render impossible the performance
of the Project by VPECI.
22. Philguarantee - asserts that since the
guarantee it issued was absolute, unconditional,
and irrevocable the nature and extent of its liability
are analogous to those of suretyship. Its liability
accrued upon the failure of the respondents to
finish the construction of the Institute of Physical
Therapy Buildings in Baghdad.
Issue:
1. WON Philguarantee is a surety. NO
2. What law shall apply to determine whether
there is default. Dapat Iraqi Laws unta kay naay
substantial connection pero wala man gi
plead, so processual presumption.
2. WON the contractor is in default. NO
3. WON Philguarantee as a guarantor secure
reimbursement from the respondents for what has
been paid under the letter of guarantee. NO
Ruling:
Phiguarantee is not a surety
1. By guaranty a person, called the guarantor,
binds himself to the creditor to fulfill the obligation
of the principal debtor in case the latter should fail
to do so. If a person binds himself solidarily with
the principal debtor, the contract is called
suretyship.
2. The letter of guarantee provides that
Philguarantee is liable only upon the event of
default of VP Eusebio.
3. Philguarantor is a guarantor and not a surety.
That the guarantee issued by the petitioner is
unconditional and irrevocable does not make the
petitioner a surety. As a guaranty, it is still
characterized by its subsidiary and conditional
quality because it does not take effect until the
fulfillment of the condition, namely, that the
principal obligor should fail in his obligation at the
time and in the form he bound himself.
Law of Iraq shall be applied
4.
. The law selected may be implied from such
factors as substantial connection with the
transaction, or the nationality or domicile of the
parties. Philippine courts would do well to adopt
the first and most basic rule in most legal systems,
namely, to allow the parties to select the law
applicable to their contract, subject to the
limitation that it is not against the law, morals, or
public policy of the forum and that the chosen law
must bear a substantive relationship to the
transaction.
6. It must be noted that the service contract
between SOB and VPECI contains no express
choice of the law that would govern it. In the
United States and Europe, the two rules that now
seem to have emerged as "kings of the hill" are
(1) the parties may choose the governing
law; and
(2) in the absence of such a choice, the
applicable law is that of the State that "has
the most significant relationship to the
transaction and the parties."
7. In this case, the laws of Iraq bear substantial
connection to the transaction, since one of the
parties is the Iraqi Government and the place of
performance is in Iraq. Hence, the issue of
whether respondent VPECI defaulted in its
obligations may be determined by the laws of Iraq.
8. However, since that foreign law was not
properly pleaded or proved, the presumption of
identity or similarity, otherwise known as the
processual presumption, comes into play. Where
foreign law is not pleaded or, even if pleaded, is
not proved, the presumption is that foreign law is
the same as ours.
Contractor is not in default
9. In order that the debtor may be in default it is
necessary that the following requisites be present:
(1) that the obligation be demandable and
already liquidated;
(2) that the debtor delays performance; and
(3) that the creditor requires the
performance because it must appear that
the tolerance or benevolence of the
creditor must have ended.
10. SOB cannot yet demand complete
performance from VPECI because it has not yet
itself performed its obligation in a proper manner,
particularly the payment of the 75% of the cost of
the Project in US Dollars. The VPECI cannot yet
be said to have incurred in delay.
11. Even assuming that there was delay and that
the delay was attributable to VPECI, still the
effects of that delay ceased upon the renunciation
by the creditor, SOB, which could be implied when
the latter granted several extensions of time to the
former.
12. Besides, no demand has yet been made by
SOB against the respondent contractor. Demand
is generally necessary even if a period has been
fixed in the obligation. And default generally
begins from the moment the creditor demands
judicially or extra-judicially the performance of the
obligation. Without such demand, the effects of
default will not arise.
13. Moreover, the Philguarantee as a guarantor is
entitled to the benefit of excussion, that is, it
cannot be compelled to pay the creditor SOB
unless the property of the debtor VPECI has been
exhausted and all legal remedies against the said
debtor have been resorted to by the creditor.
Philguarantee cannot be reimbursed
14. As a rule, a guarantor who pays for a debtor
should be indemnified by the latter and would be
legally subrogated to the rights which the creditor
has against the debtor.
15. However, a person who makes payment
without the knowledge or against the will of the
debtor has the right to recover only insofar as the
payment has been beneficial to the debtor.
16. If the obligation was subject to defenses on
the part of the debtor, the same defenses which
could have been set up against the creditor can
be set up against the paying guarantor.
17. It is clear that the payment made by
Philguarantee did not in any way benefit the
principal debtor, given the project status and the
conditions obtaining at the Project site at that time.
Moreover, the contractor was found to have valid
defenses against SOB, which are fully supported
by evidence and which have been meritoriously
set up against the paying guarantor.
18. Philguarantee should have waited for the
natural course of guaranty: the debtor VPECI
should have, in the first place, defaulted in its
obligation and that the creditor SOB should have
first made a demand from the principal debtor. It
is only when the debtor does not or cannot pay, in
whole or in part, that the guarantor should pay.
Continental Micronesia v. Basso
Principle:
An essential element of conflict rules is the
indication of a "test" or "connecting factor" or
"point of contact". Choice-of-law rules invariably
consist of a factual relationship (such as property
right, contract claim) and a connecting fact or point
of contact, such as the situs of the res, the place
of celebration, the place of performance, or the
place of wrongdoing.
Facts:
1. Parties:
- Continental Micronesia, Inc. (CMI) is a
foreign corporation organized and existing
under the laws of and domiciled in the
United States of America (US). It is
licensed to do business in the Philippines.
 - Basso, a US citizen, resided in the
Philippines prior to his death.
2. Keith Braden, Managing Director-Asia of
Continental Airlines, offered Basso the position of
General Manager of the Philippine Branch, to
which the latter accepted.
