G.R. No.

180906 October 7, 2008

THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, THE CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES
vs.
RAYMOND MANALO and REYNALDO MANALO
PUNO, C.J.:
While victims of enforced disappearances are separated from the rest of the world behind secret walls, they are not
separated from the constitutional protection of their basic rights. The constitution is an overarching sky that covers all
in its protection. The case at bar involves the rights to life, liberty and security in the first petition for a writ of Amparo
filed before this Court.
This is an appeal via Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court in relation to Section 19 1 of the Rule on
the Writ of Amparo, seeking to reverse and set aside on both questions of fact and law, the Decision promulgated by
the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. AMPARO No. 00001, entitled "Raymond Manalo and Reynaldo Manalo, petitioners,
versus The Secretary of National Defense, the Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines, respondents."
This case was originally a Petition for Prohibition, Injunction, and Temporary Restraining Order (TRO)2 filed before
this Court by herein respondents (therein petitioners) on August 23, 2007 to stop herein petitioners (therein
respondents) and/or their officers and agents from depriving them of their right to liberty and other basic rights. Therein
petitioners also sought ancillary remedies, Protective Custody Orders, Appointment of Commissioner, Inspection and
Access Orders, and all other legal and equitable reliefs under Article VIII, Section 5(5)3 of the 1987 Constitution and
Rule 135, Section 6 of the Rules of Court. In our Resolution dated August 24, 2007, we (1) ordered the Secretary of
the Department of National Defense and the Chief of Staff of the AFP, their agents, representatives, or persons acting
in their stead, including but not limited to the Citizens Armed Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU) to submit their
Comment; and (2) enjoined them from causing the arrest of therein petitioners, or otherwise restricting, curtailing,
abridging, or depriving them of their right to life, liberty, and other basic rights as guaranteed under Article III, Section
14 of the 1987 Constitution.5
While the August 23, 2007 Petition was pending, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo took effect on October 24, 2007.
Forthwith, therein petitioners filed a Manifestation and Omnibus Motion to Treat Existing Petition as Amparo Petition,
to Admit Supporting Affidavits, and to Grant Interim and Final Amparo Reliefs. They prayed that: (1) the petition be
considered a Petition for the Writ of Amparo under Sec. 266 of the Amparo Rule; (2) the Court issue the writ
commanding therein respondents to make a verified return within the period provided by law and containing the
specific matter required by law; (3) they be granted the interim reliefs allowed by the Amparo Rule and all other reliefs
prayed for in the petition but not covered by the Amparo Rule; (4) the Court, after hearing, render judgment as required
in Sec. 187 of the Amparo Rule; and (5) all other just and equitable reliefs.8
On October 25, 2007, the Court resolved to treat the August 23, 2007 Petition as a petition under the Amparo Rule
and further resolved, viz:

WHEREFORE, let a WRIT OF AMPARO be issued to respondents requiring them to file with the CA (Court of Appeals)
a verified written return within five (5) working days from service of the writ. We REMAND the petition to the CA and
designate the Division of Associate Justice Lucas P. Bersamin to conduct the summary hearing on the petition on
November 8, 2007 at 2:00 p.m. and decide the petition in accordance with the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.9

On December 26, 2007, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision in favor of therein petitioners (herein respondents),
the dispositive portion of which reads, viz:

ACCORDINGLY, the PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF AMPARO is GRANTED.

The respondents SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE and AFP CHIEF OF STAFF are hereby REQUIRED:

1. To furnish to the petitioners and to this Court within five days from notice of this decision all official and unofficial
reports of the investigation undertaken in connection with their case, except those already on file herein;

2. To confirm in writing the present places of official assignment of M/Sgt Hilario aka Rollie Castillo and Donald Caigas
within five days from notice of this decision.

3. To cause to be produced to this Court all medical reports, records and charts, reports of any treatment given or
recommended and medicines prescribed, if any, to the petitioners, to include a list of medical and (sic) personnel
(military and civilian) who attended to them from February 14, 2006 until August 12, 2007 within five days from notice
of this decision.

The compliance with this decision shall be made under the signature and oath of respondent AFP Chief of Staff or his
duly authorized deputy, the latter's authority to be express and made apparent on the face of the sworn compliance
with this directive. SO ORDERED.10

Hence, this appeal. In resolving this appeal, we first unfurl the facts as alleged by herein respondents:
Respondent Raymond Manalo recounted that about one or two weeks before February 14, 2006, several uniformed
and armed soldiers and members of the CAFGU summoned to a meeting all the residents of their barangay in San
Idelfonso, Bulacan. Respondents were not able to attend as they were not informed of the gathering, but Raymond
saw some of the soldiers when he passed by the barangay hall.11
On February 14, 2006, Raymond was sleeping in their house in Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan. At past
noon, several armed soldiers wearing white shirts, fatigue pants and army boots, entered their house and roused him.
They asked him if he was Bestre, but his mother, Ester Manalo, replied that he was Raymond, not Bestre. The armed
soldier slapped him on both cheeks and nudged him in the stomach. He was then handcuffed, brought to the rear of
his house, and forced to the ground face down. He was kicked on the hip, ordered to stand and face up to the light,
then forcibly brought near the road. He told his mother to follow him, but three soldiers stopped her and told her to
stay.12

1
Among the men who came to take him, Raymond recognized brothers Michael de la Cruz, Madning de la Cruz, "Puti"
de la Cruz, and "Pula" de la Cruz, who all acted as lookout. They were all members of the CAFGU and residing in
Manuzon, San Ildefonso, Bulacan. He also recognized brothers Randy Mendoza and Rudy Mendoza, also members
of the CAFGU. While he was being forcibly taken, he also saw outside of his house two barangay councilors, Pablo
Cunanan and Bernardo Lingasa, with some soldiers and armed men.13
The men forced Raymond into a white L300 van. Once inside, he was blindfolded. Before being blindfolded, he saw
the faces of the soldiers who took him. Later, in his 18 months of captivity, he learned their names. The one who drove
the van was Rizal Hilario alias Rollie Castillo, whom he estimated was about 40 years of age or older. The leader of
the team who entered his house and abducted him was "Ganata." He was tall, thin, curly-haired and a bit old. Another
one of his abductors was "George" who was tall, thin, white-skinned and about 30 years old.14
The van drove off, then came to a stop. A person was brought inside the van and made to sit beside Raymond. Both
of them were beaten up. On the road, he recognized the voice of the person beside him as his brother Reynaldo's.
The van stopped several times until they finally arrived at a house. Raymond and Reynaldo were each brought to a
different room. With the doors of their rooms left open, Raymond saw several soldiers continuously hitting his brother
Reynaldo on the head and other parts of his body with the butt of their guns for about 15 minutes. After which,
Reynaldo was brought to his (Raymond's) room and it was his (Raymond's) turn to be beaten up in the other room.
The soldiers asked him if he was a member of the New People's Army. Each time he said he was not, he was hit with
the butt of their guns. He was questioned where his comrades were, how many soldiers he had killed, and how many
NPA members he had helped. Each time he answered none, they hit him.15
In the next days, Raymond's interrogators appeared to be high officials as the soldiers who beat him up would salute
them, call them "sir," and treat them with respect. He was in blindfolds when interrogated by the high officials, but he
saw their faces when they arrived and before the blindfold was put on. He noticed that the uniform of the high officials
was different from those of the other soldiers. One of those officials was tall and thin, wore white pants, tie, and leather
shoes, instead of combat boots. He spoke in Tagalog and knew much about his parents and family, and a habeas
corpus case filed in connection with the respondents' abduction.16 While these officials interrogated him, Raymond
was not manhandled. But once they had left, the soldier guards beat him up. When the guards got drunk, they also
manhandled respondents. During this time, Raymond was fed only at night, usually with left-over and rotten food.17
On the third week of respondents' detention, two men arrived while Raymond was sleeping and beat him up. They
doused him with urine and hot water, hit his stomach with a piece of wood, slapped his forehead twice with a .45
pistol, punched him on the mouth, and burnt some parts of his body with a burning wood. When he could no longer
endure the torture and could hardly breathe, they stopped. They then subjected Reynaldo to the same ordeal in
another room. Before their torturers left, they warned Raymond that they would come back the next day and kill him.18
The following night, Raymond attempted to escape. He waited for the guards to get drunk, then made noise with the
chains put on him to see if they were still awake. When none of them came to check on him, he managed to free his
hand from the chains and jumped through the window. He passed through a helipad and firing range and stopped
near a fishpond where he used stones to break his chains. After walking through a forested area, he came near a
river and an Iglesia ni Kristo church. He talked to some women who were doing the laundry, asked where he was and
the road to Gapan. He was told that he was in Fort Magsaysay.19 He reached the highway, but some soldiers spotted
him, forcing him to run away. The soldiers chased him and caught up with him. They brought him to another place
near the entrance of what he saw was Fort Magsaysay. He was boxed repeatedly, kicked, and hit with chains until his
back bled. They poured gasoline on him. Then a so-called "Mam" or "Madam" suddenly called, saying that she wanted
to see Raymond before he was killed. The soldiers ceased the torture and he was returned inside Fort Magsaysay
where Reynaldo was detained.20
For some weeks, the respondents had a respite from all the torture. Their wounds were treated. When the wounds
were almost healed, the torture resumed, particularly when respondents' guards got drunk.21
Raymond recalled that sometime in April until May 2006, he was detained in a room enclosed by steel bars. He stayed
all the time in that small room measuring 1 x 2 meters, and did everything there, including urinating, removing his
bowels, bathing, eating and sleeping. He counted that eighteen people22 had been detained in that bartolina, including
his brother Reynaldo and himself.23
For about three and a half months, the respondents were detained in Fort Magsaysay. They were kept in a small
house with two rooms and a kitchen. One room was made into the bartolina. The house was near the firing range,
helipad and mango trees. At dawn, soldiers marched by their house. They were also sometimes detained in what he
only knew as the "DTU."24
At the DTU, a male doctor came to examine respondents. He checked their body and eyes, took their urine samples
and marked them. When asked how they were feeling, they replied that they had a hard time urinating, their stomachs
were aching, and they felt other pains in their body. The next day, two ladies in white arrived. They also examined
respondents and gave them medicines, including orasol, amoxicillin and mefenamic acid. They brought with them the
results of respondents' urine test and advised them to drink plenty of water and take their medicine. The two ladies
returned a few more times. Thereafter, medicines were sent through the "master" of the DTU, "Master" Del Rosario
alias Carinyoso at Puti. Respondents were kept in the DTU for about two weeks. While there, he met a soldier named
Efren who said that Gen. Palparan ordered him to monitor and take care of them.25
One day, Rizal Hilario fetched respondents in a Revo vehicle. They, along with Efren and several other armed men
wearing fatigue suits, went to a detachment in Pinaud, San Ildefonso, Bulacan. Respondents were detained for one
or two weeks in a big two-storey house. Hilario and Efren stayed with them. While there, Raymond was beaten up by
Hilario's men.26
From Pinaud, Hilario and Efren brought respondents to Sapang, San Miguel, Bulacan on board the Revo. They were
detained in a big unfinished house inside the compound of "Kapitan" for about three months. When they arrived in
Sapang, Gen. Palparan talked to them. They were brought out of the house to a basketball court in the center of the
compound and made to sit. Gen. Palparan was already waiting, seated. He was about two arms' length away from
respondents. He began by asking if respondents felt well already, to which Raymond replied in the affirmative. He
asked Raymond if he knew him. Raymond lied that he did not. He then asked Raymond if he would be scared if he
were made to face Gen. Palparan. Raymond responded that he would not be because he did not believe that Gen.
Palparan was an evil man.27
Raymond narrated his conversation with Gen. Palparan in his affidavit, viz:

2
Tinanong ako ni Gen. Palparan, "Ngayon na kaharap mo na ako, di ka ba natatakot sa akin?"

Sumagot akong, "Siyempre po, natatakot din..."

Sabi ni Gen. Palparan: "Sige, bibigyan ko kayo ng isang pagkakataon na mabuhay, basta't sundin n'yo ang lahat ng
sasabihin ko... sabihin mo sa magulang mo - huwag pumunta sa mga rali, sa hearing, sa Karapatan at sa Human
Right dahil niloloko lang kayo. Sabihin sa magulang at lahat sa bahay na huwag paloko doon. Tulungan kami na
kausapin si Bestre na sumuko na sa gobyerno."28

Respondents agreed to do as Gen. Palparan told them as they felt they could not do otherwise. At about 3:00 in the
morning, Hilario, Efren and the former's men - the same group that abducted them - brought them to their parents'
house. Raymond was shown to his parents while Reynaldo stayed in the Revo because he still could not walk. In the
presence of Hilario and other soldiers, Raymond relayed to his parents what Gen. Palparan told him. As they were
afraid, Raymond's parents acceded. Hilario threatened Raymond's parents that if they continued to join human rights
rallies, they would never see their children again. The respondents were then brought back to Sapang.29
When respondents arrived back in Sapang, Gen. Palparan was about to leave. He was talking with the four "masters"
who were there: Arman, Ganata, Hilario and Cabalse.30 When Gen. Palparan saw Raymond, he called for him. He
was in a big white vehicle. Raymond stood outside the vehicle as Gen. Palparan told him to gain back his strength
and be healthy and to take the medicine he left for him and Reynaldo. He said the medicine was expensive at
Php35.00 each, and would make them strong. He also said that they should prove that they are on the side of the
military and warned that they would not be given another chance.31 During his testimony, Raymond identified Gen.
Palparan by his picture.32
One of the soldiers named Arman made Raymond take the medicine left by Gen. Palparan. The medicine, named
"Alive," was green and yellow. Raymond and Reynaldo were each given a box of this medicine and instructed to take
one capsule a day. Arman checked if they were getting their dose of the medicine. The "Alive" made them sleep each
time they took it, and they felt heavy upon waking up.33
After a few days, Hilario arrived again. He took Reynaldo and left Raymond at Sapang. Arman instructed Raymond
that while in Sapang, he should introduce himself as "Oscar," a military trainee from Sariaya, Quezon, assigned in
Bulacan. While there, he saw again Ganata, one of the men who abducted him from his house, and got acquainted
with other military men and civilians.34
After about three months in Sapang, Raymond was brought to Camp Tecson under the 24th Infantry Battalion. He was
fetched by three unidentified men in a big white vehicle. Efren went with them. Raymond was then blindfolded. After
a 30-minute ride, his blindfold was removed. Chains were put on him and he was kept in the barracks.35
The next day, Raymond's chains were removed and he was ordered to clean outside the barracks. It was then he
learned that he was in a detachment of the Rangers. There were many soldiers, hundreds of them were training. He
was also ordered to clean inside the barracks. In one of the rooms therein, he met Sherlyn Cadapan from Laguna.
She told him that she was a student of the University of the Philippines and was abducted in Hagonoy, Bulacan. She
confided that she had been subjected to severe torture and raped. She was crying and longing to go home and be
with her parents. During the day, her chains were removed and she was made to do the laundry.36
After a week, Reynaldo was also brought to Camp Tecson. Two days from his arrival, two other captives, Karen
Empeño and Manuel Merino, arrived. Karen and Manuel were put in the room with "Allan" whose name they later
came to know as Donald Caigas, called "master" or "commander" by his men in the 24th Infantry Battalion. Raymond
and Reynaldo were put in the adjoining room. At times, Raymond and Reynaldo were threatened, and Reynaldo was
beaten up. In the daytime, their chains were removed, but were put back on at night. They were threatened that if they
escaped, their families would all be killed.37
On or about October 6, 2006, Hilario arrived in Camp Tecson. He told the detainees that they should be thankful they
were still alive and should continue along their "renewed life." Before the hearing of November 6 or 8, 2006,
respondents were brought to their parents to instruct them not to attend the hearing. However, their parents had
already left for Manila. Respondents were brought back to Camp Tecson. They stayed in that camp from September
2006 to November 2006, and Raymond was instructed to continue using the name "Oscar" and holding himself out
as a military trainee. He got acquainted with soldiers of the 24th Infantry Battalion whose names and descriptions he
stated in his affidavit.38
On November 22, 2006, respondents, along with Sherlyn, Karen, and Manuel, were transferred to a camp of the 24th
Infantry Battalion in Limay, Bataan. There were many huts in the camp. They stayed in that camp until May 8, 2007.
Some soldiers of the battalion stayed with them. While there, battalion soldiers whom Raymond knew as "Mar" and
"Billy" beat him up and hit him in the stomach with their guns. Sherlyn and Karen also suffered enormous torture in
the camp. They were all made to clean, cook, and help in raising livestock.39
Raymond recalled that when "Operation Lubog" was launched, Caigas and some other soldiers brought him and
Manuel with them to take and kill all sympathizers of the NPA. They were brought to Barangay Bayan-bayanan,
Bataan where he witnessed the killing of an old man doing kaingin. The soldiers said he was killed because he had a
son who was a member of the NPA and he coddled NPA members in his house.40 Another time, in another "Operation
Lubog," Raymond was brought to Barangay Orion in a house where NPA men stayed. When they arrived, only the
old man of the house who was sick was there. They spared him and killed only his son right before Raymond's eyes.41
From Limay, Raymond, Reynaldo, Sherlyn, Karen, and Manuel were transferred to Zambales, in a safehouse near
the sea. Caigas and some of his men stayed with them. A retired army soldier was in charge of the house. Like in
Limay, the five detainees were made to do errands and chores. They stayed in Zambales from May 8 or 9, 2007 until
June 2007.42
In June 2007, Caigas brought the five back to the camp in Limay. Raymond, Reynaldo, and Manuel were tasked to
bring food to detainees brought to the camp. Raymond narrated what he witnessed and experienced in the camp, viz:

Isang gabi, sinabihan kami ni Donald (Caigas) na matulog na kami. Nakita ko si Donald na inaayos ang kanyang baril,
at nilagyan ng silenser. Sabi ni Donald na kung mayroon man kaming makita o marinig, walang nangyari.
Kinaumagahan, nakita naming ang bangkay ng isa sa mga bihag na dinala sa kampo. Mayroong binuhos sa kanyang
katawan at ito'y sinunog. Masansang ang amoy.

3
Makaraan ang isang lingo, dalawang bangkay and ibinaba ng mga unipormadong sundalo mula sa 6 x 6 na trak at
dinala sa loob ng kampo. May naiwang mga bakas ng dugo habang hinihila nila ang mga bangkay. Naamoy ko iyon
nang nililinis ang bakas.

Makalipas ang isa o dalawang lingo, may dinukot sila na dalawang Ita. Itinali sila sa labas ng kubo, piniringan,
ikinadena at labis na binugbog. Nakita kong nakatakas ang isa sa kanila at binaril siya ng sundalo ngunit hindi siya
tinamaan. Iyong gabi nakita kong pinatay nila iyong isang Ita malapit sa Post 3; sinilaban ang bangkay at ibinaon ito.

Pagkalipas ng halos 1 buwan, 2 pang bangkay ang dinala sa kampo. Ibinaba ang mga bangkay mula sa pick up trak,
dinala ang mga bangkay sa labas ng bakod. Kinaumagahan nakita kong mayroong sinilaban, at napakamasangsang
ang amoy.

May nakilala rin akong 1 retiradong koronel at 1 kasama niya. Pinakain ko sila. Sabi nila sa akin na dinukot sila sa
Bataan. Iyong gabi, inilabas sila at hindi ko na sila nakita.

xxx xxx xxx

Ikinadena kami ng 3 araw. Sa ikatlong araw, nilabas ni Lat si Manuel dahil kakausapin daw siya ni Gen. Palparan.
Nakapiring si Manuel, wala siyang suot pang-itaas, pinosasan. Nilakasan ng mga sundalo ang tunog na galing sa
istiryo ng sasakyan. Di nagtagal, narinig ko ang hiyaw o ungol ni Manuel. Sumilip ako sa isang haligi ng kamalig at
nakita kong sinisilaban si Manuel.

Kinaumagahan, naka-kadena pa kami. Tinanggal ang mga kadena mga 3 o 4 na araw pagkalipas. Sinabi sa amin na
kaya kami nakakadena ay dahil pinagdedesisyunan pa ng mga sundalo kung papatayin kami o hindi.

Tinanggal ang aming kadena. Kinausap kami ni Donald. Tinanong kami kung ano ang sabi ni Manuel sa amin. Sabi
ni Donald huwag na raw naming hanapin ang dalawang babae at si Manuel, dahil magkakasama na yung tatlo. Sabi
pa ni Donald na kami ni Reynaldo ay magbagong buhay at ituloy namin ni Reynaldo ang trabaho. Sa gabi, hindi na
kami kinakadena.43

On or about June 13, 2007, Raymond and Reynaldo were brought to Pangasinan, ostensibly to raise poultry for
Donald (Caigas). Caigas told respondents to also farm his land, in exchange for which, he would take care of the food
of their family. They were also told that they could farm a small plot adjoining his land and sell their produce. They
were no longer put in chains and were instructed to use the names Rommel (for Raymond) and Rod (for Reynaldo)
and represent themselves as cousins from Rizal, Laguna.44
Respondents started to plan their escape. They could see the highway from where they stayed. They helped farm
adjoining lands for which they were paid Php200.00 or Php400.00 and they saved their earnings. When they had
saved Php1,000.00 each, Raymond asked a neighbor how he could get a cellular phone as he wanted to exchange
text messages with a girl who lived nearby. A phone was pawned to him, but he kept it first and did not use it. They
earned some more until they had saved Php1,400.00 between them.
There were four houses in the compound. Raymond and Reynaldo were housed in one of them while their guards
lived in the other three. Caigas entrusted respondents to Nonong, the head of the guards. Respondents' house did
not have electricity. They used a lamp. There was no television, but they had a radio. In the evening of August 13,
2007, Nonong and his cohorts had a drinking session. At about 1:00 a.m., Raymond turned up the volume of the radio.
When none of the guards awoke and took notice, Raymond and Reynaldo proceeded towards the highway, leaving
behind their sleeping guards and barking dogs. They boarded a bus bound for Manila and were thus freed from
captivity.45
Reynaldo also executed an affidavit affirming the contents of Raymond's affidavit insofar as they related to matters
they witnessed together. Reynaldo added that when they were taken from their house on February 14, 2006, he saw
the faces of his abductors before he was blindfolded with his shirt. He also named the soldiers he got acquainted with
in the 18 months he was detained. When Raymond attempted to escape from Fort Magsaysay, Reynaldo was severely
beaten up and told that they were indeed members of the NPA because Raymond escaped. With a .45 caliber pistol,
Reynaldo was hit on the back and punched in the face until he could no longer bear the pain.
At one point during their detention, when Raymond and Reynaldo were in Sapang, Reynaldo was separated from
Raymond and brought to Pinaud by Rizal Hilario. He was kept in the house of Kapitan, a friend of Hilario, in a
mountainous area. He was instructed to use the name "Rodel" and to represent himself as a military trainee from
Meycauayan, Bulacan. Sometimes, Hilario brought along Reynaldo in his trips. One time, he was brought to a market
in San Jose, del Monte, Bulacan and made to wait in the vehicle while Hilario was buying. He was also brought to
Tondo, Manila where Hilario delivered boxes of "Alive" in different houses. In these trips, Hilario drove a black and red
vehicle. Reynaldo was blindfolded while still in Bulacan, but allowed to remove the blindfold once outside the province.
In one of their trips, they passed by Fort Magsaysay and Camp Tecson where Reynaldo saw the sign board, "Welcome
to Camp Tecson."46
Dr. Benito Molino, M.D., corroborated the accounts of respondents Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo. Dr. Molino
specialized in forensic medicine and was connected with the Medical Action Group, an organization handling cases
of human rights violations, particularly cases where torture was involved. He was requested by an NGO to conduct
medical examinations on the respondents after their escape. He first asked them about their ordeal, then proceeded
with the physical examination. His findings showed that the scars borne by respondents were consistent with their
account of physical injuries inflicted upon them. The examination was conducted on August 15, 2007, two days after
respondents' escape, and the results thereof were reduced into writing. Dr. Molino took photographs of the scars. He
testified that he followed the Istanbul Protocol in conducting the examination.47
Petitioners dispute respondents' account of their alleged abduction and torture. In compliance with the October 25,
2007 Resolution of the Court, they filed a Return of the Writ of Amparo admitting the abduction but denying any
involvement therein, viz:

13. Petitioners Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo were not at any time arrested, forcibly abducted, detained, held
incommunicado, disappeared or under the custody by the military. This is a settled issue laid to rest in the habeas
4
corpus case filed in their behalf by petitioners' parents before the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 94431 against
M/Sgt. Rizal Hilario aka Rollie Castillo, as head of the 24 th Infantry Battalion; Maj. Gen. Jovito Palparan, as
Commander of the 7th Infantry Division in Luzon; Lt. Gen. Hermogenes Esperon, in his capacity as the Commanding
General of the Philippine Army, and members of the Citizens Armed Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU), namely:
Michael dela Cruz, Puti dela Cruz, Madning dela Cruz, Pula dela Cruz, Randy Mendoza and Rudy Mendoza. The
respondents therein submitted a return of the writ... On July 4, 2006, the Court of Appeals dropped as party
respondents Lt. Gen. Hermogenes C. Esperon, Jr., then Commanding General of the Philippine Army, and on
September 19, 2006, Maj. (sic) Jovito S. Palparan, then Commanding General, 7th Infantry Division, Philippine Army,
stationed at Fort Magsaysay, Palayan City, Nueva Ecija, upon a finding that no evidence was introduced to establish
their personal involvement in the taking of the Manalo brothers. In a Decision dated June 27, 2007..., it exonerated
M/Sgt. Rizal Hilario aka Rollie Castillo for lack of evidence establishing his involvement in any capacity in the
disappearance of the Manalo brothers, although it held that the remaining respondents were illegally detaining the
Manalo brothers and ordered them to release the latter.48

Attached to the Return of the Writ was the affidavit of therein respondent (herein petitioner) Secretary of National
Defense, which attested that he assumed office only on August 8, 2007 and was thus unaware of the Manalo brothers'
alleged abduction. He also claimed that:

7. The Secretary of National Defense does not engage in actual military directional operations, neither does he
undertake command directions of the AFP units in the field, nor in any way micromanage the AFP operations. The
principal responsibility of the Secretary of National Defense is focused in providing strategic policy direction to the
Department (bureaus and agencies) including the Armed Forces of the Philippines;

8. In connection with the Writ of Amparo issued by the Honorable Supreme Court in this case, I have directed the
Chief of Staff, AFP to institute immediate action in compliance with Section 9(d) of the Amparo Rule and to submit
report of such compliance... Likewise, in a Memorandum Directive also dated October 31, 2007, I have issued a policy
directive addressed to the Chief of Staff, AFP that the AFP should adopt the following rules of action in the event the
Writ of Amparo is issued by a competent court against any members of the AFP:

(1) to verify the identity of the aggrieved party;

(2) to recover and preserve evidence related to the death or disappearance of the person identified in the petition
which may aid in the prosecution of the person or persons responsible;

(3) to identify witnesses and obtain statements from them concerning the death or disappearance;

(4) to determine the cause, manner, location and time of death or disappearance as well as any pattern or practice
that may have brought about the death or disappearance;

(5) to identify and apprehend the person or persons involved in the death or disappearance; and

(6) to bring the suspected offenders before a competent court.49

Therein respondent AFP Chief of Staff also submitted his own affidavit, attached to the Return of the Writ, attesting
that he received the above directive of therein respondent Secretary of National Defense and that acting on this
directive, he did the following:

3.1. As currently designated Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), I have caused to be issued directive
to the units of the AFP for the purpose of establishing the circumstances of the alleged disappearance and the recent
reappearance of the petitioners.

3.2. I have caused the immediate investigation and submission of the result thereof to Higher headquarters and/or
direct the immediate conduct of the investigation on the matter by the concerned unit/s, dispatching Radio Message
on November 05, 2007, addressed to the Commanding General, Philippine Army (Info: COMNOLCOM, CG, 71D PA
and CO 24 IB PA). A Copy of the Radio Message is attached as ANNEX "3" of this Affidavit.

3.3. We undertake to provide result of the investigations conducted or to be conducted by the concerned unit relative
to the circumstances of the alleged disappearance of the persons in whose favor the Writ of Amparo has been sought
for as soon as the same has been furnished Higher headquarters.

3.4. A parallel investigation has been directed to the same units relative to another Petition for the Writ of Amparo
(G.R. No. 179994) filed at the instance of relatives of a certain Cadapan and Empeño pending before the Supreme
Court.

3.5. On the part of the Armed Forces, this respondent will exert earnest efforts to establish the surrounding
circumstances of the disappearances of the petitioners and to bring those responsible, including any military personnel
if shown to have participated or had complicity in the commission of the complained acts, to the bar of justice, when
warranted by the findings and the competent evidence that may be gathered in the process.50

Also attached to the Return of the Writ was the affidavit of Lt. Col. Felipe Anontado, INF (GSC) PA, earlier filed in
G.R. No. 179994, another Amparo case in this Court, involving Cadapan, Empeño and Merino, which averred among
others, viz:

10) Upon reading the allegations in the Petition implicating the 24th Infantry Batallion detachment as detention area, I
immediately went to the 24th IB detachment in Limay, Bataan and found no untoward incidents in the area nor any
detainees by the name of Sherlyn Cadapan, Karen Empeño and Manuel Merino being held captive;

5
11) There was neither any reports of any death of Manuel Merino in the 24th IB in Limay, Bataan;

12) After going to the 24th IB in Limay, Bataan, we made further inquiries with the Philippine National Police, Limay,
Bataan regarding the alleged detentions or deaths and were informed that none was reported to their good office;

13) I also directed Company Commander 1st Lt. Romeo Publico to inquire into the alleged beachhouse in Iba,
Zambales also alleged to be a detention place where Sherlyn Cadapan, Karen Empeño and Manuel Merino were
detained. As per the inquiry, however, no such beachhouse was used as a detention place found to have been used
by armed men to detain Cadapan, Empeño and Merino.51

It was explained in the Return of the Writ that for lack of sufficient time, the affidavits of Maj. Gen Jovito S. Palparan
(Ret.), M/Sgt. Rizal Hilario aka Rollie Castillo, and other persons implicated by therein petitioners could not be secured
in time for the submission of the Return and would be subsequently submitted.52
Herein petitioners presented a lone witness in the summary hearings, Lt. Col. Ruben U. Jimenez, Provost Marshall,
7th Infantry Division, Philippine Army, based in Fort Magsaysay, Palayan City, Nueva Ecija. The territorial jurisdiction
of this Division covers Nueva Ecija, Aurora, Bataan, Bulacan, Pampanga, Tarlac and a portion of Pangasinan. 53 The
24th Infantry Battalion is part of the 7th Infantry Division.54
On May 26, 2006, Lt. Col. Jimenez was directed by the Commanding General of the 7 th Infantry Division, Maj. Gen.
Jovito Palaran,55 through his Assistant Chief of Staff,56 to investigate the alleged abduction of the respondents by
CAFGU auxiliaries under his unit, namely: CAA Michael de la Cruz; CAA Roman de la Cruz, aka Puti; CAA Maximo
de la Cruz, aka Pula; CAA Randy Mendoza; ex-CAA Marcelo de la Cruz aka Madning; and a civilian named Rudy
Mendoza. He was directed to determine: (1) the veracity of the abduction of Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo by the
alleged elements of the CAFGU auxiliaries; and (2) the administrative liability of said auxiliaries, if any. 57 Jimenez
testified that this particular investigation was initiated not by a complaint as was the usual procedure, but because the
Commanding General saw news about the abduction of the Manalo brothers on the television, and he was concerned
about what was happening within his territorial jurisdiction.58
Jimenez summoned all six implicated persons for the purpose of having them execute sworn statements and
conducting an investigation on May 29, 2006.59 The investigation started at 8:00 in the morning and finished at 10:00
in the evening.60 The investigating officer, Technical Sgt. Eduardo Lingad, took the individual sworn statements of all
six persons on that day. There were no other sworn statements taken, not even of the Manalo family, nor were there
other witnesses summoned and investigated61 as according to Jimenez, the directive to him was only to investigate
the six persons.62
Jimenez was beside Lingad when the latter took the statements.63 The six persons were not known to Jimenez as it
was in fact his first time to meet them.64 During the entire time that he was beside Lingad, a subordinate of his in the
Office of the Provost Marshall, Jimenez did not propound a single question to the six persons.65
Jimenez testified that all six statements were taken on May 29, 2006, but Marcelo Mendoza and Rudy Mendoza had
to come back the next day to sign their statements as the printing of their statements was interrupted by a power
failure. Jimenez testified that the two signed on May 30, 2006, but the jurats of their statements indicated that they
were signed on May 29, 2006.66 When the Sworn Statements were turned over to Jimenez, he personally wrote his
investigation report. He began writing it in the afternoon of May 30, 2006 and finished it on June 1, 2006. 67 He then
gave his report to the Office of the Chief of Personnel.68
As petitioners largely rely on Jimenez's Investigation Report dated June 1, 2006 for their evidence, the report is herein
substantially quoted:

III. BACKGROUND OF THE CASE

4. This pertains to the abduction of RAYMOND MANALO and REYNALDO MANALO who were forcibly taken from
their respective homes in Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan on 14 February 2006 by unidentified armed
men and thereafter were forcibly disappeared. After the said incident, relatives of the victims filed a case for Abduction
in the civil court against the herein suspects: Michael dela Cruz, Madning dela Cruz, Puti Dela Cruz, Pula Dela Cruz,
Randy Mendoza and Rudy Mendoza as alleged members of the Citizen Armed Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU).

a) Sworn statement of CAA Maximo F. dela Cruz, aka Pula dated 29 May 2006 in (Exhibit "B") states that he was at
Sitio Mozon, Brgy. Bohol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan doing the concrete building of a church located nearby
his residence, together with some neighbor thereat. He claims that on 15 February 2006, he was being informed by
Brgy. Kagawad Pablo Umayan about the abduction of the brothers Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo. As to the
allegation that he was one of the suspects, he claims that they only implicated him because he was a CAFGU and
that they claimed that those who abducted the Manalo brothers are members of the Military and CAFGU. Subject
vehemently denied any participation or involvement on the abduction of said victims.

b) Sworn statement of CAA Roman dela Cruz y Faustino Aka Puti dtd 29 May 2006 in (Exhibit "C") states that he is a
resident of Sitio Muzon, Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan and a CAA member based at Biak na Bato
Detachment, San Miguel, Bulacan. He claims that Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo being his neighbors are active
members/sympathizers of the CPP/NPA and he also knows their elder Rolando Manalo @ KA BESTRE of being an
NPA Leader operating in their province. That at the time of the alleged abduction of the two (2) brothers and for
accusing him to be one of the suspects, he claims that on February 14, 2006, he was one of those working at the
concrete chapel being constructed nearby his residence. He claims further that he just came only to know about the
incident on other day (15 Feb 06) when he was being informed by Kagawad Pablo Kunanan. That subject CAA
vehemently denied any participation about the incident and claimed that they only implicated him because he is a
member of the CAFGU.

c) Sworn Statement of CAA Randy Mendoza y Lingas dated 29 May 2006 in (Exhibit "O") states that he is a resident
of Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan and a member of CAFGU based at Biak na Bato Detachment.
That being a neighbor, he was very much aware about the background of the two (2) brothers Raymond and Reynaldo
as active supporters of the CPP NPA in their Brgy. and he also knew their elder brother "KUMANDER BESTRE" TN:
Rolando Manalo. Being one of the accused, he claims that on 14 February 2006, he was at Brgy. Magmarate, San
6
Miguel, Bulacan in the house of his aunt and he learned only about the incident when he arrived home in their place.
He claims further that the only reason why they implicated him was due to the fact that his mother has filed a criminal
charge against their brother Rolando Manalo @ KA BESTRE who is an NPA Commander who killed his father and
for that reason they implicated him in support of their brother. Subject CAA vehemently denied any involvement on
the abduction of said Manalo brothers.

d) Sworn Statement of Rudy Mendoza y Lingasa dated May 29, 2006 in (Exhibit "E") states that he is a resident of
Brgy. Marungko, Angat, Bulacan. He claims that Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo are familiar to him being his
barriomate when he was still unmarried and he knew them since childhood. Being one of the accused, he claims that
on 14 February 2006, he was at his residence in Brgy. Marungko, Angat, Bulacan. He claims that he was being
informed only about the incident lately and he was not aware of any reason why the two (2) brothers were being
abducted by alleged members of the military and CAFGU. The only reason he knows why they implicated him was
because there are those people who are angry with their family particularly victims of summary execution (killing)
done by their brother @ KA Bestre Rolando Manalo who is an NPA leader. He claims further that it was their brother
@ KA BESTRE who killed his father and he was living witness to that incident. Subject civilian vehemently denied any
involvement on the abduction of the Manalo brothers.

e) Sworn statement of Ex-CAA Marcelo dala Cruz dated 29 May 2006 in (Exhibit "F") states that he is a resident of
Sitio Muzon, Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan, a farmer and a former CAA based at Biak na Bato, San
Miguel, Bulacan. He claims that Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo are familiar to him being their barrio mate. He claims
further that they are active supporters of CPP/NPA and that their brother Rolando Manalo @ KA BESTRE is an NPA
leader. Being one of the accused, he claims that on 14 February 2006, he was in his residence at Sitio Muzon, Brgy.
Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan. That he vehemently denied any participation of the alleged abduction of
the two (2) brothers and learned only about the incident when rumors reached him by his barrio mates. He claims that
his implication is merely fabricated because of his relationship to Roman and Maximo who are his brothers.

f) Sworn statement of Michael dela Cruz y Faustino dated 29 May 2006 in (Exhibit "G") states that he is a resident of
Sitio Muzon, Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan, the Chief of Brgy. Tanod and a CAFGU member based
at Biak na Bato Detachment, San Miguel, Bulacan. He claims that he knew very well the brothers Raymond and
Reynaldo Manalo in their barangay for having been the Tanod Chief for twenty (20) years. He alleged further that they
are active supporters or sympathizers of the CPP/NPA and whose elder brother Rolando Manalo @ KA BESTRE is
an NPA leader operating within the area. Being one of the accused, he claims that on 14 Feb 2006 he was helping in
the construction of their concrete chapel in their place and he learned only about the incident which is the abduction
of Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo when one of the Brgy. Kagawad in the person of Pablo Cunanan informed him
about the matter. He claims further that he is truly innocent of the allegation against him as being one of the abductors
and he considers everything fabricated in order to destroy his name that remains loyal to his service to the government
as a CAA member.

