RECENT CIVIL LAW JURISPRUDENCE (2017)

CIVIL PROCEDURE

SPOUSES SIBAY AND SPOUSES ELAS VS. SPOUSES BERMUDEZ

CONTEMPT

NHA VS. DOMINADOR LAURITO ET. AL. / HEIRS OF MANARIN

RCBC VS. SERRA ET. AL.

CONTRACTS

CUA ET. AL. VS. WEE/REYES VS WEE ET. AL.

KKCA VS. CMC/CMC VS. KKCA

VIRATA AND UMPC VS. WEE ET. AL./ W.I.C. VS. WEE/ESTRELLA VS. WEE/

EASEMENT

AMA LAND INC. VS. WACK-WACK RESIDENTS ASSOCIATION INC.

EXPROPRIATION

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. LARRAZABAL ET.AL.

FORCIBLE ENTRY AND UNLAWFUL DETAINER

RENE MICHAEL FRENCH VS. COURT OF APPEALS 18TH DIVISION ET. AL.

REGALADO VS. DELA PENA ET. AL.

LAND TITLES

ESPERANZA BERBOSO VS. VICTORIA CABRAL

HEIRS OF CASCAYAN VS. SPOUSES GUMALLAOI ET. AL.

HEIRS OF UY VS. HEIRS OF DEL CASTILLO

NHA VS. DOMINADOR LAURITO ET. AL. / HEIRS OF MANARIN

REMEDIOS V. GENORGA VS. HEIRS OF JULIAN MELITON ET. AL.

SPOUSES YU VS. A.L.I. / HEIRS OF SPOUSES DIAZ VS. A.L.I.

LEASE

HMFVAI VS. YARANON, WEYGAN, AND CITY OF BAGUIO

MORTGAGE

GOTESCO PROPERTIES VS. SOLIDBANK CORPORATION

PROPERTY

JOSE S. OCAMPO VS. RICARDO S. OCAMPO SR.

TORTS AND DAMAGES

AL DELA CRUZ VS. CAPT. RENATO OCTAVIANO AND WILMA OCTAVIANO

MARRIAGE

TILAR VS. TILAR AND REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

AMA LAND INC. VS. WACK-WACK RESIDENTS ASSOCIATION INC.

G.R. NO. 202342, 19 JULY 2017, CAGUIO, J.

Facts: A building was to be constructed in the 1990’s at EDSA corner

Fordham Street in Wack-Wack Village, Mandaluyong City. The builder
notified the local homeowners’ association of its intention to use Fordham
Street as a staging area and access road, but they received no response, so
they enclosed the area and set up a job site.

The homeowners’ association, however, claimed that the builder

had already converted part of the street to a barracks even before they had
been notified by the builder. They then tried and failed to remove the
barracks.

The builder applied with the Regional Trial Court a petition for a
permanent and temporary easements of right-of-way, along with both a
temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction against the homeowners’ association.

The homeowners’ association contended that the project violated

zoning ordinances, that the issuance of licenses and permits were irregular
and illegal, that the project was a nuisance, and that EDSA could be used
instead as the staging area.

The RTC granted the petition of the builder, who was also later
granted a permit to build.

The homeowners’ association filed with the RTC their own petition
for TRO and WPI, but this was denied. They then filed a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 65 with the Court of Appeals, which was
granted.

The builder filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45

with the Supreme Court.

Issue: Was the builder entitled to the legal easement of right of way?

Ruling: Not yet, it is still premature. As per Article 656 of the Civil Code, an
easement can be granted only after the payment of the proper indemnity
by the builder to the homeowner’s association, the owner of the dominant
estate, and also only if it is proven that the easement is indispensable to
 the project; but these can be done only after a full-blown trial was done
already.

ESPERANZA BERBOSO VS. VICTORIA CABRAL

G.R. 204617, 10 JULY 2017, TIJAM J.

Facts: The Department of Agrarian Reform awarded land to Alejandro

Berboso, pursuant to Presidential Decree 2733, with a Certificate of Land
Transfer registered with the Register of Deeds of Meycauyan, Bulacan;
this was later replaced by two EP’s, and these were later replaced again by
two Transfer Certificates of Title.

Victoria Cabral later filed
Provincial Agricultural Reform
appealed successively to the
Adjudication Board, the Court of
were all dismissed.
a petition to cancel the EP’s with the
Adjudication Board, and later, she
Department of Agricultural Reform
Appeals, and the Supreme Court. They

Meanwhile, Alejandro later died and his estate was extra-judicially

settled between his own heirs.

Victoria Cabral then filed a new petition for cancellation of the EP’s,
claiming that the heirs sold the land to someone else within the
prohibitory period of the DAR rules. This was granted by the PARAB, but
overturned on appeal by the DARAB, which was overturned again on
appeal by the CA, which was then appealed to the SC.

Issues: 1) Was there forum-shopping by Victoria Cabral?

2) Was the land sold to Fernando in violation of the provisions

against transfer of P.D. 27?

3) Is the petition for cancellation of the EP’s a collateral attack on

the TCT’s which replaced them?

Ruling: 1) No, there was none. The 1st petition was based on the validity of
the issuance of the EP’s to Alejandro, while the 2 nd petition was based on
the alleged violation of the prohibition against the sale of the land.
 2) No, it was not. There was a failure to prove the alleged sale,
because the original copy of the alleged sales contract (which was not even
notarized) was never presented, but just merely an alleged photocopy
only.

3) Yes, they are. The TCT’s are valid and binding upon the whole
world unless they are nullified and voided by a court of competent
jurisdiction in a direct proceeding for cancellation of title.

HEIRS OF CASCAYAN VS. SPOUSES GUMALLAOI ET. AL.

G.R. 211947, 03 JULY 2017, LEONEN, J:

Facts: The Heirs of Cayetano Cascayan, co-owners of a lot through a free

patent application, filed a civil complaint with the Regional Trial Court for
vacation of possession, recovery of possession, demolition of structures,
and payment of damages, against their neighbours, the Spouses
Gumallaoi, who allegedly ignored repeated notices given to them by the
Heirs that the Spouses had repeatedly encroached on the lot of the Heirs
after the construction and renovation of the Spouses’ residential house.

The Spouses filed a counterclaim with the RTC to have the FPA of
the Heirs be declared null and void, with payment of damages, and
contended that they were the true owners of both lots, and that the Heirs
had acquired the FPA, through manipulation, deception, and fraud.

The RTC ruled in favor of the Spouses, and this was later affirmed
on appeal by the Court of Appeals. Meanwhile, the Heirs filed a Motion
for New Trial on grounds of “mistake” with the RTC, but this was denied.
The RTC and the CA both ruled that the collective evidence presented by
both of the parties proved the claims of the Spouses, as the evidence of the
Heirs was full of inconsistencies. The Heirs filed a Petition for Certiorari
under Rule 45 with the Supreme Court, claiming that it was already
proven that they owned their own lot, as shown through their tax
declarations.

Issue: Did the CA properly appreciate the evidence?

Ruling: Yes, it did. As a general rule, the findings of fact of the CA bind the
Supreme Court, and the CA had already thoroughly examined the
evidence and found it lacking in probative value. The only evidence
 presented were only tax declarations, and the assertions of the Heirs
explaining the inconsistencies were just mere factual allegations, and they
were neither well-substantiated or adequately-discussed facts to compel
the SC to review the CA’s appreciation of the evidence.

AL DELA CRUZ VS. CAPT. RENATO OCTAVIANO AND WILMA OCTAVIANO

G.R. NO. 219649, 26 JULY 2017, Peralta, J:

Facts: Renato Octaviano, a military dentist, and his mother and sister
were all riding a tricycle when it was suddenly bumped from behind by a
car, which was being driven by friend of its actual owner, which caused
the tricycle to spin around. Renato was thrown from the tricycle and
landed on the ground a couple of meters away. He suffered extreme pain
and lapsed into unconsciousness, and his injuries were so severe that his
leg had to be amputated below the knee. He later suffered bone infections,
requiring further medical treatment through multiple operations and a
prosthetic leg. He ultimately spent P623,268.00 for medical expenses.

