Civ Pro Rule 34

Asian Construction and Dev’t Corp. VS Sannaedle Co. Ltd GR No. 181676 June 11, 2014

Facts: Petitioner and Respondent executed a Memorandum of Agreement wherein Sannaedle was
engaged to supply and erect insulated panel systems at various pavilions at the Philippine Centennial
Exposition Theme Park for an agreed amount of US$3,745,287.94. Pursuant to the Memorandum of
Agreement, petitioner made various payments amounting to US$3,129,667.32 leaving a balance of
US$615,620.33. Respondent claims that it made several written demands for petitioner to pay the said
balance, but the latter continuously refused to heed its plea.

Respondent filed a complaint for sum of money against petitioner. Thereafter, petitioner filed its
Answer with Counterclaim. Respondent then moved for judgment on the pleadings on the ground that
the Answer admitted all material allegations of the Complaint and, therefore, failed to tender an issue.
Thus, respondent deems that petitioner’s Answer, in effect, admitted the existence of the
Memorandum of Agreement and its failure to pay the balance despite repeated demands.

The trial court ruled in favor of respondent. The Court notes that in the Answer with Counterclaim of the
petitioner, the execution of the Memorandum of Agreement, was admitted. Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration but it was denied. Thus, petitioner filed an appeal before the CA.

CA dismissed the appeal and affirmed the trial court’s decision.

Issue: WON judgment on the pleadings is proper.

Held: Yes. Petitioner contends that the judgment on the pleadings is not proper, because it raised
special and affirmative defenses in its Answer. It asserts that with this specific denial, a genuine issue of
fact had been joined to the extent that a judgment on the pleadings could not be made.

Respondent counters that petitioner’s Answer admitted the material allegations of its complaint
regarding the cause of action, which is collection of sum of money.

Sec. 1 of Rule 34 provides: Where an answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the material
allegations of the adverse party’s pleading, the court may, on motion of that party, direct judgment on
such pleading. However, in actions for declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage or for legal
separation, the material facts alleged in the complaint shall always be proved.

Judgment on the pleadings is proper when an answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the
material allegations of the adverse party’s pleading. An answer fails to tender an issue if it does not
comply with the requirements of a specific denial as set out in Sections 811 and 10,12 Rule 8 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, resulting in the admission of the material allegations of the adverse party’s
pleadings.

In First Leverage and Services Group, Inc. v. Solid Builders, Inc., this Court held that where a motion for
judgment on the pleadings is filed, the essential question is whether there are issues generated by the
pleadings. In a proper case for judgment on the pleadings, there is no ostensible issue at all because of
the failure of the defending party’s answer to raise an issue.

Here, it is irrefutable that petitioner acknowledged having entered into a Memorandum of Agreement
with respondent and that it still has an unpaid balance of US$615,620.33.
We note that respondent’s complaint for a sum of money is based mainly on the alleged failure of
petitioner to pay the balance of US$615,620.33 under the Memorandum of Agreement.

While petitioner allegedly raised affirmative defenses, i.e., defect in the certification of non-forum
shopping, no legal capacity to sue and fortuitous event, the same cannot still bar respondent from
seeking the collection of the unpaid balance. Other than these affirmative defenses, petitioner’s denial
neither made a specific denial that a Memorandum of Agreement was perfected nor did it contest the
genuineness and due execution of said agreement.
Civ Pro Rule 37

Rafael Dinglasan VS CA GR No. 145420 Sep. 19, 2006

Facts: On August 17, 1985, Elmyra Trading Corp., represented by its President Dinglasan, and Antrom
Inc., also represented by its President, Antonio Garcia Jr., entered into a Memorandum of Agreement
whereby the parties agreed that Antrom will extend credit accommodation in favor of Elmyra to finance
its prawn business. The latter, in turn, will issue checks to guarantee the payment of its obligations.

Elmyra’s indebtedness to Antrom reached the amount of P1,476,000.58. As initial payment, Dinglasan
issued a Commercial Bank with Antrom as payee, but postdated on 3 October 1985 in the amount
of P515,000.00. Upon presentment for payment with the drawee bank, however, the said check was
dishonored for insufficiency of funds.

Dinglasan was charged for violation of BP 22. The trial court convicted Dinglasan. He filed a motion for
reconsideration which was denied. Thus, he appealed before the CA. CA dismissed the appeal and
affirmed trial court’s decision.

Dinglasan filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari. In a Resolution, Third Division of SC deny the petition
for failure to show that a reversible error had been committed by the appellate court. Dinglasan filed a
motion for reconsideration which was denied. And a second motion for reconsideration was filed but
also denied.

