PEOPLE v.
HERNANDEZ speeches without clear intent of having his listeners agree to commit rebellio
G.R. No. L-6025/ MAY 30, 1964 / LABRADOR, J.
FACTS.
• Amado Hernandez is the President of the Congress on Labor Organizations (CLO)
and a member of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP); the CLO is
responsible for propagating the principles of Communism to its laborers-members
through lectures, meetings, and organization of committees of education.
• Hernandez made numerous speeches promoting the Communist movement and
derogating the government.
• Hernandez was then charged for the crime of conspiracy to commit rebellion on
the ground that he had conspired with the CPP, which had in turn conspired to
commit rebellion with the Hukbong Magpapalaya ng Bayan
(HMB/Hukbalahap/Huk).
• Juan Cruz, Amado Racanday, Genaro de la Cruz, Fermin Rodillas, Bayani Espiritu,
and Teopista Valerio, members of the the CPP, were also charged with the same
crime under the same grounds; Julian Lumanog, a member of both the CPP and
the HMB, was similarly charged.
• The said accused parties appealed the decision of the Court of First Instance
finding them guilty of rebellion on the ground that they have no connection to the
rebellion.
o Hernandez: CLO is independent from CPP; merely made derogatory
statements against the government and spearheaded the
indoctrination of the Communist movement and did not take part in the
rebellion
o Cruz: merely committed to the establishment of the dictatorship and
proletariat and did not take part in the rebellion
o Racanday and de la Cruz: received contributions from CPP before
conspiracy to commit rebellion was made
o Lumanog: joined the CPP believing that it was for the welfare of the
laborers
o Rodillas: made solicitations to CPP during conspiracy but did not take
part in the rebellion
o Espiritu: had constant communication with the CPP and served as their
courier after conspiracy was made, but did not take part in the rebellion
o Valerio: served as Huk courier but did not take part in the rebellion
ISSUE & RATIO.
1. WON Hernandez is guilty of conspiracy to commit rebellion. – NO.
The mere fact of giving and rendering speeches favoring a movement against the
government would not make one guilty of conspiracy because there was no
evidence that the hearers of his speeches of propaganda then and there agreed to
rise up in arms against the government. In this case, Hernandez merely rendered
against the government. Thus, Hernandez is not a co-conspirator of the rebellion.
.
2. WON Cruz, Racanday, and de la Cruz are guilty of conspiracy to commit rebellion
– NO.
In this case, Cruz was proven to have absolutely no connection with the rebellion
the same rule applies to Racanday and de la Cruz, and that they received th
solicitations from CPP before the conspiracy was made, thus not holding the
liable as accessories to the conspiracy.
3. WON Lumanog, Rodillas, Espiritu, and Valerio are guilty of conspiracy to commi
rebellion. – YES.
Unlike membership in the CPP, membership in the HMB implies participation in a
actual uprising or rebellion because an HMB member already advocates uprisin
and the use of force, and by such membership he agrees or conspires that forc
be used to secure the ends of the party. In this case, Lumanog and Valerio, bein
members of the HMB, are presumed liable for the conspiracy. By makin
solicitations after the conspiracy was made, Rodillas,was charged by the Court as
co-conspirator in the crime of conspiracy to commit rebellion. Serving as CPP’
courier after the conspiracy was made, Espiritu is also found guilty of conspiracy t
commit rebellion
DECISION.
Appeal partly granted. CFI decision modified.
ENRILE v. SALAZAR
G.R. No. 92163/ JUN 5, 1990/ NARVASA, J.
FACTS.
• Senate Majority Floor Leader Juan Ponce Enrile was arrested due to the warran
issued by Hon. Jaime Salazar. The warrant was issued due to an informatio
charging Senator Enrile, spouses Panlilio and Gregorio Honasan with murder an
frustrated murder committed during the failed coup attempt on Nov. 29- Dec. 10
1990
• Senator Enrile was detained and was not allowed to post for bail as provided b
the information and the arrest warrant. He was given over to the custody of th
Superintendent of the Northern Police District. He then filed a petition for habea
corpus alleging that there was a violation of his Constitutional Rights. He claim
that he was held to answer for a non-existent crime, there was no complaint file
or a preliminary investigation which denied him of due process, he has a right t
bail, and the warrant was issued without the judge personally determining if ther
is probable cause.
