The RTC issued an order declaring as nullity

AURORA N. DE PEDRO the titles and free patents issued to all

v. ROMASAN defendants in respondent’s complaint, including
DEVELOPMENT the free patent issued to De Pedro.

CORPORATION De Pedro, through counsel, filed before the RTC

FACTS:
This case originated from separate complaints
for nullification of free patent and original
certificates of title, filed against several
defendants. One of the defendants is petitioner
Aurora De Pedro (De Pedro). The complaints
were filed by respondent Romasan
Development Corporation (RDC) before the
RTC of Antipolo City.
Respondent RDC alleged in its complaints that
it was the owner and possessor of land.
a motion for new trial, De Pedro argued that the
RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over her person
because of improper and defective service of
summons. Citing the officer’s return, De Pedro
pointed out that summons was not personally
served upon her “for the reason that according
to the messenger of Post Office of Pasig their
(sic) is no person in the said given address”.
De Pedro also argued that the case should have
been dismissed on the ground of litis
pendentia. She alleged that there was a
pending civil case filed by her, involving the
same property, when respondent filed the
complaints against her and several others.

RTC issued an order denying De Pedro’s motion

for new trial.
Attempts to personally serve summons on De
Pedro failed. The officer’s return reads in
The RTC ruled that summons was validly served
part:xAURORA N. DE PEDRO – Unserved for
upon De Pedro through publication, in
the reason that according to the messenger of
accordance with the Rules of Court.
Post Office of Pasig their [sic] is no person in
the said given address.
De Pedro filed a petition for certiorari before the
CA, alleging that the RTC committed grave
abuse of discretion when it denied her motion for
new trial. CA dismissed the petition for certiorari
Respondent filed a motion to serve summons
for lack of merit, and affirmed the denial of De
and the complaint by publication.
Pedro’s motion for new trial.
RTC granted the motion. The summons and
De Pedro’s motion for reconsideration was
the complaint were published in People’s
denied in the CA.
Balita.

De Pedro elevated the case to this court, but this

Respondent moved to declare all defendants in
was likewise denied. De Pedro filed before the
its complaints, including De Pedro, in default for
CA a petition for annulment of judgment of the
failure to file their answers. The RTC granted
RTC on grounds of lack of jurisdiction, litis
the motion.
pendentia, and for having been dispossessed of
her property without due process.
 CA promulgated its decision denying De
Pedro’s petition for annulment of judgment.
CA ruled that since petitioner already
availed herself of the remedy of new trial,
and raised the case before the CA via
petition for certiorari, she can no longer file a
petition for annulment of
judgment.51chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
De Pedro’s motion for reconsideration was
denied.
De Pedro filed before this court a Rule 45
petition, seeking the reversal of the CA
decision.
ISSUES:
I. Whether the trial court decision was void
for failure of the trial court to acquire
jurisdiction over the person of petitioner
Aurora N. De Pedro; and
II. Whether filing a motion for new trial and
petition for certiorari is a bar from filing a
petition for annulment of judgment.
RULING:
I. The sheriff’s return must show
the details of the efforts exerted
to personally serve summons
upon defendants or respondents,
before substituted service or
service by publication is availed
Regardless of the type of action — whether it
is in personam, in rem or quasi in rem — the
preferred mode of service of summons is
personal service. To avail themselves of
substituted service, courts must rely on a
detailed enumeration of the sheriff’s actions and
a showing that the defendant cannot be served
despite diligent and reasonable efforts. The
sheriff’s return, which contains these details, is
entitled to a presumption of regularity, and on
this basis, the court may allow substituted
service. Should the sheriff’s return be wanting
of these details, substituted service will be
irregular if no other evidence of the efforts to
serve summons was presented.
Failure to serve summons will mean that the
court failed to acquire jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant. However, the filing of a
motion for new trial or reconsideration is
tantamount to voluntary appearance.
Courts may exercise their powers validly and
with binding effect if they acquire jurisdiction
over: (a) the cause of action or the subject
matter of the case; (b) the thing or the res; (c)
the parties; and (d) the remedy.
Due process requires that those with interest to
the thing in litigation be notified and given an
opportunity to defend those interests. Courts, as
guardians of constitutional rights, cannot be
expected to deny persons their due process
rights while at the same time be considered as
acting within their jurisdiction. Violation of due
process rights is a jurisdictional defect. The
relation of due process to jurisdiction is
recognized even in administrative cases wherein
the standard of evidence is relatively lower.
Hence, regardless of the nature of the action,
proper service of summons is imperative. A
decision rendered without proper service of
summons suffers a defect in
jurisdiction. Respondent’s institution of a
proceeding for annulment of petitioner’s
certificate of title is sufficient to vest the court
with jurisdiction over the res, but it is not
sufficient for the court to proceed with the case
with authority and competence. Personal service
of summons is the preferred mode of service of
summons.95 Thus, as a rule, summons must be
served personally upon the defendant or
respondent wherever he or she may be found. If
the defendant or respondent refuses to receive
the summons, it shall be tendered to him or
her.96chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

If the defendant or respondent is a domestic
juridical person, personal service of summons
shall be effected upon its president, managing
partner, general manager, corporate secretary,
treasurer, or in-house counsel wherever he or
she may be found.97chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Other modes of serving summons may be done
when justified. Service of summons through
other modes will not be effective without
showing serious attempts to serve summons
through personal service. Thus, the rules allow
summons to be served by substituted service
only for justifiable causes and if the defendant or
respondent cannot be served within reasonable
time.98 Substituted service is effected “(a) by
leaving copies of the summons at the
defendant’s residence with some person of
suitable age and discretion then residing therein,
or (b) by leaving the copies at defendant’s office
or regular place of business with some
competent person in charge
thereof.”99chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Service of summons by publication in a
newspaper of general circulation is allowed
when the defendant or respondent is designated
as an unknown owner or if his or her
whereabouts are “unknown and cannot be
ascertained by diligent inquiry.”100 It may only
be effected after unsuccessful attempts to serve
the summons personally, and after diligent
inquiry as to the defendant’s or respondent’s
whereabouts.
Service of summons by extraterritorial service is
allowed after leave of court when the defendant
or respondent does not reside or is not found in
the country or is temporarily out of the
country.101chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
If a defendant or respondent voluntarily appears
in trial or participates in the proceedings, it is
generally construed as sufficient service of
summons.
In this case, the sheriff’s return states: 1.
AURORA N. DE PEDRO – Unserved for the
reason that according to the messenger of Post
Office of Pasig their [sic] is no person in the said
given address.
This return shows no detail of the sheriff’s efforts
to serve the summons personally upon
petitioner. The summons was unserved only
because the post office messenger stated that
there was no “Aurora N. De Pedro” in the
service address. The return did not show that
the sheriff attempted to locate petitioner’s
whereabouts. Moreover, it cannot be concluded
based on the return that personal service was
rendered impossible under the circumstances or
that service could no longer be made within
reasonable time.
The lack of any demonstration of effort on the
part of the sheriff to serve the summons
personally upon petitioner is a deviation from
this court’s previous rulings that personal service
is the preferred mode of service, and that the
sheriff must narrate in his or her return the
efforts made to effect personal service. Thus,
the sheriff’s return in this case was
defective. No substituted service or service by
publication will be allowed based on such
defective return.
The issuance of a judgment without proper
service of summons is a violation of due process
rights. The judgment, therefore, suffers a
jurisdictional defect. The case would have been
dismissible had petitioner learned about the
case while trial was pending. At that time, a
motion to dismiss would have been
proper. After the trial, the case would have been
the proper subject of an action for annulment of
judgment.
What cannot be denied is the fact that petitioner
was already notified of respondent’s action for
annulment of petitioner’s title when she filed a
motion for new trial and, later, a petition for
certiorari. At that time, petitioner was deemed,
for purposes of due process, to have been
properly notified of the action involving her title
to the property. Lack of jurisdiction could have
already been raised in an action for annulment
of judgment.
Thus, when petitioner erroneously filed her
motion for new trial and petition for certiorari
instead of an action for annulment of judgment,
she was deemed to have voluntarily participated
in the proceedings against her title. The actions
and remedies she chose to avail bound
her. Petitioner’s failure to file an action for
annulment of judgment at this time was fatal to
her cause. We cannot conclude now that she
was denied due process.cr
I. Petitioner is already
barred from
filing a petition for
annulment of
judgment
 A petition for annulment of judgment is a
recourse that is equitable in character. It is
independent of the case112 and is “allowed only
in exceptional cases as where there is no
available or other adequate
remedy.” chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
113
 An action for annulment of judgment
may be filed to assail RTC judgments when
resort to other remedies can no longer be had
through no fault of petitioner. An action for
annulment of judgment may be based on only
two grounds: 1) extrinsic fraud; and 2) lack of
jurisdiction. Lack of jurisdiction being a valid
ground for annulment of judgments,
circumstances that negate the court’s acquisition
of jurisdiction — including defective service of
summons — are causes for an action for
annulment of judgments.
 However, this court had an occasion to
say that an action for annulment of judgment
“may not be invoked (1) where the party has
availed himself of the remedy of new trial,
appeal, petition for relief, or other appropriate
remedy and lost; or (2) where he has failed to
avail himself of those remedies through his own
fault or negligence.”115 Thus, an action for
annulment of judgment is not always readily
available even if there are causes for annulling a
judgment.
In this case, petitioner’s main grounds for filing
the action for annulment are lack of jurisdiction
over her person, and litis pendentia. These are
the same grounds that were raised in the motion
for new trial filed before and denied by the RTC.
Applying the above rules, we rule that the CA
did not err in denying petitioner’s petition for
annulment of the Regional Trial Court’s
judgment. Petitioner had already filed a motion
for new trial and petition for certiorari invoking
lack of jurisdiction as ground.
Petitioner’s filing of the petition for annulment of
judgment after she had filed a motion for new
trial and lost, with both actions raising the same
grounds, reveals an intent to secure a judgment
in her favor by abusing and making a mockery of
the legal remedies provided by law. This kind of
abuse is what this court tries to guard against
when it limited its application, and stated in
some of the cases that an action for annulment
of judgment cannot be invoked when other
remedies had already been availed.
II. The requisites of litis
pendentia are not
satisfied when
respondent filed
its action for annulment of
title
Petitioner argued that the case for annulment of
title was dismissible on the ground of litis
pendentia because there was a pending civil
case filed by her against respondent.