Renato and his family filed a civil complaint for damages with the
RTC against the driver and owner of the car which bumped the tricycle.

The RTC dismissed the complaint, stating that the driver was
cautious and did everything expected of him by law, that the owner was
not liable as the driver was only his friend and not employed by him, that
it was the fault of the tricycle driver for driving without a license, and that
Renato was also contributorily negligent for riding behind the driver.

The CA overturned the decision on appeal, relying on the police

report and witness accounts of the incident, which stated that the driver
had been drunk at the time of the collision with the tricycle, and only
helped Renato because he was forced to do so by the bystanders who
witnessed the incident. The CA awarded moral damages, exemplary
damages, and attorneys’ fees to Renato.
 The driver denied everything and contended that the police report
should not have been used because the police officer who wrote it had not
been presented as a witness in court. He filed a petition for review on
certiorari under rule 45 with the Supreme Court.

Issues: 1) Was the driver of the car negligent and thus liable for the
incident?

2) Was Renato contributorily negligent and thus in estoppel?

3) Was Renato entitled to payment of damages from the driver?

Ruling: 1) Yes. In this case, the RTC found no reason to conclude tht the
driver was negligent, but the CA, however, found the contrary, so the SC
had to ascertain whose evidence was preponderant, affirming the CA.

Rule 133 of the rules of court mandates that in civil cases, the party
having the burden of proof must establish his case by a preponderance of
evidence. Generally, the party who denies has no burden to prove, but in
civil cases, the burden of proof is on the party who would be defeated if
no evidence is given on either side. The burden of proof is on the plaintiff
if the defendant denies the factual allegations of the complaint in the
manner required by the Rules of Court, but it may rest on the defendant if
he admits expressly or impliedly the essential allegations but raises
affirmative defense or defenses, which if proved, will exculpate him from
liability.

The driver argues that the CA in relying on the police report

without him having the opportunity to cross-examine the police officer
who prepared the same. But the contents of the police report, were
corroborated by the testimonies of the other witnesses presented by
Renato. The contents of the police report were more believable than the
version of what transpired of the driver.

As to the denial of petitioner that he was drunk at the time of the

accident, whether or not he was in a state of inebriation is inconsequential
given the above findings. His being sober does not and will not erase the
fact that he was still negligent and that the proximate cause of the collision
was due to his said negligence
 2) No, he was not. Negligence is contributory only when it
contributes proximately to the injury, and not simply a condition for its
occurrence. The causal link between the alleged negligence of the tricycle
driver and respondent Renato was not established. Negligence per se,
arising from the mere violation of a traffic statute, need not be sufficient in
itself in establishing liability for damages.

3) Yes, he is. Moral Damages because of his actual suffering and

losses, exemplary damages because the driver acted with gross disregard
and insensitivity to the suffering of Renato, and attorneys’ fees because
exemplary damages were already awarded.

RENE MICHAEL FRENCH VS. COURT OF APPEALS 18TH DIVISION ET. AL.

G.R. No. 220057, 12 July 2017, Carpio, J.

Facts: An owner of a parcel of land filed a complaint for ejectment against

her current tenant, a distant relative who took possession of the land after
the death of his father, the previous tenant, without permission from the
owner, and was thus occupying the land on mere tolerance. He had failed
to comply with her formal written demand to already vacate the property.

The tenant contended that his father was already the possessor and
owner of the land because he had redeemed it from the Philippine
National Bank after the original owner had defaulted on a mortgage
where the land was collateral, and thus the original owner had already
abandoned their rights to the land when they assigned them to the
previous tenant, who had held it in the concept of an owner for 23 years,
by paying the taxes on it.

The Metropolitan Trial Court in Cities found that aside from bare
allegation, there no written proof of the alleged assignment of rights, and
that the payment of the loan and the taxes was not inconsistent with the
concept of tolerance of the owner and was in fact in compliance with the
conditions set that the previous tenant was allowed to cultivate the land
 without rentals, on the condition that he would pay the loan of the
original owner and the real property taxes over the land.

The MTCC reiterated that lands registered under the Torrens

System cannot be acquired by prescription, and possession of the transfer
certificate of title does not, in itself, vest title or ownership. The MTCC
held that material possession of the land cannot prevail over the superior
right of the registered owner.

The tenant appealed with the Regional Trial Court, who affirmed
that the tenant and his predecessor-in-interest were not owners of the
land, but ruled that the MTCC had no jurisdiction over the case, as it was
a case of forcible entry and not unlawful detainer.

The owner appealed with the Court of Appeals, who overturned

the RTC, and affirmed the MTCC, and ruled that the case was indeed one
for unlawful detainer and not forcible entry.

The tenant appealed with the Supreme Court.

Issue: Did the CA commit a reversible error in ruling that the MTCC had
jurisdiction over the case?

Ruling: No, it did not. The nature of an action and the jurisdiction of the
court over a case are determined by the allegations in the complaint itself.
Forcible entry and unlawful detainer are distinct from each other.

All the allegations in the complaint constitute a cause of action for

unlawful detainer. The complaint clearly indicated that the owner allowed
the previous tenant to occupy the land subject to certain conditions.

There was furthermore, failure to substantiate the claim that there

was a transfer of ownership between the owner and the previous tenant.
The MTCC found that in the contract for easement and tower occupancy
with the National Power Corporation, the current tenant was a signatory
as an administrator of the land. As such, the defense of open, continuous,
notorious, and public possession of the land in the concept of an owner
must fail. In addition, the CA correctly ruled that in an ejectment case, the
issue of ownership is only provisional. The only issue in an unlawful
detainer case is the material possession or physical possession of the
 property involved, independent of any claim of ownership by any of the
parties involved.

REMEDIOS V. GENORGA VS. HEIRS OF JULIAN MELITON ET. AL.

G.R. No. 224515. 03 July 2017. Perlas-Bernabe, J:

Facts: A co-owner of a parcel of land sold portions of it to various 3 rd

parties during his lifetime, but failed to surrender the owner's duplicate
copy of TCT No. 8027 to enable the buyers, to register their respective
deeds of sale, which eventually led to the filing of a Petition with the
Regional Trial Court, for the surrender of the owner's duplicate copy of
TCT No. 8027 and/or annulment thereof, and the issuance of new titles
pursuant to Section 107 of Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1529 .

The RTC granted the petition, and ordered the heirs of the original
co-owner and/or the Register of Deeds of Naga City to deliver or
surrender possession of the original co-owner's duplicate title to the new
owners, considering the long period of time that had lapsed for the
annotation of the buyers' deeds of sale of the real property.

The Court of Appeals later affirmed the RTC, and noted the long
length of time that had lapsed for the annotation of the buyers' deeds of
sale and the issuance of the corresponding certificates of title, and found
no valid and plausible reason to further withhold custody and possession
of the subject owner's duplicate title from the buyers. Thus, the CA
adjudged buyers to have the preferential right to the possession of the said
 title, considering that the bigger portion of the subject property belongs to
them.

The case was brought to the Supreme Court.

Issue: Did the CA correctly affirm the RTC’s order directing the surrender
and delivery of possession of the original owner's duplicate title to the
buyers of the real property?

Ruling: Yes, it did. The subject land was an undivided co-owned property
when the original co-owner sold different portions to various 3 rd persons.
However, a perusal of the pertinent deeds of absolute sale reveals that
definite portions of the subject land were eventually sold, and the buyers
took possession and introduced improvements thereon, declared the same
in their names, and paid the realty taxes thereon, all without any objection
from respondents who never disputed the sales in favor of the buyers.

Consequently, a partial factual partition or termination of the

existing co-ownership resulted, which entitles the buyers to the
segregation of their respective portions, and the issuance of new
certificates of title in their names upon compliance with the requirements
of law.