• Enrile also wished to abandon the doctrines in the case of Hernandez becaus
rebellion cannot absorb more serious crimes and the doctrine can only b
 applicable if offenses are committed in furtherance or, as a necessary means of the
commission of rebellion.
ISSUES.
1. WON the Hernandez case is applicable
2. WON Enrile is charged with a crime that is not in the statutes book.
3. WON Judge Salazar properly discharged his duties when issuing the warrant
4. WON the writ of habeas corpus was the proper vehicle for asserting the right to
bail
RATIO:
1. Yes the Hernandez case is still applicable. The court said that the Hernandez case
still has the force of law. Hernandez remains binding doctrine operating to prohibit
the complexing of rebellion with any other offense committed on the occasion
thereof, either as a means necessary to its commission or as an unintended effect
of an activity that constitutes rebellion. Rebellion may not be complexed by
murder. There is an apparent need to restructure the law on rebellion, either to
raise the penalty therefor or to clearly define and delimit the other offenses to be
considered as absorbed thereby, so that it cannot be conveniently utilized as the
umbrella for every sort of illegal activity undertaken in its name.
2. Yes, technically speaking because the court has already ruled that rebellion cannot
be complexed by other offenses committed during the occasion. Thus, Enrile is
only punished by simple rebellion.
3. Yes. The petitioner’s contention that the judge was not able to thoroughly and
personally go through the records due to the brief period give to him (1 hour, 20
mins. After filing of information) do not hold weight. There was no circumstance
that would presuppose the legal presumption that the official duty of the judge
was regularly performed.
4. No. The original jurisdiction to grant bail rests upon Judge Salazar. Enrile should
have filed a petition to Salazar in order to be admitted to bail. The proper remedy
would be a motion to quash before Judge Salazar. Directly filing to the SC
circumvented or deprived the trial court from exercising its jurisdiction.
Opinions:
C.J. Fernan: There is a need to update Hernandez. It is not all encompassing due to
the changes in the society. There must be a distinction between acts or offenses that
are indispensable to the commission of rebellion and acts or offenses that are merely
necessary but not indispensable in the commission of rebellion. Indispensable acts
would form part of elements of rebellion thus it should be treated as one crime. If
not indispensable acts then it shall not be an element. This is when the crime can be
treated as complex.
J. Guttierez: During Marcos regime the crime of rebellion can be complexed due to
PD 942 but during the Aquino Admininstration, she issued EO 187 which provides
that rebellion cannot be complexed. Hernandez is the binding law.
ENRILE v. AMIN
G.R. No. 93335/ SEP 13, 1990 / GUTIERREZ, JR., J.
DOCTRINE. All crimes, whether punishable under a special law or general law, whic
are mere components or ingredients, or committed in furtherance thereof, becom
absorbed in the crime of rebellion and cannot be isolated and charged as separat
crimes in themselves.
FACTS.
• Enrile had been charged with rebellion complexed with murder and frustrate
murder.
• During a birthday party and while the charge was pending, Enrile allegedl
entertained and accommodated Gringo Honasan, a fugitive from justice at th
time, with some 100 rebel soldiers, in his house.
• Since Enrile allegedly did not do anything to have Honasan arrested o
apprehended, the government prosecutors filed another Information agains
Enrile, on ground of P.D. No. 1829 (punishing a person for “harboring o
concealing, or facilitating the escape of, any person he knows, or has reasonabl
ground to believe or suspect, has committed any offense under existing pena
laws in order to prevent his arrest, prosecution and conviction”).
• Petitioner filed an action to dismiss the second information on the contentio
that the alleged harboring or concealing of Honasan is absorbed in, or is
component element of, the “complexed” rebellion presently charged agains
him.
