Admin Law

BASIC PRINCIPLES

US VS DORR

Facts: Fred L. Dorr and a number of other persons (Dorr, et al.) were convicted of violating Section 8 of
Act No. 292 which punishes the utterance of "seditious words or speeches" and the writing, publication,
or circulation of "scurrilous libels against the Government of the United States or the Insular
Government of the Philippine Islands" or other libels against the same entities which (1) "tend to disturb
or obstruct any lawful officer in executing his office", (2) "tend to instigate others to cabal or meet
together for unlawful purposes", (3) "suggest or incite rebellious conspiracies or riots", or (4) "tend to
stir up the people against the lawful authorities or to disturb the peace of the community, the safety,
and order of the Government". The same provision also punishes the deliberate concealment of
the aforementioned acts.

The charge against Dorr et al. stemmed from an article published in the newspaper Manila
Freedom criticizing the appointment by the Civil Commission of certain persons— including Trinidad H.
Pardo de Tavera— to key government positions. The said article referred to the aforementioned
appointees as "rascals" and "corrupt" and called certain government offices organized by the Civil
Commission as "rotten" and "corrupt".

Issue: Whether or not the article be regarded as embraced within the description of scurrilous libels
against the Government of the United States or the Insular Government of the Philippine Islands

Held: No. The important question is to determine what is meant in section 8 of Act No. 292 by the
expression “the Insular Government of the Philippine Islands.” Does it mean in a general and abstract
sense the existing laws and institutions of the Islands, or does it mean the aggregate of the individuals
by whom the Government of the Islands is, for the time being, administered? Either sense would
doubtless be admissible.

We understand, in modern political science, by the term “government”, that institution or aggregate of
institutions by which an independent society makes and carries out those rules of action which are
necessary to enable men to live in a social state, or which are imposed upon the people forming that
society by those who possess the power or authority of prescribing them. Government is the aggregate
of authorities which rule a society. By “administration” again, we understand in modern times, and
especially more or less free countries, the aggregate of those persons in whose hands the reins of
government are for the time being (the chief ministers or heads of departments).” (Bouvier, Law
Dictionary, 891.) But the writer adds that the terms “government” and “administration” are not always
used in their strictness, and that “government” is often used as “Administration”.

The article in question contains no attack upon the governmental system of the United States, and it is
quite apparent that, though grossly abusive as respects both the Commission as a body and some of its
individual members, it contains no attack upon the governmental system by which the authority of the
United States is enforced in these lands. The form of Government by a Civil Commission and a Civil
Governor is not assailed. It is the character of the men who are intrusted with the administration of the
government that the writer is seeking to bring into disrepute by impugning the purity of their motives,
their public integrity, and their private morals, and the wisdom of their policy. The publication of the
article, therefore, no seditious tendency apparent, constitutes no offense under Sec. 8 of Act No. 292.

Ratio: Government is the aggregate of authorities which rule a society. By “administration” again, we
understand in modern times, and especially more or less free countries, the aggregate of those persons
in whose hands the reins of government are for the time being (the chief ministers or heads of
departments).” The terms “government” and “administration” are not always used in their strictness,
and that “government” is often used as “Administration”.
Bacani VS NACOCO

Facts: Plaintiffs Bacani and Matto are both court stenographers assigned in Branch VI of the Court of
First Instance of Manila.

During the pendency of a civil case in the said court, Francisco Sycip vs. National Coconut Corporation,
Assistant Corporate Counsel Federico Alikpala, counsel for Defendant, requested said stenographers for
copies of the transcript of the stenographic notes taken by them during the hearing. Plaintiffs complied
with the request by delivering to Counsel Alikpala the needed transcript containing 714 pages and
thereafter submitted to him their bills for the payment of their fees.

The National Coconut Corporation (NACOCO) paid the amount of P564 to Leopoldo T. Bacani and P150
to Mateo A. Matoto for said transcript at the rate of P1 per page. But the Auditor General required the
plaintiffs to reimburse said amounts by virtue of a Department of Justice circular which stated that
NACOCO, being a government entity, was exempt from the payment of the fees in question. For
reimbursement to take place, it was further ordered that the amount of P25 per payday be deducted
from the salary of Bacani and P10 from the salary of Matoto.

Petitioners filed an action in Court countering that NACOCO is not a government entity within the
purview of section 16, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. On the other hand, the defendants set up a
defense that NACOCO is a government entity within the purview of section 2 of the Revised
Administrative Code of 1917 hence, it is exempted from paying the stenographers’ fees under Rule 130
of the Rules of Court.

Issue: Whether or not National Coconut Corporation (NACOCO), which performs certain functions of
government, make them a part of the Government of the Philippines.

Held: No. NACOCO is not considered a government entity and is not exempted from paying the
stenographers’ fees under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.

Sec. 2 of the Revised Administrative Code defines the scope of the term “Government of the Republic of
the Philippines”. The term “Government” may be defined as “that institution or aggregate of institutions
by which an independent society makes and carries out those rules of action which are necessary to
enable men to live in a social state, or which are imposed upon the people forming that society by those
who possess the power or authority of prescribing them” (U.S. vs. Dorr, 2 Phil., 332). This institution,
when referring to the national government, has reference to what our Constitution has established
composed of three great departments, the legislative, executive, and the judicial, through which the
powers and functions of government are exercised. These functions are twofold: constitute and
ministrant. The former are those which constitute the very bonds of society and are compulsory in
nature; the latter are those that are undertaken only by way of advancing the general interests of
society, and are merely optional.
Central Bank VS CA and Ablaza Construction

Facts: This is a petition made by the Central Bank which was held to pay respondent Ablaza for damages
for breach of contract. In this case, it appears that after going thru the process of usual bidding, CB
awarded to Ablaza a construction contract and allowed Ablaza to commence work. However, The Bank
therafter refused to proceed with the project unless the plans were revised and a lower price were
agreed to by Ablaza.

CB raises that there was no perfected contract between the parties as there was no compliance with the
requirement under Sec. 607 of the Revised Administrative Code which provides:

Section 607. Certificate showing appropriation to meet contract.— Except in the case of a contract for
personal service or for supplies to be carried in stock, no contract involving an expenditure by the
National Government of three thousand pesos or more shall be entered into or authorized until the
Auditor General shall have certified to the officer entering into such obligation that funds have been
duly appropriated for such purpose and that th eamount necessary to cover the proposed contract is
available for expenditure on account thereof. Xxx

CB contends that in view of such omission and considering the provisions of Section 608 of the same
code to the effect that "a purported contract entered into contrary to the requirements of the next
preceding section hereof shall be wholly void. That there was no contract was ever perfected as only the
first stage, that is the award of contract was completed.