The requisites of litis pendentia are: “(a) identity
of parties, or interests in both actions; (b) identity
of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief
being founded on the same facts; and (c) the
identity of the two preceding particulars is such
that any judgment rendered in the other action,
will, regardless of which party is successful,
 amount to res judicata in the action under
consideration.128chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Although both cases involve the same parcel of
land, petitioner was not able to show that there
was identity of the relief prayed for. A review of
the complaint in the said civil case shows that it
was a case for damages, for alleged improper
conduct of respondent relating the
property. The action filed by respondent was an
action for annulment of petitioner’s title.
Petitioner was also not able to show that the
relief prayed for in both cases were founded on
the same facts. Petitioner’s complaint for
damages was founded on the alleged
misconduct of respondent. Respondent’s action
for annulment of title was founded on the alleged
irregularity in the issuance of petitioner’s title.
Hence, the petitioner was not able to show that
all the requisites for litis pendentia are
present. Respondent’s action for annulment of
title cannot be dismissed on this ground.
NATIONAL PETROLEUM GAS
INC., Nena Ang, Mario Ang, Alison
Sy, Guillermo Sy, Nelson Ang, Luisa
Ang, Renato Ang, Pauline Ang, Ricky
Ang, Melinda Ang
v. RCBC, substituted by Philippine
Asset Growth One, Inc.
SUMMARY: Resp. RCBC filed complaint against
Pet. NP for civil damages arising from estafa in re:
violation of the Trust Receipts Law. NP filed a
special appearance with motion to dismiss (MTD) on
the ground of improper service of summons. RTC
denied NP's MTD, ruled that there was valid service
of summons through Abante (liaison officer of NP)
bec. she was given the instruction to do so by Ang
(corp. sec. of NP). CA affirmed RTC. SC affirmed
CA, but only as to the service of summons on NP as
a corporation. The service of summons to the
individual petitioners (officers and employees) of NP
are invalid because the sheriff's substituted service of
summons were not compliant with the rules laid
down in the Manotoc case. HOWEVER, in the end,
the SC still said that the RTC had jurisdiction over
the individual petitioners because they voluntarily
submitted to the RTC's jurisdiction by seeking
affirmative reliefs from the RTC.
DOCTRINES:
As to service of summons on corp. - Summons may
only be made upon the exclusive list in Rule 14, Sec.
11. Substantial compliance CANNOT be invoked.
Service of summons upon persons other than those
officers in the Rule is void, defective, and NOT
binding to the corporation.
As to service of summons on individual pets. -
Manotoc case (see Ratio #6) clearly stresses that for
substituted service of summons to be available, there
must be several attempts by the sheriff to personally
serve summons within a reasonable period. (at least 3
tries, preferrably on 2 diff. dates)
As to voluntary submission to court's jurisdiction -
By seeking affirmative reliefs from the trial court,
the individual petitioners are deemed to have
voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of said court.
A party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to
secure affirmative relief against his opponent and
after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief,
repudiate or question that same jurisdiction.
How the case reached the SC
 RTC: Denied National Petroleum's (NP)
special appearance with motion to dismiss
because of improper service of summons, held
that court had jurisdiction over the case.
(However in the same ruling, RTC also denied
RCBC's motion to declare NP in default.)
 NP filed Rule 65 with CA.
 CA: Affirmed RTC. Denied NP's MR.
 NP filed Rule 45 with SC.
 SC: Agreed with the CA that there was a valid
and effective service of summons upon NP
through its liaison officer, who acted as the
agent of the corporate secretary.
FACTS
1. Respondent RCBC filed against Petitioner
National Petroleum (NP) a Complaint for civil
damages arising from estafa in relation to
violations of the Trust Receipts Law with the
RTC.
2. RCBC's prayer for a writ of preliminary
attachment was granted and issued after the ex
parte hearing.
  Sheriff served upon NP a copy of the
summons, complaint, and application for
attachment, NP's affidavit and bond, and
the order of writ and attachment.
 Sheriff's report stated that the Summons
were served to NP at BPI Building, Rizal
Street, Candelaria, Quezon. Summons
were received by Claudia Abante, the
Liaison Officer of NP as evidenced by her
signature. Sheriff served copies to other
defendants at their addresses, but they
refused to acknowledge the receipt.
 Sheriff levied the real properties of NP.
3. NP field a Special Appearance with Motion to
Dismiss stating that the RTC did not acquire
jurisdiction over the corporation since summons
were improperly served upon Claudia Abante, who
was a mere liaison officer and not one of the
corporate officers enumerated in Rule 14, Sec. 11.
 Sheriff did not personally approach them
at their respective address as stated in the
Complaint; he did not resort to substituted
services of summons and even if he did,
there was no strict compliance with Rule
14, Sec. 7.
4. RCBC countered in its Opposition with Motion
to Declare Defendants in Default: There WAS
valid service of summons upon NP.
 As to the Corporation: Abante received
summons upon express authority and
instruction of Corp. Secretary Melinda
Ang.
 As to individual petitioners: Sheriff's
Report said that they were served "at their
given addresses, but they refused to
acknowledge receipt thereof."
 Sheriff's Report = prima facie evidence of
facts stated and sheriff enjoys presumption
of regularity in the performance of his
official functions.
 Oaminal v. Castillo: NP already submitted
to court's jurisdiction voluntarily when
they prayed for the discharge of the writ
of attachment, which is an affirmative
relief apart from the dismissal to the case.
4. NP filed Reply with Comment/Opposition.
 Submitted Joint Affidavit and Abante's
Affidavit claiming that they neither
personally met with the Sheriff nor were
they handed a copy of court documents;
Ang did not give Abante any instructions
to receive the summons; Abante did not
receive instructions from Ang = Hence
court lacks jurisdiction.
 Oaminal case finds no application since in
the present case, they only filed one
motion + the additional relief prayed for
(discharge of the writ) is complementary
to and a necessary consequence of a
finding that the court has no jurisdiction
over their persons.
5. RCBC filed Rejoinder with Motion to Strike.
 Defended court's jurisdiction; Ang and
Abante's denials are self-serving
 Assuming arguendo that the Sheriff's
Return does not state in detail that the
summons were served upon individual
petitioners through substituted service,
this DOES NOT conclusively prove that
such service is invalid because it may still
be shown through extraneous evidence.
6. RTC RULING: Denied NP's motion to
dismiss, also denied RCBC's motion to declare NP
in default.
 Upheld that it had jurisdiction over the
persons of NP, required them to file an
Answer
 Very essence of service of summons is
for the defendants to be aware of an
existing suit against them and for them to
file an answer or responsive pleading
thereto.
 When NP and individual petitioners were
served with summons through Abante
who received the same for and in their
behalf as per Ang's instruction, and when
NP filed a responsive pleading in the
form of a Motion to Dismiss = they are
deemed to have ultimately received the
summons.
 No reason to doubt Sheriff's presumption
of regularity; NP did not per se deny
having received the summonses, they are
only challenging the manner it was
served. Hence they ultimately received
the summonses = rules on service
substantially complied with.
7. CA RULING: Affirmed RTC and denied NP's
MR.
 Contention of NP will only deserve full
credence if it is to be assumed that Abante
received the summons in her official
capacity as a liaison officer.
 HOWEVER, this isn't what happened in
the present case: Abante proceeded to
 receive the summons and accompanying
documents only AFTER receiving
instructions from Ang, NP's corporate
secretary. It's clear that Abante, in so
receiving the summons, did so in
representation of Ang, who, as corporate
secretary, is one of the officers competent
under the Rules to receive summons on
behalf of a private juridical person.
 While it may be true that there was no
direct, physical handling of the summons
to Ang, it could be interpreted that Ang
constructively received the summons
[through Abante's receipt of it]. This is a
valid service of summons. Hence Ang is
now prevented from impugning the RTC's
jurisdiction on the ground of invalid
service of summons. Estoppel is an
effective bar against any claim of lack of
jurisdiction.
 CA gave weight to Sheriff's statement that
Ang gave instructions to Abante despite
their assertion otherwise.
 Presumption of regularity (Rule 131) was
favored by CA. To overcome it, there
should be more concrete evidence other
than Abante's affidavit, which is self-
serving and insufficient to overturn the
presumption.
ISSUES:
1. W/N RTC acquired jurisdiction over NP by
service of summons upon its mere employee
(Abante)? YES.
2. W/N RTC acquired jurisdiction over individual
petitioners by resorting to substituted service of
summons despite absence of earnest efforts on the
part of the serving officer to serve summons
personally? NO.
HELD: NP's petition is DENIED. CA resolution
sustaining RTC's Order is AFFIRMED.
RATIO:
1st Issue: W/N RTC acquired jurisdiction over NP
by service of summons upon its mere employee
(Abante)? YES. There is a valid and effective
service of summons upon National Petroleum
Corporation, Inc., through its liaison officer who
acted as the agent of the corporate secretary.
1. Summons is a writ by which the defendant is
notified of the action brought against him/her.
 2-fold purpose: (a) to acquire jurisdiction
over person of defendant & (b) to notify
defendant that an action has commenced
against him so that he may be given an
opportunity to be heard of the charges
against him
 Compliance with the rules re: service of
summons is as much an issue of due
process as of jurisdiction.
2. Service of summons on domestic corp.,
partnership, or other juridical entity is governed by
Rule 14, Sec. 11. Summons may only be made
upon the exclusive list in the said rule.1 Substantial
compliance CANNOT be invoked. Service of
summons upon persons other than those officers in
the Rule is void, defective, and NOT binding to
the corporation.
3. SC cited CA decision in agreeing that there was
a valid service of summons upon NP. (See Fact #7,
that is exactly what the SC cited.)
4. NP cannot conveniently rely on the individual
sworn statements of the petitioners and Abante.
These statements are not incompatible with the
Sheriff's report, which said that the summons were
received by Abante upon the telephone instruction
of Ang, and as evidenced by Abante's signature at
the original copy of the Summons and Writ. Even
if Ang didn't talk to the Sheriff, it doesn't rule out
the possibility that she spoke to Abante to receive
the documents.
 Certificate of service of the Sheriff is
prima facie evidence of the facts, fortified
by the presumption of regularity.
2nd Issue: W/N RTC acquired jurisdiction over
individual petitioners by resorting to substituted
service of summons despite absence of earnest
efforts on the part of the serving officer to serve
summons personally? NO.
5. Rule 14, Secs. 6 and 72 CANNOT be construed
to apply simultaneously. They do NOT provide for
1
SECTION 11, RULE 14. Service upon domestic
private juridical entity.– When the defendant is a
corporation, partnership or association organized
under the laws of the Philippines with a juridical
personality, service may be made on the president,
managing partner, general manager, corporate
secretary, treasurer, or in-house counsel.
