Garcia VS Chief of Staff G.R. No.

L-20213 January 31, 1966

MARIANO E. GARCIA, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
THE CHIEF OF STAFF and THE ADJUTANT GENERAL, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES
and/or THE CHAIRMAN, PHILIPPINE VETERANS BOARD and/or THE AUDITOR GENERAL OF THE
PHILIPPINES,defendants-appellees.
REGALA, J.:
Facts: The plaintiff filed with the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, an action to collect a sum of money against
the above defendants. He suffered injuries while undergoing a 10-month military training at Camp Floridablanca,
Pampanga. He filed a claim under Commonwealth Act 400 and in April 1957 with the Adjutant General’s Office
which later disallow his claim for disability benefit. After further demands of the plaintiff, the same Adjutant
General’s Office denied the claim, alleging that the Commonwealth Act 400 had already been repealed by RA 610
which took effect January 1, 1950. That by the reason of the injuries suffered by plaintiff, he was deprived of his
sight or vision rendering him permanently disabled; and by the reason of unjustified refusal of defendants on the
claim, plaintiff was deprived of his disability pension from July 1948 totalling no less than P4,000 at the rate of
P20/mo and suffered moral damages and attorney’s fees the amount of P2,000. The Philippine Veterans
Administration and the Chief of Staff of AFP file separate motions to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that the
court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint; that the plaintiff failed to exhaust all
administrative remedies before coming to court; that the complaint states no cause of action; and that the cause of
action is barred by the statute of limitations. Acting on the said Motion, the Court of First Instance, on March 2,
1962, rendered an order dismissing the complaint on the ground that action has prescribed. Motion for
reconsideration of the said order having been denied, the plaintiff has interposed this appeal.

Issue: Whether or not the lower court is right in dismissing the complaint.

Held: The SC uphold the order of dismissal for the simple reason that the Court of First Instance has no jurisdiction
over the subject matter, it being a money claim against the government. It was already held in the case of New
Manila Lumber vs. Republic in L-14248, 4/28/60, that a claim for the recovery of money against the government
should be filed with the Auditor General, in line with the principle that the State can not be sued without its consent.

Commonwealth Act 327 provides:

Section 1. In all cases involving the settlement of accounts or claims, other than those of accountable officers, the
Auditor General shall act and decide the same within 60 days, exclusive of Sundays and holidays after their
presentation….

Section 2. The party aggrieved by the final decision of the Auditor General in the settlement of an account or claim,
may within 30 days from receipt of decision, take an appeal in writing to (c) the Supreme Court, if the appellant is a
private person or entity.

The well established rule that no recourse to court can be had until all administrative remedies had been exhausted
and that actions against administrative officers should not be entertained if superior administrative officer could
grant relief is applicable to this case. The order dismissing the complaint is hereby affirmed, without
pronouncement as to costs.
Festejo VS Fernando G.R. No. L-5156 March 11, 1954
CARMEN FESTEJO, demandante-apelante,
vs.
ISAIAS FERNANDO, Director de Obras Publicas, demandado-apelado.
DIOKNO, J.:
FACTS: Carmen Festejo filed a suit against Isaias Fernando, Director of the Bureau of Public Works, for taking
possession of three parcels of land she owned and causing an irrigation canal to be constructed thereon without
obtaining first a right of way, without her consent and knowledge , and against her express objection. Festejo
demanded the return of the land and its restoration to its former condition.
ISSUE: Is the Fernando immune from suit for being a public officer?
HELD: Defendant committed acts outside the scope of his authority. When he went outside the boundaries of the
right of way upon plaintiff's land and damaged it or destroyed its former condition and usefulness, he must be held
to have designedly departed from the duties imposed on him by law. There can be no claim that he thus invaded
plaintiff's land southeasterly of the right of way innocently. Surveys clearly marked the limits of the land
appropriated for the right of way of this trunk highway before construction began.
Ordinarily the officer or employee committing the tort is personally liable therefor, and may be sued as any other
citizen and held answerable for whatever injury or damage results from his tortious act.
If an officer, even while acting under color of his office, exceeds the power conferred on him by law, he cannot
shelter himself under the plea that he is a public agent.
It is a general rule that an officer-executive, administrative quasi-judicial, ministerial, or otherwise who acts outside
the scope of his jurisdiction and without authorization of law may thereby render himself amenable to personal
liability in a civil suit. If he exceed the power conferred on him by law, he cannot shelter himself by the plea that he
is a public agent acting under the color of his office, and not personally. In the eye of the law, his acts then are
wholly without authority.