3. Basso then signed the employment contract
and returned it to Mr. Braden as instructed.
4. CMI took over the Philippine operations of
Continental, with Basso retaining his position as
General Manager.
5. Basso received a letter from Mr. Ralph Schulz
(Mr. Schulz), who was then CMI’s Vice President
of Marketing and Sales, informing Basso that he
has agreed to work in CMI as a consultant on an
"as needed basis".
6. The letter also informed Basso that:
(1) he will not receive any monetary
compensation but will continue being
covered by the insurance provided by CMI;
(2) he will enjoy travel privileges; and
(3) CMI will advance Php1,140,000.00 for
the payment of housing lease for 12
months.
7. Basso wrote a counter-proposal to Mr. Schulz
regarding his employment status in CMI. Basso
wrote another letter addressed to Ms. Marty
Woodward (Ms. Woodward) of CMI’s Human
Resources Department inquiring about the status
of his employment, to which she responded that
pursuant to the employment contract, Basso could
be terminated at will upon a thirty-day notice.
8. This notice was allegedly the letter received by
Basso from Mr. Schulz. Basso was also reminded
about the telephone conversation where they
informed him of the company’s decision to relieve
him as General Manager, and instead, offered the
position as consultant. The counter-offer was also
rejected.
9. Basso filed a complaint for illegal dismissal.
10. Alleging the presence of foreign elements,
CMI filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack
of jurisdiction over the person of CMI and the
subject matter of the controversy.
11. Labor Arbiter – Granted the motion to dismiss.
Applying the doctrine of lex loci contractus, the
Labor Arbiter held that the terms and provisions of
the employment contract show that the parties did
not intend to apply our Labor Code (Presidential
Decree No. 442). The Labor Arbiter also held that
no employer-employee relationship existed
between Basso and the branch office of CMI in the
Philippines, but between Basso and the foreign
corporation itself.
12. Labor Arbiter - the employment contract was
executed in the US "since the letter-offer was
under the Texas letterhead and the acceptance of
Complainant was returned there." Thus, applying
the doctrine of lex loci celebrationis, US laws
apply. Also, applying lex loci contractus, the Labor
Arbiter ruled that the parties did not intend to apply
Philippine laws, thus: Although the contract does
not state what law shall apply, it is obvious that
Philippine laws were not written into it. More
specifically, the Philippine law on taxes and the
Labor Code were not intended by the parties to
apply, and the contract was prepared in
contemplation of Texas or US laws.
13. NLRC – Decision of labor arbiter was set
aside. The NLRC did not agree with the
pronouncement of the Labor Arbiter that his office
has no jurisdiction over the controversy. It ruled
that the Labor Arbiter acquired jurisdiction over
the case when CMI voluntarily submitted to his
office’s jurisdiction by presenting evidence,
advancing arguments in support of the legality of
its acts, and praying for reliefs on the merits of the
case.
14. NLRC - Basso was dismissed for just and valid
causes on the ground of breach of trust and loss
of confidence. The NLRC ruled that under the
applicable rules on loss of trust and confidence of
a managerial employee, such as Basso, mere
existence of a basis for believing that such
employee has breached the trust of his employer
suffices.
15. CA – Ruled in favor of Basso. Judgment is
rendered hereby declaring the dismissal of Basso
illegal and ordering Continental to pay him
separation pay equivalent to one (1) month pay for
every year of service as an alternative to
reinstatement. Further, ordering Continental to
pay Basso his full backwages from the date of his
said illegal dismissal until date of this decision.
16. CA - Labor Arbiter and the NLRC had
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case and
over the parties.
17. CA - The Court of Appeals explained that
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action is
determined by the allegations of the complaint
and the law. Since the case filed by Basso is a
termination dispute that is "undoubtedly
cognizable by the labor tribunals", the Labor
Arbiter and the NLRC had jurisdiction to rule on
the merits of the case.
18. On the issue of jurisdiction over the person of
the parties, who are foreigners, the Court of
Appeals ruled that jurisdiction over the person of
Basso was acquired when he filed the complaint
for illegal dismissal, while jurisdiction over the
person of CMI was acquired through coercive
process of service of summons to its agent in the
Philippines.
19. Furthermore, CMI insists that US law is the
applicable choice-of-law under the principles of
lex loci celebrationis and lex loci contractus. It
argues that the contract of employment originated
from and was returned to the US after Basso
signed it, and hence, was perfected there. CMI
further claims that the references to US law in the
employment contract show the parties’ intention to
apply US law and not ours.
20. CMI asserts that the US law on labor relations
particularly, the US Railway Labor Act sanctions
termination-at-will provisions in an employment
contract. Thus, CMI concludes that if such laws
were applied, there would have been no illegal
dismissal to speak of because the termination-at-
will provision in Basso’s employment contract
would have been perfectly valid.
Issue:
1. WON the LA and NLRC has jurisdiction. YES
2. WON the local forum is the convenient forum.
YES
3. What law should be applied?
Ruling:
LA and NLRC has jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the case
1. SC agreed with CMI that there is a conflict of
laws issue that needs to be resolved first. Where
the facts establish the existence of foreign
elements, the case presents a conflict-of-laws
issue.
2. Jurisdiction is defined as the power and
authority of the courts to hear, try and decide
cases. Jurisdiction over the subject matter is
conferred by the Constitution or by law and by the
material allegations in the complaint, regardless of
whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover all
or some of the claims or reliefs sought therein.
3. That the employment contract of Basso was
replete with references to US laws, and that it
originated from and was returned to the US, do
not automatically preclude our labor tribunals from
exercising jurisdiction to hear and try this case.