Issues: WON the aforementioned provisions apply to the Central Bank so as to render the contract void.

WON Central Bank is part of the National Government.

Held: 1. No. Our considered view that contracts entered into by petitioner Central Bank are not within
the contemplation of Sections 607 and 608 cited by it. Immediately to be noted, Section 607 specifically
refers to "expenditure(s) of the National Government" and that the term "National Government" may
not be deemed to include the Central Bank. Under the Administrative Code itself, the term "National
Government" refers only to the central government, consisting of the legislative, executive and judicial
departments of the government, as distinguished from local governments and other governmental
entities and is not synonymous, therefore, with the terms "The Government of the Republic of the
Philippines" or "Philippine Government", which are the expressions broad enough to include not only
the central government but also the provincial and municipal governments, chartered cities and other
government-controlled corporations or agencies, like the Central Bank. (I, Martin, Administrative Code,
p. 15.)

To be sure the Central Bank is a government instrumentality. But it was created as an autonomous body
corporate to be governed by the provisions of its charter, Republic Act 265, "to administer the monetary
and banking system of the Republic." (Sec. 1) As such, it is authorized "to adopt, alter and use a
corporate seal which shall be judicially noticed; to make contracts; to lease or own real and personal
property, and to sell or otherwise dispose of the same; to sue and be sued; and otherwise to do and
perform any and all things that may be necessary or proper to carry out the purposes of this Act. The
Central Bank may acquire and hold such assets and incur such liabilities as result directly from
operations authorized by the provisions of this Act, or as are essential to the proper conduct of such
operations." (Sec. 4) It has capital of its own and operates under a budget prepared by its own Monetary
Board and otherwise appropriates money for its operations and other expenditures independently of
the national budget. It does not depend on the National Government for the financing of its operations;
it is the National Government that occasionally resorts to it for needed budgetary accommodations.
Under Section 14 of the Bank's charter, the Monetary Board may authorize such expenditures by the
Central Bank as are in the interest of the effective administration and operation of the Bank." Its
prerogative to incur such liabilities and expenditures is not subject to any prerequisite found in any
statute or regulation not expressly applicable to it. Relevantly to the issues in this case, it is not subject,
like the Social Security Commission, to Section 1901 and related provisions of the Revised Administrative
Code which require national government constructions to be done by or under the supervision of the
Bureau of Public Works. (Op. of the Sec. of Justice No. 92, Series of 1960) For these reasons, the
provisions of the Revised Administrative Code invoked by the Bank do not apply to it. To Our knowledge,
in no other instance has the Bank ever considered itself subject thereto.
C and C Commercial Corp. VS NAWASA

Facts: C&C filed a complaint against NAWASA alleging that was excluded when NAWASA started
negotiate for direct purchase of centrifugally iron pipes for the improvement of the San Pablo
Waterworks System, which is in violation of RA 912 and the law on biddings, which provides:

Sec. 1. In construction or repair work undertaken by the Government, whether done directly or through
contract awards, Philippine made materials and products, whenever available, practicable and usable,
and will serve the purpose as equally well as foreign made products or materials, shall be used in said
construction or repair work, upon the proper certification of the availability, practicability, usability and
durability of said materials or products by the Director of the Bureau of Public Works and/or his
assistants.

C&C also filed a supplemental complaint when NAWASA called for bids for the supply of 24-inch steel
pipes, asbestos, cement pressure pipes, and cast iron pipes for the Davao Metropolitan Waterworks
System. And awarded contracts for the same as well as for the Iloilo Waterworks System.

The court rendered a decision finding and concluding that the act of the NAWASA in specifying steel
pipes for the project of the city of Manila and its suburbs, and in awarding the contracts for the supply
of steel pipes in the cases of the Davao and Iloilo Waterworks System, constituted a violation of the
provisions of Republic Act 912. NAWASA appealed contending that the provisions of Republic Act 912,
are applicable only to construction or repair works undertaken by the Government. It argues, that since
the NAWASA, though a public corporation, is not a municipal corporation or agency of the State
empowered to regulate or administer the local affairs of a town or city,2 nor one of the various arms of
the government through which political authority is made effective in the Islands, consequently, the
NAWASA should not be included within the meaning of the term "Government" as used in the law.

Issue: 1. WON NAWASA is included as part of the “Government:

2. WON NAWASA violated RA 912

Held: 1. Yes. It is to be noted, however, that Section 2 of the Revised Administrative Code defining the
term "Government" which is heavily relied upon by the appellant recognizes an exception: "when a
different meaning for the word or phrase is given a particular statute or is plainly to be collected from
the context or connection where the term is used." In this context of the law, the term "government"
without any qualification as used in Republic Act 912, should be construed in its implied sense and not in
the strict signification of the term "Government of the Philippines" as the political entity through which
political authority is exercised. A comparative analysis of Republic Act 912 and Commonwealth Act 138,
otherwise known as the "Flag Law" the latter "An Act to give Native Products and Domestic Entities the
Preference in the Purchase of Articles for the Government", and the former "An Act to Require the Use,
Under Certain Conditions, of Philippine Made Materials or Products in Government Projects or Public
Works Construction, Whether Done Directly by the Government or Awarded thru Contracts", discloses
that both relate to the same subject matter and have the same nationalistic purpose or object: to give
preference to locally produced materials in purchases, works or projects of the Government. The
oberservation that Commonwealth Act 138 expressly includespurchases by Government-owned
companies, while Republic Act 912 merely relates to construction or repair work done by the
Government, is no argument for the proposition that government-owned or controlled corporations
have been excepted from the operation of the latter law, for it is clear that Commonwealth Act 138 also
ordains that the Purchase and Equipment Division of government-owned companies authorized to
purchase or contract for materials and supplies for public use, buildings, or public works, shall give
preference to locally produced materials or products. Being statutes in pari materia they should be
construed together to attain the purpose of an expressed national policy.