ART. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats,
violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another person shall be
liable to the latter for damages:
xxx
(6) The right against deprivation of property without due process of law; (Festejo vs. Fernando, G.R. No. L-5156,
March 11, 1954)
Holy See VS. Rosario G.R. No. 101949 December 1, 1994
THE HOLY SEE, petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. ERIBERTO U. ROSARIO, JR., as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Makati,
Branch 61 and STARBRIGHT SALES ENTERPRISES, INC., respondents.
QUIASON, J.:

Facts: Petitioner is the Holy See who exercises sovereignty over the Vatican City in Rome, Italy, and is represented

in the Philippines by the Papal Nuncio; Private respondent, Starbright Sales Enterprises, Inc., is a domestic

corporation engaged in the real estate business.

This petition arose from a controversy over a parcel of land consisting of 6,000 square meters located in the

Municipality of Paranaque registered in the name of petitioner. Said lot was contiguous with two other lots

registered in the name of the Philippine Realty Corporation (PRC).

The three lots were sold to Ramon Licup, through Msgr. Domingo A. Cirilos, Jr., acting as agent to the sellers.

Later, Licup assigned his rights to the sale to private respondent.

In view of the refusal of the squatters to vacate the lots sold to private respondent, a dispute arose as to who of the

parties has the responsibility of evicting and clearing the land of squatters. Complicating the relations of the parties

was the sale by petitioner of Lot 5-A to Tropicana Properties and Development Corporation (Tropicana).

private respondent filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 61, Makati, Metro Manila for annulment

of the sale of the three parcels of land, and specific performance and damages against petitioner, represented by the

Papal Nuncio, and three other defendants: namely, Msgr. Domingo A. Cirilos, Jr., the PRC and Tropicana

petitioner and Msgr. Cirilos separately moved to dismiss the complaint — petitioner for lack of jurisdiction based on

sovereign immunity from suit, and Msgr. Cirilos for being an improper party. An opposition to the motion was filed

by private respondent.

the trial court issued an order denying, among others, petitioner’s motion to dismiss after finding that petitioner

“shed off [its] sovereign immunity by entering into the business contract in question” Petitioner forthwith elevated

the matter to us. In its petition, petitioner invokes the privilege of sovereign immunity only on its own behalf and on

behalf of its official representative, the Papal Nuncio.

ISSUE:

Whether the Holy See is immune from suit insofar as its business relations regarding selling a lot to a private entity

RULING:

The Republic of the Philippines has accorded the Holy See the status of a foreign sovereign. The Holy See, through
its Ambassador, the Papal Nuncio, has had diplomatic representations with the Philippine government since 1957

(Rollo, p. 87). This appears to be the universal practice in international relations.

There are two conflicting concepts of sovereign immunity, each widely held and firmly established. According to

the classical or absolute theory, a sovereign cannot, without its consent, be made a respondent in the courts of

another sovereign. According to the newer or restrictive theory, the immunity of the sovereign is recognized only

with regard to public acts or acts jure imperii of a state, but not with regard to private acts or acts jure gestionis

If the act is in pursuit of a sovereign activity, or an incident thereof, then it is an act jure imperii, especially when it

is not undertaken for gain or profit.

In the case at bench, if petitioner has bought and sold lands in the ordinary course of a real estate business, surely the

said transaction can be categorized as an act jure gestionis. However, petitioner has denied that the acquisition and

subsequent disposal of Lot 5-A were made for profit but claimed that it acquired said property for the site of its

mission or the Apostolic Nunciature in the Philippines. Private respondent failed to dispute said claim.

Lot 5-A was acquired by petitioner as a donation from the Archdiocese of Manila. The donation was made not for

commercial purpose, but for the use of petitioner to construct thereon the official place of residence of the Papal

Nuncio. The right of a foreign sovereign to acquire property, real or personal, in a receiving state, necessary for the

creation and maintenance of its diplomatic mission, is recognized in the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic

Relations (Arts. 20-22). This treaty was concurred in by the Philippine Senate and entered into force in the

Philippines on November 15, 1965.

The decision to transfer the property and the subsequent disposal thereof are likewise clothed with a governmental

character. Petitioner did not sell Lot 5-A for profit or gain. It merely wanted to dispose off the same because the

squatters living thereon made it almost impossible for petitioner to use it for the purpose of the donation. The fact

that squatters have occupied and are still occupying the lot, and that they stubbornly refuse to leave the premises, has

been admitted by private respondent in its complaint

Private respondent is not left without any legal remedy for the redress of its grievances. Under both Public

International Law and Transnational Law, a person who feels aggrieved by the acts of a foreign sovereign can ask

his own government to espouse his cause through diplomatic channels.