4. This case stemmed from an illegal dismissal
complaint. The Labor Code, under Article 217,
clearly vests original and exclusive jurisdiction to
hear and decide cases involving termination
disputes to the Labor Arbiter. Therefore, the LA
and NLRC has jurisdiction over the subject matter
of the case.
LA and NLRC has jurisdiction over the parties
5. They acquired jurisdiction over the person of
Basso, notwithstanding his citizenship, when he
filed his complaint against CMI.
6. jurisdiction over the person of CMI was
acquired through the coercive process of service
of summons. We note that CMI never denied that
it was served with summons. CMI has, in fact,
voluntarily appeared and participated in the
proceedings before the courts. Though a foreign
corporation, CMI is licensed to do business in the
Philippines and has a local business address
here. The purpose of the law in requiring that
foreign corporations doing business in the country
be licensed to do so, is to subject the foreign
corporations to the jurisdiction of our courts.
The local forum is the convenient forum.
7. Under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, a
Philippine court in a conflict-of-laws case may
assume jurisdiction if it chooses to do so,
provided, that the following requisites are met:
 (1) that the Philippine Court is one to which
the parties may conveniently resort to;
(2) that the Philippine Court is in a position
to make an intelligent decision as to the law
and the facts; and
(3) that the Philippine Court has or is likely
to have power to enforce its decision. All
requisites are present.
8. Basso may conveniently resort to our labor
tribunals as he and CMI had physical presence in
the Philippines during the duration of the trial. CMI
has a Philippine branch, while Basso, before his
death, was residing here. Thus, it could be
reasonably expected that no extraordinary
measures were needed for the parties to make
arrangements in advocating their respective
cases.
9. The labor tribunals can make an intelligent
decision as to the law and facts. The incident
subject of this case (i.e. dismissal of Basso)
happened in the Philippines, the surrounding
circumstances of which can be ascertained
without having to leave the Philippines. The acts
that allegedly led to loss of trust and confidence
and Basso’s eventual dismissal were committed
in the Philippines.
10. The labor tribunals have the power to enforce
their judgments because they acquired jurisdiction
over the persons of both parties.
The laws of the forum should apply
11. The choice-of-law issue in a conflict-of-laws
case seeks to answer the following important
questions:
(1) What legal system should control a
given situation where some of the
significant facts occurred in two or more
states; and
(2) to what extent should the chosen legal
system regulate the situation.
12. An essential element of conflict rules is the
indication of a "test" or "connecting factor" or
"point of contact". Choice-of-law rules invariably
consist of a factual relationship (such as property
right, contract claim) and a connecting fact or point
of contact, such as the situs of the res, the place
of celebration, the place of performance, or the
place of wrongdoing.
13. the "test factors," "points of contact" or
"connecting factors" in this case are the following:
(1) The nationality, domicile or residence of
Basso;
(2) The seat of CMI;
(3) The place where the employment
contract has been made, the locus actus;
(4) The place where the act is intended to
come into effect, e.g., the place of
performance of contractual duties;
(5) The intention of the contracting parties
as to the law that should govern their
agreement, the lex loci intentionis; and
(6) The place where judicial or
administrative proceedings are instituted or
done.
14. Applying the foregoing in this case, we
conclude that Philippine law is the applicable law.
(1) Basso, though a US citizen, was a
resident here from the time he was hired by
CMI until his death during the pendency of
the case.
(2) CMI, while a foreign corporation, has a
license to do business in the Philippines
and maintains a branch here, where Basso
was hired to work.
(3) The contract of employment was
negotiated in the Philippines.
(4) A purely consensual contract, it was
also perfected in the Philippines when
Basso accepted the terms and conditions
of his employment as offered by CMI.
(5) The place of performance relative to
Basso’s contractual duties was in the
Philippines. The alleged prohibited acts of
Basso that warranted his dismissal were
committed in the Philippines.
15. Clearly, the Philippines is the state with the
most significant relationship to the problem. Thus,
we hold that CMI and Basso intended Philippine
law to govern, notwithstanding some references
made to US laws and the fact that this intention
was not expressly stated in the contract.
Saudi Arabian Airlines v. Rebesencio
Principle:
While a Philippine tribunal (acting as the forum
court) is called upon to respect the parties' choice
of governing law, such respect must not be so
permissive as to lose sight of considerations of
law, morals, good customs, public order, or public
policy that underlie the contract central to the
controversy
Facts:
1. Saudi Arabian Airlines (Saudia) is a foreign
corporation and existing under the laws of Saudi
Arabia, and it has a Philippine office.
2. Respondents were recruited and hired by
Saudia as Temporary Flight Attendants with the
accreditation and approval of the Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration. After
undergoing seminars required by the Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration for
deployment overseas, as well as training modules
offered by Saudia (e.g., initial flight
attendant/training course and transition training),
and after working as Temporary Flight Attendants,
respondents became Permanent Flight
Attendants. They then entered into Cabin
Attendant contracts with Saudia.
3. Respondents were separated from service and
contended that the termination of their
employment was illegal. They alleged that the
termination was made solely because they were
pregnant.
4. They had informed Saudia of their respective
pregnancies and had gone through the necessary
procedures to process their maternity leaves.
Initially, Saudia had given its approval but later on
informed respondents that its management in
Jeddah, Saudi Arabia had disapproved their
maternity leaves. In addition, it required
respondents to file their resignation letters.
5. Respondents were told that if they did not
resign, Saudia would terminate them all the same.
The threat of termination entailed the loss of
benefits, such as separation pay and ticket
discount entitlements.
6. Saudia anchored its disapproval of
respondents' maternity leaves and demand for
their resignation on its "Unified Employment
Contract for Female Cabin Attendants" (Unified
Contract). Under the Unified Contract, the
employment of a Flight Attendant who becomes
pregnant is rendered void.
