Admin Chapter 2 – General Powers of Administrative Bodies – Power of Rule Making

Laguna Lake Development Authority VS CA and Serapio

Facts: The Task Force Camarin Dumpsite of Our Lady of Lourdes Parish in Caloocan, filed a leter-
complaint with the LLDA seeking to stop the operation of open garbage dumpsite in Tala Estate,
Camarin, Caloocan, due to its harmful effects on the health of the residents and the possibility of
pollution of the water content of the surrounding area. The LLDA Legal and Technical personnel found
that the City Government of Caloocan was maintaining an open dumpsite at the Camarin area without
first securing an Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) from the Environmental Management
Bureau (EMB) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources as required by PD 1586 and
clearance as required by RA 4850, as amended by PD 813 and EO 927, series of 1983. LLDA also found
that the water collected from the leachate and the receiving streams indicates the presence of bacteria.
The LLDA issued a Cease and Desist order against the City Government of Caloocan and other entities ,
to completely halt, stop and desist from dumping any form or kind of garbage and other waste matter at
the Camarin dumpsite.

The City Government of Caloocan filed with the RTC an action for the declaration of nullity of the cease
and desist order with prayer for the issuance of writ of injunction and sought to be declared as the sole
authority empowered to promote the health and safety and enhance the right of the people in Caloocan
City to a balanced ecology within its territorial jurisdiction. On the other hand, The LLDA filed a motion
to dismiss, invoking Pollution Control Law (PD 984) that the review of cease and desist order of that
nature falls under the CA and not by the RTC.

RTC denied LLDA’s motion to dismiss, and issued a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining LLDA from
enforcing the cease and desist order during the pendency of the case. The CA promulgated its decision
holding that the LLDA has no power and authority to issue a cease and desist order under its enabling
law.

The City Government of Caloocan claims that, as a local government unit, pursuant to the general
welfare provision of the LGC, it has the power to determine the effects of the operation of the dumpsite
on the ecological balance and to see that such balance is maintained. The LLDA, on the other hand,
contends that as an administrative agency which granted regulatory and adjudicatory powers and
functions by RA 4850 and its amendatory laws, PD 813 and EO 927, it has the power and authority to
issue a cease and desist order pursuant to Sec. 4 or EO 927.

Issue: WON the LLDA has authority and power to issue an order which, in its nature and effect was
injunctive.

Held: YES. 1. LLDA is mandated by law to manage the environment, preserve the quality of human
life and ecological systems and prevent undue ecological disturbances, deterioration and pollution in
the Laguna Lake area and surrounding provinces and cities, including Caloocan.

· While pollution cases are generally under the Pollution Adjudication Board under the Department
of Environment and Natural Resources, it does not preclude mandate from special laws that provide
another forum.
· In this case, RA No. 4850 provides that mandate to the LLDA. It is mandated to pass upon or
approve or disapprove plans and programs of local government offices and agencies within the region
and their underlying environmental/ecological repercussions.

· The DENR even recognized the primary jurisdiction of the LLDA over the case when the DENR
acted as intermediary at a meeting among the representatives of the city government, LLDA and the
residents.

2. LLDA has the authority to issue the cease and desist order.

a. Explicit in the law.

· §4, par. (3) explicitly authorizes the LLDA to make whatever order may be necessary in the exercise
of its jurisdiction.

· While LLDA was not expressly conferred the power “to issue an ex-parte cease and desist order” in
that language, the provision granting authority to “make (…) orders requiring the discontinuance of
pollution”, has the same effect.

b. Necessarily implied powers.

· Assuming arguendo that the cease and desist order” was not expressly conferred by law, there is
jurisprudence enough to the effect.

· While it is a fundamental rule that an administrative agency has only such power as expressly
granted to it by law, it is likewise a settled rule that an administrative agency has also such powers as
are necessarily implied in the exercise of its express powers. Otherwise, it will be reduced to a
“toothless” paper agency.

· In Pollution Adjudication Board vs Court of Appeals, the Court ruled that the PAB has the power to
issue an ex-parte cease and desist order on prima facie evidence of an establishment exceeding the
allowable standards set by the anti-pollution laws of the country.

· LLDA has been vested with sufficiently broad powers in the regulation of the projects within
the Laguna Lake region, and this includes the implementation of relevant anti-pollution laws in the area.
Rizal Empire Insurance Corp. VS NLRC

Facts: In August, 1977, herein private respondent Rogelio R. Coria was hired by herein petitioner Rizal
Empire Insurance Group as a casual employee with a salary of P10.00 a day. On January 1, 1978, he was
made a regular employee, having been appointed as clerk typist. Being a permanent employee, he was
furnished a copy of petitioner company's "General Information, Office Behavior and Other Rules and
Regulations." In the same year, without change in his position-designation, he was transferred to the
Claims Department and his salary was increased.

In 1980, he was transferred to the Underwriting Department and his salary was increased to P580.00 a
month plus cost of living allowance, until he was transferred to the Fire Department as filing clerk. In
July, 1983, he was made an inspector of the Fire Division with a monthly salary of P685.00 plus
allowances and other benefits. On October 15, 1983, private respondent Rogelio R. Coria was dismissed
from work, allegedly, on the grounds of tardiness and unexcused absences. Accordingly, he filed a
complaint with the Ministry of Labor and Employment (MOLE), and in a Decision dated March 14, 1985
(Record, pp. 80-87), Labor Arbiter Teodorico L. Ruiz reinstated him to his position with back wages.
Petitioner filed an appeal with the National labor Relations Commission (NLRC) but, in a Resolution
dated November 15, 1985, the appeal was dismissed on the ground that the same had been filed out of
time. Hence, the instant petition

Issue: Whether or not NLRC committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in
dismissing petitioner’s appeal on a technicality.

Held: No. Rule VIII of the Revised Rules of the National Labor Relations Commission on appeal, provides:
SECTION 1. (a) Appeal. — Decision or orders of a labor Arbiter shall be final and executory unless
appealed to the Commission by any or both of the parties within ten (10) calendar days from receipt of
notice thereof.

SECTION 6. No extension of period. — No motion or request for extension of the period within which to
perfect an appeal shall be entertained.

The record shows that the employer (petitioner herein) received a copy of the decision of the Labor
Arbiter on April 1, 1985. It filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File Memorandum of Appeal on April
11, 1985 and filed the Memorandum of Appeal on April 22, 1985. Pursuant to the "no extension policy"
of the National Labor Relations Commission, aforesaid motion for extension of time was denied in its
resolution dated November 15, 1985 and the appeal was dismissed for having been filed out of time.
The Revised Rules of the National Labor Relations Commission are clear and explicit and leave no room
for interpretation.

Moreover, it is an elementary rule in administrative law that administrative regulations and policies
enacted by administrative bodies to interpret the law which they are entrusted to enforce, have the
force of law, and are entitled to great respect Under the above-quoted provisions of the Revised NLRC
Rules, the decision appealed from in this case has become final and executory and can no longer be
subject to appeal. Even on the merits, the ruling of the Labor Arbiter appears to be correct; the
consistent promotions in rank and salary of the private respondent indicate he must have been a highly
efficient worker, who should be retained despite occasional lapses in punctuality and attendance.
Perfection cannot after all be demanded.
Tio VS Videogram Regulatory Board

Facts: Tio is a videogram operator who assailed the constitutionality of PD 1987 entitled “An Act
Creating the Videogram Regulatory Board” with broad powers to regulate and supervise the videogram
industry. The PD was also reinforced by PD 1994 which amended the National Internal Revenue Code.
The amendment provides that “there shall be collected on each processed video-tape cassette, ready
for playback, regardless of length, an annual tax of five pesos; Provided, that locally manufactured or
imported blank video tapes shall be subject to sales tax.” The said law was brought about by the need to
regulate the sale of videograms as it has adverse effects to the movie industry. The proliferation of
videograms has significantly lessened the revenue being acquired from the movie industry, and that
such loss may be recovered if videograms are to be taxed. Sec 10 of the PD imposes a 30% tax on the
gross receipts payable to the LGUs. Tio countered, among others, that the tax imposition provision is a
rider and is not germane to the subject matter of the PD.PD 1994 issued a month thereafter reinforced
PD 1987 and in effect amended the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC). Petitioner's attack on the
constitutionality of the DECREE on the ground that there is undue delegation of power and authority.

Issue: Whether or not the PD 1987 is unconstitutional due to the tax provision included.

Held: No. The title of the decree, which calls for the creation of the VRB is comprehensive enough to
include the purposes expressed in its Preamble and reasonably covered in all its provisions. It is
unnecessary to express all those objectives in the title or that the latter be an index to the body of the
decree. The foregoing provision is allied and germane to, and is reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the general object of the decree, which is the regulation of the video industry
through the VRB as expressed in its title. The tax provision is not inconsistent with nor foreign to the
general subject and title. As a tool for regulation it is simply one of the regulatory and control
mechanisms scattered throughout the decree. The express purpose of PD 1987 to include taxation of
the video industry in order to regulate and rationalize the heretofore uncontrolled distribution of videos
is evident from Preambles 2 and 5. Those preambles explain the motives of the lawmaker in presenting
the measure. Neither can it be successfully argued that the DECREE contains an undue delegation of
legislative power. The grant in Section 11 of the DECREE of authority to the BOARD to "solicit the direct
assistance of other agencies and units of the government and deputize, for a fixed and limited period,
the heads or personnel of such agencies and units to perform enforcement functions for theBoard" is
not a delegation of the power to legislate but merely a conferment of authority or discretion as to its
execution, enforcement, and implementation. "The true distinction is between the delegation of power
to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring authority
or discretion as to its execution to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be
done; to the latter, no valid objection can be made."
People VS Maceren

Facts: Jose Buenaventura, Godofredo Reyes, Benjamin Reyes, Nazario Aquino and Carlito del Rosario
were charged by a Constabulary investigator in the municipal court of Sta. Cruz, Laguna with having
violated Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84-1, which penalizes electro fishing in fresh water fisheries,
promulgated by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries
under the old Fisheries Law and the law creating the Fisheries Commission. It was alleged in the
complaint that the five accused resorted to electro fishing in the waters of Barrio San Pablo Norte, Sta.
Cruz.

The lower court held that electro fishing cannot be penalize because electric current is not an obnoxious
or poisonous substance as contemplated in section I I of the Fisheries Law and that it is not a substance
at all but a form of energy conducted or transmitted by substances. The lower court further held that,
since the law does not clearly prohibit electro fishing, the executive and judicial departments cannot
consider it unlawful.

Issue: WON AO 84-1 is valid.

Held: No. The Fisheries Law does not expressly punish electro fishing. Notwithstanding the silence of the
law, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, upon the recommendation of the
Commissioner of Fisheries, promulgated Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84 (62 O.G. 1224),
prohibiting electro fishing in all Philippine waters. As electro fishing is not banned under that law, the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries are powerless to
penalize it. In other words, Administrative Orders Nos. 84 and 84-1, in penalizing electro fishing, are
devoid of any legal basis.

Had the lawmaking body intended to punish electro fishing, a penal provision to that effect could have
been easily embodied in the old Fisheries Law.

That law punishes (1) the use of obnoxious or poisonous substance, or explosive in fishing; (2) unlawful
fishing in deepsea fisheries; (3) unlawful taking of marine molusca, (4) illegal taking of sponges; (5)
failure of licensed fishermen to report the kind and quantity of fish caught, and (6) other violations.
Nowhere in that law is electro fishing specifically punished.