2. No. After re-examination, the Court found that the C & C Commercial Corporation had not produced
pipes larger than 12 inches in diameter and in light of other evidence, the Court deduced that it is the
practice of the NAWASA — which we find both practical and logical — to send out its own men to the
various local manufacturing plants for the purpose of knowing the availability of materials needed for its
projects; that at the time it specified 18 and 24 inches diameter steel pipes for the Davao and Iloilo
waterworks projects, there were no locally produced materials in said sizes; and that with respect to
those sizes that were already available, the NAWASA has actually specified and used them in various
other construction and repair works even without the certification of the Director of Public Works. We
really do not see Our way clear how herein appellee could have charged that the NAWASA had
discriminated against its products under the circumstances when its own president admits that it has
supplied the NAWASA before locally produced asbestos cement pressure pipes up to 12 inches diameter
only and all those with diameters above 12 inches were of foreign manufacture. The evidence,
therefore, is conclusive that locally produced asbestos pipes above 12 inches in diameter were not
available for purposes of claiming any preference under the provisions of Republic Act 912.
Aratuc VS COMELEC

Facts: Petitioner Aratuc filed a petition for certiorari, to review the decision of respondent Comelec. A
supervening panel headed by Comelec had conducted hearings of the complaints of the petitioner
therein alleged irregularities in the election records. In order for the Commission to decide properly. It
will have to go deep into the examination of the voting records and registration records and it will have
to interview and get statements from persons under oath from the area to determine whether actual
voting took place. The Comelec then rendered its resolution being assailed in these cases, declaring the
final result of the canvass.

Issue: Whether the Comelec committee committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction?

Held: No. “As the Superior administrative body having control over boards of canvassers, the Comelec
may review the actuations of the Regional Board of Canvassers, such as by extending its inquiry beyond
the election records of the voting centers in questions.”

“The authority of the Commission is in reviewing such actuations does not spring from any appellant
jurisdiction conferred by any provisions of the law, for there is none such
provisionanywhere in the election Code, but from the plenary prerogative of direct control andsupervisi
on endowed to it by the provisions in Section 168. And in administrative law, it is a too well settled
postulate to need any supporting citation here, that a superior body or office having supervision and
control over another may do directly what the latter is supposed to do or ought to have done.
Astrurias Sugar VS Commissioner of Customs

Facts: The petitioner Asturias Sugar Central, Inc. is engaged in the production and milling of centrifugal
sugar for exert, the sugar so produced being placed in containers known as jute bags. In 1957 it made
two importations of jute bags. In the first shipment, the petitioner filed Re-exportation and Special
Import Tax Bond no. 1 in the amounts of P25,088 and P2,464.50 and in the second shipment, the
petitioner filed Re-exportation and Special Import Tax Bond no. 6 in the amounts of P42,112 and
P7,984.44, On February 6,1958 the petitioner, thru its agent Theo. H. Davies & Co., Far East, Ltd.,
requested the Commissioner of Customs for a week's extension of Re-exportation and Special Import
Tax Bond no. 6 which was to expire the following day, this request was denied by the Commissioner.
Due to the petitioner's failure to show proof of the exportation of the balance of 86,353 jute bags within
one year from their importation, the Collector of Customs of Iloilo, on March 17, 1958, required it to pay
the amount of P28,629.42representing the customs duties and special import tax due thereon, which
amount the petitioner paid under protest. The petitioner demanded the refund of the amount it had
paid, on the ground that its request for extension of the period of one year was filed on time, and that
its failure to export the jute bags within the required one-year period was due to delay in the arrival of
the vessel on which they were to be loaded and to the picketing of the Central railroad line.
Alternatively, the petitioner asked for refund of the same amount in the form of a drawback under
section 106(b) in relation to section 105(x) of the Tariff and Customs Code. The Collector of Customs
denied the claim for refund. Court of Tax Appeals affirmed the decision. The petitioner argues that the
Court of Tax Appeals erred in not declaring that it is within the power of the Collector of Customs and/or
the Commissioner of Customs to extend the period of one (1) year within which the jute bags should be
exported.

Issue: WON the Commissioner of Customs is vested, under the Philippine Tariff Act of 1909, the then
applicable law, with discretion to extend the period of one year provided for in section 23

Held: Sec. 23 of the Philippine Tariff Act of 1909 provides that: That containers, such as casks, large
metal, glass, or other receptacles which are, in the opinion of the collector of customs, of such a
character as to be readily identifiable may be delivered to the importer thereof upon identification and
the giving of a bond with sureties satisfactory to the collector of customs in an amount equal to double
the estimated duties thereon, conditioned for the exportation thereof or payment of the corresponding
duties thereon within one year from the date of importation, under such rules and regulations as the
Insular Collector of Customs shall provide

It will be noted that section 23 of the Philippine Tariff Act of 1909 and the superseding sec. 105(x) of the
Tariff and Customs Code, while fixing at one year the period within which the containers therein
mentioned must be exported, are silent as to whether the said period may be extended. It was surely by
reason of this silence that the Bureau of Customs issued Administrative Orders 389 and 66, already
adverted to, to eliminate confusion and provide a guide as to how it shall apply the law, 2 and, more
specifically, to make officially known its policy to consider the one-year period mentioned in the law as
non-extendible.

Considering that the Bureau of Customs is the office charged with implementing and enforcing the
provisions of our Tariff and Customs Code, the construction placed by it thereon should be given
controlling weight.
In applying the doctrine or principle of respect for administrative or practical construction, the courts
often refer to several factors which may be regarded as bases of the principle, as factors leading the
courts to give the principle controlling weight in particular instances, or as independent rules in
themselves. These factors are the respect due the governmental agencies charged with administration,
their competence, expertness, experience, and informed judgment and the fact that they frequently are
the drafters of the law they interpret; that the agency is the one on which the legislature must rely to
advise it as to the practical working out of the statute, and practical application of the statute presents
the agency with unique opportunity and experiences for discovering deficiencies, inaccuracies, or
improvements in the statute.
Perez VS Sandiganbayan

Facts: Salvador Perez, then Municipal Mayor of of San Manuel, Pangasinan, and Juanita Apostol, then
Municipal Treasurer, conspiring and confederating with one another, committing the crime herein
charged in relation to and taking advantage of their official functions, and through manifest partiality,
evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and criminally
cause the purchase of one (1) computer unit costing P120,000.00 acquisition by personal canvass which
is in violation of Secs. 362 and 367 of R.A. 7160, thereby causing undue injury to the Municipality of San
Manuel, Pangasinan.

