G.R. No.
230228, December 13, 2017 Enforcement Agency Regional Office IV-B (PDEA IV-B
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-
Appellee, v. MANUEL DELA ROSA Y LUMANOG @
"MANNY", Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
GESMUNDO, J.:
On appeal is the Decision,1 dated August 12, 2016, of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 06607,
which affirmed the Decision2 dated November 19, 2013,
of the Regional Trial Court of Calapan City, Oriental
Mindoro, Branch 39 (RTC) in Criminal Case No. CR-09-
9515 finding accused-appellant Manuel dela Rosa y
Lumanog (accused-appellant) guilty of violation of
Section 5, Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165.
In an Information,3 dated May 3, 2009, accused-
appellant was charged with the crime of illegal sale of
marijuana weighing 0.682 gram. On July 22, 2009, he
was arraigned and he pleaded "not guilty."4 Thereafter,
trial ensued.
Version of the Prosecution
The prosecution presented IO1 Noe Briguel (IO1 Briguel),
PCI Rhea Fe Dela Cruz Alviar (PCI Alviar) and IO1 Ed
Bryan Echavaria (IO1 Echavaria) as its witnesses. Their
combined testimonies tended to establish the following:
On March 28, 2009, at around 9:00 o'clock in the
morning, a confidential informant reported to PCI
Marijane Ojastro (PCI Ojastro) of the Philippine Drug
Office) located at Filipiniana Complex, Calapan City, that
accused-appellant was selling marijuana at White Beach,
Puerto Galera, Oriental Mindoro. The informant said that
he could introduce an agent to accused-appellant as a
buyer of marijuana.
Based on the said information, PCI Ojastro directed the
conduct of a buy-bust operation against accused-
appellant with IO1 Mary Grace Cortez as the team leader.
IO1 Briguel was designated as poseur-buyer using a
P200.00 bill bearing serial numbers EC235898 and a
P100.00 bill bearing serial numbers QC609916, which
were marked with "NSB."5 IO1 John Rick Jabano (IO1
Jabano) and IO1 Echavaria were assigned as arresting
officers. A Pre-Operation Report6 was prepared.
The team left for Puerto Galera at around 1:00 o'clock in
the morning of March 29, 2009 and they stayed for a
while in Sabang. IO1 Briguel, however, testified that they
arrived at Puerto Galera on March 30, 2009. At about
3:00 o'clock in the afternoon of that day, IO1 Briguel and
the informant proceeded to the Island Tattoo shop while
the other operatives positioned themselves in the area.
Arriving thereat, the informant introduced IO1 Briguel to
accused-appellant. IO1 Briguel asked accused-appellant,
a tattoo artist, to put a henna tattoo on his right
shoulder. As accused-appellant was doing the tattoo, IO1
Briguel asked him: "Manny, pwede bang umiskor?" to
which he replied: "Meron." IO1 Briguel told accused-
appellant that he was going to buy P300.00 worth of
drugs, and handed the marked money to accused-
appellant, who, in turn, handed to IO1 Briguel folded
dried banana leaves containing suspected dried
marijuana leaves. Thus, IO1 Briguel made the pre-
arranged signal of removing the handkerchief wrapped
around his head. Immediately, IO1 Jabano and IO1
Echavaria arrived and arrested accused-appellant. IO1
Briguel frisked him and the marked money was
recovered from him.
Subsequently, accused-appellant was boarded into the
service vehicle of the PDEA to avoid any commotion at
the shop. While inside the vehicle, IO1 Briguel marked
the seized marijuana with his initials and the date of the
arrest. He then testified that he placed the suspect dried
marijuana leaves in his pocket.
The team then proceeded back to the PDEA IV-B Office at
Calapan City, which was 54 kilometers away from Puerto
Galera. There, IO1 Briguel conducted the
Inventory,7 which was witnessed by Barangay
Chairperson Anacleto Vergara (Brgy. Captain Vergara)
and media representative Dennis Nebrejo (Nebrejo).
Photographs were likewise taken during the marking and
inventory of the seized item.
IOI Briguel then brought the suspected marijuana and
the Request for Laboratory Examination8 to the Philippine
National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory Regional Office in
Camp Efigenio C. Navarro, Calapan City for forensic
examination. Based on Chemistry Report No. D-010-
099 prepared by PCI..Alviar, the specimen weighed 0.682
gram and it tested positive for marijuana.
Version of the Defense
The defense presented accused-appellant as its sole
witness. He testified that on the date of the said arrest,
he was inside his tattoo shop, located beside a bar and
restaurant at White Beach, Puerto Galera, Oriental
Mindoro. While accused-appellant was attending to
several customers, a man suddenly approached him and
asked if he was Manny. When he replied in the
affirmative, the said man asked him to go with him.
When accused-appellant refused, the man pulled out a
.45 caliber pistol from his waist and threatened him that
he would make a scene at his shop. Reluctantly,
accused-appellant accompanied the man to a van parked
away from his shop. While inside the van, the man
handcuffed accused-appellant and brought him to the
PDEA IV B Office. For unknown reasons, accused-
appellant was incarcerated therein for a month before a
case was filed against him. He presupposed that he was
arrested and detained because he was associated with a
certain Cris Pelino, who was also arrested earlier due to
drug related charges.
The RTC Ruling
In a decision, dated November 19, 2013, the RTC found
accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable of the crime
of violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165.
Accordingly, the trial court sentenced accused appellant
to the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of
P500,000.00.
The RTC held that the prosecution was able to prove the
identity of the buyer, the seller, the object and the
consideration in the illegal sale of the marijuana. It also
held that the delivery of the said drug by accused-
appellant and the payment thereof by IO1 Briguel during
the buy-bust operation were duly established. The RTC
further ruled that it was reasonable for the PDEA to
conduct the inventory of the seized item at their office in
Calapan, Mindoro to prevent a commotion at the place of
the arrest.
Aggrieved, accused-appellant appealed before the CA
arguing in his Brief for the Accused-Appellant10 that: the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses were
inconsistent because IO1 Briguel testified that the buy-
bust was conducted on March 30, 2009, while IO1
Echavaria testified that it was conducted on March 29,
2009; that the sinumpaang salaysay of IO1 Briguel, IO1
Echavaria and IO1 Jabano alleged that the buy-bust was
conducted on March 30, 2009; that the integrity and
evidentiary value of the confiscated item was not secured
because it was merely wrapped in a banana leaf and it
was not placed in an envelope or evidence bag; that
there was an inconsistency as to who received the
confiscated drug at the crime laboratory; and that the
crime laboratory was not secured at the time of the
examination because any personnel and policemen could
enter the premises and even sleep there.
In their Brief for the Appellee,11 the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) countered that all the elements of the
crime of illegal sale of dangerous drugs were established;
that the confiscated drug was properly inventoried in the
presence of accused-appellant, media representative,
and an elected official; that the custody of the drug was
duly accounted for; and that accused-appellant failed to
refute the evidence against him.
The CA Ruling
In its decision, dated August 12, 2016, the CA dismissed
the appeal. It held that the RTC correctly ruled that all
the elements of the crime of illegal sale of dangerous
drugs were duly proven. Likewise, the CA held that full
faith and credence must be given to the testimonies of
the PDEA agents pursuant to the presumption of
regularity in the performance of their official duty. It
observed that the buy-bust actually happened on March
29, 2009 based on the evidentiary documents of the
prosecution.
Further, the CA highlighted that the prosecution was able
to prove that there was substantial compliance with the
chain of custody rule. It stated that the drug was marked
by IO1 Briguel; that he also prepared the inventory and
PCI Ojastro prepared the request for laboratory
examination; that the marked item was delivered by IO1
Briguel to the crime laboratory; that it tested positive for
marijuana; and that the same marked item was
presented in court. The CA concluded that there was no
compromise in the integrity and evidentiary value of the
seized drug.
Hence, this appeal.
Issue
WHETHER THE GUILT OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT FOR THE
CRIME CHARGED HAS BEEN PROVEN BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT.
In a Resolution,12 dated July 12, 2017, the Court
required the parties to submit their respective
supplemental briefs, if they so desire. In its Manifestation
(In Lieu of Supplemental Brief),13 dated August 24, 2017,
the OSG manifested it will no longer file a supplemental
brief considering that its Brief for the Appellee had
already amply discussed the assigned errors. In his
Manifestation (In Lieu of a Supplemental Brief),14 dated
September 15, 2017, accused-appellant stated that he
will no longer file a supplemental brief since no new issue
material to the case that were not elaborated upon in his
appellant's brief were discovered.
 The Court's Ruling
Marijane T. Ojastro and informed her that he knew of
The appeal has merit. somebody selling illegal drugs.

There are inconsistent dates

when the alleged transaction
took place xxx

The essential elements that have to be duly established

for a successful prosecution of offenses involving the
illegal sale of dangerous drugs are: (1) the identity of the
buyer and the seller, the object of the sale, and the
consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and
payment therefor.
Briefly, the delivery of the illicit drug to the poseur-buyer
and the receipt of the marked money by the seller
successfully consummate the buy-bust transaction. What
is material, therefore, is the proof that the transaction or
sale transpired, coupled with the presentation in court of
the corpus delicti.15
Q: After you have already formed the team, you as the
poseur buyer, IO1Jabano and IO1Echavaria as
arresting officers and Mary Grace Cortez the team
leader, what did you agree on in connection with [sic]
effecting the operation?
A: We set the date on within which we should be
proceeding to Puerto Galera to proceed with our
operation and we agreed that we should go to the said
place on March 30.

In this case, the Court agrees with accused-appellant

that the prosecution witnesses presented inconsistent
dates regarding the occurrence of the alleged drug
transaction. On March 3, 2010, IO1 Briguel, the poseur-
Q: Before going to that place on March 30 what
buyer, testified in his direct examination as follows: preparations did you make if any?

A: Prior to that date and if I am not mistaken that was

Q: Now, tell us Mr. Witness prior to the conduct of the on March 29 we had a briefing regarding the
operation what did your office receive in connection operation and we also prepared the pre-operational
with the same, if any? report ma'am.

A: On March 28, 2009 one of our confidential

informants went to our office and talked to our OIC
 xxx
Q: So tell us in that early morning of March 30, how did
you proceed to Puerto Galera?
A: We proceeded to Puerto Galera on board our service
the Toyota Revo ma'am.16 (emphases supplied)
It is clear from the testimony of IO1 Briguel that they
met their confidential informant in the PDEA office on
March 28, 2009. Then, on March 29, 2009, the buy-bust
team had a briefing regarding the operation and it was
then that they prepared the pre-operation report. Finally,
on March 30, 2009, the team proceeded to Puerto Galera
for the buy-bust operation. The said testimony reflects
the statements in the IO1 Briguel's Sinumpaang
Salaysay,17 dated April 1, 2009. Likewise, the said dates
are reflected in the Magkasanib na Sinumpaang
Salaysay,18 similarly dated April 1, 2009, of IO1 Jabano
and IO1 Echavaria.
Later, on September 7, 2010, IOI Briguel retracted his
statement and, instead, insisted that the buy-bust
operation occurred on March 29, 2009 based on
his Karagdagang Sinumpaang Salaysay,19 to wit:
My question now, Mr. Witness, why did you have to
execute a Karagdagang Sinumpaang Salaysay when
Q:
you have already executed a sworn statement with
respect to this case?
When we filed the case we found out that what is
A: written during the operation was March 30. The date
of operation was March 29.
Now, what was the date indicated in all other
Q:
documents aside from your Sinumpaang Salaysay?
A: Not all, ma'm.
So, you are telling us that the correct date of your
operation was March 29, 2009 but what you have
indicated in your Sinumpaang Salaysay is March 30
Q:
as the date of your operation. Now my question is, in
what other documents did this March 30, 2009
appeared?
In the laboratory result wherein March 29 was
A:
indicated.
So you are telling us that it is only in your original
Q: initial Sinumpaang Salaysay that March 30 was
indicated?
Yes, ma'm, and the Sinumpaang Salaysay of the two
A:
(2) arresting officers.20
The Karagdagang Sinumpaang Salaysay of IOI Briguel,
however, contains questionable circumstances. The said
document was simply dated April 2009 without indicating
the exact day of execution. It was also notarized on April
2, 2009. Assuming arguendo that the said Karagdagang
Sinumpaang Salaysay was notarized on April 2, 2009,
then it is dubious as to why IO1 Briguel did not mention
the said document at all when he initially testified on
March 3, 2010. It was only on September 7, 2010 that
IO1 Briguel suddenly remembered that he executed such
crucial affidavit. The only plausible explanation is that the
incomplete affidavit did not exist as of March 3, 2010.
The Court is of the view that the Karagdagang
Sinumpaang Salaysay was only executed as a mere
afterthought to conceal the inconsistent dates of the buy-
bust operation. indicated in IO1 Briguel's testimony on
March 3, 2010, his Sinumpaang Salaysay dated April 1,
2009, and the Magkasanib na Sinumpaang Salaysay,
similarly dated April 1, 2009, of IO1 Jabano and IO1
Echavaria. Accordingly, there is doubt as to the actual
date of the buy-bust operation; whether it was done on
March 29 or March 30, 2009.
Glaringly, the OSG neither addressed nor explained the
discrepancy of these dates. Further, the prosecution was
remiss of its duty because it did not immediately act to
rectify its mistake. It was only on September 7, 2010,
when IO1 Briguel testified, that the prosecution
attempted to explain the inconsistent dates, which
existed as early as April 1, 2009. The prosecution,
however, chose to rely on the Karagdagang Sinumpaang
Salaysay of IO1 Briguel, which contained doubtful dates
of execution and notarization.
The chain of custody rule
Aside from the inconsistent dates of the conduct of the
buy-bust operation, the Court finds that the prosecution
failed to sufficiently comply with the chain of custody
rule. In prosecuting both illegal sale of dangerous drugs,
conviction cannot be sustained if doubt persists on the
identity of said drugs. The identity of the dangerous drug
must be established with moral certainty. Apart from
showing that the elements of sale are present, the fact
that the dangerous drug illegally sold is the same drug
offered in court as exhibit must likewise be established
with the same degree of certitude as that needed to
sustain a guilty verdict.21
Chain of custody means the duly recorded authorized
movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled
chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or
laboratory equipment of each stage, from the time of
seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory
to safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction.
Such record of movements and custody of seized item
shall include the identity and signature of the person who
held temporary custody of the seized item, the date and
time when such transfer of custody were made in the
course of safekeeping and use in court as evidence, and
the final disposition.22
As the means of ensuring the establishment of the chain
of custody, Section 21 (1) of RA No. 9165 specifies that:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and
control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and
confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the
same in the presence of the accused or the person/s
from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized,
or his/her representative or counsel, a representative
from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ),
and any elected public official who shall be required to
sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy
thereof.
Section 21 (a) of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations (IRR) of R.A. No. 9165 complements Section
21 (1) of RA No. 9165, to wit:
(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody
and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure
and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the
same in the presence of the accused or the person/s
from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized,
or his/her representative or counsel, a representative
from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ),
and any "elected public official who shall be required to
sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy
thereof: Provided; that the physical inventory and
photograph shall be conducted at the place where the
search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station
or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team,
whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures;
Provided, further, that non-compliance with these
requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the
integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items
are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team,
shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and
custody over said items;
Based on the foregoing, Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165
requires the apprehending team, after seizure and
confiscation, to immediately conduct a physically
inventory; and photograph the same in the presence
of (1) the accused or the persons from whom such
items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
representative or counsel, (2) a representative
from the media and (3) the DOJ, and (4) any
elected public official who shall be required to sign
the copies of the inventory and be given a copy
thereof.23
In addition, Section 21 of the IRR of R.A. No. 9165
provides that the physical Inventory and photograph
shall be conducted at the place where the search
warrant is served; or at the nearest police station
or at the nearest office of the apprehending
officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of
warrantless seizures. It further states that non-
compliance with these requirements shall not render void
and invalid such seizures of and custody over the
confiscated items provided that such non-compliance
were under justifiable grounds and the integrity
and the evidentiary value of the seized items are
properly preserved by the apprehending officer or
team.24
Interestingly, Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 was amended
recently by R.A. No. 10640, which became effective on
July 15, 2014, and it essentially added the provisions
contained in the IRR with a few modifications, to wit:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and
control of the dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and
essential chemicals, instruments/paraphernalia and/or
laboratory equipment shall, immediately after seizure
and confiscation, conduct a physical inventory of the
seized items and photograph the same in the presence of
the accused or the persons from whom such items were
confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or
counsel, with an elected public official and a
representative of the National Prosecution Service or the
media who shall be required to sign the copies of the
inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, That
the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted
at the place where the search warrant is served; or at
the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the
apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in
case of warrantless seizures: Provided, finally, That
noncompliance of these requirements under justifiable
grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary
value of the seized items are properly preserved by the
apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and
invalid such seizures and custody over said items.
Notably, in the amendment of R.A. No. 10640, the
apprehending team is now required to conduct a physical
inventory. of the seized items and photograph the same
in (1) the presence of the accused or the persons
from whom such items were confiscated and/or
seized, or his/her representative or counsel, (2)
with an elected public official and (3) a
representative of the National Prosecution
Service or the media who shall be required to sign the
copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof. In
the present case, as the alleged crime was committed on
March 29, 2009, then the provisions of Section 21 of R.A.
No. 9165 and its IRR shall apply.
The apprehending team did not comply with Section 21 of
R.A. No. 9165 and its IRR
The records of the case show that the physical inventory
of the confiscated drug and the photographs of the same
where only done in the presence of the accused-
appellant, Brgy. Captain Vergara and media
representative Nebrejo. Clearly, a representative of the
DOJ, as required by Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165, was not
present during the inventory of the seized item.
More importantly, the apprehending team did not
immediately conduct the physical inventory and the
taking of the photographs at the time the suspected drug
was confiscated or at the nearest police station. Instead,
they travelled fifty four (54) kilometers from Puerto
Galera, the place of the seizure, to Calapan City before
they conducted the inventory of the seized drug.
The prosecution failed to provide a justifiable ground for
the non-compliance of Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165
As a rule, strict compliance with the prescribed procedure
under Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 is required because of
the illegal drug's unique characteristic that renders it
indistinct, not readily identifiable, and easily open to
tampering, alteration, or substitution either by accident
or otherwise.
The exception found in the IRR of R.A. 9165 comes into
play when strict compliance with the proscribed
procedures is not observed. This saving clause, however,
applies only (1) where the prosecution recognized
the procedural lapses, and thereafter explained the
cited justifiable grounds, and (2) when the
prosecution established that the integrity and
evidentiary value of the evidence seized had been
preserved. The prosecution, thus, loses the benefit of
invoking the presumption of regularity and bears the
burden of proving — with moral certainty — that the
illegal drug presented in court is the same drug that was
confiscated from the accused during his arrest.25
In this case, the prosecution failed to recognize its
procedural lapses and give a justifiable ground for the A: No, sir.
non-compliance with Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165.
Particularly, they were not able to explain the absence of
a representative of the DOJ and the distant conduct of
the inventory of the seized item. IO1 Echavaria Q: What do you mean "no"?
attempted to explain that the said inventory was not
done at the place of the arrest at Puerto Galera because A: We did not coordinate because that was the decision
they could not secure a representative of the media or
of our team leader.
the DOJ and, thus, went back to their office in Calapan
City.26 Nevertheless, upon their arrival in Calapan City,
there was still no representative from the DOJ to witness
the inventory of the confiscated item.
Q: So, in other words, your team leader instructed
On the other hand, the witnesses of the prosecution you not to coordinate and instead do the
attempted to explain the conduct of the inventory of the inventory when you travelled back 54 kilometers
seized item fifty-four (54) kilometers away from the away to Calapan, is it not correct?
place of the arrest. IO1 Briguel testified as follows:
A: Yes, sir.27(emphasis supplied)
Q: Did you bother to coordinate with the barangay
officials of White Beach, Barangay Isidro, Puerto In the same manner, IO1 Echavaria testified on the
Galera? subject matter as follows:

A: As I recall, no sir.
Q: In other words Mr. Witness, you are telling this
Honorable Court that you implemented this buy-bust
operation 54 kilometers away from Calapan City and
in the actual site, you did not bother to coordinate
with the barangay official of the place where you
conducted your buy-bust operation.
Q: Now, since you were there already in the early
morning of that date, can you please tell the
Honorable Court whether or not you
coordinate with any member of the media or
barangay official for the purpose of that buy
bust operation?
A: We did the coordination only during the
inventory to meet the requirements.