IV. DISCUSSION

5. Based on the foregoing statements of respondents in this particular case, the proof of linking them to the alleged
abduction and disappearance of Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo that transpired on 14 February 2006 at Sitio Muzon,
Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan, is unsubstantiated. Their alleged involvement theretofore to that
incident is considered doubtful, hence, no basis to indict them as charged in this investigation.

Though there are previous grudges between each families (sic) in the past to quote: the killing of the father of Randy
and Rudy Mendoza by @ KA BESTRE TN: Rolando Manalo, this will not suffice to establish a fact that they were the
ones who did the abduction as a form of revenge. As it was also stated in the testimony of other accused claiming
that the Manalos are active sympathizers/supporters of the CPP/NPA, this would not also mean, however, that in the
first place, they were in connivance with the abductors. Being their neighbors and as members of CAFGU's, they
ought to be vigilant in protecting their village from any intervention by the leftist group, hence inside their village, they
were fully aware of the activities of Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo in so far as their connection with the CPP/NPA is
concerned.

V. CONCLUSION

6. Premises considered surrounding this case shows that the alleged charges of abduction committed by the above
named respondents has not been established in this investigation. Hence, it lacks merit to indict them for any
administrative punishment and/or criminal liability. It is therefore concluded that they are innocent of the charge.

VI. RECOMMENDATIONS

7. That CAAs Michael F. dela Cruz, Maximo F. Dela Cruz, Roman dela Cruz, Randy Mendoza, and two (2) civilians
Maximo F. Dela Cruz and Rudy L. Mendoza be exonerated from the case.

8. Upon approval, this case can be dropped and closed.69

In this appeal under Rule 45, petitioners question the appellate court's assessment of the foregoing evidence and
assail the December 26, 2007 Decision on the following grounds, viz:

I.

THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY AND GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN BELIEVING AND GIVING FULL FAITH
AND CREDIT TO THE INCREDIBLE, UNCORROBORATED, CONTRADICTED, AND OBVIOUSLY SCRIPTED,
REHEARSED AND SELF-SERVING AFFIDAVIT/TESTIMONY OF HEREIN RESPONDENT RAYMOND MANALO.

7
 II.

THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY AND GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN REQUIRING RESPONDENTS (HEREIN
PETITIONERS) TO: (A) FURNISH TO THE MANALO BROTHER(S) AND TO THE COURT OF APPEALS ALL
OFFICIAL AND UNOFFICIAL REPORTS OF THE INVESTIGATION UNDERTAKEN IN CONNECTION WITH THEIR
CASE, EXCEPT THOSE ALREADY IN FILE WITH THE COURT; (B) CONFIRM IN WRITING THE PRESENT
PLACES OF OFFICIAL ASSIGNMENT OF M/SGT. HILARIO aka ROLLIE CASTILLO AND DONALD CAIGAS; AND
(C) CAUSE TO BE PRODUCED TO THE COURT OF APPEALS ALL MEDICAL REPORTS, RECORDS AND
CHARTS, AND REPORTS OF ANY TREATMENT GIVEN OR RECOMMENDED AND MEDICINES PRESCRIBED,
IF ANY, TO THE MANALO BROTHERS, TO INCLUDE A LIST OF MEDICAL PERSONNEL (MILITARY AND
CIVILIAN) WHO ATTENDED TO THEM FROM FEBRUARY 14, 2006 UNTIL AUGUST 12, 2007.70

The case at bar is the first decision on the application of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo (Amparo Rule). Let us hearken
to its beginning.
The adoption of the Amparo Rule surfaced as a recurring proposition in the recommendations that resulted from a
two-day National Consultative Summit on Extrajudicial Killings and Enforced Disappearances sponsored by the Court
on July 16-17, 2007. The Summit was "envisioned to provide a broad and fact-based perspective on the issue of
extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances,"71 hence "representatives from all sides of the political and social
spectrum, as well as all the stakeholders in the justice system"72 participated in mapping out ways to resolve the crisis.
On October 24, 2007, the Court promulgated the Amparo Rule "in light of the prevalence of extralegal killing and
enforced disappearances."73 It was an exercise for the first time of the Court's expanded power to promulgate rules to
protect our people's constitutional rights, which made its maiden appearance in the 1987 Constitution in response to
the Filipino experience of the martial law regime.74 As the Amparo Rule was intended to address the intractable
problem of "extralegal killings" and "enforced disappearances," its coverage, in its present form, is confined to these
two instances or to threats thereof. "Extralegal killings" are "killings committed without due process of law, i.e., without
legal safeguards or judicial proceedings."75 On the other hand, "enforced disappearances" are "attended by the
following characteristics: an arrest, detention or abduction of a person by a government official or organized groups
or private individuals acting with the direct or indirect acquiescence of the government; the refusal of the State to
disclose the fate or whereabouts of the person concerned or a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty which
places such persons outside the protection of law."76
The writ of Amparo originated in Mexico. "Amparo" literally means "protection" in Spanish.77 In 1837, de Tocqueville's
Democracy in America became available in Mexico and stirred great interest. Its description of the practice of judicial
review in the U.S. appealed to many Mexican jurists.78 One of them, Manuel Crescencio Rejón, drafted a constitutional
provision for his native state, Yucatan,79 which granted judges the power to protect all persons in the enjoyment of
their constitutional and legal rights. This idea was incorporated into the national constitution in 1847, viz:

The federal courts shall protect any inhabitant of the Republic in the exercise and preservation of those rights granted
to him by this Constitution and by laws enacted pursuant hereto, against attacks by the Legislative and Executive
powers of the federal or state governments, limiting themselves to granting protection in the specific case in litigation,
making no general declaration concerning the statute or regulation that motivated the violation.80

Since then, the protection has been an important part of Mexican constitutionalism.81 If, after hearing, the judge
determines that a constitutional right of the petitioner is being violated, he orders the official, or the official's superiors,
to cease the violation and to take the necessary measures to restore the petitioner to the full enjoyment of the right in
question. Amparo thus combines the principles of judicial review derived from the U.S. with the limitations on judicial
power characteristic of the civil law tradition which prevails in Mexico. It enables courts to enforce the constitution by
protecting individual rights in particular cases, but prevents them from using this power to make law for the entire
nation.82
The writ of Amparo then spread throughout the Western Hemisphere, gradually evolving into various forms, in
response to the particular needs of each country.83 It became, in the words of a justice of the Mexican Federal Supreme
Court, one piece of Mexico's self-attributed "task of conveying to the world's legal heritage that institution which, as a
shield of human dignity, her own painful history conceived."84 What began as a protection against acts or omissions
of public authorities in violation of constitutional rights later evolved for several purposes: (1) Amparo libertad for the
protection of personal freedom, equivalent to the habeas corpus writ; (2) Amparo contra leyes for the judicial review
of the constitutionality of statutes; (3) Amparo casacion for the judicial review of the constitutionality and legality of a
judicial decision; (4) Amparo administrativo for the judicial review of administrative actions; and (5) Amparo agrario
for the protection of peasants' rights derived from the agrarian reform process.85
In Latin American countries, except Cuba, the writ of Amparo has been constitutionally adopted to protect against
human rights abuses especially committed in countries under military juntas. In general, these countries adopted an
all-encompassing writ to protect the whole gamut of constitutional rights, including socio-economic rights.86 Other
countries like Colombia, Chile, Germany and Spain, however, have chosen to limit the protection of the writ of Amparo
only to some constitutional guarantees or fundamental rights.87
In the Philippines, while the 1987 Constitution does not explicitly provide for the writ of Amparo, several of the above
Amparo protections are guaranteed by our charter. The second paragraph of Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987
Constitution, the Grave Abuse Clause, provides for the judicial power "to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of
the Government." The Clause accords a similar general protection to human rights extended by the Amparo contra
leyes, Amparo casacion, and Amparo administrativo. Amparo libertad is comparable to the remedy of habeas corpus
found in several provisions of the 1987 Constitution.88 The Clause is an offspring of the U.S. common law tradition of
judicial review, which finds its roots in the 1803 case of Marbury v. Madison.89
While constitutional rights can be protected under the Grave Abuse Clause through remedies of injunction or
prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court and a petition for habeas corpus under Rule 102,90 these remedies
may not be adequate to address the pestering problem of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances. However,
with the swiftness required to resolve a petition for a writ of Amparo through summary proceedings and the availability
of appropriate interim and permanent reliefs under the Amparo Rule, this hybrid writ of the common law and civil law
8
traditions - borne out of the Latin American and Philippine experience of human rights abuses - offers a better remedy
to extralegal killings and enforced disappearances and threats thereof. The remedy provides rapid judicial relief as it
partakes of a summary proceeding that requires only substantial evidence to make the appropriate reliefs available to
the petitioner; it is not an action to determine criminal guilt requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt, or liability for
damages requiring preponderance of evidence, or administrative responsibility requiring substantial evidence that will
require full and exhaustive proceedings.91
The writ of Amparo serves both preventive and curative roles in addressing the problem of extralegal killings and
enforced disappearances. It is preventive in that it breaks the expectation of impunity in the commission of these
offenses; it is curative in that it facilitates the subsequent punishment of perpetrators as it will inevitably yield leads to
subsequent investigation and action. In the long run, the goal of both the preventive and curative roles is to deter the
further commission of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances.
In the case at bar, respondents initially filed an action for "Prohibition, Injunction, and Temporary Restraining Order"92
to stop petitioners and/or their officers and agents from depriving the respondents of their right to liberty and other
basic rights on August 23, 2007,93 prior to the promulgation of the Amparo Rule. They also sought ancillary remedies
including Protective Custody Orders, Appointment of Commissioner, Inspection and Access Orders and other legal
and equitable remedies under Article VIII, Section 5(5) of the 1987 Constitution and Rule 135, Section 6 of the Rules
of Court. When the Amparo Rule came into effect on October 24, 2007, they moved to have their petition treated as
an Amparo petition as it would be more effective and suitable to the circumstances of the Manalo brothers' enforced
disappearance. The Court granted their motion.
With this backdrop, we now come to the arguments of the petitioner. Petitioners' first argument in disputing the
Decision of the Court of Appeals states, viz:

The Court of Appeals seriously and grievously erred in believing and giving full faith and credit to the incredible
uncorroborated, contradicted, and obviously scripted, rehearsed and self-serving affidavit/testimony of herein
respondent Raymond Manalo.94

In delving into the veracity of the evidence, we need to mine and refine the ore of petitioners' cause of action, to
determine whether the evidence presented is metal-strong to satisfy the degree of proof required.
Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides for the following causes of action, viz:

Section 1. Petition. - The petition for a writ of Amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty
and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee,
or of a private individual or entity.

The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof. (emphasis supplied)

Sections 17 and 18, on the other hand, provide for the degree of proof required, viz:

Sec. 17. Burden of Proof and Standard of Diligence Required. - The parties shall establish their claims by substantial
evidence.

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 18. Judgment. - ... If the allegations in the petition are proven by substantial evidence, the court shall grant
the privilege of the writ and such reliefs as may be proper and appropriate; otherwise, the privilege shall be denied.
(emphases supplied)

Substantial evidence has been defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion.95
After careful perusal of the evidence presented, we affirm the findings of the Court of Appeals that respondents were
abducted from their houses in Sito Muzon, Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan on February 14, 2006 and
were continuously detained until they escaped on August 13, 2007. The abduction, detention, torture, and escape of
the respondents were narrated by respondent Raymond Manalo in a clear and convincing manner. His account is
dotted with countless candid details of respondents' harrowing experience and tenacious will to escape, captured
through his different senses and etched in his memory. A few examples are the following: "Sumilip ako sa isang haligi
ng kamalig at nakita kong sinisilaban si Manuel."96 "(N)ilakasan ng mga sundalo ang tunog na galing sa istiryo ng
sasakyan. Di nagtagal, narinig ko ang hiyaw o ungol ni Manuel."97 "May naiwang mga bakas ng dugo habang hinihila
nila ang mga bangkay. Naamoy ko iyon nang nililinis ang bakas."98 "Tumigil ako sa may palaisdaan kung saan ginamit
ko ang bato para tanggalin ang mga kadena."99 "Tinanong ko sa isang kapit-bahay kung paano ako makakakuha ng
cell phone; sabi ko gusto kong i-text ang isang babae na nakatira sa malapit na lugar."100
We affirm the factual findings of the appellate court, largely based on respondent Raymond Manalo's affidavit and
testimony, viz:

...the abduction was perpetrated by armed men who were sufficiently identified by the petitioners (herein respondents)
to be military personnel and CAFGU auxiliaries. Raymond recalled that the six armed men who barged into his house
through the rear door were military men based on their attire of fatigue pants and army boots, and the CAFGU
auxiliaries, namely: Michael de la Cruz, Madning de la Cruz, Puti de la Cruz and Pula de la Cruz, all members of the
CAFGU and residents of Muzon, San Ildefonso, Bulacan, and the brothers Randy Mendoza and Rudy Mendoza, also
CAFGU members, served as lookouts during the abduction. Raymond was sure that three of the six military men were
Ganata, who headed the abducting team, Hilario, who drove the van, and George. Subsequent incidents of their long
captivity, as narrated by the petitioners, validated their assertion of the participation of the elements of the 7th Infantry
Division, Philippine Army, and their CAFGU auxiliaries.

We are convinced, too, that the reason for the abduction was the suspicion that the petitioners were either members
or sympathizers of the NPA, considering that the abductors were looking for Ka Bestre, who turned out to be Rolando,
the brother of petitioners.
9
The efforts exerted by the Military Command to look into the abduction were, at best, merely superficial. The
investigation of the Provost Marshall of the 7th Infantry Division focused on the one-sided version of the CAFGU
auxiliaries involved. This one-sidedness might be due to the fact that the Provost Marshall could delve only into the
participation of military personnel, but even then the Provost Marshall should have refrained from outrightly
exculpating the CAFGU auxiliaries he perfunctorily investigated...

Gen. Palparan's participation in the abduction was also established. At the very least, he was aware of the petitioners'
captivity at the hands of men in uniform assigned to his command. In fact, he or any other officer tendered no
controversion to the firm claim of Raymond that he (Gen. Palparan) met them in person in a safehouse in Bulacan
and told them what he wanted them and their parents to do or not to be doing. Gen. Palparan's direct and personal
role in the abduction might not have been shown but his knowledge of the dire situation of the petitioners during their
long captivity at the hands of military personnel under his command bespoke of his indubitable command policy that
unavoidably encouraged and not merely tolerated the abduction of civilians without due process of law and without
probable cause.

In the habeas proceedings, the Court, through the Former Special Sixth Division (Justices Buzon, chairman; Santiago-
Lagman, Sr., member; and Romilla-Lontok, Jr., member/ponente.) found no clear and convincing evidence to
establish that M/Sgt. Rizal Hilario had anything to do with the abduction or the detention. Hilario's involvement could
not, indeed, be then established after Evangeline Francisco, who allegedly saw Hilario drive the van in which the
petitioners were boarded and ferried following the abduction, did not testify. (See the decision of the habeas
proceedings at rollo, p. 52)

However, in this case, Raymond attested that Hilario drove the white L-300 van in which the petitioners were brought
away from their houses on February 14, 2006. Raymond also attested that Hilario participated in subsequent incidents
during the captivity of the petitioners, one of which was when Hilario fetched them from Fort Magsaysay on board a
Revo and conveyed them to a detachment in Pinaud, San Ildefonso, Bulacan where they were detained for at least a
week in a house of strong materials (Exhibit D, rollo, p. 205) and then Hilario (along with Efren) brought them to
Sapang, San Miguel, Bulacan on board the Revo, to an unfinished house inside the compound of Kapitan where they
were kept for more or less three months. (Exhibit D, rollo, p. 205) It was there where the petitioners came face to face
with Gen. Palparan. Hilario and Efren also brought the petitioners one early morning to the house of the petitioners'
parents, where only Raymond was presented to the parents to relay the message from Gen. Palparan not to join
anymore rallies. On that occasion, Hilario warned the parents that they would not again see their sons should they
join any rallies to denounce human rights violations. (Exhibit D, rollo, pp. 205-206) Hilario was also among four Master
Sergeants (the others being Arman, Ganata and Cabalse) with whom Gen. Palparan conversed on the occasion when
Gen. Palparan required Raymond to take the medicines for his health. (Exhibit D, rollo, p. 206) There were other
occasions when the petitioners saw that Hilario had a direct hand in their torture.

It is clear, therefore, that the participation of Hilario in the abduction and forced disappearance of the petitioners was
established. The participation of other military personnel like Arman, Ganata, Cabalse and Caigas, among others,
was similarly established.

xxx xxx xxx

As to the CAFGU auxiliaries, the habeas Court found them personally involved in the abduction. We also do, for,
indeed, the evidence of their participation is overwhelming.101

We reject the claim of petitioners that respondent Raymond Manalo's statements were not corroborated by other
independent and credible pieces of evidence.102 Raymond's affidavit and testimony were corroborated by the affidavit
of respondent Reynaldo Manalo. The testimony and medical reports prepared by forensic specialist Dr. Molino, and
the pictures of the scars left by the physical injuries inflicted on respondents,103 also corroborate respondents' accounts
of the torture they endured while in detention. Respondent Raymond Manalo's familiarity with the facilities in Fort
Magsaysay such as the "DTU," as shown in his testimony and confirmed by Lt. Col. Jimenez to be the "Division
Training Unit,"104 firms up respondents' story that they were detained for some time in said military facility.
In Ortiz v. Guatemala,105 a case decided by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, the Commission
considered similar evidence, among others, in finding that complainant Sister Diana Ortiz was abducted and tortured
by agents of the Guatemalan government. In this case, Sister Ortiz was kidnapped and tortured in early November
1989. The Commission's findings of fact were mostly based on the consistent and credible statements, written and
oral, made by Sister Ortiz regarding her ordeal.106 These statements were supported by her recognition of portions of
the route they took when she was being driven out of the military installation where she was detained.107 She was also
examined by a medical doctor whose findings showed that the 111 circular second degree burns on her back and
abrasions on her cheek coincided with her account of cigarette burning and torture she suffered while in detention.108
With the secret nature of an enforced disappearance and the torture perpetrated on the victim during detention, it
logically holds that much of the information and evidence of the ordeal will come from the victims themselves, and the
veracity of their account will depend on their credibility and candidness in their written and/or oral statements. Their
statements can be corroborated by other evidence such as physical evidence left by the torture they suffered or
landmarks they can identify in the places where they were detained. Where powerful military officers are implicated,
the hesitation of witnesses to surface and testify against them comes as no surprise.
We now come to the right of the respondents to the privilege of the writ of Amparo. There is no quarrel that the
enforced disappearance of both respondents Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo has now passed as they have escaped
from captivity and surfaced. But while respondents admit that they are no longer in detention and are physically free,
they assert that they are not "free in every sense of the word"109 as their "movements continue to be restricted for fear
that people they have named in their Judicial Affidavits and testified against (in the case of Raymond) are still at large
and have not been held accountable in any way. These people are directly connected to the Armed Forces of the
Philippines and are, thus, in a position to threaten respondents' rights to life, liberty and security."110 (emphasis

10
supplied) Respondents claim that they are under threat of being once again abducted, kept captive or even killed,
which constitute a direct violation of their right to security of person.111
Elaborating on the "right to security, in general," respondents point out that this right is "often associated with
liberty;" it is also seen as an "expansion of rights based on the prohibition against torture and cruel and unusual
punishment." Conceding that there is no right to security expressly mentioned in Article III of the 1987 Constitution,
they submit that their rights "to be kept free from torture and from incommunicado detention and solitary detention
places112 fall under the general coverage of the right to security of person under the writ of Amparo." They submit that
the Court ought to give an expansive recognition of the right to security of person in view of the State Policy under
Article II of the 1987 Constitution which enunciates that, "The State values the dignity of every human person and
guarantees full respect for human rights." Finally, to justify a liberal interpretation of the right to security of person,
respondents cite the teaching in Moncupa v. Enrile113 that "the right to liberty may be made more meaningful only if
there is no undue restraint by the State on the exercise of that liberty"114 such as a requirement to "report under
unreasonable restrictions that amounted to a deprivation of liberty"115 or being put under "monitoring and
surveillance."116
In sum, respondents assert that their cause of action consists in the threat to their right to life and liberty, and a
violation of their right to security.
Let us put this right to security under the lens to determine if it has indeed been violated as respondents
assert. The right to security or the right to security of person finds a textual hook in Article III, Section 2 of the
1987 Constitution which provides, viz:

Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant
of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge...

At the core of this guarantee is the immunity of one's person, including the extensions of his/her person - houses,
papers, and effects - against government intrusion. Section 2 not only limits the state's power over a person's home
and possessions, but more importantly, protects the privacy and sanctity of the person himself.117 The purpose of this
provision was enunciated by the Court in People v. CFI of Rizal, Branch IX, Quezon City, viz: 118

The purpose of the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures is to prevent violations of
private security in person and property and unlawful invasion of the security of the home by officers of the law acting
under legislative or judicial sanction and to give remedy against such usurpation when attempted. (Adams v. New
York, 192 U.S. 858; Alvero v. Dizon, 76 Phil. 637 [1946]). The right to privacy is an essential condition to the dignity
and happiness and to the peace and security of every individual, whether it be of home or of persons and
correspondence. (Tañada and Carreon, Political Law of the Philippines, Vol. 2, 139 [1962]). The constitutional
inviolability of this great fundamental right against unreasonable searches and seizures must be deemed absolute as
nothing is closer to a man's soul than the serenity of his privacy and the assurance of his personal security.
Any interference allowable can only be for the best causes and reasons.119 (emphases supplied)

While the right to life under Article III, Section 1120 guarantees essentially the right to be alive121 - upon which the
enjoyment of all other rights is preconditioned - the right to security of person is a guarantee of the secure quality of
this life, viz: "The life to which each person has a right is not a life lived in fear that his person and property may be
unreasonably violated by a powerful ruler. Rather, it is a life lived with the assurance that the government he
established and consented to, will protect the security of his person and property. The ideal of security in life and
property... pervades the whole history of man. It touches every aspect of man's existence."122 In a broad sense, the
right to security of person "emanates in a person's legal and uninterrupted enjoyment of his life, his limbs, his body,
his health, and his reputation. It includes the right to exist, and the right to enjoyment of life while existing, and it is
invaded not only by a deprivation of life but also of those things which are necessary to the enjoyment of life according
to the nature, temperament, and lawful desires of the individual."123
A closer look at the right to security of person would yield various permutations of the exercise of this right.
First, the right to security of person is "freedom from fear." In its "whereas" clauses, the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights (UDHR) enunciates that "a world in which human beings shall enjoy freedom of speech and belief
and freedom from fear and want has been proclaimed as the highest aspiration of the common people." (emphasis
supplied) Some scholars postulate that "freedom from fear" is not only an aspirational principle, but essentially an
individual international human right.124 It is the "right to security of person" as the word "security" itself means "freedom
from fear."125 Article 3 of the UDHR provides, viz:

Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person.126 (emphasis supplied)

In furtherance of this right declared in the UDHR, Article 9(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR) also provides for the right to security of person, viz:

1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention.
No one shall be deprived of his liberty except on such grounds and in accordance with such procedure as are
established by law. (emphasis supplied)

The Philippines is a signatory to both the UDHR and the ICCPR.

In the context of Section 1 of the Amparo Rule, "freedom from fear" is the right and any threat to the rights to life,
liberty or security is the actionable wrong. Fear is a state of mind, a reaction; threat is a stimulus, a cause of
action. Fear caused by the same stimulus can range from being baseless to well-founded as people react differently.
The degree of fear can vary from one person to another with the variation of the prolificacy of their imagination,
strength of character or past experience with the stimulus. Thus, in the Amparo context, it is more correct to say that
the "right to security" is actually the "freedom from threat." Viewed in this light, the "threatened with violation" Clause
in the latter part of Section 1 of the Amparo Rule is a form of violation of the right to security mentioned in the earlier
part of the provision.127

11
Second, the right to security of person is a guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity or security. Article
III, Section II of the 1987 Constitution guarantees that, as a general rule, one's body cannot be searched or invaded
without a search warrant.128 Physical injuries inflicted in the context of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances
constitute more than a search or invasion of the body. It may constitute dismemberment, physical disabilities, and
painful physical intrusion. As the degree of physical injury increases, the danger to life itself escalates. Notably, in
criminal law, physical injuries constitute a crime against persons because they are an affront to the bodily integrity or
security of a person.129
Physical torture, force, and violence are a severe invasion of bodily integrity. When employed to vitiate the free will
such as to force the victim to admit, reveal or fabricate incriminating information, it constitutes an invasion of both
bodily and psychological integrity as the dignity of the human person includes the exercise of free will. Article III,
Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution more specifically proscribes bodily and psychological invasion, viz:

(2) No torture, force, violence, threat or intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the free will shall be used against
him (any person under investigation for the commission of an offense). Secret detention places, solitary,
incommunicado or other similar forms of detention are prohibited.

Parenthetically, under this provision, threat and intimidation that vitiate the free will - although not involving invasion
of bodily integrity - nevertheless constitute a violation of the right to security in the sense of "freedom from threat" as
afore-discussed.
Article III, Section 12 guarantees freedom from dehumanizing abuses of persons under investigation for the
commission of an offense. Victims of enforced disappearances who are not even under such investigation should all
the more be protected from these degradations.
An overture to an interpretation of the right to security of person as a right against torture was made by the European
Court of Human Rights (ECHR) in the recent case of Popov v. Russia.130 In this case, the claimant, who was lawfully
detained, alleged that the state authorities had physically abused him in prison, thereby violating his right to security
of person. Article 5(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights provides, viz: "Everyone has the right to liberty
and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a
procedure prescribed by law ..." (emphases supplied) Article 3, on the other hand, provides that "(n)o one shall be
subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment." Although the application failed on the facts
as the alleged ill-treatment was found baseless, the ECHR relied heavily on the concept of security in holding, viz:

...the applicant did not bring his allegations to the attention of domestic authorities at the time when they could
reasonably have been expected to take measures in order to ensure his security and to investigate the circumstances
in question.

xxx xxx xxx

... the authorities failed to ensure his security in custody or to comply with the procedural obligation under Art.3 to
conduct an effective investigation into his allegations.131 (emphasis supplied)

The U.N. Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women has also made a statement that the
protection of the bodily integrity of women may also be related to the right to security and liberty, viz:

...gender-based violence which impairs or nullifies the enjoyment by women of human rights and fundamental
freedoms under general international law or under specific human rights conventions is discrimination within the
meaning of article 1 of the Convention (on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women). These
rights and freedoms include . . . the right to liberty and security of person.132

Third, the right to security of person is a guarantee of protection of one's rights by the government. In the
context of the writ of Amparo, this right is built into the guarantees of the right to life and liberty under Article III,
Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution and the right to security of person (as freedom from threat and guarantee of
bodily and psychological integrity) under Article III, Section 2. The right to security of person in this third sense is a
corollary of the policy that the State "guarantees full respect for human rights" under Article II, Section 11 of the 1987
Constitution.133 As the government is the chief guarantor of order and security, the Constitutional guarantee of the
rights to life, liberty and security of person is rendered ineffective if government does not afford protection to these
rights especially when they are under threat. Protection includes conducting effective investigations, organization of
the government apparatus to extend protection to victims of extralegal killings or enforced disappearances (or threats
thereof) and/or their families, and bringing offenders to the bar of justice. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights
stressed the importance of investigation in the Velasquez Rodriguez Case,134 viz:

(The duty to investigate) must be undertaken in a serious manner and not as a mere formality preordained to
be ineffective. An investigation must have an objective and be assumed by the State as its own legal duty, not
as a step taken by private interests that depends upon the initiative of the victim or his family or upon their
offer of proof, without an effective search for the truth by the government.135

This third sense of the right to security of person as a guarantee of government protection has been interpreted by
the United Nations' Human Rights Committee136 in not a few cases involving Article 9137 of the ICCPR. While the right
to security of person appears in conjunction with the right to liberty under Article 9, the Committee has ruled that the
right to security of person can exist independently of the right to liberty. In other words, there need not
necessarily be a deprivation of liberty for the right to security of person to be invoked. In Delgado Paez v. Colombia,138
a case involving death threats to a religion teacher at a secondary school in Leticia, Colombia, whose social views
differed from those of the Apostolic Prefect of Leticia, the Committee held, viz:

The first sentence of article 9 does not stand as a separate paragraph. Its location as a part of paragraph one could
lead to the view that the right to security arises only in the context of arrest and detention. The travaux préparatoires
indicate that the discussions of the first sentence did indeed focus on matters dealt with in the other provisions of
12
article 9. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, in article 3, refers to the right to life, the right to liberty
and the right to security of the person. These elements have been dealt with in separate clauses in the
Covenant. Although in the Covenant the only reference to the right of security of person is to be found in
article 9, there is no evidence that it was intended to narrow the concept of the right to security only to
situations of formal deprivation of liberty. At the same time, States parties have undertaken to guarantee the
rights enshrined in the Covenant. It cannot be the case that, as a matter of law, States can ignore known
threats to the life of persons under their jurisdiction, just because that he or she is not arrested or otherwise
detained. States parties are under an obligation to take reasonable and appropriate measures to protect them.
An interpretation of article 9 which would allow a State party to ignore threats to the personal security of non-
detained persons within its jurisdiction would render totally ineffective the guarantees of the Covenant.139
(emphasis supplied)

The Paez ruling was reiterated in Bwalya v. Zambia,140 which involved a political activist and prisoner of conscience
who continued to be intimidated, harassed, and restricted in his movements following his release from detention. In a
catena of cases, the ruling of the Committee was of a similar import: Bahamonde v. Equatorial Guinea,141 involving
discrimination, intimidation and persecution of opponents of the ruling party in that state; Tshishimbi v. Zaire,142
involving the abduction of the complainant's husband who was a supporter of democratic reform in Zaire; Dias v.
Angola,143 involving the murder of the complainant's partner and the harassment he (complainant) suffered
because of his investigation of the murder; and Chongwe v. Zambia,144 involving an assassination attempt on the
chairman of an opposition alliance.
Similarly, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) has interpreted the "right to security" not only as prohibiting
the State from arbitrarily depriving liberty, but imposing a positive duty on the State to afford protection of the right to
liberty.145 The ECHR interpreted the "right to security of person" under Article 5(1) of the European Convention of
Human Rights in the leading case on disappearance of persons, Kurt v. Turkey.146 In this case, the claimant's son
had been arrested by state authorities and had not been seen since. The family's requests for information and
investigation regarding his whereabouts proved futile. The claimant suggested that this was a violation of her son's
right to security of person. The ECHR ruled, viz:

... any deprivation of liberty must not only have been effected in conformity with the substantive and procedural rules
of national law but must equally be in keeping with the very purpose of Article 5, namely to protect the individual from
arbitrariness... Having assumed control over that individual it is incumbent on the authorities to account for his or her
whereabouts. For this reason, Article 5 must be seen as requiring the authorities to take effective measures to
safeguard against the risk of disappearance and to conduct a prompt effective investigation into an arguable
claim that a person has been taken into custody and has not been seen since.147 (emphasis supplied)

Applying the foregoing concept of the right to security of person to the case at bar, we now determine whether there
is a continuing violation of respondents' right to security.
First, the violation of the right to security as freedom from threat to respondents' life, liberty and security.
While respondents were detained, they were threatened that if they escaped, their families, including them, would be
killed. In Raymond's narration, he was tortured and poured with gasoline after he was caught the first time he
attempted to escape from Fort Magsaysay. A call from a certain "Mam," who wanted to see him before he was killed,
spared him.
This time, respondents have finally escaped. The condition of the threat to be killed has come to pass. It should be
stressed that they are now free from captivity not because they were released by virtue of a lawful order or voluntarily
freed by their abductors. It ought to be recalled that towards the end of their ordeal, sometime in June 2007 when
respondents were detained in a camp in Limay, Bataan, respondents' captors even told them that they were still
deciding whether they should be executed. Respondent Raymond Manalo attested in his affidavit, viz:

Kinaumagahan, naka-kadena pa kami. Tinanggal ang mga kadena mga 3 o 4 na araw pagkalipas. Sinabi sa amin na
kaya kami nakakadena ay dahil pinagdedesisyunan pa ng mga sundalo kung papatayin kami o hindi.148

The possibility of respondents being executed stared them in the eye while they were in detention. With their escape,
this continuing threat to their life is apparent, moreso now that they have surfaced and implicated specific officers in
the military not only in their own abduction and torture, but also in those of other persons known to have disappeared
such as Sherlyn Cadapan, Karen Empeño, and Manuel Merino, among others.
Understandably, since their escape, respondents have been under concealment and protection by private citizens
because of the threat to their life, liberty and security. The threat vitiates their free will as they are forced to limit their
movements or activities.149 Precisely because respondents are being shielded from the perpetrators of their abduction,
they cannot be expected to show evidence of overt acts of threat such as face-to-face intimidation or written threats
to their life, liberty and security. Nonetheless, the circumstances of respondents' abduction, detention, torture and
escape reasonably support a conclusion that there is an apparent threat that they will again be abducted, tortured,
and this time, even executed. These constitute threats to their liberty, security, and life, actionable through a petition
for a writ of Amparo.
Next, the violation of the right to security as protection by the government. Apart from the failure of military
elements to provide protection to respondents by themselves perpetrating the abduction, detention, and torture, they
also miserably failed in conducting an effective investigation of respondents' abduction as revealed by the testimony
and investigation report of petitioners' own witness, Lt. Col. Ruben Jimenez, Provost Marshall of the 7th Infantry
Division.
The one-day investigation conducted by Jimenez was very limited, superficial, and one-sided. He merely relied on the
Sworn Statements of the six implicated members of the CAFGU and civilians whom he met in the investigation for the
first time. He was present at the investigation when his subordinate Lingad was taking the sworn statements, but he
did not propound a single question to ascertain the veracity of their statements or their credibility. He did not call for
other witnesses to test the alibis given by the six implicated persons nor for the family or neighbors of the respondents.
In his affidavit, petitioner Secretary of National Defense attested that in a Memorandum Directive dated October 31,
2007, he issued a policy directive addressed to the AFP Chief of Staff, that the AFP should adopt rules of action in

13
the event the writ of Amparo is issued by a competent court against any members of the AFP, which should essentially
include verification of the identity of the aggrieved party; recovery and preservation of relevant evidence; identification
of witnesses and securing statements from them; determination of the cause, manner, location and time of death or
disappearance; identification and apprehension of the person or persons involved in the death or disappearance; and
bringing of the suspected offenders before a competent court.150 Petitioner AFP Chief of Staff also submitted his own
affidavit attesting that he received the above directive of respondent Secretary of National Defense and that acting on
this directive, he immediately caused to be issued a directive to the units of the AFP for the purpose of establishing
the circumstances of the alleged disappearance and the recent reappearance of the respondents, and undertook to
provide results of the investigations to respondents.151 To this day, however, almost a year after the policy directive
was issued by petitioner Secretary of National Defense on October 31, 2007, respondents have not been furnished
the results of the investigation which they now seek through the instant petition for a writ of Amparo.
Under these circumstances, there is substantial evidence to warrant the conclusion that there is a violation of
respondents' right to security as a guarantee of protection by the government.
In sum, we conclude that respondents' right to security as "freedom from threat" is violated by the apparent threat to
their life, liberty and security of person. Their right to security as a guarantee of protection by the government is
likewise violated by the ineffective investigation and protection on the part of the military.
Finally, we come to the reliefs granted by the Court of Appeals, which petitioners question.
First, that petitioners furnish respondents all official and unofficial reports of the investigation undertaken in
connection with their case, except those already in file with the court.
Second, that petitioners confirm in writing the present places of official assignment of M/Sgt. Hilario aka Rollie
Castillo and Donald Caigas.
Third, that petitioners cause to be produced to the Court of Appeals all medical reports, records and charts, and
reports of any treatment given or recommended and medicines prescribed, if any, to the Manalo brothers, to
include a list of medical personnel (military and civilian) who attended to them from February 14, 2006 until
August 12, 2007.
With respect to the first and second reliefs, petitioners argue that the production order sought by respondents
partakes of the characteristics of a search warrant. Thus, they claim that the requisites for the issuance of a search
warrant must be complied with prior to the grant of the production order, namely: (1) the application must be under
oath or affirmation; (2) the search warrant must particularly describe the place to be searched and the things to be
seized; (3) there exists probable cause with one specific offense; and (4) the probable cause must be personally
determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce.152 In the case at bar, however, petitioners point out that other than the bare, self-serving and vague
allegations made by respondent Raymond Manalo in his unverified declaration and affidavit, the documents
respondents seek to be produced are only mentioned generally by name, with no other supporting details. They also
argue that the relevancy of the documents to be produced must be apparent, but this is not true in the present case
as the involvement of petitioners in the abduction has not been shown.
Petitioners' arguments do not hold water. The production order under the Amparo Rule should not be confused with
a search warrant for law enforcement under Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. This Constitutional provision
is a protection of the people from the unreasonable intrusion of the government, not a protection of the government
from the demand of the people such as respondents.
Instead, the Amparo production order may be likened to the production of documents or things under Section 1, Rule
27 of the Rules of Civil Procedure which provides in relevant part, viz:

Section 1. Motion for production or inspection order.