Prior to the arraignment, petitioners filed with the Sandiganbayan a motion for leave of court to file a
motion for reconsideration alleging the discovery of new evidence. The Sandiganbayan denied the
motion for leave but subsequently approved a motion for reconsideration. Accordingly, a reinvestigation
was conducted and Assistant Special Prosecutor Galisanao recommended the withdrawal of the
information in a memorandum, while Special Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio recommended that an
administrative case be filed against Apostol. On the other hand, new Ombudsman Marcelo, crosse out
both actions.

Thereafter, Special Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio approved the supplementary memorandum of Galisanao

which recommended that the Information be amended instead of withdrawing the same. Further, the
case of overpricing be referred for fact-finding and possible administrative investigation for violation of
Secs. 362 and 367 of RA 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991. Accordingly, the
Amended Information submitted by the prosecution is admitted.

Issue: Whether or not respondent Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction, when it admitted the Amended Information which bears no approval of the
Honorable Ombudsman, and against the latter’s written instruction to submit to him for approval the
result of the re-study before the filing of said Amended Information

Held: Republic Act No. 6770, by conferring upon the Ombudsman the power to prosecute, likewise
grants to the Ombudsman the power to authorize the filing of informations. As to the Special
Prosecutor, respondent People invokes the aforesaid authority of the Ombudsman in Section 15(10) to
delegate his powers, and claim that there was a general delegation of the authority to approve the filing
of informations. Contrary to the contention of respondent People, the delegation of the power to
authorize the filing of informations under Office Order No. 40-05 was only made to Deputy
Ombudsmen, and not to the Special Prosecutor. All that was delegated to the Special Prosecutor was
the discretional35 authority to review and modify the Deputy Ombudsmen-authorized information, but
even this is subject to the condition that such modification must be "without departing from, or varying
in any way, the contents of the basic Resolution, Order or Decision."

The petitioner’s contention that since the Special Prosecutor is of the same rank as that of a Deputy
Ombudsman, then the former can rightfully perform all the functions of the latter, including the power
to preventively suspend, is not persuasive. Under civil service laws, rank classification determines the
salary and status of government officials and employees. Although there is substantial equality in the
level of their respective functions, those occupying the same rank do not necessarily have the same
powers nor perform the same functions.
Springing from the power of control is the doctrine of qualified political agency, wherein the acts of a
subordinate bears the implied approval of his superior, unless actually disapproved by the
latter.42 Thus, taken with the powers of control and supervision, the acts of Department Secretaries in
the performance of their duties are presumed to be the act of the President, unless and until the
President alters, modifies, or nullifies the same. By arguing that "[w]hat is important is that the
amended Information has not been withdrawn, and or recalled by the Honorable Ombudsman, [a] clear
showing that the latter acknowledged/upheld the act of the Special Prosecutor in signing the Amended
Information,"43 respondent People claims that the doctrine of qualified political agency should be
applied as well to the relationship between the Ombudsman and the Special Prosecutor.

Petitioners counter that the doctrine of qualified political agency does not apply to the Office of the
Ombudsman, since the latter is an apolitical agency, and is far different from the bureaucracy to which
said doctrine applies.44

Petitioners are correct.

The doctrine of qualified political agency was adopted in our system of government on the following
pronouncement of this Court in Villena v. The Secretary of the Interior45:

After serious reflection, we have decided to sustain the contention of the government in this case on the
broad proposition, albeit not suggested, that under the presidential type of government which we have
adopted and considering the departmental organization established and continued in force by
paragraph 1, section 12, Article VII, of our Constitution, all executive and administrative organizations
are adjuncts of the Executive Department, the heads of the various executive departments are
assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in cases where the Chief Executive is required
by the Constitution or the law to act in person or the exigencies of the situation demand that he act
personally, the multifarious executive and administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed
by and through the executive departments, and the acts of the secretaries of such departments,
performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by
the Chief Executive, presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive.
University of Nueve Carceres VS Martinez

Facts: Petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, with preliminary injunction, relative to the
orders of respondent Presiding Judge of the Court of Industrial Relations which in effect held that the
determination of whether or not a charge of unfair labor practice, investigated by the Prosecution
Division of said court, should be dismissed outright because of any fatal defect of form or substance is
the exclusive prerogative of said Presiding Judge, to the exclusion of the court en banc, on the theory
that the function involved in such determination is not judicial but purely administrative and hence
entrusted to his exclusive administrative authority as head of said court. University of Nueva Caceres
Guardians Union filed with the Bicol branch of respondent Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) an unfair
labor practice charge against petitioners accompanied by the joint affidavit of Benito de la Paz and
George Offemaria. At the hearing of said charge before the prosecutor of the CIR, petitioners moved to
dismiss the same on the grounds: (1) it is not verified; (2) it does not specify the particular provisions of
Section 4 (a) of the Industrial Peace Act, RA 875, as amended, supposed to have been violated, and (3)
the supporting joint affidavit contains "falsities, misstatements and improbabilities on points otherwise
material to the charge." Respondent Presiding Judge denied the petition for reconsideration, admitted
the amended charge and directed the Court Prosecutor to set the said amended charge for preliminary
investigation. The present petition was filed charging said respondent with having acted in excess of
jurisdiction in acting on a matter addressed to and within the jurisdiction of the CIR en banc and of grave
abuse of discretion in not ordering the dismissal of the charge upon the grounds invoked by them.
Respondent Judge contended that the function of overseering the Prosecution Division of the CIR in its
work of filing and dismissing charges of unfair labor practice was purely administrative in nature and
falls within his exclusive competence was without merit.

Issue: Whether or not the preliminary investigation of charges for unfair labor practices is exclusive
prerogative of the presiding judge.

Held: No. It is true that reference to the court in the law must be construed to mean the Presiding Judge
and not the court en banc when the action contemplated is purely administrative in character, but,
precisely, the point missed is that, as already explained, the Industrial Peace Act does not consider the
investigation by the CIR, either by itself or thru an agent, as an administrative matter but a judicial one
like the preliminary investigations in election and anti- subversion cases. Preliminary investigation of
charges for unfair labor practices is not the exclusive prerogative of the presiding judge, but belongs to
the court itself. Under the old IPA, preliminary investigatons conducted by the CIR are judicial in nature,
unlike preliminary investigations conducted by prosecutors in criminal cases which are administrative in
character.
Vinzons-Chato VS Fortune Tobacco

Facts: This is a case for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code filed by Fortune against Liwayway as
CIR.
On June 10, 1993, the legislature enacted RA 7654, which provided that locally manufactured cigarettes
which are currently classified and taxed at 55% shall be charged an ad valorem tax of “55% provided
that the maximum tax shall not be less than Five Pesos per pack.” Prior to effectivity of RA 7654,
Liwayway issued a rule, reclassifying “Champion,” “Hope,” and “More” (all manufactured by Fortune) as
locally manufactured cigarettes bearing foreign brand subject to the 55% ad valorem tax. Thus, when RA
7654 was passed, these cigarette brands were already covered.