Moreover, it bears to stress that the function of a Register of Deeds

with reference to the registration of deeds is only ministerial in nature.
Thus, the RD-Naga cannot be expected to retain possession of the subject
owner's duplicate title longer than what is reasonable to perform its duty.
In the absence of a verified and approved subdivision plan and technical
description duly submitted for registration on TCT No. 8027, it must
return the same to the presenter, in this case, petitioner who, as aforesaid,
failed to establish a better right to the possession of the said owner's
duplicate title as against respondents.
GOTESCO PROPERTIES VS. SOLIDBANK CORPORATION

G.R. No. 209452, 26 July 2017, Leonen, J.:

Facts: Gotesco maintained that its foreclosure proceeding with Solidbank

is null and void. It insists that Solidbank agreed to restructure its loan,
impliedly accepted petitioner's proposal when it asked for an increase in
the collateral. 61(61) Respondent reneged on the restructuring agreement
when it caused the foreclosure of the property prematurely. It claims that
was not notified that it was in default. Under the Indenture, the
foreclosure proceeding can only be initiated upon petitioner's failure to
pay within 10 days after receipt of the notice of default. Allegedly,
Solidbank did not send any notice. Respondent's failure to prove that it
sent a demand letter means the obligation is not yet due and demandable.
Gotesco avers that the mortgage is void because the principal obligation it
secured was still inexistent when the Indenture was signed. Moreover,
Gotesco insists that Section 3 of Act No. 3135 was violated. The law
requires that the Notice of Sale be posted for not less than 20 days before
the day of the auction sale, but the 20-day period was not followed.
Gotesco further contends that the publication of the Notice of Sale in
Remate was defective, and is of the opinion that the Notice of Sale should
have been published in newspapers "published, edited and circulated" in
the same city or province where the foreclosed property was located. Since
the land being sold was situated at San Fernando, Pampanga and Remate
was printed and published in Manila, Gotesco suggests that the
publication requirement was violated. Consequently, since the foreclosure
proceeding was void, there was no basis for the issuance of the Writ of
Possession. Possession of the property must revert back to Solidbank.

Solidbank denies that it agreed to restructure petitioner's loan, and

emphasized that petitioner has not shown any concrete proof that
respondent accepted the proposal. Moreover, the alleged restructuring
agreement was not offered in evidence and cannot be considered by this
Court. It is of no moment that the mortgage agreement was executed
before the promissory notes. Jurisprudence has recognized that a
mortgage can secure present and future obligations. In any case, since
petitioner is arguing that the obligation was restructured, it is now
 estopped from questioning the validity of the Indenture. Solidbank
argues that Gotesco cannot claim that it was not notified of the default.
Solidbank submitted a return card which indicated that the demand letter
informing Gotesco of its default was received. There is also a provision in
the promissory note, which states that failure to pay the amounts due
makes the obligation immediately due, without need for notice or
demand. Section 3 of Act No. 3135 was complied with. Remate is a
newspaper of general circulation. It is among the newspapers accredited
by the Regional Trial Court where a notice of sale can be published.
Gotesco also cannot raise for the first time on appeal the allegation that the
Notice of Sale was defective for being posted less than 20 days before the
auction sale. Solidbank holds that the Writ of Possession was validly
issued because its issuance was ministerial

Issues: 1) Was the foreclosure premature?

2) Was there compliance with Section 3 of Act no. 3135?

3) Was the writ of possession properly issued?

Ruling: 1) No, it was not. Gotesco defaulted in its obligation, thus

Solidbank was within its rights to foreclose the property. There was no
perfected restructuring agreement, since the Civil Code requires absolute
acceptance of the offer before it can be considered a binding contract.

2) Yes, there was. The crucial factor is not where the newspaper is
printed but whether the newspaper is being circulated in the city where
the property is located. If notices are only published in newspapers
printed in the city where the property is located, even newspapers that are
circulated nationwide will be disqualified from announcing auction sales
outside their city of publication. This runs contrary to the spirit of the law
which is to attain wide enough publicity so all parties interested in
acquiring the property can be informed of the upcoming sale.

3) Yes, it was. Generally, the purchaser in a public auction sale of a

foreclosed property is entitled to a writ of possession during the
redemption period. When the foreclosed property is in the possession of a
third party, the issuance of a writ of possession in favor of the purchaser
ceases to be ministerial and may no longer be done ex parte. However, for
this exception to apply, the property must be held by the 3rd party
 adversely to the mortgagor. Furthermore, a pending case assailing the
validity of the foreclosure proceeding is immaterial.

HMFVAI VS. YARANON, WEYGAN, AND CITY OF BAGUIO

G.R. No. 188057, 12 July 2017, Carpio J.

Facts: HMVFAI entered into a 25-year contract of lease with the City of
Baguio, who later rescinded the contract for the failure of HMVFAI to
complete the construction of a commercial building, which COB later took
over pursuant to an Administrative Order issued by Mayor Yaranon.

HMVFAI filed a TRO with prayer for WPI and issuance of

certification to effect lease, with the RTC of Baguio against the AO of COB.

COB contended that the certification was not issued because

HMFVAI did not finish the building, and anyway the certification shall
only signal the start of payment of annual lease rental and not the
effectivity of the contract of the lease. It further contended that even
without the Certificate, HMFVAI already occupied the building anyway,
and conducted business in it; hence, it already waived the condition.

The RTC ruled in favor of COB, and found that the contract of lease
automatically expired, because the lease period of 25 years was expressly
provided in the contract of lease. Meanwhile, HMFVAI already long
occupied the lot up to the present, which is beyond the 25-year period
provided in the contract of lease. The RTC also found the building
unsanitary and dangerous to those occupying it.

The CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC in favor of COB, and ruled
that there was already a perfected contract of lease: the issuance of the
Certificate was imposed only on the performance of the obligations
contained in it. The CA held that HMFVAI is estopped from claiming that
the period of lease has not yet begun, since it already occupied the
building and conducted business in it even without the Certificate.

Issues: 1) Was the contract of lease perfected?

2) Was there estoppel?

3) Was the occupational permit properly withheld?

 4) Should damages have been awarded?

Ruling: 1) Yes, it was. In a contract of lease, the cause or essential purpose is

the use and enjoyment of the thing subject of the contract.

The thing or subject matter of the contract with COB was clearly
identified and agreed upon as the lot where the building would be
constructed by HMFVAI. The consideration were the annual lease rental
and the ownership of the building upon the termination of the lease
period. Considering that it and COB agreed upon the essential elements of
the contract, the contract of lease had been perfected.

2) Yes, there was. From the moment that the contract is perfected,
the parties are bound to fulfill what they have expressly stipulated. Thus,
the COB gave the use and enjoyment of its lot to HMFVAI. Both the RTC
and the CA found that upon the execution of the contract, HMFVAI took
possession of the lot and constructed the building on it. Thereafter,
HMFVAI occupied the building and conducted business in it up to the
present. The findings of fact of the RTC and the CA are final and
conclusive and cannot be reviewed on appeal by this Court. Since
HMFVAI exercised its right as lessee based on the contract of lease and the
law, it has no basis in claiming that the contract of lease did not
commence.

3) Yes, it was. HMFVAI failed to comply with its obligations under

the contract of lease. It failed to complete the requirements for the
issuance of the Certificate and maintain the sanitation of the building. The
City Engineer's Office did not issue the Certificate because of the fault of
HMFVAI. The party at fault cannot use the non-issuance of the Certificate
to its advantage because the non-issuance was due to its fault. HMFVAI
cannot claim that the 25-year lease period has not yet commenced because
of the non-issuance of the Certificate, since it itself was responsible for the
non-issuance of the Certificate.