Private respondent can ask the Philippine government, through the Foreign Office, to espouse its claims against the

Holy See. Its first task is to persuade the Philippine government to take up with the Holy See the validity of its
claims. Of course, the Foreign Office shall first make a determination of the impact of its espousal on the relations

between the Philippine government and the Holy See (Young, Remedies of Private Claimants Against Foreign

States, Selected Readings on Protection by Law of Private Foreign Investments 905, 919 [1964]). Once the

Philippine government decides to espouse the claim, the latter ceases to be a private cause.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is GRANTED and the complaint in Civil Case No. 90-183 against

petitioner is DISMISSED.
Merritt VS Government of the Philippine Islands G.R. No. L-11154 March 21, 1916
E. MERRITT, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, defendant-appellant.
TRENT, J.:
Facts: Merrit was riding a motorcycle along Padre Faura Street when he was bumped by the ambulance of the
General Hospital. Merrit sustained severe injuries rendering him unable to return to work. The legislature later
enacted Act 2457 authorizing Merritt to file a suit against the Government in order to fix the responsibility for the
collision between his motorcycle and the ambulance of the General Hospital, and to determine the amount of the
damages, if any, to which he is entitled. After trial, the lower court held that the collision was due to the negligence
of the driver of the ambulance. It then determined the amount of damages and ordered the government to pay the
same.
ISSUES: 1. Did the Government, in enacting the Act 2457, simply waive its immunity from suit or did it also
concede its liability to the plaintiff?
2. Is the Government liable for the negligent act of the driver of the ambulance?

HELD:
1. By consenting to be sued a state simply waives its immunity from suit. It does not thereby concede its liability to
plaintiff, or create any cause of action in his favor, or extend its liability to any cause not previously recognized. It
merely gives a remedy to enforce a preexisting liability and submits itself to the jurisdiction of the court, subject to
its right to interpose any lawful defense.
2. Under the Civil Code, the state is liable when it acts through a special agent, but not when the damage should
have been caused by the official to whom properly it pertained to do the act performed. A special agent is one who
receives a definite and fixed order or commission, foreign to the exercise of the duties of his office if he is a special
official. This concept does not apply to any executive agent who is an employee of the acting administration and
who on his own responsibility performs the functions which are inherent in and naturally pertain to his office and
which are regulated by law and the regulations. The driver of the ambulance of the General Hospital was not a
special agent; thus the Government is not liable. (Merritt vs Government of the Philippine Islands, G.R. No. L-
11154, March 21 1916, 34 Phil. 311)
NOTE:

■ The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special agent; but not when the damage has been
caused by the official to whom the task done properly pertains. (Art. 2180 par. 6, Civil Code)

■ The state is not responsible for the damages suffered by private individuals in consequence of acts performed by
its employees in the discharge of the functions pertaining to their office, because neither fault nor even negligence
can be presumed on the part of the state in the organization of branches of public service and in the appointment of
its agents. (Merritt vs. Government of the Philippine Islands)
■ The State is not liable for the torts committed by its officers or agents whom it employs, except when expressly
made so by legislative enactment. The government does not undertake to guarantee to any person the fidelity of the
officers or agents whom it employs since that would involve it in all its operations in endless embarrassments,
difficulties and losses, which would be subversive of the public interest. (Merritt vs. Government of the Philippine
Islands)
Santiago VS Republic G.R. No. L-48214 December 19, 1978
ILDEFONSO SANTIAGO, represented by his Attorney-in-Fact, ALFREDO T. SANTIAGO, petitioner,
vs.
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the Director, Bureau
of Plant Industry, and the Regional Director, Region IX, Zamboanga City, respondent,
FERNANDO, J.:
Facts: In January 1971, Ildefonso Santiago gratuitously donated a parcel of land to the Bureau of Plant Industry. The
terms of the donation are; that the Bureau should construct a building on the said lot and that the building should be
finished by December 7, 1974, that the Bureau should install lighting facilities on the said lot. However, come 1976
there were still no improvements on the lot. This prompted Santiago to file a case pleading for the revocation of such
contract of donation. The trial court dismissed the petition claiming that it is a suit against the government and
should not prosper without the consent of the government.
ISSUE: Whether or not the state has not waived its immunity from suit.
HELD: No. The government has waived its immunity and such waiver is implied by virtue of the terms provided in
the deed of donation. The government is a beneficiary of the terms of the donation. But the government through the
Bureau of Plant Industry has breached the terms of the deed by not complying with such, therefore, the donor
Santiago has the right to have his day in court and be heard. Further, to not allow the donor to be heard would be
unethical and contrary to equity which the government so advances. Case should prosper.
USA VS Ruiz G.R. No. L-35645 May 22, 1985
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, CAPT. JAMES E. GALLOWAY, WILLIAM I. COLLINS and ROBERT
GOHIER,petitioners,
vs.
HON. V. M. RUIZ, Presiding Judge of Branch XV, Court of First Instance of Rizal and ELIGIO DE
GUZMAN & CO., INC., respondents.
ABAD SANTOS, J.:
Facts: Sometime in May 1972, the United States invited the submission of bids for certain naval projects.
Eligio de Guzman & Co. Inc. responded to the invitation and submitted bids. Subsequently, the company
received two telegrams requesting it to confirm its price. In June 1972, the copany received a letter which
said that the company did not qualify to receive an award for the projects. The company then sued the
United States of America and individual petitioners demanding that the company perform the work on the
projects, or for the petitioners to pay damages and to issue a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the
petitioners from entering into contracts with third parties concerning the project.