2
SECTION 6, RULE 14. Service in person on
defendant. – Whenever practicable, the summons
shall be served by handling a copy thereof to the
alternative modes of service of summons which
can be resorted to on the mere basis of
convenience for the parties.
 Under our Rules, service of summons in
the persons of the defendants is generally
preferred over substituted service.
 Substituted service is only resorted to
when summons cannot be promptly served
on the defendant in person and after
stringent formal and substantive
requirements have been complied with.
 Failure to comply faithfully, strictly, and
fully with all requirements renders the
service of summons INEFFECTIVE.
6. SC cited Manotoc v. CA as to what constitutes a
valid substituted service of summons. (I only put the
pertinent parts here as to the case because it's very long
huhu)
 (As to impossibility of prompt personal
service) [...] since the defendant is
expected to try to avoid and evade service
of summons, the sheriff must be
resourceful, persevering, canny, and
diligent in serving the process on the
defendant. For substituted service of
summons to be available, there must be
several attempts by the sheriff to
personally serve the summons within a
reasonable period [of one month] which
eventually resulted in failure to rove
impossibility of prompt service. "Several
attempts" means at least three (3) tries,
preferrably on at least two different dates.
In addition, the sheriff must cite why such
efforts were unsuccessful. It is only then
that impossibility of service can be
confirmed or accepted.
 (As to competency of the person in
charge) If the substituted service will be
done at defendant's office or regular place
of business, then it should be served on a
defendant in person, or, if he refuses to receive and
sign for it, by tendering it to him.
SECTION 7, RULE 14. Substituted service. – If, for
justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be served
within a reasonable time as provided in the preceding
section, service may be effected (a) by leaving copies
of the summons at the defendant's residence with
some person of suitable age and discretion then
residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at
defendant's office or regular place of business with
some competent person in charge thereof.
competent person in charge of the place.
Thus, the person on whom the substituted
service will be made must be the one
managing the office or business of
defendant, such as the president or
manager; and such individual must have
sufficient knowledge to understand the
obligation of the defendant in the
summons, its importance, and the
prejudicial effects arising from inaction on
the summons. Again, these details must be
contained in the Return.
7. In this case: Sheriff did not specify why
substituted service was resorted to other than that
he served the copies to the individual petitioners
but they refused to acknowledge the receipt
thereof.
 Presumption of regularity will NOT apply
if it's patent from the sheriff's return that it
is defective. Sheriff must show
impracticability or hopelessness of
personal service.
 Substituted service will still be considered
as regular if other evidence of the efforts
to serve summons was presented
(evidence aliunde)
8. SC ruled that RCBC's contention (that the
sheriff attempted to serve summons to the
individual petitioners both at the RCBC Plaza
Office and at their individual homes, ultimately
serving them through the househelpers of the
individual petitioners3) does not suffice.
 Sheriff hastily and capriciously resorted to
substituted service without actually
exerting any genuine effort to locate the
individual petitioners.
 "Reasonable time" to serve the summons
personally had NOT yet elapsed (7 days
for plaintiff, 15-30 days for sheriff).
 Based on Sheriff's report and RCBC's
narration, the personal service of
3
RCBC's side: Says that the sheriff was always met with
the "fact" that the defendants were at neither place
whenever he would attempt to serve summons. Hence, the
summons were served to the individual petitioners by
entrusting them to their house helpers. So to require the
sheriff to return several times at the residences of ten
petitioners would clearly be unreasonable. Summons were
properly served to the individual petitioners through
substituted service because there were justifiable causes
existing which prevented personal service within a
reasonable period of time.
 summons upon NP and individual
petitioners, as well as the levy of the
personal and real properties of NP et al.
were ALL DONE IN ONE DAY.
 Manotoc case clearly stresses that for
substituted service of summons to be
available, there must be several attempts
by the sheriff to personally serve
summons within a reasonable period. (at
least 3 tries, preferrably on 2 diff. dates)
 Sheriff and RCBC's reason that it's
unreasonable to return several times to the
residences of the individual petitioners
doesn't hold water except for Quezon
Province, since the cities of Makati and
Quezon are part of NCR. These are
accessible either by private or public
modes of transportation, hence the
distance was NOT insurmountable.
9. Service of summons to househelp cannot be
taken as valid. Although they are of suitable age
and discretion, RCBC and Sheriff did not elaborate
that these persons know how to read and
understand English to comprehend the import of
the summons, and fully realize the need to deliver
the summons and complaint to the individual
petitioners at the earliest possible time for them to
take appropriate action.
 There is no way for the Court to
conclusively ascertain that the sheriff
ensured, among others, that the persons
found in the alleged dwelling or residence
comprehend the significance of the receipt
of the summons and the duty to
immediately deliver it to the individual
petitioners or at least notify them of said
receipt of summons.
10. No basis to convincingly say individual
petitioners evaded personal service of summons.
The foregoing considered, it can be deduced that
since there were no actual efforts exerted and no
positive steps undertaken to earnestly locate the
individual petitioners, there is no basis to
convincingly say that they evaded the personal
service of summons and merely gave the sheriff a
run-around, thus, justifying substituted service
upon them. Despite improper service of summons
upon their persons, the individual petitioners are
deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the
court through their voluntary appearance.
11. HOWEVER, the individual petitioners
voluntarily submitted to the Court's
jurisdiction. The second sentence of Section 20,
Rule 14 of the Rules that “[t]he inclusion in a
motion to dismiss of other grounds aside from lack
of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant
shall not be deemed a voluntary appearance”
clearly refers to affirmative defenses, not
affirmative reliefs.
 In the present case, the individual
petitioners prayed, among others, for the
following: (1) discharge of the writ of
attachment on their properties; (2) denial
of the motion to declare them in default;
(3) admission of the Comment/Opposition
(to the motion to declare them in default)
filed on December 19, 2006; and (4)
denial of respondent’s motion to strike off
from the records (their opposition to the
motion to declare them in default).
 By seeking affirmative reliefs from the
trial court, the individual petitioners
are deemed to have voluntarily
submitted to the jurisdiction of said
court. A party cannot invoke the
jurisdiction of a court to secure
affirmative relief against his opponent
and after obtaining or failing to obtain
such relief, repudiate or question that
same jurisdiction.
 Therefore, the CA cannot be considered to
have erred in affirming the trial court’s
denial of the Special Appearance with
Motion to Dismiss for alleged improper
service of summons.

Palma vs. Galvez
Facts:
On July 28, 2003, Palma filed with the RTC an
action for damages against the Philippine Heart
Center, Dr. Giron, Dr. Cruz, alleging that the
defendants committed professional fault,
negligence and omission for having removed
her right ovary against her will, and losing the
same and the tissues extracted from her during
her surgery; and that although the specimens
were subsequently found, Palma was doubtful
and uncertain that the same was hers as the
label therein pertained that of somebody else.
Later, Palma filed a Motion for Leave to Admit
Amended Complaint, praying for inclusion of
some nurses, one of which is respondent
Agudo.
The RTC’s process server submitted his return
of summons stating that the alias summons,
together with a copy of the amended complaint
and its annexes, were served upon Agudo thru
her husband Alfredo, who received and signed
the same since Agudo was out of the country.
Agudo’s counsel filed a Notice of Appearance
and Motion for Extension of Time to File
Answer stating that he was just engaged by
Alfredo Agudo, as respondent Agudo was out of
the country and the Answer was already due.
Two weeks later, counsel again filed a Motion
for Another Extension of Time to File Answer,
stating that the draft answer was finished but
would be sent to Agudo for
clarification/verification before the Phil.
Consulate in Ireland. Two weeks later, Agudo
filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the
RTC had not acquired jurisdiction over her as
she was not property served with summons
since she was temporarily out of the country.
Palma filed her Opposition to the MTD, arguing
that a substituted service of summons on
Agudo’s husband was valid and binding on her,
that the service of summons under Sec. 16, Rule
14 was not exclusive and maybe effected by
other modes of service.
RTC granted Agudo’s MTD. RTC found that
while summons was served at Agudo’s house
and received by her husband, such service did
not qualify as a valid service of summons on her
as she was out of the country at the time it was
served. Palma thus filed this petition for
certiorari under Rule 65.
Issues:
1. W/N a petition for certiorari under 65 is
proper – YES (not the main issue)
2. W/N there was a valid service of
summons on Agudo – YES (main issue)
Held:
1. A petition for certiorari is proper when
any tribunal, board or officer exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial functions has
acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction and there is no appeal, or
plain, speedy and adequate remedy at
law. Sec. 1, Rule 41 of the Rules of
CivPro states that where a judgment or
final order is not appealable, the
aggrieved party may file an appropriate
special civil action for certiorari under
Rule 65.
2. In civil cases, the trial court acquires
jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant either by the service of
summons or by the latter’s voluntary
appearance and submission to the
authority of the former. Agudo was a
Filipino resident temporarily out of the
country at the time of the service of
summons, thus service of summons on
her is governed by Sec. 16, Rule 14 of
the ROC:
“Sec. 16. When an action is
commenced against a defendant
who ordinarily resides within the
 Philippines, but who is temporarily
out of it, service may, by leave of
court, be also effected out of the
Philippines, as under the preceding
section.”
“Sec. 15. When the defendant
does not reside and is not found in
the Philippines x x x service may,
by leave of court, be effected out
of the Philippines by personal
service as under section 6; or by
publication in a newspaper of
general circulation in such places x
x x”
The use of the words “may” and “also”
in Sec. 16 means that it is not
mandatory. Other methods of service of
summons allowed may also be availed
of. Thus, if a resident defendant is
temporarily out of the country, any of
the following modes of service may be
resorted to: (1) submitted service set
forth in Sec. 7, Rule 14; (2) personal
service outside the country with leave
of court, (3) service of publication, with
leave of court; (4) in any other manner
the court may deem sufficient. Sec. 7
states that:
“Sec. 7. If, for justifiable causes,
the defendant cannot be served
within a reasonable time as
provided in the preceding section,
service may be effected (a) by
leaving copies of the summons at
defendant’s residence with some
person of suitable age and
discretion then residing therein, or
(b) by leaving the copies at
defendant’s office or regular place
of business with some competent
person in charge thereof.”
In this case, the service of summons
was made at her residence with her
husband, Alfredo Agudo,
acknowledging receipt thereof. Alfredo
was presumably of suitable age and
discretion, who was residing in that
place, and therefore, was competent to
receive the summons on Agudo’s
behalf.
