US vs Ang Tang Ho

“Undue delegation of power”

Facts: During a special session, the Philippine Legislature passed and approved Act No.

2868 entitled An Act Penalizing the Monopoly and Hoarding of Rice, Palay and Corn.

The said act under extraordinary circumstances authorizes the Governor General to

issue the necessary Rules and Regulations in regulating the distribution of such

products. Pursuant to this Act, the Governor General issued Executive Order 53 fixing

the price at which rice should be sold.

Ang Tang Ho, a rice dealer, voluntarily, criminally and illegally sold a ganta of rice to

Pedro Trinidad at the price of eighty centavos. The said amount was way higher than

that prescribed by the Executive Order. He was charged in violation of the said

Executive Order and was found guilty as charged and was sentenced to 5 months

imprisonment plus a P500.00 fine. He appealed the sentence countering that there was

an undue delegation of power to the Governor General.

Issues: Whether or not there was an undue delegation of power to the Governor
General.

Discussions:

By the terms of the Organic Act, subject only to constitutional limitations, the power to

legislate and enact laws is vested exclusively in the Legislative, which is elected by a

direct vote of the people of the Philippine Islands. As to the question here involved, the

authority of the Governor-General to fix the maximum price at which palay, rice and

corn may be sold in the manner power in violation of the organic law.

Act No. 2868, as analysed by the Court, wholly fails to provide definitely and clearly

what the standard policy should contain, so that it could be put in use as a uniform

policy required to take the place of all others without the determination of the

insurance commissioner in respect to matters involving the exercise of a legislative

discretion that could not be delegated, and without which the act could not possibly be

put in use. The law must be complete in all its terms and provisions when it leaves the

legislative branch of the government and nothing must be left to the judgment of the

electors or other appointee or delegate of the legislature, so that, in form and

substance, it is a law in all its details in presenti, but which may be left to take effect in

future, if necessary, upon the ascertainment of any prescribed fact or event.

Ruling:

Yes. When Act No. 2868 was analyzed, it is the violation of the proclamation of the

Governor-General which constitutes the crime. Without that proclamation, it was no

crime to sell rice at any price. In other words, the Legislature left it to the sole discretion

of the Governor-General to say what was and what was not “any cause” for enforcing

the act, and what was and what was not “an extraordinary rise in the price of palay,

rice or corn,” and under certain undefined conditions to fix the price at which rice

should be sold, without regard to grade or quality, also to say whether a proclamation

should be issued, if so, when, and whether or not the law should be enforced, how long
it should be enforced, and when the law should be suspended. The Legislature did not

specify or define what was “any cause,” or what was “an extraordinary rise in the price

of rice, palay or corn,” Neither did it specify or define the conditions upon which the

proclamation should be issued. In the absence of the proclamation no crime was

committed. The alleged sale was made a crime, if at all, because the Governor-General

issued the proclamation. The act or proclamation does not say anything about the

different grades or qualities of rice, and the defendant is charged with the sale “of one

ganta of rice at the price of eighty centavos (P0.80) which is a price greater than that

fixed by Executive order No. 53.”

Edu vs. Ericta

FACTS:

Judge Ericta and Teddy C. Galo filed suit for certiorari and prohibition with

preliminary injunction assailing the validity of enactment of the Reflector as well as

Admin Order No. 2 implementing it, as an invalid exercise of the police power for being

violative of the due process clause. Galo followed with a manifestation that in the event

that Judge would uphold said statute constitutional, A.O. No. 2 of the Land

Transportation Commissioner, implementing such legislation be nullified as an undue

exercise of legislative power.

ISSUE:

Whether Reflector Law and Administrative Order is constitutional and valid.

RULING:

Yes. Reflector Law is enacted under the police power in order to promote public safety

and order.

Justice Laurel identified police power with state authority to enact legislation that may

interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare.

Persons and property could thus "be subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens in

order to secure the general comfort, health and prosperity of the state." The police

power is thus a dynamic agency, suitably vague and far from precisely defined, rooted

in the conception that men in organizing the state and imposing upon its government

limitations to safeguard constitutional rights did not intend thereby to enable an

individual citizen or a group of citizens to obstruct unreasonably the enactment of such

salutary measures calculated to insure communal peace, safety, good order, and

welfare.

The same lack of success marks the effort of respondent Galo to impugn the validity of
Administrative Order No. 2 issued by petitioner in his official capacity, duly approved

by the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, for being contrary to the

principle of non-delegation of legislative power. Such administrative order, which took

effect on April 17, 1970, has a provision on reflectors in effect reproducing what was set

forth in the Act.