The lawmaking body cannot delegate to an executive official the power to declare what acts should
constitute an offense. It can authorize the issuance of regulations and the imposition of the penalty
provided for in the law itself.

Where the legislature has delegated to executive or administrative officers and boards authority to
promulgate rules to carry out an express legislative purpose, the rules of administrative officers and
boards, which have the effect of extending, or which conflict with the authority granting statute, do not
represent a valid precise of the rule-making power but constitute an attempt by an administrative body
to legislate Administrative agent are clothed with rule-making powers because the lawmaking body
finds it impracticable, if not impossible, to anticipate and provide for the multifarious and complex
situations that may be encountered in enforcing the law. All that is required is that the regulation should
be germane to the defects and purposes of the law and that it should conform to the standards that the
law prescribes.
Administrative regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular department must be in
harmony with the provisions of the law, and should be for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its
general provisions. By such regulations, of course, the law itself cannot be extended. The rule-making
power must be confined to details for regulating the mode or proceeding to carry into effect the law as
it has been enacted. The power cannot be extended to amending or expanding the statutory
requirements or to embrace matters not covered by the statute. Rules that subvert the statute cannot
be sanctioned.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue VS CA, Court of Tax Appeals and Fortune Tobacco

Facts: Prior to the enactment of RA 7654, 20-45% ad valorem tax was imposed on cigarette brands
manufactured by Fortune Tobacco corporation. RA 7654 was then enacted, which partly amended
Sec.142 (c) of the NIRC1. Applying the amendment and nothing else, the 3 brands should fall under Sec
142 (c) (2) NIRC and be taxed at 20 to 45%.

2 days before the effectivity of RA 7654, the BIR issued Revenue Memorandum Circular No. 37-93 (RMC
37-93) which reclassified Hope, More and Champion as locally manufactured cigarettes bearing a foreign
brand subject to the 55% ad valorem tax. In effect, the memo circular subjected the 3 brands to the
provisions of Sec 142 (c) (1) NIRC imposing upon these brands a rate of 55% instead of just 20 to 45%
under Sec 142 (c) (2) NIRC.

The BIR Deputy Commisioner sent via telefax a copy of RMC 37-93 to Fortune Tobacco but it was
addressed to no one in particular. Fortune Tobacco requested for a reconsideration and recall of RMC
37-93 but it was denied. Thereafter, the Commissioner on Internal Revenue assessed Fortune Tobacco
for ad valorem tax deficiency. There was no notice and hearing. CIR argued that the memo circular was
merely an interpretative ruling of the BIR which did not require notice and hearing.

Issue: Whether or not RMC 37-93 was valid and enforceable.

Held: No; lack of notice and hearing violated due process required for promulgated rules. Moreover, it
infringed on uniformity of taxation / equal protection since other local cigarettes bearing foreign brands
had not been included within the scope of the memo circular.

Contrary to petitioner’s contention, the memo was not a mere interpretative rule but a legislative rule in
the nature of subordinate legislation, designed to implement a primary legislation by providing the
details thereof. Promulgated legislative rules must be published. On the other hand, interpretative rules
only provide guidelines to the law which the administrative agency is in charge of enforcing.

BIR, in reclassifying the 3 brands and raising their applicable tax rate, did not simply interpret RA 7654
but legislated under its quasi-legislative authority. BELLOSILLO separate opinion: the administrative
issuance was not quasi-legislative but quasijudicial. Due process should still be observed of course but
use Ang Tibay v. CIR.

One of the powers of administrative agencies like the Bureau of Internal Revenue, is the power to make
rules. The necessity for vesting administrative agencies with this power stems from the impracticability
of the lawmakers providing general regulations for various and varying details pertinent to a particular
legislation. The rules that administrative agencies may promulgate may either be legislative or
interpretative. The former is a form of subordinate legislation whereby the administrative agency is
acting in a legislative capacity, supplementing the statute, filling in the details, pursuant to a specific
delegation of legislative power. It should be understandable that when an administrative rule is merely
interpretative in nature, its applicability needs nothing further than its bare issuance for it gives no real
consequence more than what the law itself has already prescribed. When, upon the other hand, the
administrative rule goes beyond merely providing for the means that can facilitate or render least
cumbersome the implementation of the law but substantially adds to or increases the burden of those
governed, it behooves the agency to accord at least to those directly affected a chance to be heard, and
thereafter to be duly informed, before that new issuance is given the force and effect of law.
Peralta VS CSC

Facts: Petitioner was appointed Trade-Specialist II on 25 September 1989 in the Department of Trade
and Industry (DTI). His appointment was classified as "Reinstatement/Permanent". 120889 petitioner
received his initial salary, covering the period from September to October 1989. Since he had no
accumulated leave credits, DTI deducted from his salary the amount corresponding to his absences
during the covered period, inclusive of Saturdays and Sundays.

Petitioner sent a memorandum to Amando T. Alvis (Chief, General Administrative Service) inquiring as to
the law on salary deductions, if the employee has no leave credits. Amando T. Alvis answered
petitioner's query in a memorandumciting Chapter 5.49 of the Handbook of Information on the
Philippine Civil Service which states that "when an employee is on leave without pay on a day before or
on a day immediately preceding a Saturday, Sunday or Holiday, such Saturday, Sunday, or Holiday shall
also be without pay.

Petitioner sent a letter addressed to CSC Chairman Patricia Sto. Tomas raising the question: 'Is an
employee who was on leave of absence without pay on a day before or on a day time immediately
preceding a Saturday, Sunday or Holiday, also considered on leave of absence without pay on such
Saturday, Sunday or Holiday? Petitioner: he cannot be deprived of his pay or salary corresponding to the
intervening Saturdays, Sundays or Holidays (in the factual situation posed), and that the withholding (or
deduction) of the same is tantamount to a deprivation of property without due process of law.

Respondent Commission promulgated Resolution No. 90- 497, ruling that the action of the DTI in
deducting from the salary of petitioner, a part thereof corresponding to six (6) days is in order.

Issue: WON the CSC resolution is valid.

Held: No. The court ruled that the construction by the respondent Commission of R.A. 2625 is not in
accordance with the legislative intent. R.A. 2625 specifically provides that government employees are
entitled to fifteen (15) days vacation leave of absence with full pay and fifteen (15) days sick leave with
full pay, exclusive of Saturdays, Sundays and Holidays in both cases. Thus, the law speaks of the granting
of a right and the law does not provide for a distinction between those who have accumulated leave
credits and those who have exhausted their leave credits in order to enjoy such right. The fact remains
that government employees, whether or not they have accumulated leave credits, are not required by
law to work on Saturdays, Sundays and Holidays and thus they can not be declared absent on such non-
working days. They cannot be or are not considered absent on non-working days; they cannot and
should not be deprived of their salary corresponding to said non-working days just because they were
absent without pay on the day immediately prior to, or after said non-working days. A different rule
would constitute a deprivation of property without due process.

Furthermore, before their amendment by R.A. 2625, Sections 284 and 285-A of the Revised
Administrative Code applied to all government employee without any distinction. It follows that the
effect of the amendment similarly applies to all employees enumerated in Sections 284 and 285-A,
whether or not they have accumulated leave credits.
The general rule vis-a-vis legislation is that an unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it
imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is in legal contemplation as inoperative
as though it had never been passed. “When an administrative or executive agency renders an opinion or
issues a statement of policy, it merely interprets a preexisting law; and the administrative interpretation
of the law is at best advisory, for it is the courts that finally determine what the law means.”
Commissioner on Internal Revenue VS Bicolandia Drug Corp.

Facts: RA 7432, otherwise known as "An Act to Maximize the Contribution of Senior Citizens to Nation
Building, Grant Benefits and Special Privileges and For Other Purposes," granted senior citizens several
privileges, one of which was obtaining a 20 percent discount from all establishments relative to the use
of transportation services, hotels and similar lodging establishments, restaurants and recreation centers
and purchase of medicines anywhere in the country.

The law also provided that the private establishments giving the discount to senior citizens may claim
the cost as tax credit. BIR issued Revenue Regulations No. 2-94, which defined "tax credit" as follows:
Tax Credit – refers to the amount representing the 20% discount granted to a qualified senior citizen by
all establishments relative to their utilization of transportation services, hotels and similar lodging
establishments, restaurants, halls, circuses, carnivals and other similar places of culture, leisure and
amusement, which discount shall be deducted by the said establishments from their gross income for
income tax purposes and from their gross sales for value-added tax or other percentage tax purposes.

1995, respondent Bicolandia Drug Corporation, a corporation engaged in the business of retailing
pharmaceutical products under the business style of "Mercury Drug," granted the 20 percent sales
discount to qualified senior citizens purchasing their medicines in compliance with R.A. No. 7432.

Respondent treated this discount as a deduction from its gross income in compliance with RR No. 2-94,
which implemented R.A. No. 7432. 1996, respondent filed its 1995 Corporate Annual ITR declaring a net
loss position with nil income tax liability. On December 27, 1996, respondent filed a claim for tax refund
or credit in the amount of PhP 259,659.00

Resp alleged that CIR erred in treating the 20 percent sales discount given to senior citizens as a
deduction from its gross income for income tax purposes or other percentage tax purposes rather than
as a tax credit. 1998 – resp appealed to CTA in order to toll the running of 2-year prescriptive period to
file a claim for refund pursuant to Section 230 of the Tax Code then. Petitioner maintained that Revenue
Regulations No. 2-94 is valid since the law tasked the Department of Finance, among other government
offices, with the issuance of the necessary rules and regulations to carry out the objectives of the law.

CTA DECISION: R.A. No. 7432 would prevail over Section 2(i) of RR No. 2-94, whose definition of "tax
credit" deviated from the intendment of the law; and as a result, partially granted the respondent's
claim for a refund. CA modified CTA decision; law provided for tax credit not a tax refund.

Issues: Whether or not the RR 2-94 is void. Yes. Whether or not the 20 percent sales discount granted to
qualified senior citizens by the respondent pursuant to R.A. No. 7432 may be claimed as a tax credit,
instead of a deduction from gross income or gross sales. No.

Held: Petition denied. Law grants a tax credit not a tax deduction. RR 2-94 VOID. Resp entitled to tax
credit.

The problem stems from the issuance of RR. 2-94, which was supposed to implement R.A. No. 7432, and
the radical departure it made when it defined the "tax credit" that would be granted to establishments
that give 20 percent discount to senior citizens. It equated "tax credit" with "tax deduction," contrary to
the definition in Black's Law Dictionary, which defined tax credit as: An amount subtracted from an
individual's or entity's tax liability to arrive at the total tax liability. A tax credit reduces the taxpayer's
liability x x x, compared to a deduction which reduces taxable income upon which the tax liability is
calculated. A credit differs from deduction to the extent that the former is subtracted from the tax while
the latter is subtracted from income before the tax is computed.

Petitioner argues that the tax credit is in the nature of a tax refund and should be treated as a return for
tax payments erroneously or excessively assessed against a taxpayer, in line with Section 204(c) of RA
8424, or the NIRC 1997. Payment first before tax credit can be claimed.

SC: NIRC speaks of a tax credit for tax due, so payment of the tax has not yet been made in that
particular example. CA correctly expressly recognized the differences between a "tax credit" and a "tax
refund," and stated that the same are not synonymous with each other.

RR No. 2-94 is still subordinate to R.A. No. 7432, and in cases of conflict, the implementing rule will not
prevail over the law it seeks to implement. While seemingly conflicting laws must be harmonized as far
as practicable, in this particular case, the conflict cannot be resolved in the manner the petitioner
wishes.