ISSUE:
1) Do the petitioners exercise governmental or proprietary functions?
2) Does the Court have jurisdiction over the case?

HELD:
The rule of State immunity exempts a State from being sued in the courts of another state without its
consent or waiver. This is a necessary consequence of the principles of independence and equality of
states. However, state immunity now extends only to governmental acts of the state. The restrictive
application of State immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out of commercial transactions of
the foreign sovereign. In this case, the projects are integral part of the naval base which is devoted to the
defense of the USA and Philippines which is, indisputably, a function of the government. As such, by
virtue of state immunity, the courts of the Philippines have no jurisdiction over the case for the US
government has not given consent to the filing of this suit.
National Airport Corporation VS Teodoro G.R. No. L-5122 April 30, 1952NATIONAL AIRPORTS
CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
JOSE TEODORO, SR., as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental and PHILIPPINE
AIRLINES, INC., respondents.
TUASON, J.:
Facts: The National Airports Corporation was organized under Republic Act No. 224, which expressly made
the provisions of the Corporation Law applicable to said corporation. On November 10, 1950, the National
Airports Corporation was abolished by Executive Order No. 365 and to take its place the Civil Aeronautics
Administration was created.
Before the abolition, the Philippine Airlines Inc. paid to the National Airports Corp. Php65,245 as fees for
landing at parking on Bacolod Airport No. 2 for the period up to and including July 31, 1948. These fees are
said to have been due and payable to the Capitol Subdivision Inc. which owned the land used by the National
Airports Corporation as airport, and the owner commenced and action in the Court of First Instance in
Negros Occidental against the Philippine Airlines, Inc.
In 1951, to recover the above said amount, PAL countered with a third-party complaint against NAC, which
by that time had been dissolved, and served summons on the Civil Aeronautics Administration.
The third party plaintiff alleged that it had paid to the National Airports Corporation the fees claimed by the Capitol
Subdivision, Inc. "on the belief and assumption that the third party defendant was the lessee of the lands subject of
the complaint and that the third party defendant and its predecessors in interest were the operators and maintainers
of said Bacolod Airport No. 2 and, further, that the third party defendant would pay to the landowners, particularly
the Capitol Subdivision, Inc., the reasonable rentals for the use of their lands."
The Solicitor General, after answering the third party complaint, filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the
court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the third- party complaint, first, because the National Airports Corporation "has
lost its juridical personality," and, second, because agency of the Republic of the Philippines, unincorporated and not
possessing juridical personality under the law, is incapable of suing and being sued."
Issue:1. Whether or not government corporate agency may be sued 2. Whether or not Civil Aeronautics
Administration may be sued
Held: 1. As a general rule, state cannot be sued without its consent and there can be no legal basis against the
authority that formulate the law and which the law depends. But the exemptions are the unincorporated type of
government and functioning for the proprietary. Not all government entities, whether corporate or non-corporate, are
immune to suits. However contended that when a sovereign state enters into a contract with a private person, the
state can be sued upon the theory that it has descended to the level of an individual from which “it can be implied
that it has given consent to be sued under the contract”
2. Among the general powers of the Civil Aeronautics Administration are under Section 3 of Executive Order No.
365, to execute contracts of any kind, to purchase property, and to grant concession rights, and under Section 4, to
charge landing fees, royalties on sale to aircraft of aviation gasoline, accessories and supplies, and rentals for the use
of any property under its management. These provisions confer upon “the Civil Aeronautics Administration the
power to sue and be sued, which is implied from the power to transact private business. And if it has power to sue
and be sued on its behalf, the Civil Aeronautics Administration with greater reason should have the power to
prosecute and defend suits against the National Airports Corporation, having acquired all the properties, funds and
choses in action and assumed all the liabilities of the latter.
According to the court, the petition is denied with costs against the Civil Aeronautics Administration
Bureau of Printing VS Bureau of Printing Association G.R. No. L-15751 January 28, 1961