Upon motion of any party showing good cause therefor, the court in which an action is pending may (a) order any
party to produce and permit the inspection and copying or photographing, by or on behalf of the moving party, of any
designated documents, papers, books of accounts, letters, photographs, objects or tangible things, not privileged,
which constitute or contain evidence material to any matter involved in the action and which are in his possession,
custody or control...

In Material Distributors (Phil.) Inc. v. Judge Natividad,153 the respondent judge, under authority of Rule 27, issued
a subpoena duces tecum for the production and inspection of among others, the books and papers of Material
Distributors (Phil.) Inc. The company questioned the issuance of the subpoena on the ground that it violated the search
and seizure clause. The Court struck down the argument and held that the subpoena pertained to a civil procedure
that "cannot be identified or confused with unreasonable searches prohibited by the Constitution..."
Moreover, in his affidavit, petitioner AFP Chief of Staff himself undertook "to provide results of the investigations
conducted or to be conducted by the concerned unit relative to the circumstances of the alleged disappearance of the
persons in whose favor the Writ of Amparo has been sought for as soon as the same has been furnished Higher
headquarters."
With respect to the second and third reliefs, petitioners assert that the disclosure of the present places of
assignment of M/Sgt. Hilario aka Rollie Castillo and Donald Caigas, as well as the submission of a list of medical
personnel, is irrelevant, improper, immaterial, and unnecessary in the resolution of the petition for a writ of Amparo.
They add that it will unnecessarily compromise and jeopardize the exercise of official functions and duties of military
officers and even unwittingly and unnecessarily expose them to threat of personal injury or even death.
On the contrary, the disclosure of the present places of assignment of M/Sgt. Hilario aka Rollie Castillo and Donald
Caigas, whom respondents both directly implicated as perpetrators behind their abduction and detention, is relevant
in ensuring the safety of respondents by avoiding their areas of territorial jurisdiction. Such disclosure would also help
ensure that these military officers can be served with notices and court processes in relation to any investigation and
action for violation of the respondents' rights. The list of medical personnel is also relevant in securing information to
create the medical history of respondents and make appropriate medical interventions, when applicable and
necessary.
In blatant violation of our hard-won guarantees to life, liberty and security, these rights are snuffed out from victims of
extralegal killings and enforced disappearances. The writ of Amparo is a tool that gives voice to preys of silent guns
and prisoners behind secret walls.
14
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DISMISSED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
December 26, 2007 is affirmed.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 100150 January 5, 1994

BRIGIDO R. SIMON, JR., CARLOS QUIMPO, CARLITO ABELARDO, AND GENEROSO OCAMPO

vs.

COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, ROQUE FERMO, AND OTHERS AS JOHN DOES

VITUG, J.:

The extent of the authority and power of the Commission on Human Rights ("CHR") is again placed into focus in this
petition for prohibition, with prayer for a restraining order and preliminary injunction. The petitioners ask us to prohibit
public respondent CHR from further hearing and investigating CHR Case No. 90-1580, entitled "Fermo, et al. vs.
Quimpo, et al."

The case all started when a "Demolition Notice," dated 9 July 1990, signed by Carlos Quimpo (one of the petitioners)
in his capacity as an Executive Officer of the Quezon City Integrated Hawkers Management Council under the Office
of the City Mayor, was sent to, and received by, the private respondents (being the officers and members of the North
EDSA Vendors Association, Incorporated). In said notice, the respondents were given a grace-period of three (3) days
(up to 12 July 1990) within which to vacate the questioned premises of North EDSA.1 Prior to their receipt of the
demolition notice, the private respondents were informed by petitioner Quimpo that their stalls should be removed to
give way to the "People's Park".2 On 12 July 1990, the group, led by their President Roque Fermo, filed a letter-
complaint (Pinag-samang Sinumpaang Salaysay) with the CHR against the petitioners, asking the late CHR Chairman
Mary Concepcion Bautista for a letter to be addressed to then Mayor Brigido Simon, Jr., of Quezon City to stop the
demolition of the private respondents' stalls, sari-sari stores, and carinderia along North EDSA. The complaint was
docketed as CHR Case No. 90-1580.3 On 23 July 1990, the CHR issued an Order, directing the petitioners "to desist
from demolishing the stalls and shanties at North EDSA pending resolution of the vendors/squatters' complaint before
the Commission" and ordering said petitioners to appear before the CHR.4

On the basis of the sworn statements submitted by the private respondents on 31 July 1990, as well as CHR's own
ocular inspection, and convinced that on 28 July 1990 the petitioners carried out the demolition of private respondents'
stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia,5 the CHR, in its resolution of 1 August 1990, ordered the disbursement of
financial assistance of not more than P200,000.00 in favor of the private respondents to purchase light housing
materials and food under the Commission's supervision and again directed the petitioners to "desist from further
demolition, with the warning that violation of said order would lead to a citation for contempt and arrest."6

A motion to dismiss,7 dated 10 September 1990, questioned CHR's jurisdiction. The motion also averred, among other
things, that:

1. this case came about due to the alleged violation by the (petitioners) of the Inter-Agency Memorandum of
Agreement whereby Metro-Manila Mayors agreed on a moratorium in the demolition of the dwellings of poor dwellers
in Metro-Manila;

xxx xxx xxx

3. . . . , a perusal of the said Agreement (revealed) that the moratorium referred to therein refers to moratorium in the
demolition of the structures of poor dwellers;

4. that the complainants in this case (were) not poor dwellers but independent business entrepreneurs even this
Honorable Office admitted in its resolution of 1 August 1990 that the complainants are indeed, vendors;

5. that the complainants (were) occupying government land, particularly the sidewalk of EDSA corner North Avenue,
Quezon City; . . . and

6. that the City Mayor of Quezon City (had) the sole and exclusive discretion and authority whether or not a certain
business establishment (should) be allowed to operate within the jurisdiction of Quezon City, to revoke or cancel a
permit, if already issued, upon grounds clearly specified by law and ordinance.8

During the 12 September 1990 hearing, the petitioners moved for postponement, arguing that the motion to dismiss
set for 21 September 1990 had yet to be resolved. The petitioners likewise manifested that they would bring the case
to the courts.

On 18 September 1990 a supplemental motion to dismiss was filed by the petitioners, stating that the Commission's
authority should be understood as being confined only to the investigation of violations of civil and political rights, and
that "the rights allegedly violated in this case (were) not civil and political rights, (but) their privilege to engage in
business."9

On 21 September 1990, the motion to dismiss was heard and submitted for resolution, along with the contempt charge
that had meantime been filed by the private respondents, albeit vigorously objected to by petitioners (on the ground
that the motion to dismiss was still then unresolved).10
15
In an Order,11 dated 25 September 1990, the CHR cited the petitioners in contempt for carrying out the demolition of
the stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia despite the "order to desist", and it imposed a fine of P500.00 on each of
them.

On 1 March 1991,12 the CHR issued an Order, denying petitioners' motion to dismiss and supplemental motion to
dismiss, in this wise:

Clearly, the Commission on Human Rights under its constitutional mandate had jurisdiction over the complaint filed
by the squatters-vendors who complained of the gross violations of their human and constitutional rights. The motion
to dismiss should be and is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.13

The CHR opined that "it was not the intention of the (Constitutional) Commission to create only a paper tiger limited
only to investigating civil and political rights, but it (should) be (considered) a quasi-judicial body with the power to
provide appropriate legal measures for the protection of human rights of all persons within the Philippines . . . ." It
added:

The right to earn a living is a right essential to one's right to development, to life and to dignity. All these brazenly and
violently ignored and trampled upon by respondents with little regard at the same time for the basic rights of women
and children, and their health, safety and welfare. Their actions have psychologically scarred and traumatized the
children, who were witness and exposed to such a violent demonstration of Man's inhumanity to man.

In an Order,14 dated 25 April 1991, petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied.

Hence, this recourse.

The petition was initially dismissed in our resolution15 of 25 June 1991; it was subsequently reinstated, however, in
our resolution16 of 18 June 1991, in which we also issued a temporary restraining order, directing the CHR to "CEASE
and DESIST from further hearing CHR No. 90-1580."17

The petitioners pose the following:

Whether or not the public respondent has jurisdiction:

a) to investigate the alleged violations of the "business rights" of the private respondents whose stalls were demolished
by the petitioners at the instance and authority given by the Mayor of Quezon City;

b) to impose the fine of P500.00 each on the petitioners; and

c) to disburse the amount of P200,000.00 as financial aid to the vendors affected by the demolition.

In the Court's resolution of 10 October 1991, the Solicitor-General was excused from filing his comment for public
respondent CHR. The latter thus filed its own comment,18 through Hon. Samuel Soriano, one of its Commissioners.
The Court also resolved to dispense with the comment of private respondent Roque Fermo, who had since failed to
comply with the resolution, dated 18 July 1991, requiring such comment.

The petition has merit.

The Commission on Human Rights was created by the 1987

Constitution.19 It was formally constituted by then President Corazon Aquino via Executive Order No. 163,20 issued
on 5 May 1987, in the exercise of her legislative power at the time. It succeeded, but so superseded as well, the
Presidential Committee on Human Rights.21

The powers and functions22 of the Commission are defined by the 1987 Constitution, thus: to —

(1) Investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party, all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political
rights;

(2) Adopt its operational guidelines and rules of procedure, and cite for contempt for violations thereof in accordance
with the Rules of Court;

(3) Provide appropriate legal measures for the protection of human rights of all persons within the Philippines, as well
as Filipinos residing abroad, and provide for preventive measures and legal aid services to the underprivileged whose
human rights have been violated or need protection;

(4) Exercise visitorial powers over jails, prisons, or detention facilities;

(5) Establish a continuing program of research, education, and information to enhance respect for the primacy of
human rights;

(6) Recommend to the Congress effective measures to promote human rights and to provide for compensation to
victims of violations of human rights, or their families;

(7) Monitor the Philippine Government's compliance with international treaty obligations on human rights;

16
(8) Grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose possession of documents or other
evidence is necessary or convenient to determine the truth in any investigation conducted by it or under its authority;

(9) Request the assistance of any department, bureau, office, or agency in the performance of its functions;

(10) Appoint its officers and employees in accordance with law; and

(11) Perform such other duties and functions as may be provided by law.

In its Order of 1 March 1991, denying petitioners' motion to dismiss, the CHR theorizes that the intention of the
members of the Constitutional Commission is to make CHR a quasi-judicial body.23 This view, however, has not
heretofore been shared by this Court. In Cariño v. Commission on Human Rights,24 the Court, through then Associate
Justice, now Chief Justice Andres Narvasa, has observed that it is "only the first of the enumerated powers and
functions that bears any resemblance to adjudication or adjudgment," but that resemblance can in no way be
synonymous to the adjudicatory power itself. The Court explained:

. . . (T)he Commission on Human Rights . . . was not meant by the fundamental law to be another court or quasi-
judicial agency in this country, or duplicate much less take over the functions of the latter.

The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it may investigate, i.e.,
receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations involving civil and political
rights. But fact finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a
quasi-judicial agency or official. The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a
controversy is not a judicial function, properly speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and
making factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those factual
conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or determined authoritatively, finally and definitively,
subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law. This function, to repeat, the Commission does
not have.

After thus laying down at the outset the above rule, we now proceed to the other kernel of this controversy and, its is,
to determine the extent of CHR's investigative power.

It can hardly be disputed that the phrase "human rights" is so generic a term that any attempt to define it, albeit not a
few have tried, could at best be described as inconclusive. Let us observe. In a symposium on human rights in the
Philippines, sponsored by the University of the Philippines in 1977, one of the questions that has been propounded is
"(w)hat do you understand by "human rights?" The participants, representing different sectors of the society, have
given the following varied answers:

Human rights are the basic rights which inhere in man by virtue of his humanity. They are the same in all parts of the
world, whether the Philippines or England, Kenya or the Soviet Union, the United States or Japan, Kenya or Indonesia
....

Human rights include civil rights, such as the right to life, liberty, and property; freedom of speech, of the press, of
religion, academic freedom, and the rights of the accused to due process of law; political rights, such as the right to
elect public officials, to be elected to public office, and to form political associations and engage in politics; and social
rights, such as the right to an education, employment, and social services.25

Human rights are the entitlement that inhere in the individual person from the sheer fact of his humanity. . . . Because
they are inherent, human rights are not granted by the State but can only be recognized and protected by it.26

(Human rights include all) the civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights defined in the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights.27

Human rights are rights that pertain to man simply because he is human. They are part of his natural birth, right, innate
and inalienable.28

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as well as, or more specifically, the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights and International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, suggests that the scope of human
rights can be understood to include those that relate to an individual's social, economic, cultural, political and civil
relations. It thus seems to closely identify the term to the universally accepted traits and attributes of an individual,
along with what is generally considered to be his inherent and inalienable rights, encompassing almost all aspects of
life.

Have these broad concepts been equally contemplated by the framers of our 1986 Constitutional Commission in
adopting the specific provisions on human rights and in creating an independent commission to safeguard these
rights? It may of value to look back at the country's experience under the martial law regime which may have, in fact,
impelled the inclusions of those provisions in our fundamental law. Many voices have been heard. Among those
voices, aptly represented perhaps of the sentiments expressed by others, comes from Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, a
respected jurist and an advocate of civil liberties, who, in his paper, entitled "Present State of Human Rights in the
Philippines,"29 observes:

But while the Constitution of 1935 and that of 1973 enshrined in their Bill of Rights most of the human rights expressed
in the International Covenant, these rights became unavailable upon the proclamation of Martial Law on 21 September
1972. Arbitrary action then became the rule. Individuals by the thousands became subject to arrest upon suspicion,
and were detained and held for indefinite periods, sometimes for years, without charges, until ordered released by the

17
Commander-in-Chief or this representative. The right to petition for the redress of grievances became useless, since
group actions were forbidden. So were strikes. Press and other mass media were subjected to censorship and short
term licensing. Martial law brought with it the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, and judges lost independence
and security of tenure, except members of the Supreme Court. They were required to submit letters of resignation
and were dismissed upon the acceptance thereof. Torture to extort confessions were practiced as declared by
international bodies like Amnesty International and the International Commission of Jurists.

Converging our attention to the records of the Constitutional Commission, we can see the following discussions during
its 26 August 1986 deliberations:

MR. GARCIA . . . , the primacy of its (CHR) task must be made clear in view of the importance of human rights and
also because civil and political rights have been determined by many international covenants and human rights
legislations in the Philippines, as well as the Constitution, specifically the Bill of Rights and subsequent legislation.
Otherwise, if we cover such a wide territory in area, we might diffuse its impact and the precise nature of its task,
hence, its effectivity would also be curtailed.

So, it is important to delienate the parameters of its tasks so that the commission can be most effective.

MR. BENGZON. That is precisely my difficulty because civil and political rights are very broad. The Article on the Bill
of Rights covers civil and political rights. Every single right of an individual involves his civil right or his political right.
So, where do we draw the line?

MR. GARCIA. Actually, these civil and political rights have been made clear in the language of human rights
advocates, as well as in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which addresses a number of articles on the right
to life, the right against torture, the right to fair and public hearing, and so on. These are very specific rights that are
considered enshrined in many international documents and legal instruments as constituting civil and political rights,
and these are precisely what we want to defend here.

MR. BENGZON. So, would the commissioner say civil and political rights as defined in the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights?

MR. GARCIA. Yes, and as I have mentioned, the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights distinguished this
right against torture.

MR. BENGZON. So as to distinguish this from the other rights that we have?

MR. GARCIA. Yes, because the other rights will encompass social and economic rights, and there are other violations
of rights of citizens which can be addressed to the proper courts and authorities.

xxx xxx xxx

MR. BENGZON. So, we will authorize the commission to define its functions, and, therefore, in doing that the
commission will be authorized to take under its wings cases which perhaps heretofore or at this moment are under
the jurisdiction of the ordinary investigative and prosecutorial agencies of the government. Am I correct?

MR. GARCIA. No. We have already mentioned earlier that we would like to define the specific parameters which cover
civil and political rights as covered by the international standards governing the behavior of governments regarding
the particular political and civil rights of citizens, especially of political detainees or prisoners. This particular aspect
we have experienced during martial law which we would now like to safeguard.

MR. BENGZON. Then, I go back to that question that I had. Therefore, what we are really trying to say is, perhaps, at
the proper time we could specify all those rights stated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and defined as
human rights. Those are the rights that we envision here?

MR. GARCIA. Yes. In fact, they are also enshrined in the Bill of Rights of our Constitution. They are integral parts of
that.

MR. BENGZON. Therefore, is the Gentleman saying that all the rights under the Bill of Rights covered by human
rights?

MR. GARCIA. No, only those that pertain to civil and political rights.

xxx xxx xxx

MR. RAMA. In connection with the discussion on the scope of human rights, I would like to state that in the past
regime, everytime we invoke the violation of human rights, the Marcos regime came out with the defense that, as a
matter of fact, they had defended the rights of people to decent living, food, decent housing and a life consistent with
human dignity.

So, I think we should really limit the definition of human rights to political rights. Is that the sense of the committee, so
as not to confuse the issue?

MR. SARMIENTO. Yes, Madam President.

MR. GARCIA. I would like to continue and respond also to repeated points raised by the previous speaker.

18
There are actually six areas where this Commission on Human Rights could act effectively: 1) protection of rights of
political detainees; 2) treatment of prisoners and the prevention of tortures; 3) fair and public trials; 4) cases of
disappearances; 5) salvagings and hamletting; and 6) other crimes committed against the religious.

xxx xxx xxx

The PRESIDENT. Commissioner Guingona is recognized.

MR. GUINGONA. Thank You Madam President.

I would like to start by saying that I agree with Commissioner Garcia that we should, in order to make the proposed
Commission more effective, delimit as much as possible, without prejudice to future expansion. The coverage of the
concept and jurisdictional area of the term "human rights". I was actually disturbed this morning when the reference
was made without qualification to the rights embodied in the universal Declaration of Human Rights, although later
on, this was qualified to refer to civil and political rights contained therein.

If I remember correctly, Madam President, Commissioner Garcia, after mentioning the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights of 1948, mentioned or linked the concept of human right with other human rights specified in other convention
which I do not remember. Am I correct?

MR. GARCIA. Is Commissioner Guingona referring to the Declaration of Torture of 1985?

MR. GUINGONA. I do not know, but the commissioner mentioned another.

MR. GARCIA. Madam President, the other one is the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights of which
we are signatory.

MR. GUINGONA. I see. The only problem is that, although I have a copy of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
here, I do not have a copy of the other covenant mentioned. It is quite possible that there are rights specified in that
other convention which may not be specified here. I was wondering whether it would be wise to link our concept of
human rights to general terms like "convention," rather than specify the rights contained in the convention.

As far as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is concerned, the Committee, before the period of amendments,
could specify to us which of these articles in the Declaration will fall within the concept of civil and political rights, not
for the purpose of including these in the proposed constitutional article, but to give the sense of the Commission as to
what human rights would be included, without prejudice to expansion later on, if the need arises. For example, there
was no definite reply to the question of Commissioner Regalado as to whether the right to marry would be considered
a civil or a social right. It is not a civil right?

MR. GARCIA. Madam President, I have to repeat the various specific civil and political rights that we felt must be
envisioned initially by this provision — freedom from political detention and arrest prevention of torture, right to fair
and public trials, as well as crimes involving disappearance, salvagings, hamlettings and collective violations. So, it is
limited to politically related crimes precisely to protect the civil and political rights of a specific group of individuals,
and therefore, we are not opening it up to all of the definite areas.

MR. GUINGONA. Correct. Therefore, just for the record, the Gentlemen is no longer linking his concept or the concept
of the Committee on Human Rights with the so-called civil or political rights as contained in the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights.

MR. GARCIA. When I mentioned earlier the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, I was referring to an international
instrument.

MR. GUINGONA. I know.

MR. GARCIA. But it does not mean that we will refer to each and every specific article therein, but only to those that
pertain to the civil and politically related, as we understand it in this Commission on Human Rights.

MR. GUINGONA. Madam President, I am not even clear as to the distinction between civil and social rights.

MR. GARCIA. There are two international covenants: the International Covenant and Civil and Political Rights and
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. The second covenant contains all the different
rights-the rights of labor to organize, the right to education, housing, shelter, et cetera.

MR. GUINGONA. So we are just limiting at the moment the sense of the committee to those that the Gentlemen has
specified.

MR. GARCIA. Yes, to civil and political rights.

MR. GUINGONA. Thank you.

xxx xxx xxx

SR. TAN. Madam President, from the standpoint of the victims of human rights, I cannot stress more on how much
we need a Commission on Human Rights. . . .

. . . human rights victims are usually penniless. They cannot pay and very few lawyers will accept clients who do not
pay. And so, they are the ones more abused and oppressed. Another reason is, the cases involved are very delicate
19
— torture, salvaging, picking up without any warrant of arrest, massacre — and the persons who are allegedly guilty
are people in power like politicians, men in the military and big shots. Therefore, this Human Rights Commission must
be independent.

I would like very much to emphasize how much we need this commission, especially for the little Filipino, the little
individual who needs this kind of help and cannot get it. And I think we should concentrate only on civil and political
violations because if we open this to land, housing and health, we will have no place to go again and we will not
receive any response. . . .30 (emphasis supplied)

The final outcome, now written as Section 18, Article XIII, of the 1987 Constitution, is a provision empowering the
Commission on Human Rights to "investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party, all forms of human rights
violations involving civil and political rights" (Sec. 1).

The term "civil rights,"31 has been defined as referring —

(t)o those (rights) that belong to every citizen of the state or country, or, in wider sense, to all its inhabitants, and are
not connected with the organization or administration of the government. They include the rights of property, marriage,
equal protection of the laws, freedom of contract, etc. Or, as otherwise defined civil rights are rights appertaining to a
person by virtue of his citizenship in a state or community. Such term may also refer, in its general sense, to rights
capable of being enforced or redressed in a civil action.

Also quite often mentioned are the guarantees against involuntary servitude, religious persecution, unreasonable
searches and seizures, and imprisonment for debt.32

Political rights,33 on the other hand, are said to refer to the right to participate, directly or indirectly, in the establishment
or administration of government, the right of suffrage, the right to hold public office, the right of petition and, in general,
the rights appurtenant to citizenship vis-a-vis the management of government.34

Recalling the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, aforequoted, it is readily apparent that the delegates
envisioned a Commission on Human Rights that would focus its attention to the more severe cases of human rights
violations. Delegate Garcia, for instance, mentioned such areas as the "(1) protection of rights of political detainees,
(2) treatment of prisoners and the prevention of tortures, (3) fair and public trials, (4) cases of disappearances, (5)
salvagings and hamletting, and (6) other crimes committed against the religious." While the enumeration has not likely
been meant to have any preclusive effect, more than just expressing a statement of priority, it is, nonetheless,
significant for the tone it has set. In any event, the delegates did not apparently take comfort in peremptorily making
a conclusive delineation of the CHR's scope of investigatorial jurisdiction. They have thus seen it fit to resolve, instead,
that "Congress may provide for other cases of violations of human rights that should fall within the authority of the
Commission, taking into account its recommendation."35

In the particular case at hand, there is no cavil that what are sought to be demolished are the stalls, sari-sari stores
and carinderia, as well as temporary shanties, erected by private respondents on a land which is planned to be
developed into a "People's Park". More than that, the land adjoins the North EDSA of Quezon City which, this Court
can take judicial notice of, is a busy national highway. The consequent danger to life and limb is not thus to be likewise
simply ignored. It is indeed paradoxical that a right which is claimed to have been violated is one that cannot, in the
first place, even be invoked, if it is, in fact, extant. Be that as it may, looking at the standards hereinabove discoursed
vis-a-vis the circumstances obtaining in this instance, we are not prepared to conclude that the order for the demolition
of the stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia of the private respondents can fall within the compartment of "human rights
violations involving civil and political rights" intended by the Constitution.

On its contempt powers, the CHR is constitutionally authorized to "adopt its operational guidelines and rules of
procedure, and cite for contempt for violations thereof in accordance with the Rules of Court." Accordingly, the CHR
acted within its authority in providing in its revised rules, its power "to cite or hold any person in direct or indirect
contempt, and to impose the appropriate penalties in accordance with the procedure and sanctions provided for in the
Rules of Court." That power to cite for contempt, however, should be understood to apply only to violations of its
adopted operational guidelines and rules of procedure essential to carry out its investigatorial powers. To exemplify,
the power to cite for contempt could be exercised against persons who refuse to cooperate with the said body, or who
unduly withhold relevant information, or who decline to honor summons, and the like, in pursuing its investigative
work. The "order to desist" (a semantic interplay for a restraining order) in the instance before us, however, is not
investigatorial in character but prescinds from an adjudicative power that it does not possess. In Export Processing
Zone Authority vs. Commission on Human Rights,36 the Court, speaking through Madame Justice Carolina Griño-
Aquino, explained:

The constitutional provision directing the CHR to "provide for preventive measures and legal aid services to the
underprivileged whose human rights have been violated or need protection" may not be construed to confer jurisdiction
on the Commission to issue a restraining order or writ of injunction for, it that were the intention, the Constitution would
have expressly said so. "Jurisdiction is conferred only by the Constitution or by law". It is never derived by implication.

Evidently, the "preventive measures and legal aid services" mentioned in the Constitution refer to extrajudicial and
judicial remedies (including a writ of preliminary injunction) which the CHR may seek from proper courts on behalf of
the victims of human rights violations. Not being a court of justice, the CHR itself has no jurisdiction to issue the writ,
for a writ of preliminary injunction may only be issued "by the judge of any court in which the action is pending [within
his district], or by a Justice of the Court of Appeals, or of the Supreme Court. . . . A writ of preliminary injunction is an
ancillary remedy. It is available only in a pending principal action, for the preservation or protection of the rights and
interests of a party thereto, and for no other purpose." (footnotes omitted).

20
The Commission does have legal standing to indorse, for appropriate action, its findings and recommendations to any
appropriate agency of government.37

The challenge on the CHR's disbursement of the amount of P200,000.00 by way of financial aid to the vendors affected
by the demolition is not an appropriate issue in the instant petition. Not only is there lack of locus standi on the part of
the petitioners to question the disbursement but, more importantly, the matter lies with the appropriate administrative
agencies concerned to initially consider.

The public respondent explains that this petition for prohibition filed by the petitioners has become moot and academic
since the case before it (CHR Case No. 90-1580) has already been fully heard, and that the matter is merely awaiting
final resolution. It is true that prohibition is a preventive remedy to restrain the doing of an act about to be done, and
not intended to provide a remedy for an act already accomplished. 38 Here, however, said Commission admittedly
has yet to promulgate its resolution in CHR Case No. 90-1580. The instant petition has been intended, among other
things, to also prevent CHR from precisely doing that.39

WHEREFORE, the writ prayed for in this petition is GRANTED. The Commission on Human Rights is hereby
prohibited from further proceeding with CHR Case No. 90-1580 and from implementing the P500.00 fine for contempt.
The temporary restraining order heretofore issued by this Court is made permanent. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 205728 January 21, 2015

THE DIOCESE OF BACOLOD, REPRESENTED BY THE MOST REV. BISHOP VICENTE M. NAVARRA and THE
BISHOP HIMSELF IN HIS PERSONAL CAPACITY
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND THE ELECTION OFFICER OF BACOLOD CITY, ATTY. MAVIL V.
MAJARUCON
LEONEN, J.:

"The Philippines is a democratic and republican State. Sovereignty resides in the people and all
government authority emanates from them." – Article II, Section 1, Constitution

All governmental authority emanates from our people. No unreasonable restrictions of the fundamental and preferred
right to expression of the electorate during political contests no matter how seemingly benign will be tolerated.
This case defines the extent that our people may shape the debates during elections. It is significant and of first
impression. We are asked to decide whether the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) has the competence to limit
expressions made by the citizens — who are not candidates — during elections.
Before us is a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition with application for preliminary injunction and temporary
restraining order1 under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking to nullify COMELEC’s Notice to Remove Campaign
Materials2 dated February 22, 2013 and letter3 issued on February 27, 2013.
The facts are not disputed.
On February 21, 2013, petitioners posted two (2) tarpaulins within a private compound housing the San Sebastian
Cathedral of Bacolod. Each tarpaulin was approximately six feet (6') by ten feet (10') in size. They were posted on the
front walls of the cathedral within public view. The first tarpaulin contains the message "IBASURA RH Law" referring
to the Reproductive Health Law of 2012 or Republic Act No. 10354. The second tarpaulin is the subject of the present
case.4 This tarpaulin contains the heading "Conscience Vote" and lists candidates as either "(Anti-RH) Team Buhay"
with a check mark, or "(Pro-RH) Team Patay" with an "X" mark.5 The electoral candidates were classified according
to their vote on the adoption of Republic Act No. 10354, otherwise known as the RH Law. 6 Those who voted for the
passing of the law were classified by petitioners as comprising "Team Patay," while those who voted against it form
"Team Buhay":7

TEAM BUHAY TEAM PATAY

Estrada, JV Angara, Juan Edgardo

Honasan, Gregorio Casiño, Teddy

Magsaysay, Mitos Cayetano, Alan Peter

Pimentel, Koko Enrile, Jackie

Trillanes, Antonio Escudero, Francis

21
 Villar, Cynthia Hontiveros, Risa

Party List Buhay Legarda, Loren

Party List Ang Pamilya Party List Gabriela

Party List Akbayan

Party List Bayan Muna

Party List Anak Pawis

During oral arguments, respondents conceded that the tarpaulin was neither sponsored nor paid for by any candidate.
Petitioners also conceded that the tarpaulin contains names ofcandidates for the 2013 elections, but not of politicians
who helped in the passage of the RH Law but were not candidates for that election.
On February 22, 2013, respondent Atty. Mavil V. Majarucon, in her capacity as Election Officer of Bacolod City, issued
a Notice to Remove Campaign Materials8 addressed to petitioner Most Rev. Bishop Vicente M. Navarra. The election
officer ordered the tarpaulin’s removal within three (3) days from receipt for being oversized. COMELEC Resolution
No. 9615 provides for the size requirement of two feet (2’) by three feet (3’).9
On February 25, 2013, petitioners replied10 requesting, among others, that (1) petitioner Bishop be given a definite
ruling by COMELEC Law Department regarding the tarpaulin; and (2) pending this opinion and the availment of legal
remedies, the tarpaulin be allowed to remain.11
On February 27, 2013, COMELEC Law Department issued a letter12 ordering the immediate removal of the tarpaulin;
otherwise, it will be constrained to file an election offense against petitioners. The letter of COMELEC Law Department
was silenton the remedies available to petitioners. The letter provides as follows:

Dear Bishop Navarra:

It has reached this Office that our Election Officer for this City, Atty. Mavil Majarucon, had already given
you notice on February 22, 2013 as regards the election propaganda material posted on the church
vicinity promoting for or against the candidates and party-list groups with the following names and
messages, particularly described as follows:

Material size : six feet (6’) by ten feet (10’)

Description : FULL COLOR TARPAULIN

Image of : SEE ATTACHED PICTURES

Message : CONSCIENCE VOTE (ANTI RH) TEAM

BUHAY; (PRO RH) TEAM PATAY

Location : POSTED ON THE CHURCH VICINITY

OF THE DIOCESE OF BACOLOD CITY

The three (3) – day notice expired on February 25, 2013.

Considering that the above-mentioned material is found to be in violation of Comelec Resolution No.
9615 promulgated on January 15, 2013 particularly on the size (even with the subsequent division of the
said tarpaulin into two), as the lawful size for election propaganda material is only two feet (2’) by three
feet (3’), please order/cause the immediate removal of said election propaganda material, otherwise, we
shall be constrained to file an election offense case against you.

We pray that the Catholic Church will be the first institution to help the Commission on Elections
inensuring the conduct of peaceful, orderly, honest and credible elections.

Thank you and God Bless!

[signed]

ATTY. ESMERALDA AMORA-LADRA

Director IV13

22
Concerned about the imminent threatof prosecution for their exercise of free speech, petitioners initiated this case
through this petition for certiorari and prohibition with application for preliminary injunction and temporary restraining
order.14 They question respondents’ notice dated February 22, 2013 and letter issued on February 27, 2013. They
pray that: (1) the petition be given due course; (2) a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or a writ of preliminary
injunction be issued restraining respondents from further proceeding in enforcing their orders for the removal of the
Team Patay tarpaulin; and (3) after notice and hearing, a decision be rendered declaring the questioned orders of
respondents as unconstitutional and void, and permanently restraining respondents from enforcing them or any other
similar order.15
After due deliberation, this court, on March 5, 2013, issued a temporary restraining order enjoining respondents from
enforcing the assailed notice and letter, and set oral arguments on March 19, 2013.16
On March 13, 2013, respondents filed their comment17 arguing that (1) a petition for certiorari and prohibition under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court filed before this court is not the proper remedy to question the notice and letter of
respondents; and (2) the tarpaulin is an election propaganda subject to regulation by COMELEC pursuant to its
mandate under Article IX-C, Section 4 of the Constitution. Hence, respondents claim that the issuances ordering its
removal for being oversized are valid and constitutional.18
During the hearing held on March 19, 2013, the parties were directed to file their respective memoranda within 10
days or by April 1, 2013, taking into consideration the intervening holidays.19
The issues, which also served as guide for the oral arguments, are:20

I.

WHETHER THE 22 FEBRUARY 2013 NOTICE/ORDER BY ELECTION OFFICER MAJARUCON AND

THE 27 FEBRUARY 2013 ORDER BY THE COMELEC LAW DEPARTMENT ARE CONSIDERED
JUDGMENTS/FINAL ORDERS/RESOLUTIONS OF THE COMELEC WHICH WOULD WARRANT A
REVIEW OF THIS COURT VIA RULE 65 PETITION[;]

A. WHETHER PETITIONERS VIOLATED THE HIERARCHY OF COURTS DOCTRINE AND

JURISPRUDENTIAL RULES GOVERNING APPEALS FROM COMELEC DECISIONS;

B. ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE AFOREMENTIONED ORDERS ARE NOT CONSIDERED

JUDGMENTS/FINAL ORDERS/RESOLUTIONS OF THE COMELEC, WHETHER THERE ARE
EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH WOULD ALLOW THIS COURT TO TAKE COGNIZANCE
OF THE CASE[;]

II.

WHETHER IT IS RELEVANT TODETERMINE WHETHER THE TARPAULINS ARE "POLITICAL

ADVERTISEMENT" OR "ELECTION PROPAGANDA" CONSIDERING THAT PETITIONER IS NOT A
POLITICAL CANDIDATE[;]

III.

WHETHER THE TARPAULINS ARE A FORM OR EXPRESSION (PROTECTED SPEECH), OR

ELECTION PROPAGANDA/POLITICAL ADVERTISEMENT[;]

A. ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE TARPAULINS ARE A FORM OF EXPRESSION, WHETHER

THE COMELEC POSSESSES THE AUTHORITY TO REGULATE THE SAME[;]

B. WHETHER THIS FORM OF EXPRESSION MAY BE REGULATED[;]

IV.

