ARISTOTLE ON THE PHILOSOPHICAL ELEMENTS OF HISTORIA SILVIA CARLI Ix THE POETICS, Aristotle briefly compares historical works with mimetic compositions.’ He remarks that the former “speak of” (legei) events that have actually happened (¢a genomena), whereas the latter of “events as they might happen (ota an genoito) or are possible according to probability or necessity.” The historian represents a multiplicity of facts whose relations are, at times, purely temporal: they follow one another or take place at the same time as others.’ The poet, on the other hand, imitates unitary actions whose parts are connected by causal relations.’ The culmination of this comparison is the famous statement that “poetry is more philosophical and more serious than history, for poetry speaks more of universals, whereas history of particulars.” The picture of history that emerges from Aristotle’s treatise on poetry has been widely criticized.’ Specifically, two related points Correspondence to: Silvia Carli, Philosophy Department, Xavier University, 3800 Victory Parkway, Cincinnati, OH 45207. ‘ Aristotle, De Arte Poetica, ed. Ingram Bywater (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1958), 9.1451b1-11; 1451b30-33; 23.145: }; herealter Poetica. Unless otherwise indicated, all translations from the Greek are my own. In citing the Poetics, I will give both the chapter number and Bekker number separated by a period. For longer works, I may prefix this citation with a book number and period. * Aristotle, Poetica, 9.1451a36-8. * Thid., 23.1459a21-30. “Thid., 8.1451a30-37, 10.1452a21. *Whid., 9.1451b4-7. *See, for example, G. E. M. de Ste. Croix, “Aristotle on History and Poetry (Poetics, 9, 1451a36-b11),” in Essays on Aristotle's Poetics, ed. Amélie ©. Rorty (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1992); Martin Ostwald, “Tragedians and Historians,” Scripta Classica Israetica 21 (2002); 9-25; C. M. J. Sicking, “Aristotle and Herodotus,” in Distant Companions: Selected Papers (Leiden: Brill Academic Publishers, 1998), 147-57, especially 149; Thomas Powell, “Why Aristotle Has No Philosophy of History,” History of Philosophy Quarterly 4, no. 3 (1987): 354; Samuel H. Butcher, Aristotle's Theory of Poetry and Fine Art: with a Critical Text and Translation of the The Review of Metaphysics 65 (December 2011): 321-849. Copyright © 2011 by The Review of Metaphysics.322 SILVIA CARLI have been called into question. The first is the thesis that historia deals with particulars, which, the critique goes, is based on a misinterpretation of the nature and value of the works produced by the Greek historians. The second is the philosopher's sharp distinction between history and poetry, which fails to appreciate the kinship between the two disciplines. On this critical reading, far from being different in kind, they differ at best in degree. Thus Ste. Croix observes that it is likely that Aristotle was familiar with Thucydides’ work, and that, if he had been consistent with his own tenets “he ought not to have written off history as dealing only with particulars.” Rather, he should have acknowledged that there is no “essential difference” between poetic plots and Thucydides’ History.” More recently Martin Ostwald writes that the above mentioned passage of Poetics 9 “shows a rather deplorable blindness to historiography. If we were to take Aristotle literally, the only kind of historical writing he would recognize as such would be the kind of annalistic historical writings practiced in his own times . . . [that] tend to list events but do nothing to relate them to one another. What Aristotle says here is certainly not applicable to Herodotus or Thucydides. ... It seems to me that the activity of the historian involves the relation of events in terms of ‘what is probable or necessary’ just as much as does the activity of the tragic poet.” This paper argues that these criticisms originate from a misinterpretation of Aristotle’s position." A careful reading of the Poetics, 4” ed. (New York: Dover, 1951), 164-5; Martha Craven Nussbaum, The Fragility of Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and Philosophy, revised ed. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 386; J. M. Armstrong, “Aristotle on the Philosophical Nature of Poetry,” The Classical Quarterly 48, no. 2 (1998): 447 n. 4; Roselyne Dupont-Roc and Jean Lallot, trans., Aristoile. La Poetique. Texte, traduction et notes (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1980), 222; D. W. Lucas, Aristotle, Poetics: Introduction, Commentary, and Appendixes (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968), 216; Pierluigi Donini, La tragedia ¢ la vita (Alessandria: Edizioni dell’Orso, 2004), 21; Carlo Gavallotti, Aristotele. DelVarte poetica, (Milano: Mondadori, 1974), 144. ’ Ste. Croix, “Aristotle on History and Poetry,” 28. “Ibid., 28. " Ostwald, “Tragedians and Historians,” 9-10. ” Authors who do not criticize Aristotle’s take on history, but share the is of his critics, similarly misinterpret his view. See, for instance, Erie anal;PHILOSOPHICAL ELEMENTS OF HISTORIA 323 relevant passages of the Poetics, on the one hand (section 2), and the analysis of his broad conception of historia as a preliminary inquiry that leads to the philosophical investigation of causes and principles ‘on the other (section 3), show that he did not confine history to the realm of particulars. Rather, he acknowledged that it has some connection with universality, and to that extent, that it partakes in the philosophical nature of poetry. At the same time, however, he also provided valid indications to the effect that, despite their affinity, historia and poiétiké differ in kind, because they are defined by different functions (erga). For this reason he correctly holds that poetry is more philosophical than history, even as he acknowledges that historical works contain a poetic element (section 4). The paper opens with a brief section devoted to the philosopher’s view of poetry, which is the term of comparison for the entire discussion of history. The philosophical nature of poetry. Aristotle holds that poetry is more philosophical than history because it speaks more of universals, not that it is philosophy or that it expresses universals tout court." Philosophia* is the highest form of knowledge that moves from what is first for us to what is first in itself, that is to say, from sensible to MacPhail, “The Plot of History from Antiquity to the Renaissance,” Journal of the History of Ideas 62, no. 1 (2001): 1-16 especially 1; Victor Goldschmidt, Temps physique et temps tragique chez Aristote: Commentaire sur le Quatriéme livre de la Physique (10-14) et sur la Poétique (Paris: J. Vrin, 1982), 58-61 "These are the universals of science, which grasp the essential properties common to a given class of onta and abstract from the accidental and particular features of its specimens. See, for example, Aristotle, De Interpretatione, in Categoriae et Liber de Interpretatione, ed. Lorenzo Minio Paluello (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1964), 7.17a38-b1; Metaphysica, ed. Wemer Jaeger (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969), 1.2.982a24-5; hereafter Metaphysica. “Philosophy” in the Poetics (Poetica, 9.1451b5: “poetry is more philosophical . . . than history") seems to be understood in the broad sense of knowledge of the truth, which includes both the sciences and the arts. See Aristotle, Metaphysica, 2.1.993b20; Topica, 1.14.105b30-1.324 SILVIA CARLI intelligible objects." It presupposes that something is the case (to hoti)"' and articulates the why and the cause of those facts (to dioti kai ten aitian).” It thus offers rational and discursive accounts (logot) of the nature of things, and is universal in an unqualified sense (haplés): it apprehends only features that are common to an entire class of objects and abstracts from their accidental and idiosyncratic features. Poetry falls short of philosophy" because, far from abstracting from ta kath’hekaston, it imitates events taking place in particular circumstances and enacted by individuals." It exhibits a succession of events rather than explaining them, and is in this sense closer to experience than epistémé. For instance, Sophocles did not write a treatise that investigates the aetiology of the conflict between city and family laws, but produced a story that illustrates how such conflict can develop when it takes hold of the members of a prominent family. Yet a good tragic plot” can be said to be akin to philosophy in virtue of the relations that it establishes among its objects. “It makes a great Aristotle, Metaphysica, 7.3.1029b3-5; b7-11. " Thid., 1.1.981a15; a29-30 " Thid., 1.1.981a30. “On the epistemological difference between philosophy and poetry see, for instance, Stephen Halliwell, “Aristotelian Mimesis and Human Understanding,” in Making Sense of Aristotle: Essays in Poetics, ed. Givind Andersen and Jan Haarberg (London: Duckworth, 2001), 95-100; Stephen Halliwell, The Aesthetics of Mimesis (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2002), 193-199; Malcolm Heath, “The Universality of Poetry in Aristotle's Poetics,” The Classical Quarterly (New Series) 41, no. 2 (1991): 389-90; Malcolm Heath, “Cognition in Aristotle's Poetics,” Mnemosyne 62, no. 1 (2009): 71; Armstrong, “Aristotle on the Philosophical Nature of Poetry,"449-50; Donini, La iragedia e la vita, 44; James Redfield, Nature and Culture in the Niad: The Tragedy of Hector, expanded ed. (Durham: Duke University Press, 1994), 55; hereafter Natwre and Culture in the Miad; Silvia Carli, “Poetry is more Philosophical than History: Aristotle on Mimésis and Form,” The Review of Metaphysics 64, no. 2 (2010): 303-36. " According to Aristotle, the dramatic characters are (and should be) the embodiment of a general type (see Poetica, 13.1452b34~1453a10). However, Antigone, Oedipus, Creon and so forth, are not simply representatives of a kind; in virtue of their particular and distinctive stories, they are individualized types. “T will focus on tragedy but the same can be said for epic and comedy, both of which imitate actions. See Poetica, 23.1459a17-21; 5.1449b9.PHILOSOPHICAL ELEMENTS OF HISTORIA. 