Statements were made that establish
the fact that Agudo had knowledge of
the case filed against her, and that her
husband had told her about the case as
Alfredo even engaged the services of
her counsel: (1) In the notice of
appearance and Motion for Extension
of Time to File Answer, Agudo’s counsel
confirmed that Agudo was out of the
country and his service was engaged by
the husband. In the other motion for
extention of time, Agudo’s counsel
stated that a draft of the answer had
already been prepared, to be submitted
to Agudo in Ireland.
RTC acquired jurisdiction over the
person of Agudo when her counsel
entered his appearance on Agudo’s
behalf, without qualification and
without questioning the propriety of
the service of summons, and even filed
2 Motions for Extension of Time to File
Answer. In effect, Agudo, through
counsel, invoked RTC’s jurisdiction over
her person. This is considered voluntary
submission to the jurisdiction of the
court.
Petition is granted. Agudo is directed to
file her Answer.
 VLASON ENTERPRISES
CORPORATION v. COURT OF
APPEALS and DURAPROOF
SERVICES,
FACTS:
Poro Point Shipping Services was then acting as
the local agent of Omega Sea Transport
Company of Honduras & Panama (Omega)
when it requested permission for its vessel M/V
Star Ace, experiencing engine trouble, to unload
its cargo and have it stored in the Philippine
Ports Authority compound in San Fernando, La
Union while awaiting transhipment to
Hongkong. It approved by the Bureau of
Customs. Howvever, the customs personnel still
boarded the vessel when it docked on the
suspicion that it was the hijacked M/V Silver
Med owned by Med Line Philippines and that its
cargo would be smuggled into the country. The
vessel and its cargo were seized. A notice of
hearing was served on its consignee, Singkong
Trading Co. of Hongkong, and its shipper, Dusit
International Co., Ltd of Thailand.
While seizure proceedings were ongoing, three
typhoons hit La Union, and the vessel ran
aground and was abandoned. A salvage
agreement was entered into with the
respondent Duraproof Services to secure and
repair the vessel.
The warrant of seizure was lifted upon finding
that there was no fraud. However, the Customs
Commissioner declined to issue a clearance and
even forfeited the vessel and its cargo. A
decision was decreed for the forfeiture and sale
of the cargo in favor of the government.
Seeking to enforce its preferred lien, the
Duraproof filed a petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus before the RTC of
Manila attacking the actions of the Bureau. PPA,
Rep. Silverio Mangaoang and Med Line Phils.
were are named as respondents. Subsequently,
Duraproof amended its petition as to include
former District Collector Quiray, PPA Port
Manager Adolfo Amor, Jr., Vlason Enterprises
Singkong Trading Company, Dusit International
Co., Inc., Thai-Nan Enterprises Ltd. And Thai-
United Trading Co., Ltd as respondents. In both
its petitions, there was failure to allege against
Vlason Enterprises or pray for a relief against it.
Summonses for the amended petition were
served to the respondents and their counsels.
Summons by publication were allowed to be
served upon the alien respondents who had no
representatives in the country.
The cases against the other respondents were
dismissed on the grounds of litis pendentia and
lack of jurisdiction despite Duraproof moving to
declare them in default. Duraproof again moved
to declare the other respondents in default.
There was no record that these motions were
acted upon. Thereafter, Duraproof amended
again its petition with supplemental petition.
The rest of the respondents were declared in
default and Duraproof was allowed to present
its evidence. With regard to Vlason Entreprises,
it was alleged that it exhibited constant
intimidation and harassment and incurred
heavy overhead expenses causing irreparable
damages. The trial court rendered a decision in
favor of Duraproof.
Vlason, by special appearance, filed a motion
for reconsideration on the grounds it was not
impleaded, served summons or declared in
default. It also filed a special appearance before
the CA praying that the levy be lifted off its
properties, or a TRO be issued against the
auction. Its motion was granted and the
previous decision was reversed. However,
Duraproof countered that although Vlason filed
the motion for reconsideration in a timely
manner, it has otherwise failed to include a
notice of hearing making its motion a mere
scrap of paper
Duraproof filed a motion to file a supplemental
petition impleading Vlason as one of the
respondents. It was granted by the CA.
Furthermore, it was able to obtain a writ of
preliminary injunction against the respondents
to prevent them from interfering in the transfer
of the vessel and its cargo from the PPA
compound.
Hence, this appeal
ISSUE: Whether or not Vlason Enterprises was
properly served with summons.
HELD: No. Appeal GRANTED.
A corporation may be served summons through
its agents or officers who under the Rules are
designated to accept service of process. A
summons addressed to a corporation and
served on the secretary of its president binds
that corporation. This is based on the rationale
that service must be made on a representative
so integrated with the corporation sued, that it
is safe to assume that said representative had
sufficient responsibility and discretion to realize
the importance of the legal papers served and
to relay the same to the president or other
responsible officer of the corporation being
sued. The secretary of the president satisfies
this criterion. This rule requires, however, that
the secretary should be an employee of the
corporation sought to be summoned. Only in
this manner can there be an assurance that the
secretary will “bring home to the corporation
[the] notice of the filing of the action” against it
In the present case, Bebero was the secretary of
Angliongto, who was president of both VSI and
petitioner, but she was an employee of VSI, not
of petitioner. The piercing of the corporate veil
cannot be resorted to when serving summons.
In the present case, Bebero was the secretary of
Angliongto, who was president of both VSI and
petitioner, but she was an employee of VSI, not
of petitioner. The piercing of the corporate veil
cannot be resorted to when serving summons.
Petitioner claims that the trial court did not
acquire jurisdiction over it, because the former
had not been served summons anew for the
Second Amended Petition or for the Second
Amended Petition with Supplemental Petition.
We disagree. Although it is well-settled that an
amended pleading supersedes the original one,
which is thus deemed withdrawn and no longer
considered part of the record, it does not follow
ipso facto that the service of a new summons
for amended petitions or complaints is
required. Where the defendants have already
appeared before the trial court by virtue of a
summons on the original complaint, the
amended complaint may be served upon them
without need of another summons, even if new
causes of action are alleged. After it is acquired,
a court’s jurisdiction continues until the case is
finally terminated. Conversely, when
defendants have not yet appeared in court and
no summons has been validly served, new
summons for the amended complaint must be
served on them. It is not the change of cause of
action that gives rise to the need to serve
another summons for the amended complaint,
but rather the acquisition of jurisdiction over
the persons of the defendants. If the trial court
has not yet acquired jurisdiction over them, a
new service of summons for the amended
complaint is required.
In this case, the trial court obviously labored
under the erroneous impression that petitioner
had already been placed under its jurisdiction
since it had been served summons through the
secretary of its president. Thus, it dispensed
with the service on petitioner of new summons
for the subsequent amendments of the
Petition. We have already ruled, however, that
the first service of summons on petitioner was
invalid. Therefore, the trial court never acquired
jurisdiction, and the said court should have
required a new service of summons for the
amended Petitions.
Preysler v. Manila
Southcoast
DOCTRINE
The three-day notice rule is not absolute. A liberal
construction of the procedural rules is proper where
the lapse in the literal observance of a rule of
procedure has not prejudiced the adverse party and
has not deprived the court of its authority.
FACTS
- Preysler filed with the Municipal Trial Court
(MTC) of Batangas a complaint for forcible
entry against Manila Southcoast
Development Corporation.
o The subject matter of the complaint
is a parcel of land with an area of
21,922 square meters located in
Sitio Kutad, Barangay Papaya,
Nasugbu, Batangas.
o The disputed land, covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
No. TF-1217 in the name of
Preysler, is also within the property
covered by TCT No. T-72097 in the
name of respondent.company. TCT
No. T-72097 covers three
contiguous parcels of land with an
aggregate area of 86,507,778
square meters.
- MTC: Ruled in favor of Preysler and ordered
respondent company to vacate the disputed
land covered by TCT No. TF-1217 and to
return the possession.
- RTC: Reversed the MTC decision and
dismissed the complaint
- Preysler received the RTC Decision on 9
February 2004 and thereafter filed a Motion
for Reconsideration, which was set for
hearing on 26 February 2004.
- Preysler sent a copy of the Motion for
Reconsideration to respondent company’s
counsel by registered mail on 23 February
2004.
- During the 26 February 2004 scheduled
hearing of the motion, the RTC judge reset
the hearing to 2 April 2004 because the
courts calendar could not accommodate the
hearing of the motion.
- It was only on 3 March 2004, or 6 days after
the scheduled hearing on 26 February 2004,
that respondents counsel received a copy of
petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.
- The rescheduled hearing on 2 April 2004
was again reset on 7 May 2004 because the
RTC judge was on official leave.
- The 7 May 2004 hearing was further reset to
6 August 2004. After the hearing, respondent
company filed its Motion to Dismiss dated 9
August 2004, claiming that non-compliance
with the three-day notice rule did not toll the
running of the period of appeal, which
rendered the decision final.
- RTC: On October 4, 2004, denied the Motion
for Reconsideration for failure to appeal
within the 15 days reglementary period and
declaring the 22 January 2004 Decision as
final and executory.
o Motion for Reconsideration was
fatally flawed for failure to observe
the three-day notice rule.
o Preysler filed an Omnibus Motion
for Reconsideration of the Order
dated 4 October 2004.
- RTC: In its Order dated 22 February 2005,
dismissed the Omnibus Motion.
- A petition for certiorari was then filed with the
Court of Appeals, alleging that the RTC
committed grave abuse of discretion in
dismissing the Motion for Reconsideration
and Omnibus Motion for alleged failure to
observe the three-day notice rule.
- CA: Dismissed the petition.
 o The three-day notice rule under
Sections 4, 5, and 6 of Rule 15 of
the Rules of Court is mandatory
and non-compliance therewith is
fatal and renders the motion pro
forma.
o As found by the RTC, Preysler’s
Motion for Reconsideration dated
12 February 2004 was received by
respondent only on 3 March 2004,
or six days after the scheduled
hearing on 26 February 2004.
o All violations of Sections 4, 5, and 6
of Rule 15 are deemed fatal.
- Thus, this petition.
ISSUE/S
1. W/N the CA committed grave error in affirming
the ruling of RTC that the three-day notice rule
was violated
PROVISIONS
Rule 15
Section 4. Hearing of motion. — Except for motions
which the court may act upon without prejudicing the
rights of the adverse party, every written motion shall
be set for hearing by the applicant.