WHETHER THE 22 FEBRUARY 2013 NOTICE/ ORDER BY ELECTION OFFICER MAJARUCON AND
THE 27 FEBRUARY 2013 ORDER BY THE COMELEC LAW DEPARTMENT VIOLATES THE
PRINCIPLE OF SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE[;] [AND]

V.

WHETHER THE ACTION OF THE PETITIONERS IN POSTING ITS TARPAULIN VIOLATES THE
CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLE OF SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE.

I
PROCEDURAL ISSUES
I.A
This court’s jurisdiction over COMELEC cases
Respondents ask that this petition be dismissed on the ground that the notice and letter are not final orders, decisions,
rulings, or judgments of the COMELEC En Banc issued in the exercise of its adjudicatory powers, reviewable via Rule
64 of the Rules of Court.21
Rule 64 is not the exclusive remedy for all acts of the COMELEC. Rule 65 is applicable especially to raise objections
relating to a grave abuse of discretion resulting in the ouster of jurisdiction.22 As a special civil action, there must also
be a showing that there be no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law.
Respondents contend that the assailed notice and letter are not subject to review by this court, whose power to review
is "limited only to final decisions, rulings and orders of the COMELEC En Banc rendered in the exercise of its
adjudicatory or quasi-judicial power."23 Instead, respondents claim that the assailed notice and letter are reviewable
only by COMELEC itself pursuant to Article IX-C, Section 2(3) of the Constitution24 on COMELEC’s power to decide
23
all questions affecting elections.25 Respondents invoke the cases of Ambil, Jr. v. COMELEC,26 Repol v. COMELEC,27
Soriano, Jr. v. COMELEC,28 Blanco v. COMELEC,29 and Cayetano v. COMELEC,30 to illustrate how
judicialintervention is limited to final decisions, orders, rulings and judgments of the COMELEC En Banc.31
These cases are not applicable.
In Ambil, Jr. v. COMELEC, the losing party in the gubernatorial race of Eastern Samar filed the election protest.32 At
issue was the validity of the promulgation of a COMELEC Division resolution.33 No motion for reconsideration was
filed to raise this issue before the COMELEC En Banc. This court declared that it did not have jurisdiction and clarified:
We have interpreted [Section 7, Article IX-A of the Constitution]34 to mean final orders, rulings and decisionsof the
COMELEC rendered in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers." This decision must be a final decision
or resolution of the Comelec en banc, not of a division, certainly not an interlocutory order of a division.The Supreme
Court has no power to review viacertiorari, an interlocutory order or even a final resolution of a Division of the
Commission on Elections.35 (Emphasis in the original, citations omitted)
However, in the next case cited by respondents, Repol v. COMELEC, this court provided exceptions to this general
rule. Repolwas another election protest case, involving the mayoralty elections in Pagsanghan, Samar.36 This time,
the case was brought to this court because the COMELEC First Division issued a status quo ante order against the
Regional Trial Court executing its decision pending appeal.37 This court’s ponencia discussed the general rule
enunciated in Ambil, Jr. that it cannot take jurisdiction to review interlocutory orders of a COMELEC Division. 38
However, consistent with ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation v. COMELEC,39 it clarified the exception:
This Court, however, has ruled in the past that this procedural requirement [of filing a motion for reconsideration] may
be glossed over to prevent miscarriage of justice, when the issue involves the principle of social justice or the
protection of labor, when the decision or resolution sought to be set aside is a nullity, or when the need for relief is
extremely urgent and certiorari is the only adequate and speedy remedy available.40
Based on ABS-CBN, this court could review orders and decisions of COMELEC — in electoral contests — despite
not being reviewed by the COMELEC En Banc, if:

1) It will prevent the miscarriage of justice;

2) The issue involves a principle of social justice;

3) The issue involves the protection of labor;

4) The decision or resolution sought tobe set aside is a nullity; or

5) The need for relief is extremely urgent and certiorari is the only adequate and speedy remedy available.

Ultimately, this court took jurisdiction in Repoland decided that the status quo anteorder issued by the COMELEC
Division was unconstitutional.
Respondents also cite Soriano, Jr. v. COMELEC.This case was also an election protest case involving candidates for
the city council of Muntinlupa City.41 Petitioners in Soriano, Jr.filed before this court a petition for certiorari against an
interlocutory order of the COMELEC First
Division.42 While the petition was pending in this court, the COMELEC First Division dismissed the main election
protest case.43 Sorianoapplied the general rule that only final orders should be questioned with this court. The
ponencia for this court, however, acknowledged the exceptions to the general rule in ABS-CBN.44
Blanco v. COMELEC, another case cited by respondents, was a disqualification case of one of the mayoralty
candidates of Meycauayan, Bulacan.45 The COMELEC Second Division ruled that petitioner could not qualify for the
2007 elections due to the findings in an administrative case that he engaged in vote buying in the 1995 elections.46
No motion for reconsideration was filed before the COMELEC En Banc. This court, however, took cognizance of this
case applying one of the exceptions in ABS-CBN: The assailed resolution was a nullity.47
Finally, respondents cited Cayetano v. COMELEC, a recent election protest case involving the mayoralty candidates
of Taguig City.48 Petitioner assailed a resolution of the COMELEC denying her motion for reconsideration to dismiss
the election protest petition for lack of form and substance.49 This court clarified the general rule and refused to take
cognizance of the review of the COMELEC order. While recognizing the exceptions in ABS-CBN, this court ruled that
these exceptions did not apply.50
Ambil, Jr., Repol, Soriano, Jr., Blanco, and Cayetano cited by respondents do not operate as precedents to oust this
court from taking jurisdiction over this case. All these cases cited involve election protests or disqualification cases
filed by the losing candidate against the winning candidate.
In the present case, petitioners are not candidates seeking for public office. Their petition is filed to assert their
fundamental right to expression.
Furthermore, all these cases cited by respondents pertained to COMELEC’s exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-
judicial power. This case pertains to acts of COMELEC in the implementation of its regulatory powers. When it issued
the notice and letter, the COMELEC was allegedly enforcingelection laws.
I.B
Rule 65, grave abuse of discretion,
and limitations on political speech
The main subject of thiscase is an alleged constitutional violation: the infringement on speech and the "chilling effect"
caused by respondent COMELEC’s notice and letter.
Petitioners allege that respondents committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
issuing the notice51 dated February 22,2013 and letter52 dated February 27, 2013 ordering the removal of the
tarpaulin.53 It is their position that these infringe on their fundamental right to freedom of expression and violate the
principle of separation of church and state and, thus, are unconstitutional.54
The jurisdiction of this court over the subject matter is determined from the allegations in the petition. Subject matter
jurisdiction is defined as the authority "to hear and determine cases of the general class to which the proceedings in
24
question belong and is conferred by the sovereign authority which organizes the court and defines its powers." 55
Definitely, the subject matter in this case is different from the cases cited by respondents.
Nothing less than the electorate’s political speech will be affected by the restrictions imposed by COMELEC. Political
speech is motivated by the desire to be heard and understood, to move people to action. It is concerned with the
sovereign right to change the contours of power whether through the election of representatives in a republican
government or the revision of the basic text of the Constitution. The zeal with which we protect this kind of speech
does not depend on our evaluation of the cogency of the message. Neither do we assess whether we should protect
speech based on the motives of COMELEC. We evaluate restrictions on freedom of expression from their effects. We
protect both speech and medium because the quality of this freedom in practice will define the quality of deliberation
in our democratic society.
COMELEC’s notice and letter affect preferred speech. Respondents’ acts are capable of repetition. Under the
conditions in which it was issued and in view of the novelty of this case,it could result in a "chilling effect" that would
affect other citizens who want their voices heard on issues during the elections. Other citizens who wish to express
their views regarding the election and other related issues may choose not to, for fear of reprisal or sanction by the
COMELEC. Direct resort to this court is allowed to avoid such proscribed conditions. Rule 65 is also the procedural
platform for raising grave abuse of discretion.
Both parties point to constitutional provisions on jurisdiction. For petitioners, it referred to this court’s expanded
exercise of certiorari as provided by the Constitution as follows:
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether ornot there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.56 (Emphasis supplied)
On the other hand, respondents relied on its constitutional mandate to decide all questions affectingelections. Article
IX-C, Section 2(3) of the Constitution, provides:
Sec. 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and functions:
....
(3) Decide, except those involving the right to vote, all questions affecting elections, including determination of the
number and location of polling places, appointment of election officials and inspectors, and registration of voters.
Respondents’ reliance on this provision is misplaced.
We are not confronted here with the question of whether the COMELEC, in its exercise of jurisdiction, gravely abused
it. We are confronted with the question as to whether the COMELEC had any jurisdiction at all with its acts threatening
imminent criminal action effectively abridging meaningful political speech.
It is clear that the subject matter of the controversy is the effect of COMELEC’s notice and letter on free speech. This
does not fall under Article IX-C, Section 2(3) of the Constitution. The use of the word "affecting" in this provision cannot
be interpreted to mean that COMELEC has the exclusive power to decide any and allquestions that arise during
elections. COMELEC’s constitutional competencies during elections should not operate to divest this court of its own
jurisdiction.
The more relevant provision for jurisdiction in this case is Article VIII, Section 5(1) of the Constitution.This provision
provides for this court’s original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari and prohibition. This should be read alongside
the expanded jurisdiction of the court in Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution.
Certainly, a breach of the fundamental right of expression by COMELEC is grave abuse of discretion. Thus, the
constitutionality of the notice and letter coming from COMELEC is within this court’s power to review.
During elections, we have the power and the duty to correct any grave abuse of discretion or any act tainted with
unconstitutionality on the part of any government branch or instrumentality. This includes actions by the COMELEC.
Furthermore, it is this court’s constitutional mandate to protect the people against government’s infringement of their
fundamental rights. This constitutional mandate out weighs the jurisdiction vested with the COMELEC.
It will, thus, be manifest injustice if the court does not take jurisdiction over this case.
I.C
Hierarchy of courts
This brings us to the issue of whether petitioners violated the doctrine of hierarchy of courts in directly filing their
petition before this court.
Respondents contend that petitioners’ failure to file the proper suit with a lower court of concurrent jurisdiction is
sufficient ground for the dismissal of their petition.57 They add that observation of the hierarchy of courts is compulsory,
citing Heirs of Bertuldo Hinog v. Melicor.58 While respondents claim that while there are exceptions to the general rule
on hierarchy of courts, none of these are present in this case.59
On the other hand, petitioners cite Fortich v. Corona60 on this court’s discretionary power to take cognizance of a
petition filed directly to it if warranted by "compelling reasons, or [by] the nature and importance of the issues raised.
. . ."61 Petitioners submit that there are "exceptional and compelling reasons to justify a direct resort [with] this Court."62
In Bañez, Jr. v. Concepcion,63 we explained the necessity of the application of the hierarchy of courts:
The Court must enjoin the observance of the policy on the hierarchy of courts, and now affirms that the policy is not
to be ignored without serious consequences. The strictness of the policy is designed to shield the Court from having
to deal with causes that are also well within the competence of the lower courts, and thus leave time to the Court to
deal with the more fundamental and more essential tasks that the Constitution has assigned to it. The Court may act
on petitions for the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus only when absolutely necessary or
when serious and important reasons exist to justify an exception to the policy.64
In Bañez, we also elaborated on the reasons why lower courts are allowed to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, and
mandamus, citing Vergara v. Suelto:65
The Supreme Court is a court of lastresort, and must so remain if it is to satisfactorily perform the functions assigned
to it by the fundamental charter and immemorial tradition. It cannot and should not be burdened with the task of dealing
with causes in the first instance. Its original jurisdiction to issue the so-called extraordinary writs should be exercised
only where absolutely necessary or where serious and important reasons exist therefore. Hence, that jurisdiction
should generally be exercised relative to actions or proceedings before the Court of Appeals, or before constitutional
or other tribunals, bodies or agencies whose acts for some reason or another are not controllable by the Court of
Appeals. Where the issuance of an extraordinary writ is also within the competence of the Court of Appeals or a

25
Regional Trial Court, it is in either of these courts that the specific action for the writ’s procurement must be presented.
This is and should continue to be the policy in this regard, a policy that courts and lawyers must strictly observe.66
(Emphasis omitted)
The doctrine that requires respect for the hierarchy of courts was created by this court to ensure that every level of
the judiciary performs its designated roles in an effective and efficient manner. Trial courts do not only determine the
facts from the evaluation of the evidence presented before them. They are likewise competent to determine issues of
law which may include the validity of an ordinance, statute, or even an executive issuance in relation to the
Constitution.67 To effectively perform these functions, they are territorially organized into regions and then into
branches. Their writs generally reach within those territorial boundaries. Necessarily, they mostly perform the all-
important task of inferring the facts from the evidence as these are physically presented before them. In many
instances, the facts occur within their territorial jurisdiction, which properly present the ‘actual case’ that makes ripe a
determination of the constitutionality of such action. The consequences, of course, would be national in scope. There
are, however, some cases where resort to courts at their level would not be practical considering their decisions could
still be appealed before the higher courts, such as the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals is primarily designed as an appellate court that reviews the determination of facts and law made
by the trial courts. It is collegiate in nature. This nature ensures more standpoints in the review of the actions of the
trial court. But the Court of Appeals also has original jurisdiction over most special civil actions. Unlike the trial courts,
its writs can have a nationwide scope. It is competent to determine facts and, ideally, should act on constitutional
issues thatmay not necessarily be novel unless there are factual questions to determine.
This court, on the other hand, leads the judiciary by breaking new ground or further reiterating — in the light of new
circumstances or in the light of some confusions of bench or bar — existing precedents. Rather than a court of first
instance or as a repetition of the actions of the Court of Appeals, this court promulgates these doctrinal devices in
order that it truly performs that role.
In other words, the Supreme Court’s role to interpret the Constitution and act in order to protect constitutional rights
when these become exigent should not be emasculated by the doctrine in respect of the hierarchy of courts. That has
never been the purpose of such doctrine.
Thus, the doctrine of hierarchy of courts is not an iron-clad rule.68 This court has "full discretionary power to take
cognizance and assume jurisdiction [over] special civil actions for certiorari . . .filed directly with it for exceptionally
compelling reasons69 or if warranted by the nature of the issues clearly and specifically raised in the petition." 70 As
correctly pointed out by petitioners,71 we have provided exceptions to this doctrine:
First, a direct resort to this court is allowed when there are genuine issues of constitutionality that must be addressed
at the most immediate time. A direct resort to this court includes availing of the remedies of certiorari and prohibition
toassail the constitutionality of actions of both legislative and executive branches of the government.72
In this case, the assailed issuances of respondents prejudice not only petitioners’ right to freedom of expression in
the present case, but also of others in future similar cases. The case before this court involves an active effort on the
part of the electorate to reform the political landscape. This has become a rare occasion when private citizens actively
engage the public in political discourse. To quote an eminent political theorist:
[T]he theory of freedom of expression involves more than a technique for arriving at better social judgments through
democratic procedures. It comprehends a vision of society, a faith and a whole way of life. The theory grew out of an
age that was awakened and invigorated by the idea of new society in which man's mind was free, his fate determined
by his own powers of reason, and his prospects of creating a rational and enlightened civilization virtually unlimited. It
is put forward as a prescription for attaining a creative, progressive, exciting and intellectually robust community. It
contemplates a mode of life that, through encouraging toleration, skepticism, reason and initiative, will allow man to
realize his full potentialities.It spurns the alternative of a society that is tyrannical, conformist, irrational and stagnant.73
In a democracy, the citizen’s right tofreely participate in the exchange of ideas in furtherance of political decision-
making is recognized. It deserves the highest protection the courts may provide, as public participation in nation-
building isa fundamental principle in our Constitution. As such, their right to engage in free expression of ideas must
be given immediate protection by this court.
A second exception is when the issuesinvolved are of transcendental importance.74 In these cases, the imminence
and clarity of the threat to fundamental constitutional rights outweigh the necessity for prudence. The doctrine relating
to constitutional issues of transcendental importance prevents courts from the paralysis of procedural niceties when
clearly faced with the need for substantial protection.
In the case before this court, there is a clear threat to the paramount right of freedom of speech and freedom of
expression which warrants invocation of relief from this court. The principles laid down in this decision will likely
influence the discourse of freedom of speech in the future, especially in the context of elections. The right to suffrage
not only includes the right to vote for one’s chosen candidate, but also the right to vocalize that choice to the public in
general, in the hope of influencing their votes. It may be said that in an election year, the right to vote necessarily
includes the right to free speech and expression. The protection of these fundamental constitutional rights, therefore,
allows for the immediate resort to this court.
Third, cases of first impression75 warrant a direct resort to this court. In cases of first impression, no jurisprudence yet
exists that will guide the lower courts on this matter. In Government of the United States v. Purganan,76 this court took
cognizance of the case as a matter of first impression that may guide the lower courts:
In the interest of justice and to settle once and for all the important issue of bail in extradition proceedings, we deem
it best to take cognizance of the present case. Such proceedings constitute a matter of first impression over which
there is, as yet, no local jurisprudence to guide lower courts.77
This court finds that this is indeed a case of first impression involving as it does the issue of whether the right of
suffrage includes the right of freedom of expression. This is a question which this court has yet to provide substantial
answers to, through jurisprudence. Thus, direct resort to this court is allowed.
Fourth, the constitutional issues raisedare better decided by this court. In Drilon v. Lim,78 this court held that:
. . . it will be prudent for such courts, if only out of a becoming modesty, to defer to the higher judgmentof this Court
in the consideration of its validity, which is better determined after a thorough deliberation by a collegiate body and
with the concurrence of the majority of those who participated in its discussion.79 (Citation omitted)

26
In this case, it is this court, with its constitutionally enshrined judicial power, that can rule with finality on whether
COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion or performed acts contrary to the Constitution through the assailed
issuances.
Fifth, the time element presented in this case cannot be ignored. This case was filed during the 2013 election period.
Although the elections have already been concluded, future cases may be filed that necessitate urgency in its
resolution. Exigency in certain situations would qualify as an exception for direct resort to this court.
Sixth, the filed petition reviews the act of a constitutional organ. COMELEC is a constitutional body. In Albano v.
Arranz,80 cited by petitioners, this court held that "[i]t is easy to realize the chaos that would ensue if the Court of First
Instance ofeach and every province were [to] arrogate itself the power to disregard, suspend, or contradict any order
of the Commission on Elections: that constitutional body would be speedily reduced to impotence."81
In this case, if petitioners sought to annul the actions of COMELEC through pursuing remedies with the lower courts,
any ruling on their part would not have been binding for other citizens whom respondents may place in the same
situation. Besides, thiscourt affords great respect to the Constitution and the powers and duties imposed upon
COMELEC. Hence, a ruling by this court would be in the best interest of respondents, in order that their actions may
be guided accordingly in the future.
Seventh, petitioners rightly claim that they had no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law that could free them from the injurious effects of respondents’ acts in violation of their right to freedom of
expression.
In this case, the repercussions of the assailed issuances on this basic right constitute an exceptionally compelling
reason to justify the direct resort to this court. The lack of other sufficient remedies in the course of law alone is
sufficient ground to allow direct resort to this court.
Eighth, the petition includes questionsthat are "dictated by public welfare and the advancement of public policy, or
demanded by the broader interest of justice, or the orders complained of were found to be patent nullities, or the
appeal was consideredas clearly an inappropriate remedy."82 In the past, questions similar to these which this court
ruled on immediately despite the doctrine of hierarchy of courts included citizens’ right to bear arms, 83 government
contracts involving modernization of voters’ registration lists,84 and the status and existence of a public office.85
This case also poses a question of similar, if not greater import. Hence, a direct action to this court is permitted.
It is not, however, necessary that all of these exceptions must occur at the same time to justify a direct resort to this
court. While generally, the hierarchy of courts is respected, the present case falls under the recognized exceptions
and, as such, may be resolved by this court directly.
I.D
The concept of a political question
Respondents argue further that the size limitation and its reasonableness is a political question, hence not within the
ambit of this court’s power of review. They cite Justice Vitug’s separate opinion in Osmeña v. COMELEC86 to support
their position:
It might be worth mentioning that Section 26, Article II, of the Constitution also states that the "State shall guarantee
equal access to opportunities for public service, and prohibit political dynasties as may be defined by law." I see
neither Article IX (C)(4) nor Section 26, Article II, of the Constitution to be all that adversarial or irreconcilably
inconsistent with the right of free expression. In any event, the latter, being one of general application, must yield to
the specific demands of the Constitution. The freedom of expression concededly holds, it is true, a vantage point in
hierarchy of constitutionally-enshrined rights but, like all fundamental rights, it is not without limitations.
The case is not about a fight between the "rich" and the "poor" or between the "powerful" and the "weak" in our society
but it is to me a genuine attempt on the part of Congress and the Commission on Elections to ensure that all candidates
are given an equal chance to media coverage and thereby be equally perceived as giving real life to the candidates’
right of free expression rather than being viewed as an undue restriction of that freedom. The wisdom in the enactment
of the law, i.e., that which the legislature deems to be best in giving life to the Constitutional mandate, is not for the
Court to question; it is a matter that lies beyond the normal prerogatives of the Court to pass upon.87
This separate opinion is cogent for the purpose it was said. But it is not in point in this case.
The present petition does not involve a dispute between the rich and poor, or the powerful and weak, on their equal
opportunities for media coverage of candidates and their right to freedom of expression. This case concerns the right
of petitioners, who are non-candidates, to post the tarpaulin in their private property, asan exercise of their right of
free expression. Despite the invocation of the political question doctrine by respondents, this court is not proscribed
from deciding on the merits of this case.
In Tañada v. Cuenco,88 this court previously elaborated on the concept of what constitutes a political question:
What is generally meant, when it is said that a question is political, and not judicial, is that it is a matter which is to be
exercised by the people in their primary political capacity, or that it has been specifically delegated to some other
department or particular officer of the government, withdiscretionary power to act.89 (Emphasis omitted)
It is not for this court to rehearse and re-enact political debates on what the text of the law should be. In political
forums, particularly the legislature, the creation of the textof the law is based on a general discussion of factual
circumstances, broadly construed in order to allow for general application by the executive branch. Thus, the creation
of the law is not limited by particular and specific facts that affect the rights of certain individuals, per se.
Courts, on the other hand, rule on adversarial positions based on existing facts established on a specific case-to-case
basis, where parties affected by the legal provision seek the courts’ understanding of the law.
The complementary nature of the political and judicial branches of government is essential in order to ensure that the
rights of the general public are upheld at all times. In order to preserve this balance, branches of government must
afford due respectand deference for the duties and functions constitutionally delegated to the other. Courts cannot
rush to invalidate a law or rule. Prudence dictates that we are careful not to veto political acts unless we can craft
doctrine narrowly tailored to the circumstances of the case.
The case before this court does not call for the exercise of prudence or modesty. There is no political question. It can
be acted upon by this court through the expanded jurisdiction granted to this court through Article VIII, Section 1 of
the Constitution.
A political question arises in constitutional issues relating to the powers or competence of different agencies and
departments of the executive or those of the legislature. The political question doctrine is used as a defense when the
petition asks this court to nullify certain acts that are exclusively within the domain of their respective competencies,
27
as provided by the Constitution or the law. In such situation, presumptively, this court should act with deference. It will
decline to void an act unless the exercise of that power was so capricious and arbitrary so as to amount to grave
abuse of discretion.
The concept of a political question, however, never precludes judicial review when the act of a constitutional organ
infringes upon a fundamental individual or collective right. Even assuming arguendo that the COMELEC did have the
discretion to choose the manner of regulation of the tarpaulin in question, it cannot do so by abridging the fundamental
right to expression.
Marcos v. Manglapus90 limited the use of the political question doctrine:
When political questions are involved, the Constitution limits the determination to whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the official whose action is being
questioned. If grave abuse is not established, the Court will not substitute its judgment for that of the official concerned
and decide a matter which by its nature or by law is for the latter alone to decide.91
How this court has chosen to address the political question doctrine has undergone an evolution since the timethat it
had been first invoked in Marcos v. Manglapus. Increasingly, this court has taken the historical and social context of
the case and the relevance of pronouncements of carefully and narrowly tailored constitutional doctrines. This trend
was followed in cases such as Daza v. Singson92 and Coseteng v. Mitra Jr.93
Daza and Coseteng involved a question as to the application of Article VI, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution involving
the removal of petitioners from the Commission on Appointments. In times past, this would have involved a quint
essentially political question as it related to the dominance of political parties in Congress. However, in these cases,
this court exercised its power of judicial review noting that the requirement of interpreting the constitutional provision
involved the legality and not the wisdom of a manner by which a constitutional duty or power was exercised. This
approach was again reiterated in Defensor Santiago v. Guingona, Jr.94
In Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora,95 this court declared again that the possible existence ofa political
question did not bar an examination of whether the exercise of discretion was done with grave abuse of discretion. In
that case, this court ruled on the question of whether there was grave abuse of discretion in the President’s use of his
power to call out the armed forces to prevent and suppress lawless violence.
In Estrada v. Desierto,96 this court ruled that the legal question as to whether a former President resigned was not a
political question even if the consequences would be to ascertain the political legitimacy of a successor President.
Many constitutional cases arise from political crises. The actors in such crises may use the resolution of constitutional
issues as leverage. But the expanded jurisdiction of this court now mandates a duty for it to exercise its power of
judicial review expanding on principles that may avert catastrophe or resolve social conflict.
This court’s understanding of the political question has not been static or unbending. In Llamas v. Executive Secretary
Oscar Orbos,97 this court held:
While it is true that courts cannot inquire into the manner in which the President's discretionary powers are exercised
or into the wisdom for its exercise, it is also a settled rule that when the issue involved concerns the validity of such
discretionary powers or whether said powers are within the limits prescribed by the Constitution, We will not decline
to exercise our power of judicial review. And such review does not constitute a modification or correction of the act of
the President, nor does it constitute interference with the functions of the President.98
The concept of judicial power in relation to the concept of the political question was discussed most extensively in
Francisco v. HRET.99 In this case, the House of Representatives arguedthat the question of the validity of the second
impeachment complaint that was filed against former Chief Justice Hilario Davide was a political question beyond the
ambit of this court. Former Chief Justice Reynato Puno elaborated on this concept in his concurring and dissenting
opinion:
To be sure, the force to impugn the jurisdiction of this Court becomes more feeble in light of the new Constitution
which expanded the definition of judicial power as including "the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there
has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government." As well observed by retired Justice Isagani Cruz, this expanded definition of
judicial power considerably constricted the scope of political question. He opined that the language luminously
suggests that this duty (and power) is available even against the executive and legislative departments including the
President and the Congress, in the exercise of their discretionary powers.100 (Emphasis in the original, citations
omitted)
Francisco also provides the cases which show the evolution of the political question, as applied in the following cases:
In Marcos v. Manglapus, this Court, speaking through Madame Justice Irene Cortes, held: The present Constitution
limits resort to the political question doctrine and broadens the scope of judicial inquiry into areas which the
Court,under previous constitutions, would have normally left to the political departments to decide. x x x
In Bengzon v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, through Justice Teodoro Padilla, this Court declared:
The "allocation of constitutional boundaries" is a task that this Court must perform under the Constitution. Moreover,
as held in a recent case, "(t)he political question doctrine neither interposes an obstacle to judicial determination of
the rival claims. The jurisdiction to delimit constitutional boundaries has been given to this Court. It cannot abdicate
that obligation mandated by the 1987 Constitution, although said provision by no means does away with the
applicability of the principle in appropriate cases." (Emphasis and italics supplied)
And in Daza v. Singson, speaking through Justice Isagani Cruz, this Court ruled:
In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection becomes even less tenable and decisive. The reason is that,
even if we were to assume that the issue presented before us was political in nature, we would still not be precluded
from resolving it under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us that now covers, in proper cases, even the political
question.x x x (Emphasis and italics supplied.)
....
In our jurisdiction, the determination of whether an issue involves a truly political and non-justiciable question lies in
the answer to the question of whether there are constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon
political bodies. If there are, then our courts are duty-bound to examine whether the branch or instrumentality of the
government properly acted within such limits.101 (Citations omitted)

28
As stated in Francisco, a political question will not be considered justiciable if there are no constitutionally imposed
limits on powers or functions conferred upon political bodies. Hence, the existence of constitutionally imposed limits
justifies subjecting the official actions of the body to the scrutiny and review of this court.
In this case, the Bill of Rights gives the utmost deference to the right to free speech. Any instance that this right may
be abridged demands judicial scrutiny. It does not fall squarely into any doubt that a political question brings.
I.E
Exhaustion of administrative remedies
Respondents allege that petitioners violated the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies. Respondents insist
that petitioners should have first brought the matter to the COMELEC En Banc or any of its divisions.102
Respondents point out that petitioners failed to comply with the requirement in Rule 65 that "there is no appeal, or any
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law."103 They add that the proper venue to assail the
validity of the assailed issuances was in the course of an administrative hearing to be conducted by COMELEC.104 In
the event that an election offense is filed against petitioners for posting the tarpaulin, they claim that petitioners should
resort to the remedies prescribed in Rule 34 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.105
The argument on exhaustion of administrative remedies is not proper in this case.
Despite the alleged non-exhaustion of administrative remedies, it is clear that the controversy is already ripe for
adjudication. Ripeness is the "prerequisite that something had by then been accomplished or performed by either
branch [or in this case, organ of government] before a court may come into the picture."106
Petitioners’ exercise of their rightto speech, given the message and their medium, had understandable relevance
especially during the elections. COMELEC’s letter threatening the filing of the election offense against petitioners is
already an actionable infringement of this right. The impending threat of criminal litigation is enough to curtail
petitioners’ speech.
In the context of this case, exhaustion of their administrative remedies as COMELEC suggested in their pleadings
prolongs the violation of their freedom of speech.
Political speech enjoys preferred protection within our constitutional order. In Chavez v. Gonzales, 107 Justice Carpio
in a separate opinion emphasized: "[i]f everthere is a hierarchy of protected expressions, political expression would
occupy the highest rank, and among different kinds of political expression, the subject of fair and honest elections
would be at the top."108 Sovereignty resides in the people.109 Political speech is a direct exercise of the sovereignty.
The principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies yields in order to protect this fundamental right.
Even assuming that the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies is applicable, the current controversy is
within the exceptions to the principle. In Chua v. Ang,110 this court held:
On the other hand, prior exhaustion of administrative remedies may be dispensed with and judicial action may be
validly resorted to immediately: (a) when there is a violation of due process; (b) when the issue involved is purely a
legal question; (c) when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; (d)
when there is estoppel on the part ofthe administrative agency concerned; (e) when there is irreparable injury; (f)
when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as analter ego of the President bear the implied and
assumed approval of the latter; (g) when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable; (h)
when it would amount to a nullification of a claim; (i) when the subject matter is a private land in land case proceedings;
(j) whenthe rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy; or (k) when there are circumstances indicating
the urgency of judicial intervention."111 (Emphasis supplied, citation omitted)
The circumstances emphasized are squarely applicable with the present case. First, petitioners allegethat the assailed
issuances violated their right to freedom of expression and the principle of separation of church and state. This is a
purely legal question. Second, the circumstances of the present case indicate the urgency of judicial intervention
considering the issue then on the RH Law as well as the upcoming elections. Thus, to require the exhaustion of
administrative remedies in this case would be unreasonable.
Time and again, we have held that this court "has the power to relax or suspend the rules or to except a case from
their operation when compelling reasons so warrant, or whenthe purpose of justice requires it, [and when] [w]hat
constitutes [as] good and sufficient cause that will merit suspension of the rules is discretionary upon the court".112
Certainly, this case of first impression where COMELEC has threatenedto prosecute private parties who seek to
participate in the elections by calling attention to issues they want debated by the publicin the manner they feel would
be effective is one of those cases.
II
SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES
II.A
COMELEC had no legal basis to regulate expressions made by private citizens
Respondents cite the Constitution, laws, and jurisprudence to support their position that they had the power to regulate
the tarpaulin.113 However, all of these provisions pertain to candidates and political parties. Petitioners are not
candidates. Neither do theybelong to any political party. COMELEC does not have the authority to regulate the
enjoyment of the preferred right to freedom of expression exercised by a non-candidate in this case.
II.A.1
First, respondents cite Article IX-C, Section 4 of the Constitution, which provides:
Section 4. The Commission may,during the election period, supervise or regulate the enjoyment or utilization of all
franchises or permits for the operation of transportation and other public utilities, media of communication or
information, all grants, special privileges, or concessions granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality thereof, including any government-owned or controlled corporation or its subsidiary. Such supervision
or regulation shall aim to ensure equal opportunity, time, and space, and the right to reply, including reasonable, equal
rates therefor, for public information campaigns and forums among candidates in connection with the objective of
holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections.114 (Emphasis supplied)
Sanidad v. COMELEC115 involved the rules promulgated by COMELEC during the plebiscite for the creation of the
Cordillera Autonomous Region.116 Columnist Pablito V. Sanidad questioned the provision prohibiting journalists from
covering plebiscite issues on the day before and on plebiscite day.117 Sanidad argued that the prohibition was a
violation of the "constitutional guarantees of the freedom of expression and of the press. . . ."118 We held that the "evil
sought to be prevented by this provision is the possibility that a franchise holder may favor or give any undue
29
advantage to a candidate in terms of advertising space or radio or television time." 119 This court found that "[m]edia
practitioners exercising their freedom of expression during plebiscite periods are neither the franchise holders nor the
candidates[,]"120 thus, their right to expression during this period may not be regulated by COMELEC.121
Similar to the media, petitioners in the case at bar are neither franchise holders nor candidates. II.A.2
Respondents likewise cite Article IX-C, Section 2(7) of the Constitution as follows:122
Sec. 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and functions:
....
(7) Recommend to the Congress effective measures to minimize election spending, including limitation of places
where propaganda materials shall be posted, and to prevent and penalize all forms of election frauds, offenses,
malpractices, and nuisance candidates. (Emphasis supplied) Based on the enumeration made on actsthat may be
penalized, it will be inferred that this provision only affects candidates.
Petitioners assail the "Notice to Remove Campaign Materials" issued by COMELEC. This was followed bythe assailed
letter regarding the "election propaganda material posted on the church vicinity promoting for or against the candidates
and party-list groups. . . ."123
Section 9 of the Fair Election Act124 on the posting of campaign materials only mentions "parties" and "candidates":
Sec. 9. Posting of Campaign Materials. - The COMELEC may authorize political parties and party-list groups to erect
common poster areas for their candidates in not more than ten (10) public places such as plazas, markets, barangay
centers and the like, wherein candidates can post, display or exhibit election propaganda: Provided, That the size
ofthe poster areas shall not exceed twelve (12) by sixteen (16) feet or its equivalent. Independent candidates with no
political parties may likewise be authorized to erect common poster areas in not more than ten (10) public places, the
size of which shall not exceed four (4) by six (6) feet or its equivalent. Candidates may post any lawful propaganda
material in private places with the consent of the owner thereof, and in public places or property which shall be
allocated equitably and impartially among the candidates. (Emphasis supplied)
Similarly, Section 17 of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615, the rules and regulations implementing the Fair Election Act,
provides as follows:
SECTION 17. Posting of Campaign Materials. - Parties and candidates may post any lawful campaign material in:

a. Authorized common poster areasin public places subject to the requirements and/or limitations set forth in the next
following section; and

b. Private places provided it has the consent of the owner thereof.

The posting of campaign materials in public places outside of the designated common poster areas and those
enumerated under Section 7 (g) of these Rules and the like is prohibited. Persons posting the same shall be liable
together with the candidates and other persons who caused the posting. It will be presumed that the candidates and
parties caused the posting of campaign materials outside the common poster areas if they do not remove the same
within three (3) days from notice which shall be issued by the Election Officer of the city or municipality where the
unlawful election propaganda are posted or displayed.
Members of the PNP and other law enforcement agencies called upon by the Election Officeror other officials of the
COMELEC shall apprehend the violators caught in the act, and file the appropriate charges against them. (Emphasis
supplied)
Respondents considered the tarpaulin as a campaign material in their issuances. The above provisions regulating the
posting of campaign materials only apply to candidates and political parties, and petitioners are neither of the two.
Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9006on "Lawful Election Propaganda" also states that these are "allowed for all
registered political parties, national, regional, sectoral parties or organizations participating under the party-list
elections and for all bona fide candidates seeking national and local elective positions subject to the limitation on
authorized expenses of candidates and political parties. . . ." Section 6 of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 provides
for a similar wording. These provisions show that election propaganda refers to matter done by or on behalf of and in
coordination with candidates and political parties. Some level of coordination with the candidates and political parties
for whom the election propaganda are released would ensure that these candidates and political parties maintain
within the authorized expenses limitation.
The tarpaulin was not paid for byany candidate or political party.125 There was no allegation that petitioners
coordinated with any of the persons named in the tarpaulin regarding its posting. On the other hand, petitioners posted
the tarpaulin as part of their advocacy against the RH Law. Respondents also cite National Press Club v.
COMELEC126 in arguing that its regulatory power under the Constitution, to some extent, set a limit on the right to
free speech during election period.127
National Press Club involved the prohibition on the sale and donation of space and time for political advertisements,
limiting political advertisements to COMELEC-designated space and time. This case was brought by representatives
of mass media and two candidates for office in the 1992 elections. They argued that the prohibition on the sale and
donation of space and time for political advertisements is tantamount to censorship, which necessarily infringes on
the freedom of speech of the candidates.128
This court upheld the constitutionality of the COMELEC prohibition in National Press Club. However, this case does
not apply as most of the petitioners were electoral candidates, unlike petitioners in the instant case. Moreover, the
subject matter of National Press Club, Section 11(b) of Republic Act No. 6646,129 only refers to a particular kind of
media such as newspapers, radio broadcasting, or television.130 Justice Feliciano emphasized that the provision did
not infringe upon the right of reporters or broadcasters to air their commentaries and opinions regarding the
candidates, their qualifications, and program for government. Compared to Sanidadwherein the columnists lost their
ability to give their commentary on the issues involving the plebiscite, National Press Clubdoes not involve the same
infringement.
In the case at bar, petitioners lost their ability to give a commentary on the candidates for the 2013 national elections
because of the COMELEC notice and letter. It was not merelya regulation on the campaigns of candidates vying for
public office. Thus, National Press Clubdoes not apply to this case.