In a case filed against Liwayway with the RTC, Fortune contended that the issuance of the rule violated
its constitutional right against deprivation of property without due process of law and the right to equal
protection of the laws.

For her part, Liwayway contended in her motion to dismiss that respondent has no cause of action
against her because she issued RMC 37-93 in the performance of her official function and within the
scope of her authority. She claimed that she acted merely as an agent of the Republic and therefore the
latter is the one responsible for her acts. She also contended that the complaint states no cause of
action for lack of allegation of malice or bad faith.

The order denying the motion to dismiss was elevated to the CA, who dismissed the case on the ground
that under Article 32, liability may arise even if the defendant did not act with malice or bad faith.
Hence this appeal.

ISSUES: Whether or not a public officer may be validly sued in his/her private capacity for acts done in
connection with the discharge of the functions of his/her office

Whether or not Article 32, NCC, should be applied instead of Sec. 38, Book I, Administrative Code

HELD: On the first issue, the general rule is that a public officer is not liable for damages which a person
may suffer arising from the just performance of his official duties and within the scope of his assigned
tasks. An officer who acts within his authority to administer the affairs of the office which he/she heads
is not liable for damages that may have been caused to another, as it would virtually be a charge against
the Republic, which is not amenable to judgment for monetary claims without its consent. However, a
public officer is by law not immune from damages in his/her personal capacity for acts done in bad faith
which, being outside the scope of his authority, are no longer protected by the mantle of immunity for
official actions.

Specifically, under Sec. 38, Book I, Administrative Code, civil liability may arise where there is bad faith,
malice, or gross negligence on the part of a superior public officer. And, under Sec. 39 of the same Book,
civil liability may arise where the subordinate public officer’s act is characterized by willfulness or
negligence. In Cojuangco, Jr. V. CA, a public officer who directly or indirectly violates the constitutional
rights of another, may be validly sued for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code even if his acts
were not so tainted with malice or bad faith.
Thus, the rule in this jurisdiction is that a public officer may be validly sued in his/her private capacity for
acts done in the course of the performance of the functions of the office, where said public officer: (1)
acted with malice, bad faith, or negligence; or (2) where the public officer violated a constitutional right
of the plaintiff.

On the second issue, SC ruled that the decisive provision is Article 32, it being a special law, which
prevails over a general law (the Administrative Code).
Article 32 was patterned after the “tort” in American law. A tort is a wrong, a tortious act which has
been defined as the commission or omission of an act by one, without right, whereby another receives
some injury, directly or indirectly, in person, property or reputation. There are cases in which it has been
stated that civil liability in tort is determined by the conduct and not by the mental state of the tort
feasor, and there are circumstances under which the motive of the defendant has been rendered
immaterial. The reason sometimes given for the rule is that otherwise, the mental attitude of the
alleged wrongdoer, and not the act itself, would determine whether the act was wrongful. Presence of
good motive, or rather, the absence of an evil motive, does not render lawful an act which is otherwise
an invasion of another’s legal right; that is, liability in tort in not precluded by the fact that defendant
acted without evil intent.
Information Technology Foundation VS COMELEC

Facts: On June 7, 1995, Congress passed Republic Act 8046, which authorized Comelec to conduct a
nationwide demonstration of a computerized election system and allowed the poll body to pilot-test the
system in the March 1996 elections in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM).

On October 29, 2002, Comelec adopted in its Resolution 02-0170 a modernization program for the
2004 elections. It resolved to conduct biddings for the three (3) phases of its Automated Election
System; namely, Phase I — Voter Registration and Validation System; Phase II — Automated Counting
and Canvassing System; and Phase III — Electronic Transmission.

On January 24, 2003, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Executive Order No. 172, which
allocated the sum of P2.5 billion to fund the AES for the May 10, 2004 elections. Upon the request of
Comelec, she authorized the release of an additional P500 million.

On January 28, 2003, the Commission issued an "Invitation to Apply for Eligibility and to Bid".

On May 29, 2003, five individuals and entities (including the herein Petitioners Information
Technology Foundation of the Philippines, represented by its president, Alfredo M. Torres; and Ma.
Corazon Akol) wrote a letter to Comelec Chairman Benjamin Abalos Sr. They protested the award of the
Contract to Respondent MPC "due to glaring irregularities in the manner in which the bidding process
had been conducted." Citing therein the noncompliance with eligibility as well as technical and
procedural requirements (many of which have been discussed at length in the Petition), they sought a
re-bidding.

Issue: Whether the bidding process was unconstitutional;

Whether the awarding of the contract was unconstitutional;
Whether the petitioner has standing; and
Whether the petition is premature.

Held: WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Court hereby declares NULL and VOID Comelec
Resolution No. 6074 awarding the contract for Phase II of the CAES to Mega Pacific Consortium (MPC).
Also declared null and void is the subject Contract executed between Comelec and Mega Pacific
eSolutions (MPEI). 55 Comelec is further ORDERED to refrain from implementing any other contract or
agreement entered into with regard to this project.

Ratio: Comelec awarded this billion-peso undertaking with inexplicable haste, without adequately
checking and observing mandatory financial, technical and legal requirements. It also accepted the
proferred computer hardware and software even if, at the time of the award, they had undeniably failed
to pass eight critical requirements designed to safeguard the integrity of elections:
1. Awarded the Contract to MPC though it did not even participate in the bidding
2. Allowed MPEI to participate in the bidding despite its failure to meet the mandatory eligibility
requirements
3. Issued its Resolution of April 15, 2003 awarding the Contract to MPC despite the issuance by the
BAC of its Report, which formed the basis of the assailed Resolution, only on April 21, 2003 31
4. Awarded the Contract, notwithstanding the fact that during the bidding process, there were
violations of the mandatory requirements of RA 8436 as well as those set forth in Comelec's own
Request for Proposal on the automated election system IHaECA
5. Refused to declare a failed bidding and to conduct a re-bidding despite the failure of the bidders
to pass the technical tests conducted by the Department of Science and Technology
6. Failed to follow strictly the provisions of RA 8436 in the conduct of the bidding for the automated
counting machines
After reviewing the slew of pleadings as well as the matters raised during the Oral Argument, the Court
deems it sufficient to focus discussion on the following major areas of concern that impinge on the issue
of grave abuse of discretion:
A. Matters pertaining to the identity, existence and eligibility of MPC as a bidder
B. Failure of the automated counting machines (ACMs) to pass the DOST technical tests
C. Remedial measures and re-testings undertaken by Comelec and DOST after the award, and their
effect on the present controversy

In view of the bidding process

Unfortunately, the Certifications from DOST fail to divulge in what manner and by what standards or
criteria the condition, performance and/or readiness of the machines were re-evaluated and re-
appraised and thereafter given the passing mark.