325 difference whether things happen because of one another or one after the other,”” writes the philosopher. If a story represents pragmata whose relations are purely temporal, it remains at the level of experience and its facticity. But if it moves to its conclusion as a result of identifiable causal antecedents, it reveals the inner logic of the events and makes them understandable. This is precisely the defining mark of excellent plots (muthoi): they exclude the accidental,” and portray events that are connected to one another by causal relations of probability or necessity.” Such an organization of the pragmata imitated is in turn a function of the guiding principle of the poet's work, namely, the unity of action (mia praxis). An object constituted by a multiplicity of parts is one if its constitutive elements, rather than being merely juxtaposed, are functionally related to one another and thus display an orderly arrangement.” In the case of the object of mimésis, every event is necessary to the functional integrity of the action to which it belongs—and thus occupies a specific place in the story—because it is causally connected to what precedes and what follows. In the philosopher's words: As then in the other mimetic arts a unitary mimésis is of one object, so the plot too, being the mimésis of an action, must be the imitation of an action which is one and complete; and the paris, isting of events, must be so put together that if one of them is sed or removed the whole is dislocated and destroyed. For that whose presence or absence makes no visible difference is not an integral part of the whole.” A whole, which is a kind of unity,” is a self-contained and perfectly delimited object that does not depend on anything else for its intelligibility: it has clearly defined and nonarbitrary external Aristotle, Poetica, 10.1452a21; emphasis added That is to say, events that have a purely temaporal relation to the others. ' Aristotle, Poetica, 7.1451al2; 8.1451a27 and following; 9.1451a38; 9.145135; 10.1452a20; 11.1452a23 and following; 15.1454a35-b2; 0, 9.1451b 23.1459a * Thid., 8.1451 23.1459a22. * See Aristotle, Metaphysica, 5.26.1024a1-3. * Aristotle, Poetica, 8.51a30-7; emphasis added. Aristotle, Metaphysica, 5.26.10241al.326 SILVIA CARLI boundaries (a beginning and an end), and a perfectly formed internal articulation that binds them together (a middle).” The distinctive work (ergon) of the poet is to compose plots that imitate actions so structured because they represent events “as they might happen or are possible according to probability or necessity.”” ‘These expressions connote the way in which pragmata depicted by good plots unfold, or the modality of their taking place.” Things happen as they might when they evolve according to the laws of their development, that is to say, the principles that govern the world of human affairs, unencumbered by anything that might prevent their full realization.” These are the “things that are possible” (Ja dunata),” because they take place in such a way as to realize their most proper possibility, that is, their distinctive potentiality (danamis). For this reason poetry brings to the fore the structured regularity of human happenings and enables the reader/spectator to understand not only that something took place, but also why dramatic characters of a given kind, whose lives unfold in the circumstances imagined by the poet, are bound to suffer or flourish." It is precisely the fact that poiétiké represents a world that is eminently intelligible—as a rule much more so than the real world as it appears to us—that, in the philosopher's view, makes it similar to philosophy and connects it to the universals of the highest form of knowledge.” For the same reason, mimetic * Aristotle, Poetica, 7.1450b26-32. * Aristotle, Poetica, 9.1451a37-8; emphasis added, “This is independent of whether such facts are fictional or historical. Evidence of this is the fact that, according to Aristotle, historical events can unfold in a way that conforms to the requirements of well made plots: “there is no reason why some historical events shouldn't be such as they would happen in conformity with the probable and the possible.” Poetica, 9.1451b31-2; emphasis added. See the next section for further elaboration of this point. | developed this point more fully in than History: Aristotle on Mimésis and Form,” especially 319-28. ” Aristotle, Poetica, 9.1451a37-8; 1451b31-3. "On this point see Donini, La tragedia e la vita, 25. * Aristotle writes: Universal’ means the kinds of things it fits (sumbanei)a certain sort of person to say or do according to probability or necessity.” Poetica 9.1451b8-9, For this “cognitivist” interpretation of the philosophical nature of poetry see, for instance, Halliwell, “Aristotelian Mimesis and Human Understanding”, The Aesthetics of Mimesis, chapter 6; i, “Poetry is more PhilosophicalPHILOSOPHICAL ELEMENTS OF HISTORIA 327 representations can be an occasion for learning (manthanein) for those who experience them, as Aristotle points out in Poetics 4." Redfield, Nature and Culture in the iad, 52-67; Donini, La Tragedia ¢ la vita, 19, 22-27, 67-85; Pierluigi Donini, Aristotele Poetica (Torino: Giulio Einaudi editore, 2008), XLVU-VIII, LVI-LXXI; Elizabeth S. Belfiore, Tragic Pleasures: Aristotle on Plot and Emotion (Princeton NJ.: Princeton University Press, 1992), especially chapter 2; Dorothea Frede “Necessit Chance and ‘What Happens for the Most Part’ in Aristotle's Poetics,” i on Aristotle's Poetics, ed. A. O. Rorty, 214-15; Nussbaum, The Fragility q Goodness, especially 4. Halper and Husain, on the other hand, argue that poetry is philosophical because tragedies have a unitary form or essence, namely the plot, and for this reason they can be defined and known. They maintain that such form is not to be found in history or actual experience but is a “making” of the poet. Thus poetry owes its philosophical nature to its fictional character. See Edward Charles Halper, “Poetry, History, and Dialectic,” in From Puzzles to Principles? Essays on Aristotle's Dialectic, ed. May Sim, (Lexington Books, 1999), 215-227; Martha Husain, Ontology and the Art of Tragedy: An Approach to Aristotle's Poetics (Albany: SUNY, 2002). In my view, it is not necessary to invoke the category of the fictional to explain the fact that tragic poems have unity and form. Rather, it is sufficient to apply Aristotle’s view according to which art imitates nature to the object represented in imitative works: they are one because they imitate the form of human events. See Aristotle, Physica, ed. William David Ross (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 2.2.194a21-2; 2.8.199a16-17; hereafter Physica. For the full presentation of this argument, see Carli, “Poetry is more Philosophical than History: Aristotle on Mimésis and Form,” 319-28. * Aristotle, Poetica, 4.1448b8-20. The example that Aristotle presents in Poetics 4 to illustrate the thesis that we learn from imitations concerns a very trivial case, namely, the recognition of the identity of a particular individual from the observation of his image or portrait (for a careful analysis of thi passage see Stavros Tsitsiridis, “Mimesis and understanding: an interpretation of Aristotle's Poetics 4.1448B4-19,” Classical Quarterly 55, no. 2 (2005): 446), This has induced some commentators to argue that the thesis of the epistemic relevance of art does not extend to poetry and that we do not learn universals from the experience of tragic and epic poems. See, for instance, G. R, F, Ferrari, “Aristotle's Literary Aesthetics,” Phronesis 44, no. 3 (1999); Jonathan Lear, “Katharsis,” in Essays on Aristotle's Poetics, ed. A. O. Rorty; Malcolm Heath, “The Universality of Poetry in Aristotle’s Poetics,” The Classical Quarterly (New Series) 41, no. 2 (1991): 389-90. It is much more likely, however, that the example of the portrait shouldi’t be taken only in its literal meaning, but also as an illustration of a more general thesis concerning the possibility of learning from the experience of poetry, given that it occurs in a chapter that makes broad claims about human nature and knowledge. Aristotle writes that mimetic