Petitioner argues that should private establishments, which count respondent in their number, be
allowed to claim tax credits for discounts given to senior citizens, they would be earning and not just be
reimbursed for the discounts given.

It cannot be denied that R.A. No. 7432 has a laudable goal. The concerns of the affected private
establishments were also considered by the lawmakers. If the private establishments appear to benefit
more from the tax credit than originally intended, it is not for petitioner to say that they shouldn't. The
tax credit may actually have provided greater incentive for the private establishments to comply with
R.A. No. 7432, or quicker relief from the cut into profits of these businesses.

From the above discussion, it must be concluded that Revenue Regulations No. 2-94 is null and void for
failing to conform to the law it sought to implement. In case of discrepancy between the basic law and a
rule or regulation issued to implement said law, the basic law prevails because said rule or regulation
cannot go beyond the terms and provisions of the basic law. R.A. No. 7432 has been amended by
Republic Act No. 9257, the "Expanded Senior Citizens Act of 2003." In this, the term "tax credit" is no
longer used.

This time around, there is no conflict between the law and the implementing Revenue Regulations.
Under Revenue Regulations No. 4-2006, "(o)nly the actual amount of the discount granted or a sales
discount not exceeding 20% of the gross selling price can be deducted from the gross income, net of
value added tax, if applicable, for income tax purposes, and from gross sales or gross receipts of the
business enterprise concerned, for VAT or other percentage tax purposes. Under the new law, there is
no tax credit to speak of, only deductions. But RA 7432 was the law in force then.

“In cases of conflict between the law and the rules and regulations implementing the law, the law shall
always prevail. Should Revenue Regulations deviate from the law they seek to implement, they will be
struck down.”
Holy Spirit Homeowners Assoc VS Michael Defensor et al

Facts: The instant petition for prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, with prayer
for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction, seeks to prevent
respondents from enforcing the implementing rules and regulations (IRR) of Republic Act No. 9207,
otherwise known as the "National Government Center (NGC) Housing and Land Utilization Act of 2003."

Petitioner Holy Spirit Homeowners Association, Inc. (Association) is a homeowners association from the
West Side of the NGC. Named respondents are the ex-officio members of the National Government
Center Administration Committee (Committee). At the filing of the instant petition, the Committee was
composed of Secretary Michael Defensor, Chairman of the Housing and Urban Development
Coordinating Council (HUDCC), Atty. Edgardo Pamintuan, General Manager of the National Housing
Authority (NHA), Mr. Percival Chavez, Chairman of the Presidential Commission for Urban Poor (PCUP),
Mayor Feliciano Belmonte of Quezon City, Secretary Elisea Gozun of the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources (DENR), and Secretary Florante Soriquez of the Department of Public Works and
Highways (DPWH).

President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo signed into law R.A. No. 9207. In accordance with Section 5 of R.A.
No. 9207, the Committee formulated the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. No. 9207 on
June 29, 2004. Petitioners subsequently filed the instant petition questioning its validity.

The OSG claims that the instant petition for prohibition is an improper remedy because the writ of
prohibition does not lie against the exercise of a quasi-legislative function. Since in issuing the
questioned IRR of R.A. No. 9207, the Committee was not exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial
function, which is the scope of a petition for prohibition under Section 2, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, the instant prohibition should be dismissed outright, the OSG contends. For their part,
respondent Mayor of Quezon City and respondent NHA contend that petitioners violated the doctrine of
hierarchy of courts in filing the instant petition with this Court and not with the Court of Appeals, which
has concurrent jurisdiction over a petition for prohibition.

Issue: Whether or not a petition for prohibition is not the proper remedy to assail an IRR issued in the
exercise of a quasi-legislative function.

Held: Yes.The court ruled that a petition for prohibition is also not the proper remedy to assail an IRR
issued in the exercise of a quasi-legislative function. Prohibition is an extraordinary writ directed against
any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or
ministerial functions, ordering said entity or person to desist from further proceedings when said
proceedings are without or in excess of said entity’s or person’s jurisdiction, or are accompanied with
grave abuse of discretion, and there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law. Prohibition lies against judicial or ministerial functions, but not against legislative
or quasi-legislative functions. Generally, the purpose of a writ of prohibition is to keep a lower court
within the limits of its jurisdiction in order to maintain the administration of justice in orderly channels.
Prohibition is the proper remedy to afford relief against usurpation of jurisdiction or power by an
inferior court, or when, in the exercise of jurisdiction in handling matters clearly within its cognizance
the inferior court transgresses the bounds prescribed to it by the law, or where there is no adequate
remedy available in the ordinary course of law by which such relief can be obtained. Where the principal
relief sought is to invalidate an IRR, petitioners’ remedy is an ordinary action for its nullification, an
action which properly falls under the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court. In any case, petitioners’
allegation that "respondents are performing or threatening to perform functions without or in excess of
their jurisdiction" may appropriately be enjoined by the trial court through a writ of injunction or a
temporary restraining order.

Administrative agencies possess quasi-legislative or rulemaking powers and quasi-judicial or

administrative adjudicatory powers. Quasi-legislative or rule-making power is the power to make rules
and regulations which results in delegated legislation that is within the confines of the granting statute
and the doctrine of nondelegability and separability of powers.

In questioning the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by an administrative agency,

a party need not exhaust administrative remedies before going to court. This principle, however, applies
only where the act of the administrative agency concerned was performed pursuant to its quasi-judicial
function, and not when the assailed act pertained to its rule-making or quasi-legislative power.

The assailed IRR was issued pursuant to the quasilegislative power of the Committee expressly
authorized by R.A. No. 9207. The petition rests mainly on the theory that the assailed IRR issued by the
Committee is invalid on the ground that it is not germane to the object and purpose of the statute it
seeks to implement. Where what is assailed is the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation
issued by the administrative agency in the performance of its quasi-legislative function, the regular
courts have jurisdiction to pass upon the same.

Since the regular courts have jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of the assailed IRR issued by the
Committee in the exercise of its quasi-legislative power, the judicial course to assail its validity must
follow the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. Although the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals and the
Regional Trial Courts have concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus,
quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction, such concurrence does not give the petitioner unrestricted
freedom of choice of court forum.

True, this Court has the full discretionary power to take cognizance of the petition filed directly with it if
compelling reasons, or the nature and importance of the issues raised, so warrant. A direct invocation of
the Court’s original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed only when there are special and
important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition.

In Heirs of Bertuldo Hinog v. Melicor, the Court said that it will not entertain direct resort to it unless the
redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts, and exceptional and compelling
circumstances, such as cases of national interest and of serious implications, justify the availment of the
extraordinary remedy of writ of certiorari, calling for the exercise of its primary jurisdiction. A perusal,
however, of the petition for prohibition shows no compelling, special or important reasons to warrant
the Court’s taking cognizance of the petition in the first instance. Petitioner also failed to state any
reason that precludes the lower courts from passing upon the validity of the questioned IRR. Moreover,
as provided in Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution, the Court’s power to evaluate the validity of an
implementing rule or regulation is generally appellate in nature. Thus, following the doctrine of
hierarchy of courts, the instant petition should have been initially filed with the Regional Trial Court.
Admin Chapter 2 – General Powers of Administrative Bodies – Power of Adjudication

Santiago VS Bautista

Facts: Teodoro Santiago Jr. was a graduating elementary student at Sero Elementary School in Cotabato
City. Prior to the end of the school year, the said school constituted a Committee on the Rating of
Students for honor, composed of the teachers of the said school, for the purpose of selecting the honor
students of its graduating class. The committee deliberated and adjudged Santiago as the 3rd honor, the
1st and 2nd honors being obtained by his classmates Socoro Medina and Patricia Lingat.

3 days before the graduation, Santiago, represented by his mother and with his father as counsel,
sought the invalidation of the ranking of honor students by instituting an action for certiorari, injunction
and damages with the CFI of Cotabato against the committee members along with the District
Supervisor and the Academic Supervisor of the place.

The respondents filed a motion to dismiss claiming that the action of certiorari was improper since the
Committee is not a tribunal nor a board, exercising judicial functions under rule 65, certiorari is a
remedy against judicial function.

Issue: WON judicial function be exercised in this case.

Held: A judicial function is an act performed by virtue of judicial powers. The exercise of judicial function
is the doing of something in the nature of the action of the court. In order for an action for certiorari to
exist,

Test to determine whether a tribunal or board exercises judicial functions:

1) there must be specific controversy involving rights of persons brought before a tribunal for hearing
and determination.

2) that the tribunal must have the power and authority to pronounce judgment and render a decision.

3) the tribunal must pertain to that branch of the sovereign which belongs to the judiciary (or at least
the not the legislative nor the executive)

It may be said that the exercise of judicial function is to determine what the law is, and what the legal
rights of parties are, with respect to a matter in controversy.

Judicial power is defined:

• as authority to determine the rights of persons or property.

• authority vested in some court, officer or persons to hear and determine when the rights of
persons or property or the propriety of doing an act is the subject matter of adjudication.

• The power exercised by courts in hearing and determining cases before them.
• The construction of laws and the adjudication of legal rights.

It is evident, upon the foregoing authorities, that the so called committee on the rating of students for
honor whose actions are questioned in this case exercised neither judicial nor quasi judicial functions in
the performance of its assigned task. From the above-quoted portions of the decision cited, it will be
gleaned that before tribunal board, or officer may exercise judicial or quasi judicial acts, it is necessary
that there be a law that give rise to some specific rights of persons or property under which adverse
claims to such rights are made, and the controversy ensuing therefrom is brought, in turn, before the
tribunal, board or officer clothed with power and authority to determine what that law is and thereupon
adjudicate the respective rights of the contending parties.

As pointed out by appellees, however, there is nothing on record about any rule of law that provides
that when teachers sit down to assess the individual merits of their pupils for purposes of rating them
for honors, such function involves the determination of what the law is and that they are therefore
automatically vested with judicial or quasi judicial functions. Worse still, this Court has not even been
appraised by appellant of the pertinent provisions of the Service Manual of Teachers for Public Schools
appellees allegedly violated in the composition of the committee they constituted thereunder, and, in
the performance of that committee's duties.
Assistant Exec. Secretary VS CA

Facts:
Desierto VS Silvestre

Facts: Task Force Aduana headed by petitioner Doctor conducted an entrapment operation in a case of
bribery involving Atty. Redempto C. Somera, Hearing Officer, Law Division, Bureau of Customs, Manila,
and Indian nationals who had pending cases of seizure with the former. After the pay-off materialized,
petitioner Doctor announced the entrapment and then arrested Atty. Somera and two (2) Indian
nationals, namely, Murli Tejoomal Mohrani and Kumar Rupchand Khiatani, for violation of Article 210 of
the Revised Penal Code. As a consequence, the Task Force filed with the Regional Trial Court, Manila,
charges of bribery, violation of R. A. No. 3019, and corruption of public officials against them.

Likewise, the Task Force filed with the Ombudsman administrative charges for grave misconduct,
dishonesty and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service against respondent Ronnie C.
Silvestre and Atty. Somera.

The Ombudsman issued an order of preventive suspension in connection with the administrative
charges for grave misconduct, dishonesty and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service that
Task Force Aduana filed with the Office of the Ombudsman against respondent Ronnie C. Silvestre and
Atty. Redempto Somera. Respondent filed with the Ombudsman a motion for the lifting of the order of
preventive suspension but it was denied. Respondent then filed with the CA a petition for certiorari and
prohibition with temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction questioning the order of
preventive suspension issued by petitioner Ombudsman. The CA rendered a decision annulling and
setting aside the order of preventive suspension against respondent for having been issued by the
Ombudsman in grave abuse of discretion.