4) No, they should not. Since the contract of lease already

commenced, HMFVAI has been occupying the building even after the
termination of the lease period. The contract of lease provides that the
period of lease is 25 years and it is renewable for the same period at the
option of both parties. Based on the findings of the RTC that HMFVAI
started occupying the lot in 1974 and 25 years have lapsed without the
 parties renewing the contract, the contract of lease is already terminated.
Thus, the COB is justified in issuing AO No. 30, and in taking over the
building being its owner under the contract of lease. There is no basis in
granting damages to HMFVAI.

KKCA VS. CMC/CMC VS. KKCA

G.R. Nos. 193969-193970, 194027-194028. 05 July 2017. Reyes, J:

Facts: CMC hired KKCA to construct a building in Makati City, but the
construction led to the erosion of an adjacent lot of the Hontiveros family,
which caused the issuance of a Hold Order against KKCA by the City of
Makati. The HF refused to sign a Quit Claim, which would have lifted the
HO, until their own property was restored. But even when this was done,
the HF still refused to sign the QC, which stalled the construction of
KKCA.

After 878 days of delay, CMC filed for payment of damages from
KKCA, who contended that it was the fault of the COM, and that CMC
failed to pay for the costs of soil protection and 70% of the restoration of
the property of the HF.

CMC filed a case with the Construction Industry Arbitration

Council, who ruled in favor of both parties. But neither CMC or KKCA
were satisfied with the CIAC decision, so they both filed separate petitions
for review on certiorari with the CA, who modified the award of the
CIAC.

Both parties then separately brought the case to the Supreme Court.

KKCA contends that it should be released from the obligation of

completing the project because the working relationship between the
parties has become so strained; hence, the construction project is best to be
performed by another contractor, and that to compel it to finish the project
is violating the constitutional guarantee against involuntary servitude.

Issue: 1) Who is liable for the delay of the project?

2) Should KKCA be released from its obligation to CMC?

Ruling: 1) Both of them. The SC found no justification behind KKCA's

failure to insure that damages shall not arise as a result of the excavation
work. It employed soil protection only after erosion had already
taken place and its failure to provide sufficient soil protection measures
caused the erosion and was the proximate cause which set in motion the
chain of events resulting to the project's delay. It represented itself as
capable, competent and duly licensed to undertake the project. Thus, it is
but reasonable to assume that it knows the importance of soil protection in
excavations and the degree of the risks involved in the absence of such
protective measures.

However, while all the evidence presented easily points to the

conclusion that KKCA is solely to be blamed for the delay of the project,
the SC however, found that CMC is also at fault. From the moment it
became apparent that KKCA paid no heed to CMC's demand to complete
the project, CMC also began contributing to its delay. Common human
experience dictates that under similar circumstances, anybody in the
predicament of CMC would have opted to exercise its right to terminate
the contract the moment it became apparent that the contractor would not
lift a finger to finish the project. CMC should have pursued the completion
of the project by another contractor to minimize injury upon itself,
without prejudice, however, to the prosecution of its cause of action
against KKCA.

2) No, it should not. KKCA's argument cannot be sanctioned. Both

the doctrine of strained relations and the policy against involuntary
servitude are concepts, which only apply to situations where one is in the
service of another, respectively, by virtue of an employment contract or by
force or compulsion. They cannot apply in reciprocal contracts such as
contracts for a piece of work, as to do so would violate both the principle
of autonomy and the obligatory nature of contracts evenly guaranteed
under Article III, Section 10 of the Constitution. If KKCA truly believes
that it has lawful basis to withdraw from the contract and/or be released
therefrom, it should have filed an action for rescission.

KKCA should finish the project. The contract subsists, and by all
legal measure, the parties should comply with their contractual
obligations. As the contract continues to be in effect, every stipulation
contained therein should, in principle, be held as controlling. Thus, the
contract price should remain per agreement of the parties. This has to be
for there is nothing in the contract which provides that any of its
 provisions will only be effective within the stipulated period of
completion. In fact, the contract even contemplated the possibility of
delay, and as stipulated, it was without prejudice to the effectivity of the
escalation clause.

However, considering that CMC is also to be blamed for the delay

of the project, it would be unjust to rule that KKCA should shoulder the
entire amount as it will be tantamount to unjust enrichment on the part of
CMC. Thus, the parties should commonly share the amount of the
increase in construction cost.

NHA VS. DOMINADOR LAURITO ET. AL. / HEIRS OF MANARIN

G.R. No. 191657, 31 July 2017, Tijam, J:

Facts: The National Housing Authority and the Heirs of the Spouses
Laurito were in a dispute over ownership of a lot, based on different
transfer certificates of title, registered on likewise varying dates.

The Spouses Laurito mortgaged the lot to the Philippine

National Bank but was able to redeem it and secured the release of the
mortgage. When the Register of Deeds was burned, the Spouses caused
the administrative reconstitution of their title and a replacement title, with
the source of reconstitution was their owner's duplicate certificate of title.

The Heirs later discovered that title to the property had been
subdivided and later on transferred to NHA, who subdivided it and
offered it to the public. They then sent demand letters to the NHA to recall
the subdivision scheme plan it submitted to the RD for registration. When
these were ignored, they filed a complaint with the RTC for quieting of
title, annulment of title, and recovery of possession against NHA.

The NHA claimed that it acquired its own title from derivative
titles of other persons and that it is not required to look beyond them,
having acquired the parcels of land from their registered owners.

The RTC discovered that the title of the Spouses Laurito which was
issued by the RD of Cavite has not been cancelled and was certified to be
existing and intact in the registry. It observed that the certificates of title
from which NHA claims to have derived its title over the subject property,
have been administratively reconstituted at a time when the owner's
 duplicate certificate of title in the names of the Spouses Laurito was in the
possession of PNB as mortgagee. It held that while the same property was
covered by different titles, preference should be given to the title of the
Spouses Laurito as it was registered earlier in time, and noted that while
NHA claims to be a buyer in good faith, it failed to demonstrate how it
acquired the subject property. This was later affirmed on appeal by the
CA. The NHA then filed a petition for review on certiorari with the SC.

Meanwhile, the Heirs of Manarin, relatives of the Heirs of Laurito,

filed their own petition for intervention, claiming to be the real owners of
the lots, which was opposed by both the NHA and the Heirs of Laurito, as
it would only cause undue and inordinate delay for the original case.

Issues: 1) Should the petition in intervention be given due course?

2) Who has a better right to the property?

Ruling: 1) No, it should not. Nevertheless, the remedy of intervention is not

a matter of right but rests on the sound discretion of the court upon
compliance with the first requirement on legal interest and the second
requirement that no delay and prejudice should result as spelled under
Section 1 of Rule 19 of the Rules of Court. Intervenors in this case claim to
be the heirs of someone alleged to be the registered owner of a property
encompassing the subject land. Apart from this naked allegation,
intervenors failed to establish the required legal interest over the subject
property to the satisfaction of the courts, as their status as supposed heirs
was merely perfunctorily alleged. Furthermore, the parent title upon
which they anchor their claim pertains to another property covered by
another title which was not even examined and appreciated by the courts,
since the petition-in-intervention was filed only in this petition for review
on certiorari, well after the RTC already rendered its judgment. By itself,
such inexcusable delay is a sufficient ground to deny the petition.

2) The Heirs of Laurito.. There can be no argument that the

claimant whose transfer certificate of title was issued earlier in time,
absent any anomaly or irregularity in the registration, is what prevails. It
is evident that the Spouses Laurito's transfer certificate of title prevails
 over NHA's title which was derived from a dubious administrative
reconstitution of a TCT. Even assuming that NHA’s parent title was
indeed administratively reconstituted in due course, preference still lies
with the title of the Spouses Laurito for having been registered earlier in
time. The title of the Spouses Laurito preceded the alleged parent titles of
the NHA by four years. Therefore, as between the respective sources of
NHA's titles and the title of the Spouses Laurito, that of the latter prevails.