activity is a universal human characteristic, which enables us to learn our first lessons (Poetica, 4.1448b5-8), and that328 SILVIA CARLI I Historia in the Poetics. In the Poetics Aristotle is more concerned with the similarities between history and poetry than he is with their differences, for they resemble one another in a variety of ways." They share, for example, a common subject matter in the Greek myths, which were typically considered to be true.” More importantly, they present their material in a similar way: rather than offering counts of their objects as philosophy does, they portray a number of events, taking place in particular circumstance: and involving individuals, which follow one another or take pla simultaneously. It was thus particularly important for Aristotle to discriminate between the two and to highlight the elements that differentiate them. This may explain why his already quick and unsystematic observations on history concentrate on features that make it unlike mimetic compositions. He did not, however, overlook its “philosophical elements.” Let us start with the passage in Chapter learning is “most delightful not only for philosophers, but equally for all men, although they have a small share of it” (Poetica, 4.1448b13-15; see also Metaphysica, 1.1). Aristotle's point that we experience the pleasure that derives from learning in connection with “mimetic products” only if we are already familiar with the objects they represent (Poetica, 4.1448b18-20) is likely to be understood, in relation to poetry, in the sense that only adults who already have some experience of “life, happiness and unhappiness” can appreciate and grasp the logic of the events that bring the dramatic characters to flourish or suffer, a point that he repeatedly emphasizes in the Ethics. See, for instance, Ethica Nicomachea, ed. Ingram Bywater (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1894), 1.3.1095a2-3; 6.7.1141b14-21; 6.11.1143b11-14; hereafter Ethica Nicomachea. Unless otherwise indicated, translations from the Greek are my own, The fact that we recognize the logic of causally connected events depicted by the plot is precisely what makes our learning experience quasi-universal. For this interpretation see Stephen Halliwell, Aristotle's Poetics (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1986), especially 70-4; Halliwell, The Aesthetics of Mimesis, especially 157-171; Pierluigi Donini, Aristotele Poetica, LXII-LXVU. “Tn fact Aristotle's observations in the Poeti disciplines were often confused with one another. 23.1459a18-30; 1459a38-b3. * Rosenmeyer remarks that “For the Greeks, all tragedy was a version of history.” T. G. Rosenmeyer, “History or Poetry? The Example of Herodotus,” Clio 11, no. 3 (1982): 239-259. The same can be suggest that the two See Poetica, 8.1451a20-3;PHILOSOPHICAL ELEMENTS OF HISTORIA 329 23 that is the primary target of Aristotle's critics because of its alleged claim that all or most historical events are accidentally related to one another: [Epic] plots should not resemble histories, in which what is necessary is the exposition not of a single action but of a single period of time, that is, of all the events that happened during that time, either concerning one or more people, each of which events relates to the others as the case may be (cov EkaaTov cas EruxeV Exel Tpos GAAnA@). For just as the battle of Salamis occurred at the same time as the battle with the Carthaginians in Sicily, although they were not at all directed toward the same end, so over successive periods of time it sometimes (éviots) happens that one event takes place after another without any single result emerging from them.” Aristotle makes a normative claim about the nature of historia based on its distinctive function (ergon). He writes that “it is necessary” (anagcké) for “histories” to present the events that happened within a unit of time, not that this is what historians, as a matter of fact, do.” Similarly, Poetics 9 frames the opposition between poetry and history in terms of their respective functions rather than in terms of the character of the writings produced in these two fields.” What is * Aristotle, Poetica 23.1459a21-30; emphasis added. “Ste. Croix and Weil accept the manuscript that reads ‘\otopiais tas ouvn@oets rather than ‘iotopiais tas auvOécets (Poelica, 23.1459a21) and accordingly translate, respectively, “our usual stories, which have to set forth not one action but one period,” and ‘ordinary’ or ‘vulgar’ stories.” Ste. Croix, “Aristotle on History and Poetry,” 23, 30 n. 3; Raymond Weil, “Aristotle's View of History,” in Articles on Aristotle, ed. Jonathan Barnes, Malcolm Schofield and Richard Sorabji (New York: St. Martin Press, 1977), 2:203. That is to say, they suggest that Aristotle's remarks on history stem from the empirical observation of “ordinary histories” produced by Greek historians, which do not include Thucydides’ work. This, however, is incompatible with the philosopher's normative language: why do “usual stories” have to set forth one period and not one action? And why does Aristotle contrast poetry and history in chapter 9 in terms of their functions (erga)? “Indeed throughout the Poetics Aristotle criticizes poets whose compositions do not conform to their ergon (that is to say, the imitation of unitary actions), but write episodic plots. See, for instance, Poctica, 8.1451a20-3; 23.1459a18-30; 1459a38-b3. By contrast, Homer is systematically praised for having grasped the nature and telos of his art. See Poetica, 8.1451a23-9; 23.1459a30-8; 4.1448b34-1449a2.330 SILVIA CARLI history’s ergon then? “The exposition of as many events as they happened during” a unit of time “concerning one or more people,” that is to say, a faithful record of ta genomena occuring in a given historical period.” Aristotle’s view of the nature of history is thus to be determined on the basis of his understanding of the objective relations that link fa genomena. For he will regard historiai as excellent specimens of their kind if they reproduce the objective configurations of the events that they investigate. Two points in the above quotation are particularly important in this respect. The first is the subordinate clause dv Exaotov cs Etuxev Exel MPOS GAANAG; the second the adverb éviote at the end of the passage. Let us start with the latter. Aristotle writes that sometimes, not always, events succeed one another in time without being connected by causal relations, and thus result in outcomes that are unrelated. The implication is that other times, fa genomena are related to one another as causes and effects, and produce a single outcome. The passage leaves the question of the likelihood of the two scenarios indeterminate, and does not imply that one is more frequent than the other.” This helps determine the translation of the subordinate clause. The majority of commentators translate it along the lines of Gerald Else and Stephen Halliwell, who write, respectively: “each of which events has a merely accidental mi relation to the and “all the contingently connected events. Aristotle's understanding of historia in other works corroborates the importance of its faithfulness to the material recorded. On this point see the next section. " Drawing his conclusion from Aristotle's remarks on history in Poetics 9 and 23, Gerald Else writes that “logical sequence can exist in history, though usually it does not.” Gerald F. Else, Aristotle’s Poetics: the Argument (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1963), 574 n. 14; original emphasis; hereafter Aristoile’s Poetics. Accordingly he translates eniote as “often” (ibid., 569). Both the conclusion and the proposed translation, however, are not supported by the Greek text. On this point see Niccolo Salanitro, “L’opposizione poesi oriografia nella Poctica di Aristotele,” Res Publica Litterarum 22 (1999): "Else, Arisiotle’s Poet 9; Stephen Halliwell, The Poetics of Arisiotle: Translation and Commentary (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1987), 58. See also Dupont-Roc et Lallot Aristotle. La Poetique, 119: “entretenant les uns avec les autres des relations contingentes”; Donini Aristotele Poctica, 157: “ciascuna delle quali cose @ con le altre in unPHILOSOPHICAL ELEMENTS OF HISTORIA 331 Thus understood, the text does indeed corroborate the thesis that Aristotle sees history as a chronicle of disconnected events. However, a more literal translation appears to be called for in this context. I suggested “each of which events relates to the others as the case may be,” which is meant to convey the idea that relations among historical events are fluid: it may happen that they are accidental, but it may also happen that they are causal. Besides being more faithful to the original, this rendering enables us to acknowledge the consistency of the philosopher’s thought. He holds that the nature of historical connections varies and (hus that only sometimes events follow one another without being causally related. By contrast, the implication of the former translation—according to which Aristotle first claims that all historical events are accidentally related to one another and then that only some