30
Finally, Section 79 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code, defines an"election
campaign" as follows:
....
(b) The term "election campaign" or "partisan political activity" refers to an act designed to promote the election or
defeat of a particular candidate or candidates to a public office which shall include:

(1) Forming organizations, associations, clubs, committees or other groups of persons for the purpose of soliciting
votes and/or undertaking any campaign for or against a candidate;

(2) Holding political caucuses, conferences, meetings, rallies, parades, or other similar assemblies, for the purpose of
soliciting votes and/or undertaking any campaign or propaganda for or against a candidate;

(3) Making speeches, announcements or commentaries, or holding interviews for or against the election of any
candidate for public office;

(4) Publishing or distributing campaign literature or materials designed to support or oppose the election of any
candidate; or

(5) Directly or indirectly soliciting votes, pledges or support for or against a candidate.

The foregoing enumerated acts ifperformed for the purpose of enhancing the chances of aspirants for nomination for
candidacy to a public office by a political party, aggroupment, or coalition of parties shall not be considered as election
campaign or partisan election activity. Public expressions or opinions or discussions of probable issues in a
forthcoming electionor on attributes of or criticisms against probable candidates proposed to be nominated in a
forthcoming political party convention shall not be construed as part of any election campaign or partisan political
activity contemplated under this Article. (Emphasis supplied)
True, there is no mention whether election campaign is limited only to the candidates and political parties themselves.
The focus of the definition is that the act must be "designed to promote the election or defeat of a particular candidate
or candidates to a public office."
In this case, the tarpaulin contains speech on a matter of public concern, that is, a statement of either appreciation or
criticism on votes made in the passing of the RH law. Thus, petitioners invoke their right to freedom of expression.
II.B
The violation of the constitutional right
to freedom of speech and expression
Petitioners contend that the assailed notice and letter for the removal of the tarpaulin violate their fundamental right
to freedom of expression.
On the other hand, respondents contend that the tarpaulin is an election propaganda subject to their regulation
pursuant to their mandate under Article IX-C, Section 4 of the Constitution. Thus, the assailed notice and letter ordering
itsremoval for being oversized are valid and constitutional.131
II.B.1
Fundamental to the consideration of this issue is Article III, Section 4 of the Constitution:
Section 4. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right of the
people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances.132
No law. . .
While it is true that the present petition assails not a law but an opinion by the COMELEC Law Department, this court
has applied Article III, Section 4 of the Constitution even to governmental acts.
In Primicias v. Fugoso,133 respondent Mayor applied by analogy Section 1119 of the Revised Ordinances of 1927 of
Manila for the public meeting and assembly organized by petitioner Primicias.134 Section 1119 requires a Mayor’s
permit for the use of streets and public places for purposes such as athletic games, sports, or celebration of national
holidays.135 What was questioned was not a law but the Mayor’s refusal to issue a permit for the holding of petitioner’s
public meeting.136 Nevertheless, this court recognized the constitutional right to freedom of speech, to peaceful
assembly and to petition for redress of grievances, albeit not absolute,137 and the petition for mandamus to compel
respondent Mayor to issue the permit was granted.138
In ABS-CBN v. COMELEC, what was assailed was not a law but COMELEC En Banc Resolution No. 98-1419 where
the COMELEC resolved to approve the issuance of a restraining order to stop ABS-CBN from conducting exit
surveys.139 The right to freedom of expression was similarly upheld in this case and, consequently, the assailed
resolution was nullified and set aside.140
. . . shall be passed abridging. . .
All regulations will have an impact directly or indirectly on expression. The prohibition against the abridgment of speech
should not mean an absolute prohibition against regulation. The primary and incidental burden on speech must be
weighed against a compelling state interest clearly allowed in the Constitution. The test depends on the relevant theory
of speech implicit in the kind of society framed by our Constitution.
. . . of expression. . .
Our Constitution has also explicitly included the freedom of expression, separate and in addition to the freedom of
speech and of the press provided in the US Constitution. The word "expression" was added in the 1987 Constitution
by Commissioner Brocka for having a wider scope:
MR. BROCKA: This is a very minor amendment, Mr. Presiding Officer. On Section 9, page 2, line 29, it says: "No law
shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech." I would like to recommend to the Committee the change of the
word "speech" to EXPRESSION; or if not, add the words AND EXPRESSION after the word "speech," because it is
more expansive, it has a wider scope, and it would refer to means of expression other than speech.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.Bengzon): What does the Committee say?
FR. BERNAS: "Expression" is more broad than speech. We accept it.
MR. BROCKA: Thank you.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.Bengzon): Is it accepted?
31
FR. BERNAS: Yes.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.Bengzon): Is there any objection? (Silence) The Chair hears none; the amendment
is approved.
FR. BERNAS: So, that provision will now read: "No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, expression
or of the press . . . ."141 Speech may be said to be inextricably linked to freedom itself as "[t]he right to think is the
beginning of freedom, and speech must be protected from the government because speech is the beginning of
thought."142
II.B.2
Communication is an essential outcome of protected speech.143 Communication exists when "(1) a speaker, seeking
to signal others, uses conventional actions because he orshe reasonably believes that such actions will be taken by
the audience in the manner intended; and (2) the audience so takes the actions."144 "[I]n communicative action[,] the
hearer may respond to the claims by . . . either accepting the speech act’s claims or opposing them with criticism or
requests for justification."145
Speech is not limited to vocal communication. "[C]onduct is treated as a form of speech sometimes referred to as
‘symbolic speech[,]’"146 such that "‘when ‘speech’ and ‘nonspeech’ elements are combined in the same course of
conduct,’ the ‘communicative element’ of the conduct may be ‘sufficient to bring into play the [right to freedom of
expression].’"147
The right to freedom of expression, thus, applies to the entire continuum of speech from utterances made to conduct
enacted, and even to inaction itself as a symbolic manner of communication.
In Ebralinag v. The Division Superintendent of Schools of Cebu,148 students who were members of the religious sect
Jehovah’s Witnesses were to be expelled from school for refusing to salute the flag, sing the national anthem, and
recite the patriotic pledge.149 In his concurring opinion, Justice Cruz discussed how the salute is a symbolic manner
of communication and a valid form of expression.150 He adds that freedom of speech includes even the right to be
silent:
Freedom of speech includes the right to be silent. Aptly has it been said that the Bill of Rights that guarantees to the
individual the liberty to utter what is in his mind also guarantees to him the liberty not to utter what is not in his mind.
The salute is a symbolic manner of communication that conveys its messageas clearly as the written or spoken word.
As a valid form of expression, it cannot be compelled any more than it can be prohibited in the face of valid religious
objections like those raised in this petition. To impose it on the petitioners is to deny them the right not to speak when
their religion bids them to be silent. This coercion of conscience has no place in the free society.
The democratic system provides for the accommodation of diverse ideas, including the unconventional and even the
bizarre or eccentric. The will of the majority prevails, but it cannot regiment thought by prescribing the recitation by
rote of its opinions or proscribing the assertion of unorthodox or unpopular views as inthis case. The conscientious
objections of the petitioners, no less than the impatience of those who disagree with them, are protected by the
Constitution. The State cannot make the individual speak when the soul within rebels.151
Even before freedom "of expression" was included in Article III, Section 4 of the present Constitution,this court has
applied its precedent version to expressions other than verbal utterances.
In the 1985 case of Gonzalez v. Chairman Katigbak,152 petitioners objected to the classification of the motion picture
"Kapit sa Patalim" as "For Adults Only." They contend that the classification "is without legal and factual basis and is
exercised as impermissible restraint of artistic expression."153 This court recognized that "[m]otion pictures are
important both as a medium for the communication of ideas and the expression of the artistic impulse."154 It adds that
"every writer,actor, or producer, no matter what medium of expression he may use, should be freed from the
censor."155 This court found that "[the Board’s] perception of what constitutes obscenity appears to be unduly
restrictive."156 However, the petition was dismissed solely on the ground that there were not enough votes for a ruling
of grave abuse of discretion in the classification made by the Board.157
II.B.3
Size does matter
The form of expression is just as important as the information conveyed that it forms part of the expression. The
present case is in point.
It is easy to discern why size matters.
First, it enhances efficiency in communication. A larger tarpaulin allows larger fonts which make it easier to view its
messages from greater distances. Furthermore, a larger tarpaulin makes it easier for passengers inside moving
vehicles to read its content. Compared with the pedestrians, the passengers inside moving vehicles have lesser time
to view the content of a tarpaulin. The larger the fonts and images, the greater the probability that it will catch their
attention and, thus, the greater the possibility that they will understand its message.
Second, the size of the tarpaulin may underscore the importance of the message to the reader. From an ordinary
person’s perspective, those who post their messages in larger fonts care more about their message than those who
carry their messages in smaller media. The perceived importance given by the speakers, in this case petitioners, to
their cause is also part of the message. The effectivity of communication sometimes relies on the emphasis put by
the speakers and onthe credibility of the speakers themselves. Certainly, larger segments of the public may tend to
be more convinced of the point made by authoritative figures when they make the effort to emphasize their messages.
Third, larger spaces allow for more messages. Larger spaces, therefore, may translate to more opportunities to
amplify, explain, and argue points which the speakers might want to communicate. Rather than simply placing the
names and images of political candidates and an expression of support, larger spaces can allow for brief but
memorable presentations of the candidates’ platforms for governance. Larger spaces allow for more precise
inceptions of ideas, catalyze reactions to advocacies, and contribute more to a more educated and reasoned
electorate. A more educated electorate will increase the possibilities of both good governance and accountability in
our government.
These points become more salient when it is the electorate, not the candidates or the political parties, that speaks.
Too often, the terms of public discussion during elections are framed and kept hostage by brief and catchy but
meaningless sound bites extolling the character of the candidate. Worse, elections sideline political arguments and
privilege the endorsement by celebrities. Rather than provide obstacles to their speech, government should in fact

32
encourage it. Between the candidates and the electorate, the latter have the better incentive to demand discussion of
the more important issues. Between the candidates and the electorate, the former have better incentives to avoid
difficult political standpoints and instead focus on appearances and empty promises.
Large tarpaulins, therefore, are not analogous to time and place.158 They are fundamentally part of expression
protected under Article III, Section 4 of the Constitution.
II.B.4
There are several theories and schools of thought that strengthen the need to protect the basic right to freedom of
expression.
First, this relates to the right ofthe people to participate in public affairs, including the right to criticize government
actions.
Proponents of the political theory on "deliberative democracy" submit that "substantial, open, [and] ethical dialogue
isa critical, and indeed defining, feature of a good polity."159 This theory may be considered broad, but it definitely
"includes [a] collective decision making with the participation of all who will beaffected by the decision."160 It anchors
on the principle that the cornerstone of every democracy is that sovereignty resides in the people.161 To ensure order
in running the state’s affairs, sovereign powers were delegated and individuals would be elected or nominated in key
government positions to represent the people. On this note, the theory on deliberative democracy may evolve to the
right of the people to make government accountable. Necessarily, this includes the right of the people to criticize acts
made pursuant to governmental functions.
Speech that promotes dialogue on publicaffairs, or airs out grievances and political discontent, should thus be
protected and encouraged.
Borrowing the words of Justice Brandeis, "it is hazardous to discourage thought, hope and imagination; that fear
breeds repression; that repression breeds hate; that hate menaces stable government; that the path of safety lies in
the opportunity to discuss freely supposed grievances and proposed remedies."162
In this jurisdiction, this court held that "[t]he interest of society and the maintenance of good government demand a
full discussion of public affairs."163 This court has, thus, adopted the principle that "debate on public issues should be
uninhibited, robust,and wide open . . . [including even] unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public
officials."164
Second, free speech should be encouraged under the concept of a market place of ideas. This theory was articulated
by Justice Holmes in that "the ultimate good desired is better reached by [the] free trade in ideas:"165
When men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may come to believe even more than they
believe the very foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in
ideas - that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market, and
that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out.166
The way it works, the exposure to the ideas of others allows one to "consider, test, and develop their own
conclusions."167 A free, open, and dynamic market place of ideas is constantly shaping new ones. This promotes both
stability and change where recurring points may crystallize and weak ones may develop. Of course, free speech is
more than the right to approve existing political beliefs and economic arrangements as it includes, "[t]o paraphrase
Justice Holmes, [the] freedom for the thought that we hate, no less than for the thought that agrees with us."168 In
fact, free speech may "best serve its high purpose when it induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with
conditions as they are, or even stirs people to anger."169 It is in this context that we should guard against any
curtailment of the people’s right to participate in the free trade of ideas.
Third, free speech involves self-expression that enhances human dignity. This right is "a means of assuring individual
self-fulfillment,"170 among others. In Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization v. Philippine Blooming Mills
Co., Inc,171 this court discussed as follows:
The rights of free expression, free assembly and petition, are not only civil rights but also political rights essential to
man's enjoyment of his life, to his happiness and to his full and complete fulfillment.Thru these freedoms the citizens
can participate not merely in the periodic establishment of the government through their suffrage but also in the
administration of public affairs as well as in the discipline of abusive public officers. The citizen is accorded these
rights so that he can appeal to the appropriate governmental officers or agencies for redress and protection as well
as for the imposition of the lawful sanctions on erring public officers and employees.172 (Emphasis supplied)
Fourth, expression is a marker for group identity. For one, "[v]oluntary associations perform [an] important democratic
role [in providing] forums for the development of civil skills, for deliberation, and for the formation of identity and
community spirit[,] [and] are largely immune from [any] governmental interference."173 They also "provide a buffer
between individuals and the state - a free space for the development of individual personality, distinct group identity,
and dissident ideas - and a potential source of opposition to the state."174 Free speech must be protected as the
vehicle to find those who have similar and shared values and ideals, to join together and forward common goals.
Fifth, the Bill of Rights, free speech included, is supposed to "protect individuals and minorities against majoritarian
abuses perpetrated through [the] framework [of democratic governance]."175 Federalist framers led by James Madison
were concerned about two potentially vulnerable groups: "the citizenry at large - majorities - who might be tyrannized
or plundered by despotic federal officials"176 and the minorities who may be oppressed by "dominant factions of the
electorate [that] capture [the] government for their own selfish ends[.]"177 According to Madison, "[i]t is of great
importance in a republic not only to guard the society against the oppression of its rulers, but to guard one part of the
society against the injustice of the other part."178 We should strive to ensure that free speech is protected especially
in light of any potential oppression against those who find themselves in the fringes on public issues.
Lastly, free speech must be protected under the safety valve theory.179 This provides that "nonviolent manifestations
of dissent reduce the likelihood of violence[.]"180 "[A] dam about to burst . . . resulting in the ‘banking up of a menacing
flood of sullen anger behind the walls of restriction’"181 has been used to describe the effect of repressing nonviolent
outlets.182 In order to avoid this situation and prevent people from resorting to violence, there is a need for peaceful
methods in making passionate dissent. This includes "free expression and political participation" 183 in that they can
"vote for candidates who share their views, petition their legislatures to [make or] change laws, . . . distribute literature
alerting other citizens of their concerns[,]"184 and conduct peaceful rallies and other similar acts.185 Free speech must,
33
thus, be protected as a peaceful means of achieving one’s goal, considering the possibility that repression of
nonviolent dissent may spill over to violent means just to drive a point.
II.B.5
Every citizen’s expression with political consequences enjoys a high degree of protection. Respondents argue that
the tarpaulinis election propaganda, being petitioners’ way of endorsing candidates who voted against the RH Law
and rejecting those who voted for it.186 As such, it is subject to regulation by COMELEC under its constitutional
mandate.187 Election propaganda is defined under Section 1(4) of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 as follows:
SECTION 1. Definitions . . .
....
4. The term "political advertisement" or "election propaganda" refers to any matter broadcasted, published, printed,
displayed or exhibited, in any medium, which contain the name, image, logo, brand, insignia, color motif, initials, and
other symbol or graphic representation that is capable of being associated with a candidate or party, and is intended
to draw the attention of the public or a segment thereof to promote or oppose, directly or indirectly, the election of the
said candidate or candidates to a public office. In broadcast media, political advertisements may take the form of
spots, appearances on TV shows and radio programs, live or taped announcements, teasers, and other forms of
advertising messages or announcements used by commercial advertisers. Political advertising includes matters, not
falling within the scope of personal opinion, that appear on any Internet website, including, but not limited to, social
networks, blogging sites, and micro-blogging sites, in return for consideration, or otherwise capable of pecuniary
estimation.
On the other hand, petitioners invoke their "constitutional right to communicate their opinions, views and beliefs about
issues and candidates."188 They argue that the tarpaulin was their statement of approval and appreciation of the
named public officials’ act of voting against the RH Law, and their criticism toward those who voted in its favor.189 It
was "part of their advocacy campaign against the RH Law,"190 which was not paid for by any candidate or political
party.191 Thus, "the questioned orders which . . . effectively restrain[ed] and curtail[ed] [their] freedom of expression
should be declared unconstitutional and void."192
This court has held free speech and other intellectual freedoms as "highly ranked in our scheme of constitutional
values."193 These rights enjoy precedence and primacy.194 In Philippine Blooming Mills, this court discussed the
preferred position occupied by freedom of expression:
Property and property rights can belost thru prescription; but human rights are imprescriptible. If human rights are
extinguished by the passage of time, then the Bill of Rights is a useless attempt to limit the power of government and
ceases to be an efficacious shield against the tyranny of officials, of majorities, ofthe influential and powerful, and of
oligarchs - political, economic or otherwise.
In the hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights of free expression and of assembly occupy a preferred position as they are
essential to the preservation and vitality of our civil and political institutions; and such priority "gives these liberties the
sanctity and the sanction not permitting dubious intrusions."195 (Citations omitted)
This primordial right calls for utmost respect, more so "when what may be curtailed is the dissemination of information
to make more meaningful the equally vital right of suffrage."196 A similar idea appeared in our jurisprudence as early
as 1969, which was Justice Barredo’s concurring and dissenting opinion in Gonzales v. COMELEC:197
I like to reiterate over and over, for it seems this is the fundamental point others miss, that genuine democracy thrives
only where the power and right of the people toelect the men to whom they would entrust the privilege to run the
affairs of the state exist. In the language of the declaration of principles of our Constitution, "The Philippines is a
republican state. Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them" (Section 1,
Article II). Translating this declaration into actuality, the Philippines is a republic because and solely because the
people in it can be governed only by officials whom they themselves have placed in office by their votes. And in it is
on this cornerstone that I hold it tobe self-evident that when the freedoms of speech, press and peaceful assembly
and redress of grievances are being exercised in relation to suffrage or asa means to enjoy the inalienable right of the
qualified citizen to vote, they are absolute and timeless. If our democracy and republicanism are to be worthwhile, the
conduct of public affairs by our officials must be allowed to suffer incessant and unabating scrutiny, favorable or
unfavorable, everyday and at all times. Every holder of power in our government must be ready to undergo exposure
any moment of the day or night, from January to December every year, as it is only in this way that he can rightfully
gain the confidence of the people. I have no patience for those who would regard public dissection of the establishment
as an attribute to be indulged by the people only at certain periods of time. I consider the freedoms of speech, press
and peaceful assembly and redress of grievances, when exercised in the name of suffrage, as the very means by
which the right itself to vote can only be properly enjoyed.It stands to reason therefore, that suffrage itself would be
next to useless if these liberties cannot be untrammelled [sic] whether as to degree or time.198 (Emphasis supplied)
Not all speech are treated the same. In Chavez v. Gonzales, this court discussed that some types of speech may be
subject to regulation:
Some types of speech may be subjected to some regulation by the State under its pervasive police power, in order
that it may not be injurious to the equal right of others or those of the community or society. The difference in treatment
is expected because the relevant interests of one type of speech, e.g., political speech, may vary from those of
another, e.g., obscene speech. Distinctionshave therefore been made in the treatment, analysis, and evaluation ofthe
permissible scope of restrictions on various categories of speech. We have ruled, for example, that in our jurisdiction
slander or libel, lewd and obscene speech, as well as "fighting words" are not entitled to constitutional protection and
may be penalized.199 (Citations omitted)
We distinguish between politicaland commercial speech. Political speech refers to speech "both intended and received
as a contribution to public deliberation about some issue,"200 "foster[ing] informed and civicminded deliberation."201
On the other hand, commercial speech has been defined as speech that does "no more than propose a commercial
transaction."202 The expression resulting from the content of the tarpaulin is, however, definitely political speech. In
Justice Brion’s dissenting opinion, he discussed that "[t]he content of the tarpaulin, as well as the timing of its posting,
makes it subject of the regulations in RA 9006 and Comelec Resolution No. 9615."203 He adds that "[w]hile indeed
the RH issue, by itself,is not an electoralmatter, the slant that the petitioners gave the issue converted the non-election

34
issue into a live election one hence, Team Buhay and Team Patay and the plea to support one and oppose the
other."204
While the tarpaulin may influence the success or failure of the named candidates and political parties, this does not
necessarily mean it is election propaganda. The tarpaulin was not paid for or posted "in return for consideration" by
any candidate, political party, or party-list group.
The second paragraph of Section 1(4) of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615, or the rules and regulations implementing
Republic Act No. 9006 as an aid to interpret the law insofar as the facts of this case requires, states:
4. The term "political advertisement" or "election propaganda" refers to any matter broadcasted, published, printed,
displayed or exhibited, in any medium, which contain the name, image, logo, brand, insignia, color motif, initials, and
other symbol or graphic representation that is capable of being associated with a candidate or party, and is intended
to draw the attention of the public or a segment thereof to promote or oppose, directly or indirectly, the election of the
said candidate or candidates to a public office. In broadcast media, political advertisements may take the form of
spots, appearances on TV shows and radio programs, live or taped announcements, teasers, and other forms of
advertising messages or announcements used by commercial advertisers. Political advertising includes matters, not
falling within the scope of personal opinion, that appear on any Internet website, including, but not limited to, social
networks, blogging sites, and micro-blogging sites, in return for consideration, or otherwise capable of pecuniary
estimation. (Emphasis supplied)
It is clear that this paragraph suggests that personal opinions are not included, while sponsored messages are
covered.
Thus, the last paragraph of Section 1(1) of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 states:
SECTION 1. Definitions - As used in this Resolution:
1. The term "election campaign" or "partisan political activity" refers to an act designed to promote the election or
defeat of a particular candidate or candidates to a public office, and shall include any of the following:
....
Personal opinions, views, and preferences for candidates, contained in blogs shall not be considered acts of election
campaigning or partisan politicalactivity unless expressed by government officials in the Executive Department, the
Legislative Department, the Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions, and members of the Civil Service.
In any event, this case does not refer to speech in cyberspace, and its effects and parameters should be deemed
narrowly tailored only in relation to the facts and issues in this case. It also appears that such wording in COMELEC
Resolution No. 9615 does not similarly appear in Republic Act No. 9006, the law it implements.
We should interpret in this manner because of the value of political speech.
As early as 1918, in United States v. Bustos,205 this court recognized the need for full discussion of public affairs. We
acknowledged that free speech includes the right to criticize the conduct of public men:
The interest of society and the maintenance of good government demand a full discussion of public affairs. Complete
liberty to comment on the conduct of public men is a scalpel in the case of free speech. The sharp incision of its probe
relieves the abscesses of official dom. Men in public life may suffer under a hostile and an unjust accusation; the
wound can be assuaged with the balm of a clear conscience. A public officer must not be too thin-skinned with
reference to comment upon his official acts. Only thus can the intelligence and dignity of the individual be exalted.206
Subsequent jurisprudence developed the right to petition the government for redress of grievances, allowing for
criticism, save for some exceptions.207 In the 1951 case of Espuelas v. People,208 this court noted every citizen’s
privilege to criticize his or her government, provided it is "specific and therefore constructive, reasoned or tempered,
and not a contemptuous condemnation of the entire government set-up."209
The 1927 case of People v. Titular210 involved an alleged violation of the Election Law provision "penaliz[ing] the
anonymous criticism of a candidate by means of posters or circulars."211 This court explained that it is the poster’s
anonymous character that is being penalized.212 The ponente adds that he would "dislike very muchto see this
decision made the vehicle for the suppression of public opinion."213
In 1983, Reyes v. Bagatsing214 discussed the importance of allowing individuals to vent their views. According to this
court, "[i]ts value may lie in the fact that there may be something worth hearing from the dissenter [and] [t]hat is to
ensurea true ferment of ideas."215
Allowing citizens to air grievances and speak constructive criticisms against their government contributes to every
society’s goal for development. It puts forward matters that may be changed for the better and ideas that may be
deliberated on to attain that purpose. Necessarily, it also makes the government accountable for acts that violate
constitutionally protected rights.
In 1998, Osmeña v. COMELEC found Section 11(b) of Republic Act No. 6646, which prohibits mass media from
selling print space and air time for campaign except to the COMELEC, to be a democracy-enhancing measure.216
This court mentioned how "discussion of public issues and debate on the qualifications of candidates in an election
are essential to the proper functioning of the government established by our Constitution."217
As pointed out by petitioners, "speech serves one of its greatest public purposes in the context of elections when the
free exercise thereof informs the people what the issues are, and who are supporting what issues."218 At the heart of
democracy is every advocate’s right to make known what the people need to know,219 while the meaningful exercise
of one’s right of suffrage includes the right of every voter to know what they need to know in order to make their choice.
Thus, in Adiong v. COMELEC,220 this court discussed the importance of debate on public issues, and the freedom of
expression especially in relation to information that ensures the meaningful exercise of the right of suffrage:
We have adopted the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide open and that it
may well include vehement, caustic and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials.
Too many restrictions will deny to people the robust, uninhibited, and wide open debate, the generating of interest
essential if our elections will truly be free, clean and honest.
We have also ruled that the preferred freedom of expression calls all the more for the utmost respect when what may
be curtailed is the dissemination of information to make more meaningful the equally vital right of suffrage.221
(Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
Speech with political consequences isat the core of the freedom of expression and must be protected by this court.

35
Justice Brion pointed out that freedomof expression "is not the god of rights to which all other rights and even
government protection of state interest must bow."222
The right to freedom of expression isindeed not absolute. Even some forms of protected speech are still subjectto
some restrictions. The degree of restriction may depend on whether the regulation is content-based or content-
neutral.223 Content-based regulations can either be based on the viewpoint of the speaker or the subject of the
expression.
II.B.6
Content-based regulation
COMELEC contends that the order for removal of the tarpaulin is a content-neutral regulation. The order was made
simply because petitioners failed to comply with the maximum size limitation for lawful election propaganda.224
On the other hand, petitioners argue that the present size regulation is content-based as it applies only to political
speech and not to other forms of speech such as commercial speech.225 "[A]ssuming arguendo that the size restriction
sought to be applied . . . is a mere time, place, and manner regulation, it’s still unconstitutional for lack of a clear and
reasonable nexus with a constitutionally sanctioned objective."226
The regulation may reasonably be considered as either content-neutral or content-based.227 Regardless, the
disposition of this case will be the same. Generally, compared with other forms of speech, the proposed speech is
content-based.
As pointed out by petitioners, the interpretation of COMELEC contained in the questioned order applies only to posters
and tarpaulins that may affect the elections because they deliver opinions that shape both their choices. It does not
cover, for instance, commercial speech.
Worse, COMELEC does not point to a definite view of what kind of expression of non-candidates will be adjudged as
"election paraphernalia." There are no existing bright lines to categorize speech as election-related and those that are
not. This is especially true when citizens will want to use their resources to be able to raise public issues that should
be tackled by the candidates as what has happened in this case. COMELEC’s discretion to limit speech in this case
is fundamentally unbridled.
Size limitations during elections hit ata core part of expression. The content of the tarpaulin is not easily divorced from
the size of its medium.
Content-based regulation bears a heavy presumption of invalidity, and this court has used the clear and present
danger rule as measure.228 Thus, in Chavez v. Gonzales:
A content-based regulation, however, bears a heavy presumption of invalidity and is measured against the clear and
present danger rule. The latter will pass constitutional muster only if justified by a compelling reason, and the
restrictions imposedare neither overbroad nor vague.229 (Citations omitted)
Under this rule, "the evil consequences sought to be prevented must be substantive, ‘extremely serious and the
degree of imminence extremely high.’"230 "Only when the challenged act has overcome the clear and present danger
rule will it pass constitutional muster, with the government having the burden of overcoming the presumed
unconstitutionality."231
Even with the clear and present danger test, respondents failed to justify the regulation. There is no compelling and
substantial state interest endangered by the posting of the tarpaulinas to justify curtailment of the right of freedom of
expression. There is no reason for the state to minimize the right of non-candidate petitioners to post the tarpaulin in
their private property. The size of the tarpaulin does not affect anyone else’s constitutional rights.
Content-based restraint or censorship refers to restrictions "based on the subject matter of the utterance or
speech."232 In contrast, content-neutral regulation includes controls merely on the incidents of the speech such as
time, place, or manner of the speech.233
This court has attempted to define "content-neutral" restraints starting with the 1948 case of Primicias v. Fugoso.234
The ordinance in this case was construed to grant the Mayor discretion only to determine the public places that may
be used for the procession ormeeting, but not the power to refuse the issuance of a permit for such procession or
meeting.235 This court explained that free speech and peaceful assembly are "not absolute for it may be so regulated
that it shall not beinjurious to the equal enjoyment of others having equal rights, nor injurious to the rights of the
community or society."236
The earlier case of Calalang v. Williams237 involved the National Traffic Commission resolution that prohibited the
passing of animal-drawn vehicles along certain roads at specific hours.238 This court similarly discussed police power
in that the assailed rules carry outthe legislative policy that "aims to promote safe transit upon and avoid obstructions
on national roads, in the interest and convenience of the public."239
As early as 1907, United States v. Apurado240 recognized that "more or less disorder will mark the public assembly
of the people to protest against grievances whether real or imaginary, because on such occasions feeling is always
wrought to a high pitch of excitement. . . ."241 It is with this backdrop that the state is justified in imposing restrictions
on incidental matters as time, place, and manner of the speech.
In the landmark case of Reyes v. Bagatsing, this court summarized the steps that permit applicants must follow which
include informing the licensing authority ahead of time as regards the date, public place, and time of the assembly.242
This would afford the public official time to inform applicants if there would be valid objections, provided that the clear
and present danger test is the standard used for his decision and the applicants are given the opportunity to be
heard.243 This ruling was practically codified in Batas Pambansa No. 880, otherwise known as the Public Assembly
Act of 1985.
Subsequent jurisprudence have upheld Batas Pambansa No. 880 as a valid content-neutral regulation. In the 2006
case of Bayan v. Ermita,244 this court discussed how Batas Pambansa No. 880 does not prohibit assemblies but
simply regulates their time, place, and manner.245 In 2010, this court found in Integrated Bar of the Philippines v.
Atienza246 that respondent Mayor Atienza committed grave abuse of discretion when he modified the rally permit by
changing the venue from Mendiola Bridge to Plaza Miranda without first affording petitioners the opportunity to be
heard.247
We reiterate that the regulation involved at bar is content-based. The tarpaulin content is not easily divorced from the
size of its medium.
36
II.B.7
Justice Carpio and Justice Perlas-Bernabe suggest that the provisions imposing a size limit for tarpaulins are content-
neutral regulations as these "restrict the mannerby which speech is relayed but not the content of what is
conveyed."248
If we apply the test for content-neutral regulation, the questioned acts of COMELEC will not pass the three
requirements for evaluating such restraints on freedom of speech.249 "When the speech restraints take the form of a
content-neutral regulation, only a substantial governmental interest is required for its validity,"250 and it is subject only
to the intermediate approach.251
This intermediate approach is based on the test that we have prescribed in several cases.252 A content-neutral
government regulation is sufficiently justified:
[1] if it is within the constitutional power of the Government; [2] if it furthers an important or substantial governmental
interest; [3] if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and [4] if the incident
restriction on alleged [freedom of speech & expression] is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that
interest.253
On the first requisite, it is not within the constitutional powers of the COMELEC to regulate the tarpaulin. As discussed
earlier, this is protected speech by petitioners who are non-candidates. On the second requirement, not only must the
governmental interest be important or substantial, it must also be compelling as to justify the restrictions made.
Compelling governmental interest would include constitutionally declared principles. We have held, for example, that
"the welfare of children and the State’s mandate to protect and care for them, as parens patriae,254 constitute a
substantial and compelling government interest in regulating . . . utterances in TV broadcast."255
Respondent invokes its constitutional mandate to ensure equal opportunity for public information campaigns among
candidates in connection with the holding of a free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible election.256
Justice Brion in his dissenting opinion discussed that "[s]ize limits to posters are necessary to ensure equality of public
information campaigns among candidates, as allowing posters with different sizes gives candidates and their
supporters the incentive to post larger posters[,] [and] [t]his places candidates with more money and/or with deep-
pocket supporters at an undue advantage against candidates with more humble financial capabilities."257
First, Adiong v. COMELEC has held that this interest is "not as important as the right of [a private citizen] to freely
express his choice and exercise his right of free speech."258 In any case, faced with both rights to freedom of speech
and equality, a prudent course would be to "try to resolve the tension in a way that protects the right of participation."259
Second, the pertinent election lawsrelated to private property only require that the private property owner’s consent
be obtained when posting election propaganda in the property.260 This is consistent with the fundamental right against
deprivation of property without due process of law.261 The present facts do not involve such posting of election
propaganda absent consent from the property owner. Thus, this regulation does not apply in this case.
Respondents likewise cite the Constitution262 on their authority to recommend effective measures to minimize election
spending. Specifically, Article IX-C, Section 2(7) provides:
Sec. 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and functions:
....
(7) Recommend to the Congress effective measures to minimize election spending, including limitation of places
where propaganda materials shall be posted, and to prevent and penalize all forms of election frauds, offenses,
malpractices, and nuisance candidates. (Emphasis supplied) This does not qualify as a compelling and substantial
government interest to justify regulation of the preferred right to freedom of expression.
The assailed issuances for the removal of the tarpaulin are based on the two feet (2’) by three feet (3’) size limitation
under Section 6(c) of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615. This resolution implements the Fair Election Act that provides
for the same size limitation.263
This court held in Adiong v. COMELEC that "[c]ompared to the paramount interest of the State in guaranteeing
freedom of expression, any financial considerations behind the regulation are of marginal significance."264 In fact,
speech with political consequences, as in this case, should be encouraged and not curtailed. As petitioners pointed
out, the size limitation will not serve the objective of minimizing election spending considering there is no limit on the
number of tarpaulins that may be posted.265
The third requisite is likewise lacking. We look not only at the legislative intent or motive in imposing the restriction,
but more so at the effects of such restriction, if implemented. The restriction must not be narrowly tailored to achieve
the purpose. It must be demonstrable. It must allow alternative avenues for the actor to make speech.
In this case, the size regulation is not unrelated to the suppression of speech. Limiting the maximum sizeof the
tarpaulin would render ineffective petitioners’ message and violate their right to exercise freedom of expression.
The COMELEC’s act of requiring the removal of the tarpaulin has the effect of dissuading expressions with political
consequences. These should be encouraged, more so when exercised to make more meaningful the equally
important right to suffrage.
The restriction in the present case does not pass even the lower test of intermediate scrutiny for content-neutral
regulations.
The action of the COMELEC in thiscase is a strong deterrent to further speech by the electorate. Given the stature of
petitioners and their message, there are indicators that this will cause a "chilling effect" on robust discussion during
elections.
The form of expression is just as important as the message itself. In the words of Marshall McLuhan, "the medium is
the message."266 McLuhan’s colleague and mentor Harold Innis has earlier asserted that "the materials on which
words were written down have often counted for more than the words themselves."267