Issue: whether the Ombudsman has authority to suspend from office respondent Ronnie C. Silvestre
indefinitely on the basis of the administrative complaint filed with his office showing that evidence of
guilt is strong.

Held: Issue has become moot. The Ombudsman dismissed the administrative charges against
respondent. In dismissing the charges, the Ombudsman categorically ruled as follows:

It is another story, however, as regards respondent SILVESTRE. In implicating respondent SILVESTRE in

the instant case, Atty. DOCTOR stated in his AFFIDAVIT OF ARREST AND COMPLAINT, the following:

6. That after the hearing of the case (S.I. No. 00-005) on January 20, 2000, ATTY. SOMERA approached
me and invited me to the room of ATTY. RONNIE SILVESTRE (herein petitioner), Head of the Law
Department of the Port of Manila wherein the duo convinced me to cooperate with them in the
withdrawal of the complaint and its eventual dismissal;

7. That I did not commit myself to their proposition to drop the case but I just continued talking with
them with the plan in mind to report the same to LT. GEN. JOSE T. CALIMLIM, Task Force Commander of
Presidential Anti-Smuggling Task Force ADUANA;

Except this bare allegation of the complainant, however, practically no other evidence was ever
presented to substantiate the charge against respondent SILVESTRE. At this point, it may be noted that
well settled is the rule that within the field of administrative law, while strict rules of evidence are not
applicable to quasi-judicial proceedings, nevertheless, in adducing evidence constitutive of substantial
evidence, the basic rule that mere allegation is not evidence cannot be disregarded.

We are, therefore inclined to believe the defense of respondent SILVESTRE, that what was discussed
between him, respondent SOMERA and Atty. DOCTOR on January 20, 2000, was the legal issue on the
continued detention of some kitchen wares which were not covered by the Warrant of Seizure and
Detention (WSD). This, in light of subsequent Order of the District Collector of the Port of Manila dated
March 2, 2000, releasing the said kitchen wares which were indeed, not covered by the Warrant of
Seizure and Detention (WSD) x x x

Worthy of note also is the DECISION of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. SP No. 58958 dated August 14,
2000 entitled RONNIE C. SILVESTRE vs. OMBUDSMAN ANIANO A. DESIERTO, (pages 253 to 254, Records)
where in granting the petition for certiorari and prohibition involving the preventive suspension order
on respondent SILVESTRE, the said appellate court stated, thus:

While the above DECISION may not necessarily be controlling in the resolution of the merits of the
instant case insofar as it pertains to respondent SILVESTRE, we cannot help but note its relevancy
inasmuch as practically no other evidence was presented by the complainant, other than his AFFIDAVIT
OF ARREST AND COMPLAINT to support the charge against respondent SILVESTRE. Needless to state,
this is also the very same and only evidence presented before the Court of Appeals which rendered the
aforequoted DECISION.
Realty Exchange Venture VS Sendino

Facts: Sendino entered into a reservation agreement with Realty Exchange for a 120-meter lot in
Raymondville Subdivision, Sucat, Paranaque for P307,800 as its purchase price. She paid 1000 as partial
reservation fee and completed the payment of reservation by paying 4000 5 days after. On July 18,
1989, she paid 16,600 as full downpayment on the purchase price. But Realty Exchange advised her to
change her co-maker, which she agreed, and asked for an extension of one month to do so.

For alleged non-compliance with the requirement of submission of the appropriate documents under
the terms of the original agreement. Realty, through its VP for Marketing, informed respondent of the
cancellation of the contract on July 31, 1989.

Respondent filed an action for specific performance and damages against Realty with with the office of
Appeals, Adjudication and Legal Affairs (OAALA) of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB).

The HULRB rendered its judgment in favor of private respondents and ordered petitioner to continue
with sale of the house and lot and to pay damages. An appeal of this decision was brought to the
HLURB OAALA Arbiter, which affirmed the Board's decision. The decision of the OAALA Arbiter was
appealed to the Office of the President.

The Office of the President rendered its decision dismissing the petitioner’s appeal. Hence, this petition.

Issue: WON the Office of the President committed serious error when it declared that HULRB has quasi-
judicial functions notwithstanding absence of express grant by EO No. 90 which created it.

Held: No. It is settled that the rules of procedure are as matter of course construed liberally in
proceedings before administrative bodies. In the instant case, In the instant case, the original suit for
specific performance and damages was filed by the private respondent with the HLURB-OAALA, an
administrative body not hamstrung by the strict procedural technicalities of the Rules of Court. Under
the circumstances, it was certainly appropriate for the HLURB-OAALA to have acted on the substantive
questions relating to the validity of petitioners' unilateral rescission of the contract without unduly
concerning itself with a mere procedural slip, the non-joinder of private petitioner's husband in the
original complaint before the HLURB. Moreover, since petitioners participated in the administrative
proceedings without objecting to or raising the procedural infirmity, they were certainly estopped from
raising it on appeal before the Office of the President and before this Court.

Proceeding to the principal issues raised by the petitioner, while E.O. 85 dated 12 December 1986
abolished the Ministry of Human Settlements (MHS), it is patently clear from a reading of its provisions
that the said executive order did not abolish the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission (HSRC)
which continued to exercise its powers and functions even after the Ministry of Human Settlements
ceased to exist. In spite of the Aquino Government's stated intention of eradicating what it considered
the vestiges of the previous regime, it was not its intention to create a vacuum by abolishing those
juridical entities, agencies, corporations, etc., attached to or supervised by the MHS, which performed
vital administrative functions.

Pursuant to this provision therefore, the President Subsequently issued Executive Order No. 90, series of
1986, recognizing the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission (renamed the HLURB) as one of the
principal housing agencies of the government. Prior to this, Executive Order No. 648 in 1981 transferred
all the functions of the National Housing Authority (pursuant to Presidential Decrees Nos. 957, 1216 and
1344) to the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission (HSRC) consolidating all regulatory functions
relating to land use and housing development in a single entity.[10] Being the sole regulatory body for
housing and land development, the renamed body, the HLURB,[11] would have been reduced to a
functionally sterile entity if, as the petitioner contends, it lacked the powers exercised by its predecessor
which included the power to settle disputes concerning land use and housing development and
acquisition.

As explicitly provided by law, jurisdiction over actions for specific performance of contractual and
statutory obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lot or condominium unit against the owner or
developer, is vested exclusively in the HSRC.

There is no question that a statute may vest exclusive original jurisdiction in an administrative agency
over certain disputes and controversies falling within the agency's special expertise. The
constitutionality of such grant of exclusive jurisdiction to the National Housing Authority (now Housing
and Land Use Regulatory Board) over cases involving the sale of lots in commercial subdivisions was
upheld in Tropical Homes Inc. v. National Housing Authority (152 SCRA 540 [1987]) and again sustained
in a later decision inAntipolo Realty Corporation v. National Housing Authority (153 SCRA 399 [1987])
where We restated that the National Housing Authority (now HLURB) shall have exclusive jurisdiction to
regulate the real estate trade and business in accordance with the terms of PD No. 957 which defines
the quantum of judicial or quasi-judicial powers of said agency.

Clearly, therefore, the HLURB properly exercised its jurisdiction over the case filed by the petitioners
with its adjudicative body, the OAALA, in ordering petitioners to comply with their obligations arising
from the Reservation Agreement. In general, the quantum of judicial or quasi-judicial powers which an
administrative agency may exercise is defined in the agency's enabling act. In view of the Court's
pronouncement in United Housing Corporation vs. Hon. Dayrit, supra, recognizing the HLURB as the
successor agency of the HSRC's powers and functions, it therefore follows that the transfer of such
functions from the NHA to the HRSC effected by Section 8 of E.O. 648, series of 1981, thereby resulted in
the acquisition by the HLURB of adjudicatory powers which included the power to "(h)ear and decide
cases of unsound real estate business practices . . . and cases of specific performance."[14] Obviously, in
the exercise of its powers and functions, the HLURB must interpret and apply contracts, determine the
rights of the parties under these contracts, and award damages whenever appropriate.[15] We fail to
see how the HSRC -- which possessed jurisdiction over the actions for specific performance for
contractual and statutory obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lots against developers -- had
suddenly lost its adjudicatory powers by the mere fiat of a change in name through E.O. 90. One thrust
of the multiplication of administrative agencies is that the interpretation of such contracts and
agreements and the determination of private rights under these agreements is no longer a uniquely
judicial function.[16] The absence of any provision, express or implied, in E. O. 90, repealing those quasi-
judicial powers inherited by the HSRC from the National Housing Authority, furthermore militates
against petitioners' position on the question.

In fine, the HLURB-OAALA acted within the scope of its authority in ordering petitioners to comply and
continue with the sale of the house and lot subject of the contract between the original parties. It
cannot be gainsaid that the quasi-judicial functions exercised by the body are necessary incidents to the
proper exercise of its powers and functions under E.O. 90 and the laws enacted delineating the scope of
authority of its Board of Commissioners. Denying the body those functions so necessary in carrying out
its power to regulate housing and land use results in its effective emasculation as an important
regulatory body in an area vital to the national economy.
Republic VS Migrino

Facts: Acting on information received by the New AFP Anti-Graft Board, which indicated the acquisition
of wealth beyond his lawful income, private respondent Ret.Lt.Tecson was required by the Board to
submit his explanation/comment together with his supporting evidence. Private respondent was unable
to produce his supporting evidence because they were allegedly in the custody of his bookkeeper who
had gone abroad. The Board proceeded with its investigation and submitted its resolution,
recommending that private respondent be prosecuted and tried for violation of Rep. Act No.3019, as
amended, and Rep. Act No. 1379, as amended.

The case was set for preliminary investigation by the PCGG. Private respondent moved to dismiss
the case on the following grounds: (1) that the PCGG has no jurisdiction over his person; (2) that
the action against him under Rep. Act No. 1379 has already prescribed; (3) that E.O. No. 14, insofar as it
suspended the provisions of Rep. Act No. 1379 on prescription of actions, was inapplicable to his case;
and (4) that having retired from the AFP, he was now beyond the reach of Rep. Act No.3019. The Board
opposed the motion to dismiss. The PCGG denied the motion to dismiss for lack of merit. Private
respondent moved for reconsideration but was denied by the PCGG. Private respondent was directed to
submit his counter-affidavit and other controverting evidence. Private respondent filed a petition for
prohibition with preliminary injunction with the RTC. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss and opposed
the application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction on the principal ground that the RTC
had no jurisdiction over the Board, citing the case of PCGG v. Pena. Private respondent opposed the
motion to dismiss. Petitioner replied to the opposition.

The court judge denied petitioner’s motion to dismiss. The respondent judge granted the application for
the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, enjoining petitioners from investigating or prosecuting
private respondent under Rep. Acts Nos. 3019 and 1379 upon the filing of a bond in the amount of
Twenty Thousand Pesos. Petitioner strongly argues that the private respondent’s case falls within the
jurisdiction of the PCGG. Hence, this petition.