are—is that he contradicts himself in the space of a paragraph.” rapporto casuale”; Aristotle's Poetics, trans. W. H. Fyfe, in W. H. Fyfe et al., Aristotle, The Poetics. ‘Longinus’ On the Sublime. Demetrius On Style (Cambridge, MA: Loeb Classical Library, 1953), 91: “events that have a merely casual relation to each other’; S. H. Butcher, Aristotle's Theory of Poetry and Fine Art, 89: “little connected together as the events may be”; Poetics, trans. Ingram Bywater, in The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation, vol. 2., ed. Jonathan Barnes (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 2335: “however disconnected the several events may be.” Powell translates “regardless of how each thing happened to be in other respects,” and explains the clause as expressing a “linking of events and persons b mere coincidence.” Powell, “Why Aristotle Has No Philosophy of History 345-6. Lucas’s commentary to the sentence is: “they [historical events] have a purely random association.” Lucas, Aristotle Poetics, 215. | also adopted this common translation in a previous paper and interpreted the philosopher's words as an overstatement. See Carli, “Poetry is more Philosophical than History: Aristotle on Mimésis and Form,” 316. ‘The notable exception is Salanitro to whom I am indebted for the analysis of this passage. See Salanitro, “Llopposizione poesia vs. storiografia nella Poctica di Aristotele,” 17. “An even more literal translation is “each of which events relates to the others as it just might happen to relate to them.” Salanitro translates it as follows: “ciascuno dei quali sta in rapporto con gli altri a seconda dei casi.” Salanitro, “L’opposizione poesia vs. storiografia nella Poetica di Aristotele,” 17. My thanks to David Roochnik for advice on this translation. “While it is of course always possible that the philosopher contradicts himself (especially given the history of his manuscripts) a charitable interpretation ought to avoid this conclusion whenever possible. Armstrong's332 SILVIA CARLI The proposed reading of chapter 23 is also in keeping with chapter 9, where Aristotle defines the difference between poiéliké and historia in terms of the content of their representations: the former “speaks of” “things as they might happen” (hoia an genoito), the latter of actual events (ta genomena)." He then continues: It is clear then from what has been said that the poet should be a maker more of plots than of verses, for he is a poet in virtue of imitation, and what he imitates are actions. And even if he happens to put into poetry events that have actually taken place, he is none the less a poet, since there is no reason why some historical events shouldn't be such as they might happen in conformity with the probable and the possible, and it is in virtue of this that he is their maker.” Recall that by “universal” (or more universal than history) in the Poetics, Aristotle means precisely things that happen “as they might in conformity with the probable or the possible,” and that in chains of events so organized, not even one pragma is out of place or accidentally related to the rest." His claim is thus that sometimes (eniote) historical events can be so structured as to form uninterrupted chains of causally connected events that display the orderly causal arrangement required of well formed plots. For this reason the poet can “put them into poetry” (genomena poiein)” and still be regarded as their maker: he exercises his ability to recognize actions that form a unitary whole, and are thus the proper object of mimetic representations. If it is possible for actual events to display this “perfect” configuration, it would seem that it is a fortiori possible, and indeed much more likely, for them to exhibit arrangements in which ai least some of the praymata are causally comected, while others bear an accidental relation to one another. approach to the problem is that Aristotle’s claim, according to which all the events of a given historical period “relate to the others by chance,” is an overstatement. See Armstrong, “Aristotle on the Philosophical Nature of Poetry,” 447. Else tries to provide a coherent reading of Aristotle's claims on history but his hypothesis does not seem plausible. See Else, Aristotle's Poetics, 574n. 14, and n. 40 above, "' Aristotle, Poetica, 9.1451b-5. * Ibid., 9.1451b26-33; emphasis added. “Thid., 9.1451a36-8. See also n. 32 above. " Aristotle, Poetica, 8.1451a30-7. “Thid., 9.1451b30-1,PHILOSOPHICAL ELEMENTS OF HISTORIA 333 The chapters analyzed so far, then, present the following picture of the events of the human world: sometimes they display a “flawless” causal configuration and are for this reason indistinguishable from the objects of mimésis, although one would expect this to be the exception rather than the norm. Other times, they exhibit identifiable causal connections (likely) mixed with accidental happenings; other times still they are simply juxtaposed. Given that the job of the historian is to make such events known as they are, his writings should reflect the order of the phenomena. When he comes across events that have no intelligible link to the rest, his work should reproduce their accidental relations. Likewise, when causally linked events are given in experience, he should make their connections visible and conspicuous for his readers. If, as argued in the first section, the philosophical nature of a logos depends on its “capacity” to exhibit causal revi holding among its objects, then, to the extent that historia does (and ought to) represent these connections, it shares in such a nature, although to a lesser degree than poetry.” This, I believe, is precisely the meaning of Aristotle’s famous passage in chapter 9, which must now be quoted in full: GAG Toute Sladépet, 1 Tov ev Tc yevduevar Myst, TOV BE clo bw yévorto. 816 Kai puNosopestepov Kai oMouSaiStepov. oinoIs otopias Eoriv: h fev yap ToInoIs aAAov Ta KaBSROU, NS LoTOpiC 16 Kad exarotov Ayer But the difference [between the historian and the poet] is this: that one tells what happened, the other the things as they might happen. This is why poetry is more philosophical and more serious than “As Halper puts it: “History and poetry cover the same ground, human actions. They differ in the amount of unity they take these actions to have.” Halper, “Poetry, History, and Dialectic,” 223; emphasis added. As we know, unity is a function of the causal connections among the parts of the “narrative.” Nevertheless Halper writes that history “is intrinsically particular, intrinsically unphilosophical” (223) because he holds that the articulation of causes does not make a logos (more or less) philosophical. An object (and the logos that expresses it) is philosophical—by which he means that it can be defined and scientifically known—only if it has an identifiable form and essence, and human events contain no essential unities. See Halper, “Poetry, History, and Dialectic,” 223, and n. 32 above. For my criticism of his position see section I above, and Carli, “Poetry is more Philosophical than History: Aristotle on Mimésis and Form,” 319-28334 SILVIA CARLI history: poetry speaks more of universals, whereas history [more] of particulars.” ‘The statement that poetry is more philosophical than history does not per se imply that historia is completely severed from philosophia. It may entail that history does have some connection with philosophy, although weaker than that between poetry and philosophy. In the context of this passage, the issue depends on the function of mdllon, which could be understood in two different ways.” It might refer exclusively to poetry, and if so, the sentence asserts that history speaks only of particulars, and potétikéis far more universal than— indeed it is essentially different from—history. Or it might refer to poetry and history: in this case the passage signifies that both speak of universals, although the former to a greater extent than the latter. The syntactical structure of the compound sentence seems to support the second reading.” The verb legei(n), which is understood in the first clause and stated in the second, establishes a parallelism between the two parts: 1 uév yap moinats paAAov Ta KaBdhou [Aeyet], 1) 8 oropia Ta Kaé ¢kaotov Aye. This parallelism is preserved only if mdllon, which qualifies the implicit verb of the first clause, also qualifies the explicit verb of the second. This suggests that the adverb is operative in the second sentence as well. On this reading, the syntactical construction appears coherent and organic: h wv yap moinots padov ta KaOddou [AéEyel], fh 6 ‘otopia [WGAAoV] ta a6 fkactov Aeyel. If, on the other hand, mdilon were related only to the implicit occurrence of legei, the symmetry of the compound would ’ Aristotle, Poetica, 9.145 1b5- “See Ernst-Richard Schwinge, “Aristoteles iiber Struktur und Sujet der Tragodie. Zum 9. Kapitel der Poetik,” Rheinisches Museum fiir Philologie 139 (1996): 114-116; Halliwell, “Aristotelian Mimesis and Human Understanding,” Donini, Aristoicle Poetica, 63 n. 104; Ferrari, “Aristotle's Literary Aesthetics,” 184 n. 4. See Salanitro, “L’opposizione poesia vs. storiografia nella Poetica di Aristotele,” 