III
Freedom of expression and equality
III.A
The possibility of abuse
Of course, candidates and political parties do solicit the help of private individuals for the endorsement of their electoral
campaigns.
37
On the one extreme, this can take illicit forms such as when endorsement materials in the form of tarpaulins, posters,
or media advertisements are made ostensibly by "friends" but in reality are really paid for by the candidate or political
party. This skirts the constitutional value that provides for equal opportunities for all candidates.
However, as agreed by the parties during the oral arguments in this case, this is not the situation that confronts us. In
such cases, it will simply be a matter for investigation and proof of fraud on the part of the COMELEC.
The guarantee of freedom of expression to individuals without any relationship to any political candidate should not
be held hostage by the possibility of abuse by those seeking to be elected. It is true that there can be underhanded,
covert, or illicit dealings so as to hide the candidate’s real levels of expenditures. However, labelling all expressions
of private parties that tend to have an effect on the debate in the elections as election paraphernalia would be too
broad a remedy that can stifle genuine speech like in this case. Instead, to address this evil, better and more effective
enforcement will be the least restrictive means to the fundamental freedom.
On the other extreme, moved by the credentials and the message of a candidate, others will spend their own resources
in order to lend support for the campaigns. This may be without agreement between the speaker and the candidate
or his or her political party. In lieu of donating funds to the campaign, they will instead use their resources directly in
a way that the candidate or political party would have doneso. This may effectively skirt the constitutional and statutory
limits of campaign spending.
Again, this is not the situation in this case.
The message of petitioners in thiscase will certainly not be what candidates and political parties will carry in their
election posters or media ads. The message of petitioner, taken as a whole, is an advocacy of a social issue that it
deeply believes. Through rhetorical devices, it communicates the desire of Diocese that the positions of those who
run for a political position on this social issue be determinative of how the public will vote. It primarily advocates a
stand on a social issue; only secondarily — even almost incidentally — will cause the election or non-election of a
candidate.
The twin tarpaulins consist of satire of political parties. Satire is a "literary form that employs such devices as sarcasm,
irony and ridicule to deride prevailing vices or follies,"268 and this may target any individual or group in society, private
and government alike. It seeks to effectively communicate a greater purpose, often used for "political and social
criticism"269 "because it tears down facades, deflates stuffed shirts, and unmasks hypocrisy. . . . Nothing is more
thoroughly democratic than to have the high-and-mighty lampooned and spoofed."270 Northrop Frye, wellknown in
this literary field, claimed that satire had two defining features: "one is wit or humor founded on fantasy or a sense of
the grotesque and absurd, the other is an object of attack."271 Thus, satire frequently uses exaggeration, analogy, and
other rhetorical devices.
The tarpaulins exaggerate. Surely, "Team Patay" does not refer to a list of dead individuals nor could the Archbishop
of the Diocese of Bacolod have intended it to mean that the entire plan of the candidates in his list was to cause death
intentionally. The tarpaulin caricatures political parties and parodies the intention of those in the list. Furthermore, the
list of "Team Patay" is juxtaposed with the list of "Team Buhay" that further emphasizes the theme of its author:
Reproductive health is an important marker for the church of petitioners to endorse.
The messages in the tarpaulins are different from the usual messages of candidates. Election paraphernalia from
candidates and political parties are more declarative and descriptive and contain no sophisticated literary allusion to
any social objective. Thus, they usually simply exhort the public to vote for a person with a brief description of the
attributes of the candidate. For example "Vote for [x], Sipag at Tiyaga," "Vote for [y], Mr. Palengke," or "Vote for [z],
Iba kami sa Makati."
This court’s construction of the guarantee of freedom of expression has always been wary of censorship or subsequent
punishment that entails evaluation of the speaker’s viewpoint or the content of one’s speech. This is especially true
when the expression involved has political consequences. In this case, it hopes to affect the type of deliberation that
happens during elections. A becoming humility on the part of any human institution no matter how endowed with the
secular ability to decide legal controversies with finality entails that we are not the keepers of all wisdom.
Humanity’s lack of omniscience, even acting collectively, provides space for the weakest dissent. Tolerance has
always been a libertarian virtue whose version is embedded in our Billof Rights. There are occasional heretics of
yesterday that have become our visionaries. Heterodoxies have always given us pause. The unforgiving but insistent
nuance that the majority surely and comfortably disregards provides us with the checks upon reality that may soon
evolve into creative solutions to grave social problems. This is the utilitarian version. It could also be that it is just part
of human necessity to evolve through being able to express or communicate.
However, the Constitution we interpret is not a theoretical document. It contains other provisions which, taken together
with the guarantee of free expression, enhances each other’s value. Among these are the provisions that acknowledge
the idea of equality. In shaping doctrine construing these constitutional values, this court needs to exercise
extraordinary prudence and produce narrowly tailored guidance fit to the facts as given so as not to unwittingly cause
the undesired effect of diluting freedoms as exercised in reality and, thus, render them meaningless.
III.B.
Speech and equality:
Some considerations We first establish that there are two paradigms of free speech that separate at the point of giving
priority to equality vis-à-vis liberty.272
In an equality-based approach, "politically disadvantaged speech prevails over regulation[,] but regulation promoting
political equality prevails over speech."273 This view allows the government leeway to redistribute or equalize
‘speaking power,’ such as protecting, even implicitly subsidizing, unpopular or dissenting voices often systematically
subdued within society’s ideological ladder.274 This view acknowledges that there are dominant political actors who,
through authority, power, resources, identity, or status, have capabilities that may drown out the messages of others.
This is especially true in a developing or emerging economy that is part of the majoritarian world like ours.
The question of libertarian tolerance
This balance between equality and the ability to express so as to find one’s authentic self or to participate in the self
determination of one’s communities is not new only to law. It has always been a philosophical problematique.
In his seminal work, Repressive Tolerance, philosopher and social theorist Herbert Marcuse recognized how
institutionalized inequality exists as a background limitation, rendering freedoms exercised within such limitation as
merely "protect[ing] the already established machinery of discrimination."275 In his view, any improvement "in the

38
normal course of events" within an unequal society, without subversion, only strengthens existing interests of those
in power and control.276
In other words, abstract guarantees of fundamental rights like freedom of expression may become meaningless if not
taken in a real context. This tendency to tackle rights in the abstract compromises liberties. In his words:
Liberty is self-determination, autonomy—this is almost a tautology, but a tautology which results from a whole series
of synthetic judgments. It stipulates the ability to determine one’s own life: to be able to determine what to do and
what not to do, what to suffer and what not. But the subject of this autonomy is never the contingent, private individual
as that which he actually is or happens to be; it is rather the individual as a human being who is capable of being free
with the others. And the problem of making possible such a harmony between every individual liberty and the other is
not that of finding a compromise between competitors, or between freedom and law, between general and individual
interest, common and private welfare in an established society, but of creating the society in which man is no longer
enslaved by institutions which vitiate self-determination from the beginning. In other words, freedom is still to be
created even for the freest of the existing societies.277 (Emphasis in the original)
Marcuse suggests that the democratic argument — with all opinions presented to and deliberated by the people —
"implies a necessary condition, namely, that the people must be capable of deliberating and choosing on the basis of
knowledge, that they must have access to authentic information, and that, on this basis, their evaluation must be the
result of autonomous thought."278 He submits that "[d]ifferent opinions and ‘philosophies’ can no longer compete
peacefully for adherence and persuasion on rational grounds: the ‘marketplace of ideas’ is organized and delimited
by those who determine the national and the individual interest."279 A slant toward left manifests from his belief that
"there is a ‘natural right’ of resistance for oppressed and overpowered minorities to use extralegal means if the legal
ones have proved to be inadequate."280 Marcuse, thus, stands for an equality that breaks away and transcends from
established hierarchies, power structures, and indoctrinations. The tolerance of libertarian society he refers to as
"repressive tolerance."
Legal scholars
The 20th century also bears witness to strong support from legal scholars for "stringent protections of expressive
liberty,"281 especially by political egalitarians. Considerations such as "expressive, deliberative, and informational
interests,"282 costs or the price of expression, and background facts, when taken together, produce bases for a system
of stringent protections for expressive liberties.283
Many legal scholars discuss the interest and value of expressive liberties. Justice Brandeis proposed that "public
discussion is a political duty."284 Cass Sustein placed political speech on the upper tier of his twotier model for freedom
of expression, thus, warranting stringent protection.285 He defined political speech as "both intended and received as
a contribution to public deliberation about some issue."286
But this is usually related also tofair access to opportunities for such liberties.287 Fair access to opportunity is
suggested to mean substantive equality and not mere formal equalitysince "favorable conditions for realizing the
expressive interest will include some assurance of the resources required for expression and some guarantee that
efforts to express views on matters of common concern will not be drowned out by the speech of betterendowed
citizens."288 Justice Brandeis’ solution is to "remedy the harms of speech with more speech."289 This view moves
away from playing down the danger as merely exaggerated, toward "tak[ing] the costs seriously and embrac[ing]
expression as the preferred strategy for addressing them."290 However, in some cases, the idea of more speech may
not be enough. Professor Laurence Tribe observed the need for context and "the specification of substantive values
before [equality] has full meaning."291 Professor Catherine A. MacKinnon adds that "equality continues to be viewed
in a formal rather than a substantive sense."292 Thus, more speech can only mean more speech from the few who
are dominant rather than those who are not.
Our jurisprudence
This court has tackled these issues.
Osmeña v. COMELEC affirmed National Press Club v. COMELEC on the validity of Section 11(b) ofthe Electoral
Reforms Law of 1987.293 This section "prohibits mass media from selling or giving free of charge print space or air
time for campaign or other political purposes, except to the Commission on Elections."294 This court explained that
this provision only regulates the time and manner of advertising in order to ensure media equality among
candidates.295 This court grounded this measure on constitutional provisions mandating political equality:296 Article
IX-C, Section 4
Section 4. The Commission may, during the election period, supervise or regulate the enjoyment or utilization of all
franchises or permits for the operation of transportation and other public utilities, media of communication or
information, all grants, special privileges, or concessions granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality thereof, including any government-owned or controlled corporation or its subsidiary. Such supervision
or regulation shall aim to ensure equal opportunity, time, and space, and the right to reply, including reasonable, equal
rates therefor, for public information campaigns and forums among candidates in connection with the objective of
holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections. (Emphasis supplied)
Article XIII, Section 1
Section 1. The Congress shall give highest priorityto the enactment of measures that protect and enhance the right of
all the people to human dignity, reducesocial, economic, and political inequalities, and remove cultural inequities by
equitably diffusing wealth and political power for the common good.
To this end, the State shall regulate the acquisition, ownership, use, and disposition of property and its increments.
(Emphasis supplied)
Article II, Section 26
Section 26. The State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service, and prohibit political dynasties
as may be defined by law. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, in these cases, we have acknowledged the Constitution’s guarantee for more substantive expressive freedoms
that take equality of opportunities into consideration during elections.
The other view
However, there is also the other view. This is that considerations of equality of opportunity or equality inthe ability of
citizens as speakers should not have a bearing in free speech doctrine. Under this view, "members of the public are
39
trusted to make their own individual evaluations of speech, and government is forbidden to intervene for paternalistic
or redistributive reasons . . . [thus,] ideas are best left to a freely competitive ideological market."297 This is consistent
with the libertarian suspicion on the use of viewpoint as well as content to evaluate the constitutional validity or
invalidity of speech.
The textual basis of this view is that the constitutional provision uses negative rather than affirmative language. It uses
‘speech’ as its subject and not ‘speakers’.298 Consequently, the Constitution protects free speech per se, indifferent
to the types, status, or associations of its speakers.299 Pursuant to this, "government must leave speakers and
listeners in the private order to their own devices in sorting out the relative influence of speech."300
Justice Romero’s dissenting opinion in Osmeña v. COMELEC formulates this view that freedom of speech includes
"not only the right to express one’s views, but also other cognate rights relevant to the free communication [of] ideas,
not excluding the right to be informed on matters of public concern."301 She adds:
And since so many imponderables may affect the outcome of elections — qualifications of voters and candidates,
education, means of transportation, health, public discussion, private animosities, the weather, the threshold of a
voter’s resistance to pressure — the utmost ventilation of opinion of men and issues, through assembly, association
and organizations, both by the candidate and the voter, becomes a sine qua non for elections to truly reflect the will
of the electorate.302 (Emphasis supplied)
Justice Romero’s dissenting opinion cited an American case, if only to emphasize free speech primacy such
that"courts, as a rule are wary to impose greater restrictions as to any attempt to curtail speeches with political
content,"303 thus:
the concept that the government may restrict the speech of some elements in our society in order to enhance the
relative voice of the others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment which was designed to "secure the widest possible
dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources" and "to assure unfettered interchange of ideas
for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people."304
This echoes Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes’ submission "that the market place of ideas is still the best alternative to
censorship."305
Parenthetically and just to provide the whole detail of the argument, the majority of the US Supreme Court in the
campaign expenditures case of Buckley v. Valeo "condemned restrictions (even if content-neutral) on expressive
liberty imposed in the name of ‘enhanc[ing] the relative voice of others’ and thereby ‘equaliz[ing] access to the political
arena."306 The majority did not use the equality-based paradigm.
One flaw of campaign expenditurelimits is that "any limit placed on the amount which a person can speak, which takes
out of his exclusive judgment the decision of when enough is enough, deprives him of his free speech."307
Another flaw is how "[a]ny quantitative limitation on political campaigning inherently constricts the sum of public
information and runs counter to our ‘profound national commitment that debate on public issues should be uninhibited,
robust, and wide-open.’"308
In fact, "[c]onstraining those who have funds or have been able to raise funds does not ease the plight of those without
funds in the first place . . . [and] even if one’s main concern isslowing the increase in political costs, it may be more
effective torely on market forces toachieve that result than on active legal intervention."309 According to Herbert
Alexander, "[t]o oppose limitations is not necessarily to argue that the sky’s the limit [because in] any campaign there
are saturation levels and a point where spending no longer pays off in votes per dollar."310
III. C.
When private speech amounts
to election paraphernalia
The scope of the guarantee of free expression takes into consideration the constitutional respect for human potentiality
and the effect of speech. It valorizes the ability of human beings to express and their necessity to relate. On the other
hand, a complete guarantee must also take into consideration the effects it will have in a deliberative democracy.
Skewed distribution of resources as well as the cultural hegemony of the majority may have the effect of drowning out
the speech and the messages of those in the minority. In a sense, social inequality does have its effect on the exercise
and effect of the guarantee of free speech. Those who have more will have better access to media that reaches a
wider audience than those who have less. Those who espouse the more popular ideas will have better reception than
the subversive and the dissenters of society.To be really heard and understood, the marginalized view normally
undergoes its own degree of struggle.
The traditional view has been to tolerate the viewpoint of the speaker and the content of his or her expression. This
view, thus, restricts laws or regulation that allows public officials to make judgments of the value of such viewpoint or
message content. This should still be the principal approach.
However, the requirements of the Constitution regarding equality in opportunity must provide limits to some expression
during electoral campaigns.
Thus clearly, regulation of speech in the context of electoral campaigns made by candidates or the members of their
political parties or their political parties may be regulated as to time, place, and manner. This is the effect of our rulings
in Osmeña v. COMELEC and National Press Club v. COMELEC.
Regulation of speech in the context of electoral campaigns made by persons who are not candidates or who do not
speak as members of a political party which are, taken as a whole, principally advocacies of a social issue that the
public must consider during elections is unconstitutional. Such regulation is inconsistent with the guarantee of
according the fullest possible range of opinions coming from the electorate including those that can catalyze candid,
uninhibited, and robust debate in the criteria for the choice of a candidate.
This does not mean that there cannot be a specie of speech by a private citizen which will not amount toan election
paraphernalia to be validly regulated by law.
Regulation of election paraphernalia will still be constitutionally valid if it reaches into speech of persons who are not
candidates or who do not speak as members of a political party if they are not candidates, only if what is regulated is
declarative speech that, taken as a whole, has for its principal object the endorsement of a candidate only. The
regulation (a) should be provided by law, (b) reasonable, (c) narrowly tailored to meet the objective of enhancing the
opportunity of all candidates to be heard and considering the primacy of the guarantee of free expression, and (d)
demonstrably the least restrictive means to achieve that object. The regulation must only be with respect to the time,

40
place, and manner of the rendition of the message. In no situation may the speech be prohibited or censored onthe
basis of its content. For this purpose, it will notmatter whether the speech is made with or on private property.
This is not the situation, however, in this case for two reasons. First, as discussed, the principal message in the twin
tarpaulins of petitioners consists of a social advocacy.
Second, as pointed out in the concurring opinion of Justice Antonio Carpio, the present law — Section 3.3 of Republic
Act No. 9006 and Section 6(c) of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 — if applied to this case, will not pass the test of
reasonability. A fixed size for election posters or tarpaulins without any relation to the distance from the intended
average audience will be arbitrary. At certain distances, posters measuring 2 by 3 feet could no longer be read by the
general public and, hence, would render speech meaningless. It will amount to the abridgement of speech with political
consequences.
IV
Right to property
Other than the right to freedom of expression311 and the meaningful exercise of the right to suffrage,312 the present
case also involves one’s right to property.313
Respondents argue that it is the right of the state to prevent the circumvention of regulations relating to election
propaganda by applying such regulations to private individuals.314 Certainly, any provision or regulation can be
circumvented. But we are not confronted with this possibility. Respondents agree that the tarpaulin in question belongs
to petitioners. Respondents have also agreed, during the oral arguments, that petitioners were neither commissioned
nor paid by any candidate or political party to post the material on their walls.
Even though the tarpaulin is readily seen by the public, the tarpaulin remains the private property of petitioners. Their
right to use their property is likewise protected by the Constitution.
In Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation v. Alcuaz:315
Any regulation, therefore, which operates as an effective confiscation of private property or constitutes an arbitrary or
unreasonable infringement of property rights is void, because it is repugnant to the constitutional guaranties of due
process and equal protection of the laws.316 (Citation omitted)
This court in Adiong held that a restriction that regulates where decals and stickers should be posted is "so broad that
it encompasses even the citizen’s private property."317 Consequently, it violates Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution
which provides thatno person shall be deprived of his property without due process of law. This court explained:
Property is more than the mere thing which a person owns, it includes the right to acquire, use, and dispose of it; and
the Constitution, in the 14th Amendment, protects these essential attributes.
Property is more than the mere thing which a person owns. It is elementary that it includes the right to acquire, use,
and dispose of it. The Constitution protects these essential attributes of property. Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 391,
41 L. ed. 780, 790, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 383. Property consists of the free use, enjoyment, and disposal of a person’s
acquisitions without control or diminution save by the law of the land. 1 Cooley’s Bl. Com. 127. (Buchanan v. Warley
245 US 60 [1917])318
This court ruled that the regulation in Adiong violates private property rights:
The right to property may be subject to a greater degree of regulation but when this right is joined by a "liberty" interest,
the burden of justification on the part of the Government must be exceptionally convincing and irrefutable. The burden
is not met in this case.
Section 11 of Rep. Act 6646 is so encompassing and invasive that it prohibits the posting or display of election
propaganda in any place, whether public or private, except inthe common poster areas sanctioned by COMELEC.
This means that a private person cannot post his own crudely prepared personal poster on his own front dooror on a
post in his yard. While the COMELEC will certainly never require the absurd, there are no limits to what overzealous
and partisan police officers, armed with a copy of the statute or regulation, may do.319 Respondents ordered
petitioners, who are private citizens, to remove the tarpaulin from their own property. The absurdity of the situation is
in itself an indication of the unconstitutionality of COMELEC’s interpretation of its powers.
Freedom of expression can be intimately related with the right to property. There may be no expression when there
is no place where the expression may be made. COMELEC’s infringement upon petitioners’ property rights as in the
present case also reaches out to infringement on their fundamental right to speech.
Respondents have not demonstrated thatthe present state interest they seek to promote justifies the intrusion into
petitioners’ property rights. Election laws and regulations must be reasonable. It must also acknowledge a private
individual’s right to exercise property rights. Otherwise, the due process clause will be violated.
COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 and the Fair Election Act intend to prevent the posting of election propaganda in
private property without the consent of the owners of such private property. COMELEC has incorrectly implemented
these regulations. Consistent with our ruling in Adiong, we find that the act of respondents in seeking to restrain
petitioners from posting the tarpaulin in their own private property is an impermissible encroachments on the right to
property.
V
Tarpaulin and its message are not religious speech
We proceed to the last issues pertaining to whether the COMELEC in issuing the questioned notice and letter violated
the right of petitioners to the free exercise of their religion.
At the outset, the Constitution mandates the separation of church and state.320 This takes many forms. Article III,
Section 5 of the Constitution, for instance provides:
Section 5. No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The
free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever
be allowed. Noreligious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights.
There are two aspects of this provision.321 The first is the none stablishment clause.322 Second is the free exercise
and enjoyment of religious profession and worship.323
The second aspect is atissue in this case.
Clearly, not all acts done by those who are priests, bishops, ustadz, imams, or any other religious make such act
immune from any secular regulation.324 The religious also have a secular existence. They exist within a society that
is regulated by law.

41
The Bishop of Bacolod caused the posting of the tarpaulin. But not all acts of a bishop amounts to religious expression.
This notwithstanding petitioners’ claim that "the views and position of the petitioners, the Bishop and the Diocese of
Bacolod, on the RH Bill is inextricably connected to its Catholic dogma, faith, and moral teachings. . . ."325
The difficulty that often presents itself in these cases stems from the reality that every act can be motivated by moral,
ethical, and religious considerations. In terms of their effect on the corporeal world, these acts range from belief, to
expressions of these faiths, to religious ceremonies, and then to acts of a secular character that may, from the point
of view of others who do not share the same faith or may not subscribe to any religion, may not have any religious
bearing.
Definitely, the characterizations ofthe religious of their acts are not conclusive on this court. Certainly, our powers of
adjudication cannot be blinded by bare claims that acts are religious in nature.
Petitioners erroneously relied on the case of Ebralinag v. The Division Superintendent of Schools of Cebu 326 in
claiming that the court "emphatically" held that the adherents ofa particular religion shall be the ones to determine
whether a particular matter shall be considered ecclesiastical in nature.327 This court in Ebralinagexempted Jehovah’s
Witnesses from participating in the flag ceremony "out of respect for their religious beliefs, [no matter how] "bizarre"
those beliefsmay seem to others."328 This court found a balance between the assertion of a religious practice and the
compelling necessities of a secular command. It was an early attempt at accommodation of religious beliefs.
In Estrada v. Escritor,329 this court adopted a policy of benevolent neutrality:
With religion looked upon with benevolence and not hostility, benevolent neutrality allows accommodation of religion
under certain circumstances. Accommodations are government policies that take religion specifically intoaccount not
to promote the government’s favored form of religion, but to allow individuals and groups to exercise their religion
without hindrance. Their purpose or effect therefore is to remove a burden on, or facilitate the exercise of, a person’s
or institution’s religion. As Justice Brennan explained, the "government [may] take religion into account . . . to exempt,
when possible, from generally applicable governmental regulation individuals whose religious beliefs and practices
would otherwise thereby be infringed, or to create without state involvement an atmosphere in which voluntary
religious exercise may flourish."330
This court also discussed the Lemon test in that case, such that a regulation is constitutional when: (1) it has a secular
legislative purpose; (2) it neither advances nor inhibits religion; and (3) it does not foster an excessive entanglement
with religion.331
As aptly argued by COMELEC, however, the tarpaulin, on its face, "does not convey any religious doctrine of the
Catholic church."332 That the position of the Catholic church appears to coincide with the message of the tarpaulin
regarding the RH Law does not, by itself, bring the expression within the ambit of religious speech. On the contrary,
the tarpaulin clearly refers to candidates classified under "Team Patay" and "Team Buhay" according to their
respective votes on the RH Law.
The same may be said of petitioners’ reliance on papal encyclicals to support their claim that the expression onthe
tarpaulin is an ecclesiastical matter. With all due respect to the Catholic faithful, the church doctrines relied upon by
petitioners are not binding upon this court. The position of the Catholic religion in the Philippines as regards the RH
Law does not suffice to qualify the posting by one of its members of a tarpaulin as religious speech solely on such
basis. The enumeration of candidates on the face of the tarpaulin precludes any doubtas to its nature as speech with
political consequences and not religious speech.
Furthermore, the definition of an "ecclesiastical affair" in Austria v. National Labor Relations Commission 333 cited by
petitioners finds no application in the present case. The posting of the tarpaulin does not fall within the category of
matters that are beyond the jurisdiction of civil courts as enumerated in the Austriacase such as "proceedings for
excommunication, ordinations of religious ministers, administration of sacraments and other activities withattached
religious significance."334
A FINAL NOTE
We maintain sympathies for the COMELEC in attempting to do what it thought was its duty in this case. However, it
was misdirected.
COMELEC’s general role includes a mandate to ensure equal opportunities and reduce spending among candidates
and their registered political parties. It is not to regulate or limit the speech of the electorate as it strives to participate
inthe electoral exercise.
The tarpaulin in question may be viewed as producing a caricature of those who are running for public office.Their
message may be construed generalizations of very complex individuals and party-list organizations.
They are classified into black and white: as belonging to "Team Patay" or "Team Buhay."
But this caricature, though not agreeable to some, is still protected speech.
That petitioners chose to categorize them as purveyors of death or of life on the basis of a single issue — and a
complex piece of legislation at that — can easily be interpreted as anattempt to stereo type the candidates and party-
list organizations. Not all may agree to the way their thoughts were expressed, as in fact there are other Catholic
dioceses that chose not to follow the example of petitioners.
Some may have thought that there should be more room to consider being more broad-minded and non-judgmental.
Some may have expected that the authors would give more space to practice forgiveness and humility.
But, the Bill of Rights enumerated in our Constitution is an enumeration of our fundamental liberties. It is not a detailed
code that prescribes good conduct. It provides space for all to be guided by their conscience, not only in the act that
they do to others but also in judgment of the acts of others.
Freedom for the thought we can disagree with can be wielded not only by those in the minority. This can often be
expressed by dominant institutions, even religious ones. That they made their point dramatically and in a large way
does not necessarily mean that their statements are true, or that they have basis, or that they have been expressed
in good taste.
Embedded in the tarpaulin, however, are opinions expressed by petitioners. It is a specie of expression protected by
our fundamental law. It is an expression designed to invite attention, cause debate, and hopefully, persuade. It may
be motivated by the interpretation of petitioners of their ecclesiastical duty, but their parishioner’s actions will have
very real secular consequences. Certainly, provocative messages do matter for the elections.

42
What is involved in this case is the most sacred of speech forms: expression by the electorate that tends to rouse the
public to debate contemporary issues. This is not speechby candidates or political parties to entice votes. It is a portion
of the electorate telling candidates the conditions for their election. It is the substantive content of the right to suffrage.
This. is a form of speech hopeful of a quality of democracy that we should all deserve. It is protected as a fundamental
and primordial right by our Constitution. The expression in the medium chosen by petitioners deserves our protection.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The temporary restraining order previously issued is hereby made
permanent. The act of the COMELEC in issuing the assailed notice dated February 22, 2013 and letter dated February
27, 2013 is declared unconstitutional.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-31195 June 5, 1973

PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS EMPLOYMENT ORGANIZATION, NICANOR TOLENTINO, FLORENCIO,

PADRIGANO RUFINO, ROXAS MARIANO DE LEON, ASENCION PACIENTE, BONIFACIO VACUNA,
BENJAMIN PAGCU and RODULFO MUNSOD

vs.

PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS CO., INC. and COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS

MAKASIAR, J.:

The petitioner Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization (hereinafter referred to as PBMEO) is a legitimate
labor union composed of the employees of the respondent Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc., and petitioners Nicanor
Tolentino, Florencio Padrigano, Rufino Roxas, Mariano de Leon, Asencion Paciente, Bonifacio Vacuna, Benjamin
Pagcu and Rodulfo Munsod are officers and members of the petitioner Union.

Petitioners claim that on March 1, 1969, they decided to stage a mass demonstration at Malacañang on March 4,
1969, in protest against alleged abuses of the Pasig police, to be participated in by the workers in the first shift (from
6 A.M. to 2 P.M.) as well as those in the regular second and third shifts (from 7 A.M. to 4 P.M. and from 8 A.M. to 5
P.M., respectively); and that they informed the respondent Company of their proposed demonstration.

The questioned order dated September 15, 1969, of Associate Judge Joaquin M. Salvador of the respondent Court
reproduced the following stipulation of facts of the parties — parties —

3. That on March 2, 1969 complainant company learned of the projected mass demonstration at Malacañang in protest
against alleged abuses of the Pasig Police Department to be participated by the first shift (6:00 AM-2:00 PM) workers
as well as those working in the regular shifts (7:00 A.M. to 4:00 PM and 8:00 AM to 5:00 PM) in the morning of March
4, 1969;

4. That a meeting was called by the Company on March 3, 1969 at about 11:00 A.M. at the Company's canteen, and
those present were: for the Company: (1) Mr. Arthur L. Ang (2) Atty. S. de Leon, Jr., (3) and all department and section
heads. For the PBMEO (1) Florencio Padrigano, (2) Rufino Roxas, (3) Mariano de Leon, (4) Asencion Paciente, (5)
Bonifacio Vacuna and (6) Benjamin Pagcu.

5. That the Company asked the union panel to confirm or deny said projected mass demonstration at Malacañang on
March 4, 1969. PBMEO thru Benjamin Pagcu who acted as spokesman of the union panel, confirmed the planned
demonstration and stated that the demonstration or rally cannot be cancelled because it has already been agreed
upon in the meeting. Pagcu explained further that the demonstration has nothing to do with the Company because
the union has no quarrel or dispute with Management;

6. That Management, thru Atty. C.S. de Leon, Company personnel manager, informed PBMEO that the demonstration
is an inalienable right of the union guaranteed by the Constitution but emphasized, however, that any demonstration
for that matter should not unduly prejudice the normal operation of the Company. For which reason, the Company,
thru Atty. C.S. de Leon warned the PBMEO representatives that workers who belong to the first and regular shifts,
who without previous leave of absence approved by the Company, particularly , the officers present who are the
organizers of the demonstration, who shall fail to report for work the following morning (March 4, 1969) shall be
dismissed, because such failure is a violation of the existing CBA and, therefore, would be amounting to an illegal
strike;

7. That at about 5:00 P.M. on March 3, 1969, another meeting was convoked Company represented by Atty. C.S. de
Leon, Jr. The Union panel was composed of: Nicanor Tolentino, Rodolfo Munsod, Benjamin Pagcu and Florencio
Padrigano. In this afternoon meeting of March 3, 1969, Company reiterated and appealed to the PBMEO
representatives that while all workers may join the Malacañang demonstration, the workers for the first and regular
shift of March 4, 1969 should be excused from joining the demonstration and should report for work; and thus utilize
the workers in the 2nd and 3rd shifts in order not to violate the provisions of the CBA, particularly Article XXIV: NO
LOCKOUT — NO STRIKE'. All those who will not follow this warning of the Company shall be dismiss; De Leon
reiterated the Company's warning that the officers shall be primarily liable being the organizers of the mass
demonstration. The union panel countered that it was rather too late to change their plans inasmuch as the
Malacañang demonstration will be held the following morning; and

8. That a certain Mr. Wilfredo Ariston, adviser of PBMEO sent a cablegram to the Company which was received 9:50
A.M., March 4, 1969, the contents of which are as follows: 'REITERATING REQUEST EXCUSE DAY SHIFT
EMPLOYEES JOINING DEMONSTRATION MARCH 4, 1969.' (Pars. 3-8, Annex "F", pp. 42-43, rec.)

43
Because the petitioners and their members numbering about 400 proceeded with the demonstration despite the pleas
of the respondent Company that the first shift workers should not be required to participate in the demonstration and
that the workers in the second and third shifts should be utilized for the demonstration from 6 A.M. to 2 P.M. on March
4, 1969, respondent Company prior notice of the mass demonstration on March 4, 1969, with the respondent Court,
a charge against petitioners and other employees who composed the first shift, charging them with a "violation of
Section 4(a)-6 in relation to Sections 13 and 14, as well as Section 15, all of Republic Act No. 875, and of the CBA
providing for 'No Strike and No Lockout.' " (Annex "A", pp. 19-20, rec.). The charge was accompanied by the joint
affidavit of Arthur L. Ang and Cesareo de Leon, Jr. (Annex "B", pp. 21-24, rec.). Thereafter, a corresponding complaint
was filed, dated April 18, 1969, by Acting Chief Prosecutor Antonio T. Tirona and Acting Prosecutor Linda P. Ilagan
(Annex "C", pp. 25-30, rec.)

In their answer, dated May 9, 1969, herein petitioners claim that they did not violate the existing CBA because they
gave the respondent Company prior notice of the mass demonstration on March 4, 1969; that the said mass
demonstration was a valid exercise of their constitutional freedom of speech against the alleged abuses of some Pasig
policemen; and that their mass demonstration was not a declaration of strike because it was not directed against the
respondent firm (Annex "D", pp. 31-34, rec.)

After considering the aforementioned stipulation of facts submitted by the parties, Judge Joaquin M. Salvador, in an
order dated September 15, 1969, found herein petitioner PBMEO guilty of bargaining in bad faith and herein petitioners
Florencio Padrigano, Rufino Roxas, Mariano de Leon, Asencion Paciente, Bonifacio Vacuna, Benjamin Pagcu,
Nicanor Tolentino and Rodulfo Munsod as directly responsible for perpetrating the said unfair labor practice and were,
as a consequence, considered to have lost their status as employees of the respondent Company (Annex "F", pp. 42-
56, rec.)

Herein petitioners claim that they received on September 23, 1969, the aforesaid order (p. 11, rec.); and that they filed
on September 29, 1969, because September 28, 1969 fell on Sunday (p. 59, rec.), a motion for reconsideration of
said order dated September 15, 1969, on the ground that it is contrary to law and the evidence, as well as asked for
ten (10) days within which to file their arguments pursuant to Sections 15, 16 and 17 of the Rules of the CIR, as
amended (Annex "G", pp. 57-60, rec. )

In its opposition dated October 7, 1969, filed on October 11, 1969 (p. 63, rec.), respondent Company averred that
herein petitioners received on September 22, 1969, the order dated September 17 (should be September 15), 1969;
that under Section 15 of the amended Rules of the Court of Industrial Relations, herein petitioners had five (5) days
from September 22, 1969 or until September 27, 1969, within which to file their motion for reconsideration; and that
because their motion for reconsideration was two (2) days late, it should be accordingly dismissed, invoking Bien vs.
Castillo,1 which held among others, that a motion for extension of the five-day period for the filing of a motion for
reconsideration should be filed before the said five-day period elapses (Annex "M", pp. 61-64, rec.).

Subsequently, herein petitioners filed on October 14, 1969 their written arguments dated October 11, 1969, in support
of their motion for reconsideration (Annex "I", pp. 65-73, rec.).

In a resolution dated October 9, 1969, the respondent en banc dismissed the motion for reconsideration of herein
petitioners for being pro forma as it was filed beyond the reglementary period prescribed by its Rules (Annex "J", pp.
74-75, rec.), which herein petitioners received on October 28, 196 (pp. 12 & 76, rec.).

At the bottom of the notice of the order dated October 9, 1969, which was released on October 24, 1969 and addressed
to the counsels of the parties (pp. 75-76, rec.), appear the requirements of Sections 15, 16 and 17, as amended, of
the Rules of the Court of Industrial Relations, that a motion for reconsideration shall be filed within five (5) days from
receipt of its decision or order and that an appeal from the decision, resolution or order of the C.I.R., sitting en banc,
shall be perfected within ten (10) days from receipt thereof (p. 76, rec.).

On October 31, 1969, herein petitioners filed with the respondent court a petition for relief from the order dated October
9, 1969, on the ground that their failure to file their motion for reconsideration on time was due to excusable negligence
and honest mistake committed by the president of the petitioner Union and of the office clerk of their counsel, attaching
thereto the affidavits of the said president and clerk (Annexes "K", "K-1" and "K-2", rec.).

Without waiting for any resolution on their petition for relief from the order dated October 9, 1969, herein petitioners
filed on November 3, 1969, with the Supreme Court, a notice of appeal (Annex "L", pp. 88-89, rec.).

There is need of briefly restating basic concepts and principles which underlie the issues posed by the case at bar.