7. Respondents filed a Complaint against Saudia
and its officers for illegal dismissal and for
underpayment of salary, overtime pay, premium
pay for holiday, rest day, premium, service
incentive leave pay, 13th month pay, separation
pay, night shift differentials, medical expense
reimbursements, retirement benefits, illegal
deduction, lay-over expense and allowances,
moral and exemplary damages, and attorney's
fees.
8. Saudia assailed the jurisdiction of the Labor
Arbiter. It claimed that all the determining points of
contact referred to foreign law and insisted that
the Complaint ought to be dismissed on the
ground of forum non conveniens. It added that
respondents had no cause of action as they
resigned voluntarily.
9. Labor Arbiter – Dismissed.
10. NLRC – Reverse. Considering that
complainants are OFWs, the Labor Arbiters and
the NLRC has jurisdiction to hear and decide their
complaint for illegal termination. On the matter of
forum non conveniens, it noted that there were no
special circumstances that warranted its
abstention from exercising jurisdiction. On the
issue of whether respondents were validly
dismissed, it held that there was nothing on record
to support Saudia's claim that respondents
resigned voluntarily.
11. CA – Denied.
12. Saudia - Labor Arbiter and the National Labor
Relations Commission had no jurisdiction over it
because summons were never served on it but on
"Saudia Manila. Referring to itself as "Saudia
Jeddah," it claims that "Saudia Jeddah" and not
"Saudia Manila" was the employer of respondents
because:
First, "Saudia Manila" was never a party to
the Cabin Attendant contracts entered into
by respondents;
 Second, it was "Saudia Jeddah" that
provided the funds to pay for respondents'
salaries and benefits; and
Lastly, it was with "Saudia Jeddah" that
respondents filed their resignations.
Ergo, complaint was brough against the wrong
party.
13. Furthermore, Saudia asserts that Philippine
courts and/or tribunals are not in a position to
make an intelligent decision as to the law and the
facts because the contracts require the
application of the laws of Saudi Arabia, rather than
those of the Philippines. Forum non conveniens
kuno!
Issue:
1. WON the Labor Arbiter and the National Labor
Relations Commission may exercise jurisdiction
over Saudi Arabian Airlines. YES
2. WON it should apply Philippine law in
adjudicating the present dispute. YES
Ruling:
NLRC has jurisdiction
1. Saudia is vainly splitting hairs in its effort to
absolve itself of liability. Other than its bare
allegation, there is no basis for concluding that
"Saudia Jeddah" is distinct from "Saudia Manila."
2. What is clear is Saudia's statement in its own
Petition that what it has is a "Philippine Office.
Even in the position paper that Saudia submitted
to the Labor Arbiter, what Saudia now refers to as
"Saudia Jeddah" was then only referred to as
"Saudia Head Office at Jeddah, KSA,” while what
Saudia now refers to as "Saudia Manila" was then
only referred to as "Saudia's office in Manila."
3. By its own admission, Saudia, while a foreign
corporation, has a Philippine office.
4. Foreign Investments Act of 1991, provides that
The phrase "doing business" shall include . . .
opening offices, whether called "liaison" offices or
branches; . . . and any other act or acts that imply
a continuity of commercial dealings or
arrangements and contemplate to that extent the
performance of acts or works, or the exercise of
some of the functions normally incident to, and in
progressive prosecution of commercial gain or of
the purpose and object of the business
organization.
5. A plain application of Section 3(d) of the Foreign
Investments Act leads to no other conclusion than
that Saudia is a foreign corporation doing
business in the Philippines. As such, Saudia may
be sued in the Philippines and is subject to the
jurisdiction of Philippine tribunals.
6. Moreover, since there is no real distinction
between "Saudia Jeddah" and "Saudia Manila" —
the latter being nothing more than Saudia's local
office — service of summons to Saudia's office in
Manila sufficed to vest jurisdiction over Saudia's
person in Philippine tribunals.
Philippine law should be applied
7. A choice of law governing the validity of
contracts or the interpretation of its provisions
dees not necessarily imply forum non conveniens.
Choice of law and forum non conveniens are
entirely different matters.
8. Choice of law provisions are an offshoot of the
fundamental principle of autonomy of contracts.
Art. 1306 provides that the contracting parties
may establish such stipulations, clauses, terms
and conditions as they may deem convenient,
provided they are not contrary to law, morals,
good customs, public order, or public policy.
9. Contractual choice of law is not determinative
of jurisdiction. Stipulating on the laws of a given
jurisdiction as the governing law of a contract does
not preclude the exercise of jurisdiction by
tribunals elsewhere. The reverse is equally true:
The assumption of jurisdiction by tribunals does
not ipso facto mean that it cannot apply and rule
on the basis of the parties' stipulation.
10. Philippine law is definite as to what governs
the formal or extrinsic validity of contracts. The
first paragraph of Article 17 of the Civil Code
provides that "the forms and solemnities of
contracts . . . shall be governed by the laws of the
country in which they are executed"
11. In contrast, there is no statutorily established
mode of settling conflict of laws situations on
matters pertaining to substantive content of
contracts. It has been noted that three (3) modes
have emerged:
 (1) lex loci contractus or the law of the
place of the making;
(2) lex loci solutionis or the law of the place
of performance; and
(3) lex loci intentionis or the law intended
by the parties.
12. Nevertheless, while a Philippine tribunal
(acting as the forum court) is called upon to
respect the parties' choice of governing law, such
respect must not be so permissive as to lose sight
of considerations of law, morals, good customs,
public order, or public policy that underlie the
contract central to the controversy.
13. Article II, Section 14 of the 1987 Constitution
provides that "[t]he State ... shall ensure the
fundamental equality before the law of women
and men." Contrasted with Article II, Section 1 of
the 1987 Constitution's statement that "[n]o
person shall ... be denied the equal protection of
the laws," Article II, Section 14 exhorts the State
to "ensure."