24-5; Kurt von Fritz, “Die Bedeutung der Aristoteles fiir die Geschichtsschreibung,” in Histoire et historiens dans Vantiquité, Entretiens sur I'antiquité classique, vol. 4 (Vandoeuvres-Geneve, 1958), 116-123, espe- cially Ada Neschke, “Mythe et histoire d’aprés Aristote (Poétique, 9): contribution & une histoire des concepts,” in Philosophes et historiens anciens face awe mythes, ed. D. Bouvier & C. Calame (Lausanne: Etudes de lettres, 1998), 109-10.PHILOSOPHICAL ELEMENTS OF HISTORIA 335 be broken and we would have the peculiar situation in which the meaning of the verb is first qualified by the adverb, but then reverts to its “absolute” meaning in the second clause. If this analysis is correct, the much quoted chapter 9 of the Poetics, in keeping with the other passages of the treatise devoted to historia, says that while philosophy speaks more of universals than of particulars, history speaks more of particulars than of universals, and is therefore not unrelated to philosophy but less philosophical than poiétiké. Thus, rather than opening a hiatus between these two disciplines, the passage places them along a continuum. One attains the highest degree of universality possible for a logos depicting individuals that act in particular circumstances; the other achieves varying degrees of universality, determined by the nature of its objects, and in limit cases equals the universality of poetry.” Their difference, however, is not one of degree but of kind. For mimetic representa- tions must in principle exclude the accidental and portray unitary actions, whereas historical logoi cannot by definition exclude the coincidental. Given that experience seldom offers perfectly formed chains of events free of chance occurrences, as a rule their very ergon prevents the historians from “producing” reports that exhibit the same tight causal organization of pragmata as the poets’ plots. I Historia in Aristotle's philosophy. Aristotle’s observations on “the historiai of those who write about human actions”™ in the Rhetoric are consistent with, and indeed reinforce, the view that he expresses in the Poetics. In this text he insists on the importance of Ste. Croix himself acknowledges that historia ‘is not absolutely disparaged: it is merely said to be less philosophical and worthwhile than poetry.” Ste. Croix, “Aristotle on History and Poetry Halper makes a similar point. See Halper, “Poetry, History, and Dialectic,” 224-5, and n. 49 above. al Tédv Tepi Tas Mpckers ypaddvta ‘iotopiat. Aristotle, Ars Rhetorica, ed. William David Ross (Oxford: Oxford University Press, | 1.4.1360a37; hereafter Rhetor Unless otherwise indicated, translations from the Greek are my own.336 SILVIA CARLI the study of history for deliberative oratory. The goal of this branch of rhetoric is to exhort or dissuade the audience—typically members of the assembly—to adopt a certain course of action on account of its expediency or harmfulne Specifically, the speaker will harangue on decisions concerning finance, war and peace, defense, import and export, and legislation.” His focus is thus on particular actions to be adopted in specific future circumstances, and in order to be effective he should, among other things, be familiar with past events, as well as with old and present constitutions, customs and interests of one’s own and other countries.” Why? Because, Aristotle writes, “for the most part future events are similar to past ones,”” which—given his tenets on the grounds of regularities"—must be due to the fact that they exhibit similar causal configurations." Indeed after stressing that the good orator must study the nature and outcome of past wars, the philosopher explains that the rationale for this requirement is that “from similar causes similar results are naturally generated.”' Thus, embedded in the multifarious and unique situations that the human world offers to our observation are recurrent causal patterns, which the perceptive observer can detect and use to make his case. For this **“All other considerations, such as justice and injustice, honor and disgrace, are included as accessory in reference to this [expediency and harmfulness].” Aristotle, Rhetorica, 1.3.1358b24-5. " Thid., 1.4.1359b20-1 "Ibid., 14. 1356 -60a4; 1360a31-7; 1.8.13 A ® Spo1a yap cas Emi TO TON) Ta peAAovTA Tois yeyovdoWv. Rhetorica, 0.139428; emphasis added. Politics 7.10 provides a significant example of recurrent causal patterns. Aristotle observes that divisions of populations in classes, common meals, and political institutions “have been invented several times over the course of ages, or rather times without number; for necessity may be supposed to have taught men the inventions which were absolutely required, and when these were provided, it was natural that other things which would adorn and enrich life should grow up by degrees.” Aristotle, Politics, trans. Benjamin Jowett, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, vol. 2, ed, J. Bares, 7.10.1329b25-3; hereafter Politics. See, for instance, Metaphysica, 6,2-3; 5.5; Physica, ee also Aristotle, Rhetorica, 1.9.1368a29-30. GMd yap Tav Ouoiwv Ta Syoia yiyvedbar me>uKev. Aristotle, Rhetorica, 1.4.1360a4. aPHILOSOPHICAL ELEMENTS OF HISTORIA 337 reason, of the two kinds of example (paradeigma)” available to him— “one consisting in relating things that have happened before, and another in inventing them oneself™'—the deliberative rhetor should rely primarily on the former, of which Aristotle offers the following illustration: It would be an instance of the example that tells of actual events if one were to say that it is necessary to make preparations against the Great king and not to allow him'to subdue Egypt; for Darius did not cross over to Greece until he had obtained possession of Egypt; but as soon as he had done so, he did. Again, Xerxes did not attack {us] until he had obtained possession of that country, but when he had, he crossed over; consequently if the present Great King were to conquer Egypt, he would cross over, and for this reason it, must not be allowed." Although it is easier to invent an example that suits one’s purposes than to find historical precedents,” those based on the past will be more valuable (chrésimétera)” for the rhetor concerned with things to come. Given the similarity between “the before and the after,” the audience will be more easily persuaded to adopt the measures advocated by the speaker, if he can show that in the past a similar course of action produced the kinds of results that the community hopes for now. The Rhetoric thus indicates that according to Aristotle human events are sufficiently orderly and stable to make the study of history an indispensable tool for the orator and, we may add, for anyone who wishes to engage in politics. Considerations of order and regularity bring us to the broader notion of historia at work in his philosophy. (Note that for the sake of clarity, I will refer to this broader notion of historia as historia, whenever the context makes it necessary.) So far I have considered the history of human pragmata as a self-standing discipline, but for Aristotle historia can also, and perhaps primarily, be considered as xample” is the form of induction used in rhetoric. See Aristotle, Rhetorica, 1.2.1356a37-b26; 1.2.1357b27-1358al. .20.1393a27-8.338 SILVIA CARLI part of a broader investigation.” A brief analysis of this more general notion of history will shed further light on the discipline to which the works of Herodotus and Thucydides belong. The best starting point for our exploration is perhaps the [Historia Animalium (Tdv mepi ta Ca ‘iotopicsv), a treatise that is explicitly and exclusively a work of historia in this sense, The text opens with a sketch of similarities and differences among animals determined on the basis of four criteria—their manner of living (bioi), actions (praxeis), characters (éthé), and constitutive parts (moria).