Every written motion required to be heard and the
notice of the hearing thereof shall be served in such a
manner as to ensure its receipt by the other party at
least three (3) days before the date of hearing, unless
the court for good cause sets the hearing on shorter
notice. (4a)
Section 5. Notice of hearing. — The notice of hearing
shall be addressed to all parties concerned, and shall
specify the time and date of the hearing which must
not be later than ten (10) days after the filing of the
motion. (5a)
Section 6. Proof of service necessary. — No written
motion set for hearing shall be acted upon by the
court without proof of service thereof. (6a)
RULING & RATIO
1. YES
- In upholding the RTC, CA relied mainly on
petitioners alleged violation of the notice requirements
under Sections 4, 5, and 6, Rule 15 of the Rules of
Court which read:
- The three-day notice rule is not absolute. A
liberal construction of the procedural rules is proper
where the lapse in the literal observance of a rule of
procedure has not prejudiced the adverse party and
has not deprived the court of its authority.
- Section 6, Rule 1 of the Rules of Court
provides that the Rules should be liberally construed
in order to promote their objective of securing a just,
speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action
and proceeding.
- This Court has indeed held time and again,
that under Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of
Court, mandatory is the requirement in a motion,
which is rendered defective by failure to comply with
the requirement.
- As a rule, a motion without a notice of
hearing is considered pro forma and does not affect
the reglementary period for the appeal or the filing of
the requisite pleading.
- As an integral component of the procedural
due process, the three-day notice required by the
Rules is not intended for the benefit of the movant.
Rather, the requirement is for the purpose of avoiding
surprises that may be sprung upon the adverse party,
who must be given time to study and meet the
arguments in the motion before a resolution of the
court.
- The test is the presence of opportunity to be
heard, as well as to have time to study the motion and
meaningfully oppose or controvert the grounds upon
which it is based.
- The requirement of notice of time and
hearing in the pleading filed by a party is necessary
only to apprise the other of the actions of the former.
Under the circumstances of the present case, the
purpose of a notice of hearing was served.
- In this case, the Court of Appeals ruled that
petitioner failed to comply with the three-day notice
rule. However, the Court of Appeals overlooked the
fact that although respondent received petitioners
Motion for Reconsideration six days after the
scheduled hearing on 26 February 2004, the said
hearing was reset three (3) times with due notice to
the parties.
- It was only on 6 August 2004, or more than
five months after respondent received a copy of
petitioners Motion for Reconsideration, that the
motion was heard by the RTC. Clearly, respondent
had more than sufficient time to oppose petitioners
Motion for Reconsideration. In fact, respondent did
oppose the motion when it filed its Motion to Dismiss
dated 9 August 2004.
- In view of the circumstances of this case, we
find that there was substantial compliance with
procedural due process. Instead of dismissing
petitioners Motion for Reconsideration based merely
on the alleged procedural lapses, the RTC should
have resolved the motion based on the merits.
The RTC likewise erred in dismissing petitioners
Omnibus Motion for allegedly failing to comply with
the three-day notice requirement.
o Section 4 of Rule 15 provides that
every written motion required to be
heard and the notice of the hearing
thereof shall be served in such a
manner as to ensure its receipt by
the other party at least three (3)
days before the date of the hearing,
unless the court for good cause
sets the hearing on shorter notice.
DISPOSITION
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We SET
ASIDE the Decision dated 22 November 2005 and the
Resolution dated 3 March 2006 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 89621. We REMAND the
case to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14,
Nasugbu, Batangas to resolve petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration and Omnibus Motion on the merits.
SO ORDERED.
Michelle Lana Brown-
Araneta v Juan Ignacio
Araneta
SV: After 7 years of marriage, Juan and Michelle
separated and Michelle had custody of their 2
children. Juan filed a PETITION FOR
CUSTODY of their children with the Makati RTC.
After initially failing to file an answer Michelle
filed a Motion to Admit Answer and with a Very
Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Issuance of
Protection Order. The Makati judge was
disinclined to grant Michelle’s motion for a TPO
and declared her in default. Subsequently, she
interposed a Motion to Withdraw her Motion for
TPO. Subsequently, Michelle initiated a
PETITION FOR TEMPORARY AND
PERMANENT PROTECTION ORDER with the
Muntinlupa RTC, which granted the same. Juan
filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of litis
pendentia and arguing that this constitutes
forum shopping, which the RTC only partially
granted. He then filed a Petition for Certiorari
with the CA. CA ruled that although the Petition
for Certiorari is a prohibited pleading under RA
9262, the case can’t be dismissed because it
would in effect “reward” the forum shopping
done by Michelle.
Court said that Michelle committed forum
shopping. Forum shopping is the institution of 2
or more actions involving the same parties for
the same cause of action, either simultaneously
or successively, on the supposition that one or
the other court would come out with a favorable
disposition. Litis pendentia refers to the situation
wherein another action is pending between the
same parties for the same cause of action, such
that the second cause of action becomes
vexatious and unnecessary. Applying the rules,
Michelle committed forum shopping because, as
a result or in anticipation of the adverse ruling of
Makati RTC, she sought the favorable opinion of
Muntinlupa RTC. PETITION FOR TEMPORARY
AND PERMANENT PROTECTION ORDER in
Muntinlupa RTC is dismissed.
FACTS:
- Juan Ignacio and Michelle were married and had
2 children, Ara and Ava. After 7 years, they
separated and their 2 children remained in
Michelle’s custody.
- Juan filed a PETITION FOR CUSTODY of his
children4 with prayer for visitation rights with the
Makati RTC against Michelle and her mother,
Glenda Santos, claiming that they have completely
barred him from seeing or getting in touch with
his daughters despite repeated requests.
- The process server attempted to serve summons
upon both of them, but only Santos was served. In
Santos’ answer, she disclaimed knowledge of
Michelle’s whereabouts and she raised the court’s
4Pursuant to A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC or The
Rule on Custody of Minors and Writ of
Habeas Corpus In relation to Custody of
Minors
jurisdiction over Michelle and rattled off negative
habits and traits of Juan.
- After a visiting grant was granted to Juan later
on, Michelle filed a Motion to Admit Answer and
an Answer (With Affirmative Defenses and With
Very Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Issuance of
Protection Order), acknowledging that she heard
about the delivery of summons, but she
disregarded it because she claimed she thought
that it was improperly served upon her person.
- [RTC Makati] In a hearing for the issuance of a
TPO, the judge expressed her bent to maintain
jurisdiction over the PETITION FOR CUSTODY and
her disinclination to issue the TPO. Juan was
granted visitation rights for one Saturday and
Sunday because he was previously unable to see
his children.
 Subsequently, the RTC resolved to deny
admission of Michelle’s answer to the
PETITION FOR CUSTODY and declared
her in default.
 Michelle interposed a Motion to
Withdraw Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for
Protective Order
- Michelle initiated a PETITION FOR TEMPORARY
AND PERMANENT PRTECTION ORDER before
RTC Muntinlupa. In the verification portion of her
petition for protection order, Michelle stated that
there was a pending petition for custody of their
children in Makati.
- [RTC Muntinlupa] granted Michelle’s prayer for a
TPO which ordered Juan to stay away at a
specified distance from Michelle and the children
and to desist from communicating with Michelle.
 Juan filed a MOTION TO DISMISS
PETITION WITH PRAYER TO LIFT TPO
anchored on, among others, litis
pendentia, since Makati RTC is competent
to grant the very same reliefs Michelle
sought from Muntinlupa RTC. Thus,
Michelle’s act of filing her PETITION FOR
PROTECTION ORDER constitutes forum
shopping.
 RTC conceded the exclusionary effect of
RTC Makati assuming the jurisdiction on
the issue of custody first, so it PARTIALLY
GRANTED the Motion to Dismiss and
modified the protection order to exclude
from its coverage the orders issued by
Makati RTC in the exercise of its
jurisdiction on the pending custody case.
- Meanwhile in relation to the custody case in
Makati RTC, Michelle went to the CA on certiorari
- [CA] ruled partly in favor of Michelle, and
decided that Makati RTC erred in not admitting
her answer and in holding that she is in default.
- From the adverse orders of Muntinlupa RTC,
Juan also went to the CA on a Petition for
Certiorari, praying to enjoin the Muntinlupa RTC
from further taking cognizance of Michelle’s
protection order petition since it will intrude upon
Makati RTC’s disposition of the custody case.
 Michelle opposed and sought the
dismissal of the PETITION FOR
CERTIORARI on the ground that it is a
prohibited pleading under RA 9262.
- [CA] found Michelle guilty of forum shopping, but
also said that Juan’s PETITION FOR CERTIORARI
is a prohibited pleading which renders it
dismissible. Nonetheless, it ruled in favor of Juan,
declaring void the issuances made by Muntinlupa
RTC.
 It said that the rule that a petition for
certiorari against any interlocutory order
issued by a family court is a prohibited
pleading is not absolute.
 On the other hand, Michelle initially
recognized the jurisdiction of Makati RTC
to issue a TPO, but it was only after it
denied her prayer for a TPO when she
filed a petition before Muntinlupa RTC.
 Dismissing this petition on the ground
that it is a prohibited pleading would in
effect, “reward” Michelle for this negative
act.
- Michelle sought to set aside the Decision of the
CA.
ISSUE: Did Michelle commit forum shopping?
(YES)
- Michelle argues that:
  She withdrew her petition for protective
order in the custody case. Besides, the CA
decided that Makati RTC did not acquire
jurisdiction over her so all its issuances
were void
 There was no forum shopping because
there is no identity of parties and the
rights asserted and the reliefs prayed for
aren’t the same
 It wasn’t possible for her to apply for a
protection order under RA 9262 in the
custody case because she wasn’t a
petitioner in the Makati case and the
venue for the application for a protection
order under the law is the place where
the offended party resides, which is
Muntinlupa.
- Court pointed out that Michelle only withdrew
her petition for protective order in the Makati
Court after it was denied. Also, there is nothing in
the CA decision declaring that all issuances of the
Makati RTC were void for lack of jurisdiction over
Michelle—the Court said that this posture was
meant to deceive and mislead the court.
- Forum shopping is the institution of 2 or more
actions involving the same parties for the same
- Applying the rules, Michelle committed forum
cause of action, either simultaneously or
shopping because, as a result or in anticipation of
successively, on the supposition that one or the
the adverse ruling of Makati RTC, she sought the
other court would come out with a favorable
favorable opinion of Muntinlupa RTC.
disposition.
 The test for determining whether there is
forum shopping is where the elements of
litis pendentia are present or where a
final judgment in one case will amount to
res judicata in the other case.