It is a fundamental principle flowing from the doctrine of separation of powers that

Congress may not delegate its legislative power to the two other branches of the

government, subject to the exception that local governments may over local affairs

participate in its exercise. What cannot be delegated is the authority under the

Constitution to make laws and to alter and repeal them; the test is the completeness of

the statute in all its term and provisions when it leaves the hands of the legislature. To

determine whether or not there is an undue delegation of legislative power the inquiry

must be directed to the scope and definiteness of the measure enacted. The legislature

does not abdicate its functions when it describes what job must be done, who is to do

it, and what is the scope of his authority.

It bears repeating that the Reflector Law construed together with the Land

Transportation Code. Republic Act No. 4136, of which it is an amendment, leaves no

doubt as to the stress and emphasis on public safety which is the prime consideration

in statutes of this character. There is likewise a categorical affirmation Of the power of

petitioner as Land Transportation Commissioner to promulgate rules and regulations

to give life to and translate into actuality such fundamental purpose. His power is clear.

There has been no abuse. His Administrative Order No. 2 can easily survive the attack,

far-from-formidable, launched against it by respondent Galo.

Rubi vs Provincial Board of Mindoro

FACTS:

The case is an application for habeas corpus in favor of Rubi and other Manguianes of

the Province of Mindoro. It is alleged that the Maguianes are being illegally deprived of

their liberty by the provincial officials of that province. Rubi and his companions are

said to be held on the reservation established at Tigbao, Mindoro, against their will,

and one Dabalos is said to be held under the custody of the provincial sheriff in the

prison at Calapan for having run away from the reservation.

The provincial governor of Mindoro and the provincial board thereof directed the

Manguianes in question to take up their habitation in Tigbao, a site on the shore of

Lake Naujan, selected by the provincial governor and approved by the provincial board.

The action was taken in accordance with section 2145 of the Administrative Code of

1917, and was duly approved by the Secretary of the Interior as required by said action.
Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 reads as follows:

SEC. 2145. Establishment of non-Christian upon sites selected by provincial governor.

— With the prior approval of the Department Head, the provincial governor of any

province in which non-Christian inhabitants are found is authorized, when such a

course is deemed necessary in the interest of law and order, to direct such inhabitants

to take up their habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands to be selected by him

an approved by the provincial board.

Petitioners, however, challenge the validity of this section of the Administrative Code.

ISSUE:

Does section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 constitute an unlawful delegation

of legislative power by the Philippine Legislature to a provincial official and a

department head, therefore making it unconstitutional?

HELD:

No. The Philippine Legislature has here conferred authority upon the Province of

Mindoro, to be exercised by the provincial governor and the provincial board.

In determining whether the delegation of legislative power is valid or not, the

distinction is between the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily

involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring an authority or discretion as

to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be

done; to the later no valid objection can be made. Discretion may be committed by the

Legislature to an executive department or official. The Legislature may make decisions

of executive departments of subordinate official thereof, to whom it has committed the

execution of certain acts, final on questions of fact. The growing tendency in the

decision is to give prominence to the "necessity" of the case.

In enacting the said provision of the Administrative Code, the Legislature merely

conferred upon the provincial governor, with the approval of the provincial board and

the Department Head, discretionary authority as to the execution of the law. This is

necessary since the provincial governor and the provincial board, as the official

representatives of the province, are better qualified to judge “when such as course is

deemed necessary in the interest of law and order”. As officials charged with the

administration of the province and the protection of its inhabitants, they are better

fitted to select sites which have the conditions most favorable for improving the people

who have the misfortune of being in a backward state.

Hence, Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is not an unlawful delegation of
legislative power by the Philippine Legislature to provincial official and a department

head.

Association of Colleges and Universities vs. Secretary of Education

Facts: Philippine Association of Colleges and Universities assailed the constitutionality

of Act No. 2706, known as the “Act making the Inspection and Recognition of private

schools and colleges obligatory for the Secretary of Public Instruction.” As contended

by PACU, the Act is unconstitutional because of the following reasons: 1) The act

deprives the owner of the school and colleges as well as teachers and parents of liberty

and property without due process of law; 2) it will also deprive the parents of their

natural rights and duty to rear their children for civic efficiency; and 3) its provisions

conferred on the Secretary of Education unlimited powers and discretion to prescribe

rules and standards constitute towards unlawful delegation of legislative powers.

Additionally, the association contended that the Constitution guaranteed every citizen

the right to own and operate a school and any law requiring previous governmental

approval or permit before such person could exercise the said right.

On the contrary, the Department of Education maintained that 1) the matters does not

contain justiciable controversy and thus does not need court decision or intervention; 2)
petitioners are inestoppels to challenge the validity of the said act; and 3) the Act is

constitutionally valid.

Section 1 of Act No. 2706 provides that “It shall be the duty of the Secretary of Public

Instruction to maintain a general standard of efficiency in all private schools and

colleges of the Philippines so that the same shall furnish adequate instruction to the

public, in accordance with the class and grade of instruction given in them, and for this

purpose said Secretary or his duly-authorized representative shall have authority to

advise, inspect, and regulate said schools and colleges in order to determine the

efficiency of instruction given in the same.”