* This outline is followed by a programmatic statement that explains the purpose of the inquiry and its intended contribution to the overall investigation of the animal kingdom: These things, then, have now been said by way of outline, so as to give a foretaste of what things need to be studied, and what about them needs to be studied (later we will discuss these matters with greater accuracy) in order that we may first grasp the existing differences and attributes belonging to all animals. After we do we must attempt to discover the causes, For to proceed in this way is the natural method (kata phusin ten methodon), beginning with the investigation (historia) into each thing; for from these things it becomes clear about which things the demonstration should be and from which things [it should proceed].”” “This sense of historia is closer to the primary meaning of the word in Greek, which is “research” or “inquiry.” “ Aristotle, Historia Animalium, Vol. 1: Books 1-3, trans. A. L. Peck (Cambridge, MA: Loeb Classical Library, 1965), 1.1-5; hereafter, Historia Animalium. My translation. “ Aristotle, Historia Animalium, 1.6.49la7-14; emphasis added. Aristotle provides the same explanation of the function of historia in Prior Analytics, which deals with all kinds of inquiry: “Similarly with any other art and science. Thus if the attributes of the object in question are apprehended, our task will then be to exhibit the demonstration readily. For if none of the true attributes of the objects has been omitted in the historia, we shall be able to discover the proof and demonstrate everything that admits of proof, and to make clear what by nature does not admit of proof.” Aristotle, Analytica Priora, in Analytica Priora et Posteriora, ed. W. D. Ross (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), 1.30.4617-26. Hereafter, Analytica Priora Similar distinctions between a stage of inquiry devoted to the “grasping the attributes” of the objects investigated, and a stage devoted to investigation of ises can be found at De Incessu Animatium, in Aristotle, The Works of ofle, vol. V: De Partibus Animalium. De Mota & De IncessuPHILOSOPHICAL ELEMENTS OF HISTORIA 339 The goal of scientific inquiry, namely, the identification of the aitiai that define the essential nature of a kind and explain why its specimens possess their per se (kath'auto) attributes,” is the culmination of a complex and careful investigation. The search for causes cannot start from the phenomena as they appear immediately in their multifarious character, for thus apprehended they do not (yet) enable us to distinguish “about which things the demonstration should be and from which things.”” The phainomena must first be carefully observed and organized. The goal is to bring to light coextensive correlations among their attributes, which prepare the way for the formulation of informed and intelligent hypotheses about scientifically significant kinds. This preparatory work is what Aristotle calls historia, We can characterize it as a systematic gathering of data in Animalium. De Generatione Animatium, trans. J. A. Smith, and W. D. Ross (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1949), 704b9; hereafter De Incessu Animalium; De Partibus Animalium, in Aristotle, Parts of Animals, Movement of Animals, Progression of Animals, trans. A. L. Peck and E. S. Forster (Cambridge, MA: Locb Classical Library, 1993), 2.1.646a8-12; hereafter De Partibus Animalium. We can add the passage in the Posterior Analytics where Aristotle distinguishes questions about facts (to hoti) and questions about the reason of the facts (to dioti), for by “facts” here he means a theoretically motivated organization of the phenomena of one’s field of inquiry. Analytica Posteriora, in Aristotle, Analytica Priora et Posteriora, ed. W. D. Ross, 2.1,89b24-31; hereafter Analytica Posteriora. On the last point see James G. Lennox, Aristotle’s Philosophy of Biology: Studies in the Origins of the Life Science (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), chapters 1-2, especially 40-46; hereafter Aristotle's Philosophy of Biology. “ Aristotle, Analytica Posteriora 1.9; Aristotle, De Anima, ed. William David Ross (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963), 1.1.402a7; hereafter De Anima. Aristotle, Historia Animatium, 1.6.491al14. = Historia occurs with the same meaning at Analytica Posteriora, 1.30.46a24 (on this point see previous footnote). In the De Anima and De Caelo, historia has the more generic meaning of “study, inquiry or cognition” of a given subject matter as a whole. See De Anima 1.1.402a4; Aristotle, De Caelo, ed. Donald James Allan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1936), 3.1.298b2. Hence these occurrences of the term indirectly corroborate, or at least do not contradict, the sense of history as preliminary investigation. These occurrences of the word historia are the most relevant to determine the (primary) sense in which Aristotle used it, because the vast majority of the other occurrences are in explanatory biological works and are internal references to the History of Animals. Thus they cannot shed light on the340 SILVIA CARLI a given field organized in such a way as to make the investigation into the causes possible.” As such, historia, coincides with the first, predemonstrative stage of scientific research distinguished in the Posterior Analytics, which aims to establish the facts (o hoti), and makes possible to ask about their reason(s) (to dioti)." The facts in question are of the kind suited to science: if, on the one hand, they provide a thorough and faithful picture of the attributes of the objects being investigated, on the other, they are already the result of a preliminary and theoretically motivated analysis of their differentiae.” The body of the Historia Animalium carries out this inquiry and illustrates the ingenious and perceptive handling of the material that is required of it. It follows a method of division of animai differences based on multiple differentiae and is aimed at discovering the most general correlations among them." To illustrate, let us consider the following passage: meaning of the word (although the fact that explanatory works refer to the Historia Animalium as their starting point or ground is). See De Generatione Animalium, in Aristotle, The Works of Aristotle, vol. V: De Partibus Animalium. De Motu & De Incessu Animalium. De Generatione Animalium, trans. J. A. Smith, and W. D. Ross (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1949), 1.3.716b31; 1.4,717a33; 1.11.719a10; 1.20.728b14; 2.4,740a23; 2.7.746a15; 3.1.750b31; 3.2.753b17; 3.10.761a10; 3.11.763b16; De Partibus Animalium, 2.1.646a8-12; 0a31 (where Aristotle refers to the Historia Animalium simply as “natural history"); 2.17.660b3; 4.4.680a2; 4.8,684b5; 4.13.696b15; On Breath, in Aristotle, On the Soul. Parva Naturalia. On Breath, trans. W. S. Hett (Cambridge, MA: Loeb Classical Library, 1957), 12.477a7; 16.478828; 1G478b1. At De Incessu Animalium, 1.704b10 the Historia Animatium referred to as “natural history.” Finally, in the Rhetoric Aristotle mentiot respectively, the “historiai of those who write about human actions" and “Herodotus’ history” without elaborating further on the meaning of the word. Aristotle, Rhetorica, 1.4.1360a37; 3.9.1409a28. Lennox describes it as “a pre-demonstrative yet theoretical scientific inquiry.” Lennox, Aristotle's Philosophy of Biology, 40. ” Aristotle, Analytica Posteriora, 2.1.89b24-31. The term historia is not used in this passage, but the function of this first stage is the same as historia, On this point see D. M. Balme, “Aristotle’s Use of Division and Differentiae,” in Philosophical Issues in Aristotle's Biology, eds. A. Gotthelf and J. G. Lennox (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 88. "On this point see Aristotle, Historia Animalium, v-xi; Lennox, Aristotle's Philosophy of Biology, chapters 1-2.PHILOSOPHICAL ELEMENTS OF HISTORIA 341 All viviparous quadrupeds have an esophagus and a windpipe, situated just as in human beings; similarly for oviparous quadrupeds and birds, although they differ in the forms of these parts. Generally, all those which take up air, i.e., that breathe in and out, have a lung, a windpipe and an esophagus, and the position of the windpipe and the esophagus is similar, but the organs are not the same, as the lung is neither alike in all nor similar in position.” As James Lennox emphasizes, this passage is as significant for what it establishes as for what it does not touch upon.” It correlates three different “kinds” (viviparous quadrupeds, oviparous quadrupeds, and birds) on the basis of three of their parts and establishes a further correlation between animals that breathe and the possession of these three organs. As one would expect from a “historical inquiry,” however, it does not propose causal connections or relations of functional dependence among these parts and their activities. Following the programmatic statement quoted above,” the research into the causes is carried out in the treati that logically follow the Historiae, namely, Parts of Animals, Generation of Animals, Movement of Animals, On Breath, and so forth. Indeed these works refer back to the Historia as their ground and starting point, and build upon the data of that preliminary investigation.” We know of a few other (lost) works in the Aristotelian corpus that were exclusively “historical” in the sense we are discussing, whose character conformed to the nature of the causal inquiry that they made possible. They are: a collection of laws and political constitutions"—of which only the Constitution of Athens is pre- served—that formed the basis for the Polit a compilation of Aristotle, Historia Animatium, 2.15.505b32-506a7. My translation. ™ Lennox, Aristotle's Philosophy of Biology, 58. More in general, chapter 2 of Lennox’s work provides an illuminating analysis of the methods of inquiry at work in the Historia Animalium as well as of the relation between the concrete results presented in this text about the animal world and his general method of inquiry outlined in the Analytics (on the latter see also chapter | of his book). ” Aristotle, Historia Animatium, 1.6.491a7-14. © See n. 72 above for references. “Tev vopcov Kal Tv MOATEICV at oUvaywyai. Khica Nicomachea, 10.9.L181b7. © See Aristotelis qui ferebantur librorum fragmenta collegit Valentinus Rose, ed. V. Rose (Lipsia: B. G. Teubneri, 1886), fragments 381-603; hereafter342 SILVIA