 Litis pendentia refers to the situation
wherein another action is pending
between the same parties for the same
cause of action, such that the second
cause of action becomes vexatious and
unnecessary. For this to apply, the ff.
requisites must be present:
o 1. Identity of the parties, or at
least such parties as represent
the same interests in both actions
o 2. Identity of rights asserted and
relief prayed for, the relief being
founded on the same facts
o 3. Identity of the two preceding
particulars is such that any
judgment rendered in the
pending case, regardless of which
party is successful would amount
to res judicata in the other
 Thus it has been held that there is forum
shopping:
o 1. Whenever as a result of an
adverse decision in one forum, a
party seeks a favorable decision
(other than by appeal or
certiorari) in another;
o 2. If, after he has filed a petition
before the SC, a party files
another before the CA since in
such case said party deliberately
splits appeals “in the hope that
even as one case in which a
particular remedy is sought is
dismissed, another case offering
a similar remedy would still be
open; or
o 3. Where a party attempts to
obtain a preliminary injunction in
another court after failing to
obtain it from the original court.
 The cases have identical parties. In a
long line of cases, the SC has held that
absolute identity of parties isn’t required,
it being enough that there is substantial
identity of the parties or at least such
parties represent the same interests in
both actions. The fact that the identities of
parties are reversed doesn’t negate the
identity of parties for the purpose of
determining whether the case is
dismissible on the ground of litis
pendentia.
 The rights asserted and reliefs prayed
for are based on the same facts. Both
courts will have to make a finding on
Michelle’s allegations of abuse and
whether granting visitation rights will be
in the children’s best interest.
  Elements of litis pendentia are present
and any any judgment rendered in the
pending cases, regardless of which
party is successful, will amount to res
judicata. In the custody case, Juan
asserted his right to visit his children and
enjoy custody over them. In the Petition
for Protection Order filed by Michelle, on
the other hand, she asserts that the grant
of visitation rights in Juan’s favor will not
be in the best interest of the children. A
favorable decision in one case would
amount to res judicata in the other.
- The evil sought to be avoided by the rule against
forum shopping is the rendition by 2 competent
tribunals of 2 separate and contradictory
decisions, thereby causing confusion, is present in
this case.
Petition for TPO filed by Michelle in
Muntinlupa RTC should be dismissed with
prejudice since this is a clear case of forum
shopping.
CA Decision AFFIRMED.
UCPB v. Sps. Samueal and
Beluso
FACTS:
UCPB granted Sps. Beluso a Credit Line so they
could avail of loans. This was secured by a real
estate mortgage over some land in Roxas City.
Years later, Beluso did not pay when the loans
became due. As such, UCPB foreclosed on the
Roxas City properties subject to the mortgage.
Two months after the foreclosure, the spouses Beluso
filed a Petition for Annulment, Accounting and
Damages against UCPB with the RTC of Makati City.
UCPB moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the
spouses Beluso instituted another case before the RTC
of Roxas City, involving the same parties and issues.
UCPB claims that while the Roxas City case initially
appears to be a different action, as it prayed for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or
injunction to stop foreclosure of spouses Beluso’s
properties, it poses issues which are similar to those of
the present case.
The spouses Beluso claim that the issue in the Roxas
City case is the propriety of the foreclosure before the
true account of spouses Beluso is determined. On the
other hand, the issue in the Makati case is the validity
of the interest rate provision. The spouses Beluso claim
that the Roxas City case has become moot because,
before RTC Roxas City could act on the restraining
order, UCPB proceeded with the foreclosure and
auction sale. As the act sought to be restrained has
already been accomplished, the spouses Beluso had to
file a different action, that of Annulment of the
Foreclosure Sale with RTC Makati.
RTC ruled in favor of the Belusos. CA affirmed.
Issue: W/n the rtc erred in dismissing the MD?
Held:
Yes.
DOCTRINE: Even if we assume for the sake of
argument, however, that only one cause of
action is involved in the 2 civil actions, namely,
the violation of the right of the spouses Beluso
not to have their property foreclosed for an
amount they do not owe, the Rules of Court
nevertheless allows the filing of the second
action. Civil Case No. V-7227 was dismissed by
the RTC of Roxas City before the filing of Case
No. 99-314 with the RTC of Makati City, since
the venue of litigation as provided for in the
Credit Agreement is in Makati City.
Rule 16, Section 5 bars the refiling of an action
previously dismissed only in the following
instances:
SEC. 5. Effect of dismissal.—Subject to the right
of appeal, an order granting a motion to dismiss
based on paragraphs (f), (h) and (i) of section 1
hereof shall bar the refiling of the same action
or claim
IMPROPER VENUE as a ground for the dismissal
of an action is found in paragraph (c) of Section
1, not in paragraphs (f), (h) and (i)
When an action is dismissed on the motion of
the other party, it is only when the ground for
the dismissal of an action is found in paragraphs
(f), (h) and (i) that the action CANNOT be
refiled. As regards all the other grounds, the
complainant is allowed to file same action, but
should take care that, this time, it is filed with
the proper court or after the accomplishment of
the erstwhile absent condition precedent, as
the case may be
UCPB, however, brings to the attention of this
Court a Motion for Reconsideration filed by the
spouses Beluso on 15 January 1999 with the
RTC of Roxas City, which Motion had not yet
been ruled upon when the spouses Beluso filed
Civil Case No. 99-314 with the RTC of Makati.
Hence, there were allegedly two pending
actions between the same parties on the same
issue at the time of the filing of Civil Case No.
99-314 on 9 February 1999 with the RTC of
Makati. This will still not change our findings.
It is indeed the general rule that in cases where
there are two pending actions between the
same parties on the same issue, it should be the
later case that should be dismissed. However,
this rule is not absolute. According to this Court
in Allied Banking Corporation v. Court of
Appeals:
In these cases, it is evident that the first action
was filed in anticipation of the filing of the later
action and the purpose is to preempt the later
suit or provide a basis for seeking the dismissal
of the second action.
Even if this is not the purpose for the filing of
the first action, it may nevertheless be
dismissed if the later action is the more
appropriate vehicle for the ventilation of the
issues between the parties
In the case at bar, Civil Case No. V-7227 before
the RTC of Roxas City was an action for
injunction against a foreclosure sale that has
already been held, while Civil Case No. 99-314
before the RTC of Makati City includes an action
for the annulment of said foreclosure, an action
certainly more proper in view of the execution
of the foreclosure sale. The former case was
improperly filed in Roxas City, while the latter
was filed in Makati City, the proper venue of the
action as mandated by the Credit Agreement. It
is evident, therefore, that Civil Case No. 99-314
is the more appropriate vehicle for litigating the
issues between the parties, as compared to Civil
Case No. V-7227. Thus, we rule that the RTC of
Makati City was not in error in not dismissing
Civil Case No. 99-314.
Forum Shopping
UCPB had earlier moved to dismiss the petition
(originally Case No. 99-314 in RTC, Makati City) on
the ground that the spouses Beluso instituted another
case (Civil Case No. V-7227) before the RTC of
Roxas City, involving the same parties and issues.
UCPB claims that while Civil Case No. V-7227 initially
appears to be a different action, as it prayed for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or
injunction to stop foreclosure of spouses Beluso’s
properties, it poses issues which are similar to those
of the present case.43 To prove its point, UCPB cited
the spouses Beluso’s Amended Petition in Civil Case
No. V-7227, which contains similar allegations as
those in the present case. The RTC of Makati denied
UCPB’s Motion to Dismiss Case No. 99-314 for lack
of merit. Petitioner UCPB raised the same issue with
the Court of Appeals, and is raising the same issue
with us now.
The spouses Beluso claim that the issue in Civil Case
No. V-7227 before the RTC of Roxas City, a Petition
for Injunction Against Foreclosure, is the propriety of
the foreclosure before the true account of spouses
Beluso is determined. On the other hand, the issue in
Case No. 99-314 before the RTC of Makati City is the
validity of the interest rate provision. The spouses
Beluso claim that Civil Case No. V-7227 has become
moot because, before the RTC of Roxas City could
act on the restraining order, UCPB proceeded with
the foreclosure and auction sale. As the act sought to
be restrained by Civil Case No. V-7227 has already
been accomplished, the spouses Beluso had to file a
different action, that of Annulment of the Foreclosure
Sale, Case No. 99-314 with the RTC, Makati City.
Even if we assume for the sake of argument,
however, that only one cause of action is involved in
the two civil actions, namely, the violation of the right
of the spouses Beluso not to have their property
foreclosed for an amount they do not owe, the Rules
of Court nevertheless allows the filing of the second
action. Civil Case No. V-7227 was dismissed by the
RTC of Roxas City before the filing of Case No. 99-
314 with the RTC of Makati City, since the venue of
litigation as provided for in the Credit Agreement is in
Makati City.
Rule 16, Section 5 bars the refiling of an action
previously dismissed only in the following instances:
SEC. 5. Effect of dismissal.—Subject to the right of
appeal, an order granting a motion to dismiss based
on paragraphs (f), (h) and (i) of section 1 hereof shall
bar the refiling of the same action or claim. (n)
Improper venue as a ground for the dismissal of an
action is found in paragraph (c) of Section 1, not in
paragraphs (f), (h) and (i):
SECTION 1. Grounds.—Within the time for but before
filing the answer to the complaint or pleading
asserting a claim, a motion to dismiss may be made
on any of the following grounds:
(a) That the court has no jurisdiction over the
person of the defending party;
(b) That the court has no jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the claim;
(c) That venue is improperly laid;
(d) That the plaintiff has no legal capacity to
sue;
(e) That there is another action pending
between the same parties for the same
cause;
(f) That the cause of action is barred by a
prior judgment or by the statute of limitations;
(g) That the pleading asserting the claim
states no cause of action;
(h) That the claim or demand set forth in the
plaintiff’s pleading has been paid, waived,
abandoned, or otherwise extinguished;
(i) That the claim on which the action is
founded is unenforceable under the
provisions of the statute of frauds; and
(j) That a condition precedent for filing the
claim has not been complied
with.44 (Emphases supplied.)
When an action is dismissed on the motion of the
other party, it is only when the ground for the
dismissal of an action is found in paragraphs (f), (h)
and (i) that the action cannot be refiled. As regards all
the other grounds, the complainant is allowed to file
same action, but should take care that, this time, it is
filed with the proper court or after the accomplishment
of the erstwhile absent condition precedent, as the
case may be.
UCPB, however, brings to the attention of this Court a
Motion for Reconsideration filed by the spouses
Beluso on 15 January 1999 with the RTC of Roxas
City, which Motion had not yet been ruled upon when
the spouses Beluso filed Civil Case No. 99-314 with
the RTC of Makati. Hence, there were allegedly two
pending actions between the same parties on the
same issue at the time of the filing of Civil Case No.
99-314 on 9 February 1999 with the RTC of Makati.