Issue: WON PCGG has jurisdiction over the case of private respondent

Held: No. It will not do to cite the order of the PCGG Chairman, creating the Board and authorizing it to
investigate the unexplained wealth and corrupt practices of AFP personnel, both retired and in active
service, to support the contention that PCGG has jurisdiction over the case of private respondent.
Applying the rule in statutory construction known as ejusdem generis, the term “subordinate” as used in
E.O. Nos. 1 and 2 would refer to one who enjoys a close association or relation with former Pres. Marcos
and/or his wife, similar to the immediate family member, relative, and close associate in E.O. No. 1 and
the close relative, business associate, dummy, agent, or nominee in E.O. No. 2. Clearly, this alleged
unlawful accumulation of wealth is not that contemplated in E.O. Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A.
Admin Chapter 3 – Judicial Review of Administrative Cases

Arrow Transport Corporation VS Board of Transportation

Facts: Both petitioner and private respondent Sultan Rent-a-Car are domestic corporations. Arrow has in
his favor a certificate of public convenience (CPN) to operate a public utility bus air-conditioned-auto-
truck service from Cebu City to Mactan International Airport and vice-versa with the use of twenty (20)
units. Sultan filed a petition with the respondent Board for the issuance of a CPN to operate a similar
service on the same line. 8 days later, without the required publication, the Board issued an Order
granting its provisional permit to operate. After filing an MR and for the cancellation of such provisional
permit filed but without awaiting final action thereon, Arrow filed the present petition for certiorari
with preliminary injunction alleging that the question involved herein is purely legal and that
the issuance of the Order without the Board having acquired jurisdiction of the case yet, is patently
illegal or was performed without jurisdiction. In their answer, the respondents denied the need
for publication before a provisional permit can be issued, in light of Presidential Decree No. 101, which
authorized respondent Board to grant provisional permits when warranted by compelling circumstances
and to proceed promptly along the method of legislative inquiry.

Issue: 1. WON the issuance of the provisional permit was legal. 2. WON the controversy is ripe for
judicial determination

Held: Affirmative. For a provisional permit to operate a public utility, an ex parte hearing would suffice.
The decisive consideration is the existence of public need. That was shown in this case, respondent
Board, on the basis of demonstrable data, being satisfied of the pressing necessity for the grant of the
provisional permit sought. There is no warrant for the nullification of what was ordered by it.

2. Affirmative. This Court was impelled to go into the merits of the controversy at this stage, not only
because of the importance of the issue raised but also because of the strong public interest in having the
matter settled. As was set forth in EO No. 101 which prescribes the procedure to be followed by
respondent Board, it is the policy of the State, as swiftly as possible, to improve the deplorable condition
of vehicular traffic, obtain maximum utilization of existing public motor vehicles and eradicate the
harmful and unlawful trade of clandestine operators, as well as update the standards of those carrying
such business, making it “imperative to provide, among other urgently needed measures, more
expeditious methods in prescribing, redefining, or modifying the lines and mode of operation of public
utility motor vehicles that now or thereafter, may operate in this country.” It is essential then both from
the standpoint of the firms engaged as well as of the riding public to ascertain whether or not the
procedure followed in this case and very likely in others of a similar nature satisfies the procedural due
process requirement. Thus its ripeness for adjudication becomes apparent.
Carpio VS Executive Secretary

Facts: In 1990, Republic Act No. 6975 entitled “AN ACT ESTABLISHING THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE
UNDER A REORGANIZED DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES” was passed. Antonio Carpio, as a member of the bar and a defender of the Constitution,
assailed the constitutionality of the said law as he averred that it only interferes with the control power
of the president.

He advances the view that RA 6975 weakened the National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM) by limiting
its power “to administrative control” over the PNP thus, “control” remained with the Department
Secretary under whom both the NPC and the PNP were placed; that the system of letting local
executives choose local police heads also undermine the power of the president.

ISSUE: Whether or not the president abdicated its control power over the PNP and NPC by virtue of RA
6975.

HELD: No. The President has control of all executive departments, bureaus, and offices. This presidential
power of control over the executive branch of government extends over all executive officers from
Cabinet Secretary to the lowliest clerk. Equally well accepted, as a corollary rule to the control powers of
the President, is the “Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency”. As the President cannot be expected to
exercise his control powers all at the same time and in person, he will have to delegate some of them to
his Cabinet members.

Under this doctrine, which recognizes the establishment of a single executive, “all executive and
administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department, the heads of the various
executive departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in cases where the
Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or law to act in person on the exigencies of the situation
demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and administrative functions of the Chief
Executive are performed by and through the executive departments, and the acts of the Secretaries of
such departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless
disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive.”

Thus, and in short, “the President’s power of control is directly exercised by him over the members of
the Cabinet who, in turn, and by his authority, control the bureaus and other offices under their
respective jurisdictions in the executive department.”

Additionally, the circumstance that the NAPOLCOM and the PNP are placed under the reorganized DILG
is merely an administrative realignment that would bolster a system of coordination and cooperation
among the citizenry, local executives and the integrated law enforcement agencies and public safety
agencies created under the assailed Act, the funding of the PNP being in large part subsidized by the
national government.
Industrial Enterprises Inc. VS CA

Facts: Industrial Enterprises Inc. (IEI) was granted a coal operating contract by the Bureau of Energy
Development (BED), for the exploration of two coal blocks in Eastern Samar. IEI asked the Ministry
of Energy for another to contract for the additional three coal blocks. Thereafter, IEI was advised that
there is another coal operator, Marinduque Mining and Industrial Corporation (MMIC). IEI and MMIC
signed a Memorandum of Agreement on which IEI will assign all its rights and interests to MMIC.

IEI filed for rescission of the memorandum plus damages against the MMIC and the Ministry of Energy
Geronimo Velasco before the RTC of Makati, alleging that MMIC started operating in the coal blocks
prior to finalization of the memorandum. IEI prayed for that the rights for the operation be granted
back. Philippine National Bank (PNB) pleaded as co-defendant because they have mortgages in favor of
MMIC. It was dismissed. Oddly enough, Mr. Jesus Cabarrus is President of both IEI and MMIC.

RTC ordered the rescission of the memorandum and for the reinstatement of the contract in favor of IEI.

CA reversed the ruling of the RTC, stating that RTC has no jurisdiction over the matter.

Issue: W/ON RTC has jurisdiction?

Held: No. While the action filed by IEI sought the rescission of what appears to be an ordinary civil
contract cognizable by a civil court, the fact is that the Memorandum of Agreement sought to be
rescinded is derived from a coal-operating contract and is inextricably tied up with the right to develop
coal-bearing lands and the determination of whether or not the reversion of the coal operating contract
over the subject coal blocks to IEI would be in line with the integrated national program for coal-
development and with the objective of rationalizing the country's over-all coal-supply-demand balance,
IEI's cause of action was not merely the rescission of a contract but the reversion or return to it of the
operation of the coal blocks. Thus it was that in its Decision ordering the rescission of the Agreement,
the Trial Court, inter alia, declared the continued efficacy of the coal-operating contract in IEI's favor and
directed the BED to give due course to IEI's application for three (3) IEI more coal blocks. These are
matters properly falling within the domain of the BED.

For the BED, as the successor to the Energy Development Board is tasked with the function of
establishing a comprehensive and integrated national program for the exploration, exploitation, and
development and extraction of fossil fuels, such as the country's coal resources; adopting a coal
development program; regulating all activities relative thereto; and undertaking by itself or through
service contracts such exploitation and development, all in the interest of an effective and coordinated
development of extracted resources. The jurisdiction of the BED to pass upon any question involving the
Memorandum of Agreement between IEI and MMIC, revolving as its does around a coal operating
contract, should be sustained.

In recent years, it has been the jurisprudential trend to apply the doctrine of primary jurisdiction in
many cases involving matters that demand the special competence of administrative agencies. It may
occur that the Court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of a particular case, which means that the
matter involved is also judicial in character. However, if the case is such that its determination requires
the expertise, specialized skills and knowledge of the proper administrative bodies because technical
matters or intricate questions of facts are involved, then relief must first be obtained in an
administrative proceeding before a remedy will be supplied by the courts even though the matter is
within the proper jurisdiction of a court. This is the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. It applies "where a
claim is originally cognizable in the courts, and comes into play whenever enforcement of the claim
requires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, have been placed within the special
competence of an administrative body, in such case the judicial process is suspended pending referral of
such issues to the administrative body for its view"

Clearly, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction finds application in this case since the question of what coal
areas should be exploited and developed and which entity should be granted coal operating contracts
over said areas involves a technical determination by the BED as the administrative agency in possession
of the specialized expertise to act on the matter. The Trial Court does not have the competence to
decide matters concerning activities relative to the exploration, exploitation, development and
extraction of mineral resources like coal. These issues preclude an initial judicial determination. It
behooves the courts to stand aside even when apparently they have statutory power to proceed in
recognition of the primary jurisdiction of an administrative agency.
Manuel VS Villena

Facts: Magno Manuel filed a complaint against Villena, the Director of Forestry, and the Secretary of
DENR alleging that he had been in continuous possession of the land in question since 1939. Being an
ignorant farmer, he did not file his Tree Farm Application until June 1954 and when he applied for it, the
Director of Forestry rejected the same because a prior application had been filed by private respondent
Villena. When he appealed to the Secretary of DENR, it was dismissed. He then filed a motion for
reconsideration and the Secretary found that the previous investigation conducted by the District
Forester was not in accordance with the rules and regulations of the Bureau, and so ordered another
investigation to be made; but before said investigation was terminated the Secretary rendered a
decision dismissing the appeal.

Issue: WON the decision of the Secretary of DENR should be set aside.

Held: Under Section 1838 of the Revised Administrative Code, this function falls within the jurisdiction of
the Director of Forestry with the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources.

The power thus conferred on the Director of Forestry with the approval of the Secretary of ANR is
basically executive or administrative in nature. And courts, as a rule, refuse to interfere with the
proceedings undertaken by the administrative bodies or officials in the exercise of administrative
functions. This is so because such bodies are generally better equipped technically to decide
administrative questions and that non-legal factors, such as government policy on the matter, are
usually involved in the decisions.

There are of course, limits to the exercise of administrative discretion. Administrative proceedings may
be reviewed by the courts upon the showing that “the board or official has gone beyond his statutory
authority, exercised unconstitutional powers or clearly acted arbitrarily and without regard to his duty
or with grave abuse of discretion” or that the decision is vitiated by fraud, imposition or mistake.

Since 1838 of the RAC does not require the investigation be in the nature of a court trial. In deciding
administrative questions, administrative bodies or officials generally enjoy wide discretion. Technical
rule of procedure are not strictly enforced and due process of law in the strict judicial sense is not
indispensable. It is sufficient that substantive due process requirement of fairness and reasonableness
be observed.

Absence of previous notice is not itself a substantial defect; what the law abhors is the lack of
opportunity to be heard.

It was not essential that the appellant be represented by a lawyer. The investigation conducted by
Bureau of Forestry was purely fact-finding. It was not required to be in a form of a trial where both
parties, each represented by a counsel, confront each other and their witnesses. In any case, appellant
does not allege that the presence of a lawyer could have altered the result of the investigation. He does
not even cite any substantial error in the findings of the Director of Forestry which could have been
avoided, if a lawyer had represented him.

It should be noted that the order of the Acting Secretary of ANR, a formal investigation of the case was
ordered. That the investigation was actually conducted was not denied, and is borne out by the decision
of the Secretary dismissing the plaintiff’s appeal.