OCA ET AL. VS. CUSTODIO

G.R. No. 199825, 26 July 2017, Leonen, J:

Facts: There was an intra-corporate controversy among the Board of

Trustees of petitioner St. Francis School of General Trias, Cavite. It was
established by incorporators with the assistance of the La Salle brothers,
and despite the lack of a written agreement, the La Salle brothers agreed
to give the necessary supervision to establish the school's academic
foundation. They formalized their arrangement in a Memorandum of
Agreement, under which De La Salle Greenhills would supervise the
academic affairs of St. Francis School to increase enrollment. DLSGH
appointed supervisors to sit in the Board of Trustees without voting
rights.

The members of the Board of Trustees later came into a

disagreement regarding the school's administrative structure and La
Salle's supervision over the school. After several incidents relating to the
disagreement, a complaint was filed by one of the trustees against St.
Francis School with the Regional Trial Court, alleging that two other
trustees were never qualified to sit in the Board of Trustees, and praying
for a Temporary Restraining Order to prevent another trustee from calling
a special membership meeting in order to remove the complainant from
the Board of Trustees. The case was dismissed and the complainant was
subsequently removed from the Board of Trustees and as Curriculum
Administrator. Lengthy legal proceedings followed. Eventually, a
complaint for contempt of court was filed by the original complainant
 against the adverse parties for their alleged willful disobedience to the
various orders of the trial court. The case ultimately reached the SC.

Issues: Were the parties guilty for contempt of court?

Ruling: Yes, they were. The punishment for contempt is classified into two
(2): civil contempt and criminal contempt. Civil contempt is committed
when a party fails to comply with an order of a court or judge "for the
benefit of the other party." A criminal contempt is committed when a
party acts against the court's authority and dignity or commits a
forbidden act tending to disrespect the court or judge.

This stems from the two (2)-fold aspect of contempt which seeks: (i)
to punish the party for disrespecting the court or its orders; and (ii) to
compel the party to do an act or duty which it refuses to perform. 162(162)

While the nature of the punishment imposed is a mixture of both

criminal and civil, the contempt proceeding in this case is more civil
contempt than criminal contempt. The purpose of the filing and the nature
of the contempt proceeding show that the original complainant was
seeking enforcement of the trial court orders in the intra-corporate
controversy because the adverse parties refused to comply. Hence, this is a
civil contempt case, which does not need proof beyond reasonable doubt.

This Court has ruled that while the power to cite parties in
contempt should be used sparingly, it should be allowed to exercise its
power of contempt to maintain the respect due to it and to ensure the
infallibility of justice where the defiance is so clear and contumacious and
there is an evident refusal to obey.
JOSE S. OCAMPO VS. RICARDO S. OCAMPO SR.

G.R. No. 227894, 05 July 2017, Velasco Jr., J:

Facts: Two brothers were co-owners of a lot. One brother accused the
other brother of falsifying his signature on an extra-judicial settlement
with waiver, and effecting the transfer of the whole property to him.
Based upon official findings of the National Bureau of Investigation, a case
was filed against the 2nd brother, along with other parties. The 1 st brother
asked the 2nd brother to partition the property, but the 2 nd brother refused
and secretly mortgaged the property. He denied that he forged the 1 st
brother’s signature, and claimed that the ESW was valid, as it was actually
their father who secured his brother’s signature. Thus the TCT based on
the ESW was valid, and had become indefeasible one year after its
issuance. The 1st filed an action with the RTC to have the TCT be declared
null & void, but the 2nd brother claimed that it had already prescribed for
being filed 21 years & 7 months after the issuance of the TC. He further
claimed that such an action was a collateral attack on the TCT and the lack
of prescription against a co-owner did not apply because he had already
become the exclusive owner of the real property.

The RTC dismissed the action of the 1 st brother based on

prescription, but this was overturned on appeal by the CA.

Meanwhile, the 2nd brother further claimed that he had paid a loan
to the DBP on behalf of his family, and in exchange both the 1 st brother
and their father had signed the ESW, and that their father had later also
executed a deed of sale in favor of the 2nd brother.

Further legal proceedings ensued until the RTC eventually ruled in

favor of the 1st brother, finding that his signature was forged by the 2 nd
brother, and thus the alleged ESW was null & void. This was affirmed on
appeal by the CA. The 2nd brother then filed a petition for review on
certiorari with the SC, citing an additional new ground of laches on the
part of the 1st brother.

Issue: 1) Did the CA appreciate properly the findings of the RTC?

2) Did laches apply?

Ruling: 1). Yes, it did. Given the falsity of the ESW, it becomes apparent
that petitioner obtained the registration through fraud. This wrongful
registration gives occasion to the creation of an implied or constructive
trust under Article 1456 of the New Civil Code. An action for
reconveyance based on an implied trust generally prescribes in ten years.
However, if the plaintiff remains in possession of the property, the
prescriptive period to recover title of possession does not run against him.
Considering that respondent was in actual possession of the disputed land
at the time of the filing of the complaint, the present case may be treated
as an action for quieting of title, an action that is imprescriptible. Since it
was already established that respondent's signature on the ESW, which
was the basis of petitioner's title over the property, was forged, then it is
only necessary for the cloud on respondent's title to be removed. Thus, the
trial court's order to cancel TCT No. 102822 and uphold the parties' co-
ownership was proper.

2) No, he did not. Based on the facts presented before us, it appears
that the 1st brother did not sleep on his rights, as claimed by the 2 nd
brother. It is undeniable that the 1st brother had filed several cases to assert
his rights over the property. Aside from the present complaint, the 1st
brother also filed, on separate occasions, three criminal complaints for: 1)
falsification of public document, 2) estafa through falsification of public
documents, and 3) forgery, all against the 2 nd brother. To Our mind, the
filing of these cases at different times negates the claim of laches. It has
been ruled that courts, under the principle of equity, will not be guided or
bound strictly by the statute of limitations or the doctrine of laches when
to do so, manifest wrong or injustice would result.
RCBC VS. SERRA ET. AL.

G.R. No. 216124, 19 July 2017, Carpio, J:

Facts: RCBC filed a motion for execution in 2011 before the RTC Makati,
seeing to execute an order dated 1989, which directed Federico A. Serra to
sell to RCBC a parcel of land in Masbate covered by Original Certificate of
Title No. O-232 on which the Masbate Business Center of RCBC is located.

During the pendency of Civil Case No. 10054, Serra mortgaged the
subject property to respondent Spouses Andueza in 2011, and had the real
estate mortgage annotated on OCT No. O-232 under Entry No.
2011000513.

The RTC denied RCBC's motion for execution for lack of basis and
found that it had been almost 18 years after the original Order had become
final and executory that RCBC filed the motion for execution. Neither did
RCBC file an action to revive judgment within ten years from the date that
the original Order became final. Motion for Reconsideration was denied.

Meanwhile, the Spouses Andueza foreclosed the mortgage.

RCBC later filed a new motion for execution in 2014 with the RTC,
which was granted. The Spouses Andueza filed an opposition with prayer
for affirmative reliefs, which was dismissed by the RTC, who held that the
real estate mortgage is inferior to RCBC's right since the mortgage with
the Spouses Andueza was constituted when Francisco Serra no longer had
the ownership and free disposal of the subject property. This was not
appealed.

Meanwhile, the property was extrajudicially foreclosed in Masbate,

and sold to the Spouses Andueza.

Further legal proceedings ensued. Eventually, RCBC filed an action

for contempt against Francisco Serra, for colluding with the Spouses
Andueza for the illegal mortgage and foreclosure of the subject property.

Issue: Were the parties liable for contempt?

Ruling: Yes, they were. As a party in a related case involving the same
property, Serra cannot feign ignorance of the Court's decision and
restraining order in that case. The TRO was in 2012 while the decision was
promulgated in 2013.

By virtue of the TRO, which was made permanent, Serra was

enjoined to perform any act to remove RCBC from the subject property.