This will still not change our findings. It is indeed the
general rule that in cases where there are two
pending actions between the same parties on the
same issue, it should be the later case that should be
dismissed. However, this rule is not absolute.
According to this Court in Allied Banking Corporation
v. Court of Appeals45 :
In these cases, it is evident that the first action was
filed in anticipation of the filing of the later action and
the purpose is to preempt the later suit or provide a
basis for seeking the dismissal of the second action.
Even if this is not the purpose for the filing of the first
action, it may nevertheless be dismissed if the later
action is the more appropriate vehicle for the
ventilation of the issues between the parties. Thus, in
Ramos v. Peralta, it was held:
[T]he rule on litis pendentia does not require that the
later case should yield to the earlier case. What is
required merely is that there be another pending
action, not a prior pending action. Considering the
broader scope of inquiry involved in Civil Case No.
4102 and the location of the property involved, no
error was committed by the lower court in deferring to
the Bataan court's jurisdiction.
Given, therefore, the pendency of two actions, the
following are the relevant considerations in
determining which action should be dismissed: (1) the
date of filing, with preference generally given to the
first action filed to be retained; (2) whether the action
sought to be dismissed was filed merely to preempt
the later action or to anticipate its filing and lay the
basis for its dismissal; and (3) whether the action is
the appropriate vehicle for litigating the issues
between the parties.
In the case at bar, Civil Case No. V-7227 before the
RTC of Roxas City was an action for injunction
against a foreclosure sale that has already been held,
while Civil Case No. 99-314 before the RTC of Makati
City includes an action for the annulment of said
foreclosure, an action certainly more proper in view of
the execution of the foreclosure sale. The former case
was improperly filed in Roxas City, while the latter
was filed in Makati City, the proper venue of the
action as mandated by the Credit Agreement. It is
evident, therefore, that Civil Case No. 99-314 is the
more appropriate vehicle for litigating the issues
between the parties, as compared to Civil Case No.
V-7227. Thus, we rule that the RTC of Makati City
was not in error in not dismissing Civil Case No. 99-
314.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals
is hereby AFFIRMED with the following
MODIFICATIONS:
NATIONAL HOUSING
AUTHORITY vs. PEDRO
BAELLO, and his heirs
SUMMARY:
Pedro Baello and Nicanora Baello
inherited from Esperanza a parcel of land in
Caloocan. This was later on registered with the
Register of Deeds under their names. Sometime
during the Martial Law, FL Marcos came up
with the Dagat-Dagatan Project, a housing
project to be built in Caloocan. The project
would also cover the properties of respondents.
NHA was tasked by the project committee to
expropriate the properties to begin the project.
Soon after, NHA and the respondents engaged in
a dispute who has the better right over the
properties. NHA claims that petitioners could
not have possessed the property in 1971 because
it was declared as inalienable and not
disposable. The NHA asked for the SC to nullify
the title to the land under the names of Pedro
and Nicanora. However, the Court held that it is
barred by res judicata to pronounce a new
decision. Also, NHA was pronounced to be a
builder in bad faith by knowing that the
respondents were the real owners of the land and
not the government. The NHA also violated the
Constitutional mandate in expropriation of
private lands to be executed with just
compensation and due process.
Facts:
In October 23, 1911, a parcel of land
with an area of 147, 972 sq.m. located in Sitio
Dalisay, Caloocan was surveyed for Esperanza
Baella. The plan was approved on November
14, 1911. Esperanza Baello died intestate on
March 22, 1929 and was survived by her heirs
Pedro Baello and Nicanora Baello.
Subsequently, the plan was verified anew and
approved by the Director of Bureau of Lands on
April 24, 1951.
Subsequently, the Register of Deeds
issued OCT to Pedro and Nicanora. The
property was subdivided into 2 parcels of land:
Lot A, with an area of 98,648sqm. for Pedro;
and Lot B, with an area of 49,324sqm. for
Nicanora. The subdivision plan was approved by
the Court on July 27, 1971.
Martial law was declared by then
President Marcos. On October 30, 1974,
President Marcos issued PD No. 569 creating a
committee to expropriate the Dagat-Dagatan
Lagoon and its adjacent areas, including the
property of the Baello and Rodriguez heirs. The
property had been identified as a permanent
relocation site for families affected by the Tondo
Foreshore Urban Renewal Project Team, and the
government planned to develop it into a
residential area and an industrial/commercial
complex.
In 1976, former First Lady Imelda R.
Marcos launched a project dubbed as the Dagat-
Dagatan Project, a showcase program for the
homeless. Among the vast areas covered by the
project were the properties of the Baello and
Rodriguez heirs. The NHA was tasked to
develop the property into a residential area,
subdivide the same, and award the lots to chosen
beneficiaries. A truckload of fully armed
military personnel entered the Baello property,
and, at gunpoint, forcibly ejected the caretaker
of the Baello family. The soldiers then
demolished the two-storey residential structure
and destroyed all the fishpond improvements
thereon. The NHA took possession of the
property of the respondents.
The NHA, thereafter, acquired the
properties adjacent to the lagoon, either by
purchase or by expropriation. These properties,
including that of the respondents were
developed and subdivided into residential,
industrial and commercial lands. The NHA later
executed separate conditional contracts to sell
over the subdivision lots in favour of
beneficiaries. The beneficiaries were awarded
620 lots found in Lot A, the Baello property,
while 275 lots found in Lot B of the Rodriguez
property were awarded to other grantees. The
community of beneficiaries was called the
Kaunlaran Village.
After the Marcos regime was cut short
by the EDSA I upheaval, the Baello and
Rodriquez heirs executed an extrajudicial
settlement of their estates. The NHA filed a
complaint for the expropriation of the property
of the respondents Baello and Rodriguez heirs in
the RTC. The NHA secured a writ of possession
over the property.
During the same period, respondents
acquired titles over the lots. Petitioners filed an
amended complaint. The respondent heirs filed
separate motions to dismiss the complaint. The
trial court issued an Order granting the motion
and dismissed the complaint on the ground of
res judicata and lack of cause of action. The
petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals, the
court rendered a Decision affirming the Order of
the RTC. The petitioner then filed a petition for
review on certiorari in the Supreme Court. The
Court issued a Resolution denying due course
the petition on the ground that the CA
committed no reversible error.
But the petitioner was undaunted; it
filed a complaint against the respondent heirs in
the RTC of Caloocan City, this time, for
declaration of nullity of OCT which was issued
to Pedro T. Baello and his sister Nicanora
Baello-Rodriguez. The subject property was
declared alienable and disposable by the
government only lately on 17 January 1986, and
thus the said OCT could not have been validly
issued in 1954.
The trial court dismissing the complaint
on the grounds of estoppel and res judicata. On
appeal, the appellate court affirmed the assailed
resolution of the RTC, ruling that the
petitioner’s complaint was barred by res
judicata. It also held that the Republic of the
Philippines and the petitioner, by their own acts,
had admitted that the properties titled to the
respondents were private lands, even long before
Administrative Order No. 4-1766 was issued by
then Minister of Agriculture Rodolfo del
Rosario during Martial Law. Thus, the present
petition.
Issue: Whether or not the decision of the then
Court of First Instance in LRC Case No. 520,
G.R.L.O. No. 4815 (case of the issuance of
OCT) and the consequent issuance of OCT No.
(804) 53839 (title to the subject property) is
valid? -VALID DECISION —> valid title
Held: (RES JUDICATA)
The Court held that NHA did not
expressly assail or pray for the nullification of
the CFI decision, which granted the title to the
Baellos. What the NHA prayed for was the
nullification of the title by claiming that the
property was a forestland which makes it
inalienable and not disposable. The nullification
of the title cannot be done unless the CFI
decision is declared as null void first. This
complaint should have been filed in the CA,
which had exclusive jurisdiction over the action,
not in the trial court. Even assuming that the trial
court had jurisdiction over the action of the
petitioner, nonetheless, the Court agrees with
the ruling of the trial and appellate courts
that the petitioners action to annul the title
was barred by the decision in LRC Case No.
520.
The doctrine of res judicata has been
explained as follows:
The rule is that when material facts or
questions, which were in issue in a former
action and were admitted or judicially
determined are conclusively settled by a
judgment rendered therein, such facts or
questions become res judicata and may not
again be litigated in a subsequent action
between the same parties or their privies
regardless of the form of the latter.
Jurisprudence expounds that the concept of
res judicata embraces two aspects. The first,
known as "bar by prior judgment," or "estoppel
by verdict," is the effect of a judgment as a bar
to the prosecution of a second action upon the
same claim, demand or cause of action. The
second, known as "conclusiveness of
judgment," otherwise known as the rule of
auter action pendent, ordains that issues
actually and directly resolved in a former suit
cannot again be raised in any future case
between the same parties involving a different
cause of action. x x x.11
The Court explained further:
Conclusiveness of judgment does not require
identity of the causes of action for it to work. If
a particular point or question is in issue in the
second action, and the judgment will depend
on the determination of that particular point or
question, a former judgment between the
same parties will be final and conclusive in the
second if that same point or question was in
issue and adjudicated in the first suit; but the
adjudication of an issue in the first case is not
conclusive of an entirely different and distinct
issue arising in the second. Hence, facts and
issues actually and directly resolved in a
former suit cannot again be raised in any
future case between the same parties, even if
the latter suit may involve a different claim or
cause of action.12
In this case, the NHA’s petition is barred by
conclusiveness of judgment which states that
-
x x x any right, fact, or matter in issue directly
adjudicated or necessarily involved in the
determination of an action before a competent
court in which judgment is rendered on the
merits is conclusively settled by the judgment
therein and cannot again be litigated between
the parties and their privies whether or not the
claim, demand, purpose, or subject matter of
the two actions is the same.13
We sustain the Court of Appeals in ruling that
the main issue raised by the NHA, which it
alleged in its Answer before the trial court, is
the validity of OCT No. (804) 53839. The
validity of OCT No. (804) 53839 had long
been settled by this Court in G.R. No. 143230.
In that case, the Court ruled that the action to
annul OCT No. (804) 53839 was barred by the
decision in LRC Case No. 520. The Court
noted that the Republic did not oppose Pedro
and Nicanora’s application for registration in
LRC Case No. 520, and neither did it appeal
the decision. OCT No. (804) 53839 was
issued by the Register of Deeds in 1959 and
the Republic did not file any action to nullify
the CFI’s decision until the NHA filed a
complaint for nullity of OCT No. (804) 53839
on 5 November 1993, the case which was the
origin of G.R. No. 143230. As pointed out by
this Court in G.R. No. 143230, the NHA was
already barred from assailing OCT No. (804)
53839 and its derivative titles.