14. This does not only mean that the Philippines
shall not countenance nor lend legal recognition
and approbation to measures that discriminate on
the basis of one's being male or female. It
imposes an obligation to actively engage in
securing the fundamental equality of men and
women.
15. The Convention on the Elimination of all
Forms of Discrimination against Women
(CEDAW), signed and ratified by the Philippines
on July 15, 1980, and on August 5, 1981,
respectively,[81] is part of the law of the land. In
view of the widespread signing and ratification of,
as well as adherence (in practice) to it by states, it
may even be said that many provisions of the
CEDAW may have become customary
international law.
16. The CEDAW gives effect to the Constitution's
policy statement in Article II, Section 14. Article I
of the CEDAW defines "discrimination against
women" as: any distinction, exclusion or
restriction made on the basis of sex which has the
effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the
recognition, enjoyment or exercise by women,
irrespective of their marital status, on a basis of
equality of men and women, of human rights and
fundamental freedoms in the political, economic,
social, cultural, civil or any other field.
17. So informed and animated, we emphasize the
glaringly discriminatory nature of Saudia's policy.
As argued by respondents, Saudia's policy entails
the termination of employment of flight attendants
who become pregnant. At the risk of stating the
obvious, pregnancy is an occurrence that pertains
specifically to women. Saudia's policy excludes
from and restricts employment on the basis of no
other consideration but sex.
18. We do not lose sight of the reality that
pregnancy does present physical limitations that
may render difficult the performance of functions
associated with being a flight attendant.
Nevertheless, it would be the height of iniquity to
view pregnancy as a disability so permanent and
immutable that, it must entail the termination of
one's employment. It is clear to us that any
individual, regardless of gender, may be subject
to exigencies that limit the performance of
functions. However, we fail to appreciate how
pregnancy could be such an impairing occurrence
that it leaves no other recourse but the complete
termination of the means through which a woman
earns a living.
19. As the present dispute relates to (what the
respondents allege to be) the illegal termination of
respondents' employment, this case is immutably
a matter of public interest and public policy.
Philippine laws properly find application in and
govern this case.
Industrial Personnel & Management Services,
Inc. v. De Vera and Arriola
Principle:
The general rule is that Philippine laws apply even
to overseas employment contracts. Even if the
OFW has his employment abroad, it does not strip
him of his rights to security of tenure, humane
conditions of work and a living wage under our
Constitution.
Foreign law will apply under the ff requisites:
 i. That it is expressly stipulated in the
overseas employment contract that a
specific foreign law shall govern;
ii. That the foreign law invoked must be
proven before the courts pursuant to the
Philippine rules on evidence;
iii. That the foreign law stipulated in the
overseas employment contract must not be
contrary to law, morals, good customs,
public order, or public policy of the
Philippines; and
iv. That the overseas employment contract
must be processed through the POEA.
Facts:
1. Parties:
- Industrial Personnel & Management
Services, Inc. (IPAMS) is a local placement
agency duly organized and existing under
Philippine laws, with Angelito C.
Hernandez as its president and managing
director.
- SNC Lavalin Engineers & Contractors,
Inc. (SNC-Lavalin) is the principal of
IPAMS, a Canadian company with
business interests in several countries.
-Alberto Arriola (Arriola) is a licensed
general surgeon in the Philippines.
Employee’s Position
2. Arriola was offered by SNC-Lavalin the position
of Safety Officer in its Ambatovy Project site in
Madagascar. The position offered had a rate of
CA$32.00 per hour for forty (40) hours a week with
overtime pay in excess of forty (40) hours. It was
for a period of nineteen (19) months. Arriola was
then hired through the local manning agency,
IPAMS, and his contract was signed in the PH and
was processed through the PEOA.
3. After three months, Arriola received a notice of
pre-termination of employments due to
diminishing workload in the area of his expertise
and the unavailability of alternative assignments.
He was consequently repatriated. SNC-Lavalin
deposited in Arriola's bank account his pay based
on Canadian labor law.
4. Arriola filed a complaint against the petitioners
for illegal dismissal and non-payment of overtime
pay, vacation leave and sick leave pay before the
Labor Arbiter (LA). He asserted that SNC-Lavalin
never offered any valid reason for his early
termination and that he was not given sufficient
notice regarding the same. Arriola also insisted
that the employers must prove the applicability of
Canadian law before the same could be applied to
his employment contract.
Employer’s Position
5. Employer denied the charge of illegal dismissal.
They claimed that SNC-Lavalin was greatly
affected by the global financial crises during the
latter part of 2008. The economy of Madagascar,
where SNC-Lavalin had business sites, also
slowed down. It has no choice but to minimize its
expenditures and operational expenses.
6. Since all of Arriola's employment documents
were processed in Canada, not to mention that
SNC-Lavalin's office was in Ontario, the principle
of lex loci celebrationis was applicable. Thus, the
employers insisted that Canadian laws governed
the contract.
7. The pre-termination of Arriola's contract was
valid for being consistent with the provisions of
both the Expatriate Policy and laws of Canada.
The said foreign law did not require any ground for
early termination of employment, and the only
requirement was the written notice of termination.
Even assuming that Philippine laws should apply,
Arriola would still be validly dismissed because
domestic law recognized retrenchment and
redundancy as legal grounds for termination.
8. LA – Dismissed for lack of merit. uled that the
rights and obligations among and between the
OFW, the local recruiter/agent, and the foreign
employer/principal were governed by the
employment contract, thus, the provisions on
termination of employment found in the ESA, a
foreign law which governed Arriola's employment
contract, were applied. Given that SNC-Lavalin
was able to produce the duly authenticated ESA,
the LA opined that there was no other conclusion
but to uphold the validity of Arriola's dismissal
based on Canadian law.