CARLI manuals (technai) of rhetoric from Tisias onward with a commentary by Aristotle; and various works on poetry that provided the material for the elaboration of the theoretical or scientific treatment of poiétiké in the Poetic Moreover, the case can be made that virtually all extant Aristotelian treatises, before engaging in an investigation of “the why,” start with a historia of their field, whose nature—again—varies to suit the nature of their subject matter. The Metaphysics, the Physics and the De Anima, to mention only a few examples, open with a systematic review of the major theories and views brought forward by Aristotle’s predecessors—which the philosopher regards as part of the phenomena that must be explained”—and of the aporiai Aristotelis qui ferebantur librorum fragmenta collegit Valentinus Rose; Aristotle's Constitution of Athens and Related Texts, trans. Kurt von Fritz, and Ernst Kapp (New York: Hafner Publishing Co., 1950); hereafter Aristotle's Constitution of Athens. On the question of the authorship of the collection see Aristotle's Constitution of Athens, 3-7; Kurt von Fritz, “The Composition of Aristotle's Constitution of Athens and the So-Called Dracontian Constitution,” Classical Philology 49, no. 2 (1954): 73-93; W. K. C. Guthrie, Aristotle An Encownter, vol. 4 of A History of Greek Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 52 n. 1 ” Aristotelis qui ferebantur librorum fragmenta colle Valentinus Rose, fragment 136 (Cicero, De Inventione, 2.2.; De Oralore, 2.38.160). Anoprpata "Oynpixa, —AidaoxaAiat, —Nikai — Atovuciaxa, TluBiovikai, OAuumovixat. In addition, he wrote the dialogue Tlepi rointev—destined to publication—which also. probably served as background for the Poetics. Sce Aristotelis qui ferebantur librorum fragmenta collegit Valentinus Rose, fragments 70-7, 142-79; Augusto Rostagni, “I dialogo aristotelico TEP! TIOIHTAN, Prima Parte,” Rivista di filologia e d' Istrazione Classica (later Rivista di Filologia Classic 433-70, especially 434-6; Ingemar Diiring, Aristoteles: De Denkens (Heidelberg: Carl Winter Universititsverslag, 1966), 126. “See Halper, “Poetry, History, and Diale: Neschke, “Mythe et histoire d’aprés Aristote (Poétique, 9),” 110-112. Fritz argues that Aristotle and/or his school began historical investigations in a number of fields that range from the history of various sciences, to the history of philosophy, to political history. Fritz, “Die Bedeutung der Aristoteles fur die Geschichtsschreibung.” “ For Aristotle's rich view of the nature of ta phainomena, which include observable facts and endowa, see G. E. L. Owen, “Tithenai ta Phainomena,” in Articles on Aristotie, vol. 1, ed. J. Barnes, M. Schofield and R. Sorabji (New York: St. Martin Press, 1975), 113-126, Nussbaum, The Fragility of Goodness, especially chapter 8; John J. Cleary, “Phainomena in lung und Interpretation seinesPHILOSOPHICAL ELEMENTS OF HISTORIA 343, that they generated. Thi: still part of the investigation aimed at preparing the ground for the search of the causes because not only “everyone says something [true] about nature””—and thus makes the facts to be explained conspicuous —but also “for those who wish to get clear of the difficulties, it is useful to grasp the difficulties well; for the subsequent solution is a release from the previous difficulties, and it is not possible to untie a knot of which one does not know.” Indeed “those who inquire without first considering the difficulties are like people who do not know where they have to go.”" These historiai then prepare for, and assist in, the formulation of explanatory hypotheses that take into account the multifarious nature of the phenomena by alerting one to the complexities of the issues involved Insofar as the field of human praxis is concerned, I have mentioned the Athenian Constitution, a text that, in its present form, traces the development of Athens’ regimes and constitutions, and the attending transformations in the relations between social classes, from the end of the monarchy to Aristotle’s time.” In addition, the Politics itself contains an internal historia, since book two is devoted to a preliminary inquiry into both theoretical models of regimes elaborated by previous thinkers and historical examples of existing constitutions that had evoked special admiration. Historia, then is a fundamental and organic component of Aristotle’s entire philosophy, and his view of this theoretically motivated preliminary inquiry sheds further light on the discipline that he contrasts with poetry in the Poetics. Although it records causally connected events and even recurrent al patterns of human Aristotle’s Methodology,” International Journal of Philosophical Studies 2, no. | (1994): 61-97; Christopher P. Long, “Saving Ta Legomena: Aristotle and the History of Philosophy,” The Review of Mctaphysics 60, no. 2 (2006): 247- 67. " Aristotle, Metaphysice Aristotle, Metaphys' 1453-7. “ Aristotle, Metaphysica, 3.1.995a34-6. “ The beginning of the text is missing, but Athenian Constitution 41 indicates that the missing chapters contained the history of the time of the monarchy. On this point see Aristotle's Constitution of Athens, 7. The second part of this historia deals more in detail with the democratic constitutional order of Aristotle's time. 0; see also Ethica Nicomachea, n344 SILVIA CARLI pragmata, history 4 la Herodotus clearly does not (and cannot) qualify jai in the sense of philosophical inquiry. The causal relations that it identifies are always of particular events, and the regularities that it may bring to light always appear in and through unique and specific situations.” In addition, the accidental has a rightful and indeed “necessary” place in the history of human actions. From the point of view of science, works of historiography function rather as historia, that is, as “collections” of predemonstrative data that call for causal explanation." The philosopher makes the point almost explicitly in the Rhetor Books of travel are useful aids to legislation, since from these we may learn the laws and customs of different races. The deliberative speaker will also find the historiai of those who write about human actions useful. But all of this is the business of political science and not of rhetor Human actions, laws, and customs are the object of political science, and the political philosopher is the expert who first and foremost needs to examine the data provided by books of travel and historiai, and is qualified to formulate hypotheses starting from them. He will use them to identify stable correlations that call for further analysis. Aristotle's writings indicate that he did use Herodotus’ work in this way not only for his practical philosophy but also for his zoological investigations. Of the few explicit references to the “father of history” in his corpus, three are in explanatory works, namely the Generation of Animals and the Eudemian Ethics.” These texts either use data "For the same reason poetry does not count as philosophical investigation either (see section I above), * “Necessary” given the ergon of the historian, Neschke also connects works of historiography to historia, and claims that they are less philosophical than poetry, not unphilosophical, in that they are the first stage of philosophical investigations. However she equates historia,—exemplified by the results reported in the Historia Animalium— to experience in the sense of inquiry of the individual as such, a characterization that does not fit the nature of Aristotle’s preliminary inquiry of the animal kingdom. Neschke, “Mythe et histoire daprés Aristote (Poétique, 9),” 109-10, 115. * Aristotle, Rhetorica, 1.4.1360a34-7; emphasis added. Aristotle, De Generatione Animalium, 2.2.736a10 (Herodotus, Historiac, 3.101 h6 (Herodotus, Historiae, 2.93); Aristotle, EudemianPHILOSOPHICAL ELEMENTS OF HISTORIA 345 presented in Herodotus’ History to corroborate a generalization, or reject them because they establish wrong correlations and draw wrong conclusions. The two references in the Historia Animalium are, similarly, criticisms of Herodotus’ observations that run counter Aristotle's tentative correlations.” The fact that historical works can be used as hisioriai, confirms and completes the characterization of historiography that emerges from the Poetics and the Rketoric. The philosopher's emphasis on organization and order in the characterization of the preliminary stage of inquiry harmonizes with the view that history, far from reporting only accidentally related facts, presents chains of events that are sufficiently orderly to be of use to the philosopher in the formulation of explanatory hypotheses. Iv The role of the historikos. Aristotle's view of the first stage of philosophical inquiry makes it clear that its success depends in no small measure on the ability of the researchers. Organizing the data of a given field in a way that is suitable to the search of archaé and aitiai Ethics, trans. H. Rackam (Cambridge, Mass: Loeb Classical Library, 1996), 7.2.123b9 (Herodotus, Historiae, 2.68). Aristotle, Historia Animalium, 3.22.523a17 (Herodotus, Historiae, 3.101); 6.31.579b2 (here Herodotus is not explicitly mentioned but the