Issue: Whether or not Act No. 2706 is unconstitutional.

Held: No, Act No. 2706 is constitutional.

The organic law provides that the state has the power to regulate private schools for

the development of morals, civic efficiency, and scientific aptitude of students. The

court found no justiciable controversy. The power of the courts to declare a law

unconstitutional arises only when the interest of litigant require the use of judicial

authority for their protection against actual interference. As such, judicial power is

limited to the decision of actual cases and controversies. Thus, the court does not sit to
adjudicate a mere academic question, such as that provided by the petitioner. On this

phase of the litigation, the court conclude that there has been no undue delegation of

legislative power even if the petitioners appended a list of circulars and memoranda

issued by the Department of Education.

BALBUNA, ET AL. vs. THE HON. SEC. OF EDUCATION

FACTS:

1. Members of the Jehova’s Witnesses filed a petition for prohibition and mandamus

before the CFI of Capiz against the Sec. of Education, et al. It was to prevent the

enforcement of Dept. Order No. 8 issued pursuant to RA 1265 promulgating rules and

regulations for the conduct of the compulsory flag ceremony in all schools.

2. The facts are the same with the Gerona case. It allegedly denies them freedom of

worship and of speech, however, new issues have been raised this time such as:

a. the department order has no binding force and effect, not having been published in
the Official Gazette; and

b. it is an undue delegation of legislative power

3. The petition was dismissed. Hence, appeal to the SC.

ISSUE/S:

1. Does it violate freedom of worship and speech?

2. Is it in accordance with the requirements of publication?

3. Is it unconstitutional for being an undue delegation of legislative power?

RULING:

1. Issue on freedom of worship and speech. No.

a. the court maintains that the Filipino flag is not an image that requires religious

veneration; rather, it is a symbol of the Republic of the Philippines, of sovereignty, an

emblem of freedom, liberty and national unity;

b. that the flag salute is not a religious ceremony but an act and profession of love and

allegiance and pledge of loyalty to the fatherland which the flag stands for;

c. that compliance with the non-discriminatory and reasonable rules and regulations is

a prerequisite to attendance in public schools; and that for failure and refusal to

participate in the flag ceremony, petitioners were properly excluded and dismissed

from the public school they were attending.

2. Issue on publication. Yes.

a. Commonwealth Act 638 and Act 2930 do not require the publication of the circulars,

regulations or notices therein mentioned in order to become binding and effective;

b. said two acts merely enumerate and make a list of what should be published in the

Official Gazette, presumably, for the guidance of the different branches of the

government issuing the same, and of the Bureau of Printing.

c. while it is true that statutes or laws shall take effect fifteen days after publication in
the Official Gazette and it is also true that administrative rules and regulations have the

force of law, the primary factor for this rationale is that such statutes provided for

penalties for violations thereof.

d. in the case at bar, Department Order No. 8 does not provide any penalty against

those pupils or students refusing to participate in the flag ceremony or otherwise

violating the provisions of said order; their expulsion was merely the consequence of

their failure to observe school discipline which the school authorities are bound to

maintain.

e. for their failure or refusal to obey school regulations about the flag salute, they were

not being prosecuted under threat of penal sanction; if they choose not to obey the

flag salute regulation, they merely lost the benefits of public education being

maintained at the expense of their fellow citizens, nothing more and having elected not

to comply, they forfeited their right to attend public schools.

3. Issue on undue delegation of legislative power. No.

a. the requirements in Sections 1 and 2 of the department order constitute an adequate

standard, to wit, simplicity and dignity of the flag ceremony and the singing of the
National Anthem.

b. that the Legislature did not specify the details of the flag ceremony is no objection to

the validity of the statute, for all that is required of it is the laying down of standards

and policy that will limit the discretion of the regulatory agency;

c. to require the statute to establish in detail the manner of exercise of the delegated

power would be to destroy the administrative flexibility that the delegation is intended

to achieve.

International Hardwood and Veneer Company vs. Pañgil Federation of Labor

FACTS:

An industrial dispute existed between the petitioner company and certain of its

employees who are members of the respondent union. The Court of Industrial

Relations tried and heard the dispute as it was considered as “public interest” under

Section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 103. The industrial dispute referred to certain

demand by the union to the company which includes particularly:

2.) Setting of minimum daily wages of common laborers at one peso

3.) Devising a proper schedule of rate wages for all laborers

4.) Setting of the rate of wages for the mountain camps which should be higher by 20%

over those given in town.

One of the Judges of CIR then rendered a decision in favor of the union’s demand.

Petitioner company the filed a motion for reconsideration and while such was pending,

it also filed a motion questioning the jurisdiction of the CIR over said industrial dispute.