Yet by defaulting on his loan obligation with the Spouses Andueza,

and their foreclosure of the real estate mortgage, Serra in effect allowed
the removal of RCBC from the subject property. Serra's conduct tended to
impede the administration of justice by effectively allowing RCBC to be
removed from the premises of the subject property, in contravention of the
clear directive in the decision and restraining order in the related case.

Therefore, Francisco Serra is guilty of indirect contempt and

accordingly fined.

Despite being non-parties in the other case, Spouses Andueza have

notice of the pendency of such action. In 2013, RCBC had the TRO issued
by this Court annotated on OCT No. O-232 under Entry No. 2013000087.

Therefore, Spouses Andueza have actual knowledge of the Court's

TRO in the other case prior to their filing of the petition for extrajudicial
foreclosure of the subject property on 2013.

Furthermore, the decision the other case was promulgated prior to

the Spouses Andueza's initiation of foreclosure proceedings. Spouses
Andueza cannot therefore invoke lack of knowledge of RCBC's interest
over the subject property when they filed the petition for extrajudicial
foreclosure.

Hence, such knowledge should have prevented, or at the very least

cautioned, the Spouses Andueza from proceeding with the foreclosure
which had the effect of removing RCBC from the property, in
contravention of the clear language of the Court in the other case.

The Spouses Andueza's act of instituting the petition for

extrajudicial foreclosure, which would ultimately result in removing
RCBC from the subject property, obviously tended to impede the
administration of justice and thus constitutes indirect contempt of court.

Accordingly, the Spouses Andueza are likewise adjudged guilty of

indirect contempt and fined.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. LARRAZABAL ET.AL.

G.R. No. 204530, 26 July 2017, Caguioa, J:

Facts: The Department of Public Works and Highways undertook a flood

mitigation project at the Malabasag River in Ormoc City, Leyte Province.
This required a right-of-way so the Republic filed an action for
expropriation of three parcels of land with the RTC.

There was a Commissioner’s Report on the amount of just

compensation to be given to the affected landowners.

The Republic later filed a comment on the CR, stating that the
appraisal values in Resolution 8-98 --- later Republic Act No. 8974 ---
should be used instead of the findings of the CR.

The RTC, however, ruled in favor of using the CR. This was
affirmed on appeal by the CA, who ruled that ruled that RA No. 8974 was
not applicable since it only applies prospectively, since the Complaint was
filed as early as September 1999, R.A. No. 8974 was not applicable because
it was signed into law and became effective only on November 2000.

The Republic filed a petition for review on certiorari with the SC.

Issue: 1) Is RA No. 8974 is applicable to the determination of the just

compensation to be paid for the properties?

2) Was the RTC correct in its determination of just compensation?

Ruling: 1) No, it is not. R.A. No. 8974 cannot be made to apply retroactively
since it is a substantive law; there is nothing in RA No. 8974 which
expressly provides for retroactive application; and retroactivity could not
necessarily be implied from RA No. 8974 or in any of its provisions.

2) No, it is not. The error of the RTC was exacerbated by its reliance
solely on comparative sales of other properties. As ruled in National Power
Corporation vs. YCLA Sugar Development Corporation, factors such as
acquisition cost, current market value of like properties, tax value of the
properties of respondents, and the sizes, shapes, and locations of the
properties, should have been considered, but the RTC's determination of
just compensation did not consider any of the foregoing factors.
SPOUSES SIBAY AND SPOUSES ELAS VS. SPOUSES BERMUDEZ

G.R. No. 198196, 17July 2017, Peralta J.

Facts: The Spouses Sibay mortgaged their lot to the Land Bank of the
Philippines, who foreclosed the mortgage and later sold the lot to the
Spouses Bermudez. The Spouses Sibay then filed an action with the RTC
to null & void the loan with LBP. The case was set for hearing, and the
Spouses Sibay filed a motion for postponement, which was denied by the
RTC, who fined them P5,000 for their allegedly unexplained absences of
them and their counsel at the scheduled hearing, and also ordered them to
pay the an equal amount of P5,000 to the Spouses Bermudez. The Spouses
Sibay claimed that their absence was due to schedule conflicts and
sicknesses, and that they could not pay the fine since they were just
merely paupers only. They filed a motion for reconsideration, but this was
denied. The RTC, however, then reduced the fine to P5,000. The Spouses
Sibay filed a petition for certiorari with the CA, but this was denied, along
with their motion for reconsideration. They then filed another petition for
certiorari with the SC.

Issue: Was the CA correct in affirming the RTC in charging a fine on

them?

Ruling: Yes, it was. As a rule, the grant or denial of a motion for

postponement is addressed to the sound discretion of the court, which
should always be predicated on the consideration that more than the mere
convenience of the courts or of the parties in the case, the ends of justice
and fairness should be served thereby. After all, postponements and
continuances are part and parcel of our procedural system of dispensing
justice. When no substantial rights are affected and the intention to delay
is not manifest with the corresponding motion to transfer the hearing
having been filed accordingly, it is sound judicial discretion to allow the
same to the end that the merits of the case may be fully ventilated. Thus,
in considering motions for postponements, two things must be borne in
mind: (1) the reason for the postponement, and (2) the merits of the case of
the movant. Unless grave abuse of discretion is shown, such discretion
will not be interfered with either by mandamus or appeal. Because it is a
matter of privilege, not a right, a movant for postponement should not
assume beforehand that his motion will be granted.

Litigants must be reminded that the judge must, at all times,

remain in full control of the proceedings in his sala and should adopt a
firm policy against improvident postponements. More importantly, he
should follow the time limit set for deciding cases. Judges should actively
manage the trial of their cases byrational calendaring of cases, and avoid
unnecessary postponements of cases as mandated by Administrative
Circular No. 1, dated January 28, 1988, paragraph 2.2. Judges are bound to
dispose of the courts' business promptly and to decide cases within the
required period. It bears repeating that the public's faith and confidence
in the judicial system depends, to a large extent, on the judicious and
prompt disposition of cases and other matters pending before the courts.

Thus, it must be emphasized anew that procedural rules are not to

be belittled or dismissed simply because their non-observance may have
resulted in prejudice to a party's substantive rights. Like all rules, they are
required to be followed except only when for the most persuasive of
reasons they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not
commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying
with the procedure prescribed. While it is true that a litigation is not a
game of technicalities, this does not mean that the Rules of Court may be
ignored at will and at random to the prejudice of the orderly presentation
and assessment of the issues and their just resolution.
SPOUSES YU VS. A.L.I. / HEIRS OF SPOUSES DIAZ VS. A.L.I.

G.R. No. 173120 / G.R. No. 173141, July 26, 2017, Mendoza, J:

Facts: In 1921, the Director of Lands of the General Land Registration

Office approved the survey plan of Spouses Diaz over parcels of land in
what was then part of Rizal. Various surveys over the same or similar lots
were conducted over the years, leading to disputes.

In 1968, the Spouses Diaz filed for original registration with the
Court of First Instance of Pasay City. The CPJ Corporation, an owner of
one of those disputed lots, filed an action to review the original certificate
of title of the Spouses Diaz, contending that interested persons were not
notified of the application.

Meanwhile, the Spouses Diaz sold the lot to the Spouses Cabautan
in 1976. In 1993 and 1994, the Spouses Yu acquired ownership of lots
originating from title of the Spouses Diaz. Meanwhile in 1980, CPJC had
sold its own ownership in the disputed lots to 3 rd person. In 1992, A.L.I.
eventually acquired all of the disputed lots. In 1995, the RTC ordered all
the certificates originating from the Spouses Diaz to be cancelled, and held
that that Spouses Diaz committed fraud when they filed their application
for original registration of land without informing the interested parties
therein in violation of Sections 31 and 32 of Act No. 496. It also held that
they knew that CPJC had an appropriate interest over the real properties.