(1) In a democracy, the preservation and enhancement of the dignity and worth of the human personality is the central
core as well as the cardinal article of faith of our civilization. The inviolable character of man as an individual must be
"protected to the largest possible extent in his thoughts and in his beliefs as the citadel of his person."2

(2) The Bill of Rights is designed to preserve the ideals of liberty, equality and security "against the assaults of
opportunism, the expediency of the passing hour, the erosion of small encroachments, and the scorn and derision of
those who have no patience with general principles."3

In the pithy language of Mr. Justice Robert Jackson, the purpose of the Bill of Rights is to withdraw "certain subjects
from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials, and to establish
them as legal principles to be applied by the courts. One's rights to life, liberty and property, to free speech, or free
press, freedom of worship and assembly, and other fundamental rights may not be submitted to a vote; they depend

44
on the outcome of no elections."4 Laski proclaimed that "the happiness of the individual, not the well-being of the
State, was the criterion by which its behaviour was to be judged. His interests, not its power, set the limits to the
authority it was entitled to exercise."5

(3) The freedoms of expression and of assembly as well as the right to petition are included among the immunities
reserved by the sovereign people, in the rhetorical aphorism of Justice Holmes, to protect the ideas that we abhor or
hate more than the ideas we cherish; or as Socrates insinuated, not only to protect the minority who want to talk, but
also to benefit the majority who refuse to listen.6 And as Justice Douglas cogently stresses it, the liberties of one are
the liberties of all; and the liberties of one are not safe unless the liberties of all are protected.7

(4) The rights of free expression, free assembly and petition, are not only civil rights but also political rights essential
to man's enjoyment of his life, to his happiness and to his full and complete fulfillment. Thru these freedoms the citizens
can participate not merely in the periodic establishment of the government through their suffrage but also in the
administration of public affairs as well as in the discipline of abusive public officers. The citizen is accorded these
rights so that he can appeal to the appropriate governmental officers or agencies for redress and protection as well
as for the imposition of the lawful sanctions on erring public officers and employees.

(5) While the Bill of Rights also protects property rights, the primacy of human rights over property rights is
recognized.8 Because these freedoms are "delicate and vulnerable, as well as supremely precious in our society" and
the "threat of sanctions may deter their exercise almost as potently as the actual application of sanctions," they "need
breathing space to survive," permitting government regulation only "with narrow specificity."9

Property and property rights can be lost thru prescription; but human rights are imprescriptible. If human rights are
extinguished by the passage of time, then the Bill of Rights is a useless attempt to limit the power of government and
ceases to be an efficacious shield against the tyranny of officials, of majorities, of the influential and powerful, and of
oligarchs — political, economic or otherwise.

In the hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights of free expression and of assembly occupy a preferred position as they are
essential to the preservation and vitality of our civil and political institutions; 10 and such priority "gives these liberties
the sanctity and the sanction not permitting dubious intrusions." 11

II

The respondent Court of Industrial Relations, after opining that the mass demonstration was not a declaration of strike,
concluded that by their "concerted act and the occurrence temporary stoppage of work," herein petitioners are guilty
bargaining in bad faith and hence violated the collective bargaining agreement with private respondent Philippine
Blooming Mills Co., inc.. Set against and tested by foregoing principles governing a democratic society, such
conclusion cannot be sustained. The demonstration held petitioners on March 4, 1969 before Malacañang was against
alleged abuses of some Pasig policemen, not against their employer, herein private respondent firm, said demonstrate
was purely and completely an exercise of their freedom expression in general and of their right of assembly and
petition for redress of grievances in particular before appropriate governmental agency, the Chief Executive, again
the police officers of the municipality of Pasig. They exercise their civil and political rights for their mutual aid protection
from what they believe were police excesses. As matter of fact, it was the duty of herein private respondent firm to
protect herein petitioner Union and its members fro the harassment of local police officers. It was to the interest herein
private respondent firm to rally to the defense of, and take up the cudgels for, its employees, so that they can report
to work free from harassment, vexation or peril and as consequence perform more efficiently their respective tasks
enhance its productivity as well as profits. Herein respondent employer did not even offer to intercede for its employees
with the local police. Was it securing peace for itself at the expenses of its workers? Was it also intimidated by the
local police or did it encourage the local police to terrorize or vex its workers? Its failure to defend its own employees
all the more weakened the position of its laborers the alleged oppressive police who might have been all the more
emboldened thereby subject its lowly employees to further indignities.

In seeking sanctuary behind their freedom of expression well as their right of assembly and of petition against alleged
persecution of local officialdom, the employees and laborers of herein private respondent firm were fighting for their
very survival, utilizing only the weapons afforded them by the Constitution — the untrammelled enjoyment of their
basic human rights. The pretension of their employer that it would suffer loss or damage by reason of the absence of
its employees from 6 o'clock in the morning to 2 o'clock in the afternoon, is a plea for the preservation merely of their
property rights. Such apprehended loss or damage would not spell the difference between the life and death of the
firm or its owners or its management. The employees' pathetic situation was a stark reality — abused, harassment
and persecuted as they believed they were by the peace officers of the municipality. As above intimated, the condition
in which the employees found themselves vis-a-vis the local police of Pasig, was a matter that vitally affected their
right to individual existence as well as that of their families. Material loss can be repaired or adequately compensated.
The debasement of the human being broken in morale and brutalized in spirit-can never be fully evaluated in monetary
terms. The wounds fester and the scars remain to humiliate him to his dying day, even as he cries in anguish for
retribution, denial of which is like rubbing salt on bruised tissues.

As heretofore stated, the primacy of human rights — freedom of expression, of peaceful assembly and of petition for
redress of grievances — over property rights has been sustained. 18 Emphatic reiteration of this basic tenet as a
coveted boon — at once the shield and armor of the dignity and worth of the human personality, the all-consuming
ideal of our enlightened civilization — becomes Our duty, if freedom and social justice have any meaning at all for him
who toils so that capital can produce economic goods that can generate happiness for all. To regard the demonstration
against police officers, not against the employer, as evidence of bad faith in collective bargaining and hence a violation
of the collective bargaining agreement and a cause for the dismissal from employment of the demonstrating
employees, stretches unduly the compass of the collective bargaining agreement, is "a potent means of inhibiting

45
speech" and therefore inflicts a moral as well as mortal wound on the constitutional guarantees of free expression, of
peaceful assembly and of petition. 19

The collective bargaining agreement which fixes the working shifts of the employees, according to the respondent
Court Industrial Relations, in effect imposes on the workers the "duty ... to observe regular working hours." The strain
construction of the Court of Industrial Relations that a stipulated working shifts deny the workers the right to stage
mass demonstration against police abuses during working hours, constitutes a virtual tyranny over the mind and life
the workers and deserves severe condemnation. Renunciation of the freedom should not be predicated on such a
slender ground.

The mass demonstration staged by the employees on March 4, 1969 could not have been legally enjoined by any
court, such an injunction would be trenching upon the freedom expression of the workers, even if it legally appears to
be illegal picketing or strike. 20 The respondent Court of Industrial Relations in the case at bar concedes that the mass
demonstration was not a declaration of a strike "as the same not rooted in any industrial dispute although there is
concerted act and the occurrence of a temporary stoppage work." (Annex "F", p. 45, rec.).

The respondent firm claims that there was no need for all its employees to participate in the demonstration and that
they suggested to the Union that only the first and regular shift from 6 A.M. to 2 P.M. should report for work in order
that loss or damage to the firm will be averted. This stand failed appreciate the sine qua non of an effective
demonstration especially by a labor union, namely the complete unity of the Union members as well as their total
presence at the demonstration site in order to generate the maximum sympathy for the validity of their cause but also
immediately action on the part of the corresponding government agencies with jurisdiction over the issues they raised
against the local police. Circulation is one of the aspects of freedom of expression. 21 If demonstrators are reduced
by one-third, then by that much the circulation of the issues raised by the demonstration is diminished. The more the
participants, the more persons can be apprised of the purpose of the rally. Moreover, the absence of one-third of their
members will be regarded as a substantial indication of disunity in their ranks which will enervate their position and
abet continued alleged police persecution. At any rate, the Union notified the company two days in advance of their
projected demonstration and the company could have made arrangements to counteract or prevent whatever losses
it might sustain by reason of the absence of its workers for one day, especially in this case when the Union requested
it to excuse only the day-shift employees who will join the demonstration on March 4, 1969 which request the Union
reiterated in their telegram received by the company at 9:50 in the morning of March 4, 1969, the day of the mass
demonstration (pp. 42-43, rec.). There was a lack of human understanding or compassion on the part of the firm in
rejecting the request of the Union for excuse from work for the day shifts in order to carry out its mass demonstration.
And to regard as a ground for dismissal the mass demonstration held against the Pasig police, not against the
company, is gross vindictiveness on the part of the employer, which is as unchristian as it is unconstitutional.

III

The respondent company is the one guilty of unfair labor practice. Because the refusal on the part of the respondent
firm to permit all its employees and workers to join the mass demonstration against alleged police abuses and the
subsequent separation of the eight (8) petitioners from the service constituted an unconstitutional restraint on the
freedom of expression, freedom of assembly and freedom petition for redress of grievances, the respondent firm
committed an unfair labor practice defined in Section 4(a-1) in relation to Section 3 of Republic Act No. 875, otherwise
known as the Industrial Peace Act. Section 3 of Republic Act No. 8 guarantees to the employees the right "to engage
in concert activities for ... mutual aid or protection"; while Section 4(a-1) regards as an unfair labor practice for an
employer interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise their rights guaranteed in Section Three."

We repeat that the obvious purpose of the mass demonstration staged by the workers of the respondent firm on March
4, 1969, was for their mutual aid and protection against alleged police abuses, denial of which was interference with
or restraint on the right of the employees to engage in such common action to better shield themselves against such
alleged police indignities. The insistence on the part of the respondent firm that the workers for the morning and
regular shift should not participate in the mass demonstration, under pain of dismissal, was as heretofore stated, "a
potent means of inhibiting speech." 22

Such a concerted action for their mutual help and protection deserves at least equal protection as the concerted action
of employees in giving publicity to a letter complaint charging bank president with immorality, nepotism, favoritism an
discrimination in the appointment and promotion of ban employees. 23 We further ruled in the Republic Savings Bank
case, supra, that for the employees to come within the protective mantle of Section 3 in relation to Section 4(a-1) on
Republic Act No. 875, "it is not necessary that union activity be involved or that collective bargaining be contemplated,"
as long as the concerted activity is for the furtherance of their interests. 24

As stated clearly in the stipulation of facts embodied in the questioned order of respondent Court dated September
15, 1969, the company, "while expressly acknowledging, that the demonstration is an inalienable right of the Union
guaranteed by the Constitution," nonetheless emphasized that "any demonstration for that matter should not unduly
prejudice the normal operation of the company" and "warned the PBMEO representatives that workers who belong to
the first and regular shifts, who without previous leave of absence approved by the Company, particularly the officers
present who are the organizers of the demonstration, who shall fail to report for work the following morning (March 4,
1969) shall be dismissed, because such failure is a violation of the existing CBA and, therefore, would be amounting
to an illegal strike (;)" (p. III, petitioner's brief). Such threat of dismissal tended to coerce the employees from joining
the mass demonstration. However, the issues that the employees raised against the local police, were more important
to them because they had the courage to proceed with the demonstration, despite such threat of dismissal. The most
that could happen to them was to lose a day's wage by reason of their absence from work on the day of the
demonstration. One day's pay means much to a laborer, more especially if he has a family to support. Yet, they were
willing to forego their one-day salary hoping that their demonstration would bring about the desired relief from police

46
abuses. But management was adamant in refusing to recognize the superior legitimacy of their right of free speech,
free assembly and the right to petition for redress.

Because the respondent company ostensibly did not find it necessary to demand from the workers proof of the truth
of the alleged abuses inflicted on them by the local police, it thereby concedes that the evidence of such abuses
should properly be submitted to the corresponding authorities having jurisdiction over their complaint and to whom
such complaint may be referred by the President of the Philippines for proper investigation and action with a view to
disciplining the local police officers involved.

On the other hand, while the respondent Court of Industrial Relations found that the demonstration "paralyzed to a
large extent the operations of the complainant company," the respondent Court of Industrial Relations did not make
any finding as to the fact of loss actually sustained by the firm. This significant circumstance can only mean that the
firm did not sustain any loss or damage. It did not present evidence as to whether it lost expected profits for failure to
comply with purchase orders on that day; or that penalties were exacted from it by customers whose orders could not
be filled that day of the demonstration; or that purchase orders were cancelled by the customers by reason of its
failure to deliver the materials ordered; or that its own equipment or materials or products were damaged due to
absence of its workers on March 4, 1969. On the contrary, the company saved a sizable amount in the form of wages
for its hundreds of workers, cost of fuel, water and electric consumption that day. Such savings could have amply
compensated for unrealized profits or damages it might have sustained by reason of the absence of its workers for
only one day.

IV

Apart from violating the constitutional guarantees of free speech and assembly as well as the right to petition for
redress of grievances of the employees, the dismissal of the eight (8) leaders of the workers for proceeding with the
demonstration and consequently being absent from work, constitutes a denial of social justice likewise assured by the
fundamental law to these lowly employees. Section 5 of Article II of the Constitution imposes upon the State "the
promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all of the people," which guarantee is
emphasized by the other directive in Section 6 of Article XIV of the Constitution that "the State shall afford protection
to labor ...". Respondent Court of Industrial Relations as an agency of the State is under obligation at all times to give
meaning and substance to these constitutional guarantees in favor of the working man; for otherwise these
constitutional safeguards would be merely a lot of "meaningless constitutional patter." Under the Industrial Peace Act,
the Court of Industrial Relations is enjoined to effect the policy of the law "to eliminate the causes of industrial unrest
by encouraging and protecting the exercise by employees of their right to self-organization for the purpose of collective
bargaining and for the promotion of their moral, social and economic well-being." It is most unfortunate in the case at
bar that respondent Court of Industrial Relations, the very governmental agency designed therefor, failed to implement
this policy and failed to keep faith with its avowed mission — its raison d'etre — as ordained and directed by the
Constitution.

It has been likewise established that a violation of a constitutional right divests the court of jurisdiction; and as a
consequence its judgment is null and void and confers no rights. Relief from a criminal conviction secured at the
sacrifice of constitutional liberties, may be obtained through habeas corpus proceedings even long after the finality of
the judgment. Thus, habeas corpus is the remedy to obtain the release of an individual, who is convicted by final
judgment through a forced confession, which violated his constitutional right against self-incrimination; 25 or who is
denied the right to present evidence in his defense as a deprivation of his liberty without due process of law, 26 even
after the accused has already served sentence for twenty-two years. 27

Both the respondents Court of Industrial Relations and private firm trenched upon these constitutional immunities of
petitioners. Both failed to accord preference to such rights and aggravated the inhumanity to which the aggrieved
workers claimed they had been subjected by the municipal police. Having violated these basic human rights of the
laborers, the Court of Industrial Relations ousted itself of jurisdiction and the questioned orders it issued in the instant
case are a nullity. Recognition and protection of such freedoms are imperative on all public offices including the courts
28 as well as private citizens and corporations, the exercise and enjoyment of which must not be nullified by mere

procedural rule promulgated by the Court Industrial Relations exercising a purely delegate legislative power, when
even a law enacted by Congress must yield to the untrammelled enjoyment of these human rights. There is no time
limit to the exercise of the freedoms. The right to enjoy them is not exhausted by the delivery of one speech, the
printing of one article or the staging of one demonstration. It is a continuing immunity to be invoked and exercised
when exigent and expedient whenever there are errors to be rectified, abuses to be denounced, inhumanities to be
condemned. Otherwise these guarantees in the Bill of Rights would be vitiated by rule on procedure prescribing the
period for appeal. The battle then would be reduced to a race for time. And in such a contest between an employer
and its laborer, the latter eventually loses because he cannot employ the best an dedicated counsel who can defend
his interest with the required diligence and zeal, bereft as he is of the financial resources with which to pay for
competent legal services. 28-a

VI

The Court of Industrial Relations rule prescribes that motion for reconsideration of its order or writ should filed within
five (5) days from notice thereof and that the arguments in support of said motion shall be filed within ten (10) days
from the date of filing of such motion for reconsideration (Sec. 16). As above intimated, these rules of procedure were
promulgated by the Court of Industrial Relations pursuant to a legislative delegation. 29

47
The motion for reconsideration was filed on September 29, 1969, or seven (7) days from notice on September 22,
1969 of the order dated September 15, 1969 or two (2) days late. Petitioners claim that they could have filed it on
September 28, 1969, but it was a Sunday.

Does the mere fact that the motion for reconsideration was filed two (2) days late defeat the rights of the petitioning
employees? Or more directly and concretely, does the inadvertent omission to comply with a mere Court of Industrial
Relations procedural rule governing the period for filing a motion for reconsideration or appeal in labor cases,
promulgated pursuant to a legislative delegation, prevail over constitutional rights? The answer should be obvious in
the light of the aforecited cases. To accord supremacy to the foregoing rules of the Court of Industrial Relations over
basic human rights sheltered by the Constitution, is not only incompatible with the basic tenet of constitutional
government that the Constitution is superior to any statute or subordinate rules and regulations, but also does violence
to natural reason and logic. The dominance and superiority of the constitutional right over the aforesaid Court of
Industrial Relations procedural rule of necessity should be affirmed. Such a Court of Industrial Relations rule as applied
in this case does not implement or reinforce or strengthen the constitutional rights affected,' but instead constrict the
same to the point of nullifying the enjoyment thereof by the petitioning employees. Said Court of Industrial Relations
rule, promulgated as it was pursuant to a mere legislative delegation, is unreasonable and therefore is beyond the
authority granted by the Constitution and the law. A period of five (5) days within which to file a motion for
reconsideration is too short, especially for the aggrieved workers, who usually do not have the ready funds to meet
the necessary expenses therefor. In case of the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court, a period of fifteen (15) days
has been fixed for the filing of the motion for re hearing or reconsideration (See. 10, Rule 51; Sec. 1, Rule 52; Sec. 1,
Rule 56, Revised Rules of Court). The delay in the filing of the motion for reconsideration could have been only one
day if September 28, 1969 was not a Sunday. This fact accentuates the unreasonableness of the Court of Industrial
are concerned.

It should be stressed here that the motion for reconsideration dated September 27, 1969, is based on the ground that
the order sought to be reconsidered "is not in accordance with law, evidence and facts adduced during the hearing,"
and likewise prays for an extension of ten (10) days within which to file arguments pursuant to Sections 15, 16 and
17 of the Rules of the Court of Industrial Relations (Annex "G", pp. 57-60, rec.); although the arguments were actually
filed by the herein petitioners on October 14, 1969 (Annex "I", pp. 70-73, rec.), long after the 10-day period required
for the filing of such supporting arguments counted from the filing of the motion for reconsideration. Herein petitioners
received only on October 28, 1969 the resolution dated October 9, 1969 dismissing the motion for reconsideration for
being pro forma since it was filed beyond the reglementary period (Annex "J", pp. 74-75, rec.)

It is true that We ruled in several cases that where a motion to reconsider is filed out of time, or where the arguments
in suppf such motion are filed beyond the 10 day reglementary period provided for by the Court of Industrial Relations
rules, the order or decision subject of29-a reconsideration becomes final and unappealable. But in all these cases, the
constitutional rights of free expression, free assembly and petition were not involved.

It is a procedural rule that generally all causes of action and defenses presently available must be specifically raised
in the complaint or answer; so that any cause of action or defense not raised in such pleadings, is deemed waived.
However, a constitutional issue can be raised any time, even for the first time on appeal, if it appears that the
determination of the constitutional issue is necessary to a decision of the case, the very lis mota of the case without
the resolution of which no final and complete determination of the dispute can be made. 30 It is thus seen that a
procedural rule of Congress or of the Supreme Court gives way to a constitutional right. In the instant case, the
procedural rule of the Court of Industrial Relations, a creature of Congress, must likewise yield to the constitutional
rights invoked by herein petitioners even before the institution of the unfair labor practice charged against them and
in their defense to the said charge.

In the case at bar, enforcement of the basic human freedoms sheltered no less by the organic law, is a most compelling
reason to deny application of a Court of Industrial Relations rule which impinges on such human rights. 30-a

It is an accepted principle that the Supreme Court has the inherent power to "suspend its own rules or to except a
particular case from its operation, whenever the purposes of justice require." 30-b Mr. Justice Barredo in his concurring
opinion in Estrada vs. Sto. Domingo. 30-c reiterated this principle and added that

Under this authority, this Court is enabled to cove with all situations without concerning itself about procedural niceties
that do not square with the need to do justice, in any case, without further loss of time, provided that the right of the
parties to a full day in court is not substantially impaired. Thus, this Court may treat an appeal as a certiorari and vice-
versa. In other words, when all the material facts are spread in the records before Us, and all the parties have been
duly heard, it matters little that the error of the court a quo is of judgment or of jurisdiction. We can then and there
render the appropriate judgment. Is within the contemplation of this doctrine that as it is perfectly legal and within the
power of this Court to strike down in an appeal acts without or in excess of jurisdiction or committed with grave abuse
of discretion, it cannot be beyond the admit of its authority, in appropriate cases, to reverse in a certain proceed in
any error of judgment of a court a quo which cannot be exactly categorized as a flaw of jurisdiction. If there can be
any doubt, which I do not entertain, on whether or not the errors this Court has found in the decision of the Court of
Appeals are short of being jurisdiction nullities or excesses, this Court would still be on firm legal grounds should it
choose to reverse said decision here and now even if such errors can be considered as mere mistakes of judgment
or only as faults in the exercise of jurisdiction, so as to avoid the unnecessary return of this case to the lower court for
the sole purpose of pursuing the ordinary course of an appeal. (Emphasis supplied). 30-d

Insistence on the application of the questioned Court industrial Relations rule in this particular case at bar would an
unreasoning adherence to "Procedural niceties" which denies justice to the herein laborers, whose basic human
freedoms, including the right to survive, must be according supremacy over the property rights of their employer firm
which has been given a full hearing on this case, especially when, as in the case at bar, no actual material damage
has be demonstrated as having been inflicted on its property rights.
48
If We can disregard our own rules when justice requires it, obedience to the Constitution renders more imperative the
suspension of a Court of Industrial Relations rule that clash with the human rights sanctioned and shielded with
resolution concern by the specific guarantees outlined in the organic law. It should be stressed that the application in
the instant case Section 15 of the Court of Industrial Relations rules relied upon by herein respondent firm is
unreasonable and therefore such application becomes unconstitutional as it subverts the human rights of petitioning
labor union and workers in the light of the peculiar facts and circumstances revealed by the record.

The suspension of the application of Section 15 of the Court of Industrial Relations rules with reference to the case at
is also authorized by Section 20 of Commonwealth Act No. 103, the C.I.R. charter, which enjoins the Court of Industrial
Relations to "act according to justice and equity and substantial merits of the case, without regard to technicalities or
legal forms ..."

On several occasions, We emphasized this doctrine which was re-stated by Mr. Justice Barredo, speaking for the
Court, in the 1970 case of Kapisanan, etc. vs. Hamilton, etc., et. al., 30-e thus:

As to the point that the evidence being offered by the petitioners in the motion for new trial is not "newly discovered,"
as such term is understood in the rules of procedure for the ordinary courts, We hold that such criterion is not binding
upon the Court of Industrial Relations. Under Section 20 of Commonwealth Act No. 103, 'The Court of Industrial
Relations shall adopt its, rules or procedure and shall have such other powers as generally pertain to a court of justice:
Provided, however, That in the hearing, investigation and determination of any question or controversy and in
exercising any duties and power under this Act, the Court shall act according to justice and equity and substantial
merits of the case, without regard to technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound by any technical rules of legal
evidence but may inform its mind in such manner as it may deem just and equitable.' By this provision the industrial
court is disengaged from the rigidity of the technicalities applicable to ordinary courts. Said court is not even restricted
to the specific relief demanded by the parties but may issue such orders as may be deemed necessary or expedient
for the purpose of settling the dispute or dispelling any doubts that may give rise to future disputes. (Ang Tibay v.
C.I.R., G.R. No. 46496, Feb. 17, 1940; Manila Trading & Supply Co. v. Phil. Labor, 71 Phil. 124.) For these reasons,
We believe that this provision is ample enough to have enabled the respondent court to consider whether or not its
previous ruling that petitioners constitute a minority was founded on fact, without regard to the technical meaning of
newly discovered evidence. ... (Alonso v. Villamor, 16 Phil. 315; Chua Kiong v. Whitaker, 46 Phil. 578). (emphasis
supplied.)

To apply Section 15 of the Court of Industrial Relations rules with "pedantic rigor" in the instant case is to rule in effect
that the poor workers, who can ill-afford an alert competent lawyer, can no longer seek the sanctuary of human
freedoms secured to them by the fundamental law, simply because their counsel — erroneously believing that he
received a copy of the decision on September 23, 1969, instead of September 22, 1969 - filed his motion for
reconsideration September 29, 1969, which practically is only one day late considering that September 28, 1969 was
a Sunday.

Many a time, this Court deviated from procedure technicalities when they ceased to be instruments of justice, for the
attainment of which such rules have been devised. Summarizing the jurisprudence on this score, Mr. Justice
Fernando, speaking for a unanimous Court in Palma vs. Oreta, 30-f Stated:

As was so aptly expressed by Justice Moreland in Alonso v. Villamor (16 Phil. 315 [1910]. The Villamor decision was
cited with approval in Register of Deeds v. Phil. Nat. Bank, 84 Phil. 600 [1949]; Potenciano v. Court of Appeals, 104
Phil. 156 [1958] and Uy v. Uy, 14243, June 30, 1961, 2 SCRA 675.), decided as far back as 1910, "technicality. when
it deserts its proper-office as an aid to justice and becomes its great hindrance and chief enemy, deserves scant
consideration from courts." (Ibid., p, 322.) To that norm, this Court has remained committed. The late Justice Recto
in Blanco v. Bernabe, (63 Phil. 124 [1936]) was of a similar mind. For him the interpretation of procedural rule should
never "sacrifice the ends justice." While "procedural laws are no other than technicalities" view them in their entirety,
'they were adopted not as ends themselves for the compliance with which courts have organized and function, but as
means conducive to the realization the administration of the law and of justice (Ibid., p.,128). We have remained
steadfastly opposed, in the highly rhetorical language Justice Felix, to "a sacrifice of substantial rights of a litigant in
altar of sophisticated technicalities with impairment of the sacred principles of justice." (Potenciano v. Court of
Appeals, 104 Phil. 156, 161 [1958]). As succinctly put by Justice Makalintal, they "should give way to the realities of
the situation." (Urbayan v. Caltex, L-15379, Aug. 31, 1962, 5 SCRA 1016, 1019). In the latest decision in point
promulgated in 1968, (Udan v. Amon, (1968, 23 SCRA citing McEntee v. Manotok, L-14968, Oct. 27, 1961, 3 SCRA
272.) Justice Zaldivar was partial to an earlier formulation of Justice Labrador that rules of procedure "are not to be
applied in a very rigid, technical sense"; but are intended "to help secure substantial justice." (Ibid., p. 843) ... 30-g

Even if the questioned Court of Industrial Relations orders and rule were to be given effect, the dismissal or termination
of the employment of the petitioning eight (8) leaders of the Union is harsh for a one-day absence from work. The
respondent Court itself recognized the severity of such a sanction when it did not include the dismissal of the other
393 employees who are members of the same Union and who participated in the demonstration against the Pasig
police. As a matter of fact, upon the intercession of the Secretary of Labor, the Union members who are not officers,
were not dismissed and only the Union itself and its thirteen (13) officers were specifically named as respondents in
the unfair labor practice charge filed against them by the firm (pp. 16-20, respondent's Brief; Annexes "A", "B" and
"C", pp. 20-30, rec.). Counsel for respondent firm insinuates that not all the 400 or so employee participated in the
demonstration, for which reason only the Union and its thirteen (13) officers were specifically named in the unfair labor
practice charge (p. 20, respondent's brief). If that were so, then many, if not all, of the morning and regular shifts
reported for work on March 4, 1969 and that, as a consequence, the firm continued in operation that day and did not
sustain any damage.

The appropriate penalty — if it deserves any penalty at all — should have been simply to charge said one-day absence
against their vacation or sick leave. But to dismiss the eight (8) leaders of the petitioner Union is a most cruel penalty,
49
since as aforestated the Union leaders depend on their wages for their daily sustenance as well as that of their
respective families aside from the fact that it is a lethal blow to unionism, while at the same time strengthening the
oppressive hand of the petty tyrants in the localities.

Mr. Justice Douglas articulated this pointed reminder:

The challenge to our liberties comes frequently not from those who consciously seek to destroy our system of
Government, but from men of goodwill — good men who allow their proper concerns to blind them to the fact that
what they propose to accomplish involves an impairment of liberty.

... The Motives of these men are often commendable. What we must remember, however, is that preservation of
liberties does not depend on motives. A suppression of liberty has the same effect whether the suppress or be a
reformer or an outlaw. The only protection against misguided zeal is a constant alertness of the infractions of the
guarantees of liberty contained in our Constitution. Each surrender of liberty to the demands of the moment makes
easier another, larger surrender. The battle over the Bill of Rights is a never ending one.

... The liberties of any person are the liberties of all of us.

... In short, the Liberties of none are safe unless the liberties of all are protected.

... But even if we should sense no danger to our own liberties, even if we feel secure because we belong to a group
that is important and respected, we must recognize that our Bill of Rights is a code of fair play for the less fortunate
that we in all honor and good conscience must be observe. 31

The case at bar is worse.

Management has shown not only lack of good-will or good intention, but a complete lack of sympathetic understanding
of the plight of its laborers who claim that they are being subjected to indignities by the local police, It was more
expedient for the firm to conserve its income or profits than to assist its employees in their fight for their freedoms and
security against alleged petty tyrannies of local police officers. This is sheer opportunism. Such opportunism and
expediency resorted to by the respondent company assaulted the immunities and welfare of its employees. It was
pure and implement selfishness, if not greed.

Of happy relevance is the 1967 case of Republic Savings Bank vs. C.I.R., 32 where the petitioner Bank dismissed
eight (8) employees for having written and published "a patently libelous letter ... to the Bank president demanding his
resignation on the grounds of immorality, nepotism in the appointment and favoritism as well as discrimination in the
promotion of bank employees." Therein, thru Mr. Justice Castro, We ruled:

It will avail the Bank none to gloat over this admission of the respondents. Assuming that the latter acted in their
individual capacities when they wrote the letter-charge they were nonetheless protected for they were engaged in
concerted activity, in the exercise of their right of self organization that includes concerted activity for mutual aid and
protection, (Section 3 of the Industrial Peace Act ...) This is the view of some members of this Court. For, as has been
aptly stated, the joining in protests or demands, even by a small group of employees, if in furtherance of their interests
as such, is a concerted activity protected by the Industrial Peace Act. It is not necessary that union activity be involved
or that collective bargaining be contemplated. (Annot., 6 A.L.R. 2d 416 [1949]).

xxx xxx xxx

Instead of stifling criticism, the Bank should have allowed the respondents to air their grievances.

xxx xxx xxx

The Bank defends its action by invoking its right to discipline for what it calls the respondents' libel in giving undue
publicity to their letter-charge. To be sure, the right of self-organization of employees is not unlimited (Republic Aviation
Corp. vs. NLRB 324 U.S. 793 [1945]), as the right of the employer to discharge for cause (Philippine Education Co.
v. Union of Phil. Educ. Employees, L-13773, April 29, 1960) is undenied. The Industrial Peace Act does not touch the
normal exercise of the right of the employer to select his employees or to discharge them. It is directed solely against
the abuse of that right by interfering with the countervailing right of self organization (Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB
313 U.S. 177 [1941])...

xxx xxx xxx

In the final sum and substance, this Court is in unanimity that the Bank's conduct, identified as an interference with
the employees' right of self-organization or as a retaliatory action, and/or as a refusal to bargain collectively,
constituted an unfair labor practice within the meaning and intendment of section 4(a) of the Industrial Peace Act.
(Emphasis supplied.) 33

If free expression was accorded recognition and protection to fortify labor unionism in the Republic Savings case,
supra, where the complaint assailed the morality and integrity of the bank president no less, such recognition and
protection for free speech, free assembly and right to petition are rendered all the more justifiable and more imperative
in the case at bar, where the mass demonstration was not against the company nor any of its officers.

WHEREFORE, judgement is hereby rendered:

(1) setting aside as null and void the orders of the respondent Court of Industrial Relations dated September 15 and
October 9, 1969; and
50
(2) directing the re instatement of the herein eight (8) petitioners, with full back pay from the date of their separation
from the service until re instated, minus one day's pay and whatever earnings they might have realized from other
sources during their separation from the service. With costs against private respondent Philippine Blooming Company,
Inc.

G.R. No. 88211 September 15, 1989

FERDINAND E. MARCOS, IMELDA R. MARCOS, FERDINAND R. MARCOS, JR., IRENE M. ARANETA, IMEE
MANOTOC, TOMAS MANOTOC, GREGORIO ARANETA, PACIFICO E. MARCOS, NICANOR YÑIGUEZ and
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION (PHILCONSA), represented by its President, CONRADO F.
ESTRELLA

vs.

HONORABLE RAUL MANGLAPUS, CATALINO MACARAIG, SEDFREY ORDOÑEZ, MIRIAM DEFENSOR

SANTIAGO, FIDEL RAMOS, RENATO DE VILLA, in their capacity as Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Executive
Secretary, Secretary of Justice, Immigration Commissioner, Secretary of National Defense and Chief of
Staff, respectively

CORTES, J.:

Before the Court is a contreversy of grave national importance. While ostensibly only legal issues are involved, the
Court's decision in this case would undeniably have a profound effect on the political, economic and other aspects of
national life.

We recall that in February 1986, Ferdinand E. Marcos was deposed from the presidency via the non-violent "people
power" revolution and forced into exile. In his stead, Corazon C. Aquino was declared President of the Republic under
a revolutionary government. Her ascension to and consilidation of power have not been unchallenged. The failed
Manila Hotel coup in 1986 led by political leaders of Mr. Marcos, the takeover of television station Channel 7 by rebel
troops led by Col. Canlas with the support of "Marcos loyalists" and the unseccessful plot of the Marcos spouses to
surreptitiously return from Hawii with mercenaries aboard an aircraft chartered by a Lebanese arms dealer [Manila
Bulletin, January 30, 1987] awakened the nation to the capacity of the Marcoses to stir trouble even from afar and to
the fanaticism and blind loyalty of their followers in the country. The ratification of the 1987 Constitution enshrined the
victory of "people power" and also clearly reinforced the constitutional moorings of Mrs. Aquino's presidency. This did
not, however, stop bloody challenges to the government. On August 28, 1987, Col. Gregorio Honasan, one of the
major players in the February Revolution, led a failed coup that left scores of people, both combatants and civilians,
dead. There were several other armed sorties of lesser significance, but the message they conveyed was the same
— a split in the ranks of the military establishment that thraetened civilian supremacy over military and brought to the
fore the realization that civilian government could be at the mercy of a fractious military.

But the armed threats to the Government were not only found in misguided elements and among rabid followers of
Mr. Marcos. There are also the communist insurgency and the seccessionist movement in Mindanao which gained
ground during the rule of Mr. Marcos, to the extent that the communists have set up a parallel government of their
own on the areas they effectively control while the separatist are virtually free to move about in armed bands. There
has been no let up on this groups' determination to wrest power from the govermnent. Not only through resort to arms
but also to through the use of propaganda have they been successful in dreating chaos and destabilizing the country.

Nor are the woes of the Republic purely political. The accumulated foreign debt and the plunder of the nation attributed
to Mr. Marcos and his cronies left the economy devastated. The efforts at economic recovery, three years after Mrs.
Aquino assumed office, have yet to show concrete results in alleviating the poverty of the masses, while the recovery
of the ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses has remained elusive.

Now, Mr. Marcos, in his deathbed, has signified his wish to return to the Philipppines to die. But Mrs. Aquino,
considering the dire consequences to the nation of his return at a time when the stability of government is threatened
from various directions and the economy is just beginning to rise and move forward, has stood firmly on the decision
to bar the return of Mr. Marcos and his family.

The Petition

This case is unique. It should not create a precedent, for the case of a dictator forced out of office and into exile after
causing twenty years of political, economic and social havoc in the country and who within the short space of three
years seeks to return, is in a class by itself.

This petition for mandamus and prohibition asks the Courts to order the respondents to issue travel documents to Mr.
Marcos and the immediate members of his family and to enjoin the implementation of the President's decision to bar
their return to the Philippines.

The Issue

Th issue is basically one of power: whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the Constitution, the
President may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.

According to the petitioners, the resolution of the case would depend on the resolution of the following issues:

1. Does the President have the power to bar the return of former President Marcos and family to the Philippines?

51
a. Is this a political question?

2. Assuming that the President has the power to bar former President Marcos and his family from returning to the
Philippines, in the interest of "national security, public safety or public health

a. Has the President made a finding that the return of former President Marcos and his family to the Philippines is a
clear and present danger to national security, public safety or public health?

b. Assuming that she has made that finding

(1) Have the requirements of due process been complied with in making such finding?

(2) Has there been prior notice to petitioners?

(3) Has there been a hearing?