Q: So in other words, during the eight (8) long
hours, you did not bother to call any barangay
official nor did you bother to secure the
representative from the media while you were
in Puerto Galera?
A: Our team leader deemed it no longer necessary
to coordinate with the media or with the
barangay officials. It was only during the
inventory of the confiscated items that we did
the coordination with such agencies.
Q: So can we be clarified as to where you
conducted this inventory?
A: In our regional office, Sir.
Q: In Calapan City?
A: Yes Sir.
Q: Why did you not conduct that in Puerto
Galera?
A: Because there were already many people in
the exact place so we decided to do the
inventory in our office.
xxx
COURT:
Questions from the Court.
Q: During your cross-examination you stated that
it was not practical to conduct the inventory at
the scene and instead you made the inventory
at your office. What do you mean by it is not
practical?
A: Your Honor because during that particular
situation there were many people around so we
could only do the marking[s] but we could not
do the inventory at that place.
Q: What do you mean by it is not practical?
A: Because we could not secure the presence of
the Witnesses if we have done the inventory in
the exact scene where the buy bust operation
happened, Your Honor.
Q: Why can you not conduct the inventory at the
scene and at the presence of the media and the
DOJ representative?
A: Your Honor because we could not completely
do the inventory at the scene if we would first
call the representative of the media and the
barangay official so we just did the marking on
that place and did the inventory in the office.
Q: And how far is your office from the place of
the incident?
A: I could not exactly determine. It took us about
an hour and a half to reach our office.
Q: And in this particular case did you not prepare
the inventory in Puerto Galera but instead
prepared it in your office in Calapan, is it not?
A: Yes Your Honor.
Q: Would it not be impractical for the media,
the DOJ representative and the barangay
official to travel from Puerto Galera to
Calapan City in your office and witness the
preparation of the inventory?
A: Because in the preparation of the inventory
we needed some witnesses.
Q: Who are these witnesses that you are referring
to that you needed to contact for the
inventory?
A: The barangay official, media representative
and DOJ representative, your
Honor.28 (emphases supplied)
As can be gleaned from the witnesses' testimony, the
excuses they proffered to justify the distant conduct of
the inventory fifty-four (54) kilometers away from the
place of seizure, are: (1) it was the team leader's
discretion to conduct the inventory in Calapan City; (2)
to avoid commotion at the place of seizure; and (3) they
could not secure the witnesses required by law in the
said place.
The Court finds that these excuses are
unmeritorious. First, Section 21 of the IRR is clear that
the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted
at the place of the seizure or at the nearest police station
or at the nearest office of the apprehending team. In this
case, the apprehending team did not even bother to look
for the nearest police station at the place of seizure to
conduct the inventory. Instead, they leisurely took their
time and travelled 54 kilometers away from the said
place to secure an inventory of the seized item.
Second, another reason stated by the prosecution
witness - that the inventory was done in Calapan to avoid
a commotion at the place of the seizure - is unavailing.
Evidently, there is no need to travel fifty four (54)
kilometers away from Puerto Galera simply to avoid a
commotion. As stated in IO1 Echavaria's testimony, the
apprehending team had eight (8) hours to prepare before
the operation was conducted and they could have easily
identified the nearest police station in Puerto Galera for
the inventory of the seized item. Certainly, the PDEA
office in Calapan City is not the nearest police station in
Puerto Galera.
Third, the apprehending officers allegedly travelled all the
way back to Calapan City because only there could they
secure the witnesses required by law. However, as
discussed above, even when they travelled 54 kilometers
to their office, they still failed to complete all the
witnesses needed during the inventory. The RTC even
observed that it was impractical for the media
representative, DOJ representative and the elected
official to travel from Puerto Galera all the way to
Calapan City to simply witness the inventory. Indeed, the
inventory could have been done at the nearest police
station in Puerto Galera and the required witnesses could
have conveniently attended thereat.
In Dela Riva v. People,29 the Court acquitted the
accused-appellant therein because although the buy-bust
operation occurred in Subic, Zambales, the apprehending
team conducted the marking, inventory and
photographing of the seized item in Quezon City, which
was several kilometers away. The prosecution could not
give any justifiable reason for the unusually distant
conduct of the physical inventory.
The prosecution failed to establish that the integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized item was preserved
Aside from failing to provide a justifiable ground for the
non-compliance of Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165, the
prosecution also failed to establish that the integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized item was preserved.
In the first link of the chain of custody, the apprehending
officer acquires possession of the suspected drug from
the offender at the time of the arrest. The apprehending
officer is required to mark the seized items — to truly
ensure that they are the same items that enter the chain
and are eventually the ones offered in evidence — and it
should be done (1) in the presence of the apprehended
violator and(2) immediately upon confiscation.30 In this
case, the marking was not done at the place of the
seizure; rather it was done at the vehicle. While there
may be exceptions to the immediate marking of the
seized item,31 even a less stringent application of the
requirement would not suffice in sustaining a conviction
in this case.
Aside from marking, the seized items should be placed in
an envelope or an evidence bag unless the type and
quantity of these items require a different type of
handling and/or container. The evidence bag or container
shall accordingly be signed by the handling officer and
turned over to the next officer in the chain of
custody.32 The purpose of placing the seized item in an
envelope or an evidence bag is to ensure that the item is
secured from tampering, especially when the seized item
is susceptible to alteration or damage.
Here, as shown by its photographs,33 the seized
marijuana was simply wrapped in a dried banana leaf;
while the marking was merely written on a strip of paper
that was attached to the seized item. Evidently, the
confiscated marijuana was not placed in a secured
container. IO1 Briguel testified as to how he handled the
specimen, viz:
Q: Now, Mr. Witness, going back to the specimen
which was earlier presented to you by the
government prosecutor. How did you secure the
dried marijuana leaves after you bought that from the
body of the accused?
A: I took it from him and placed it in my pocket, sir.
Q: But insofar as the way you packed it, it appears that it
is wrapped with banana leaves and what did you do
after you packed it with banana leaves?
A: It was already packed when we bought it, sir.
Q: Did you not bother to put the same in a secured
sealed container?
A: We did not bring any, sir, so I just placed it in our
[sic] pocket.
Q: So, in other words when you received the unsecure
specimen you did not bother to make it sure that the
integrity of the specimen will be protected by putting
it in a seal (sic) container or plastic sachet?
A: After marking the said specimen and when we were
already in our way home we placed it in a plastic
container, sir.
Q: You said that you placed it in a plastic to secure the
specimen. But where is the sealed plastic, Mr.
Witness?
A: When we brought this specimen in the crime
laboratory and then submitted the same to the office
of the prosecutor they already removed it from the
plastic, sir.
 In this case, while IO1 Briguel claims that he delivered
Q: In other words, you did not bother to put your initial the confiscated item to the PNP Crime Laboratory in
on the plastic in which you placed this specimen? Camp Efigenio C. Navarro, Calapan City, it was not clear
who received the confiscated drug thereat. On direct
A: None, sir. examination, PCI Alviar testified as follows:

PROSECUTOR
OLIVAR
Q: Why did you not do that?

A: I was notable to do it sir.34 (emphasis supplied)

Q: Madam Witness, in this letter
From the above testimony, it can be observed that when request the one [sic] received the
IO1 Briguel seized the marijuana wrapped in dried said specimen on behalf of the
banana leaves, he simply placed the said item inside his Regional Crime Laboratory is one
pocket without securing it in a sealed container. PO1 Carreon. Would you confirm
Evidently, due to the poor packaging of the item, it is that PO1 Carreon is connected with
susceptible to tampering or alteration. Realizing his your office?
damaging testimony, IO1 Briguel suddenly changed his
tune and stated that he allegedly placed the confiscated
item in a plastic container. However, the purported
A: Yes, ma'm.
plastic container was neither presented in evidence nor
was it marked by IO1 Briguel. Glaringly, the
photographs, Inventory35 and the Chemistry Report No.
D-010-0936 demonstrate that the seized marijuana was xxx
merely wrapped in a dried banana leaf and was not
secured in a plastic container.

Further, there are also irregularities in the third link of

the chain of custody. In the said link, there must be a
Q: May we know if there is also SPO1
delivery by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to Watson in that crime lab?
the forensic chemist. Once the seized drugs arrive at the
forensic laboratory, it will be the laboratory technician A: Yes, ma'm.
who will test and verify the nature of the substance.37
 Q: From whom did you received that
specimen for examination?
Q: What is his position in that crime
laboratory? A: From PSI Ernesto Niduaza, ma'm.

A: He is now assigned at Mamburao,

ma'm.
Q: Who received the same from PO1
Carreon?

Q: But when he was with the Crime A: It was received by PSI Ernesto
Laboratory what was his position? Niduaza, ma'm.38

A: Macro itching technician, ma'm.

On cross-examination, however, PCI Alviar presented a
different chain of custody.

Q: And also authorized in receiving Q: When it was delivered to the crime laboratory what
specimen being submitted? time was that when it was delivered to the crime
laboratory.
A: Yes, ma'm.
A: Our office received the letter request based on the
stamp marked appearing on the lower portion 2300H
of March 29, 2009, ma'm.
Q: And how about PSI Niduaza, Jr.? Is he
also connected with your office?

A: Yes, ma'm. He is our forensic Q: That is eleven o'clock in the evening?

chemical officer.
A: Yes, ma'm.

Q: And are you the chemist on duty during that
time?
A: Yes, ma'm. It was received by PSI Ernesto
Niduaza.
Q: It was received by PSI Niduaza because during the
time when it was received you were not the one on
duty, is it not?
A: I cannot remember. I do not know if we have SOCO
response during that time, sir.
Q: But is it not that the chemist on duty at the PNP
Crime Laboratory in Suqui is either you or Engr.
Niduaza being the two chemist available thereat?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: So, if Engr. Niduaza is present logically it (sic)
meaning to say that you were not around during that
time because Engr. Niduaza is on duty?
A: No, sir.
Q: But you cannot remember having been around that
time?
A: Yes, sir.39
From the testimony, it can be gathered that PCI Alviar
initially testified that the specimen was received by PO1
Carreon; that PO1 Carreon, SPO1 Watson and PSI
Niduaza were authorized to handle the specimen; that
PCI Alviar acquired the item from PSI Niduaza. Then on
cross-examination, she then stated that it was PSI
Niduaza that actually received the same; that the latter
was present in the crime laboratory but was not on duty;
and that she was on duty but cannot remember whether
she was present at the crime laboratory. Accordingly,
there is doubt as to who actually received the seized item
from IO1 Briguel. Within the crime laboratory, the said
specimen was handed from one person to another. It was
even received by an officer who was not on duty at that
time. The changing of hands of the specimen is
precarious considering that it was not placed in a secured
container.
Likewise, as properly pointed out by accused-appellant,
the arrangement of the PNP Crime Laboratory therein is
problematic based on the testimony of PCI Alviar, to wit:
Q: Is it not that the PNP Crime Laboratory is composed A: Yes, sir.
of three separate rooms, the PNP Crime Laboratory
in Suqui?

A: We do not have permanent room, sir. Q: It is not that inside that second part, the sink,
where you conduct your examination, there is a
double deck bed?

xxx A: Yes, sir.

Q: The laboratory itself, the sink where you conduct Q:
your examination was located at the middle because
the first portion of your office is the receiving area
where there are many tables side by side, the second
part is this portion where there is a one way mirror? A:
And it is where some of your personnel and even
some policemen would sleep there, day in and
day out whenever there is operation?
Yes, sir.40

A: Yes, sir.
PCI Alviar admitted that the room where the drugs are
inspected had a double deck bed where the personnel
and the policemen would sleep when there is a police
operation. These persons can enter the forensic room
Q: And there is a door to enter that? and there is a possibility they could contaminate the
evidence. Surely, the reliability of the seized drugs
A: Yes, sir. cannot be preserved when there are various persons in
the forensic room who are not even connected with the
crime laboratory. The testimony of PCI Alviar falls short
of the requirement that the intergrity and evidentiary
value of the seized drug must be preserved.
Q: And the third part is the storage room or evidence
room? Conclusion
In fine, the Court finds that there are several errors in
the prosecution of the case. There were inconsistent
dates on the conduct of the alleged buy bust operation
because of the conflicting statements and affidavits of
the prosecution witnesses. Likewise, the requirement
under Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 was not complied with
because a representative of the DOJ was not present at
the time of the inventory of the seized item. Further, the
inventory was done fifty-four (54) kilometres away from
the place of seizure. No justifiable reason was provided
for the non-compliance with Section 21.
charged against him and ordered
immediately RELEASED from custody, unless he is being
held for some other lawful cause.
The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is ORDERED to
implement this decision and to inform this Court of the
date of the actual release from confinement of the
accused-appellant within five (5) days from receipt
hereof.
SO ORDERED.

The apprehending officers also failed to properly safe-

keep the seized item because they did not place it in a
secured container. Finally, the forensic chemist did not
give a consistent statement as to who received the
seized item and that the crime laboratory's arrangement
made it possible for other personnel to contaminate the
evidence. Accordingly, the prosecution failed to prove
that the integrity and evidentiary value of the confiscated
item were preserved.

Given the substantive flaws and procedural lapses,

serious uncertainty hangs over the identity of the seized
marijuana that the prosecution presented as evidence
before the Court. In effect, the prosecution failed to fully
prove the elements of the crime charged, creating a
reasonable doubt on the criminal liability of accused-
appellant.41

WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision

dated August 12, 2016, of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CR-HC No. 06607 is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE for failure of the prosecution to prove beyond
reasonable doubt the guilt of accused-appellant Manuel
dela Rosa who is accordingly ACQUITTED of the crime
 G.R. No. 231383, March 07, 2018
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-
Appellee, v. JOEY SANCHEZ Y LICUDINE, Accused-
Appellants.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Before the Court is an ordinary appeal1 filed by accused-
appellant Joey Sanchez y Licudine (Sanchez) assailing
the Decision2 dated February 19, 2016 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 06911, which
affirmed the Decision3 dated May 21, 2014 of the
Regional Trial Court of San Fernando City, La Union,
Branch 27 (RTC) in Criminal Case Nos. 8842 and 8843,
finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating
Sections 5 and 11, Article II of Republic Act No. (RA)
9165,4 otherwise known as the "Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002," respectively, with
modification imposing fines therefor.
The Facts
This case stemmed from two (2) Informations5 filed
before the RTC charging Sanchez with the crimes of
illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the
accusatory portions of which state:
Criminal Case No. 8842
That on or about the 29th day of July, 2010 in the
Municipality of Bacnotan, Province of La Union,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously for and in
consideration of in the amount of Five Hundred Pesos,
sell and deliver one (1) heat sealed transparent plastic
sachet containing methamphetamine hydrochloride
otherwise known as SHABU, a dangerous drug, with a
weight of 0.0352 gram to IO1 RAYMUND TABUYO, who
posed as buyer thereof using marked money, a Five
Hundred Pesos bill bearing Serial Number VX925142,
without first securing the necessary permit, license or
prescription from the proper government agency.
CONTRARY TO LAW.6
Criminal Case No. 8843
That on or about the 29th day of July, 2010 in the
Municipality of Bacnotan, Province of La Union,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, did then and there,
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession,
control and custody two (2) heat sealed transparent
plastic sachets containing methamphetamine
hydrochloride, a dangerous drug, weighing 0.0430 gram
and 0.0352 gram, without first securing the necessary
permit, license or prescription from the proper
government agency to possess the same.
CONTRARY TO LAW.7
The prosecution alleged that on July 29, 2010, with the
help of a confidential informant, the members of the
Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) and the
Philippine National Police (PNP) Regional Public Safety
Mobile Battalion organized a buy-bust operation against a
certain alias "Totoy" (later on identified as Sanchez), who
was allegedly engaged in illegal drug trade at the
Bacnotan Public Market, Bacnotan, La Union. After a
briefing where, inter alia, PDEA Investigation Officer (IO)
1 Raymund Tabuyo (IO1 Tabuyo) was designated as the
poseur-buyer, the buy-bust team proceeded to the target
area. Thereat, IO1 Tabuyo was able to meet Sanchez,
who, after receiving the marked money, handed over a
heat-sealed plastic sachet containing a white crystalline
substance to the former. After IO1 Tabuyo examined the
contents of the plastic sachet, he executed the pre-
arranged signal, thus prompting the other members of
the buy-bust team to rush to the scene and arrest
Sanchez. The buy-bust team searched Sanchez and
found two (2) other plastic sachets also containing a
white crystalline substance.8
The buy-bust team then conducted the markings,
inventory, and photography on site before proceeding to
their office for documentation purposes.9 Thereat, the
team was met with representatives from the Department
of Justice (DOJ) and the media,10 both of whom signed
the Certificate of Inventory.11 The seized plastic sachets
were then taken to the PNP Crime Laboratory where it
was confirmed12 that their contents are indeed
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.13
For his part, Sanchez pleaded not guilty to the charges
against him and offered his version of what transpired on
the day he was arrested. He narrated that between 3:00
to 4:00 in the afternoon of July 29, 2010, he was in front
of the public market collecting bets for jueteng, when
two (2) men unknown to him suddenly approached him
and gave their numbers; and that when they were about
to pay, they handcuffed and arrested him for allegedly
selling drugs. Sanchez then insisted that when he was
frisked, the men were only able to find money from the
bets he collected and that they only made it appear that
they recovered sachets containing shabu from him.14
The RTC Ruling
In a Decision15 dated May 21, 2014, the RTC found
Sanchez guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes
charged, and accordingly, sentenced him as follows: (a)
for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the RTC sentenced
Sanchez to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment,
among others; and (b) for illegal possession of
dangerous drugs, the RTC sentenced Sanchez to suffer
the penalty of imprisonment for a period of twelve (12)
years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years, among
others.16
The RTC found that the buy-bust team validly arrested
Sanchez who was caught in flagrante
delicto selling shabu to the poseur-buyer; and that after
his arrest, the arresting officers discovered two (2) more
sachets, also containing shabu, from his pocket. Further,
the RTC found that the arresting officers followed the
procedures in conducting buy-bust operation, and that
the evidence were preserved as the chain of custody
thereof was not broken.17
Aggrieved, Sanchez appealed to the CA.18
The CA Ruling
In a Decision19 dated February 19, 2016, the CA affirmed
the RTC ruling with modifications, further ordering
Sanchez to pay a fine of P500,000.00 for violating
Section 5, Article II of RA 9165, and P300,000.00 for
violating Section 11, Article II of the same law.20 It held
that the prosecution had successfully established the
elements necessary to convict Sanchez of the crimes
charged.21 It further held that the arresting officers had
shown an unbroken chain of custody over the seized
drugs, and thus, their integrity and evidentiary value
were preserved.22
Hence, this appeal.23
The Issue Before the Court
The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the
CA correctly upheld Sanchez's conviction for the crimes
charged.
The Court's Ruling
The appeal is meritorious.
At the outset, it must be stressed that an appeal in
criminal cases opens the entire case for review and, thus,
it is the duty of the reviewing tribunal to correct, cite,
and appreciate errors in the appealed judgment whether
they are assigned or unassigned.24 "The appeal confers
the appellate court full jurisdiction over the case and
renders such court competent to examine records, revise
the judgment appealed from, increase the penalty, and
cite the proper provision of the penal law."25
Here, Sanchez was charged with the crimes of illegal sale
and illegal possession of dangerous drugs, respectively
defined and penalized under Sections 5 and 11, Article II
of RA 9165. Notably, in order to properly secure the
conviction of an accused charged with illegal sale of
dangerous drugs, the prosecution must prove: (a) the
identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the
consideration; and (b) the delivery of the thing sold and
the payment.26 Meanwhile, in instances wherein an
accused is charged with illegal possession of dangerous
drugs, the prosecution must establish the following
elements to warrant his conviction: (a) the accused was
in possession of an item or object identified as a
prohibited drug; (b) such possession was not authorized
by law; and (c) the accused freely and consciously
possessed the said drug.27
Case law states that in both instances, it is essential that
the identity of the prohibited drug be established with
moral certainty, considering that the dangerous drug
itself forms an integral part of the corpus delicti of the
crime. Thus, in order to obviate any unnecessary doubt
on the identity of the dangerous drugs, the prosecution
has to show an unbroken chain of custody over the same
and account for each link in the chain of custody from the
moment the drugs are seized up to their presentation in
court as evidence of the crime.28
Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 outlines the procedure
which the apprehending officers must follow when
handling the seized drugs in order to preserve their
integrity and evidentiary value.29 Under the said section,
prior to its amendment by RA 10640,30 the apprehending
team shall, among others, immediately after seizure
and confiscation conduct a physical inventory and
photograph the seized items in the presence of the
accused or the person from whom the items were
seized, or his representative or counsel, a
representative from the media and the DOJ, and
any elected public official who shall be required to
sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy of
the same, and the seized drugs must be turned over to
the PNP Crime Laboratory within twenty-four (24) hours
from confiscation for examination.31 In the case of People
v. Mendoza,32 the Court stressed that "[w]ithout the
insulating presence of the representative from the
media or the [DOJ], or any elected public official
during the seizure and marking of the [seized
drugs], the evils of switching, 'planting' or
contamination of the evidence that had tainted the
buy-busts conducted under the regime of [RA] 6425
(Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972) again reared their ugly
heads as to negate the integrity and credibility of
the seizure and confiscation of the [said drugs]
that were evidence herein of the corpus delicti, and
thus adversely affected the trustworthiness of the
incrimination of the accused. Indeed, the x x x
presence of such witnesses would have preserved an
unbroken chain of custody."33
The Court, however, clarified that under varied field
conditions, strict compliance with the requirements of
Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 may not always be
possible.34 In fact, the IRR of RA 9165 - which is now
crystallized into statutory law with the passage of RA
10640 - provides that the said inventory and
photography may be conducted at the nearest police
station or office of the apprehending team in instances of
warrantless seizure, and that non-compliance with the
requirements of Section 21, Article II of RA 9165
- under justifiable grounds - will not render void
and invalid the seizure and custody over the seized
items so long as the integrity and evidentiary value
of the seized items are properly preserved by the
apprehending officer or team.35 In other words, the
failure of the apprehending team to strictly comply with
the procedure laid out in Section 21, Article II of RA 9165
and its IRR does not ipso facto render the seizure and
custody over the items as void and invalid, provided that
the prosecution satisfactorily proves that: (a) there is
justifiable ground for non-compliance; and (b) the
integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are
properly preserved.36 In People v. Almorfe,37the Court
explained that for the above-saving clause to
apply, the prosecution must explain the reasons
behind the procedural lapses, and that the integrity
and evidentiary value of the seized evidence had
nonetheless been preserved.38 Also, in People v. De
Guzman,39 it was emphasized that the justifiable
ground for non-compliance must be proven as a
fact, because the Court cannot presume what these
grounds are or that they even exist.40
After a judicious study of the case, the Court finds that
the arresting officers committed unjustified deviations
from the prescribed chain of custody rule, thereby
putting into question the integrity and evidentiary value
of the dangerous drugs allegedly seized from Sanchez.
While it appears that representatives from the DOJ and
the media were present during the conduct of the
inventory as evidenced by their signatures on the
Certificate of Inventory,41 a more careful scrutiny of the
records shows that the buy-bust team conducted the
marking, inventory, and photography where the arrest
was made,42 and merely made the aforesaid
representatives sign the Certificate of Inventory upon the
buy-bust team's arrival at their office. Moreover, the said
procedures were not done in the presence of any elected
public official. During trial, IO1 Tabuyo admitted to these
procedural mishaps, viz.:
[Pros. Crispin Lamong, Jr.] Q: Now, after your
recovered [the] 2 sachets and the 1 piece P500.00
buy-bust money, what did you do next?
[IO1 Tabuyo] A: We conducted an inventory at the
transaction area, your honor.
Q: When you said, in the transaction area, how did
you conduct an inventory? [sic]
A: We made marking and photographs.
Q: Marking on what items, mr. witness?
A: All, the 3 plastic sachets, sir.
xxxx
Q: Mr. witness, aside from the request you made,
what else transpired at the PDEA Office?
A: We requested a DOJ representative to sign the
inventory.
Q: Aside from the DOJ representative what else
requested Mr. Witness made by your office? [sic]
A: The media representative[,] [Y]our [H]onor.
Q: And were the DOJ representative and media
representative were able to sign the
inventory? [sic]
A: Yes[,] [S]ir.
xxxx
Q: While the DOJ representative and the media
representative signing what happened next[,] if any, mr.
witness? [sic]
A: They signed, [Y]our [H]onor.
Q: How about you[?] [W]hat were you doing then at the
time the DOJ representative and the media
representative signing, [mr.] witness? [sic]
A: I was there[,] [Y]our [H]onor[,] to witness that they
signed.
Q: And how about the accused[?] [W]here was he when
these DOJ and media representatives were signing?
A: There also, [S]ir.
Q: Mr. [w]itness, do you have any proof to show that
these indeed the DOJ representative and the media
representative signing?
A: Yes, pictures.
Q: And who took the pictures?
A: Our photographers, [Y]our [H]onor.43 (Emphases and
underscoring supplied)
The law requires the presence of an elected public
official, as well as representatives from the DOJ and the
media during the actual conduct of inventory and
photography to ensure that the chain of custody rule is
observed and thus, remove any suspicion of tampering,
switching, planting, or contamination of evidence which
could considerably affect a case. However, minor
deviations may be excused in situations where a
justifiable reason for non-compliance is explained. In this
case, despite the non-observance of the witness
requirement, no plausible explanation was given by the
prosecution. For instance, in an attempt to justify the
absence of any elected public official during the conduct
of inventory and photography, IO1 Tabuyo stated on
cross-examination that:
[Atty. Loida Martirez] Q: Mr. Witness, in your Certificate
of Inventory[,] it appears that there are only three (3)
persons who signed, you as the seizing officer, a media
representative, and a DOJ representative.
[IO1 Tabuyo] A: Yes, ma'am.
Q: Where was the elected public official? [W]hy
was he not present at the place?
A: We were not able to get one elected official
because it was a rush operation and after the
inventory we proceeded right away to our office.
Q: So you are now trying to tell us that you did not
coordinate with any barangay official that is why
they were not present, Mr. Witness.
A: Yes, ma'am.
Q: And is it not a requirement that you have to
coordinate with a local official, Mr. Witness, so that
they will be present during the inventory[?] [sic]
A: No, ma'am.
Q: That is not a requirement Mr. Witness?
A: No, ma'am.
Q: So you went to Bacnotan [P]ublic [Mjarket which is a
public place and you were not able to see even one
elected public official at the place, Mr. Witness?
A: No, ma'am.
Q: That is just very near the municipal hall, is that
correct, Mr. Witness?
A: (no answer)
Q: So you also did not coordinate with the Bacnotan
Police, Mr. Witness?
A: We coordinate, ma'am, [sic]
Q: You coordinate with the Bacnotan PNP.
A: The precinct at the left side of the public market.
Q: You just coordinated with them after the operation
when you were there already, is that correct?
A: No, ma'am.
Q: You just saw the police sub-station there, is that
correct?
A: No, ma'am.44 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
At this point, it is well to note that the absence of these
required witnesses does not per se render the
confiscated items inadmissible.45 However, in People v.
Umipang,46 the Court held that the prosecution must
show that earnest efforts were employed in contacting
the representatives enumerated under the law for "a
sheer statement that representatives were unavailable
without so much as an explanation on whether serious
attempts were employed to look for other
representatives, given the circumstances is to be
regarded as a flimsy excuse."47 Verily, mere statements
of unavailability, absent actual serious attempts to
contact the required witnesses are unacceptable as
justified grounds for non-compliance.48 These
considerations arise from the fact that these officers are
ordinarily given sufficient time - beginning from the
moment they have received the information about the
activities of the accused until the time of his arrest - to
prepare for a buy-bust operation and consequently,
make the necessary arrangements beforehand knowing
fully well that they would have to strictly comply with the
set procedure prescribed in Section 21, Article II of RA
9165. As such, the apprehending officers are
compelled not only to state reasons for their non-
compliance, but must in fact, also convince the
Court that they exerted earnest efforts to comply
with the mandated procedure, and that under the
given circumstances, their actions were
reasonable.49
Thus, for failure of the prosecution to provide justifiable
grounds or show that special circumstances exist which
would excuse their transgression — as in fact the only
reason given was that they were conducting a "rush
operation" — the Court is constrained to conclude that
the integrity and evidentiary value of the items
purportedly seized from Sanchez have been
compromised. It is settled that in a prosecution for the
sale and possession of dangerous drugs under RA 9165,
the State carries the heavy burden of proving not only
the elements of the offense, but also to prove the
integrity of the corpus delicti, failing in which, renders
the case for the State insufficient to prove the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt.50
As a final note, the Court finds it fitting to echo its
recurring pronouncement in recent jurisprudence on the
subject matter:
The Court strongly supports the campaign of the
government against drug addiction and commends the
efforts of our law enforcement officers against those who
would inflict this malediction upon our people, especially
the susceptible youth. But as demanding as this
campaign may be, it cannot be more so than the
compulsions of the Bill of Rights for the protection of
liberty of every individual in the realm, including the
basest of criminals. The Constitution covers with the
mantle of its protection the innocent and the guilty alike
against any manner of high-handedness from the
authorities, however praiseworthy their intentions.
Those who are supposed to enforce the law are not
justified in disregarding the right of the individual in the
name of order. [For indeed,] [o]rder is too high a price
for the loss of liberty. x x x.51
"In this light, prosecutors are strongly reminded that
they have the positive duty to prove compliance with
the procedure set forth in Section 21[, Article II] of RA
9165, as amended. As such, they must have
the initiative to not only acknowledge but
also justify any perceived deviations from the said
procedure during the proceedings before the trial
court. Since compliance with the procedure is
determinative of the integrity and evidentiary value of
the corpus delicti and ultimately, the fate of the liberty of
the accused, the fact that any issue regarding the same
was not raise, or even threshed out in the court/s below,
would not preclude the appellate court, including this
Court, from fully examining the records of the case if
only to ascertain whether the procedure had been
completely complied with, and if not, whether justifiable
reasons exist to excuse any deviation. If no such reasons
exist, then it is the appellate court's bounden duty to
acquit the accused, and perforce, overturn a
conviction."52
WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision
dated February 19, 2016 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CR-H.C. No. 06911 is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Accordingly, accused-appellant Joey Sanchez y
Licudine is ACQUITTED of the crimes charged. The
Director of the Bureau of Corrections is ordered to cause
his immediate release, unless he is being lawfully held in
custody for any other reason.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 215790, March 12, 2018
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-
Appellee, v. MAURICIO CABAJAR VIBAR, Accused-
Appellants.
DECISION
MARTIRES, J.:
This is an appeal from the 14 March 2014 Decision1 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 05989,
which affirmed the 12 December 2012 Judgment2 of the
Regional Trial Court, xxxxxxxxxxx Camarines Norte
(RTC), in Criminal Case No. 12249, finding accused-
appellant Mauricio Cabajar Vibar (Vibar) guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape defined and
penalized under Article 266-B(l) of the Revised Penal
Code (RPC).
THE FACTS
In an Information dated 23 December 2004, Vibar was
charged with the Crime of Rape committed
against xxxxxxxxxxx AAA3. The accusatory portion reads:
That on or about 11:00 in the morning of August 4, 2002
at xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xx Province of Camarines Norte, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named
accused, with lewd design, motivated by bestial lust and
by means of force and intimidation, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously had carnal
knowledge xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx with AAA, 15 years old,
against her will and to her damage.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
During his arraignment on 7 March 2005, Vibar, with the
assistance of his counsel, pleaded "Not Guilty."5
Evidence for the Prosecution
The prosecution presented AAA and Dr. Raul Alcantara
(Dr. Alcantara) as witnesses. Their combined testimonies
tended to establish the following:
On 4 August 2002, at around 11:00 A.M., while AAA was
cooking lunch outside their nipa hut in Camarines Norte,
Vibar came and asked her to get his gloves from inside
the house. When AAA refused to do so, he carried her
inside and laid her on the floor,6 removed her shorts and
panty, zipped open his pants, placed himself on top of
her, and made push and pull movements.7 During this
time, AAA felt Vibar's penis enter her vagina causing her
pain.8
That same day, AAA reported the incident to the police.
After executing an affidavit at the police station, she
appeared before the judge of the Municipal Circuit Trial
Court (MCTC) of San Lorenzo Ruiz for preliminary
investigation.9 AAA's first complaint for rape, however,
was dismissed because she refused to speak during that
time. She did not cooperate with the preliminary
investigation because she was afraid of xxxxxxxxxxx who
had threatened to kill her.10 Further, AAA was hesitant
because she did not have the support of her mother, who
initially chose to side with Vibar.11
After the incident, AAA left Camarines Norte and went to
Antipolo to work. On 7 July 2004, she returned to
Camarines Norte to study. Unfortunately, AAA was
constantly harassed by Vibar; he would touch her breast
and kiss her. This prompted her to file anew the
complaint for rape xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx.12 On 20
August 2004, AAA was subjected to a medical
examination where it was discovered that she had an
elastic hymen that could be penetrated by a penis
without causing any lacerations.13
Evidence for the Defense
The defense presented Vibar as its lone witness, whose
testimony sought to prove the following:
On 4 August 2002, at around 11:00 A.M., Vibar went
home after attending Sunday worship. Once home, he
asked AAA why she did not prepare lunch, and the latter
retorted in a disrespectful manner. Because he was
hungry and had an earlier misunderstanding with his wife
BBB, Vibar scolded her and uttered other unsavory
remarks. After the verbal confrontation, AAA went to the
police station and accused him of attempted rape.14
In 2004, however, AAA re-filed the case against Vibar
with the prodding of BBB, Arlene Rosinto (Arlene), and a
certain Shirley: Arlene and Shirley belonged to the same
religious sect as Vibar. They conspired against him and
used AAA to exact vengeance upon him: BBB had a
paramour and wanted to elope with him but could not do
so because she was still living with Vibar; Arlene had an
axe to grind against him after he did not vote for her
husband, a candidate chosen by their sect, during the
elections; Shirley got mad at Vibar when he distanced
himself from the sect after refusing to vote for Arlene's
husband.15
While in detention, Vibar received a letter16 from AAA in
2006 wherein she alleged that she was merely coerced to
re-file the complaint for rape and that she regretted her
decision to do so. Relevant portions of the letter read:
xxxxxx patawarin mo po ako. Hindi ko po kagustuhan
ang pangyayaring ito. Natakot lang po ako at ang sabi po
nila Ate Arlene na laga DSWD na humahawak sa kaso
mo, kapag hindi ko raw pinanindigan ang kasong
isinampa nila sa yo at ikaw ay nadismiss at nakalaya, ako
raw po ang ipapalit nila sa kulungan.
xxxx
xxxxxx gulong-gulo na po ang isip ko, hindi ko na po
alam kung ano ang gagawin ko para makalaya ka, naisip
ko na lang xxxxxx ang magpakalayo-layo na lang ako,
wag po kayong malungkot sa paglayo ko, ito na lang po
ang naisip kong paraan, at ito na rin po ang hiding sulat
ko sa yo.
The RTC Ruling
In its 12 December 2012 judgment, the RTC found Vibar
guilty of rape. The trial court ruled that the prosecution
was able to prove that AAA was indeed sexually
abused xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx noting that AAA's
straightforward testimony trumped Vibar's defenses of
denial and alibi. The RTC averred that no family member
would fabricate a case of rape against another family
member and undergo public prosecution if it were
untrue. The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, the prosecution having proven the guilt of
accused Mauricio Vibar y Cabajar beyond reasonable
doubt for the crime of Rape, he is hereby sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility
of parole and to pay offended party the following:
a. P75,000.00 by way of civil indemnity;
b. P75,000.00 by way of moral damages;
c. P30,000.00 by way of exemplary damages
with interest of 6% per annum on all the aforesaid
damages from the date of finality of this judgment until
fully paid.
With costs.
SO ORDERED.17
Aggrieved, Vibar appealed before the CA.
The CA Ruling
In its assailed decision, the CA affirmed the RTC
judgment. The appellate court upheld AAA's testimony,
which was found credible by the trial court after having
directly observed her demeanor and behavior on the
witness stand. It highlighted that the physical evidence
corroborated her testimony. The CA brushed aside
Vibar's imputation of conspiracy for being self-serving.
Finally, the appellate court disregarded AAA's purported
letter for lack of authentication. It ruled:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant
appeal is hereby DENIED. The assailed Judgment dated
December 12, 2012 of the Daet, Camarines Norte RTC,
Branch 40, in Criminal Case No. 12249 for Rape is
hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.18
Hence, this appeal raising the following:
ISSUE
WHETHER THE ACCUSED IS GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT OF RAPE.
 THE COURT'S RULING
The appeal has no merit.
Rape is a peculiar crime in that it is shrouded in mystery.
More often than not, the victim is left alone at the hand
of the assailant with no one to corroborate her claims;
sometimes physical evidence to suggest she was defiled
is even lacking. It becomes a battle of credibility where
the courts are left to decide whether to believe in the
victim's narration of her harrowing experience or to
accept the abuser's plea of innocence.
Thus, in deciding rape cases, the Court is guided by the
following well-established principles: (1) an accusation of
rape can be made with facility and while the accusation is
difficult to prove, it is even more difficult for the accused,
though innocent, to disprove; (2) considering that in the
nature of things, only two persons are usually involved in
the crime of rape, the testimony of the complainant
should be scrutinized with great caution; and (3) the
evidence of the prosecution must stand or fall on its own
merits and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the
weakness of the evidence for the defense.19 The Court is
duty bound to conduct a thorough and exhaustive
evaluation of a judgment of conviction for rape
considering the grave consequences for both the accused
and the complainant.20
Credible and categorical testimony of the victim
sufficient to convict accused for rape
The Court has consistently observed the rule that the
assessment by the trial courts of a witness' credibility is
accorded great weight and respect. This is so as trial
court judges have the advantage of directly observing a
witness on the stand and determining whether one is
telling the truth or not.21 Such findings of the trial courts
are generally upheld absent any showing that they have
overlooked substantial facts and circumstances which
would materially affect the result of the case.22
Vibar bewails that the courts a quo erred in lending
credibility to AAA's testimony claiming that it was against
human nature for a young girl to fabricate a story that
would expose herself to ridicule and place a family
member behind bars. Truly, the Court in past rulings has
held that testimonies of female or child victims should be
given full weight and credence because when they say
they have been raped, they are saying in effect all that is
necessary to show that rape has indeed been
committed.23
In People v. Amarela,24 however, the Court cautioned
against the over-reliance on the presumption that no
woman would spin a tale of sexual abuse if it were untrue
because it would tarnish her honor:
More often than not, where the alleged victim survives to
tell her story of sexual depredation, rape cases are solely
decided based on the credibility of the testimony of the
private complainant. In doing so, we have hinged on
the impression that no young Filipina of decent
repute would publicly admit that she has been
sexually abused, unless that is the truth, for it is
her natural instinct to protect her honor. However,
this misconception, particularly in this day and age, not
only puts the accused at an unfair disadvantage, but
creates a travesty of justice.
xxxx
This opinion borders on the fallacy of non sequitor.
And while the factual setting back then would have
been appropriate to say it is natural for a woman to Q: You will agree with me that it is
be reluctant in disclosing sexual assault; today, we normal xxxxxxxxxxxxxx to enter the nipa hut during
simply cannot be stuck to the Maria Clara that time?
stereotype of a demure and reserved Filipino
woman. We, should stay away from such mindset and A: I was outside the nipa hut that time because our
accept the realities of a woman's dynamic role in society kitchen is outside.
today; she who has over the years transformed into a
strong and confidently intelligent and beautiful person,
willing to fight for her rights.