The Spouses Diaz then filed an appeal with the CA. Meanwhile, the
Spouses Yu filed with the RTC of Las Pinas to null & void the TCT’s of
ALI, and sought to recover the possession of the properties of ALI which
overlapped their own lots, stating that their predecessors had open,
uninterrupted and adverse possession of the same from 1921 until it was
transferred to the Spouses Cabautan in 1976. Spouses Yu averred that the
Spouses Cabautan possessed the said land until it was sold to them in
1994. They sought the judicial confirmation of the validity of their own
land titles.

The RTC ruled in favor of the Spouses Yu, but this was overturned
on appeal by the CA, who had consolidated the two cases of the Spouses
Diaz and the Spouses Yu, and ruled in favor of ALI for both, citing fraud
 in the former case and prescription in the latter case, and presumption of
regularity for the surveys which were the basis of the titles claimed by
A.L.I.

Issues: Was the ruling of the CA correct?

Ruling: No. The Court finds that the complaint of Spouses Yu is not barred
by prescription. While Section 38 of Act No. 496 states that the petition for
review to question a decree of registration must be filed within one (1)
year after entry of the decree, such provision is not the only remedy of an
aggrieved party who was deprived of land by fraudulent means. The
remedy of the landowner whose property has been wrongfully or
erroneously registered in another's name is, after one year from the date of
the decree, not to set aside the decree, as was done in this case, but
respecting the decree as incontrovertible and no longer open to review, to
bring an ordinary action in the ordinary court of justice for reconveyance
or, if the property has passed into the hands of an innocent purchaser for
value, for payment of damages instead.

Although a certificate of title serves as evidence of an indefeasible

and incontrovertible title to the property in favor of the person whose
name appears therein, it is not a conclusive proof of ownership. It is a
well-settled rule that ownership is different from a certificate of title. The
fact that a person was able to secure a title in his name does not operate to
vest ownership upon him of the subject land. Registration of a piece of
land under the Torrens System does not create or vest title, because it is
not a mode of acquiring ownership. A certificate of title is merely an
evidence of ownership or title over the particular property described
therein. It cannot be used to protect a usurper from the true owner; nor
can it be used as a shield for the commission of fraud; neither does it
permit one to enrich himself at the expense of others. Its issuance in favor
of a particular person does not foreclose the possibility that the real
property may be co-owned with persons not named in the certificate, or
that it may be held in trust for another person by the registered owner.

Hence, the Court may inquire into the validity of the ownership of
a property by scrutinizing the movant's evidence of title and the basis of
such title. When there is compelling proof that there is doubt on the
validity of the sources or basis of such title, then an examination is proper.
 Thus, the surveys of the certificates of title are not immune from judicial
scrutiny, in light of the genuine and legitimate reasons for its analysis.

TILAR VS. TILAR AND REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 214529, July 12, 2017, Peralta, J:

Facts: In 2010, Jerrysus Tillar filed to have his marriage to Elizabeth Tilar
be declared null and void by reason of psychological incapacity to comply
with her essential marital obligations because of a combination of
aggressive personality disorder and histrionic personality disorder,
especially since he said that they had already separated in 2002, and she
was now living with someone else.

Elizabeth never bothered to respond to the summons of the court,

but an investigation by the Fiscal revealed no collusion between the two.

The RTC, however, still dismissed the case, citing lack of

jurisdiction, due to the public policy of separation of Church and State,
and denied his motion for reconsideration, on the same grounds.

Jerrysus then filed a petition for review on certiorari with the SC,
with the Solicitor-General commenting in concurrence.

Issue: Was the RTC correct in denying jurisdiction?

Ruling: No, it was not. As marriage is a special contract, their terms and
conditions are not merely subject to the stipulations of the contracting
parties but are governed by law.

Thus, the contract of marriage is entered into by complying with

the requirements and formalities prescribed by law. The marriage of
petitioner and respondent which was solemnized by a Catholic priest and
was held in a church was in accordance with the above-quoted provisions.
Although, marriage is considered a sacrament in the Catholic Church, it
has civil and legal consequences which are governed by the Family Code.
As was correctly pointed out, the instant petition only seeks to nullify the
marriage contract between the parties as postulated in the Family Code of
the Philippines; and the declaration of nullity of the parties' marriage in
the religious and ecclesiastical aspect is another matter. Notably, the
proceedings for church annulment which is in accordance with the norms
of Canon Law is not binding upon the State as the couple is still
considered married to each other in the eyes of the civil law. Thus, the
principle of separation of the church and state finds no application in this
case.
HEIRS OF UY VS. HEIRS OF DEL CASTILLO

G.R. No. 223610, 24 July 2017, Perlas-Bernabe, J:

Facts: There was an action for quieting of title in the RTC involving land,
where the original petitioner was eventually substituted by his siblings,
the Heirs of Uy, and the original respondents were eventually substituted
by their children, the Heirs of Del Castillo.

The RTC eventually ruled in favor of the respondents and issued a

writ of execution with a notice of garnishment, seeking a levy for
attorney’s fees, moral damages, and litigation costs.

The Heirs of Uy then filed both an omnibus motion to quash the

WOE, claiming that it was invalid because it altered the terms of the RTC’s
decision which did not state that the zonal value mentioned therein
referred to the zonal value of the property at the time of execution, and a
motion to quash the case itself on jurisdictional grounds, claiming that the
RTC had no jurisdiction over the Heirs of Uy in the Quieting of Title Case
as they were never served with summons.

The RTC granted the omnibus motion, nullifying and voiding the
NOG, but denying the motion to quash as its grounds had never been
raised before in the trial itself. The Heirs of Uy then filed a consolidated
motion for reconsideration, but this was denied. The Heirs of Uy then filed
a motion for review on certiorari with the CA, raising the additional issue
that that they cannot be held personally liable with their separate property
for their deceased sibling Jaime's liability and that respondents should
have filed a claim against Jaime's estate in accordance with Section 20,
Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. The CA, however, affirmed the RTC. The
Heirs of Uy then filed a petition for review on certiorari with the SC.

Issue: Was the CA correct in affirming the RTC?

Ruling: Yes, it was. Anent the Heirs of Uy’s claim that they were never
served with summons, the CA correctly pointed out that in the November
1997 Manifestation/Motion, they, through their counsel, explicitly stated,
among others, that they "received the Summons with a copy of the Second
Amended Complaint" and that "the Answer earlier filed serves as the
Answer to the Second Amended Complaint." Having admitted the
foregoing, petitioners cannot now assert otherwise. Assuming arguendo
that petitioners did not receive summons for the amended complaint, they
were nonetheless deemed to have voluntarily submitted to the RTC's
jurisdiction by filing an Answer to the amended complaint and actively
participating in the case. In fact, one of the siblings was presented as a
witness for the defense. Moreover, they appealed the adverse RTC ruling
in the Quieting of Title Case all the way to the SC. It is settled that the
active participation of the party against whom the action was brought, is
tantamount to an invocation of the court's jurisdiction and a willingness to
abide by the resolution of the case, and such will bar said party from later
on impugning the court's jurisdiction. After all, jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant in civil cases is obtained either by a valid service
of summons upon him or by his voluntary submission to the court's
authority.

In this regard, petitioners cannot also deny their counsel’s authority

to represent them. Indeed, if he was not authorized to represent them, the
natural reaction for petitioners was to exhibit concern. Based on the
records, however, there is no indication that any of them made even the
slightest objections to the representation. This only confirms the CA's
finding that such denial was a mere afterthought and a desperate attempt
to undo a final and executory judgment against them.

As to their contention that the Heirs of Del Castillo should have

proceeded against their brother’s estate pursuant to Section 20, Rule 3 of
the Rules of Court, it is well to point out that based on the records, they
were not merely substituted in their brother’s place as Defendant; rather,
they were impleaded in their personal capacities. Under Section 16, Rule 3
of the Rules of Court, substitution of parties takes place when the party to
the action dies pending the resolution of the case and the claim is not
extinguished. As per Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, it applies in
cases where the defendant dies while the case is pending and not before
the case was even filed in court, as in this case. If they truly believed the
estate is the proper party to the Quieting of Title Case, they could and
should have raised the lack of cause of action against them at the earliest
opportunity. Obviously, they did not do so; instead, they actively
participated in the case, adopted the answer earlier filed, and even
litigated the case all the way to the SC. They cannot now question the final
 and executory judgment in the Quieting of Title Case because it happened
to be adverse to them.