Thereafter, the Resolution denying the petition for review became final and executory and the
prosecution filed a motion for the issuance of warrant of arrest and writ of execution in order to satisfy
the judgment. The prosecution likewise prayed that a hold-departure order be issued in order to
prevent Dinglasan from leaving the country until he has fully served his sentence.

The trial court, acting on the said motion, issued a warrant of arrest and a writ of execution for the
enforcement of his civil liability and, at the same time, enjoining him from leaving the country.

Dinglasan filed a petition for new trial based on a newly discovered evidence. He emphasized that the
newly discovered evidence he seeks to introduce in this case is so material and of such weight that, if,
admitted would probably change the judgment, hence, suspension of procedural rules is warranted.

The alleged newly discovered evidence claimed by Dinglasan are the affidavits of Ma. Elena Dinglasan, in
her capacity as Executive Vice-President and Treasurer of Elmyra, and Ma. Encarnacion Vda. De
Dinglasan, the wife of Mariano Dinglasan, who, during his lifetime, was the Cashier and Liaison Officer of
the same company. These affidavits, together with the transmittal letter dated 8 October 1985 attached
to Solidbank Manager's Check No. 002969 dated 3 October 1985 sent by Ma. Elena Dinglasan to Antrom,
tends to prove that Dinglasan made good of the check within five banking days from notice of dishonor.
He could not, therefore, be validly convicted of violating Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 for one of the essential
elements of the offense, that is, the drawer failed and refused to make good the said check within five
banking days from the notice of dishonor, is absent.

Antrom ontends that the Petition for New Trial and/or Reopening of the Case based on newly
discovered evidence should be dismissed. Antrom claims that under the Revised Rules of Court, the
Motion for New Trial should be filed at any time after the appeal from the lower court has been
perfected and before the judgment of the appellate court convicting the accused becomes final. Antrom
also argued that considering that the petition was filed within the reglementary period , still, the
petition must fail for the requisites for newly discovered evidence as ground for new trial were not
satisfactorily complied with. The evidence was also introduced as evidence before the Court of Appeals
when Dinglasan assailed the RTC decision. Hence, the claim that the alleged evidence was not available
during the trial in the courts below, and is thus, newly discovered is erroneous, if not misleading.

Issue: WON a new trial based on newly discovered evidence should be allowed.

Held: Sec. 14 Rule 124 provides: Section 14. Motion for New Trial. – At any time after the appeal from
the lower court has been perfected and before the judgment of the Court of Appeals convicting the
accused becomes final, the latter may move for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence
material to his defense. The motion shall conform to the provisions of section 4 Rule 121.

Explicit from the above stated rule that a Motion for New Trial should be filed before the judgment of
the appellate court convicting the accused becomes final.

While Dinglasan agrees with the above stated rules that the instant petition should be filed before the
finality of the judgment convicting the appellant, he, however argues that judgment attains finality only
upon the receipt of the order or resolution denying his second motion for reconsideration.

To rule that finality of judgment shall be reckoned from the receipt of the resolution or order denying
the second motion for reconsideration would result to an absurd situation whereby courts will be
obliged to issue orders or resolutions denying what is a prohibited motion in the first place, in order that
the period for the finality of judgments shall run, thereby, prolonging the disposition of cases.
Moreover, such a ruling would allow a party to forestall the running of the period of finality of
judgments by virtue of filing a prohibited pleading; such a situation is not only illogical but also unjust to
the winning party.

Very clearly, the filing of the instant Petition for New Trial and/or Reopening of the Case on 30 October
2000 was made way beyond the prescriptive period for doing so. The claim of Dinglasan that he honestly
believed that this Court will appreciate his defense of payment as reiterated in his Second Motion for
Reconsideration which was why he deemed it pre-mature to file the instant petition before receiving the
Court's ruling on the said motion, could not be given credence.

The finality of decision is a jurisdictional event which cannot be made to depend on the convenience of
the party. To rule otherwise would completely negate the purpose of the rule on completeness of
service, which is to place the date of receipt of pleadings, judgment and processes beyond the power of
the party being served to determine at his pleasure.

Dinglasan further asseverates that this petition was belatedly made because the evidence sought to be
admitted were not available at the time the instant petition should have been filed. Accordingly, he
claims that this evidence falls within the purview of newly discovered evidence as contemplated by law.

Rule 121 – New Trial or Reconsideration.

Sec. 2. Grounds for a new trial. — The court shall grant a new trial on any of the following grounds:

(a) That errors of law or irregularities prejudicial to the substantial rights of the accused have been
committed during the trial;
(b) That new and material evidence has been discovered which the accused could not with reasonable
diligence have discovered and produced at the trial and which if introduced and admitted would
probably change the judgment.

The requisites for newly discovered evidence under Section 2, Rule 121 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure are: (a) the evidence was discovered after the trial; (b) such evidence could not have been
discovered and produced at the trial with reasonable diligence; and (c) that it is material, not merely
cumulative, corroborative or impeaching, and is of such weight that, if admitted, will probably change
the judgment.