The Automated Counting and Canvassing Project involves not only the manufacturing of the ACM
hardware but also the development of three (3) types of software, which are intended for use in the
following:
1. Evaluation of Technical Bids
2. Testing and Acceptance Procedures
3. Election Day Use."

In short, Comelec claims that it evaluated the bids and made the decision to award the Contract to
the "winning" bidder partly on the basis of the operation of the ACMs running a "base" software. That
software was therefore nothing but a sample or "demo" software, which would not be the actual one
that would be used on election day.

What then was the point of conducting the bidding, when the software that was the subject of the
Contract was still to be created and could conceivably undergo innumerable changes before being
considered as being in final form?

In view of awarding of contract

The public bidding system designed by Comelec under its RFP (Request for Proposal for the
Automation of the 2004 Election) mandated the use of a two-envelope, two-stage system. A bidder's
first envelope (Eligibility Envelope) was meant to establish its eligibility to bid and its qualifications and
capacity to perform the contract if its bid was accepted, while the second envelope would be the Bid
Envelope itself.

The Eligibility Envelope was to contain legal documents such as articles of incorporation, business
registrations, licenses and permits, mayor's permit, VAT certification, and so forth; technical documents
containing documentary evidence to establish the track record of the bidder and its technical and
production capabilities to perform the contract; and financial documents, including audited financial
statements for the last three years, to establish the bidder's financial capacity.

However, there is no sign whatsoever of any joint venture agreement, consortium agreement,
memorandum of agreement, or business plan executed among the members of the purported
consortium.So, it necessarily follows that, during the bidding process, Comelec had no basis at all for
determining that the alleged consortium really existed and was eligible and qualified; and that the
arrangements among the members were satisfactory and sufficient to ensure delivery on the Contract
and to protect the government's interest.

In view of standing
On the other hand, petitioners — suing in their capacities as taxpayers, registered voters and
concerned citizens — respond that the issues central to this case are "of transcendental importance and
of national interest." Allegedly, Comelec's flawed bidding and questionable award of the Contract to an
unqualified entity would impact directly on the success or the failure of the electoral process. Thus, any
taint on the sanctity of the ballot as the expression of the will of the people would inevitably affect their
faith in the democratic system of government. Petitioners further argue that the award of any contract
for automation involves disbursement of public funds in gargantuan amounts; therefore, public interest
requires that the laws governing the transaction must be followed strictly.

Moreover, this Court has held that taxpayers are allowed to sue when there is a claim of "illegal
disbursement of public funds," 22 or if public money is being "deflected to any improper purpose"; 23 or
when petitioners seek to restrain respondent from "wasting public funds through the enforcement of an
invalid or unconstitutional law."

In view of prematurity
The letter addressed to Chairman Benjamin Abalos Sr. dated May 29, 2003 28 serves to eliminate the
prematurity issue as it was an actual written protest against the decision of the poll body to award the
Contract. The letter was signed by/for, inter alia, two of herein petitioners: the Information Technology
Foundation of the Philippines, represented by its president, Alfredo M. Torres; and Ma. Corazon Akol.
Such letter-protest is sufficient compliance with the requirement to exhaust administrative remedies
particularly because it hews closely to the procedure outlined in Section 55 of RA 9184.

Paat v. Court of Appeals enumerates the instances when the rule on exhaustion of administrative
remedies may be disregarded, as follows:
"(1) when there is a violation of due process,
(2) when the issue involved is purely a legal question,
(3) when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction,
(4) when there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency concerned,
 (5) when there is irreparable injury,
(6) when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the President
bears the implied and assumed approval of the latter,
(7) when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable,
(8) when it would amount to a nullification of a claim,
(9) when the subject matter is a private land in land case proceedings,
(10) when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, and
(11) when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention."
CLASSIFICATION OF ADMINISTRATIVE BODIES

Beja, Sr. VS CA

Facts: Petitioner Fidencio Beja Sr. was first employed by Philippine Ports Authority as arrastre supervisor
in 1975. He became Assistant Port Operations Officer in 1976 and Port Operations Officer in 1977. In
February 1988, as a result of the reorganization of the PPA, he was appointed Terminal Supervisor.

The PPA General Manager Dayan filed an administrative case against petitioner Beja and for grave
dishonesty, grave misconduct, willful violation of reasonable office rules and regulations and conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service. Beja and Villaluz allegedly erroneously assessed storage
fees resulting in the loss of P38,150.77 on the part of the PPA. Consequently, they were preventively
suspended for the charges. The case was considered closed for lack of merit after preliminary
investigation.

Thereafter, another charge sheet was filed against Beja by the General Manager consisting of six (6)
different specifications of administrative offenses including fraud against the PPA in the total amount of
P218,000.00. Beja was also placed under preventive suspension. The Administrative Athority Board
proceeded to hear the case. However, Beja filed a petition for certiorari. Meanwhile, AAB rendered a
decision against petitioner. CA, thereafter, also rendered its decision dismissing the petition for
certiorari on lack of merit.

Petitioner assailed the CA’s decision challenging the legality of the preventive suspension and the
jurisdiction of the DOTC Secretary and/or the AAB to initiate and hear administrative cases against PPA
personnel below the rank of Assistant General Manager.

Petitioner anchors his contention that the PPA general manager cannot subject him to a preventive
suspension

Issue:

Held: In preventive suspension, he PPA general manager is the disciplining authority who may, by
himself and without the approval of the PPA Board of Directors, subject a respondent in an
administrative case to preventive suspension. His disciplinary powers are sanctioned, not only by Sec. 8
of P.D. No. 857 aforequoted, but also by Sec. 37 of P.D. No. 807 granting heads of agencies the
"jurisdiction to investigate and decide matters involving disciplinary actions against officers and
employees" in the PPA.