VIRATA AND UMPC VS. WEE ET. AL./ W.I.C. VS. WEE/ESTRELLA VS. WEE/

CUA ET. AL. VS. WEE/REYES VS WEE ET. AL.

G.R. No. 220926/ G.R. No. 221058/ G.R. No. 22110/ G.R. No. 221135/ G.R. No. 221218

05 July 2017, Velasco, Jr. J:

Facts: Ng Wee was a valued client of Westmont Bank. Sometime in 1998,

he was enticed by the bank manager to make money placements with
Westmont Investment Corporation, a domestic corporation organized and
licensed to operate as an investment house, and one of the bank's affiliates.
Lured by representations that the "sans recourse" transactions are safe,
stable, high-yielding, and involve little to no risk, he placed investments
thereon under accounts in his own name, or in the names of his trustees.
In exchange, WIC issued him and his trustees Confirmation Advices
informing them of the identity of the borrower with whom they were
matched, and the terms under which the said borrower would repay
them.

Ng Wee's initial investments were matched with Hottick Holdings

Corporation, one of WIC's accredited borrowers, which fully availed of
the loan facility extended by WIC, but it defaulted in paying its
outstanding obligations when the Asian financial crisis struck. As a result,
WIC filed a collection suit against HHC and other parties for the loan and
related costs. Alarmed by the news of HHC default and financial distress,
Ng Wee confronted WIC and inquired about the status of his investments.
WIC assured him that the losses from the HHC account will be absorbed
by the company and that his investments would be transferred instead to
a new borrower account. In view of these representations, he continued
making money placements, rolling over his previous investments in HHC
and even increased his stakes in the new borrower, Power Merge
Corporation.

Despite repeated demands, however, he was not able to collect

PMC’s outstanding obligation under the Confirmation Advices in the
amount of P213+ million. This prompted him, in 2000, to institute a
Complaint with the RTC for Collection of Sum of Money with Damages
 with prayer for the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Attachment, as he
claimed that he fell prey to the intricate scheme of fraud and deceit that
was hatched by WIC and PMC. He attributed gross negligence, if not
fraud and bad faith, on the part of WIC and its directors for approving
PMC’s credit line application and its subsequent increase to the amount of
P2.5 billion despite its glaring inability to pay. WIC officers were likewise
impleaded for signing the Side Agreements that would allow Power
Merge to avoid paying its obligations to the investors. He also sought to
pierce the separate juridical personality of PMC since a director of WIC
owned almost all of the company's stocks, and it was further alleged that
this director acquired interest in other firms using the funds swindled
from the WIC investors. The RTC ruled in favor of Ng Wee, and this was
also affirmed by the CA. Defendants moved for the dismissal of the case
for failure to state a cause of action, among other reasons, since the
investments were not recorded in the name of Ng Wee, and they also
denied personal liability for the alleged actions of WIC & PMC. The case
eventually reached the Supreme Court.

Issue: 1) Was Ng Wee the real party-in-interest?

2) Were the parties liable to Ng Wee?

3) Is Ng Wee entitled to damages?

Ruling: 1) Yes, he was. Testimonial evidence on record established Ng

Wee's ownership over the invested funds, thus he did not lack a cause of
action.

2) Yes, they were. WIC and PMC are liable to him for fraud and
under contract, respectively. WIC’s actuations establishes the presence of
actionable fraud, for which they can be held liable. Meanwhile, PMC was
not an active party in defrauding him as it was used instead as a mere
conduit in order for WIC to be able to conceal its act of directly borrowing
funds for its own account. It is WIC, as the assignor of the portions of
credit, that is under obligation to disclose to investors the existence and
execution of the SA’s. Failure to do so only goes to show that targets of
WIC's fraud were not any particular individual, but the public at large.
Meanwhile, it was not PMC’s positive legal duty to forewarn the investors
of its discharge since the company did not deal with them directly. PMC
was agnostic as to the source of funds since they relied on their
 underlying agreement with WIC that they would not be liable for the PN’s
issued.

3) Yes, he is. However, a claim for moral damages in the amount of

P5 million is indeed too excessive, even with the principal amount, since
moral damages were never meant to enrich the claimant.

REGALADO VS. DELA PENA ET. AL.

G.R. No. 202448, 13 December 2017, Del Castillo, J:

Facts: In 1994, Joseph Regalado allegedly occupied a lot co-owned by the

Dela Pena siblings, without their knowledge and consent, in order to plant
and harvest sugarcane without paying them any rent. They discovered
this sometime from 1995 to 1996. They repeatedly demanded him to
vacate the property, but he refused. They later went to the Barangay, but
failed to reach any settlement on the matter. They then filed a complaint
against him with the RTC for recovery of possession of the property.

JR denied their allegations, and claimed that they had all

renounced their rights to the property to their sibling, Jaime, and he had
then renounced his rights to petitioner. He contended that the since the
case was for recovery of physical possession and it was filed within a year
from the confrontation at the Barangay, it was a case for ejectment, and
thus the RTC had no jurisdiction, as it should have been filed with the
MTC.

The siblings stated that their waiver of rights in favor of their

brother was predicated on the condition that he pay the P6.7 million loans
with Republic Planters Bank and Philippine National Bank and that if the
property was sold, the proceeds would be equally divided among them.
They also contended that their waiver was limited to JDP alone, that any
sale would need the approval of the banks with whom it was mortgaged.
Since neither JDP nor JR paid either RPB or PNB, there was no valid
waiver. They also contended that the RTC did have jurisdiction over the
case.

The RTC ruled in favor of the siblings, and ordered JR to return the
possession to the siblings, but did not award them any payment of
damages from JR. Both parties then appealed to the CA, who affirmed that
 the RTC indeed had jurisdiction over the case, especially since the value of
the property was over P20 thousand.

Issue: Was the CA correct in affirming the RTC?

Ruling: No, it was not. the Court agrees with petitioner that while this case
is an Accion Publiciana, there was no clear showing that the RTC indeed
has the jurisdiction over it.

Well-settled is the rule that jurisdiction is conferred only by law,

and cannot be presumed or implied, and must distinctly appear from the
law. It cannot also be vested upon a court by the agreement of the parties;
or by the court's erroneous belief that it had jurisdiction over a case.

To emphasize, when the siblings filed the Complaint in 1998,

Republic Act No. 7691 was already in force as it was approved on March
25, 1994 and took effect on April 15, 1994. As such, it is necessary that the
assessed value of the subject properties, or its adjacent lots (if the
properties are not declared for taxation purposes) be alleged to ascertain
which court has jurisdiction over the case.

As argued by JR, the Complaint failed to specify the assessed value

of the subject properties. Thus, it is unclear if the RTC properly acquired
jurisdiction, or the MTC has jurisdiction, over the siblings’ action.

Also worth noting is the fact that the RTC took cognizance of the
complaint only on the presumption that the assessed value of the proper
exceeds ₱20 thousand. Aside from affirming such presumption, the CA, in
turn, declared that the RTC had jurisdiction because the parties stipulated
on it. However, as discussed, jurisdiction cam1ot be presumed. It cannot
be conferred by the agreement of the parties, or on the erroneous belief of
the court that it had jurisdiction over a case.

Indeed, in the absence of any allegation in the Complaint of the

assessed value of the subject properties, it cannot be determined which
court has exclusive original jurisdiction over respondents' Complaint.
Courts cannot simply take judicial notice of the assessed value, or even
market value of the land. Resultantly, for lack of jurisdiction, all
proceedings before the RTC, including its decision, are null and void,
which makes it unnecessary to discuss the other issues raised by JR.