9. NLRC – Reversed the LA decision and ruled
that Arriola was illegally dismissed by the
petitioners. Whether employed locally or
overseas, all Filipino workers enjoyed the
protective mantle of Philippine labor and social
legislation, contract stipulations to the contrary
notwithstanding. Thus, the Labor Code of the
Philippines and Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8042, or
the Migrant Workers Act, as amended, should be
applied. Moreover, the NLRC added that the
overseas employment contract of Arriola was
processed in the POEA.
10. CA – Affirmed. Although parties were free to
establish stipulations in their contracts, the same
must remain consistent with law, morals, good
custom, public order or public policy. The
appellate court wrote that the ESA allowed an
employer to disregard the required notice of
termination by simply giving the employee a
severance pay. The ESA could not be made to
apply in this case for being contrary to our
Constitution, specifically on the right of due
process.
Issue:
WON Arriola was validly dismissed pursuant to
the employment contract.
Ruling:
1. R.A. No. 8042, or the Migrant Workers Act, was
enacted to institute the policies on overseas
employment and to establish a higher standard of
protection and promotion of the welfare of migrant
workers. It emphasized that while recognizing the
significant contribution of Filipino migrant workers
to the national economy through their foreign
exchange remittances, the State does not
promote overseas employment as a means to
sustain economic growth and achieve national
development.
2. The rule in Article 1306, of our Civil Code is that
the contracting parties may establish such
stipulations as they may deem convenient,
"provided they are not contrary to law, morals,
good customs, public order or public policy." Thus,
counter-balancing the principle of autonomy of
contracting parties is the equally general rule that
provisions of applicable law, especially provisions
relating to matters affected with public policy, are
deemed written into the contract. Put a little
differently, the governing principle is that parties
may not contract away applicable provisions of
law especially peremptory provisions dealing with
matters heavily impressed with public interest.
3. The law relating to labor and employment is
clearly such an area and parties are not at liberty
to insulate themselves and their relationships from
the impact of labor laws and regulations by simply
contracting with each other.
4. The general rule is that Philippine laws apply
even to overseas employment contracts. Even if
the OFW has his employment abroad, it does not
strip him of his rights to security of tenure, humane
conditions of work and a living wage under our
Constitution.
5. The following are the exceptions:
i. That it is expressly stipulated in the
overseas employment contract that a
specific foreign law shall govern;
ii. That the foreign law invoked must be
proven before the courts pursuant to the
Philippine rules on evidence;
iii. That the foreign law stipulated in the
overseas employment contract must not be
contrary to law, morals, good customs,
public order, or public policy of the
Philippines; and
iv. That the overseas employment contract
must be processed through the POEA.
6. These four (4) requisites must be complied with
before the employer could invoke the applicability
of a foreign law to an overseas employment
contract. With these requisites, the State would be
able to abide by its constitutional obligation to
ensure that the rights and well-being of our OFWs
are fully protected.
7. If the first requisite is absent, or that no foreign
law was expressly stipulated in the employment
contract which was executed in the Philippines,
then the domestic labor laws shall apply in
accordance with the principle of lex loci
contractus.
8. If the second requisite is lacking, or that the
foreign law was not proven pursuant to Sections
24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of
Court, then the international law doctrine of
processual presumption operates.
9. If the third requisite is not met, or that the
foreign law stipulated is contrary to law, morals,
good customs, public order or public policy, then
Philippine laws govern.
10. If the fourth requisite is missing, or that the
overseas employment contract was not
processed through the POEA, then Article 18 of
the Labor Code is violated. Article 18 provides that
no employer may hire a Filipino worker for
overseas employment except through the boards
and entities authorized by the Secretary of Labor.
This power is vested upon the POEA.
11. In this case, the employer was able to observe
the 2nd requisite, because they were able to
present the ESA, duly authenticated by the
Canadian authorities and certified by the
Philippine Embassy, before the LA. The fourth
requisite was also followed because Arriola's
employment contract was processed through the
POEA.
12. However, there were not able to follow the 1st
and 3rd requisite.
13. The petitioners failed to comply with the first
requisite because no foreign law was expressly
stipulated in the overseas employment contract
with Arriola. In its pleadings, the petitioners did not
directly cite any specific provision or stipulation in
the said labor contract which indicated the
applicability of the Canadian labor laws or the
ESA. They failed to show on the face of the
contract that a foreign law was agreed upon by the
parties.
14. Considering that no foreign law was specified
in the contract and the same was executed in the
Philippines, the doctrine of lex loci celebrationis
applies and the Philippine laws shall govern the
overseas employment of Arriola.
15. Granting arguendo that the labor contract
expressly stipulated the applicability of Canadian
law, still, Arriola's employment cannot be
governed by such foreign law because the third
requisite is not satisfied.
16. First, the ESA does not require any ground for
the early termination of employment. Article 54
thereof only provides that no employer should
terminate the employment of an employee unless
a written notice had been given in advance.
Necessarily, the employer can dismiss any
employee for any ground it so desired. At its own
pleasure, the foreign employer is endowed with
the absolute power to end the employment of an
employee even on the most whimsical grounds.
17. Second, the ESA allows the employer to
dispense with the prior notice of termination to an
employee. Article 65(4) thereof indicated that the
employer could terminate the employment without
notice by simply paying the employee a
severance pay computed on the basis of the
period within which the notice should have been
given. The employee under the ESA could be
immediately dismissed without giving him the
opportunity to explain and defend himself.
18. The provisions of the ESA are patently
inconsistent with the right to security of tenure.
Both the Constitution and the Labor Code provide
that this right is available to any employee.