Appellant says that the investigation was incomplete. He does not, however, point out how incomplete
it was, or in what aspect it had not been completed, or in what manner the incompleteness constituted
grave abuse of discretion or violated the requirement of due process. We have examined the documents
and pleadings reproduced in the appellant’s record on appeal, particularly the decision of the Secretary
of Agriculture and Natural Resources which is sought to be set aside, and we find that said decision is
based on a thorough analysis of the facts as revealed by the evidence.
Admin – Chapter 4 – Local Governments

Emmanuel Pelaez vs Auditor General

FACTS: In 1964, President Ferdinand Marcos issued executive orders creating 33 municipalities – this was
purportedly pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code which provides in part:
The President may by executive order define the boundary… of any… municipality… and may change the
seat of government within any subdivision to such place therein as the public welfare may require…
The then Vice President, Emmanuel Pelaez, as a taxpayer, filed a special civil action to prohibit the auditor
general from disbursing funds to be appropriated for the said municipalities. Pelaez claims that the EOs
were unconstitutional. He said that Section 68 of the RAC had been impliedly repealed by Section 3 of RA
2370 which provides that barrios may “not be created or their boundaries altered nor their names changed”
except by Act of Congress. Pelaez argues: “If the President, under this new law, cannot even create a barrio,
how can he create a municipality which is composed of several barrios, since barrios are units of
municipalities?”
The Auditor General countered that there was no repeal and that only barrios were barred from being created
by the President. Municipalities are exempt from the bar and that a municipality can be created without
creating barrios. He further maintains that through Sec. 68 of the RAC, Congress has delegated such power
to create municipalities to the President.
ISSUE: Whether or not Congress has delegated the power to create barrios to the President by virtue of
Sec. 68 of the RAC.
HELD: No. There was no delegation here. Although Congress may delegate to another branch of the
government the power to fill in the details in the execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is
essential, to forestall a violation of the principle of separation of powers, that said law: (a) be complete in
itself — it must set forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate —
and (b) fix a standard — the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or determinable — to which the
delegate must conform in the performance of his functions. In this case, Sec. 68 lacked any such standard.
Indeed, without a statutory declaration of policy, the delegate would, in effect, make or formulate such
policy, which is the essence of every law; and, without the aforementioned standard, there would be no
means to determine, with reasonable certainty, whether the delegate has acted within or beyond the scope
of his authority.
Further, although Sec. 68 provides the qualifying clause “as the public welfare may require” – which would
mean that the President may exercise such power as the public welfare may require – is present, still, such
will not replace the standard needed for a proper delegation of power. In the first place, what the phrase “as
the public welfare may require” qualifies is the text which immediately precedes hence, the proper
interpretation is “the President may change the seat of government within any subdivision to such place
therein as the public welfare may require.” Only the seat of government may be changed by the President
when public welfare so requires and NOT the creation of municipality.
The Supreme Court declared that the power to create municipalities is essentially and eminently legislative
in character not administrative (not executive).
Province of Batangas vs. Romulo
Doctrine: The crucial legal issue submitted for resolution of this Court entails the proper legal interpretation
of constitutional and statutory provisions. Moreover, the “transcendental importance” of the case, as it
necessarily involves the application of the constitutional principle on local autonomy, cannot be gainsaid.
The nature of the present controversy, therefore, warrants the relaxation by this Court of procedural rules
in order to resolve the
case.
• In 1998, then President Estrada issued EO No. 48 establishing the “Program for Devolution Adjustment
and Equalization” to enhance the capabilities of LGUs in the discharge of the functions and services
devolved to them through the LGC.

• The Oversight Committee under Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora passed Resolutions No. OCD-99-
005, OCD-99-006 and OCD-99-003 which were approved by Pres. Estrada on October 6, 1999. The
guidelines formulated by the Oversight Committee required the LGUs to identify the projects eligible for
funding under the portion of LGSEF and submit the project proposals and other requirements to the
DILG for appraisal before the Committee serves notice to the DBM for the subsequent release of the
corresponding funds.

• Hon. Herminaldo Mandanas, Governor of Batangas, petitioned to declare unconstitutional and void
certain provisos contained in the General Appropriations Acts (GAAs) of 1999, 2000, and 2001, insofar as
they uniformly earmarked for each corresponding year the amount of P5billion for the Internal Revenue
Allotment (IRA) for the Local Government Service Equalization Fund (LGSEF) & imposed conditions for
the release thereof.

WON the petitioner has legal standing or locus standi to file the present suit
Yes.
• The Court holds that the petitioner possesses the requisite standing to maintain the present suit. The
petitioner, a local government unit, seeks relief in order to protect or vindicate an interest of its own, and
of the other LGUs.

• This interest pertains to the LGUs share in the national taxes or the IRA. The petitioners constitutional
claim is, in substance, that the assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000 and 2001, and the OCD
resolutions contravene Section 6, Article X of the Constitution, mandating the automatic release to the
LGUs of their share in the national taxes.

• Further, the injury that the petitioner claims to suffer is the diminution of its share in the IRA, as provided
under Section 285 of the Local Government Code of 1991, occasioned by the implementation of the assailed
measures. These allegations are sufficient to grant the petitioner standing to question the validity of the
assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000 and 2001, and the OCD resolutions as the petitioner clearly
has a plain, direct and adequate interest in the manner and distribution of the IRA
BITO-ONON VS JUDGE FERNANDEZ
FACTS: petitioner, Joel Bito-Onon is the duly elected Barangay Chairman of Barangay Tacras and is the
Municipal Liga Chapter President for the Municipality of Narra. The private respondent, Elegio Quejano,
Jr. on the other hand, is the duly elected Barangay Chairman of Barangay Rizal and is the Municipal Liga
Chapter President for the Municipality of Magsaysay. Both Bito-Onon and Quejano were candidates for
the position of Executive Vice-President in the election for the Liga ng Barangay Provincial Chapter of the
province of Palawan. Bito-Onon was proclaimed the winning candidate in the said election prompting
Quejano to file a post proclamation protest with the Board of Election Supervisors (BES), which was
decided against him on August 25, 1997.

Not satisfied with the decision of the BES, Quejano filed a Petition for Review of the decision of the BES
with the RTC. Bito-Onon filed a motion to dismiss the Petition for Review raising the issue of jurisdiction.
He claimed that the Supplemental Guidelines for the 1997 Liga ng mga Barangay election issued by the
DILG in its Memorandum Circular No. 97-193, providing for review of decisions or resolutions of the BES
by the regular courts of law is an ultra vires act and is void for being issued without or in excess of
jurisdiction, as its issuance is not a mere act of supervision but rather an exercise of control over the Liga's
internal organization.

The RTC denied Onon's motion to dismiss. In its order, the RTC ratiocinated that the Secretary of the
Department of Interior and Local Government is vested with the power to establish and prescribe rules,
regulations and other issuances and implementing laws on the general supervision of local government
units and the promotion of local autonomy and monitor compliance thereof by said units.

The RTC added that DILG Circular No. 97-193 was issued by the DILG Secretary pursuant to his
rulemaking power as provided for under Section 7, Chapter II, Book IV of the Administrative Code.

Consequently, the RTC ruled that it had jurisdiction over the petition for review filed by Quejada.

ISSUE: Whether or not the questioned provision in Memorandum Circular 97-193 was issued by the
DILG secretary in excess of his authority.

RULING: Yes.
Memorandum Circular No. 97-193 was issued by the DILG Secretary pursuant to the power of general
supervision of the President over all local government units which was delegated to the DILG Secretary by
virtue of Administrative Order No. 267 dated February 18, 1992.

The President's power of general supervision over local government units is conferred upon him by the
Constitution. The power of supervision is defined as "the power of a superior officer to see to it that lower
officers perform their functions in accordance with law.". This is distinguished from the power of control
or "the power of an officer to alter or modify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the
performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for the latter." Thus, does the
President's power of general supervision extend to the liga ng mga barangay, which is not a local
government unit?
We rule in the affirmative. In Opinion No. 41, Series of 1995, the Department of Justice ruled that the liga
ng mga barangay is a government organization, being an association, federation, league or union created
by law or by authority of law, whose members are either appointed or elected government officials. The
ligas are primarily governed by the provisions of the Local Government Code, however, their respective
constitution and by-laws shall govern all other matters affecting the internal organization of the liga not
otherwise provided for in the Local Government Code provided that the constitution and by-laws shall be
suppletory to the provisions of Book III, Title VI of the Local Government Code and shall always conform
to the provisions of the Constitution and existing laws. We agree with both the petitioner and the Solicitor
General that in authorizing the filing of the petition for review of the decision of the BES with the regular
courts, the DILG Secretary in effect amended and modified the GUIDELINES promulgated by the National
Liga Board and adopted by the
LIGA which provides that the decision of the BES shall be subject to review by the National Liga Board.
The amendment of the GUIDELINES is more than an exercise of the power of supervision but is an exercise
of the power of control, which the President does not have over the LIGA. Although the DILG is given the
power to prescribe rules, regulations and other issuances, the Administrative Code limits its authority to
merely "monitoring compliance" by local government units of such issuances. To monitor means "to watch,
observe or check" and is compatible with the power of supervision of the DILG Secretary over local
governments, which is limited to checking whether the local government unit concerned or the officers
thereof perform their duties as per statutory enactments. Besides, any doubt as to the power of the DILG
Secretary to interfere with local affairs should be resolved in favor of the greater autonomy of the local
government.
Rosales v Mijares
facts of the case
July 1998: Rosales (1998 elected Mayor of Catarman, Northern Samar) assumed office. Shortly
thereafter, he summoned Mijares (municipal engineer) and asked the latter to resign, since Mijares’
position is going to be abolished. In reply, Mijares said that he was open to the possibility of being
transferred or detailed at the Provincial Engineering Office. Then and there, Rosales instructed Mijares to
prepare his papers.
August 1998: Rosales indorsed Mijares to the provincial governor for consideration for the position of
Assistant Provincial Engineer. Subsequently, Rosales wrote to Mijares stating that the request to transfer
was granted for a period of 30 days, subject to the condition imposed by Civil Service Law, rules and
regulations. Meanwhile, respondent continued reporting for work at the Municipal Engineers Office.
However, the provincial governor did not act on petitioners endorsement.
September 1998 (Separation letter): Rosales again wrote to Mijares, this time informing him of his
separation, by virtue of the lapse of the 30-day period and the absence of any extension of the permit to
transfer, pursuant to MC No. 38, S. 1993 of the Civil Service Commission.
Letter-reply (October): Mijares requested that such separation letter be withdrawn. He pointed out that
since the request for transfer to the Provincial Engineers Office was not acted upon, the same never became
effective and, therefore, he did not cease to be an employee of the municipal government.
Rejoinder letter (lol): Rosales replied, explaining that respondent was not terminated and that his
separation from the service was by operation of law, i.e., CSC MC No. 38, S. 1993. In the same
communication, Rosales offered to reinstate respondent.
November 1998: Mijares filed a complaint for illegal termination against petitioner before the CSC.
Treating the complaint as an appeal, the Director of CSC Regional Office No. 8 instructed the Head Civil
Service Field Officer in Catarman, to conduct a fact­finding investigation on respondent’s case. Pursuant
to the directive, the latter found out that the request for transfer was merely verbal.
April 1999: the CSC Office of Legal Affairs required petitioner to comment on the appeal. Rosales
explained that Mijares’ separation was valid and legal under CSC MC No. 38, S. 1993, since the latters’
permit to transfer to the Provincial Engineers Office expired without his transfer being effected. In support
of his defense, petitioner appended his documentary evidence to his comment, including the legal opinions
of the CSC Regional Office and the Provincial Prosecutor upholding the validity of his action.
June 1999: The CSC issued a resolution reinstating Mijares (Municipal Engineer). It held that Mijares
did not freely and voluntarily seek permission from Rosales to transfer to another office and that based on
the record, the supposed transfer of the respondent to the Office of the Provincial Engineer was a shrewd
machination or clever ploy resorted to by the petitioner to oust the respondent from his position as
Municipal Engineer; hence, such transfer was illegal. The CSC cited the rulings in Sta. Maria v. Lopez and
Divinagracia, Jr. v. Sto. Tomas.
The CSC also ruled that a request for transfer, under CSC Memorandum Circular No. 98-38,
must be in writing; and that even assuming that a verbal request for transfer may be made, Rosales
failed to adduce any proof that Mijares made such verbal request, as well as the date of the effectivity
of the transfer.
CA: Dismissed the petition and affirmed the resolutions of the CSC. MR denied too.