text clearly refers to Historia 3.108). Other references to Herodotus are: Aristotle's Constitution of Athens, 14, where he is cited as the source of one of the hypotheses concerning the identity of Phya, the woman accompanying Pisistratus in his dramatic entrance to Athens; Rhetorica 3.16.1409a27, where his writing is presented as an example of the “free-running” style of prose; Rhetorica 3.16.1417a7 (Herodotus, Historiae, 2.30), where Aristotle refers to the historian’s style as an example of the form of narration that discredits one’s adversaries, Aristotle is probably relying on Herodotus (Herodotus, Historiae, 8.73) also in Politics 3.3.1276a28 where he claims that the fact that men live in the same place is not sufficient to make a city, and that if the Peloponnesus, which was inhabited by several different peoples, had been surrounded with a wall, it would not have counted as a unified political unit. Thucydides is never explicitly mentioned, although it is generally agreed that Aristotle's Constitution of Athens 33.22 refers to Thucydides, Historia belli peloponnesiaci, 8.97.2.346 SILVIA CARLI is a task that requires both talent and appropriate training.” Although the Poetics does not touch upon this issue, evidence from other writings suggests that the philosopher did not fail to appreciate the active role of the historian either. The considerations presented in the previous section already make apparent that, in his view, the quality of every kind of research is a function of the inquirer’s awareness of his discipline’s goals and methods. For this reason we may suppose that Aristotle would acknowledge that someone like Thucydides is likely to be more keen in detecting the causal antecedents of the events he reports, as well as the recurrent patterns of human behavior that they exhibit, than Ephorus or one of the local chroniclers of the Greek states. For, unlike those chroniclers, he explicitly understood history search of causes, and believed that his work was relevant not only as a record of the past but also as a “guide” in understanding future events.” In addition, the philosopher stresses. that the — correct understanding of human actions and events requires the acquisition of a distinctive kind of intelligence, which is discriminative about particulars. He observes, for instance, that “one must pay attention to the unproven assertions and the opinions of the empeiroi and the elderly, or of men of practical wisdom, no less than to those they prove. For, since they have an eye for things from experience, they see correctly (orésin orthés).”” Similarly, he insists that those who lack experience are—as a rule—unable to understand and evaluate human actions, whose comprehension requires both a grasp of general principles and the ability to perceive the salient features of particular situations.” Thus it is not enough for the historian to aim to identify the causally relevant factors of the time period he writes about. He must also be the kind of person who is well equipped to perform the task successfully. Fritz points out that one of Aristotle's several contributions to historiography (broadly understood) is precisely the constitution of a “team” of collaborators/researchers. Only a trained group could realize the objectives that Aristotle assigns to historia. See Fritz, “Die Bedeutung der Aristoteles fiir die Geschichtsschreibung,” 91 * Thucydides, Historia belli peloponnesiacé, 1.22. * Aristotle, Ethica Nicomachea, 6.11.1143b11-14; emphasis added. “See, for instance, Bthica Nicomachea, 1.3.1095a2-3; 6.7.1141b14-21PHILOSOPHICAL ELEMENTS OF HISTORIA 347 In fact, the case can be made that for Aristotle the writing of history even involves the exercise of a poetic ability. In the Poetics he writes that there are historical events, such as the Trojan War, that have natural beginnings and ends." In such cases the boundaries of the historikos’ logoi are given to him, so to speak. More often though, pragmata are not so clearly demarcated, and this makes it necessary for the observer to introduce limits in his material. Aristotle makes the point at Nicomachean Ethics 1.7, where he explains that a good life, far from being spent in isolation, includes a variety of human relations. A bios that can be said to be self-sufficient, that is to say, desirable in itself and lacking in nothing," includes “one’s parents and children and wife, and one’s friends and fellow citizens in general.”"” However, he immediately specifies: On the other hand, a limit (horos tis) has to be set to these relations. For if we extend our requirement to one’s ancestors and descendants and friends’ friends, if will go on ad infinitum (eis apeiron proeisin)."" Let us suppose that we want to recount major portions of the life of an individual, If we were taken by the fever of tracing every possible person who might have been related to him, our narration would soon no longer be recognizable as the narration of the life of this particular man. The more we tried to follow the endless ramifications of his near and remote relations, the more we would lose sight of him as a definite individual with a recognizable life-story. As Redfield puts it, although “no man is an island , . . to treat his fate as inextricably entangled with the present condition and the future adventures of the entire continent is to rob him of personal identity altogether.” Limits must indeed be " Aristotle, Poetica, 23.1 3. * Aristotle, Ethica Nicomachea, 1.7.1097b16-17. Thid., 1.7.1097b10-11. Tbid., 1.7.1097b11-13; emphasis added. The unstated steps of this reasoning are: 1) that which goes off to infinity is unintelligible; 2) human life and happiness can be understoo hence we shouldn't extend our considerations of the human relations that are necessary to the good life to an indefinite number of people. Poetics 8 echoes this passage. Aristotle writes that imitating the life of a man does not produce a unitary action because, among other things, “many and indeed an unlimited number (apeira) of things happen to a man.” Poetica, 8.1451al7 "” Redfield, Nature and Culture in the Miad, 64.348 SILVIA CARLI set if the story is to have a definite subject. Only if we select some relations and exclude others can we have a bio-graphy, that is to say, a logos whose center is the life of the man whose deeds and sufferings we want to record. Thus the historian must intervene to give shape to his material in order to satisfy the minimum requirement of intelli ity, which consists in writing about a definite and identifiable subject matter. If, moreover, we want to comprehend our “hero's” actions and life, the setting of limits on the material of our logoi becomes even more necessary. For Aristotle holds that we can understand the nature of actions only if, besides knowing the agent's motives, we identify their outcome.” Similarly to the human relations that affect our lives, however, the consequences of our deeds are open-ended or tend to “go off to infinity.”"” This is part of the reason why the philosopher feels compelled to ask in the Nicomachean Ethics whether we can call a man blessed before he dies," and whether our assessment of his life is affected by the “fate” of his descendants and friends.” The long term effects of our deeds may be incalculable, and they may have an impact on people remotely connected to us that we never intended to involve in our decisions. But again, the necessity to have a definite subject matter, and, in addition, to make sense of a person’s actions, requires that his deeds be apprehended as having more or less definite outcomes. For this reason, logoi that report human praxeis will have to introduce boundaries that circumscribe their upshot(s). Historical works, then, are bound to include a poetic element, which makes them similar to mimetic compositions. It should also be clear that the boundaries that circumscribe their content will have to be, to a certain degree at least, arbitrary. For the “unlimited nature” of his object will often force the historian to make pragmatic decisions Aristotle, Ethica Nicomachea, 2.4.1105a33; 2.6.1106b26-7. "On this point see Redfield, Nature and Culture in the Iliad, 64-5; Hanna Arendi, The Human Condition, 2" edition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998), 190-2. “ Aristotle, Ethica Nicomachea, 1.10. ® Tbid., 1.11. The other fundamental reason is the role played by fortune d_ external goods in shaping the life of an individual. See Ethica comachea ,1.8-10,PHILOSOPHICAL ELEMENTS OF HISTORIA, 349 concerning where to draw the line in his “narrative.” This element of “making,” however, is not sufficient to undermine the distinction between historia and poiétiké. Even though requirements of intel- ligibility make it necessary for the historikos to impose limits on a potentially unbounded material, and thus to select some pragmata and to exclude others, the relations that he identifies in “the facts” which he includes in his logoi ought to reproduce the order of ta genomena, a constraint that uniquely defines his function and differentiates it from that of the poet.” Xa University My thanks to David Roochnik, who read the article and suggested helpful stylistic revisions.