In this way, we can evaluate the testimony of a private Q: So, what is this untoward incident that happened?
complainant of rape without gender bias or cultural
misconception. It is important to weed out these A: He came and then he asked me to get his glo[v]es but
unnecessary notions because an accused may be I do not want to enter the house, so what he did is he
convicted solely on the testimony of the victim, forced me to enter and he almost carried me and put
provided of course, that the testimony is credible, me on the floor.
natural, convincing and consistent with human
nature and the normal course of things. (emphases
and underscoring supplied)
Nevertheless, when AAA's testimony is taken in a
vacuum and examined devoid of any preconceptions or Q: When you say he forced you and almost carried you,
presumption, it stands sufficient to convict Vibar of Rape, can you describe it to me?
thus:
A: He carried me up in going inside.
Direct Examination

xxxx
FISCAL MANLAPAZ:

Q: So, after he managed to carry you and laid you to the

floor, what happened next?
A: He removed my shorts and panty and then he opened you and he touched your vagina, what did he say to
up his zipper and place[d] himself on top of me. you?

A: None, sir.

Q: What happened next?

A: I felt something touched my vagina. Q: Can you describe to us his appearance while he was
on top of you?

A: He was lying and he was on top of me and pressing

Q: You just felt it? my vagina.

A: Yes sir.

Q: While the accused was on top of you, what did the

accused do if any?
Q: What is that?
A: He was trying to insert his penis.
A: His penis.

Q: So, what movement did he make?

xxxx
A: (Witness is making a push and pull movement).25

Q: While the accused was doing all of these from the

time that he grabbed you and brought you inside the Re-Direct
house and then he opened his zipper and he mounted
Q: After he removed your shorts what happened next? Q: You were hurt?

A: He opened the zipper of his pants and laid on top of A: Yes, sir.26
me, sir.
AAA was straightforward and categorical in narrating how
Vibar had forcibly taken her inside the house and
mounted her while she was lying on the floor and then
inserted his penis into her vagina. It did not matter that
Q: After that what else happened? the penetration lasted only for a short period of time
because carnal knowledge means sexual bodily
A: I felt his penis touched my vagina, sir. connection between persons; and the slightest
penetration of the female genitalia consummates the
crime of rape.27

Moreover, it is noteworthy that AAA immediately sought

Q: Touched only? help from the authorities when she was
defiled xxxxxxxxxxxxx in August 2002. Unfortunately,
A: It penetrated my vagina, sir. the case was dismissed during the preliminary
investigation stage due to her reluctance to speak before
the investigating MCTC judge.

Q: For how long? AAA's hesitation, nonetheless, was caused by the initial
lack of support of her mother, who sided with Vibar, and
the threats of the accused towards her. It should not
A: It was for a short time only, sir. diminish her urgency to report the gruesome incident to
the police. If the delay in reporting incidents of rape may
cast doubt upon the courts as to the veracity of the
alleged crime,28 then the swift desire to achieve justice
Q: And after he finished what did you notice, if any? should strengthen the victim's claims. In this case, AAA's
minority coupled with her immediate action to seek
A: I felt pain, sir. redress for the wrong committed against her, tend to
support her testimony that indeed she was
raped xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx.

Medical reports corroborative evidence in rape.

Vibar also laments that there was no physical evidence of Q:
penetration to support AAA's claims of defilement, noting
that there were no medical reports that indicated even
the slightest of penetration. It must be remembered,
however, that medical reports are merely corroborative
in character and are not essential for a conviction
because the credible testimony of a victim would
suffice.29
A:
Nevertheless, in the case at bench, the findings from
AAA's medical examination actually support her
testimony. Dr. Alacantara explained the findings as
follows:
Q:
FISCAL BOADO:
So you are saying Doctor, that although the hymen is
still intact it is still possible that there was sexual
intercourse? I will rephrase, Your Honor. You said
Doctor, that although the hymen is intact the
allegations of AAA xxxxxxxxxxx the accused in this
case, had intercourse with her [is] inconsistent with
her testimony?
It is possible.
So, it means Doctor that even though the minor in
this case was a victim of sexual abuse, healed hymen
can still be considered intact?

A: Yes, ma'am.
Q: Doctor, in the conclusions of Dr. Jane Perpetua F.
Fajardo, she states, "hymenal orifice wide (measure
2.5cm wide) as to allow complete penetration by an
average sized adult Filipino organ in full erection Q: What is the layman's term of this hymen intact but
without producing hymenal injury." What does she distensible?
mean by that, can you interpret?
A: Elastic.
A: Taking into consideration the shape of the hymen and
as mentioned by Dr. Fajardo, as I said that the hymen
is elastic and has a diameter of 2.5 cm., that means
fully elastic male organ can easily visible to the xxxx
examining physician.

Q: So, even if the incident transpired on August 4, 2002
if there is a penetration by a penis, adult penis, inside
the vagina of AAA because the hymen is elastic it
can no longer be determined whether there is a
laceration?
A: The characteristic of the hymen is elastic. If there is a
penetration then the hymen will just distense and
accommodate the male organ and it is possible that
no laceration.30
Thus, it is clear that AAA's medical report did not
discount the fact that intercourse occurred even if her
hymen was intact. As characterized by Dr. Alcantara,
AAA's elastic hymen made it possible for an erect adult
penis to penetrate her vagina without causing lacerations
or rupture of the hymen.
saw the document executed or written; or (2) by
evidence of the genuineness of the signature or
handwriting of the maker. The authentication of private
document before it is received in evidence is vital
because during such process, a witness positively
identifies that the document is genuine and has been
duly executed or that the document is neither spurious
nor counterfeit nor executed by mistake or under
duress.32
In order to bolster his claim of innocence, Vibar testified:
Cross-examination
FISCAL BOADO:

Lack of authentication of private documents

renders them inadmissible.
Q: You also presented, Mr. witness, a letter allegedly
As a last-ditch effort to convince the courts of his written by AAA the private complainant in this case
innocence, Vibar claimed that he received a letter from addressed to you, is that correct?
AAA sometime in 2006 wherein the latter explained that
she was merely coerced to re-file the complaint for rape A: Yes, ma'am.
and she very much regretted doing so. He stated the
while it was not AAA herself who gave the letter, he was
sure that it was AAA who wrote it because no one else by
AAA's name would call her xxxxxx and that he was
Q: But you do not have any proof to substantiate your
familiar with her handwriting.31
claim that this letter was really prepared
Section 20, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides that by xxxxxxxxxxxxx AAA aside from your bare
in order for any private document offered as authentic to allegation?
be admitted as evidence, its due execution and
authenticity must be proved either: (1) by anyone who
A: She is the one, ma'am, because no other AAA would A: More or less May 24, 2006, Your Honor.
call me xxxxx and all the contents of the letter speak
[to] all the incidents involving our case, ma'am.

Q: And when you received the said alleged letter, AAA

[had] already testified in court?
Q: But you cannot present any documents written by
AAA to prove that this penmanship belongs to AAA, A: Yes, Your Honor.
is that correct?

A: I do not have, ma'am.

Q: Who handed to you the letter?

A: It was given to me by the one who visited me in jail,

xxxx he said that it was given to him by AAA, Your
Honor.33
A plain reading of Vibar's testimony immediately reveals
that he miserably failed to comply with the
Court
authentication requirement set forth under the Rules.
Neither was there any witness who could testify that the
alleged letter was voluntarily and personally made by
AAA nor was there any document from which her
Q: Mr. witness, when did you receive the letter allegedly handwriting could have been compared. Curiously, the
coming from AAA? person who purportedly handed to Vibar AAA's letter was
not presented in court to testify as to the genuineness of
A: On May 2006, Your Honor. the document.

Vibar merely relies on his self-serving testimony that he

was sure that the letter was AAA's doing. Such hollow
assurance, however, in no way proves that AAA had
Q: Can you not remember the date of May? indeed voluntarily executed the said document. He could
have easily fabricated the letter and feigned that it was
made xxxxxxxxxxxxxx As such, AAA's professed letter is
but a mere scrap of paper with no evidentiary value for
lack of proper authentication.
With this in mind, the Court agrees that all the elements
of rape are present in the case at bar. Under Article 266-
A(l) of the RPC, Rape is committed by a man who shall
have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the
following circumstances: (a) Through force, threat or
intimidation; (b) When the offended party is deprived of
reason or is otherwise unconscious; (c) By means of
fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and
(d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years
of age or is demented, even though none of the
circumstances mentioned above is present. Here, AAA
categorically testified that Vibar had carnal knowledge
with her after the latter lay on top of her and inserted his
penis into her vagina. In addition, force and intimidation
were
present xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx.34
the award of damages for the crime of rape wherein it
stated that when the penalty imposed is death but
reduced because of R.A. No. 9346, the victim is entitled
to P100,000.00 as civil indemnity, P100,000.00 as moral
damages and P100,000.00 as exemplary damages.37 In
conformity with the said ruling, all damages awarded to
AAA should be increased accordingly.
WHEREFORE, the 14 March 2014 Decision of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 05989 is AFFIRMED
with MODIFICATION. Accused-appellant Mauricio Vibar
y Cabajar is ordered to pay AAA P100,000.00 as civil
indemnity, P100,000.00 as moral damages, and
P100,000.00 as exemplary damages with interest at the
rate of six percent (6%) per annum computed from the
finality of this judgment until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.

Modification of damages to conform to recent

jurisprudence

In convicting Vibar, the RTC ordered that he pay AAA

P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral
damages and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages. Under
Article 266-B of the RPC, the penalty of death shall be
imposed xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx. In view of Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 9346,35 however, the penalty of reclusion
perpetua shall be imposed in lieu of the death penalty
when the law violated uses the nomenclature of the
penalties under the RPC.

On the other hand, the Court in People v. Jugueta36 set

 G.R. No. 204289, November 22, 2017
FERNANDO MANCOL,
JR., Petitioner, v. DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
TIJAM, J.:
Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari1 is the
Decision2 dated February 22, 2012 and Resolution3 dated
September 27, 2012 of the Court of Appeals (CA),
Visayas Station in CA-G.R. CEB-CV No. 03030, affirming
the Orders dated June 13, 2008,4 November 4,
20085 and April 17, 20096 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Calbayog City, Branch 31 in Civil Case No. 923.
Factual Antecedents
Respondent Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP),
scheduled an Invitation to Bid for Negotiated Sale on
October 13, 2004 at the Mezzanine Floor, over a
residential lot with a two-storey building (subject
property) covered by TCT No. 2041 located at Navarro
Street, Calbayog City, and with Tax Declaration (TD)
Nos. 9901006009317 and 9901006004798 with a
purchase price of P1,326,000.9
In line with this, Fernando Mancol, Jr. (petitioner)
executed a Special Power of Attorney (SPA)10 appointing
his father, Fernando Mancol, Sr. (Mancol, Sr.), to
represent and negotiate, on his behalf, the sale of the
subject property. Pursuant to the SPA, Mancol, Sr. signed
the Negotiated Offer to Purchase11 and Negotiated Sale
Rules and Procedures/Disposition of Assets on a First-
Come First Served Basis.12 DBP then issued an Official
Receipt (O.R.) No. 344001813 dated October 13, 2004, in
the name of Fernando R. Mancol, Jr., paid by Fernando
M. Mancol, Sr., in the amount of P265,200, as initial
payment for the purchase price of the subject property.
During the negotiations, DBP officials allegedly agreed,
albeit verbally, to: (1) arrange and effect the transfer of
title of the lot in petitioner's name, including the payment
of capital gains tax (CGT); and (2) to get rid of the
occupants of the subject property.14
Petitioner paid the balance in the amount of P1,060,800,
as evidenced by O.R. No. 344045115 dated December 10,
2004. Thereafter, DBP, through its Branch Manager Jorge
B. Albarillo, executed a Deed of Absolute Sale,16 in
petitioner's favor.
On December 21, 2004, petitioner made a deposit with
DBP for the payment of the CGT and documentary stamp
tax (DST) in the amount of P99,450. DBP acknowledged
the deposit and issued O.R. No. 3440537.17
Sometime in 2006, DBP reneged on its undertaking
based on the oral agreement. DBP returned to the
petitioner all the pertinent documents of the sale and
issued a Manager's Check (MC) No. 000095647518 in the
amount of P99,450.19
In a Letter20 dated February 21, 2006, petitioner through
its counsel demanded from DBP to comply with its verbal
undertaking. He returned the MC and all pertinent
documents affecting the sale of the subject property to
DBP.
DBP, through its Letter21 dated April 22, 2006,
disregarded the subsequent oral agreement and
reminded petitioner that DBP has no obligation to eject
the occupants and to cause the transfer of title of the lot
in petitioner's name.
Meanwhile, Mancol, Sr. wrote a Letter22 dated May 15,
2006 to the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) requesting
for a detailed computation of the CGT and DST with
penalties and surcharges thereof affecting the sale of the
subject property. The BIR, through its Letter23 dated May
24, 2006 came out with a detailed computation in the
total of P160,700.88.
In a Letter24 dated June 2, 2006, petitioner proposed to
DBP that he will facilitate the payment of the CGT and
DST but DBP should shoulder the penalties and
surcharges. The proposal, however, was turned down. As
of March 7, 2007, the total amount to be paid which is
necessary for the transfer of the title in petitioner's name
ballooned to P183,553.61 and counting.25
On August 24, 2006, petitioner filed a Complaint26 for
damages for breach of contract against DBP before the
RTC of Calbayog City, Branch 31. He prayed that DBP be
found to have breached its obligation with petitioner;
that DBP be held liable to pay the aggregate amount of
P160,700.88 and surcharges which may be imposed by
the BIR at the time of payment; that DBP be ordered to
pay damages and attorney's fees; and that DBP be
ordered to return the MC dated February 8, 2006 for
P99,450.
27
In its Answer with Counter-Claim, DBP alleged that the
terms of the Deed of Absolute Sale stated no condition
that DBP will work on the document of transfer and to
eject the occupants thereon.28 Assuming that DBP's
officials made such a promise, DBP alleged that the same
would not be possible since the petitioner did not give
any money to DBP for other expenses in going to and
from Calbayog City. DBP likewise alleged that it is not the
bank's policy to work for the registration of the
instrument of sale of properties.29 DBP further claimed
that petitioner's unilateral act in issuing a check to DBP
does not constitute as evidence to prove that DBP
assumed the responsibility of registering the instrument
of sale. By way of counterclaim, DBP averred that
petitioner grossly violated the terms and conditions of
the agreement of sale.30 Petitioner failed to pay,
reimburse or assume the financial obligation consequent
to the initiation and filing of the writ of possession by
DBP against the occupants. Petitioner's failure was
contrary to his promise and assurance that he will pay.
Petitioner did not comply with the clear and express
provisions of the Deed of Absolute Sale and of the rules
and procedures of sale on negotiation. DBP, thus, prayed
that the complaint be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction
and that petitioner be ordered to assume the burden of
initiating the ejectment suit and to pay DBP damages,
attorney's fees and cost of suit amounting to P200,000.
On February 20, 2007, the RTC issued an
Orde31 declaring DBP in default by reason of its counsel's
failure to appear during the pre-trial and to file its pre-
trial brief.
Trial ensued.
During the trial, Rodel Villanueva testified32 that he was
the one commissioned or ordered by a certain Atty. Mar
De Asis (Atty. De Asis) of DBP, to go to BIR-Catbalogan,
and to bring the following documents: a check worth
PhP99,450.00, the amount for the CGT, the title, the TD,
and the deed of sale.33

Mancol, Sr. testified34 that he signed the Negotiated Offer
to Purchase and Negotiated Sale Rules and
Procedures/Disposition of Assets on a First-Come First
Served Basis on behalf of his son, by virtue of the
SPA.35 He stated that after the execution and delivery of
the Deed of Absolute Sale, DBP verbally agreed to
facilitate the transfer of the title, the payment of the
CGT, and to cause the vacation of the occupants of the
house and lot. Although he admitted that the verbal
agreement contradicted the negotiated rules and
agreement.36 He stated that DBP undertook to get rid of
the occupants, when its lawyer filed an Ex-Parte Motion
for Issuance of a Writ of Possession37 dated January 11,
2005, which is pending in the RTC.38
On April 14, 2008, the RTC Decision39 ruled in favor of
the petitioner, and ordered DBP to return to petitioner
the amount of P99,450 deposited to it for payment of the
CGT and DST; to pay the surcharges and/or interests on
the CGT and DST as may be determined by the BIR from
June 12, 2005 up to the date of payment; and to pay the
petitioner attorney's fees in the amount of P15,000. The
RTC likewise dismissed DBP's counterclaim.40
Thereafter, DBP moved for the reconsideration41 of the
RTC's Decision. DBP alleged, among others, that the
testimonies of Villanueva and Mancol, Sr. were hearsay
because their statements were based on facts relayed to
them by other people and not based on their personal
knowledge.
On June 13, 2008, the RTC Order42 granted DBP's motion
and dismissed petitioner's complaint.
Petitioner moved for the reconsideration43 of the June 13,
2008 Order. For the first time, petitioner alleged that
through his father, Mancol, Sr., he entered into a
contemporaneous verbal agreement with DBP. He argued
that since his father was his attorney-in-fact, then his
father had personal knowledge of all transactions
involving the sale of the subject property. The motion,
however, was denied in the RTC Order44 dated November
4, 2008. The RTC affirmed with modification its June 13,
2008 Order, to read thus:
WHEREFORE, this court finds no reason to disturb its
order dated June 13, 2008, subject only to a modification
that [DBP] is directed to return to the [petitioner], the
total amount of P99,450.00 deposited to it for the
payment of the [CGT] and [DST], with interest of six
percent (6%) per annum from December 21, 2004 until
its return to the [petitioner].
SO ORDERED.45
DBP sought reconsideration46 of the RTC Order dated
November 4, 2008, which however, was denied by the
RTC in its Order47 dated April 17, 2009. The RTC ruled
that DBP has waived its right to question the return of
P99,450 to the petitioner since DBP failed to refute such
an issue in the RTC Decision dated April 14, 2008.
Both petitioner48 and DBP49 appealed the RTC Order
dated June 13, 2008 and November 4, 2008,
respectively, with the CA.
On February 22, 2012, the CA in its Decision,50 denied
both appeals, the dispositive portion of which reads,
thus:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the
appeals filed in this case are hereby DENIED. The
assailed Orders dated June 13, 2008, November 4, 2008
and April 17, 2009 of the [RTC], Branch 31 of Calbayog
City in Civil Case No. 923 are AFFIRMED. Costs to be
shouldered equally by both parties.
SO ORDERED.51
Thereafter, petitioner filed a Motion for Partial
Reconsideration,52 while DBP filed a Motion for
Reconsideration,53 seeking the reversal of the CA
Decision dated February 22, 2012. Both motions,
however, were denied in the CA Resolution54 dated
September 27, 2012.
Henceforth, only the petitioner filed the instant appeal
anchored on the following arguments:
I. THE TESTIMONIES OF [PETITIONER'S]
WITNESSES, [VILLANUEVA] AND [MANCOL,
SR.] ARE BASED ON PERSONAL
KNOWLEDGE AND NOT HEARSAY
EVIDENCE, AND THAT THEY SUFFICIENTLY
ESTABLISHED THE EXISTENCE AND
VALIDITY OF A SUBSEQUENT ORAL
AGREEMENT BETWEEN [PETITIONER] AND
DBP TO (1) ARRANGE AND EFFECT THE
TRANSFER OF THE TORRENS TITLE IN THE
NAME OF [PETITIONER], INCLUDING
PAYMENT OF [CGT] AND [DSTs], AND (2)
TO GET RID OF THE OCCUPANTS IN THE
SUBJECT PROPERTY[;]
II. UNDISPUTED RELEVANT AND MATERIAL
EVIDENCE ON RECORD ESTABLISHED THE
EXISTENCE AND VALIDITY OF THE
SUBSEQUENT ORAL AGREEMENT BETWEEN
MANCOL, JR. AND DBP, AND THAT TO
IGNORE THEM IS TO SANCTION VIOLATION
OF MANCOL. JR.'S DUE PROCESS RIGHTS[;
AND]
III. [PETITIONER] IS ENTITLED TO THE
PAYMENT OF MORAL AND EXEMPLARY
DAMAGES, ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS
OF SUIT.55
The petition fails.
The above assignment of errors make it evident that the
only issue involved in this appeal is one of fact: whether
or not the testimonies of petitioner's witnesses,
Villanueva and Mancol, Sr., should be given probative
value to establish the alleged contemporaneous verbal
agreement in the sale contract, i.e., that DBP bound itself
to arrange and effect the transfer of title of the lot in
petitioner's name; and, get rid of the occupants of the
subject property.
We answer in the negative.
"The parol evidence rule forbids any addition to, or
contradiction of, the terms of a written agreement by
testimony or other evidence purporting to show that
different terms were agreed upon by the parties, varying
the purport of the written contract."56
This, however, is merely a general rule. Provided that a
party puts in issue in its pleading any of the exceptions in
the second paragraph of Rule 130, Section 957 of the
Revised Rules on Evidence, a party may present evidence
to modify, explain or add to the terms of the agreement.
Moreover, as with all possible objections to the admission
of evidence, a party's failure to timely object is deemed a
waiver, and parol evidence may then be entertained.58