issue
WON the dismissal of Mijares was proper – NO.
WON Rosales had been deprived of due process for not being heard on his arguments regarding the
approval by the CSC. NO.
WON the CSC properly considered the appeal of Mijares given that it was filed beyond the reglamentary
period. YES.

ratio
As regards the dismissal of Mijares
CSC Memorandum Circular No. 93-38 reads:
Transfer is a movement from one position without break in service involving the issuance of an
appointment.
The transfer may be from one agency to another or from one organizational unit to another in
the same agency.
An employee who seeks transfer to another office shall first secure permission from the head of
the department or agency where he is employed stating the effective date of the transfer. If the
request to transfer of an employee is not granted by the head of the agency where he is
employed, it shall be deemed approved after the lapse of 30 days from the date of notice to the
agency head.
If, for whatever reason, the employee fails to transfer on the specified date, he shall be
considered resigned and his reemployment in his former office shall be at the discretion of his
head.

The CSC interpreted its Memorandum as requiring a written and not merely a verbal request
for an employee to transfer to another office. Moreover, such request must be express and unequivocal,
and cannot be merely implied or ambiguous. The request by an employee to transfer to another office must
be such that he intended to surrender his permanent office.
Also, a transfer connotes an absolute relinquishment of an office in exchange for another office. Such
request must be voluntary on the part of the officer concerned and not vitiated by force, coercion, or
intimidation or even deceit. Indeed, in Sta. Maria v. Lopez, the Court held that:
A transfer that results in promotion or demotion, advancement or reduction or a transfer that
aims to lure the employee away from his permanent position, cannot be done without the
employees consent. […]
The Court also held that unconsented transfer is anathema to security of tenure. A transfer that aims by
indirect method to terminate services or to force resignation constitutes removal. An employee cannot be
transferred unless for causes provided for by law and after due process. Any attempt to breach the protective
wall built around the employees right to security of tenure should be slain on sight. The right of employees
to security of tenure should never be sacrificed merely at the whims and pleasure of some unscrupulous and
heartless politicians.

As applied.
Rosales, who perceived that the respondent was a well-known supporter of the political party opposed
to his candidacy, coerced the respondent into resigning and even threatened to have his position abolished.
Before the elections, there was no reason for Mijares to abandon his position as Municipal Engineer and
seek a transfer to another office. Mijares’ ordeal commenced only after the election of Rosales, who
subsequently coerced Mijares into resigning or transferring to another position.
What about the letter of Mijares? In light of the demands and threats by Rosales, Mijares had only 3
options: to resign, to agree to transfer to another office, or to remain as Municipal Engineer with the threat
of the petitioner to have his position abolished hanging over his head.
Admittedly, rather than resigning, Mijares opted to make himself available for appointment by the
Provincial Governor. However, the Form 212 submitted by the respondent to the Provincial Governor is
not the written request envisaged in CSC Memorandum Circular No. 93-38 for the following reasons:
(a) Mijares continued reporting and performing his duties as Municipal Engineer of Catarman and
receiving his salary as such; and
(b) Mijares did not send any written request to the petitioner for transfer.
Evidently, Mijares waited until the Governor agreed to the transfer because he did not want to risk
unemployment by making a written request for transfer without first being assured of his appointment. As
it were, the Governor failed to act on the respondents application.
Dahil sa kasamaan ni Rosales, he wrote to Mijares to “inform” the latter that his request for transfer
had been granted, knowing fully well that Mijares had not yet made such a written request for transfer.

[Detail v. Transfer]
The purported permit to transfer issued by movant unmistakably refers to a personnel action other than
a transfer. The said permit does not contemplate a transfer as defined under the Civil Service Law and
Rules. Rather, such a personnel action is in reality a detail because Mijares is to be temporarily moved
for a period of 30 days from his employer, the Municipal Government of Catarman, to the Provincial
Engineering Office.
Rosales made it appear that he had granted the permission to transfer within 30 days, and that the
respondent failed to effect his transfer. This was done by the petitioner despite the absence of any letter
from the respondent requesting for such transfer. It must be stressed that the only legal effect of a detail
of an employee, upon the lapse of the period of such detail, is for that employee to return to his
permanent station. Thus, Mijares retained his position as Municipal Engineer despite his detail.

WRT issue of deprivation of due process by Rosales

There is no merit in Rosales’ insistence that he was denied due process because the CSC did not
consider the documentary evidence attached to his comment.
 The petitioner cannot find solace in the October 28, 1998 Opinion of Judith Chicano, Regional Director
of Region 8 of the CSC, and the letter- opinion of the Provincial Prosecutor stating that the petitioner
correctly applied CSC Memorandum Circular No. 93-38. This is because:
(a) Rosales falsely represented to the RD and PP that Mijares had requested for a transfer to the Office
of the Provincial Engineer when, in truth and in fact, Mijares had not done so;
(b) The RD and the PP were not even furnished with copies of the October 2, 1998 Letter of Mijares;
and
(c) The opinion of the CSC RD and PP were not conclusive on the CSC, as the latter could still reverse
the said opinion on appeal.
WRT issue of appeal
The CSC need not delve much on the dates when Mijares was separated from the service and when he
assailed his separation. Suffice it to state that the Commission found his appeal meritorious. This being the
case, procedural rules need not be strictly observed. (Mauna vs. CSC)
Assuming for the sake of argument that the petitioners appeal was filed out of time, it is within the
power of this Court to temper rigid rules in favor of substantial justice. While it is desirable that the Rules
of Court be faithfully and even meticulously observed, courts should not be so strict about procedural lapses
that do not really impair the proper administration of justice. If the rules are intended to ensure the orderly
conduct of litigation, it is because of the higher objective they seek which is the protection of substantive
rights of the parties.
Besides, Mijares assailed his separation from the service and asserted his right to his office within 1
year from his separation. This being so, the CSC correctly gave due course to his appeal.
PLUS! What is ironic is that it is only now that movant raised the issue on timeliness of filing an appeal.
Never did he assail this matter in his comment. In his comment on the appeal of the respondent, the
petitioner did not contest the timeliness of the said appeal and opted to delve into and discuss the merits of
the case.
Admin - Chapter 5 – Powers and Functions of Local Governments

MANILA VS IAC
FACTS: Vivencio Sto. Domingo, Sr. deceased husband of plaintiff Irene Sto.Domingo and father of the
litigating minors, died on June 4, 1971 and buriedon June 6, 1971 in Lot. No. 159, Block No. 194 of the
North Cemetery whichlot was leased by the city to irene Sto. Domingo for the period from June 6,1971 to
June 6, 2021. Full payment of the rental therefor of P50.00 isevidenced by a receipt which appears to be
regular on its face. The burialrecord for Block No. 149 of Manila North Cemetery in which subject Lot.
159is situated does not reflect the term of duration of the lease thereover infavor of the St. Domingo.On
January 25, 1978, the subject Lot No. 159 of Block 194 in which the mortalremains of the late Vivencio
Sto. Domingo were laid to rest was made readyfor exhumation in accordance with Administrative Order
No. 5, Series of 1975, dated March 6, 1975.
On the basis of such certification, the authoritiesof the North Cemetery then headed by defendant Joseph
Helmuth authorizedthe exhumation and removal from subject burial lot the remains of the lateVivencio Sto.
Domingo., placed the bones and skull in a bag or sack and kept the same in the depository or bodega of the
cemetery. Subsequently, the same lot in question was rented out to another lessee so when the
Sto.Domingos went to said lot on All Souls Day they were shocked and dismayed that the resting place of
their dear departed did not anymore bear the stone marker which they lovingly placed on the tomb. Irene
Sto. Domingo was told about the lease of the lot to another lessee and that she can look for thebones of her
deceased husband in the warehouse of the cemetery where the exhumed remains from the different burial
lots of the North Cemetery are being kept until they are retrieved by interested parties.
What she was advised to do was simply unacceptable; hence, the bereaved widow came to court for relief
even before she could formally present her claims and demands to the city government and to the other
defendants named in the present complaint. The RTC rendered its Decision in favor of the complainants.
The decision was appealed to the CA which rendered a decision modifying the decision appealed from.
Petitioners alleged in their petition that the North Cemetery is exclusively devoted for public use or purpose
as stated in Sec. 316 of the Compilation of the Ordinances of the City of Manila. They conclude that since
the City is apolitical subdivision in the performance of its governmental function, it is immune from tort
liability which may be caused by its public officers and subordinate employees. Further Section 4, Article
I of the Revised Charter of Manila exempts the city from liability for damages or injuries to persons or
property arising from the failure of the Mayor, the Municipal Board, or any other city officer, to enforce
the provision of its charter or any other laws, or ordinance, or from negligence of said Mayor, Municipal
Board or any other officers while enforcing or attempting to enforce said provisions.
They allege that the Revised Charter of Manila being a special law cannot be defeated by the Human
Relations provisions of the Civil Code being a general law. Private respondents on the other hand maintain
that the City of Manila entered into a contract of lease which involve the exercise of proprietary functions
with private respondent Irene Sto. Domingo. The city and its officers therefore can be sued for any-violation
of the contract of lease.