It claimed that the provision of Section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 103 constitutes an

undue delegation of legislative power and denies the petitioner the equal protection of

laws, thus rendering said section unconstitutional and void.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CIR has the power to determine minimum wages for an individual

employer in connection with an industrial dispute under provisions of Section 4 of

Commonwealth Act No. 103, and if it has, whether or not such grant of power is
unconstitutional and void.

HELD:

Petitioner’s view was without merit. Petitioner gave only a narrow construction under

Section 5 of CA No. 103. The Court of Industrial Relations was granted the plenary

powers to “settle all questions, matters, controversies, or disputes arising between, and

/or affecting employees and employers.” Petitioner’s contention that CIR must first be

directed by the President of the Philippines to investigate such dispute before it can

acquire jurisdiction is NOT mandatory. The Commonwealth Act should receive a

construction that will lead to its very objective namely, which is to create an

instrumentality through which intervention of the government could be made effective

in order to prevent non-pacific methods in the determinations of industrial or

agricultural disputes.

The National Assembly, under Sec. 20 of the CA No. 103 has also furnished a sufficient

standard by which the court will be guided in exercising its discretion in the

determination of any question or controversy before it. The requisites for such

delegation therefore were complied with, namely:

a.) The completeness of the statute making the delegation; and

b.) The presence of sufficient standards

Such discretionary power which is in judicial character being conferred to the CIR does

not infringe upon the Doctrine of Separation of Powers. It is recognized in

administrative law that such doctrine does not preclude a certain degree of admixture

of the three powers of the government to administrative agency. The non-delegation

of powers is not absolute. Exceptions are circumstances which are brought by the

complexities in our government. Example is that there are matters which really requires

specialized knowledge and expertise which is possessed by administrative agencies.

Eastern Shipping Lines v. POEA

GENERAL RULE: Non-delegation of Legislative Power

EXCEPTION: Subordinate Legislation

Tests for Valid Delegation of Legislative Power

FACTS:

Vitaliano Saco, the Chief Officer of a ship, was killed in an accident in Tokyo, Japan. The

widow filed a complaint for damages against the Eastern Shipping Lines with the POEA,

based on Memorandum Circular No. 2 issued by the latter which stipulated death

benefits and burial expenses for the family of an overseas worker. Eastern Shipping

Lines questioned the validity of the memorandum circular. Nevertheless, the POEA

assumed jurisdiction and decided the case.

ISSUE:

W/N the issuance of Memorandum Circular No. 2 is a violation of non-delegation of

powers
HELD:

SC held that there was valid delegation of powers.

In questioning the validity of the memorandum circular, Eastern Shipping Lines

contended that POEA was given no authority to promulgate the regulation, and even

with such authorization, the regulation represents an exercise of legislative discretion

which, under the principle, is not subject to delegation.

GENERAL RULE: Non-delegation of powers; exception

It is true that legislative discretion as to the substantive contents of the law cannot be

delegated. What can be delegated is the discretion to determine how the law may be

enforced, not what the law shall be. The ascertainment of the latter subject is a

prerogative of the legislature. This prerogative cannot be abdicated or surrendered by

the legislature to the delegate.

Two Tests of Valid Delegation of Legislative Power

There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a valid delegation of

legislative power, viz, the completeness test and the sufficient standard test. Under the

first test, the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the

legislature such that when it reaches the delegate the only thing he will have to do is to

enforce it. Under the sufficient standard test, there must be adequate guidelines or

stations in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegate’s authority and prevent

the delegation from running riot.

Both tests are intended to prevent a total transference of legislative authority to the

delegate, who is not allowed to step into the shoes of the legislature and exercise a

power essentially legislative.

Xxx The delegation of legislative power has become the rule and its non-delegation the

exception.

Rationale for Delegation of Legislative Power

The reason is the increasing complexity of the task of government and the growing

inability of the legislature to cope directly with the myriad problems demanding its
attention. The growth of society has ramified its activities and created peculiar and

sophisticated problems that the legislature cannot be expected to reasonably

comprehend. Specialization even in legislation has become necessary. Too many of the

problems attendant upon present-day undertakings, the legislature may not have the

competence to provide the required direct and efficacious, not to say, specific solutions.

These solutions may, however, be expected from its delegates, who are supposed to be

experts in the particular fields.

Power of Subordinate Legislation

The reasons given above for the delegation of legislative powers in general are

particularly applicable to administrative bodies. With the proliferation of specialized

activities and their attendant peculiar problems, the national legislature has found it

more and more necessary to entrust to administrative agencies the authority to issue

rules to carry out the general provisions of the statute. This is called the “power of

subordinate legislation.”

With this power, administrative bodies may implement the broad policies laid down in

statute by “filling in” the details which the Congress may not have the opportunity or

competence to provide. Memorandum Circular No. 2 is one such administrative

regulation.