19. Not only do these provisions collide with the
right to security of tenure, but they also deprive
the employee of his constitutional right to due
process by denying him of any notice of
termination and the opportunity to be heard.
20. In fine, as the petitioners failed to meet all the
four (4) requisites on the applicability of a foreign
law, then the Philippine labor laws must govern
the overseas employment contract of Arriola.
Santos III v. Northwest Orient Airlines
Principle:
Facts:
1. This case involves the Proper interpretation of
Article 28(1) of the Warsaw Convention, reading
as follows:
 Art. 28. (1) An action for damage must be
brought at the option of the plaintiff, in the
territory of one of the High Contracting
Parties, either before the court of the
domicile of the carrier or of his principal
place of business, or where he has a place
of business through which the contract has
been made, or before the court at the place
of destination.
2. Parties:
- Augusto Benedicto Santos III is a minor
and a resident of the Philippines.
- Northwest Orient Airlines (NOA) is a
foreign corporation with principal office in
Minnesota, U.S.A. and licensed to do
business and maintain a branch office in
the Philippines.
3. Santos purchased from NOA a round-trip ticket
in San Francisco. U.S.A., for his flight from San
Francisco to Manila via Tokyo and back. The
scheduled departure date from Tokyo was
December 20, 1986. No date was specified for his
return to San Francisco.
4. Santos checked in at the NOA counter in the
San Francisco airport for his scheduled departure
to Manila. Despite a previous confirmation and re-
confirmation, he was informed that he had no
reservation for his flight from Tokyo to Manila. He
therefore had to be wait-listed.
5. Santos sued NOA for damages in the RTC of
Makati.
6. NOA moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. It
contended that according to Art. 28(1) of the
Warsaw Convention, the complaint could only be
instituted in the territory of one of the High
Contracting Parties, before:
i. the court of the domicile of the carrier;
ii. the court of its principal place of
business;
iii. the court where it has a place of
business through which the contract had
been made;
iv. the court of the place of destination.
7. NOA contended that the Philippines was not its
domicile nor was this its principal place of
business. Neither was the Santos’ ticket issued in
this country nor was his destination Manila but
San Francisco in the United States.
8. RTC – Dismissed.
9. CA – Affirmed.
Contentions based on Consitutionality
10. He claimes that Art. 28(1) of the Warsaw
Convention is unconstitutional because it violates
the due process and equal protection clause. He
argues that there is no substantial distinction
between a person who purchases a ticket in
Manila and a person who purchases his ticket in
San Francisco. The classification of the places in
which actions for damages may be brought is
arbitrary and irrational and thus violates the due
process and equal protection clauses.
11. Furthermore, he contends that the Warsaw
Convention is inapplicable because of a
fundamental change in circumstances that served
as its basis (doctrine of rebus sic stantibus). The
provisions in the Convention were intended to
protect airline companies under "the conditions
prevailing then and which have long ceased to
exist." He argues that in view of the significant
developments in the airline industry through the
years, the treaty has become irrelevant. Hence, to
the extent that it has lost its basis for approval, it
has become unconstitutional.
12. He claims that if he sues in the US, this would
deny him the right to access to our courts. The
expenses and difficulties he will incur in filing a suit
in the United States would constitute a
constructive denial of his right to access to our
courts for the protection of his rights. He would
consequently be deprived of this vital guaranty as
embodied in the Bill of Rights.
Contentions based on jurisdiction
13. Santos argues that Art. 28(1) of the Warsaw
Convention is a rule merely of venue and was
waived by NOA when it did not move to dismiss
on the ground of improper venue.
14. Furthermore, he argues that this case is
properly filed under the Warsaw Convention,
because Manila was the destination of Santos.
15. He also argues that the case was properly filed
because NOA has its domicile in the Ph.
Issue:
1. WON the Warsaw Convention is constitutional.
Yes
2. WON the Philippines has jurisdiction. No
Ruling:
Art. 28(1) is constitutional
1. The allegations of Santos are not convincing
enough to overcome the presumption of
constitutionality. Apparently, the Convention
considered the four places designated in Article
28 the most convenient forums for the litigation of
any claim that may arise between the airline and
its passenger, as distinguished from all other
places. At any rate, we agree with NOA that this
case can be decided on other grounds without the
necessity of resolving the constitutional issue.
2. It is true that at the time the Warsaw Convention
was drafted, the airline industry was still in its
infancy. However, that circumstance alone is not
sufficient justification for the rejection of the treaty
at this time. The changes recited by the petitioner
were, realistically, not entirely unforeseen
although they were expected in a general sense
only.
3. Also, the treaty has not been rejected by the
Philippine government. The doctrine of rebus sic
stantibus does not operate automatically to render
the treaty inoperative. There is a necessity for a
formal act of rejection, usually made by the head
of State, with a statement of the reasons why
compliance with the treaty is no longer required.
4. Rejection of the treaty, whether on the ground
of rebus sic stantibus or pursuant to Article 39, is
not a function of the courts but of the other
branches of government. This is a political act.
The conclusion and renunciation of treaties is the
prerogative of the political departments and may
not be usurped by the judiciary. The courts are
concerned only with the interpretation and
application of laws and treaties in force and not
with their wisdom or efficacy.
5. The constitutional guaranty of access to courts
refers only to courts with appropriate jurisdiction
as defined by law. It does not mean that a person
can go to any court for redress of his grievances
regardless of the nature or value of his claim. If
the petitioner is barred from filing his complaint
before our courts, it is because they are not vested
with the appropriate
The Philippines has no jurisdiction
6. A number of reasons tends to support the
characterization of Article 28(1) as a jurisdiction
and not a venue provision.
- First, the wording of Article 32, which
indicates the places where the action for
damages "must" be brought, underscores
the mandatory nature of Article 28(1).