Parenthetically, the period of preventive suspension is limited. It may be lifted even if the disciplining
authority has not finally decided the administrative case provided the ninety-day period from the
effectivity of the preventive suspension has been exhausted. The employee concerned may then be
reinstated.

With respect to the issue of whether or not the DOTC Secretary and/or the AAB may initiate and hear
administrative cases against PPA Personnel below the rank of Assistant General Manager, the
Court qualifiedly rules in favor of petitioner.

The PPA was created through P.D. No. 505 dated July 11, 1974. Under that Law, the corporate powers of
the PPA were vested in a governing Board of Directors known as the Philippine Port Authority Council.
Sec. 5(i) of the same decree gave the Council the power "to appoint, discipline and remove, and
determine the composition of the technical staff of the Authority and other personnel."

Attachment of an agency to a Department is one of the three administrative relationships mentioned in

Book IV, Chapter 7 of the Administrative Code of 1987, the other two being supervision and control and
administrative supervision. "Attachment" is defined in Sec. 38 thereof as follows:

(3) Attachment. — (a) This refers to the lateral relationship between the Department or its equivalent
and the attached agency or corporation for purposes of policy and program coordination. The
coordination shall be accomplished by having the department represented in the governing board of the
attached agency or corporation, either as chairman or as a member, with or without voting rights, if this
is permitted by the charter; having the attached corporation or agency comply with a system of periodic
reporting which shall reflect the progress of programs and projects; and having the department or its
equivalent provide general policies through its representative in the board, which shall serve as the
framework for the internal policies of the attached corporation or agency;

(b) Matters of day-to-day administration or all those pertaining to internal operations shall he left to the
discretion or judgment of the executive officer of the agency or corporation. In the event that the
Secretary and the head of the board or the attached agency or corporation strongly disagree on the
interpretation and application of policies, and the Secretary is unable to resolve the disagreement, he
shall bring the matter to the President for resolution and direction;

(c) Government-owned or controlled corporations attached to a department shall submit to the

Secretary concerned their audited financial statements within sixty (60) days after the close of the fiscal
year; and

(d) Pending submission of the required financial statements, the corporation shall continue to operate
on the basis of the preceding year's budget until the financial statements shall have been submitted.
Should any government-owned or controlled corporation incur an operation deficit at the close of its
fiscal year, it shall be subject to administrative supervision of the department; and the corporation's
operating and capital budget shall be subject to the department's examination, review, modification and
approval. (emphasis supplied.)

An attached agency has a larger measure of independence from the Department to which it is attached
than one which is under departmental supervision and control or administrative supervision. This is
borne out by the "lateral relationship" between the Department and the attached agency. The
attachment is merely for "policy and program coordination." With respect to administrative matters, the
independence of an attached agency from Departmental control and supervision is further reinforced by
the fact that even an agency under a Department's administrative supervision is free from Departmental
interference with respect to appointments and other personnel actions "in accordance with the
decentralization of personnel functions" under the Administrative Code of 1987. 11 Moreover, the
Administrative Code explicitly provides that Chapter 8 of Book IV on supervision and control shall not
apply to chartered institutions attached to a Department. 12

Hence, the inescapable conclusion is that with respect to the management of personnel, an attached
agency is, to a certain extent, free from Departmental interference and control.
From an adverse decision of the PPA General Manager and the Board of Directors, the employee
concerned may elevate the matter to the Department Head or Secretary. Otherwise, he may appeal
directly to the Civil Service Commission. It is, therefore, clear that the transmittal of the complaint by
the PPA General Manager to the AAB was premature. The PPA General Manager should have first
conducted an investigation, made the proper recommendation for the imposable penalty and sought its
approval by the PPA Board of Directors. It was discretionary on the part of the herein petitioner to
elevate the case to the then DOTC Secretary Reyes. Only then could the AAB take jurisdiction of the
case.

The AAB, which was created during the tenure of Secretary Reyes under Office Order No. 88-318 dated
July 1, 1988, was designed to act, decide and recommend to him "all cases of administrative
malfeasance, irregularities, grafts and acts of corruption in the Department." Composed of a Chairman
and two (2) members, the AAB came into being pursuant to Administrative Order No. 25 issued by the
President on May 25, 1987. 15 Its special nature as a quasi-judicial administrative body notwithstanding,
the AAB is not exempt from the observance of due process in its proceedings. 16 We are not satisfied
that it did so in this case the respondents protestation that petitioner waived his right to be heard
notwithstanding. It should be observed that petitioner was precisely questioning the AAB's jurisdiction
when it sought judicial recourse.
Blaquera VS Alcala

Facts: Petitioners are officials and employees of several government departments and agencies who
were paid incentive benefits for the year 1992, pursuant to EO No. 292, otherwise known as The
Administrative Code of 1987, and the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of EO 292. On January 19,
1993, President Ramos issued Administrative Order No. 29 authorizing the grant of productivity
incentive benefits for the year 1992 in the maximum amount of P1,000,000 and reiterating the
prohibition under Sec. 7 of Administrative Code No. 268, enjoining the grant of productivity incentive
benefits without prior approval of the President. Sec. 4 of AO 29 directed “all departments, offices and
agencies which authorized under Sec. 1 hereof are hereby directed to immediately cause the
return/refund of the excess within a period of 6 months to commence 15 days after the issuance of this
Order.” In compliance therewith, the heads of departments or agencies of the government concerned,
who are the herein respondents, caused the deduction of petitioners’ salaries or allowances of the
amounts needed to cover the alleged overpayments. Petitioner filed a case against the respondents to
prevent further deductions, seeking relief.

The petitioner, Association of Dedicated Employees of the Philippine Tourism Authority, is an

association of the employees of Philippine Tourism Authority who were granted productivity incentive
bonus pursuant to RA No. 6971, otherwise known as Productivity Incentives Act of 1990. Subject bonus
was, however, disallowed by the Corporate Auditor on the ground that it was prohibited under AO 29.
The Commission on Audit ruled that the provisions of RA 6971 insofar as the coverage is concerned,
refer to business enterprises including government owned and/or controlled corporations performing
proprietary functions. Petitioner then seek relief in the aforesaid COA’s decision.

Issue: WON PTA is within the ambit of RA 6971.