In the case of Maunlad Savings & Loan Assoc., Inc. v.
CA,59 the Court held that:
The rule is that objections to evidence must be made as
soon as the grounds therefor become reasonably
apparent. In the case of testimonial evidence, the
objection must be made when the objectionable question
is asked or after the answer is given if the objectionable
features become apparent only by reason of such
answer, otherwise the objection is waived and such
evidence will form part of the records of the case as
competent and complete evidence and all parties are
thus amenable to any favorable or unfavorable effects
resulting from the evidence.60 (Citations omitted)
Here, in order to prove the verbal agreement allegedly
made by DBP, petitioner invoked the fourth exception
under the parol evidence rule, i.e., the existence of other
terms agreed to by the parties or their successors-in--
interest after the execution of the written agreement, by
offering the testimonies of Villanueva and Mancol, Sr.
The bank, however, failed to make a timely objection
against the said testimonies during the trial since DBP
was declared in default. Thus, DBP waived the protection
of the parol evidence rule.
This notwithstanding, We stress that the admissibility of
the testimonial evidence as an exception to the parol
evidence rule does not necessarily mean that it has
weight. Admissibility of evidence should not be
confounded with its probative value.
"The admissibility of evidence depends on its relevance
and competence, while the weight of evidence pertains to
evidence already admitted and its tendency to convince
and persuade."61 The admissibility of a particular item of
evidence has to do with whether it meets various tests
by which its reliability is to be determined, so as to be
considered with other evidence admitted in the case in
arriving at a decision as to the truth.62 The weight of
evidence is not determined mathematically by the
numerical superiority of the witnesses testifying to a
given fact, but depends upon its practical effect in
inducing belief on the part of the judge trying the
case.63 "Admissibility refers to the question of whether
certain pieces of evidence are to be considered at all,
while probative value refers to the question of whether
the admitted evidence proves an issue."64 "Thus, a
particular item of evidence may be admissible, but its
evidentiary weight depends on judicial evaluation within
the guidelines provided by the rules of evidence."65
It is a basic rule in evidence that a witness can testify
only on the facts that he knows of his own personal
knowledge, i.e., those which are derived from his own
perception.66 A witness may not testify on what he
merely learned, read or heard from others because such
testimony is considered hearsay and may not be received
as proof of the truth of what he has learned, read or
heard.67 Hearsay evidence is evidence, not of what the
witness knows himself but, of what he has heard from
others; it is not only limited to oral testimony or
statements but likewise applies to written statements.68
The personal knowledge of a witness is a substantive
prerequisite for accepting testimonial evidence that
establishes the truth of a disputed fact.69 A witness
bereft of personal knowledge of the disputed fact cannot
be called upon for that purpose because his testimony
derives its value not from the credit accorded to him as a
witness presently testifying but from the veracity and
competency of the extrajudicial source ofhis
information.70 agreement with DBP. Upon being asked what transpired
after the delivery of the Deed of Absolute Sale, Mancol,
Guided by these precepts, Villanueva's testimony falls Sr. simply answered that DBP agreed to undertake the
within the category of hearsay evidence. Contrary to transfer of title of the lot, and to oust the occupants.
petitioner's claim, Villanueva had no personal inkling as There was no mention as to who actually and personally
to the contemporaneous verbal agreement between appeared before DBP or any of its officials in order to
petitioner and DBP. In fact, there was no such verbal forge the alleged verbal agreement. Thus:
agreement. As admitted by the petitioner, the alleged
verbal agreement was entered into between DBP and (DIRECT EXAMINATION by Atty. Elino Chin, counsel
MancoI, Sr., by virtue of the SPA. Villanueva has no for Witness: [Mancol, Sr.])
personal knowledge of such fact. His testimony related
only to the fact that Atty. De Asis ordered him to go to
BIR-Catbalogan, and bring the following documents: a
check worth P99,450, the amount for the CGT, title, TD,
xxxx
and the deed of sale. None of Villanueva's acts would
suggest, even remotely, that he personally knew about
the verbal agreement.

As correctly pointed out by the CA: ATTY. CHIN

[Villanueva] did not personally witness the perfection of
the alleged contemporaneous agreement between
Mancol, Jr. and DBP. Furthermore, he had no personal
knowledge of its existence. His testimony merely touched
Q After the delivery of this Exh. "H", what transpired?
on the alleged denial by the Revenue Office of the
payment of the [CGT] on the subject property and the
subsequent execution of a new deed of conveyance by A The bank agreed to facilitate the transfer of the title
the DBP. It is clear then that his testimony did not and the payment of the [CGT] to get rid of the present
bolster [petitioner's] allegation to any degree.71 occupants of the house and lot.
The same conclusion can be drawn from Mancol, Sr.'s
testimony. Although the records show that by virtue of
an SPA executed by the petitioner, Mancol, Sr. signed the
Negotiated Offer to Purchase, including the Negotiated Q You said that the bank agreed, is that in writing?
Sale Rules and Procedures/Disposition of Assets on a
First Come First Served Basis, and that he made the
initial payment for the sale, there is dearth of evidence to A Only verbal.
prove that indeed, he personally entered into a verbal

Q That does not contradict the negotiated rules and
agreement?
A Yes, but there was a verbal undertaking for them to do
what was agreed upon.
x x x x.72
Additionally, the RTC aptly observed that:
[N]owhere in the records would also reveal that the
agreement to arrange and effect the transfer of title over
the subject lot was entered into between [DBP] and
[Mancol, Sr.], for and on behalf of the [petitioner].
x x x The [SPA] authorizes [Mancol, Sr.] to represent the
[petitioner] and negotiate before the DBP, Catarman
Branch on the invitation to bid on he sale of the lot
covered by TCT No. 2041 scheduled on October 13,
2004, as well as to sign or execute and receive any paper
or document necessary for said purposes. This explains
why it was Mancol, Sr. who signed the Negotiated Offer
to Purchase and the Negotiated Sale Rules and
Procedure, and who paid to DBP the initial payment of
the purchase price on October 13, 2004 in [petitioner's]
behalf. It was not established however whether the
subsequent payments and other transactions, including
the act of entering into an oral agreement with [DBP]
that it will effect the transfer of the subject title, were
also carried out by Fernando Mancol, Sr. in behalf of
[petitioner].
The [petitioner] fails [sic] to show with whom the [DBP]
agreed to arrange and effect the transfer of the title in
his name. Thus, as there is no showing that it was
[Mancol, Sr.] who entered into such agreement with
[DBP] or that he was personally present during the
perfection of the agreement and witnessed the same,
any statement from the latter as to the circumstances
relative to the perfection of such oral agreement would
indeed be hearsay.73
Assuming for argument's sake that Mancol, Sr., on behalf
of petitioner, entered into a verbal agreement with DBP,
such agreement would remain unenforceable. Despite
petitioner's insistence, the act of entering into a verbal
agreement was not stipulated in the SPA. The authority
given to Mancol, Sr. was limited to representing and
negotiating, on petitioner's behalf, the invitation to bid
on the sale of the subject lot, which is specifically worded
as follows:
I, FERNANDO R. MANCOL, JR., x x x by these presents
do hereby name, constitute and appoint my father
Fernando M. Manco, Sr., as true and lawful attorney-in-
fact, for me, in my name, place and to do and perform
the following:
1. To represent and negotiate before the DBP Catarman
Branch regarding the INVITATION TO BID FOR
NEGOTIATED SALE scheduled on October 13, 2004 at the
Mezzanine Floor, the subject Residential Lot with two
storey building (TCT No. 2041) located at Navarro Street,
Calbayog City; and
2. To sign, or execute and receive any paper or
document necessary for the above purpose.
x x x x.74
There is nothing in the language of the SPA from which
We could deduce the intention of petitioner to authorize
Mancol, Sr. to enter into a verbal agreement with DBP.
Indeed, it has been held that "[w]here powers and duties
are specified and defined in an instrument, all such
powers and duties are limited and are confined to those
which are specified and defined, and all other powers and
duties are excluded."75 Clearly, the power to enter into a
verbal agreement with DBP is conspicuously inexistent in
the SPA.

To adopt the intent theory advanced by petitioner, in the

absence of clear and convincing evidence to that effect,
would run afoul of the express tenor of the SPA. It would
likewise be contrary to "the rule that a power of attorney
must be strictly construed and pursued. The instrument
will be held to grant only those powers which are
specified therein, and the agent may neither go beyond
nor deviate from the power of attorney."76

It is axiomatic that this Court will not review, much less

reverse, the factual findings of the CA, especially where,
as in this case, such findings coincide with those of the
trial court, since this Court is not a trier of facts.