ISSUE:
WON the operations and functions of a public cemetery are agovernmental, or a corporate or proprietary
function of the City of Manila.
HELD:
Private respondents' are right.Under Philippine laws, the City of Manila is a political body corporate and
assuch endowed with the faculties of municipal corporations to be exercised byand through its city
government in conformity with law, and in its propercorporate name. It may sue and be sued, and contract
and be contractedwith. Its powers are twofold in character-public, governmental or political onthe one hand,
and corporate, private and proprietary on the other.
Governmental powers are those exercised in administering thepowers of the state and promoting the public
welfare and theyinclude the legislative, judicial, public and political.
Municipalpowers on the one hand are exercised for the special benefitand advantage of the community and
include those which areministerial, private and corporate.
In McQuillin on MunicipalCorporation, the rule is stated thus: "A municipal corporation proper has ...
apublic character as regards the state at large insofar as it is its agent ingovernment, and private (so called)
insofar as it is to promote localnecessities and conveniences for its own community. In connection with
thepowers of a municipal corporation, it may acquire property in its public orgovernmental capacity, and
private or proprietary capacity. The New CivilCode divides such properties into property for public use and
patrimonialproperties (Article 423), and further enumerates the properties for public useas provincial roads,
city streets, municipal streets, the squares, fountains,public waters, promenades, and public works for public
service paid for bysaid provisions, cities or municipalities, all other property is patrimonialwithout prejudice
to the provisions of special laws. Thus in Torio v. Fontanilla, supra, the Court declared that with respect
toproprietary functions the settled rule is that a municipal corporation can be held liable to third persons ex
contractu or ex delicto.
The Court further stressed that Municipal corporations are subject to be suedupon contracts and in tort....
The rule of law is a general one, that thesuperior or employer must answer civilly for the negligence or
want of skill of its agent or servant in the course or line of his employment, by which anotherwho is free
from contributory fault, is injured. Municipal corporations underthe conditions herein stated, fall within tile
operation of this rule of law, andare liable accordingly, to civil actions for damages when the
requisiteelements of liability co-exist. ... The court added that while the following are corporate or
proprietary incharacter, viz: municipal waterworks, slaughter houses, markets, stables,bathing
establishments, wharves, ferries and fisheries. Maintenance of parks,golf courses, cemeteries and airports
among others, are also recognized asmunicipal or city activities of a proprietary character. Under the
foregoingconsiderations and in the absence of a special law,
the North Cemeteryis a patrimonial property of the City of Manila which wascreated by resolution of the
Municipal Board of August 27,1903 and January 7, 1904.
The administration and government of thecemetery are under the City Health Officer, the order and police
of thecemetery , the opening of graves, niches, or tombs, the exhuming of remains,and the purification of
the same are under the charge and responsibility of the superintendent of the cemetery. The City of Manila
furthermoreprescribes the procedure and guidelines for the use and dispositions of buriallots and plots
within the North Cemetery through Administrative Order No. 5,s. 1975. With the acts of dominion, there
is, therefore no doubt that the NorthCemetery is within the class of property which the City of Manila owns
in itsproprietary or private character. Furthermore, there is no dispute that theburial lot was leased in favor
of the private respondents. Hence, obligationsarising from contracts have the force of law between the
contracting parties. Thus a lease contract executed by the lessor and lessee remains as the lawbetween them.
Therefore, a breach of contractual provision entitles the otherparty to damages even if no penalty for such
breach is prescribed in thecontract.As regards the issue of the validity of the contract of lease of grave lot
No.159, Block No. 195 of the North Cemetery for 50 years beginning from June 6,1971 to June 6, 2021 as
clearly stated in the receipt duly signed by thedeputy treasurer of the City of Manila and sealed by the city
government,there is nothing in the record that justifies the reversal of the conclusion of both the trial court
and the Intermediate Appellate Court to the effect thatthe receipt is in itself a contract of lease.

Under the doctrine of respondent superior, (Torio v. Fontanilla, supra),petitioner City of Manila is liable
for the tortious act committed by its agentswho failed to verify and check the duration of the contract of
lease. Thecontention of the petitioner-city that the lease is covered by AdministrativeOrder No. 5, series of
1975 dated March 6, 1975 of the City of Manila for five(5) years only beginning from June 6, 1971 is not
meritorious for the saidadministrative order covers new leases. When subject lot was certified on January
25, 1978 as ready for exhumation, the lease contract for fifty (50)years was still in full force and effect. The
decision of the IAC is hereby AFFIRMED.
MMDA Vs. Bel-Air Village [328 SCRA 836; G.R. No. 135962; 27 Mar 2000]
Facts: Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA), petitioner herein, is a Government Agency
tasked with the delivery of basic services in Metro Manila. Bel-Air Village Association (BAVA),
respondent herein, received a letter of request from the petitioner to open Neptune Street of Bel-Air Village
for the use of the public. The said opening of Neptune Street will be for the safe and convenient movement
of persons and to regulate the flow of traffic in Makati City. This was pursuant to MMDA law or Republic
Act No. 7924. On the same day, the respondent was appraised that the perimeter wall separating the
subdivision and Kalayaan Avenue would be demolished.
The respondent, to stop the opening of the said street and demolition of the wall, filed a preliminary
injunction and a temporary restraining order. Respondent claimed that the MMDA had no authority to do
so and the lower court decided in favor of the Respondent. Petitioner appealed the decision of the lower
courts and claimed that it has the authority to open Neptune Street to public traffic because it is an agent of
the State that can practice police power in the delivery of basic services in Metro Manila.
Issue: Whether or not the MMDA has the mandate to open Neptune Street to public traffic pursuant to its
regulatory and police powers.

Held: The Court held that the MMDA does not have the capacity to exercise police power. Police power is
primarily lodged in the National Legislature. However, police power may be delegated to government units.
Petitioner herein is a development authority and not a political government unit. Therefore, the MMDA
cannot exercise police power because it cannot be delegated to them. It is not a legislative unit of the
government. Republic Act No. 7924 does not empower the MMDA to enact ordinances, approve resolutions
and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the inhabitants of Manila. There is no syllable in the said
act that grants MMDA police power.
It is an agency created for the purpose of laying down policies and coordinating with various national
government agencies, people’s organizations, non-governmental organizations and the private sector for
the efficient and expeditious delivery of basic services in the vast metropolitan area.
National Power Corporation vs. Angas [GR 60225-26, 8 May 1992]
Facts: On 13 April and 3 December 1974, the National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR), a
governmentowned and controlled corporation and the agency through which the government undertakes
the on-going infrastructure and development projects throughout the country, filed two complaints for
eminent domain with the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Lanao del Sur (against
Lacsamana Batugan, and/or Guimba Shipping & Development Corporation, Magancong Digayan, Moctara
Lampaco, Lampaco Pasandalan, Dimaporo Subang, Hadji Daluma Kinidar, Dimaampao Baute, Pangonotan
Cosna Tagol, Salacop Dimacaling, Hadji Sittie Sohra Linang Batara, Bertudan Pimping And/Or Cadurog
Pimping, Butuan Tagol, Disangcopan Marabong, and Hadji Salic Sawa in Civil Case 2248; and against
Mangorsi Casan, Casnangan Batugan, Pundamarug Atocal, Pasayod Pado, Dimaampao Baute, Casnangan
Baute, Dimaporo Subang, Tambilawan Ote, Manisun Atocal, and Masacal Tomiara in Civil Case 2277).
The complaint which sought to expropriate certain specified lots situated at Limogao, Saguiaran, Lanao del
Sur was for the purpose of the development of hydro-electric power and production of electricity as well as
the erection to such subsidiary works and constructions as may be necessarily connected therewith. Both
cases were jointly tried upon
agreement of the parties. After a series of hearings were held, on 15 June 1979, a consolidated decision was
rendered by the lower court, declaring and confirming that the lots mentioned and described in the
complaints have entirely been lawfully condemned and expropriated by NAPOCOR, and ordering the latter
to pay the landowners certain sums of money as just compensation for their lands expropriated "with legal
interest thereon until fully paid. Two consecutive motions for reconsideration of the consolidated decision
were filed by NAPOCOR.
The same were denied by the court. NAPOCOR did not appeal on the consolidated decision, which became
final and executory. Thus, on 16 May 1980, one of the landowners (Sittie Sohra Batara) filed an ex-parte
motion for the execution of the decision, praying that petitioner be directed to pay her the unpaid balance
of P14,300.00 for the lands expropriated from her, including legal interest which she computed at 6% per
annum.
The said motion was granted by the lower court. Thereafter, the lower court directed the petitioner to deposit
with its Clerk of Court the sums of money as adjudged in the joint decision dated 15 June 1979. NAPOCOR
complied with said order and deposited the sums of money with interest computed at 6% per annum. On
10 February 1981, another landowner (Pangonatan Cosna Tagol) filed with the trial court an exparte motion
praying, for the first time, that the legal interest on the just compensation awarded to her by the court be
computed at 12% per annum as allegedly "authorized under and by virtue of Circular 416 of the Central
Bank issued pursuant to Presidential Decree 116 and in a decision of the Supreme Court that legal interest
allowed in the judgment of the courts, in the absence of express contract, shall be computed at 12% per
annum." On 11 February 1981, the lower court granted the said motion allowing 12% interest per annum.
Subsequently, the other landowners filed motions also praying that the legal interest on the just
compensation awarded to them be computed at 12% per annum, on the basis of which the lower court issued
on 10 March 1981 and 28 August 1981 orders bearing similar import. NAPOCOR moved for the
reconsideration of the lower court's last order dated 28 August 1981, which the court denied on 25 January
1982. NAPOCOR filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether, in the computation of the legal rate of interest on just compensation for expropriated lands,
the rate applicable as legal interest is 6% (Article 2209 of the Civil Code) or 12% (Central Bank Circular
416).
Held:
Article 2209 of the Civil Code, which provides that "If the obligation consists in the payment of a sum of
money, and the debtor incurs a delay, the indemnity for damages, there being no stipulation to the contrary,
shall be the payment of the interest agreed upon, and in the absence of stipulation, the legal interest, which
is six percent per annum," and not Central Bank Circular 416, is the law applicable. The Central Bank
circular applies only to loan or forbearance of money, goods or credits and to judgments involving such
loan or forbearance of money, goods or credits. This is evident not only from said circular but also from
Presidential Decree 116, which amended Act 2655, otherwise known as the Usury Law. On the other hand,
Article 2209 of the Civil Code applies to transactions requiring the payment of indemnities as damages, in
connection with any delay in the performance of the obligation arising therefrom other than those covering
loan or forbearance of money, goods or credits. Herein, the transaction involved is clearly not a loan or
forbearance of money, goods or credits but expropriation of certain parcels of land for a public purpose, the
payment of which is without stipulation regarding interest, and the interest adjudged by the trial court is in
the nature of indemnity for damages. The legal interest required to be paid on the amount of just
compensation for the properties expropriated is manifestly in the form of indemnity for damages for the
delay in the payment thereof. Therefore, since the kind of interest involved in the joint judgment of the
lower court sought to be enforced in this case is interest by way of damages, and not by way of earnings
from loans, etc. Article 2209 of the Civil Code shall apply.
J.B.L. Reyes, Edmundo Reyes, et al, petitioner, v. Board of Assessment Appeals of Manila and City
Assessor of Manila, respondents:
G.R. Nos. L-49839-46, 196 SCRA 322

FACTS:
J.B.L Reyes, et al., petitioners, owners of parcels of land in Tondo and Sta. Cruz Districts, City of Manila
which are leased by tenants for a monthly rentals not exceeding three hundred pesos (P300.00) in July 1971.
Around that time, a law was passed prohibiting the increase of rentals of properties leased for rentals not
exceeding P300.00 monthly and ejecting lessees after the expiration of the usual legal period of lease. In
1973, respondent City Assessor of Manila re-classified and reassessed the value of the subject properties
based on the schedule of market values which entailed an increase in the acorresponding tax rates prompting
petitioners to file a Memorandum of Disagreement with the Board of Tax Assessment Appeals. They
averred that the reassessments made were "excessive, unwarranted, inequitable, confiscatory and
unconstitutional" considering that the taxes imposed upon them greatly exceeded the annual income derived
from their properties. They argued that the income approach should have been used in determining the land
values instead of the comparable sales approach which the City Assessor adopted

ISSUE:
Is the approach adopted by the City Assessor appropriate in assessing the property?

HELD
No. The taxing power is an attribute of sovereignty. However, the power to tax is not unconfined as there
are restrictions. The due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution limit this power. The laws
should operate equally and uniformly on all persons under similar circumstances or that all persons must
be treated in the same manner, the conditions not being different both in the privileges conferred and the
liabilities imposed. The market value of properties covered by P.D. No. 20 cannot be equated with the
market value of properties not covered. The former has naturally a much lesser market value in view of the
rental restrictions. Consequently, the use of the Comparable Sales Approach in the assessment of the
properties on the ground of uniformity is unreasonable.