- Second, this characterization is
consistent with one of the objectives of the
Convention, which is to "regulate in a
uniform manner the conditions of
international transportation by air."
- Third, the Convention does not contain
any provision prescribing rules of
jurisdiction other than Article 28(1), which
means that the phrase "rules as to
jurisdiction" used in Article 32 must refer
only to Article 28(1).
- In fact, the last sentence of Article 32
specifically deals with the exclusive
enumeration in Article 28(1) as
"jurisdictions," which, as such, cannot be
left to the will of the parties regardless of
the time when the damage occurred.
7. Where the matter is governed by the Warsaw
Convention, jurisdiction takes on a dual concept.
Jurisdiction in the international sense must be
established in accordance with Article 28(1) of the
Warsaw Convention, following which the
jurisdiction of a particular court must be
established pursuant to the applicable domestic
law.
8. The place of destination, within the meaning of
the Warsaw Convention, is determined by the
terms of the contract of carriage or, specifically in
this case, the ticket between the passenger and
the carrier. Examination of the petitioner's ticket
shows that his ultimate destination is San
Francisco. Although the date of the return flight
was left open, the contract of carriage between the
parties indicates that NOA was bound to transport
the petitioner to San Francisco from Manila.
Manila should therefore be considered merely an
agreed stopping place and not the destination.
9. Article 1(2) also draws a distinction between a
"destination" and an "agreed stopping place." It is
the "destination" and not an "agreed stopping
place" that controls for purposes of ascertaining
jurisdiction under the Convention. The contract is
a single undivided operation, beginning with the
place of departure and ending with the ultimate
destination. The use of the singular in this
expression indicates the understanding of the
parties to the Convention that every contract of
carriage has one place of departure and one place
of destination. An intermediate place where the
carriage may be broken is not regarded as a
"place of destination."
10. Air France v. Giliberto provides that the
domicile of a corporation is customarily regarded
as the place where it is incorporated, and the
courts have given the meaning to the term as it is
used in article 28(1) of the Convention.
11. Notably, the domicile of the carrier is only one
of the places where the complaint is allowed to be
filed under Article 28(1). By specifying the three
other places, to wit, the principal place of business
of the carrier, its place of business where the
contract was made, and the place of destination,
the article clearly meant that these three other
places were not comprehended in the term
"domicile."
Sabena Belgian World Airlines v. CA
Principle:
Facts:
1. Ma. Paula San Agustin was a passenger on
board Flight SN 284 of Sabena originating from
Casablanca to Brussels, Belgium on her way back
to Manila. San Agustin checked in her luggage
which contained her valuables. She stayed
overnight in Brussels and her luggage was left on
board.
2. When she arrived at Manila, her luggage was
missing. She filed a property irregularity report.
3. She filed a formal complaint with the office of
Ferge Massed, Sabena’s local manager,
demanding immediate attention.
4. Gi informan siya nga nakit-an na iya luggage,
pero pagpadung na sa Manila, nawala nasad ang
iya luggage.
5. San Agustin demanded from the defendant the
value of the luggage and its contents, but Sabena
refused to settle the claim.
6. Sabena asserts that while San Agustin was a
passenger with a piece of checked in luggage, the
loss of the luggage was due to her sole if not
contributory negligence because she did not
declare the valuable items in her luggage so
Sabena could have advised her to secure an
insurance on the valuable items, or would have
refused acceptance as required by generally
accepted practices of international carriers. She
should also have retrieved her undeclared
valuables from her baggage at the Brussels
Airport since her flight from Brussels to Manila will
Still be confirmed.
7. RTC – Sabena is liable.
8. CA – Affirmed.
9. Sabena insists that San Agustin, being a
seasoned international traveler, must have
likewise been familiar with the standard provisions
contained in her flight ticket that items of value are
required to be hand-carried by the passenger and
that the liability of the airline for loss, delay or
damage to baggage would be limited, in any
event, to only US $20.00 per kilo unless a higher
value is declared in advance and corresponding
additional charges are paid thereon. San Agustin
did not declare its contents or value.
10. Sabena cites Sec 5(c), Art. IX of the General
Conditions of Carriage, stating that passengers
shall not include in his checked baggage, and the
carrier may refuse to carry as checked baggage,
fragile or perishable articles, money, jewelry,
precious metals, negotiable papers, securities or
other valuable.
Issue:
WON Sabena is liable.
Ruling:
1. Fault or negligence consists in the omission of
that diligence which is demanded by the nature of
an obligation and corresponds with the
circumstances of the person, of the time, and of
the place. When the source of an obligation is
derived from a contract, the mere breach or non-
fulfillment of the prestation gives rise to the
presumption of fault on the part of the obligor.
2. This rule is no different in the case of common
carriers in the carriage of goods which, indeed,
are bound to observe not just the due diligence of
a good father of a family but that of "extraordinary"
care in the vigilance over the goods. The court
then discussed Art. 1733 pero essentially transpo
thingy
3. Sabena tried to say nga its acts is not the
proximate cause of the damage, but di daw siya
muapply ani nga case.
4. It remained undisputed that San Agustin’s
luggage was lost while it was in the custody of
Sabena. It was supposed to arrive on the same
flight that San Agustin took in returning to Manila.
When she discovered that the luggage was
missing, she promptly accomplished and filed a
Property Irregularity Report. She followed up her
claim on 14 September 1987, and filed, on the
following day, a formal letter-complaint with
Sabena. She felt relieved when she was advised
that her luggage had finally been found, with its
contents intact when examined, and that she
could expect it to arrive soon. She then waited
anxiously only to be told later that her luggage had
been lost for the second time. PAASA
5. Following the facts stated above, Sabena is
guilty of gross negligence in the handling of San
Agustin’s luggage.