All told, therefore, the Court finds no reason or basis to

grant the petition.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision

dated February 22, 2012 and Resolution dated
September 27, 2012 of the Court of Appeals, Visayas
Station in CA-G.R. CEB-CV No. 03030 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 193225 February 9, 2015
BBB,* Petitioner,
vs.
AAA,* Respondent.
RESOLUTION
REYES, J.:
Petitioner BBB is now before this Court with a Petition for Review
on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to
assail the Decision2 dated November 6, 2009 and
Resolution3 dated August 3, 2010 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. CV No. 89581, which affirmed with modification the
issuance against him on August 14, 2007 of a Permanent
Protection Order (PPO)4 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Pasig City, Branch 162, in favor of his wife, herein respondent
AAA.
Antecedent Facts
The CA aptly summarized as follows the facts of the case until
the RTC’s issuance of the PPO against BBB:
Both [BBB] and [AAA] allege that they first met in 1991 but started
to date seriously only in 1996. [AAA] was then a medical student
and was raising her first child borne from a previous relationship,
a boy named [CCC], with the help of her parents.
During the relationship with [BBB], [AAA] bore two more children
namely, [DDD] (born on December 11, 1997) and [EEE] (born on
October 19, 2000).
To legalize their relationship, [BBB] and [AAA] married in civil
rights on October 10, 2002 and thereafter, the birth certificates of
the children, including [CCC’s], was amended to change their civil
status to legitimated by virtue of the said marriage.
The relationship, both admit, was far from ideal and has had its
share of happy moments and heated arguments. The two
however have contradicting statements as to the cause of their
present situation.
[BBB] alleges that [AAA’s] irrational jealousy has caused their
frequent arguments. According to [BBB], [AAA] has been
suspicious of [BBB] and his relationship with his female co-
workers, which [BBB] alleges, contrary to [AAA’s] suspicion, are
purely professional. According to [BBB], because of their
repeated fights, he was forced to leave the family home to
prevent the brewing animosity between him and his wife. Soon
after [BBB] left, [AAA] herself decided to leave the family home
and brought the children with her, which made it difficult for [BBB]
to see their kids regularly. This has also caused the family
expense to double, making it even more difficult for [BBB] to fulfill
his financial obligations.
[AAA], on the other hand, alleges that their heated arguments
were often due to [BBB’s] incessant womanizing. When
confronted about it, [BBB], instead of denying the same, would
even curse [AAA].
The breaking point for [AAA] came when, [BBB’s] alleged
mistress, a woman by the name of [FFF], insulted and humiliated
[AAA] in public, in the presence of [BBB] himself, who, according
to [AAA], did nothing to stop the same. Extremely hurt, [AAA]
decided to leave the conjugal home with the children and lived
temporarily at a friend’s house. She however went back to the
conjugal home with [DDD] and [EEE] after some time, leaving her
son [CCC] at her friend’s house.
What made matters worse, according to [AAA], was the apparent
biases of [BBB] in favor of [DDD] and [EEE]. That despite his
promise to treat [CCC] as his own, [BBB] would still treat the latter
differently from the two kids, putting [CCC] at a disadvantage.
[AAA], cites as example the instances when, [BBB] would buy
food and toys for [DDD] and [EEE] only, buying nothing for [CCC].
While living separately from [BBB], [AAA] discovered that [BBB]
was not paying the rentals due on the condominium unit they
were occupying, forcing [AAA] to move out. [AAA] was likewise
compelled to find work to support the family, after [BBB] has
started to be remiss in his financial obligations to the family.
According to [AAA], the amounts given by [BBB] were not
sufficient to cover the family expenses, forcing her to request for
loans from friends.
[AAA] likewise feels threatened after discovering [that BBB] was
stalking her and/or their children. [AAA] alleges that she found out
that [BBB] has sought the help of one [GGG], a friend of [BBB]
who lives within the same compound where [AAA] lives, to go
through the guard’s logbook to monitor their every move, i.e., who
visits them, what time [AAA] leaves and returns back home, etc.
Citing the foregoing as constituting economic and psychological
abuse, [AAA] filed an application for the issuance of a Temporary
Protection Order with a request to make the same permanent
after due hearing, before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City.
Finding good ground in [AAA’s] application, the court a quo
issued a Temporary Protection Order (TPO). The TPO was
thereafter, made permanent by virtue of a Decision of the RTC
dated August [14, 2007], the dispositive portion of which orders:
"x x x x
a. Prohibiting [BBB], directly and indirectly, from stalking,
harassing, annoying, or otherwise verbally abusing [AAA], directly
or indirectly, to refrain from insulting her, cursing her and shouting
invectives at her;
b. Prohibiting [BBB] from committing or threatening to commit any
act that may cause mental and emotional anguish to [AAA], i.e.
publicly displaying her extramarital relations with his mistress
[FFF] and anyone else for that matter;
c. Prohibiting [BBB] from exposing the minor children to immoral
and illicit environment, specifically prohibiting him to allow her
(sic) mistress[FFF] and anyone else to be with them in instances
where he would be allowed by this Court to see their children;
d. Allowing [BBB] ALONE to see and visit his children once a
month (for a total of 12 visits per year) at the latter’s residence for
a maximum period of 2 years [sic]each visit, subject to further
orders from this Court. For this purpose, [BBB’s every visit] shall
be accompanied by the Court Sheriff, who shall coordinate with
[AAA] as to the availability of time and date of children for such
visit, at the expense of [BBB]. For every visit, the Court Sheriff is
directed to submit his report within 5 days from the date [BBB]
visited the children;
e. Directing [BBB] to allow [AAA] to continue to have lawful use
and possession of the motor vehicle more particularly described
as follows:
One (1) Hyundai Starex Van
1997 Model
Plate Number: WJP 902
Chassis Number:
Serial Number KMJWH7HPXU158443
f. Granting [AAA] permanent sole custody over their common
children until further orders from this Court;
g. Ordering [BBB] to provide support in the amount of Php
62,918.97 per month (not Php 81,650.00 being prayed by [AAA])
to [AAA] as monthly support, inclusive of educational expenses,
groceries, medicines, medical bills, and insurance premiums,
starting from the month of January 2007 to be given within the
first five (5) days of the month through the Court Sheriff, who shall
coordinate with [AAA] in receiving such support;
h. Requiring [BBB] to stay away from the offended party and any
designated family or household member at a distance of 100
meters;
i. Requiring [BBB] to stay away from the residence, school, place
of employment or any specified place frequented regularly by the
offended party and children and any designated family or
household member;
j. Ordering [BBB] to post bond of Php 300,000.00 to keep peace
pursuant to Section 23 of RA 9262 with the undertaking that
[BBB] will not commit the violence sought to be prevented and
that in case such violence is committed[,] he will pay the amount
determined by the Court in its judgment;
k. Ordering [BBB] to pay the sum of Php 100,000.00 (not Php
200,000.00 being prayed by [AAA]) representing both reasonable
attorney’s fees and cost of litigation, including cost of suit.
x x x x."5
Ruling of the CA
BBB filed before the CA an appeal6 to challenge the RTC
Decision dated August 14, 2007. BBB alleged that the RTC’s (a)
1âwphi1
issuance of the PPO against him, (b) award to AAA of the sole
custody over their children, (c) directives for him to pay attorney’s
fees and costs of litigation and to post an excessive amount of
bond, and (d) declaration that he had an abusive character lack
factual bases.
On November 6, 2009, the CA rendered the assailed decision
affirming the factual findings and dispositions of the RTC, but
ordering the remand of the case for the latter to determine in the
proper proceedings who shall be awarded custody of the children.
Like the RTC, the CA found that under the provisions of Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 9262,7 BBB had subjected AAA and their children
to psychological, emotional and economic abuses. BBB displayed
acts of marital infidelity which exposed AAA to public ridicule
causing her emotional and psychological distress. While BBB
alleged that FFF was only a professional colleague, he continued
to have public appearances with her which did not help to dispel
AAA’s accusation that the two had an extra-marital relation.
Further, BBB verbally abused AAA either in person or through
text messages. The CA likewise did not favorably consider BBB’s
claim that he cannot provide financial support to AAA and the
children in the amount required by the RTC as his income merely
depended on contractual hosting and events management
assignments. The CA emphasized that AAA was in the position to
know the sources of BBB’s income. Citing Section 288 of R.A. No.
9262 and Article 2139 of the Family Code, the CA, however,
ordered the RTC to determine who shall be entitled to exercise
custody over the children, who at that time were already older
than seven years of age.
The CA denied BBB’s Motion for Partial Reconsideration10 by way
of the Resolution11 dated August 3, 2010 which is likewise
assailed in the instant petition.
Issues
Undaunted, BBB now comes before this Court raising the
following issues:
 I admissibility. Further, he points out that due to the current
WHETHER OR NOT THE [CA]COMMITTED ERROR IN
AFFIRMING THE RTC’S DECISION TO MAKE THE
[TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER (TPO)] PERMANENT.
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE [CA]COMMITTED ERROR IN
AFFIRMING THE RTC’S AWARD OF ATTORNEY’S FEES AND
COST OF LITIGATION IN FAVOR OF [AAA].
III
WHETHER OR NOT THE [CA]COMMITTED ERROR IN
AFFIRMING THE RTC’S ORDER REQUIRING [BBB] TO POST
AN EXCESSIVE AMOUNTOF BOND TO KEEP THE PEACE.12
IV
WHETHER OR NOT THE CA AND THE RTC CORRECTLY
ADMITTED INTO EVIDENCETHE UNAUTHENTICATED TEXT
MESSAGES ADDUCED BY AAA.13
V out that since their children are all older than seven years of age,
WHETHER OR NOT THE AWARD OF SUPPORT SHOULD BE
DELETED AS THE SPOUSES’ COMMON BIOLOGICAL
CHILDREN, DDD AND EEE, ARE ALREADY UNDER BBB’S
ACTUAL CARE AND CUSTODY SINCE AUGUST 2010 WHEN
AAA LEFT TO WORK AS A NURSE IN THE UNITED STATES.14
In support of the instant petition, BBB merely reiterates his factual
claims in the proceedings below relative to his financial position
and AAA’s supposedly baseless accusations and demands from
him. In addition, he posits that the text messages offered by AAA
as evidence were unauthenticated; hence, doubt exists as to their
whereabouts and circumstances of the parties, the PPO issued
against him is rendered moot. He now has actual care and
custody of DDD and EEE, while CCC, who is not his biological
son, resides in a college dormitory. BBB and AAA barely get in
touch with each other except when the latter initiates the same.
In her Comment15 to the petition, AAA counters that BBB
erroneously raises factual issues which are subjects beyond the
contemplation of a petition filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Civil Procedure. Further, BBB continuously violates the PPO,
which under the provisions of R.A. No. 9262, is supposed to be
immediately executory upon its issuance by the RTC. AAA claims
that BBB still verbally abuses her. BBB has not posted the
300,000.00 bond required from him. He likewise has not paid the
attorney’s fees and costs of litigation awarded to AAA. He does
not provide support for CCC, who, in the eyes of the law, is also
among his legitimated children. AAA further alleges that in2010,
she left DDD and EEE under the care of BBB only because the
circumstances then obtaining forced her to do so. Three years
had then lapsed from the time she filed an application for a
protection order and still, no execution of the PPO ensued. She
could not depend for financial support from BBB. She was thus
left with no choice but to yield custody over DDD and EEE even if
the set-up exposed the children to BBB’s illicit affairs. AAA points
they are already capable of choosing for themselves whom they
want to exercise custody over them.
Pending the Court’s deliberation of the instant case, BBB filed a
Manifestation and Motion to Render Judgment Based on a
Memorandum of Agreement (MOA).16 BBB alleges that on July
29, 2013, he and AAA had entered into a compromise anent the
custody, exercise of parental authority over, and support of DDD
and EEE.17
AAA’s counsel, Atty. Shielah Elbinias-Uyboco (Atty. Uyboco), filed
a Comment to the MOA18 pointing out that AAA signed the MOA
while emotionally distressed and sans the former’s advice and
guidance. Atty. Uyboco likewise emphasizes that BBB’s illicit
relationship with FFF continues in violation of the PPO issued by
the RTC.
In BBB’s Reply,19 he counters that AAA should be presumed to
have acted with due care and full knowledge of the contents of
the MOA which she signed. Further, BBB’s alleged involvement
with FFF is an issue which need not be resolved in a judgment
based on compromise.
Disquisition of the Court
The instant petition is not a proper subject of a compromise
agreement.
The Court cannot take the simplest course of finally writing finis to
the instant petition by rendering a judgment merely based on
compromise as prayed for by BBB due to reasons discussed
below.
Alleging psychological violence and economic abuse, AAA
anchored her application for the issuance of a TPO and a PPO on
the basis of the provisions of R.A. No. 9262. In the instant
petition, what is essentially being assailed is the PPO issued by
the RTC and which was affirmed by the CA. The rules, however,
intend that cases filed under the provisions of R.A. No. 9262 be
not subjects of compromise agreements.
It bears stressing that Section 23(d) of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC20
explicitly prohibits compromise on any act constituting the crime
of violence against women. Thus, in Garcia v. Drilon,21 the Court
declared that:
Violence, however, is not a subject for compromise. A process
which involves parties mediating the issue of violence implies that
the victim is somehow at fault. x x x.22 (Emphasis deleted) AM No.
10-4-16-SC,23 on the other hand, directs the referral to mediation
of all issues under the Family Code and other laws in relation to
support, custody, visitation, property relations and guardianship of
minor children, excepting therefrom those covered by R.A. No.
9262.
While AAA filed her application for a TPO and a PPO as an
independent action and not as an incidental relief prayed for in a
criminal suit, the instant petition cannot be taken outside the
ambit of cases falling under the provisions of R.A. No. 9262.
Perforce, the prohibition against subjecting the instant petition to
compromise applies.
The courts a quo committed no error in issuing a PPO against
BBB.
Anent the main issues raised in the instant petition, the Court
finds no error in the CA’s ruling that the RTC properly issued a
PPO against BBB and that a remanding of the case to the trial
court is necessary to determine who shall exercise custody over
CCC, DDD and EEE. However, the choices of the children as
with whom they would prefer to stay would alter the effects of the
PPO. Hence, this Court affirms the herein assailed PPO except
items (d), (f), (g), (h) and (i)24 thereof relative to who shall be
granted custody over the three children, how the spouses shall
exercise visitation rights, and the amount and manner of
providing financial support, which are matters the RTC is now
directed to determine with dispatch.
The Court notes BBB’s manifestation that he and AAA had
arrived at an amicable settlement as regards the issues of
custody, exercise of parental authority over, and support of DDD
and EEE. While these matters can be lawful subjects of
compromise, AAA’s vacillation, as expressed by her counsel,
compels the Court to exercise prudence by directing the RTC to
resolve with finality the aforesaid issues. The parties are,
however, not precluded from entering into a compromise as
regards the aforesaid issues, but the Court now requires the
RTC’s direct supervision lest the parties muddle the issues anew
and fail to put an end to their bickering.
No grounds exist which compel this Court to resolve the first three
issues raised by BBB since they are merely factual in character.
In Padalhin v. Laviña,25 the Court declared that:
Primarily, Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court categorically
states that the petition filed shall raise only questions of law,
which must be distinctly set forth. A question of law arises when
there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of facts,
while there is a question of fact when the doubt arises as to the
truth or falsity of the alleged facts. For a question to be one of
law, the same must not involve an examination of the probative
value of the evidence presented by the litigants or any of them.
The resolution of the issue must rest solely on what the law
provides on the given set of circumstances. Once it is clear that
the issue invites a review of the evidence presented, the question
posed is one of fact.
x x x [T]he substantive issue of whether or not the petitioners are
entitled to moral and exemplary damages as well as attorney’s
fees is a factual issue which is beyond the province of a petition
for review on certiorari. x x x
In the case at bar, the petitioner spouses present to us issues
with an intent to subject to review the uniform factual findings of
the RTC and the CA. Specifically, the instant petition challenges
the existence of clear and substantial evidence warranting the
award of damages and attorney’s fees in Laviña’s favor. Further,
the instant petition prays for the grant of the Spouses Padalhin’s
counterclaims on the supposed showing that the complaint filed
by Laviña before the RTC was groundless. It bears stressing that
we are not a trier of facts. Undoubtedly, the questions now raised
before us are factual and not legal in character, hence, beyond
the contemplation of a petition filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Civil Procedure.26 (Italics in the original and emphasis ours)
In BBB’s case, he avers that the RTC and the CA’s (a) issuance
of the PPO, (b) award of attorney’s fees and costs of litigation in
AAA’s favor, and (c) directive for him to post a bond in the
amount of 300,000.00 all lack factual bases. The first three issues
presented unmistakably call for a re-calibration of evidence. While
the general rule that only legal issues can be resolved in a
petition filed under Rule 45 recognizes exceptions,27 BBB’s case
does not fall in the latter category. The RTC and the CA are in
accord with each other as to their factual findings, which are
supported by substantial evidence, thus, binding upon this Court.
The doubt raised by BBB anent the admissibility of the text
messages as evidence is not genuinely a legal issue.
In the case of Justice Vidallon-Magtolis v. Salud,28 it is stated that
any question as to the admissibility of text messages as evidence
is rendered moot and academic if the party raising such issue
admits authorship of the subject messages.29
BBB argues that the RTC and the CA erred in admitting as
evidence the text messages which were sent by him and FFF to
AAA since they were unauthenticated. However, BBB himself
effectively admitted in the pleadings filed with this Court and the
CA that he indeed sent the text messages attributed to him by
AAA. The Appellant’s Brief30 filed before the CA stated in part that:
[AAA] conveniently chose to leave out the initiatory messages to
which [BBB] replied to. It is totally obvious that the alleged
messages from [BBB] are only messages that are in response to
an ongoing verbal or virtual tussle and the adamant refusal of
[AAA] to bring the children home despite the entreaties of [BBB].
Be it noted that [BBB], for the past several months leading up to
their separation, and up to the time that the instant case has been
filed, continuously endured the extreme mood swings, malicious
accusations, haranguing, curses, insults, and even violence from
[AAA].31 (Emphasis and underscoring in the original and italics
ours)
Further, in the instant petition, BBB repleads that:
[I]t is utterly apparent that the alleged messages from [BBB] are
only messages that are in response to an ongoing verbal or
virtual tussle between the parties.32
In the above-quoted portions of the pleadings, BBB attempted to
justify why he sent the messages to AAA. However, in doing so,
he, in effect, admitted authorship of the messages which AAA
adduced as evidence. It is likewise noted that BBB did not deny
ownership of the cellphone number from which the text messages
were sent.
Hence, while at first glance, it would seem that the issue of
admissibility of the text messages requires an interpretation of the
rules of evidence, this Court does not find the same to be
necessary. While BBB had admitted authorship of the text
messages, he pleads for this Court to consider those messages
as inadmissible for allegedly being unauthenticated. BBB’s
arguments are unbearably self-contradictory and he cannot be
allowed to take refuge under technical rules of procedure to assail
what is already apparent.
The deletion from the PPO of the directive of the RTC and the CA
relative to the award of support is not warranted. While CCC is
not BBB’s biological son, he was legitimated under the latter’s
name. Like DDD and EEE, CCC is entitled to receive support
from BBB.
BBB claims that DDD and EEE are now under his sole care and
custody, which allegedly renders moot the provision in the PPO
relative to support. BBB points out that CCC is not his biological
son. Impliedly then, BBB justifies why CCC is not entitled to
receive support from him. This Court is not persuaded.
Article 177 of the Family Code provides that "[o]nly children
conceived and born outside of wedlock of parents who, at the
time of the conception of the former, were not disqualified by any
impediment to marry each other may be legitimated." Article 178
states that "[l]egitimation shall take place by a subsequent valid
marriage between parents."
In the case at bar, the parties do not dispute the fact that BBB is
not CCC’s biological father. Such being the case, it was improper
to have CCC legitimated after the celebration of BBB and AAA’s
marriage. Clearly then, the legal process of legitimation was
trifled with. BBB voluntarily but falsely acknowledged CCC as his
son. Article 1431 of the New Civil Code pertinently provides:
Art. 1431. Through estoppel an admission or representation is
rendered conclusive upon the person making it, and cannot be
denied or disproved as against the person relying thereon.
At least for the purpose of resolving the instant petition, the
principle of estoppel finds application and it now bars BBB from
making an assertion contrary to his previous representations. He
should not be allowed to evade a responsibility arising from his
own misrepresentations. He is bound by the effects of the
legitimation process. CCC remains to be BBB’s son, and
pursuant to Article 179 of the Family Code, the former is entitled
to the same rights as those of a legitimate child, including the
receipt of his father’s support.
Notwithstanding the above, there is no absolute preclusion for
BBB from raising before the proper court the issue of CCC’s
status and filiation. However, BBB cannot do the same in the
instant petition before this Court now. In Tison v. CA,33 the Court
held that "the civil status [of a child] cannot be attacked
collaterally." The child’s legitimacy "cannot be contested by way
of defense or as a collateral issue in another action for a different
purpose."34 The instant petition sprang out of AAA’s application for
a PPO before the RTC. Hence, BBB’s claim that CCC is not his
biological son is a collateral issue, which this Court has no
authority to resolve now.
All told, the Court finds no merit in BBB’s petition, but there exists
a necessity to remand the case for the RTC to resolve matters
relative to who shall be granted custody over the three children,
how the spouses shall exercise visitation rights, and the amount
and manner of providing financial support.
The RTC and the CA found substantial evidence and did not
commit reversible errors when they issued the PPO against BBB.
Events, which took place after the issuance of the PPO, do not
erase the fact that psychological, emotional and economic
abuses were committed by BBB against AAA. Hence, BBB’s
claim that he now has actual sole care of DDD and EEE does not
necessarily call for this Court’s revocation of the PPO and the
award to him of custody over the children.
This Court, thus, affirms the CA’s order to remand the case for
the RTC to resolve the question of custody. Since the children are
now all older than seven years of age, they can choose for
themselves whom they want to stay with. If all the three children
would manifest to the RTC their choice to stay with AAA, then the
PPO issued by RTC shall continue to be executed in its entirety.
However, if any of the three children would choose to be under
BBB’s care, necessarily, the PPO issued against BBB relative to
them is to be modified. The PPO, in its entirety, would remain
effective only as to AAA and any of the children who opt to stay
with her. Consequently, the RTC may accordingly alter the
manner and amount of financial support BBB should give
depending on who shall finally be awarded custody over the
children. Pursuant to Articles 201 and 202 of the Family Code,
BBB’s resources and means and the necessities of AAA and the
children are the essential factors in determining the amount of
support, and the same can be reduced or increased
proportionately. The RTC is reminded to be circumspect in
resolving the matter of support, which is a mutual responsibility of
the spouses. The parties do not dispute that AAA is now
employed as well, thus, the RTC should consider the same with
the end in mind of promoting the best interests of the children.
A final note on the effectivity and violation of a PPO
The Court reminds the parties that the application for the
issuance of a PPO is not a process to be trifled with. It is only
granted after notice and hearing. Once issued, violation of its
provisions shall be punishable with a fine ranging from Five
Thousand Pesos (5,000.00) to Fifty Thousand Pesos
(₱50,000.00) and/or imprisonment of six (6) months.35
Section 16 of R.A. No. 9262, on the other hand, provides that "[a]
PPO shall be effective until revoked by a court upon application of
the person in whose favor the order was issued." Pending the
resolution of the instant petition, BBB claims that he and AAA had
executed a MOA, upon which basis a judgment by compromise is
sought to be rendered. Atty. Uyboco, on her part, pointed out
AAA’s vacillation anent the MOA’s execution. With the foregoing
circumstances, the parties, wittingly or unwittingly, have imposed
upon this Court the undue burden of speculating whether or not
AAA’s half-hearted acquiescence to the MOA is tantamount to an
application for the revocation of the PPO. The Court, however,
refuses to indulge the whims of either parties. The questions
raised in the instant petition for the Court to dispose of revolve
around the propriety of the PPO’s issuance. The Court resolves
that principal query in the affirmative. The PPO thus stands
unless AAA, categorically and without any equivocation, files an
application for its revocation.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED. The
Decision dated November 6, 2009 and Resolution dated August
3, 2010 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 89581 are
AFFIRMED. The Permanent Protection Order, dated August 14,
2007, issued against BBB by the Regional Trial Court of Pasig
City, Branch 162STANDS except items (d), (f), (g), (h) and
(i)36 thereof. The case is hereby remanded to the trial court for it to
accordingly modify the aforecited items after determining with
dispatch the following:

(1) who between BBB and AAA shall exercise custody

over the three children;

(2) how the parties shall exercise their respective

visitation rights; and

(3) the amount and manner of providing financial support.

The Reply and Manifestation dated November 10, 2014 and

December 4, 2014, respectively, are NOTED.