• Prosecution contends that that harboring or concealing a fugitive is punishabl
under a special law while the rebellion case is based on the Revised Penal Code
hence, prosecution under one law will not bar a prosecution under the other.
ISSUE & RATIO.
Whether or not the petitioner Enrile could be separately charged for violation of P
No. 1829 notwithstanding the rebellion case earlier filed against him.
– NO. The crime of rebellion consists of many acts. It is described as a vas
movement of men and a complex net of intrigues and plots. xxx The acts committe
in furtherance of the rebellion though crimes in themselves are deemed absorbed i
the one single crime of rebellion. In this case, the act of harboring or concealing Co
Honasan is clearly a mere component or ingredient of rebellion or an act done i
furtherance of the rebellion. It cannot therefore be made the basis of a separat
charge.
DECISION.
Petition is GRANTED. The Information in Crim. Case No. 90-777 is QUASHED.
 PEOPLE v. SILONGAN
G.R. No. 137182/ APR 24, 2003
FACTS.
On March 16, 1996, businessman Alexander Saldaña went to Sultan Kudarat with
three other men to meet a certain Macapagal Silongan alias Commander Lambada.
They arrived in the morning and were able to talk to Macapagal concerning the gold
nuggets that purportedly being sold by the latter. The business transaction was
postponed and continued in the afternoon due to the death of Macapagal’s relative
and that he has to pick his brother in Cotabato City.
Then at around 8:30 PM, as they headed to the highway, Macapagal ordered the
driver to stop. Suddenly, 15 armed men appeared. Alexander and his three
companions were ordered to go out of the vehicle, they were tied up, and
blindfolded. Macapagal and Teddy were also tied and blindfolded, but nothing more
was done to them. Alexander identified all the abductors including the brothers of
Macapagal. The four victims were taken to the mountain hideout in Maguindanao.
The kidnappers demanded P15, 000,000 from Alexander’s wife for his release, but
the amount was reduced to twelve million. The victims were then transferred from
one place to another. They made Alexander write a letter to his wife for his ransom.
But on several occasions, a person named Mayangkang himself would write to
Alexander’s wife. The two other victims managed to escape but Alexander was
released after payment of ransom. The trial court convicted Macapagal and his
companions of the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom with Serious Illegal Detention.
ISSUE.
WON it is necessary that there is actual payment of ransom in the crime of
Kidnapping.
RATIO.
The prosecution has established beyond reasonable doubt that the kidnapping was
committed “for the purpose of extorting ransom” from Alexander, as to warrant the
mandatory imposition of the death penalty. For the crime to be committed, at least
one overt act of demanding ransom must be made. It is not necessary that there be
actual payment of ransom because what the law requires is merely the existence of
the purpose of demanding ransom. In this case, the records replete with instances
when the kidnappers demanded ransom from the victim.
PEOPLE v. OLIVA
G.R. No. 106826/ JAN 18, 2001
FACTS.
Appellant-Accused Oscar Oliva and Noli Salcedo together with Edgar Manlapaz,
Bocoy Seachon, Metchel Ibaya, Joel Cinco, Amy Inopia, Ka Nelly, John Doe and
Peter Doe, Ka Yoli, Ka Gerson, Bogoy Manlapaz, Virgilio Panguilinan, Ka Riza, Ka Liz
who represented themselves as NPA were charged with kidnapping with murde
committed against Jacinto Magbojos. Oliva and Salcedo presented their respectiv
alibis which the court found to be meritless. In order that alibi will prevail, th
defense must establish by positive, clear and satisfactory proof that it was physicall
impossible for the accused to have been at the scene of the crime at the time of it
commission, and not merely that the accused were somewhere else. There were n
eyewitnesses who testified regarding the actual killing of the victim. Nonetheless, th
abovecited circumstances taken together constitute in our view one unbroken chai
leading to the fair and reasonable conclusion that appellants, to the exclusion o
others, are responsible for the victim’s death.
ISSUE.
Whether or not the killing is qualified by treachery.
RATIO.