Property Issue: Whether or not NHA is a builder
who acted in good faith?- NO
Held:
The SC reaffirmed the trial and
appellate courts in holding that NHA was a
builder in bad faith when it took possession of
the property in 1976, and introduced
improvement and disposed of said property
despite the knowledge that the ownership
pertained to the respondents.
Not only that, NHA also violated the
Constitution by disregarding the Constitutional
mandate that property shall not be taken without
just compensation and unless it is for public use.
The NHA may have a laudable purpose in the
expropriation of the land, which was to provide
affordable housing in the Metro Manila area.
However, the manner by the use of force and
guns to take property in 1976 was scary and
reprehensible. Moreover, there was no notice of
the possession, control and disposition of the
property. It infringed the rights of the Baellos
and their right to due process.
Relevant provision:
Art. 526: He is deemed a possessor in good faith
who is not aware that there exists in his title or
mode of acquisition any flaw which invalidates
it.
Heirs of Loreto Maramag v.
Maramag
Facts:
 Petitioners were the legitimate wife and
children of Loreto Maramag (Loreto), while
respondents were Loreto’s illegitimate
family.
 Loreto designated respondents as
beneficiaries in his life insurance policies
from Insular Life Assurance Company, Ltd.
(Insular) and Great Pacific Life Assurance
Corporation (Grepalife).
 Petitioners insituted in the RTC a petition
for revocation and/or reduction of
insurance proceeds for being void and/or
inofficious, with prayer for a temporary
restraining order (TRO) and a writ of
preliminary injunction.
 Pursuant to the motion to dismiss
incorporated in Insular and Grepalife’s
respective answers, the TC dismissed the
complaint with respect to the illegitimate
children, who are the the designated
primary beneficiaries in the life insurance
policies, for lack of cause action. However,
trial court ruled that the action may
proceed against the concubine, Insular Life,
and Grepalife.
 Insular and Grepalife filed their respective
motions for reconsideration, arguing, in the
main, that the petition failed to state a
cause of action against them.
 TC granted, and dismissed the case against
them. In doing so, the TC court considered
the allegations found in Insular’s answer.5
 CA dismissed petitioners’appeal for lack of
jurisdiction, holding that the decision of the
trial court dismissing the complaint for
failure to state a cause of action involved a
pure question of law. Further, it found that
due to petitioners’ failure to timely file a
motion for reconsideration, the dismissal
against Insular and Grepalife had already
attained finality.
Issue: WON the TC erred in granting the motion
to dismiss? NO
Arguments:
Petitioners:The finding that Eva was either
disqualified as a beneficiary by the insurance
companies or that her designation was revoked
by Loreto was raised only in the answers and
motions for reconsideration of both Insular and
Grepalife. For a motion to dismiss to prosper
on that ground, only the allegations in the
complaint should be considered.
Ratio:
5
Specifically, the allegations that Loreto revoked the
designation of the concubine in one policy and that
Insular disqualified her as a beneficiary in the other
policy such that the entire proceeds would be paid
to the illegitimate children of Loreto with Eva
pursuant to Section 53 of the Insurance Code.
When a motion to dismiss is premised on this
ground, the ruling thereon should be based
only on the facts alleged in the complaint. The
court must resolve the issue on the strength of
such allegations, assuming them to be true.
The test of sufficiency of a cause of action
rests on whether, hypothetically admitting the
facts alleged in the complaint to be true, the
court can render a valid judgment upon the
same, in accordance with the prayer in the
complaint. This is the general rule.
However, this rule is subject to well-
recognized exceptions, such that there is no
hypothetical admission of the veracity of the
allegations if:
1. the falsity of the allegations is
subject to judicial notice;
2. such allegations are legally
impossible;
3. the allegations refer to facts which
are inadmissible in evidence;
4. by the record or document in the
pleading, the allegations appear
unfounded; or
5. there is evidence which has been
presented to the court by stipulation of
the parties or in the course of the
hearings related to the case.18
In this case, it is clear from the petition filed
before the trial court that, although petitioners
are the legitimate heirs of Loreto, they were
not named as beneficiaries in the insurance
policies issued by Insular and Grepalife. The
basis of petitioners’ claim is that Eva, being a
concubine of Loreto and a suspect in his
murder, is disqualified from being designated
as beneficiary of the insurance policies, and
that Eva’s children with Loreto, being
illegitimate children, are entitled to a lesser
share of the proceeds of the policies. They
also argued that pursuant to Section 12 of the
Insurance Code,19 Eva’s share in the
proceeds should be forfeited in their favor, the
former having brought about the death of
Loreto. Thus, they prayed that the share of
Eva and portions of the shares of Loreto’s
illegitimate children should be awarded to
them, being the legitimate heirs of Loreto
entitled to their respective legitimes.
It is evident from the face of the complaint that
petitioners are not entitled to a favorable
judgment in light of Article 2011 of the Civil
Code which expressly provides that insurance
contracts shall be governed by special laws,
i.e., the Insurance Code. Section 53 of the
Insurance Code states—
SECTION 53. The insurance proceeds shall
be applied exclusively to the proper interest of
the person in whose name or for whose
benefit it is made unless otherwise specified in
the policy.
Pursuant thereto, it is obvious that the only
persons entitled to claim the insurance
proceeds are either the insured, if still alive; or
the beneficiary, if the insured is already
deceased, upon the maturation of the
policy.20 The exception to this rule is a
situation where the insurance contract was
intended to benefit third persons who are not
parties to the same in the form of favorable
stipulations or indemnity. In such a case, third
parties may directly sue and claim from the
insurer.21
Petitioners are third parties to the insurance
contracts with Insular and Grepalife and, thus,
are not entitled to the proceeds thereof.
Accordingly, respondents Insular and
Grepalife have no legal obligation to turn over
the insurance proceeds to petitioners. The
revocation of Eva as a beneficiary in one
policy and her disqualification as such in
another are of no moment considering that the
designation of the illegitimate children as
beneficiaries in Loreto’s insurance policies
remains valid. Because no legal proscription
exists in naming as beneficiaries the children
of illicit relationships by the insured,22 the
shares of Eva in the insurance proceeds,
whether forfeited by the court in view of the
prohibition on donations under Article 739 of
the Civil Code or by the insurers themselves
for reasons based on the insurance contracts,
must be awarded to the said illegitimate
children, the designated beneficiaries, to the
exclusion of petitioners. It is only in cases
where the insured has not designated any
beneficiary,23 or when the designated
beneficiary is disqualified by law to receive the
proceeds,24 that the insurance policy proceeds
shall redound to the benefit of the estate of
the insured.
In this regard, the assailed June 16, 2005
Resolution of the trial court should be upheld.
In the same light, the Decision of the CA
dated January 8, 2008 should be sustained.
Indeed, the appellate court had no jurisdiction
to take cognizance of the appeal; the issue of
failure to state a cause of action is a question
of law and not of fact, there being no findings
of fact in the first place.25
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack
of merit. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
EDGARDO PINGA, Petitioner vs.
THE HEIRS OF GERMAN,
SANTIAGO, Respondents
Facts:
The Heirs of Santiago filed an injunction
against Pinga alleging that Pinga had been
unlawfully entering the coco lands of the
respondent cutting wood and bamboos
and harvesting the fruits of the coconut
trees. As a counterclaim, Pinga contests the
ownership of the lands to which Pinga was
harvesting the fruits. However, due to failures
of Heirs of Santiago to attend the hearings,
the court ordered the dismissal of said case
for failure to prosecute.
Respondents thus filed an MR not to
reinstate the case but to ask for the entire
action to be dismissed and not to allow
petitioner to present evidence ex parte.
RTC granted respondents’ MR and dismissed
the counterclaim on the only ground that there
was no opposition to respondent’s MR.
Petitioner filed an urgent MR (which was later
denied) to which respondents filed an
Opposition to Defendants Urgent MR arguing
that compulsory counterclaims cannot be
adjudicated independently of plaintiffs cause of
action, and the dismissal of the complaint
carries with it the dismissal of the compulsory
counterclaims. Hence, the present Petition for
Review under Rule 45 on a pure question of
law.
Issue:
Whether or not dismissal of original
complaint affects that of the compulsory
counter claims?
Ruling:
NO the counterclaims, in this case, can
stand on its own.
Rule 17 Sec 3 provides: “If for any cause, the
plaintiff fails to appear on the date of his
presentation of his evidence x x x the
complaint may be dismissed upon motion of
the defendant or upon the court’s own
motion, without prejudice to the right of the
defendant to prosecute his counterclaim in
the same or in a separate action”
The dismissal of the complaint does not the counterclaim itself and not on the
carry with the dismissal of the counterclaim, survival of the main complaint.
compulsory or otherwise. In fact, the
Certainly, if the counterclaim is palpably
dismissal of the complaint is without
without merit or suffers jurisdictional flaws
prejudice to the right of defendants to which stand independent of the complaint,
prosecute his counterclaim. Section 3 the trial court is not precluded from
contemplates a dismissal not procured by dismissing it under the amended rules,
plaintiff, albeit justified by causes imputable provided that the judgment or order
to him and which, in the present case, was dismissing the counterclaim is premised on
petitioner's failure to appear at the pre-trial. those defects. At the same time, if the
counterclaim is justified, the amended rules
now unequivocally protect such
counterclaim from peremptory dismissal by
This situation is also covered by Section 3, as reason of the dismissal of the complaint.
extended by judicial interpretation, and is
ordered upon motion of defendant or motu Petition granted.
proprio by the court. Here, the issue of
whether defendant has a pending
counterclaim, permissive or compulsory, is
not of determinative significance. The
dismissal of plaintiff's complaint is evidently a
confirmation of the failure of evidence to
prove his cause of action outlined therein,
hence the dismissal is considered, as a
matter of evidence, an adjudication on the
merits.

This does not, however, mean that there is

likewise such absence of evidence to prove
defendant's counterclaim although the
same arises out of the subject matter of the
complaint which was merely terminated for
lack of proof. To hold otherwise would not
only work injustice to defendant but would
be reading a further provision into Section 3
and wresting a meaning therefrom although
neither exists even by mere implication.

Thus understood, the complaint can

accordingly be dismissed, but relief can
nevertheless be granted as a matter of
course to defendant on his counterclaim as
alleged and proved, with or without any
reservation therefor on his part, unless from
his conduct, express or implied, he has
virtually consented to the concomitant
dismissal of his counterclaim.The present rule
embodied in Sections 2 and 3 of Rule 17
ordains a more equitable disposition of the
counterclaims by ensuring that any
judgment thereon is based on the merit of