SO ORDERED.
 A.M. No. P-09-2668, February 24, 2015
ASTORGA AND REPOL LAW OFFICES, REPRESENTED
BY ATTY. ARNOLD B.
LUGARES, Complainant, v. ALEXANDER D.
VILLANUEVA, SHERIFF IV, REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT, BRANCH 60, MAKATI CITY, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
This administrative Complaint1 was filed by Astorga and
Repol Law Offices against Alexander D. Villanueva,
Sheriff IV of Branch 60 of the Regional Trial Court, Makati
City. Complainant Astorga and Repol Law Offices is a
professional law practice partnership, represented by
Atty. Arnold B. Lugares.2
Astorga and Repol Law Offices charged Alexander D.
Villanueva (Sheriff Villanueva) with “willful neglect of
duty [and] serious misconduct [in office] due to graft and
corruption [or] extortion with a prayer that a penalty of
dismissal . . . [or] other appropriate sanctions be meted
against him.”3
Astorga and Repol Law Offices represented FGU
Insurance Corporation in a Complaint for damages filed
against NEC Cargo Services, Inc.4 The Complaint was
filed before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City and
raffled to Branch 66 presided by Judge Ricardo R.
Rosario.5 On August 23, 2004, Judge Ricardo R. Rosario
issued a Decision in favor of FGU Insurance
Corporation.6 The dispositive portion of the decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of
the plaintiff and against the defendant NEC Cargo
Services, Inc., ordering the latter to pay the plaintiff
[FGU Insurance Corporation] the following:
1. the amount of P1,942,285.19 with
legal interest thereon from June 21,
2001 until the whole amount is fully
paid;
2. attorney’s fees amounting to
P70,000.00; and
3. costs of suit.7
NEC Cargo Services, Inc. and Albert Tamayo, a third-
party defendant-appellant, appealed the Decision before
the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals denied the
Appeal in its Resolutions dated July 20, 2005 and
December 20, 2005. These Resolutions became final and
executory.8
The Writ of Execution dated July 10, 2006 was issued by
Atty. Marjorie M. de Castro, Branch Clerk of Court of
Branch 66 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City. On
September 19, 2008, Presiding Judge Joselito C. Villarosa
(Judge Villarosa) issued the Order granting Astorga and
Repol Law Offices’ Motion to Appoint Special Sheriff.
Sheriff Villanueva was assigned to execute the Decision.9
On October 29, 2008, Sheriff Villanueva and Atty. Arnold
B. Lugares (Atty. Lugares) started coordinating with each
other for the execution of the Decision.10 They agreed to
meet on November 24, 2008 allegedly “to discuss the
service of the Notice[s] of Garnishment.”11
On November 24, 2008 at 8:54 a.m.,12 Sheriff Villanueva
allegedly sent a text message to Atty. Lugares. The
message said, “Nagcoffee break lang sir, antay nio lng
muna ako dyan sir, gd. day.”13
At around 10:00 a.m., Atty. Lugares met with Sheriff
Villanueva on the 10th floor of the Makati City Hall.14
During the meeting, Sheriff Villanueva allegedly
demanded P8,000.00 to execute the Decision.15 He
allegedly stated: “[S]ayang lang ang pagod ko dito, kung
wala naman tayong makokolekta”16 and “E wala pang
50% ang magagarnish natin diyan eh.”17 Atty. Lugares
informed Sheriff Villanueva that this was part of his job,
and he should not demand money from him. Sheriff
Villanueva allegedly lowered the price to P5,000.00. They
agreed to meet on Wednesday, November 26, 2008 at
8:00 a.m., to serve the Notices of Garnishment.18
On November 25, 2008, Sheriff Villanueva sent a text
message at 4:27 p.m. to Atty. Lugares. The text
message was the following: “Cge po sir magCALL na kau
ngayon.”19 Atty. Lugares called Sheriff Villanueva on his
cellular phone to confirm their appointment.20 In the
morning of November 26, 2008, Atty. Lugares sent a text
message to Sheriff Villanueva to remind him of their
appointment.21 At 7:23 a.m., he replied, “Dala mo ba
mga colors?”22 Atty. Lugares asked Sheriff Villanueva
what he meant by “colors.”23 At 7:29 a.m., he replied,
“Hauz pa po, nagcoffee breakfast lng, un legal fees kako
kung dala mo?”24 Atty. Lugares told Sheriff Villanueva to
proceed with the meeting.25 At 7:44 a.m., he replied,
“Bka puede bukas nlng sir, nag insist ang mga tga
ChinaTrust mamya.”26
Atty. Lugares insisted that they proceed with the
garnishment since it was Sheriff Villanueva who set the
appointment.27 At 8:45 a.m., Sheriff Villanueva replied:
“Patawagin mo nga c atty. astorga dto sa mobil phone ko
para magconfirm tau sa legal fees.”28
At 8:51 a.m., Sheriff Villanueva allegedly sent this text
message to Atty. Lugares: “Padala mo nlng khit lunch
time un legal fees, khit kmi na bhala magpaserve nina
shf. Flora.”29 Atty. Lugares then assumed that since
Sheriff Villanueva was not given the amount of P5,000.00
he demanded, the issuance of the Notices of
Garnishment did not take place.30
In his Comment,31 Sheriff Villanueva countered that the
Complaint “stemmed from a Writ of Execution dated July
10, 2006 . . . originally assigned to Sheriff Leodel N.
Roxas[.]”32 This Writ of Execution was served on NEC
Cargo Services, Inc., and personal properties or office
equipment found inside NEC Cargo Services, Inc.’s office
were levied.33 However, prior to the scheduled auction
sale on July 19, 2006, Mr. Narciso E. Calaton filed an
Affidavit of Third-Party Claim.34 FGU Insurance
Corporation “failed to post [the] indemnity bond in favor
of the third-party claimant.”35 Thus, the Writ of Execution
was returned unsatisfied.36
On October 21, 2008, Sheriff Villanueva was ordered to
implement the Writ of Execution.37 The Sheriff’s
Return38 dated November 5, 2008 was returned
unsatisfied because there were no other properties that
could be subject to execution that could be levied upon,
besides the shares of stocks registered with the
Securities and Exchange Commission with Stocks Cert.
Reg. No. A199703734.39
According to Sheriff Villanueva, Atty. Lugares allegedly
approached him and asked whether it was possible to
garnish the individual stock certificates of NEC Cargo
Services, Inc.40 Sheriff Villanueva alleged that he
consulted with his fellow Deputy Sheriffs about how to
proceed. This led to Sheriff Villanueva meeting with the
Clerk of Court and Ex-Officio Sheriff Atty. Engracio M.
Escasiñas, Jr. (Atty. Escasiñas) and Judge Villarosa, then
Presiding Judge of Branch 66 of the Regional Trial Court
of Makati City.41
Sheriff Villanueva claimed that he was advised not to
garnish the individual stocks since Rule 39, Section 9 of
the Revised Rules of Court provided that the sheriff or
officer may only levy on debts and credits, such as bank
deposits, financial interests, royalties, and commissions,
but not on stock certificates. He allegedly advised Atty.
Lugares that he might be held administratively liable for
gross ignorance of the law.42
Sheriff Villanueva denied any attempt to extort money
from Atty. Lugares. He alleged that if he had met with
Atty. Lugares, it would only be out of courtesy due to the
latter’s persistence to garnish the stocks.43
Sheriff Villanueva stated that Atty. Lugares offered him
money as a “token of gratitude”44 if the garnishment of
the stocks would take place.45 He denied all imputations
of bribery alleged by Atty. Lugares and stated that Atty.
Lugares was filing these charges against him to harass
him.46
Further, Sheriff Villanueva maintained that he would not
risk being sanctioned or disciplined for a mere P8,000.00,
after having served government for 18 years, 14 of
which he served as a Deputy Sheriff. He alleged that
Atty. Lugares had shown him a copy of the Complaint-
Affidavit before it was even filed before the Office of the
Court Administrator as a threat to ensure that the
garnishment would proceed.47
In his Reply-Affidavit,48 Atty. Lugares raised that Sheriff
Villanueva concocted a legal issue on the propriety of the
execution to distract the Office of the Court Administrator
from the real issue.49
According to Atty. Lugares, he wanted Sheriff Villanueva
to send Notices of Garnishment to NEC Cargo Services,
Inc.’s incorporators. The unpaid subscriptions on NEC
Corporation’s stocks were debts and credits that could be
subjected to garnishment.50
Atty. Lugares alleged that Sheriff Villanueva prepared
these Notices of Garnishment. These notices were not
served because Atty. Lugares refused to pay the
P5,000.00 Sheriff Villanueva demanded.51
According to Atty. Lugares, there were no “illegal
wishes”52 on his part. If he made these alleged “illegal
wishes,” Sheriff Villanueva should not have prepared the
Notices of Garnishment, scheduled their service on
November 26, 2008, or inquired about the address of the
garnishee, American Wire, Inc.53 He denied approaching
Sheriff Villanueva before the filing of the Complaint since
the Order dated December 12, 2008 appointing a Special
Sheriff had already been filed. This was prior to Sheriff
Villanueva’s receipt of the Complaint on December 15,
2008.54
The Office of the Court Administrator recommended this
case for re-docketing as a regular administrative
matter.55 Further, the Court Administrator recommended
the referral of the Complaint to Executive Judge Maria
Cristina J. Cornejo (Executive Judge Cornejo) of the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City for investigation and
submission of her Report and Recommendation.56 The
First Division of this court approved the
recommendations of the Office of the Court Administrator
in the Resolution57 dated July 29, 2009.58
Executive Judge Cornejo began the investigation.59 When
she was appointed to the Sandiganbayan, Judge Tranquil
Salvador, Jr. (Judge Salvador) took over the
investigation.60
In his Investigation Report and
Recommendation,61 Judge Salvador recommended the
dismissal of the Complaint. This was due to Atty.
Lugares’ alleged desistance to testify on the contents of
his Complaint. According to Judge Salvador, Atty.
Lugares failed to prove his allegations with substantial
evidence.62
In its Memorandum63 dated March 29, 2011, the Office of
the Court Administrator recommended the dismissal of
the Complaint for lack of evidence. It found that Atty.
Lugares’ failure to prosecute the case invited suspicion
that the Complaint was not filed with sincerity of
purpose, or that a settlement was reached to cover up
his misconduct. The Office of the Court Administrator
recommended that Atty. Lugares should show cause why
he should not be held in contempt of court for filing an
unfounded Complaint against Sheriff Villanueva.64
In the Resolution65 dated June 22, 2011, this court
adopted the recommendations of the Office of the Court
Administrator by dismissing the case and requiring Atty.
Lugares to show cause.66
Atty. Lugares filed a Compliance with Motion for
Reconsideration67 where he manifested that he was
willing to prosecute the case. He alleged that “he was not
furnished . . . a copy of the Investigation Report of Judge
Salvador.”68 He claimed that no amicable settlement was
reached with Sheriff Villanueva and that he had no
improper motive in filing this case.69 He attached as
annexes70 the photographs of the text messages that
Sheriff Villanueva sent him.
In the Resolution71 dated March 5, 2012, this court
recalled the Resolution dated June 22, 2011 dismissing
the administrative Complaint for lack of evidence and
ordered the case to be reopened. This court further
ordered Executive Judge Benjamin T. Pozon (Executive
Judge Pozon) of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City to
conduct an investigation on the administrative
Complaint.72
The parties, particularly Atty. Lugares, were directed to
attend the hearings73 and submit their respective
memoranda.74 In the hearings, Atty. Lugares failed to
present the text messages that he sent to Sheriff
Villanueva from his phone.75 These outgoing text
messages were automatically deleted since his phone
could only store a hundred messages at a time.76
The parties submitted their respective memoranda to
Executive Judge Pozon. In his Memorandum,77 Atty.
Lugares reiterated his allegations regarding Sheriff
Villanueva’s willful neglect of duty and graft and
corruption.78 He stated that since Sheriff Villanueva
himself prepared the Notices of Garnishment, there was
nothing illegal or improper about his request.79 According
to Atty. Lugares, Sheriff Villanueva “thwarted the
Decision by refusing to execute it. He was able to set at
naught all the hardships and labor of the plaintiff,
Presiding Judge, Justices, lawyers and other court
officers and employees in litigating the case.”80
In his Memorandum,81 Sheriff Villanueva asserted that
Atty. Lugares had no personality to complain since there
“was no written specific authorization for [him] to file this
administrative complaint[.]”82 Further, Sheriff Villanueva
maintained that the “legal fees” that were being
demanded from Atty. Lugares were payments required
by the Office of the Clerk of Court, Cashier’s
Section.83 The “legal fees” pertained to the amount of
?100.00 per Notice of Garnishment with the subsequent
charge of 3.5% interest of the total amount to be paid to
the Office of the Clerk of Court.84 Sheriff Villanueva
alleged that Atty. Lugares “never paid the required legal
fees with the Office of the Clerk of Court[.]”85
In his Report and Recommendation,86 Executive Judge
Pozon concluded that Sheriff Villanueva did not commit
gross neglect of duty.87 He stated that Atty. Lugares was
not able to provide evidence to substantiate his claim
that Sheriff Villanueva did not perform his duty.88 On the
other hand, Sheriff Villanueva was able to provide the
affidavit of Atty. Escasiñas, Jr., confirming that when
Sheriff Villanueva met with Atty. Lugares, it was to
ensure the execution of the Decision.89
Executive Judge Pozon relied on the testimony and
affidavit of Sheriff Villanueva, particularly that of the
meeting with Judge Villarosa who discouraged him from
executing the Writ of Execution.90
Executive Judge Pozon stated that “colors” in Sheriff
Villanueva’s text message “Dala mo na yung colors?”
pertained to the legal fees and not to a claim to extort
money from Atty. Lugares. He found that the use of
“colors” could not automatically be construed to pertain
to something illegal.91
Executive Judge Pozon stated that upon his examination
of the purported text messages, he found that these
could not be construed as evidence that Sheriff
Villanueva extorted money.92 Since Atty. Lugares’
outgoing text messages to Sheriff Villanueva were not
presented as evidence, the text messages from Sheriff
Villanueva served as the sole evidentiary basis for Atty.
Lugares’ allegations.93 Atty. Lugares’ failure to show and
verify the text messages he sent meant that the charges
were bereft of evidence.94 Hence, Executive Judge Pozon
ordered that the Complaint be dismissed for lack of
evidence.95 He submitted his Report and
Recommendation to the Office of the Court
Administrator.96
The issue is whether respondent Sheriff Alexander D.
Villanueva is guilty of misconduct due to willful neglect of
duty and corruption or extortion.
After a review of the records and the evidence, this court
must reverse the findings of Executive Judge Pozon.
Respondent should be subject to disciplinary sanctions.
In Sison-Barias v. Rubia97:
The findings of fact of an investigating justice [or judge]
must be accorded great weight and finality similar with
the weight given to a trial court judge’s since an
investigating justice [or judge] personally assessed the
witnesses’ credibility. However, this rule admits of
exceptions.
In J. King & Sons Company, Inc. v. Judge Hontanosas, Lugares was unable to present his outgoing text
Jr., this court held: messages:
Such findings may be reviewed if there appears in the
record some fact or circumstance of weight which the COURT:
lower court may have overlooked, misunderstood or For the Court, Atty. Lugares.
misappreciated, and which, if properly considered, would Now, you have marked several text messages all
alter the result of the case. Among the circumstances coming from the respondents.
which had been held to be justifiable reasons for the WITNESS:[Atty. Lugares]
Court to re-examine the trial court or appellate court’s A: Yes, Your Honor.
findings of facts are, when the interference made is
COURT:
manifestly mistaken; when the judgment is based on
misapprehension of facts; and when the finding of fact of
And as a matter of fact, even up to the present,
the trial court or appellate court is premised on the these text messages are still saved in your cell
supposed absence of evidence and is contradicted by phone?
evidence on record.98 (Citations omitted) WITNESS:
A: Yes, Your Honor.
A review of the facts is called for when the finding of a COURT:
lack of administrative liability is premised on the How about the messages coming from you that took
supposed absence of evidence, but an examination of the or answered by respondent thru his own text
record shows that there is evidence to support the messages, did you also save those text messages?
allegations.99 Even if respondent is initially exculpated WITNESS:
based on an alleged lack of evidence to support the A: Your Honor, with regard to the out coming
allegations, this court can still conduct its own
messages, my cell phone only has that setting to
assessment of the evidence on record and impose the
corresponding administrative liability.100
100 messages, it was overtime [sic] deleted, Your
Honor, automatically.
Respondent’s neglect to faithfully COURT:
execute his duties as Sheriff is Overtime [sic] deleted. So you did not intentionally
supported by substantial evidence. delete it?
WITNESS:
In Executive Judge Pozon’s Report and Recommendation, A: I did not, Your Honor.
he stated that Atty. Lugares failed to provide evidence COURT: So whenever it reaches a certain maximum number
showing that respondent committed the actions alleged of text messages, it is automatically erased?
in the Complaint. His exculpation of respondent from WITNESS:
liability was primarily based on the fact that Atty. A: Yes, Your Honor, that’s a setting in my cell phone,
Your Honor.
COURT:
That is your claim. So, in short, even if we look at
your text to your cell phone, we will no longer see
these text messages coming from you?
WITNESS
A: Yes, Your Honor.
COURT:
As far as you can remember, Atty. Lugares, who,
between you and respondent started sending text
messages regarding this intimidation?
WITNESS
A: It was him first, Your Honor.101
Contrary to Executive Judge Pozon’s position, however,
Atty. Lugares was able to prove that respondent
committed actions that warrant administrative liability.
In administrative cases, the quantum of evidence
required is that of substantial evidence. In Menor v.
Guillermo:102
Administrative proceedings are governed by the
substantial evidence rule. Otherwise stated, a finding of
guilt in an administrative case would have to be
sustained for as long as it is supported by substantial
evidence that the respondent has committed acts stated
in the complaint. Substantial evidence is such amount of
relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept
as adequate to support a conclusion. The standard of
substantial evidence is justified when there is reasonable
ground to believe that respondent is responsible for the
misconduct complained of, even if such evidence is not
overwhelming or even preponderant.103 (Citations
omitted)
There is substantial evidence to support Atty. Lugares’
allegation of neglect of duty.
In previous administrative cases involving other court
personnel, text messages were admitted as evidence and
given probative value by this court.104 In those cases, the
court considered the content of the text messages and
the identification of the person sending them as
substantial evidence to prove the commission of
administrative offenses.
Atty. Lugares was able to present the text messages he
received in his cellular phone. He attached photographs
of the screen of his cellular phone, showing the messages
as they were received. He submitted respondent’s calling
card105 that contained the same phone number seen in
the text messages. Through this calling card, he was able
to prove that respondent was the source of the text
messages. Respondent denied meeting with Atty.
Lugares, but he never denied sending the text messages
to him.
The content of the text messages from respondent and
the circumstances within which they were made
constitute substantial evidence that justify the finding of
administrative liability. The presentation of text
messages that Atty. Lugares sent to respondent is not
necessary.
Respondent’s text messages sent to Atty. Lugares show
an actual evasion of duty to implement the Writ of
Execution. The contents of the text messages sufficiently
prove his manifest refusal to properly implement the Writ
of Execution.
Among the text messages presented by Atty. Lugares,
Exhibit “V”106 states that respondent sent Atty. Lugares
the following text message: “Nka pag Shf. return na ako
dyan sa kaso na yan, bhala ka sa gusto mo
mangyari.”107 Respondent Sheriff Villanueva sent this
text message at 9:06 a.m. on November 26, 2008.108
That text message is evidence that respondent did not
undertake his duty to implement the Writ of Execution.
In his Reply, Atty. Lugares correctly stated that a cursory
execution of the Sheriff’s Return did not excuse
respondent from faithfully implementing the Writ of
Execution. A writ of execution continues to be effective
during the period within which a judgment may be
enforced by motion,109 which is within five (5) years from
the entry of judgment.110 After the lapse of the five (5)
year period, the judgment may be revived and executed
before it is barred by the statue of limitations.111 The
failure to execute the judgment could result in years of
protracted litigation. Thus, the Sheriff must exert the
necessary effort to ensure that the judgment is duly
executed.
Atty. Lugares sought to have the Notices of Garnishment
served on the NEC Cargo Services, Inc.’s shareholders in
order to garnish their unpaid subscriptions on their
respective shares of stocks. If the service of the notices
had been carried out in good faith, Atty. Lugares would
not need to file an Ex-Parte Motion to Appoint Special
Sheriff, which would lead to the appointment of Sheriff
de Castro to serve the Notices of Garnishment anew.
Finally, respondent’s neglect is made evident when the
Sheriff tasked to replace him was able to discharge his
duties without incident. Respondent revealed during his
testimony that unlike him, Special Sheriff Fermin de
Castro was able to serve the Notices of Garnishment:
ATTY.
LUGARES:
Q: And you are also aware, Mr. Witness, that sheriff
De Castro was able to comply with the request of
the plaintiff’s counsel, to serve the Notices of
Garnishment. You are aware of that, because you
in fact annexed his reports to your pleadings, is
that correct?
WITNESS:
A: Reading upon the return, the sheriff’s report of
sheriff Fermin De Castro, were all negative results.
ATTY.
LUGARES:
Q: Yes, but the negative results of the Notices of
Garnishment is [sic] another matter from the non-
service thereof, Mr. Witness. So my question is;
[sic] you are aware of what sheriff Fermin De
Castro has done?
WITNESS:
A: Yes, sir.112
Thus, respondent’s failure to show that he did the
necessary steps to implement the Writ of Execution in
good faith cannot be tolerated by this court. Respondent
violated Canon IV, Sections 1 and 6 of the Code of
Conduct for Court Personnel:
SECTION 1. Court personnel shall at all times perform
official duties properly and with diligence. They shall
commit themselves exclusively to the business and
responsibilities of their office during working hours.
....
SEC. 6. Court personnel shall expeditiously enforce rules
and implement orders of the court within the limits of
their authority.
“When a writ is placed in the hands of a sheriff, it is his
duty, in the absence of any instructions to the contrary,
to proceed with reasonable celerity and promptness to
execute it according to its mandate.”113 “The Court has
said time and again that a sheriff’s duty in the execution
of a writ is purely ministerial; he is to execute the order
of the court strictly to the letter. He has no discretion
whether to execute the judgment or not.”114 “[T]he
officers charged with the delicate task of the enforcement
and/or implementation of the same must, in the absence
of a restraining order, act with considerable dispatch so
as not to unduly delay the administration of justice[.]”115
For violating the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel and
for failing to perform his duties as a Sheriff in an
expeditious manner, respondent must be held liable for
willful neglect of duty.
There is substantial evidence
to support the allegation of
extortion.