The settled rule is that treachery cannot be presumed but must be proved by clea
and convincing evidence or as conclusively as the killing itself. In the case at ba
although the fact of death and the identity of the victim and the identity of th
perpetrators were established, there is no proof at all on how the killing was done
Thus, absent any particulars as to the manner in which the aggression commenced o
how the act which resulted in the death of the victim unfolded, treachery cannot b
appreciated.
*Rebellion, uprising, or insurrection is a refusal of obedience or order. It may
therefore, be seen as encompassing a range of behaviors aimed at destroying o
taking over the position of an established authority such as a government, governo
president, political leader.
*Treachery is when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person
employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly an
specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defens
which the offended part might make. The offended party was not given a
opportunity to make a defense
RIVERA v. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 138553/ JUN 30, 2005
FACTS.
• Police Inspector Edward M. Leygo and SPO1 Joseph Basquial were conductin
patrols on board in Shilan, Benguet. They came upon a truck which was unloadin
sacks of chicken dung at the stall of Enrique Totoy Rivera along the highway.
• Since Municipal Ordinance No. I-91 prohibits the unloading of chicken dung along
the highway, Inspector Leygo asked the driver to stop unloading the manure and
return the truck from where it came. The driver complied.
• After a while, Enrique Rivera asked the driver to drive back to Shilan, Benguet and
unload the sacks of chicken dung and not follow the police’s orders. The driver
followed Rivera’s order and drove back to Shilan Benguet while Rivera was following
closely behind in his own car.
• Inspector Leygo gave chase to the truck. Leygo was able to intercept the truck and
force it to stop. Leygo inquired why they insisted on defying the ban on the loading
and unloading of manure. Rivera then alighted from his vehicle and uttered insulting
words such as: “babalian kita ng buto”, “Ilalampaso kita”, and “Pulis lang kayo”.
• Leygo then approached Rivera and said that he was going to arrest him for
violating the Municipal Ordinance. Rivera then assumed fighting stance and punched
Leygo in his lower lip. They grappled for a while and with the help of fellow police
officers, Rivera was finally arrested.
ISSUE.
WON Rivera is guilty of the crime of direct assault?
RATIO.
YES. Direct assault may be committed by two ways: first, by any person or persons
who, without a public uprising, shall employ force or intimidation for the attainment
of any of the purposes enumerated in defining the crimes of rebellion and sedition;
second, by any person or persons who, without a public uprising, shall attack,
employ force, or seriously intimidate or resist any person in authority or any of his
agents, while engaged in the performance of official duties, or on occasion of such
performance.
It is evident that this case falls under the second mode. It is evident that the assault
happened when Leygo was engaged in the actual performance of his official duties.
He was wearing the designated police uniform and was on board a police car
conducting a routinary patrol when he first came upon the truck unloading chicken
manure. Since the loading and unloading of chicken manure is prohibited by an
ordinance, Leygo has every right to order the accused to stop. When accused defied
such a lawful order, it is only natural that Leygo would stop them from doing so.
Under the circumstances, it simply defies reason to argue that Leygo was not in the
performance of his lawful duties as a police officer when the assault upon him was
perpetrated by the petitioner.
Aggravating circumstances
1. The assault is committed with a weapon
2. When the offender is a public officer or employee
3. When the offender lays hand upon a person in authority
GELIG v. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 173150/ JUL 28, 2010
FACTS.
• Lydia C. Gelig and Gemma B. Micarsos were public school teachers at the Nailo
Elementary School. Lydia’son, Roseller, was a student of Gemma.
• Lydia confronted Gemma during class after learning that Gemma called Roseller
sissy. Gemma tried to calm Lydia down but failed to do so. As Gemma tried to go t
the Principal’s office, Lydia pushed Gemma causing her to fall and hit a wall divider.
• Gemma experienced abdominal pain and after 42 days she suffered incomplet
abortion.
• Lydia was convicted in the RTC for the crime of direct assault with unintentiona
abortion. Lydia was then acquitted before the CA for the crime of direct assault bu
was held liable for slight physical injuries. Unsatisfied with the ruling, Lydia brough
the case before the SC.