These standards, also known as the "Berry Rule," These guidelines have since been followed by our
courts in determining the propriety of motions for new trial based on newly discovered evidence.

It should be emphasized that the applicant for new trial has the burden of showing that the new
evidence he seeks to present has complied with the requisites to justify the holding of a new trial.

The threshold question in resolving a motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence is
whether the proferred evidence is in fact a "newly discovered evidence which could not have been
discovered by due diligence." The question of whether evidence is newly discovered has two aspects: a
temporal one, i.e., when was the evidence discovered, and a predictive one, i.e., when should or could it
have been discovered.

Applying the foregoing test, Dinglasan insists, and the affidavits of Ma. Elena Dinglasan and Encarnacion
Vda. De Dinglasan attest, that the transmittal letter dated 8 October 1985 was discovered recently or
just before the time the affidavits were executed on 23 October 2000. The records, however, show
otherwise.
San Lorenzo Ruiz Builders and Oscar Violago VS Ma. Cristina Bayang GR NO. 194702 April 20, 2015

Facts: On April 15, 2000, SLR Builders and Bayang entered into a Contract to Sell of a parcel of land in
Payatas, Quezon City. Upon full payment of the monthly amortizations on the purchased lot, Cristina
demanded from SLR Builders the execution of the deed of absolute sale and the lot's certificate of title
but the latter failed to deliver, prompting Cristina to file a complaint for specific performance and
damages against SLR Builders and its President, Oscar Violago before the HLURB.

On February 16, 2004, Housing and Land Use Arbiter Atty. Joselito F. Melchor ruled in Cristina's favor,
ordering SLR builders to execute the Deed of Absolute Sale and deliver the title thereof free from all
liens and encumbrances; and in case of legal and physical impossibility, SLR is ordered to reimburse the
amount of P324,865.16 with legal interest of 12& per annum.

The petitioners appealed Arbiter Melchor's decision to the HLURB Board of Commissioners. The Board
dismissed and denied, respectively, the petitioners' appeal and subsequent motion for reconsideration.
The petitioners then brought their case to the Office of the President (OP). The OP in a Resolution,
dismissed the appeal stating that: A review of the records shows that the HLURB Decision affirming the
Arbiter's decision was received by the respondents/appellants (referring to the petitioners) on July 27,
2005. On that date, the 15-day prescriptive period within which to file an appeal began to run. Instead
of preparing an appeal, respondents-appellants opted to file a Motion for Reconsideration on August 10,
2005. Their filing of the said motion interrupted the period of appeal by that time, however, fourteen
(14) days had already elapsed.

On April 17, 2006, respondents-appellants received the Resolution denying their Motion for
Reconsideration. Following the above rules, respondents-appellants have only one (1) day left, or until
April 18, 2006, within which to file their notice of appeal to this Office. Unfortunately, they were able to
do so only on April 27, 2006, or nine (9) days late.

Petitioners moved to econsider and argued that the "fresh period rule" enunciated in the case
of Domingo Neypes, et at. v. Court of Appeals, et al.9 should be applied to their case.

The OP, in a resolution10 dated July 26, 2007, denied the petitioners' motion with finality, stating that
the "fresh period rule" applies only to judicial appeals and not to administrative appeals, such as in
petitioners' case. The petitioners then appealed to the CA via petition for review under Rule 43 of the
Rules of Court.

In its assailed decision, the CA denied the petitioners' petition for review. The CA, likewise, denied the
petitioners' motion for reconsideration; hence, the filing of the present petition for review
on certiorariwith this Court.

Issue: Whether the "fresh period rule" in Neypes applies to administrative appeals, such as an appeal
filed from a decision of the HLURB Board of Commissioners to the Office to the President.

Held: NO. It is settled that the "fresh period rule" in Neypes applies only to judicial appeals and not to
administrative appeals.
The "fresh period rule" in Neypes declares:

To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal
their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice
of appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new
trial or motion for reconsideration.

Henceforth, this “fresh period rule” shall also apply to Rule 40 governing appeals from the Municipal
Trial Courts to the Regional Trial Courts; Rule 42 on petitions for review from the Regional Trial Courts to
the Court of Appeals; Rule 43 on appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to the Court of Appeals; and Rule
45 governing appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court. The new rule aims to regiment or make the
appeal period uniform, to be counted from receipt of the order denying the motion for new trial, motion
for reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any final order or resolution.

Obviously, these Rules cover judicialproceedings under the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

In this case, the subject appeal, i.e., appeal from a decision of the HLURB Board of Commissioners to the
OP, is not judicial but administrative in nature; thus, the "fresh period rule" in Neypes does not apply.