Held: Government-owned and controlled corporations may perform governmental or proprietary

functions or both, depending on the purpose for which they have been created. If the purpose is to
obtain special corporate benefits or earn pecuniary profit, the function is proprietary. If it is in the
interest of health, safety, and for the advancement of public good and welfare, affecting the public in
general, the function is governmental. Powers classified as “proprietary” are those intended for private
advantage and benefit.

The aforecited powers and functions of PTA are predominantly governmental, principally geared
towards the development and promotion of tourism in the scenic Philippine archipelago. But it is
irrefutable that PTA also performs proprietary functions, as envisaged by its charter. To ascertain
whether PTA is within the ambit of RA 6971, there is need to find out the legislative intent, and to refer
to other provisions of RA 6971 and other pertinent laws, that may aid the Court in ruling on the right of
officials and employees of PTA to receive bonuses under RA 6971.

All things studiedly considered in proper perspective, the Court finds no reversible error in the finding by
respondent Commission that PTA is not within the purview of RA 6971. As regards the promulgation
of implementing rules and regulations, it bears stressing that the “power of administrative offcials to
promulgate rules in the implementation of the statute is necessarily limited to what is provided for in
the legislative enactment". In the case under scrutiny, the Supplementary Rules Implementing RA 6971
issued by the Secretary of Labor and Employment and the Secretary of Finance accord with the
intendment and provisions of RA 6971. Consequently, not being covered by RA 6971, AO 29 applies to
the petitioner.

RATIO: Government-owned or controlled corporations refer to any agency organized as a stock or non-
stock corporation, vested with functions relating to public needs whether governmental or proprietary
in nature, and owned by the government directly or through its instrumentalities either wholly, or,
where applicable, as in the case of stock corporations, to the extent of at least 50% of its capital stock.
Dela Lana VS Alba

Facts: (1) Petitioners sought to bolster their claim by imputing lack of good faith in its enactment and
characterizing as an undue delegation of legislative power to the President his authority to fix the
compensation and allowances of the Justices and judges thereafter appointed and the determination of
the date when the reorganization shall be deemed completed

ISSUE:
Whether or not BP 129 entitled "An act reorganizing the Judiciary, Appropriating Funds Therefor and for
Other Purposes" is constitutional

HELD:
WHEREFORE, the unconstitutionality of Batas Pambansa Blg 129 not having been shown, this petition is
dismissed. No costs.

RATIO:
(1) Petitioners have convincingly shown that in their capacity as tax payers, their standing to sue has
been amply demonstrated.
(2) Confronted with what appears to be a crisis situation that calls for a remedy, the Batasang Pambansa
had no choice. It had to act, before the ailment became even worse. Time was of the essence, and yet it
did not hesitate to be duly mindful, as it ought to be, of the extent of its coverage before enacting Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129. (3) There is no denying, therefore, the need for "institutional reforms,"
characterized in the Report as "both pressing and urgent."
(4) Cabinet Bill No. 42, which later became the basis of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, was introduced. Stress
was laid by the sponsor that the enactment of such Cabinet Bill would, firstly, result in the attainment of
more efficiency in the disposal of cases. Secondly, the improvement in the quality of justice dispensed
by the courts is expected as a necessary consequence of the easing of the court's dockets. Thirdly, the
structural changes introduced in the bill, together with the reallocation of jurisdiction and the revision of
the rules of procedure, are designated to suit the court system to the exigencies of the present day
Philippine society, and hopefully, of the foreseeable future."
(5) Nothing is bettersettled in our law than that the abolition of an office within the competence of a
legitimate body if done in good faith suffers from no infirmity. This conclusion flows from the
fundamental proposition that the legislature may abolish courts inferior to the Supreme Court and
therefore may reorganiz e them territorially or otherwise thereby necessitating new appointments and
commissions.

Section 11. The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts shall hold office

during good behavior until they reach the age of seventy years or become incapacitated to

discharge the duties of their office. The Supreme Courten banc shall have the power to

discipline judges of lower courts, or order their dismissal by a vote of a majority of the

Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted
thereon.

(6) The challenged statute creates an intermediate appellate court, regional trial courts, metropolitan
trial courts of the national capital region, and other metropolitan trial courts, municipal trial courts in
cities, as well as in municipalities, and municipal circuit trial courts. There is even less reason then to
doubt the fact that ex isting inferior courts were abolished. For the Batasang Pambansa, the
establishment of such new inferior courts was the appropriate response to the grave and urgent
problems that pressed for solution. Certainly, there could be differences of opinion as to the appropriate
remedy.
(7) I t is likewise undeniable that the Batasang Pambansa retains its full authority to enact whatever
legislation may be necessary to carryout national policy as usually formulated in a caucus of the majority
party. It is understandable then why in Fortun v . Labang it was stressed that with the provision
transferring to the Supreme Court administrative supervision over the Judiciary, there is a greater need
"to preserve unimpaired the independence of the judiciary, especially so at present, where to all intents
and purposes, there is a fusion between the executive and the legislative branches."
(8) To be more specific, petitioners contend that the abolition of the existing inferior courts collides with
the security of tenure enjoyed by incumbent Justices and judges under Article X , Section 7 of the
Constitution. Removal is, of course, to be distinguished from termination by virtue of the abolition of the
office. There can be no tenure to a non-existent office. After the abolition, there is in law no occupant. I
n case of removal, there is an office with an occupant who would thereby lose his position. It is in that
sense that from the standpoint of strict law, the question of any impairment of security of tenure does
not arise
(9) To be specific, the Batasang Pambansa is expressly vested with the authority to re organize inferior
courts and in the process to abolish ex isting ones.
(10) Petitioners would characterize as an undue delegation of legislative power to the President the
grant of authority to fix the compensation and the allowances of the Justices and judges thereafter
appointed. The language of the statute is quite clear. The questioned provisions reads as follows:
"Intermediate Appellate Justices, Regional Trial Judges, Metropolitan Trial Judges, municipal Trial
Judges, and Municipal Circuit Trial Judges shall receive such receive such compensation and allowances
as may be authorized by the President along the guidelines set forth in Letter of Implementation No. 93
pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 985, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1597." The existence of
a standard is thus clear.
(11) The challenged legislation is entirely the product of the efforts of the legislative body. The work of
justices was limited, as set forth in the Executive Order, to submitting alternative plan for
reorganization. That is more in the nature of scholarly studies.