ISSUE.
WON Lydia C. Gelig is liable for the crime of Direct Assault?
RATIO.
Yes. This case falls under the second mode of Direct Assault which has the followin
elements:
1. That the offender (a) makes an attack, (b) employs force, (c) makes a seriou
intimidation, or (d) makes a serious resistance.
2. That the person assaulted is a person in authority or his agent.
3. That at the time of the assault the person in authority or his agent (a) is engaged i
the actual performance of official duties, or (b) that he is assaulted by reason of th
past performance of official duties.
4. That the offender knows that the one he is assaulting is a person in authority or hi
agent in the exercise of his duties.
5. That there is no public uprising.
Gemma being a public school teacher, belongs to the class of persons in authorit
expressly mentioned in Article 152 of the RPC. Since the assault happened whil
Gemma was overseeing the class, she is in the actual performance of her officia
duties. That being the case, all of the requisites of the crime of Direct Assault ar
present. As such, Lydia is guilty of Direct Assault.
However, Lydia is not guilty of indirect abortion since the prosecution failed to prov
that the act of pushing is the proximate cause of the abortion. The interval of time
42 days, is too lengthy to prove that the discharge of the fetus from the womb o
Gemma was a direct outcome of the assault.

SYDECO v. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 202692/ NOV 12, 2014 / VELASCO, JR., J.
FACTS.
• Police officers filed two charges against petitioner Sydeco for drunk driving and for
unlawfully resisting arrest.
• After the arrest, police officers brought Sydeco to a hospital and there they
secured a medical certificate, signed by Dr. Balucating, depicting petitioner as
positive of alcoholic breath; although he refused to be examined and no alcohol
breath examination was conducted. He was then detained. Before his release,
however, he was allowed to undergo actual medical examination where the
resulting medical certificate indicated that he has sustained physical injuries but
negative for alcohol breath.
• Petitioner claimed to be a victim in the incident in question, adding in this regard
that he has in fact filed criminal charges for physical injuries, robbery and arbitrary
detention against the police officers.
• Petitioner recounts that, during the incident, the police officers forcibly asked him
to step out of his due to the alleged DUI. He claims that the acts of the officers
were beyond their authority because they were only supposed to demand the
presentation of the driver’s license or issue any ticket or similar citation paper for
traffic violation as required under the particular premises by Sec. 29 of RA 4136.
• The MeTC, RTC, and CA, relying on the testimonies of the police officers, ruled
against Sydeco’s favor, convicting him of the charges. Hence, the appeal.
ISSUE & RATIO.
Whether or not Sydeco is guilty of violating Art. 151.
– NO. One of the requisites for this felony is “that the offender resists or seriously
disobeys such person or his agent” and this is not present in the case. It remains to
stress that the petitioner has not, when flagged down, committed a crime or
performed an overt act warranting a reasonable inference of criminal activity. He did
not try to avoid the road block established. He came to a full stop when so required
to stop.
DECISION.
The appealed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CR No.
33567 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner is hereby acquitted of the
crimes charged in Criminal Case No. 052527-CN and Criminal Case No. 052528-CN.
PEOPLE v. RECTO
G.R. No. 129069/ OCTOBER 17, 2001 / PANGANIBAN, J. / DIRECT ASSAULTS / AABPAYAD
FACTS.
• The trial court convicted appellant of four (4) crimes: two counts of the comple
crime of qualified direct assault with frustrated homicide (for a barangay chie
tanod and barangay captain), one count of the complex crime of qualified direc
assault with murder (for a barangay kagawad), and one count of homicide. We wi
now discuss each of these crimes.
• On April 18, 1994, Barangay Captain Percival Orbe was in his residence wit
Barangay Kagawad Antonio Macalipay and Barangay Tanod Melchor Recto
appellants cousin, to settle a land dispute.
• There, they noticed that the padlock of the bodega was destroyed, and the pala
stored therein, stolen.
• Melchor Recto passed by the bodega to inquire what was happening. Orbe aske
Melchor Recto to stay in case he is needed there.