In addition to finding that respondent neglected his duty,
this court finds that he is guilty of extortion.
Atty. Lugares alleged that during the meeting of
November 24, 2008, respondent demanded P8,000.00 to
execute the Decision.116 After Atty. Lugares had refused,
respondent said, “[S]ayang lang ang pagod ko dito, kung
wala naman tayong makokolekta”117 and “E wala pang
50% ang magagarnish natin diyan eh.”118
Respondent’s allegation that the Complaint against him
stemmed from an illegal request by Atty. Lugares seeks
to diminish Atty. Lugares’ credibility. However, this
allegation does not disprove Atty. Lugares’ allegations. In
response to respondent’s allegation, he was able to prove
that his intention was to serve the Notices of
Garnishment on the stockholders. There can be no ill
motive that may be interpreted from Atty. Lugares’
request to be assisted by respondent.
Respondent’s consultations with Atty. Escasiñas and
Judge Villarosa do not negate or disprove the allegation
that he made the alleged statements and committed
extortion during the meeting of November 24, 2008.
When confronted with the allegation that he extorted
from Atty. Lugares during the meeting, respondent only
offers a bare denial without providing any contradictory
evidence. With “respondent’s bare denial vis-a-vis the
positive testimonies of the witnesses, the latter should
prevail.”119
Adding greater weight to Atty. Lugares’ allegations are
the text messages he presented as evidence. These text
messages demonstrate willingness to secure some favor
or concession in order for respondent to proceed with
implementing the Writ of Execution promptly.
Executive Judge Pozon stated that the use of the term
“colors” in the text messages did not show an attempt to
demand money from Atty. Lugares and the law firm he
represented. This court cannot uphold the finding of
Executive Judge Pozon.
The usage of the term “colors” as a reference to certain
“legal fees” that were demanded by respondent has no
legal basis. The term “colors” is not found in Rule 39 of
the Rules of Court, which provides for the procedure by
which orders or decisions of the courts are executed. A
thorough examination of the records, the Rules of Court
and other applicable rules, and issuances or circulars
governing the conduct of execution proceedings further
reveals that there is, indeed, no basis for the use of this
term in relation to the duties of a Sheriff.
Atty. Lugares’ narration of the purpose of the term
“colors” provides basis for his claim of extortion. Neither
respondent nor his counsel attempts to explain the use of
the term, undoubtedly due to its dubious origin.
Respondent sent another text message where he told
Atty. Lugares to facilitate a conversation between the
former and Atty. Astorga, one of the partners of
complainant law firm. Atty. Lugares presented evidence
showing that on November 26, 2008 at 8:45 a.m.,
respondent sent this text message:120 “Patawagin mo
nga c atty. astorga dto sa mobil phone ko para
magconfirm tau sa legal fees.”121
Respondent was already coordinating with Atty. Lugares
for the service of the notices on the stockholders of NEC
Cargo Services, Inc. His demand for communication with
Atty. Astorga could only lead to the reasonable
conclusion that respondent sought some other favor or
concession to execute the Decision. By necessary
implication, respondent refused to implement the Writ of
Execution until these “legal fees” or “colors” were settled.
A refusal to coordinate with Atty. Lugares and a terse
proposal to talk to Atty. Astorga regarding the payment
of “legal fees” support the conclusion that respondent
unjustly refused to implement the Writ of Execution,
absent the consideration of settling certain “legal fees” or
“colors.”
In his Memorandum to Executive Judge Pozon,
respondent raised as a defense that the “legal fees” he
was asking for were official payments to the Office of the
Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City.
However, respondent did not raise this as a defense in
the first and only Comment filed on February 27, 2009
before the Office of the Court Administrator, or in any of
the earlier proceedings before Executive Judge Cornejo
or Judge Salvador. The belated nature of this defense is
suspicious, considering that it should have been raised at
the earliest possible opportunity by respondent.
With regard to the alleged non-payment of these so-
called “legal fees,” Atty. Lugares categorically stated that
all pertinent fees for execution had already been
paid.122 This was why they were allowed to proceed with
the execution. Since respondent alleged non-payment of
these fees as a defense, he had the burden to prove that
these were the “legal fees” he was pertaining to in the
text messages.
Further, respondent was inconsistent in his testimony
before Executive Judge Pozon. He admitted receiving the
Writ of Execution on October 21, 2008,123 and he did not
deny sending a text message124 to Atty. Lugares on the
same date:
ATTY .
LUGARES:
I’m showing Exhibit “A”, which read as follows:
“Gd. am atty. Lugares, this is shf. villanueva re:
FGU writ br. 66 rtc. Can you arrange a meeting
 asap sir?” This was sent October 29, 2008. Exhibit A: What date was this [sic] text messages?
“B”, another text message coming from you: ATTY.
“Check ko lng atty. L. kung nsa vicinity na kau LUGARES:
po?” This was sent October 29, 2008 1:10 pm., October 29, 2008.
then this was followed by another text message WITNESS:
coming from you, “Sir proceed lng kau dto sa br. A: There were text messages and the sheriff’s return
144 rtc 10f Courtrm.” . . . Then on Exhibit “D”, has nothing to do with each other. At first, we were
sent on October 29, 2008 a [sic] 2:59 pm, you sent duty bound to do our duties to serve the writ of
another text message, stating: “No atty. Lugares. execution at the defendant’s location.
walang Cert. true copy un Decision sa akin.” ATTY.
. ... LUGARES:
So my question is; [sic] if you did not coordinate Q: Mr. Witness, you will agree with me that you met
with the plaintiff’s counsel, how come you sent with the plaintiff’s counsel and Atty. Escasinas to
this [sic] text messages?125 discuss certain matters regarding the writ of
execution?
Despite the existence of these text messages and WITNESS:
respondent’s failure to deny them, respondent still A: I can’t remember that moment wherein Atty.
denied meeting with Atty. Lugares at any time after Escasinas and Atty. Lugares and I, met.
being assigned to implement the Writ of Execution:126 ATTY.
LUGARES:
WITNESS:
Q: So you will deny that there was a meeting held?
A: At first, Atty. Arnold Lugares is the first one who
WITNESS:
initiates the meeting. That text messages was [sic]
A: None whatsoever.
sent because we don’t have any other way to
ATTY.
arrange a meeting, but he was the one who first
LUGARES:
like the meeting to take place with regards to the
Q: And you would also not admit that you led the
Notice of Garnishment among incorporators.
plaintiff’s counsel Atty. Lugares at the 10th floor
ATTY.
to discuss something in connection with the service
LUGARES:
of the Notice of Garnishment?
Q: So now, Mr. Witness, what you are stating that that
WITNESS:
[sic] you have coordinated with plaintiff’s counsel
A: None whatsoever.
before your execution of the November 5, 2008
ATTY.
sheriff’s return?
LUGARES
WITNESS
 Q: What about your request for some amount of Q: Now, do you confirm, Mr. Witness, that you
money, would you deny that? actually scheduled a meeting with the plaintiff’s
RET. JUDGE VILLANUEVA: counsel in order to serve the Notices of
Your Honor, we have denied that and I think that is Garnishments for this case?
improper for cross-examination, to elicit from the WITNESS:
mouth of the witness an answer which is A: I am not aware of the notice of garnishment itself. I
incriminating, Your Honor. am only aware of the fact that you eagerly want the
ATTY. arrangement meeting with me on that day.
LUGARES: ATTY.
But he took the witness stand, Your Honor. LUGARES:
COURT: Q: And you in fact agreed to set the meeting in order
Well, I will allow that. to serve the notice of garnishment?
.... WITNESS:
ATTY. A: I told you I am not aware of the notice of
LUGARES: garnishment to be served among incorporators.
Are you denying that you requested money from ATTY.
the plaintiff’s counsel? LUGARES:
WITNESS: Q: So you are denying that that [sic] you have set a
A: Sir, we are [sic] raised by our father to be good meeting with the plaintiff’s counsel in order to
citizen [sic] and responsible at [sic] that duties. serve the notice of garnishment? Is it a yes or a no?
ATTY. WITNESS:
LUGARES: A: No.
Q: So what is your answer? ATTY.
WITNESS: LUGARES:
A: I never demanded whatsoever. Q: So there was no such arrangement?
ATTY. WITNESS:
LUGARES: A: No.127
Q: And you did not demand any fee for the Notice of
Garnishment? As seen in the records of the proceedings before
WITNESS: Executive Judge Pozon, respondent categorically denied
A: Only legal fees for the Notices of Garnishments. making any demand for money. However, a perusal of
ATTY. the records of the other proceedings contradicts his
claim. In the proceedings before Executive Judge
LUGARES:
Cornejo, Atty. Lugares testified regarding the events that
led to the filing of the Complaint against respondent:
COURT:
Ano ang exactly ang demand sa iyo?
(addressed to Atty. Lugares)
Atty.
Lugares:
P8,000.00.
COURT:
No, no, how was the demand made?
Atty.
Lugares:
After our meeting with Atty. Escasinas, Atty.
Escasinas said, to proceed with the execution and the
Sheriff led me to the staircase instead of us just
talking at his table just outside the office of Atty.
Escasinas, tapos sinabi niya na nagdemand siya sa
akin ng P8,000.00 para sa services niya para sa
execute [sic] ng decision. And he further stated,
“Sayang naman ang pagod ko dito kung wala naman
tayong makukulekta e wala pang 50% na magagarnish
natin diyan.” That is number 6 of our
Complaint/Affidavit so I replied to him and explained
to him that this is his job and he should not demand
for money in exchange for two weeks job, that is why
he lowered his price to P5,000.00. Despite that he is
insisting that I should give it to him at that very
instant or not later than the afternoon of that date
November 24, 2008, otherwise, the Notice of
Garnishment would not push through. That was his
exact demand, your Honor. In fact, we coordinated,
your Honor. . . .
COURT:
So what happened to the Notice of Garnishment dito?
Wala?
Atty.
Lugares:
Sa time niya, wala hong nangyari kasi ayaw na niya
kumilos, e.128
During these proceedings before Executive Judge
Cornejo, the counsel for respondent was his father, Atty.
Candido Villanueva (Atty. Villanueva), who made several
statements binding on the defense of respondent:
Atty. Villanueva:
We deny that he demanded money. That is your
allegation.
Atty. Lugares:
Yes, defendant always deny [sic] matters. We are used to
that. We can prove that.
Atty. Villanueva:
To demand is to extort by to intimidate you to give
money. It never happened that way as you alleged. He
said, you insinuated, “may dala ka bang ganito?” He
must be a young idealistic lawyer but we who are all in
the profession, you know how to deal with this [sic]
people.
....
Atty. Villaneuva:
Actually, what happened here, despite your allegation na
mayroon demand or insinuation of money, hindi ka
naman nagbigay kahit isang pera. Walang damage
except your thinking that it tarnishes the administration
of justice, a Sheriff should not do that. Well, I agree with
you but it is a question of pag-aaralan yung
circumstances paano nangyari. Pero ang issue sa kaso
 mo hindi ka pa nakakasingil dun sa defendant, sa mga
officers. Kawawa naman itong, in the course of trying to
collect from the defendant, naiipit itong mga low
salaried employee dun sa ano, I agree with you we have
to clean up the judiciary pero baka naman we are being
too harsh against them or you misinterpret their words
to mean they are after money when actually they are not.
Kasi pag ikaw ang magdedemand nang service ng writ
of execution, you have to pay to the Sheriff certain
amount, di ba?129 (Emphasis supplied)
In his defense of respondent, Atty. Villanueva elaborated
on what he alleged to be Atty. Lugares’ motives for filing
the Complaint:
Atty. Villanueva:
Ang nakikita ko sa kaso, I think counsel is being so self-
righteous, “I want to clean-up the judiciary.” Ganyan,
ganyan. “Itong mga taong ganito kailangan weed-out
from the service.” E, ang liit na bagay na ito, hindi ka
nga nahingian nang kahit isang pera at saka yung
nagpapa-serve talaga ng Writ of Execution, may
binabayaran sa Sheriff’s Office nang service ng Writ of
Execution, wala ka pa rin nabayaran dun.
Atty. Lugares:
Sino nagsabi po? We are already paid with that.
Atty. Villanueva:
Sa service nitong Writ of Execution?
Atty. Lugares:
Opo, sa unang Sheriff, nabayaran na namin yung Writ of
Execution kaya nakapag-proceed siya, e.
Atty. Villanueva:
Kung nagpapa-serve ka ng Writ of Execution, talagang
may binabayaran?
Atty. Lugares:
Nabayaran na po lahat. Kaya po kami may appointment
that morning para dun sa transportation niya, wala nang
gastos, ako na mismos [sic] ang magsasama sa kanya
duon. So there is no need to give P8,000.00. Kasi ang
premise po niya, e, “Magbigay ka nang P8,000.00 which
he lowered to P5,000.00, kung hindi hindi matutuloy ang
service nang Notice of Garnishment na iyan.” Hindi na
nga natuloy, tapos ang dahilan niya nasa Marikina area
siya.
Atty. Villanueva:
Hindi ka naman napilitan magbigay kahit piso, ayaw mo
talagang magbigay dahil masama nga yun, di ba?
Atty. Lugares:
Pero ang point dito bakit siya nagdedemand?
Atty. Villanueva:
Sa makatuwid, walang [sic] talagang na [sic] material
damage sa iyo na nagbigay ka and somebody else
enriched himself with your money, wala, except that you
did not like the attitude of the Sheriff na “Bakit siya
hihihingi [sic] eh, dapat trabahuin niya, di ba
ganun?”130 (Emphasis supplied)
Counsel for respondent stated that, since no exchange of
money took place and no one was enriched, then no
extortion or bribery took place. Further, counsel for
respondent raised as a defense that respondent did not
“intimidate” Atty. Lugares to give a certain amount to
execute the Decision.
Respondent’s defense directly contradicts his own abject
denials that any meeting took place between him and
Atty. Lugares regarding the payment of “legal fees.”
Respondent and his counsel cannot deny the occurrence
of any meeting while asserting that Atty. Lugares did not
pay respondent any money when that meeting took
place. The sheer inconsistency of these two positions
casts serious doubts on respondent’s defense against the
allegations in the Complaint. Respondent cannot expect
to evade liability by relying on two contradictory
arguments.
Taking all these findings in consideration, there is
substantial evidence to support Atty. Lugares’ allegations
that respondent demanded the amount of ?8,000.00 to
serve the Notices of Garnishment. Respondent’s bare
denials and conflicting positions cannot counter Atty.
Lugares’ consistent narrative of facts.
Respondent is guilty of gross
misconduct and must be dismissed
from the service.
Having found substantial evidence to prove Atty.
Lugares’ allegations, respondent must be held
accountable by this court. He has failed to uphold the
high standard of integrity required by a position in the
judiciary. He has violated Canon 1, Sections 1 and 2 of
the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel:
CANON I
FIDELITY TO DUTY
SECTION 1. Court personnel shall not use their official
position to secure unwarranted benefits, privileges or
exemptions for themselves or for others.
SEC. 2. Court personnel shall not solicit or accept any
gift, favor or benefit based on any or explicit or implicit
understanding that such gift, favor or benefit shall
influence their official actions.
Respondent has been found guilty of soliciting money
from litigants in order to execute his duties as a Sheriff.
This deplorable behavior in some court personnel must
be stopped. In Villahermosa, Sr. v. Sarcia:131
The Code of Conduct for Court Personnel requires that
court personnel avoid conflicts of interest in performing
official duties. It mandates that court personnel should
not receive tips or other remunerations for assisting or
attending to parties engaged in transactions or involved
in actions or proceedings with the judiciary. “The Court
has always stressed that all members of the judiciary
should be free from any whiff of impropriety, not only
with respect to their duties in the judicial branch but also
to their behavior outside the court as private individuals,
in order that the integrity and good name of the courts of
justice shall be preserved.” Court personnel cannot take
advantage of the vulnerability of party-litigants.
....
Indeed, “[a]s a court employee, [one] should be more
circumspect in [one’s] behavior and should [steer] clear
of any situation casting the slightest of doubt on [one’s]
conduct.”132 (Citations omitted)
Respondent is guilty of gross misconduct. Sison-Barias
defined gross misconduct:
Respondents in this case failed to subscribe to the
highest moral fiber mandated of the judiciary and its
personnel. Their actions tainted their office and
besmirched its integrity. In effect, both respondents are
guilty of gross misconduct. This court defined misconduct
as “a transgression of some established and definite rule
of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross
negligence by a public officer.” In Camus v. The Civil
Service Board of Appeals, this court held that
“[m]isconduct has been defined as ‘wrong or improper
conduct’ and ‘gross’ has been held to mean ‘flagrant;
shameful’. . . . This Court once held that the word
misconduct implies a wrongful intention and not a mere
error of judgment.”133 (Citations omitted)
Thus, respondent must face the full consequences of his
actions. This court will not abandon its responsibility in
exacting the highest amount of integrity from those
within its ranks. Respondent must be dismissed from the
service.
Araza v. Garcia and Judge Tan v.
Paredes justify the dismissal of
respondent from the service.
In previous administrative cases, this court has dismissed
Sheriffs who violated their duty to faithfully execute the
courts’ decisions.
In Araza v. Garcia,134 this court dismissed respondent
Sheriff Marlon Garcia from service.135 He refused to
conduct an inventory of the property seized from the
judgment debtor.136 He told the spouse of complainant
Wilfredo Araza that no inventory would be conducted
until the latter paid the assisting sheriff the amount of
P1,000.00.137 This court held that respondent Sheriff
Marlon Garcia should be liable for his actions:
As regards the fact that respondent Garcia asked from
complainant one thousand (P1,000.00) pesos to be given
to assisting sheriff respondent Nicolas A. Tonga, the
evidence showed that complainant refused to give the
amount demanded. However, complainant directly gave
P1,000.00 to Rustom Galicia who prepared the inventory
of materials seized. Such act of asking complainant for
money intended for “assisting” sheriff Tonga was virtually
an extortion. The sheriff assigned by the court was not
authorized on his own, to appoint an “assisting” sheriff or
a “technical” adviser. Decidedly, it was in violation of
Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 31-
90.138 (Citations omitted)
In Judge Tan v. Paredes,139 this court dismissed
respondent Sheriff Henry G. Paredes for demanding the
amount of P10,000.00 from the plaintiff to execute the
decision:
The OCA found Sheriff Paredes liable for gross
misconduct and dishonesty for failure to comply with the
provisions of Section 9, Rule 141. Contrary to the
findings of Judge Tomaneng, records showed that Mrs.
Mijares testified that Sheriff Paredes demanded and
asked P10,000. Further, the OCA noted that this was the
first case against the sheriff who had been with the
judiciary for twenty-seven years.
We agree with the findings of the OCA, concerning the
charges against Sheriff Paredes. Under Section 9, Rule
141 of the Rules of Court [now Rule 141, Section 10 of
the Rules of Court, as revised by Administrative Matter
No. 04-2-04-SC, effective August 16, 2004], the sheriff is
required to secure the court’s prior approval of the
estimated expenses and fees needed to implement the
court process. The requesting party shall deposit such
amount with the Clerk of Court. These expenses shall
then be disbursed to the executing Sheriff subject to his
liquidation within the same period for rendering a return
on the process or writ. Any unspent amount shall be
refunded to the party who made the deposit.
In the implementation of a writ of execution, only the
payment of sheriff’s fees may be received by sheriffs.
Sheriffs are not allowed to receive any voluntary
payments from parties in the course of the performance
of their duties. To do so would be inimical to the best
interests of the service because even
assuming arguendo such payments were indeed given
and received in good faith, this fact alone would not
dispel the suspicion that such payments were made for
less than noble purposes. Corollary, a sheriff cannot just
unilaterally demand sums of money from a party-litigant
without observing the proper procedural steps,
otherwise, it would amount to dishonesty or
extortion.140 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
In Araza, respondent Sheriff Marlon Garcia was found
guilty of violating the provisions of Supreme Court
Administrative Circular No. 31-90 concerning sheriffs and
the fees that may be provided to them. In Judge
Tan, respondent Sheriff Henry G. Paredes was found
guilty of violating the same provision, which was
incorporated into the Rules of Court under Rule 141 by
Administrative Matter No. 00-2-01-SC.141 Presently, the
rules governing fees that may be provided to the sheriff
are stated in Rule 141, Section 10 of the Rules of
Court:142
With regard to sheriff’s expenses in executing writs
issued pursuant to court orders or decisions or
safeguarding the property levied upon, attached or
seized, including kilometrage for each kilometer of travel,
guards’ fees, warehousing and similar charges, the
interested party shall pay said expenses in an amount
estimated by the sheriff, subject to the approval of
the court. Upon approval of said estimated expenses,
the interested party shall deposit such amount with the
clerk of court and ex-officio sheriff, who shall disburse
the same to the deputy sheriff assigned to effect the
process, subject to liquidation within the same
period for rendering a return on the process. Any
unspent amount shall be refunded to the party making
the deposit. A full report shall be submitted by the
deputy sheriff assigned with his return, and the sheriff’s
expenses shall be taxed as costs against the judgment
debtor. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, respondent violated not only the Code of Conduct
for Court Personnel but also Rule 141, Section 10 of the
Rules of Court. He failed to implement the Writ of
Execution. He failed to get the approval of the court in
demanding “colors” and “legal fees” from Atty. Lugares.
The similarities among Araza, Judge Tan, and this case
cannot be ignored. All three cases involve the refusal of
the Sheriff to faithfully implement the Writ of Execution.
They involve the demand of a sum of money by the
Sheriff tasked with the implementation of the Writ of
Execution. Even if respondent did not actually receive
any money from Atty. Lugares, it is the practice of
demanding money that this court seeks to end.
In Villahermosa, this court found that to its dismay, “it
has received many complaints from party-litigants
against court employees extorting money from
them.”143 This court must take decisive action in its
efforts to ensure that the judiciary is free from any hint
of corruption.
The role that Sheriffs play in the dispensation of justice is
pivotal. They serve as the agents to ensure that arduous
and painstaking court proceedings will result in a final
execution. It is incumbent upon them to act in a manner
fitting of the dignity of their office as employees of the
judiciary. Respondent failed to subscribe to this solemn
duty. To deter similar cases of gross misconduct, this
court is mandated to impose a sanction befitting his
administrative liability.

WHEREFORE, respondent Sheriff Alexander D.

Villanueva is found GUILTY of willful neglect of duty and
serious misconduct due to graft and corruption and
extortion and is DISMISSED from the service with
forfeiture of all benefits, except accrued leave credits,
and with prejudice to his re-employment in any branch or
service of the government, including government-owned
and controlled corporations.

This Resolution is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.