BUREAU OF PRINTING, SERAFIN SALVADOR and MARIANO LEDESMA, petitioners,
vs.
THE BUREAU OF PRINTING EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (NLU), PACIFICO ADVINCULA,
ROBERTO MENDOZA, PONCIANO ARGANDA and TEODULO TOLERAN, respondents.
GUTIERREZ DAVID, J.:
Facts: The action in question was
—
upon complaint of the respondents Bureau of Printing Employees Association (NLU)Pacifico Advincula, Roberto
Mendoza, Ponciano Arganda and Teodulo Toleran
—
filed by an acting prosecutor of the Industrial Court against herein petitioner Bureau of Printing, Serafin Salvador,
the Acting Secretary of the Department of General Services, and Mariano Ledesma the Director of the Bureau of
Printing. The complaint alleged that Serafin Salvador and Mariano Ledesma have been engaging in unfair labor
practices by interfering with, or coercing the employees of the Bureau of Printing particularly the members of the
complaining association petition, in the exercise of their right to self-organization an discriminating in regard to hire
and tenure of their employment in order to discourage them from pursuing the union activities. The petitioners
Bureau of Printing, Serafin Salvador and Mariano Ledesma denied the charges of unfair labor practices attributed to
the and, by way of affirmative defenses, alleged, among other things, that respondents Pacifico Advincula,Roberto
Mendoza Ponciano Arganda and Teodulo Toleran were suspended pending result of an administrative investigation
against them for breach of Civil Service rules and regulations petitions; that the Bureau of Printing has no juridical
personality to sue and be sued; that said Bureau of Printing is not an industrial concern engaged for the purpose of
gain but is an agency of the Republic performing government functions. For relief, they prayed that the case be
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Thereafter, before the case could be heard, petitioners filed an "Omnibus Motion"
asking for a preliminary hearing on the question of jurisdiction raised by them in their answer and for suspension of
the trial of the case on the merits pending the determination of such jurisdictional question. The motion was granted,
but after hearing, the trial judge of the Industrial Court in an order dated January 27, 1959 sustained the jurisdiction
of the court on the theory that the functions of the Bureau of Printing are "exclusively proprietary in nature," and
consequently, denied the prayer for dismissal. Reconsideration of this order having been also denied by the court in
banc.
Note: The Bureau of Printing is an office of the Government created by the Administrative Code of 1916 (Act No.
2657). As such instrumentality of the Government, it operates under the direct supervision of the Executive
Secretary, Office of the President, and is "charged with the execution of all printing and binding, including work
incidental to those processes, required by the National Government and such other work of the same character as
said Bureau may, by law or by order of the (Secretary of Finance) Executive Secretary, be authorized to undertake . .
.." (See. 1644, Rev. Adm. Code). It has no corporate existence, and its appropriations are provided for in the General
Appropriations Act. Designed to meet the printing needs of the Government, it is primarily a service bureau and
obviously, not engaged in business or occupation for pecuniary profit.
Issue:
whether or not Bureau of Printing can be sued.
Ruling:
No. Indeed, as an office of the Government, without any corporate or juridical personality, the Bureau of Printing
cannot be sued. Any suit, action or proceeding against it, if it were to produce any effect, would actually be a suit,
action or proceeding against the Government itself, and the rule is settled that the Government cannot be sued
without its consent, much less over its objection. It is true that the Bureau of Printing receives outside jobs and that
many of its employees are paid for overtime work on regular working days and on holidays, but these facts do not
justify the conclusion that its functions are "exclusively proprietary in nature." Overtime work in the Bureau of
Printing is done only when the interest of the service so requires. As a matter of administrative policy, the overtime
compensation may be paid, but such payment is discretionary with the head of the Bureau depending upon its
current appropriations, so that it cannot be the basis for holding that the functions of said Bureau are wholly
proprietary in character. Clearly, while the Bureau of Printing is allowed to undertake private printing jobs, it cannot
be pretended that it is thereby an industrial or business concern. The additional work it executes for private parties is
merely incidental to its function, and although such work may be deemed proprietary in character, there is no
showing that the employees performing said proprietary function are
separate and distinct from those employed in its general governmental functions.