• Julio Recto then arrived along with others and Orbe advised then not to creat
trouble but one pulled a piece of wood and threw towards them.
• Appellant had a balisong and Orbe asked to put it down. However, the forme
stepped backward and pulled a gun. Hence, the latter retrieved.
• Macalipay asked the appellant to settle things instead. But the latter pulled th
trigger and hit the former.
• Melchor Recto saw the shooting so he, along with Orbe, hid inside the bathroom
From them, they witness fire his gun at Emilio Santos. Santos also fired his revolve
at appellant and later, turned around and crawled. While crawling, Santos fire
another shot towards Regis, Jr[.], but, the latter was able to reach and hack th
former with a bolo.
• When Orbe and Melchor Recto heard appellant saying: Where is that kapitan
When Melchor could no longer see Julio Recto, he jumped out of the bathroo
window and ran.
• While running, Julio Recto shot him hitting the latters thigh.
• Orbe also got out of the bathroom and before he could take a step, he was als
shot by appellant at his right elbow, but was still able to continue running an
cross the southern portion of the ricefield. He caught up with the wounde
Melchor Recto and both went their separate ways.
• On the other hand, both Barangay Kagawad Antonio Macalipay and Emilian
Renato Santos died due to multiple wounds inflicted on them by herein appellant.
[RELEVANT] ISSUES & RATIO.
1. WON accused was guilty of direct assault for the frustrated homicide of Baranga
Chief Tanod Recto. – NO.
There was no direct assault with regard to the victim, Melchor Recto – being th
barangay chief tanod of Ambulong, Magdiwang, Romblon -- was clearly an agen
of a person in authority. However, he was not “engaged in the performance of hi
official duties” at the time he was shot. Neither was he attacked “on the occasio
of such performance.” It must be emphasized that Melchor Recto was on his wa
home when he happened to pass by the bodega of the Rance couple where a
 investigation by the other barangay officials was ongoing. Orbe requested
Melchor Recto to stay as he might be needed.

With regard to Melchor Recto, for reasons other than his own desistance, the
accused was not able to perform all the acts of execution necessary to
consummate the killing, since the wounds he inflicted were not mortal. If the
wounds would not normally cause death, then the last act necessary to produce
homicide has not been performed by the offender. Thus, accused’s liability
amounted only to attempted, not frustrated, homicide.

2. WON accussed was guilty of direct assault for the frustrated homicide of Barangay
Captain Orbe. – NO.
The attack on Percival Orbe – then a barangay captain, a person in authority--
amounted to qualified direct assault, because he was attacked on the occasion of
the performance of his duty of maintaining public order. At the time, he was
attempting to pacify accused and to keep the peace between the two groups.

With regard to Orbe, the nature of the weapon used by the accused unmistakably
shows that he intended to kill Orbe. However, like the wounds inflicted by the
accused on Melchor Recto, those on Orbe were not fatal. Evidently, accused had
not yet been able to perform all the acts of execution necessary to bring about the
death of Orbe, because the latter was able to run away after being fired at.
Although accused had already directly commenced the commission of a felony by
overt acts (shooting Orbe with a de sabog), he was not able to consummate that
felony for some reason other than his spontaneous desistance. Thus, he
committed attempted homicide.

3. WON the accused is guilty of qualified direct assault with murder of Antonio
Macalipay– NO.
The accused should be held liable for the complex crime of qualified direct assault
with homicide. Considering that Antonio Macalipay was a kagawad who was in the
actual performance of his duties when he was shot, the attack on him constituted
direct assault. n this case, the accused was out in the open during the entire span
of time from the heated discussion, to the brewing of the violence, and up to the
shooting of Macalipay. At the time, his every action, which indicated the
imminence of more violence, was visible to them -- to the victim and the latter’s
companions. The accused was actually vulnerable to any attack that they could
have made at the time, had they chosen to. Hismode of attack was therefore not
without risk to himself. Absent treachery, the killing is homicide, not murder.

DECISION.
RTC decision modified.