(4) Assuming that notice and hearing may be dispensed with, has the President's decision, including the grounds
upon which it was based, been made known to petitioners so that they may controvert the same?

c. Is the President's determination that the return of former President Marcos and his family to the Philippines is a
clear and present danger to national security, public safety, or public health a political question?

d. Assuming that the Court may inquire as to whether the return of former President Marcos and his family is a clear
and present danger to national security, public safety, or public health, have respondents established such fact?

3. Have the respondents, therefore, in implementing the President's decision to bar the return of former President
Marcos and his family, acted and would be acting without jurisdiction, or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse
of discretion, in performing any act which would effectively bar the return of former President Marcos and his family
to the Philippines? [Memorandum for Petitioners, pp. 5-7; Rollo, pp. 234-236.1

The case for petitioners is founded on the assertion that the right of the Marcoses to return to the Philippines is
guaranteed under the following provisions of the Bill of Rights, to wit:

Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be
denied the equal protection of the laws.

xxx xxx xxx

Section 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired
except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the interest of national
security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided by law.

The petitioners contend that the President is without power to impair the liberty of abode of the Marcoses because
only a court may do so "within the limits prescribed by law." Nor may the President impair their right to travel because
no law has authorized her to do so. They advance the view that before the right to travel may be impaired by any
authority or agency of the government, there must be legislation to that effect.

The petitioners further assert that under international law, the right of Mr. Marcos and his family to return to the
Philippines is guaranteed.

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides:

Article 13. (1) Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state.

(2) Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country.

Likewise, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which had been ratified by the Philippines, provides:

Article 12

1) Everyone lawfully within the territory of a State shall, within that territory, have the right to liberty of movement and
freedom to choose his residence.

2) Everyone shall be free to leave any country, including his own.

3) The above-mentioned rights shall not be subject to any restrictions except those which are provided by law, are
necessary to protect national security, public order (order public), public health or morals or the rights and freedoms
of others, and are consistent with the other rights recognized in the present Covenant.

4) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own country.

On the other hand, the respondents' principal argument is that the issue in this case involves a political question which
is non-justiciable. According to the Solicitor General:

As petitioners couch it, the question involved is simply whether or not petitioners Ferdinand E. Marcos and his family
have the right to travel and liberty of abode. Petitioners invoke these constitutional rights in vacuo without reference
to attendant circumstances.

52
Respondents submit that in its proper formulation, the issue is whether or not petitioners Ferdinand E. Marcos and
family have the right to return to the Philippines and reside here at this time in the face of the determination by the
President that such return and residence will endanger national security and public safety.

It may be conceded that as formulated by petitioners, the question is not a political question as it involves merely a
determination of what the law provides on the matter and application thereof to petitioners Ferdinand E. Marcos and
family. But when the question is whether the two rights claimed by petitioners Ferdinand E. Marcos and family impinge
on or collide with the more primordial and transcendental right of the State to security and safety of its nationals, the
question becomes political and this Honorable Court can not consider it.

There are thus gradations to the question, to wit:

Do petitioners Ferdinand E. Marcos and family have the right to return to the Philippines and reestablish their
residence here? This is clearly a justiciable question which this Honorable Court can decide.

Do petitioners Ferdinand E. Marcos and family have their right to return to the Philippines and reestablish their
residence here even if their return and residence here will endanger national security and public safety? this is still a
justiciable question which this Honorable Court can decide.

Is there danger to national security and public safety if petitioners Ferdinand E. Marcos and family shall return to the
Philippines and establish their residence here? This is now a political question which this Honorable Court can not
decide for it falls within the exclusive authority and competence of the President of the Philippines. [Memorandum for
Respondents, pp. 9-11; Rollo, pp. 297-299.]

Respondents argue for the primacy of the right of the State to national security over individual rights. In support thereof,
they cite Article II of the Constitution, to wit:

Section 4. The prime duty of the Government is to serve and protect the people. The Government may call upon the
people to defend the State and, in the fulfillment thereof, all citizens may be required, under conditions provided by
law, to render personal, military, or civil service.

Section 5. The maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty, and property, and the promotion of the
general welfare are essential for the enjoyment by all the people of the blessings of democracy.

Respondents also point out that the decision to ban Mr. Marcos and family from returning to the Philippines for reasons
of national security and public safety has international precedents. Rafael Trujillo of the Dominican Republic,
Anastacio Somoza Jr. of Nicaragua, Jorge Ubico of Guatemala, Fulgencio batista of Cuba, King Farouk of Egypt,
Maximiliano Hernandez Martinez of El Salvador, and Marcos Perez Jimenez of Venezuela were among the deposed
dictators whose return to their homelands was prevented by their governments. [See Statement of Foreign Affairs
Secretary Raul S. Manglapus, quoted in Memorandum for Respondents, pp. 26-32; Rollo, pp. 314-319.]

The parties are in agreement that the underlying issue is one of the scope of presidential power and its limits. We,
however, view this issue in a different light. Although we give due weight to the parties' formulation of the issues, we
are not bound by its narrow confines in arriving at a solution to the controversy.

At the outset, we must state that it would not do to view the case within the confines of the right to travel and the import
of the decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court in the leading cases of Kent v. Dulles [357 U.S. 116, 78 SCt 1113, 2 L Ed.
2d 1204] and Haig v. Agee [453 U.S. 280, 101 SCt 2766, 69 L Ed. 2d 640) which affirmed the right to travel and
recognized exceptions to the exercise thereof, respectively.

It must be emphasized that the individual right involved is not the right to travel from the Philippines to other countries
or within the Philippines. These are what the right to travel would normally connote. Essentially, the right involved is
the right to return to one's country, a totally distinct right under international law, independent from although related to
the right to travel. Thus, the Universal Declaration of Humans Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights treat the right to freedom of movement and abode within the territory of a state, the right to leave a
country, and the right to enter one's country as separate and distinct rights. The Declaration speaks of the "right to
freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state" [Art. 13(l)] separately from the "right to leave
any country, including his own, and to return to his country." [Art. 13(2).] On the other hand, the Covenant guarantees
the "right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence" [Art. 12(l)] and the right to "be free to leave
any country, including his own." [Art. 12(2)] which rights may be restricted by such laws as "are necessary to protect
national security, public order, public health or morals or enter qqqs own country" of which one cannot be "arbitrarily
deprived." [Art. 12(4).] It would therefore be inappropriate to construe the limitations to the right to return to one's
country in the same context as those pertaining to the liberty of abode and the right to travel.

The right to return to one's country is not among the rights specifically guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, which treats
only of the liberty of abode and the right to travel, but it is our well-considered view that the right to return may be
considered, as a generally accepted principle of international law and, under our Constitution, is part of the law of the
land [Art. II, Sec. 2 of the Constitution.] However, it is distinct and separate from the right to travel and enjoys a different
protection under the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, i.e., against being "arbitrarily deprived" thereof
[Art. 12 (4).]

Thus, the rulings in the cases Kent and Haig which refer to the issuance of passports for the purpose of effectively
exercising the right to travel are not determinative of this case and are only tangentially material insofar as they relate
to a conflict between executive action and the exercise of a protected right. The issue before the Court is novel and
without precedent in Philippine, and even in American jurisprudence.

53
Consequently, resolution by the Court of the well-debated issue of whether or not there can be limitations on the right
to travel in the absence of legislation to that effect is rendered unnecessary. An appropriate case for its resolution will
have to be awaited.

Having clarified the substance of the legal issue, we find now a need to explain the methodology for its resolution. Our
resolution of the issue will involve a two-tiered approach. We shall first resolve whether or not the President has the
power under the Constitution, to bar the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines. Then, we shall determine,
pursuant to the express power of the Court under the Constitution in Article VIII, Section 1, whether or not the President
acted arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when she determined that
the return of the Marcose's to the Philippines poses a serious threat to national interest and welfare and decided to
bar their return.

Executive Power

The 1987 Constitution has fully restored the separation of powers of the three great branches of government. To recall
the words of Justice Laurel in Angara v. Electoral Commission [63 Phil. 139 (1936)], "the Constitution has blocked but
with deft strokes and in bold lines, allotment of power to the executive, the legislative and the judicial departments of
the government." [At 157.1 Thus, the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that "[the legislative power shall be vested
in the Congress of the Philippines" Art VI, Sec. 11, "[t]he executive power shall bevested in the President of the
Philippines" [Art. VII, Sec. 11, and "[te judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts
as may be established by law" [Art. VIII, Sec. 1.] These provisions not only establish a separation of powers by actual
division [Angara v. Electoral Commission, supra] but also confer plenary legislative, executive and judicial powers
subject only to limitations provided in the Constitution. For as the Supreme Court in Ocampo v. Cabangis [15 Phil.
626 (1910)] pointed out "a grant of the legislative power means a grant of all legislative power; and a grant of the
judicial power means a grant of all the judicial power which may be exercised under the government." [At 631-632.1
If this can be said of the legislative power which is exercised by two chambers with a combined membership of more
than two hundred members and of the judicial power which is vested in a hierarchy of courts, it can equally be said of
the executive power which is vested in one official the President.

As stated above, the Constitution provides that "[t]he executive power shall be vested in the President of the
Philippines." [Art. VII, Sec. 1]. However, it does not define what is meant by executive power" although in the same
article it touches on the exercise of certain powers by the President, i.e., the power of control over all executive
departments, bureaus and offices, the power to execute the laws, the appointing power, the powers under the
commander-in-chief clause, the power to grant reprieves, commutations and pardons, the power to grant amnesty
with the concurrence of Congress, the power to contract or guarantee foreign loans, the power to enter into treaties
or international agreements, the power to submit the budget to Congress, and the power to address Congress [Art.
VII, Sec. 14-23].

The inevitable question then arises: by enumerating certain powers of the President did the framers of the Constitution
intend that the President shall exercise those specific powers and no other? Are these se enumerated powers the
breadth and scope of "executive power"? Petitioners advance the view that the President's powers are limited to those
specifically enumerated in the 1987 Constitution. Thus, they assert: "The President has enumerated powers, and what
is not enumerated is impliedly denied to her. Inclusion unius est exclusio alterius[Memorandum for Petitioners, p. 4-
Rollo p. 233.1 This argument brings to mind the institution of the U.S. Presidency after which ours is legally
patterned.**

Corwin, in his monumental volume on the President of the United States grappled with the same problem. He said:

Article II is the most loosely drawn chapter of the Constitution. To those who think that a constitution ought to settle
everything beforehand it should be a nightmare; by the same token, to those who think that constitution makers ought
to leave considerable leeway for the future play of political forces, it should be a vision realized.

We encounter this characteristic of Article 11 in its opening words: "The executive power shall be vested in a President
of the United States of America." . . .. [The President: Office and Powers, 17871957, pp. 3-4.]

Reviewing how the powers of the U.S. President were exercised by the different persons who held the office from
Washington to the early 1900's, and the swing from the presidency by commission to Lincoln's dictatorship, he
concluded that "what the presidency is at any particular moment depends in important measure on who is President."
[At 30.]

This view is shared by Schlesinger who wrote in The Imperial Presidency:

For the American Presidency was a peculiarly personal institution. it remained of course, an agency of government
subject to unvarying demands and duties no remained, of cas President. But, more than most agencies of government,
it changed shape, intensity and ethos according to the man in charge. Each President's distinctive temperament and
character, his values, standards, style, his habits, expectations, Idiosyncrasies, compulsions, phobias recast the
WhiteHouse and pervaded the entire government. The executive branch, said Clark Clifford, was a chameleon, taking
its color from the character and personality of the President. The thrust of the office, its impact on the constitutional
order, therefore altered from President to President. Above all, the way each President understood it as his personal
obligation to inform and involve the Congress, to earn and hold the confidence of the electorate and to render an
accounting to the nation and posterity determined whether he strengthened or weakened the constitutional order. [At
212- 213.]

We do not say that the presidency is what Mrs. Aquino says it is or what she does but, rather, that the consideration
of tradition and the development of presidential power under the different constitutions are essential for a complete
understanding of the extent of and limitations to the President's powers under the 1987 Constitution. The 1935
54
Constitution created a strong President with explicitly broader powers than the U.S. President. The 1973 Constitution
attempted to modify the system of government into the parliamentary type, with the President as a mere figurehead,
but through numerous amendments, the President became even more powerful, to the point that he was also the de
facto Legislature. The 1987 Constitution, however, brought back the presidential system of government and restored
the separation of legislative, executive and judicial powers by their actual distribution among three distinct branches
of government with provision for checks and balances.

It would not be accurate, however, to state that "executive power" is the power to enforce the laws, for the President
is head of state as well as head of government and whatever powers inhere in such positions pertain to the office
unless the Constitution itself withholds it. Furthermore, the Constitution itself provides that the execution of the laws
is only one of the powers of the President. It also grants the President other powers that do not involve the execution
of any provision of law, e.g., his power over the country's foreign relations.

On these premises, we hold the view that although the 1987 Constitution imposes limitations on the exercise of specific
powers of the President, it maintains intact what is traditionally considered as within the scope of "executive power."
Corollarily, the powers of the President cannot be said to be limited only to the specific powers enumerated in the
Constitution. In other words, executive power is more than the sum of specific powers so enumerated,

It has been advanced that whatever power inherent in the government that is neither legislative nor judicial has to be
executive. Thus, in the landmark decision of Springer v. Government of the Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189 (1928),
on the issue of who between the Governor-General of the Philippines and the Legislature may vote the shares of
stock held by the Government to elect directors in the National Coal Company and the Philippine National Bank, the
U.S. Supreme Court, in upholding the power of the Governor-General to do so, said:

...Here the members of the legislature who constitute a majority of the "board" and "committee" respectively, are not
charged with the performance of any legislative functions or with the doing of anything which is in aid of performance
of any such functions by the legislature. Putting aside for the moment the question whether the duties devolved upon
these members are vested by the Organic Act in the Governor-General, it is clear that they are not legislative in
character, and still more clear that they are not judicial. The fact that they do not fall within the authority of either of
these two constitutes logical ground for concluding that they do fall within that of the remaining one among which the
powers of government are divided ....[At 202-203; Emphasis supplied.]

We are not unmindful of Justice Holmes' strong dissent. But in his enduring words of dissent we find reinforcement
for the view that it would indeed be a folly to construe the powers of a branch of government to embrace only what
are specifically mentioned in the Constitution:

The great ordinances of the Constitution do not establish and divide fields of black and white. Even the more specific
of them are found to terminate in a penumbra shading gradually from one extreme to the other. ....

xxx xxx xxx

It does not seem to need argument to show that however we may disguise it by veiling words we do not and cannot
carry out the distinction between legislative and executive action with mathematical precision and divide the branches
into watertight compartments, were it ever so desirable to do so, which I am far from believing that it is, or that the
Constitution requires. [At 210- 211.]

The Power Involved

The Constitution declares among the guiding principles that "[t]he prime duty of theGovernment is to serve and protect
the people" and that "[t]he maintenance of peace and order,the protection of life, liberty, and property, and the
promotion of the general welfare are essential for the enjoyment by all the people of the blessings of democracy." [Art.
II, Secs. 4 and 5.]

Admittedly, service and protection of the people, the maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty
and property, and the promotion of the general welfare are essentially ideals to guide governmental action. But such
does not mean that they are empty words. Thus, in the exercise of presidential functions, in drawing a plan of
government, and in directing implementing action for these plans, or from another point of view, in making any decision
as President of the Republic, the President has to consider these principles, among other things, and adhere to them.

Faced with the problem of whether or not the time is right to allow the Marcoses to return to the Philippines, the
President is, under the Constitution, constrained to consider these basic principles in arriving at a decision. More than
that, having sworn to defend and uphold the Constitution, the President has the obligation under the Constitution to
protect the people, promote their welfare and advance the national interest. It must be borne in mind that the
Constitution, aside from being an allocation of power is also a social contract whereby the people have surrendered
their sovereign powers to the State for the common good. Hence, lest the officers of the Government exercising the
powers delegated by the people forget and the servants of the people become rulers, the Constitution reminds
everyone that "[s]overeignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them." [Art. II, Sec. 1.]

The resolution of the problem is made difficult because the persons who seek to return to the country are the deposed
dictator and his family at whose door the travails of the country are laid and from whom billions of dollars believed to
be ill-gotten wealth are sought to be recovered. The constitutional guarantees they invoke are neither absolute nor
inflexible. For the exercise of even the preferred freedoms of speech and ofexpression, although couched in absolute
terms, admits of limits and must be adjusted to the requirements of equally important public interests [Zaldivar v.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 79690-707, October 7, 1981.]

55
To the President, the problem is one of balancing the general welfare and the common good against the exercise of
rights of certain individuals. The power involved is the President's residual power to protect the general welfare of the
people. It is founded on the duty of the President, as steward of the people. To paraphrase Theodore Roosevelt, it is
not only the power of the President but also his duty to do anything not forbidden by the Constitution or the laws that
the needs of the nation demand [See Corwin, supra, at 153]. It is a power borne by the President's duty to preserve
and defend the Constitution. It also may be viewed as a power implicit in the President's duty to take care that the
laws are faithfully executed [see Hyman, The American President, where the author advances the view that an
allowance of discretionary power is unavoidable in any government and is best lodged in the President].

More particularly, this case calls for the exercise of the President's powers as protector of the peace. Rossiter The
American Presidency].The power of the President to keep the peace is not limited merely to exercising the
commander-in-chief powers in times of emergency or to leading the State against external and internal threats to its
existence. The President is not only clothed with extraordinary powers in times of emergency, but is also tasked with
attending to the day-to-day problems of maintaining peace and order and ensuring domestic tranquility in times when
no foreign foe appears on the horizon. Wide discretion, within the bounds of law, in fulfilling presidential duties in times
of peace is not in any way diminished by the relative want of an emergency specified in the commander-in-chief
provision. For in making the President commander-in-chief the enumeration of powers that follow cannot be said to
exclude the President's exercising as Commander-in- Chief powers short of the calling of the armed forces, or
suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or declaring martial law, in order to keep the peace, and maintain
public order and security.

That the President has the power under the Constitution to bar the Marcose's from returning has been recognized by
memembers of the Legislature, and is manifested by the Resolution proposed in the House of Representatives and
signed by 103 of its members urging the President to allow Mr. Marcos to return to the Philippines "as a genuine
unselfish gesture for true national reconciliation and as irrevocable proof of our collective adherence to
uncompromising respect for human rights under the Constitution and our laws." [House Resolution No. 1342, Rollo,
p. 321.1 The Resolution does not question the President's power to bar the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines,
rather, it appeals to the President's sense of compassion to allow a man to come home to die in his country.

What we are saying in effect is that the request or demand of the Marcoses to be allowed to return to the Philippines
cannot be considered in the light solely of the constitutional provisions guaranteeing liberty of abode and the right to
travel, subject to certain exceptions, or of case law which clearly never contemplated situations even remotely similar
to the present one. It must be treated as a matter that is appropriately addressed to those residual unstated powers
of the President which are implicit in and correlative to the paramount duty residing in that office to safeguard and
protect general welfare. In that context, such request or demand should submit to the exercise of a broader discretion
on the part of the President to determine whether it must be granted or denied.

The Extent of Review

Under the Constitution, judicial power includes the duty to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government."
[Art. VIII, Sec. 1] Given this wording, we cannot agree with the Solicitor General that the issue constitutes a political
question which is beyond the jurisdiction of the Court to decide.

The present Constitution limits resort to the political question doctrine and broadens the scope of judicial inquiry into
areas which the Court, under previous constitutions, would have normally left to the political departments to decide.
But nonetheless there remain issues beyond the Court's jurisdiction the determination of which is exclusively for the
President, for Congress or for the people themselves through a plebiscite or referendum. We cannot, for example,
question the President's recognition of a foreign government, no matter how premature or improvident such action
may appear. We cannot set aside a presidential pardon though it may appear to us that the beneficiary is totally
undeserving of the grant. Nor can we amend the Constitution under the guise of resolving a dispute brought before
us because the power is reserved to the people.

There is nothing in the case before us that precludes our determination thereof on the political question doctrine. The
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission cited by petitioners show that the framers intended to widen the scope
of judicial review but they did not intend courts of justice to settle all actual controversies before them. When political
questions are involved, the Constitution limits the determination to whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the official whose action is being questioned. If
grave abuse is not established, the Court will not substitute its judgment for that of the official concerned and decide
a matter which by its nature or by law is for the latter alone to decide. In this light, it would appear clear that the second
paragraph of Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution, defining "judicial power," which specifically empowers the courts
to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion on the part of any branch or instrumentality
of the government, incorporates in the fundamental law the ruling in Lansang v. Garcia [G.R. No. L-33964, December
11, 1971, 42 SCRA 4481 that:]

Article VII of the [1935] Constitution vests in the Executive the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus under specified conditions. Pursuant to the principle of separation of powers underlying our system of
government, the Executive is supreme within his own sphere. However, the separation of powers, under the
Constitution, is not absolute. What is more, it goes hand in hand with the system of checks and balances, under which
the Executive is supreme, as regards the suspension of the privilege, but only if and when he acts within the sphere
alloted to him by the Basic Law, and the authority to determine whether or not he has so acted is vested in the Judicial
Department, which, in this respect, is, in turn, constitutionally supreme. In the exercise of such authority, the function
of the Court is merely to check — not to supplant the Executive, or to ascertain merely whether he has gone beyond
the constitutional limits of his jurisdiction, not to exercise the power vested in him or to determine the wisdom of his
act [At 479-480.]

56
Accordingly, the question for the Court to determine is whether or not there exist factual bases for the President to
conclude that it was in the national interest to bar the return of the Marcoses to the Philippines. If such postulates do
exist, it cannot be said that she has acted, or acts, arbitrarily or that she has gravely abused her discretion in deciding
to bar their return.

We find that from the pleadings filed by the parties, from their oral arguments, and the facts revealed during the briefing
in chambers by the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the National Security Adviser, wherein
petitioners and respondents were represented, there exist factual bases for the President's decision..

The Court cannot close its eyes to present realities and pretend that the country is not besieged from within by a well-
organized communist insurgency, a separatist movement in Mindanao, rightist conspiracies to grab power, urban
terrorism, the murder with impunity of military men, police officers and civilian officials, to mention only a few. The
documented history of the efforts of the Marcose's and their followers to destabilize the country, as earlier narrated in
this ponencia bolsters the conclusion that the return of the Marcoses at this time would only exacerbate and intensify
the violence directed against the State and instigate more chaos.

As divergent and discordant forces, the enemies of the State may be contained. The military establishment has given
assurances that it could handle the threats posed by particular groups. But it is the catalytic effect of the return of the
Marcoses that may prove to be the proverbial final straw that would break the camel's back. With these before her,
the President cannot be said to have acted arbitrarily and capriciously and whimsically in determining that the return
of the Marcoses poses a serious threat to the national interest and welfare and in prohibiting their return.

It will not do to argue that if the return of the Marcoses to the Philippines will cause the escalation of violence against
the State, that would be the time for the President to step in and exercise the commander-in-chief powers granted her
by the Constitution to suppress or stamp out such violence. The State, acting through the Government, is not
precluded from taking pre- emptive action against threats to its existence if, though still nascent they are perceived as
apt to become serious and direct. Protection of the people is the essence of the duty of government. The preservation
of the State the fruition of the people's sovereignty is an obligation in the highest order. The President, sworn to
preserve and defend the Constitution and to see the faithful execution the laws, cannot shirk from that responsibility.

We cannot also lose sight of the fact that the country is only now beginning to recover from the hardships brought
about by the plunder of the economy attributed to the Marcoses and their close associates and relatives, many of
whom are still here in the Philippines in a position to destabilize the country, while the Government has barely
scratched the surface, so to speak, in its efforts to recover the enormous wealth stashed away by the Marcoses in
foreign jurisdictions. Then, We cannot ignore the continually increasing burden imposed on the economy by the
excessive foreign borrowing during the Marcos regime, which stifles and stagnates development and is one of the
root causes of widespread poverty and all its attendant ills. The resulting precarious state of our economy is of
common knowledge and is easily within the ambit of judicial notice.

The President has determined that the destabilization caused by the return of the Marcoses would wipe away the
gains achieved during the past few years and lead to total economic collapse. Given what is within our individual and
common knowledge of the state of the economy, we cannot argue with that determination.

WHEREFORE, and it being our well-considered opinion that the President did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse
of discretion in determining that the return of former President Marcos and his family at the present time and under
present circumstances poses a serious threat to national interest and welfare and in prohibiting their return to the
Philippines, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 213847 August 18, 2015

JUAN PONCE ENRILE
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION), AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
BERSAMIN, J.:
The decision whether to detain or release an accused before and during trial is ultimately an incident of the judicial
power to hear and determine his criminal case. The strength of the Prosecution's case, albeit a good measure of the
accused’s propensity for flight or for causing harm to the public, is subsidiary to the primary objective of bail, which is
to ensure that the accused appears at trial.1
The Case
Before the Court is the petition for certiorari filed by Senator Juan Ponce Enrile to assail and annul the resolutions
dated July 14, 20142 and August 8, 20143 issued by the Sandiganbayan (Third Division) in Case No. SB-14-CRM-
0238, where he has been charged with plunder along with several others. Enrile insists that the resolutions, which
respectively denied his Motion To Fix Bail and his Motion For Reconsideration, were issued with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Antecedents
On June 5, 2014, the Office of the Ombudsman charged Enrile and several others with plunder in the Sandiganbayan
on the basis of their purported involvement in the diversion and misuse of appropriations under the Priority
Development Assistance Fund (PDAF).4 On June 10, 2014 and June 16, 2014, Enrile respectively filed his Omnibus
Motion5 and Supplemental Opposition,6 praying, among others, that he be allowed to post bail should probable cause
be found against him. The motions were heard by the Sandiganbayan after the Prosecution filed its Consolidated
Opposition.7
On July 3, 2014, the Sandiganbaya n issued its resolution denying Enrile’s motion, particularly on the matter of bail,
on the ground of its prematurity considering that Enrile had not yet then voluntarily surrendered or been placed under
the custody of the law.8 Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan ordered the arrest of Enrile.9

57
On the same day that the warrant for his arrest was issued, Enrile voluntarily surrendered to Director Benjamin
Magalong of the Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG) in Camp Crame, Quezon City, and was later on
confined at the Philippine National Police (PNP) General Hospital following his medical examination.10
Thereafter, Enrile filed his Motion for Detention at the PNP General Hospital ,11 and his Motion to Fix Bail ,12 both
dated July 7, 2014, which were heard by the Sandiganbayan on July 8, 2014.13 In support of the motions, Enrile
argued that he should be allowed to post bail because: (a) the Prosecution had not yet established that the evidence
of his guilt was strong; (b) although he was charged with plunder, the penalty as to him would only be reclusion
temporal , not reclusion perpetua ; and (c) he was not a flight risk, and his age and physical condition must further be
seriously considered.
On July 14, 2014, the Sandiganbayan issued its first assailed resolution denying Enrile’s Motion to Fix Bail, disposing
thusly:

x x x [I]t is only after the prosecution shall have presented its evidence and the Court shall have made a
determination that the evidence of guilt is not strong against accused Enrile can he demand bail as a
matter of right. Then and only then will the Court be duty-bound to fix the amount of his bail.

To be sure, no such determination has been made by the Court. In fact, accused Enrile has not filed an
application for bail. Necessarily, no bail hearing can even commence. It is thus exceedingly premature
for accused Enrile to ask the Court to fix his bail.

Accused Enrile next argues that the Court should grant him bail because while he is charged with plunder,
"the maximum penalty that may be possibly imposed on him is reclusion temporal, not reclusion
perpetua." He anchors this claim on Section 2 of R.A. No. 7080, as amended, and on the allegation that
he is over seventy (70) years old and that he voluntarily surrendered. "Accordingly, it may be said that
the crime charged against Enrile is not punishable by reclusion perpetua, and thus bailable."

The argument has no merit.

x x x [F]or purposes of bail, the presence of mitigating circumstance/s is not taken into consideration.
These circumstances will only be appreciated in the imposition of the proper penalty after trial should the
accused be found guilty of the offense charged. x x x

Lastly, accused Enrile asserts that the Court should already fix his bail because he is not a flight risk and
his physical condition must also be seriously considered by the Court.

Admittedly, the accused’s age, physical condition and his being a flight risk are among the factors that
are considered in fixing a reasonable amount of bail. However, as explained above, it is premature for
the Court to fix the amount of bail without an anterior showing that the evidence of guilt against accused
Enrile is not strong.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused Juan Ponce Enrile’s Motion to Fix Bail dated July 7, 2014
is DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.14

On August 8, 2014, the Sandiganbayan issued it s second assailed resolution to deny Enrile’s motion for
reconsideration filed vis-à-vis the July 14, 2014 resolution.15
Enrile raises the following grounds in support of his petition for certiorari , namely:

A. Before judgment of the Sandiganbayan, Enrile is bailable as a matter of right. Enrile may be deemed to fall
within the exception only upon concurrence of two (2) circumstances: (i) where the offense is punishable by
reclusion perpetua, and (ii) when evidence of guilt is strong.

B. The prosecution failed to show clearly and conclusively that Enrile, if ever he would be convicted, is
punishable by reclusion perpetua; hence, Enrile is entitled to bail as a matter of right.

C. The prosecution failed to show clearly and conclusively that evidence of Enrile’s guilt (if ever) is strong;
hence, Enrile is entitled to bail as a matter of right.

D. At any rate, Enrile may be bailable as he is not a flight risk.16

Enrile claims that before judgment of conviction, an accused is entitled to bail as matter of right; th at it is the duty and
burden of the Prosecution to show clearly and conclusively that Enrile comes under the exception and cannot be
excluded from enjoying the right to bail; that the Prosecution has failed to establish that Enrile, if convicted of plunder,
is punishable by reclusion perpetua considering the presence of two mitigating circumstances – his age and his
voluntary surrender; that the Prosecution has not come forward with proof showing that his guilt for the crime of
plunder is strong; and that he should not be considered a flight risk taking into account that he is already over the age
of 90, his medical condition, and his social standing.
In its Comment ,17 the Ombudsman contends that Enrile’s right to bail is discretionary as he is charged with a capital
offense; that to be granted bail, it is mandatory that a bail hearing be conducted to determine whether there is strong
evidence of his guilt, or the lack of it; and that entitlement to bail considers the imposable penalty, regardless of the
attendant circumstances.

58
 Ruling of the Court
The petition for certiorari is meritorious.
1.
Bail protects the right of the accused to
due process and to be presumed innocent
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved. 18 The presumption
of innocence is rooted in the guarantee of due process, and is safeguarded by the constitutional right to be released
on bail,19 and further binds the court to wait until after trial to impose any punishment on the accused.20
It is worthy to note that bail is not granted to prevent the accused from committing additional crimes.[[21] The purpose
of bail is to guarantee the appearance of the accused at the trial, or whenever so required by the trial court. The
amount of bail should be high enough to assure the presence of the accused when so required, but it should be no
higher than is reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose.22 Thus, bail acts as a reconciling mechanism to
accommodate both the accused’s interest in his provisional liberty before or during the trial, and the society’s interest
in assuring the accused’s presence at trial.23
2.
Bail may be granted as a
matter of right or of discretion
The right to bail is expressly afforded by Section 13, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the Constitution, viz.:
x x x All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is
strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided
by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended.
Excessive bail shall not be required.
This constitutional provision is repeated in Section 7, Rule 11424 of the Rules of Court , as follows:
Section 7. Capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, not bailable. — No
person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be
admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution.
A capital offense in the context of the rule refers to an offense that, under the law existing at the time of its commission
and the application for admission to bail, may be punished with death.25
The general rule is, therefore, that any person, before being convicted of any criminal offense, shall be bailable, unless
he is charged with a capital offense, or with an offense punishable with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, and
the evidence of his guilt is strong. Hence, from the moment he is placed under arrest, or is detained or restrained by
the officers of the law, he can claim the guarantee of his provisional liberty under the Bill of Rights, and he retains his
right to bail unless he is charged with a capital offense, or with an offense punishable with reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, and the evidence of his guilt is strong.26 Once it has been established that the evidence of guilt is
strong, no right to bail shall be recognized.27
As a result, all criminal cases within the competence of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court, Municipal
Trial Court in Cities, or Municipal Circuit Trial Court are bailable as matter of right because these courts have no
jurisdiction to try capital offenses, or offenses punishable with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. Likewise, bail
is a matter of right prior to conviction by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for any offense not punishable by death,
reclusion perpetua , or life imprisonment, or even prior to conviction for an offense punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua , or life imprisonment when evidence of guilt is not strong.28
On the other hand, the granting of bail is discretionary: (1) upon conviction by the RTC of an offense not punishable
by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment;29 or (2) if the RTC has imposed a penalty of imprisonment
exceeding six years, provided none of the circumstances enumerated under paragraph 3 of Section 5, Rule 114 is
present, as follows:

(a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has committed the crime aggravated by the
circumstance of reiteration;

(b) That he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or violated the conditions of his bail
without valid justification;

(c) That he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or conditional pardon;

(d) That the circumstances of hi s case indicate the probability of flight if released on bail; or

(e) That there is undue risk that he may commit another crime during the pendency of the appeal.

3.
Admission to bail in offenses punished
by death, or life imprisonment, or reclusion
perpetua is subject to judicial discretion
For purposes of admission to bail, the determination of whether or not evidence of guilt is strong in criminal cases
involving capital offenses, or offenses punishable with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment lies within the discretion
of the trial court. But, as the Court has held in Concerned Citizens v. Elma ,30 "such discretion may be exercised only
after the hearing called to ascertain the degree of guilt of the accused for the purpose of whether or not he should be
granted provisional liberty." It is axiomatic, therefore, that bail cannot be allowed when its grant is a matter of discretion
on the part of the trial court unless there has been a hearing with notice to the Prosecution. 31 The indispensability of
the hearing with notice has been aptly explained in Aguirre v. Belmonte, viz. :32
x x x Even before its pronouncement in the Lim case, this Court already ruled in People vs. Dacudao, etc., et al. that
a hearing is mandatory before bail can be granted to an accused who is charged with a capital offense, in this wise:

The respondent court acted irregularly in granting bail in a murder case without any hearing on the motion
asking for it, without bothering to ask the prosecution for its conformity or comment, as it turned out later,
59
 over its strong objections. The court granted bail on the sole basis of the complaint and the affidavits of
three policemen, not one of whom apparently witnessed the killing. Whatever the court possessed at the
time it issued the questioned ruling was intended only for prima facie determining whether or not there is
sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that the crime was committed and pinpointing the
persons who probably committed it. Whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong for each individual
accused still has to be established unless the prosecution submits the issue on whatever it has already
presented. To appreciate the strength or weakness of the evidence of guilt, the prosecution must be
consulted or heard. It is equally entitled as the accused to due process.

Certain guidelines in the fixing of a bailbond call for the presentation of evidence and reasonable
opportunity for the prosecution to refute it. Among them are the nature and circumstances of the crime,
character and reputation of the accused, the weight of the evidence against him, the probability of the
accused appearing at the trial, whether or not the accused is a fugitive from justice, and whether or not
the accused is under bond in other cases. (Section 6, Rule 114, Rules of Court) It is highly doubtful if the
trial court can appreciate these guidelines in an ex-parte determination where the Fiscal is neither present
nor heard.

The hearing, which may be either summary or otherwise, in the discretion of the court, should primarily determine
whether or not the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong. For this purpose, a summary hearing means:

x x x such brief and speedy method of receiving and considering the evidence of guilt as is practicable
and consistent with the purpose of hearing which is merely to determine the weight of evidence for
purposes of bail. On such hearing, the court does not sit to try the merits or to enter into any nice inquiry
as to the weight that ought to be allowed to the evidence for or against the accused, nor will it speculate
on the outcome of the trial or on what further evidence may be therein offered or admitted. The course
of inquiry may be left to the discretion of the court which may confine itself to receiving such evidence as
has reference to substantial matters, avoiding unnecessary thoroughness in the examination and cross
examination.33

In resolving bail applications of the accused who is charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, the trial judge is expected to comply with the guidelines outlined in Cortes v.
Catral,34 to wit:

1. In all cases, whether bail is a matter of right or of discretion, notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the application
for bail or require him to submit his recommendation (Section 18, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, as amended);

2. Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a hearing of the application for bail regardless of whether or not the
prosecution refuses to present evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is strong for the purpose of enabling the
court to exercise its sound discretion; (Section 7 and 8, supra)

3. Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary of evidence of the prosecution;

4. If the guilt of the accused is no t strong, discharge the accused upon the approval of the bailbond (Section 19,
supra) Otherwise petition should be denied.

3.
Enrile’s poor health justifies his admission to bail
We first note that Enrile has averred in his Motion to Fix Bail the presence of two mitigating circumstances that should
be appreciated in his favor, namely: that he was already over 70 years at the time of the alleged commission of the
offense, and that he voluntarily surrendered.35
Enrile’s averment has been mainly uncontested by the Prosecution, whose Opposition to the Motion to Fix Bail has
only argued that –

8. As regards the assertion that the maximum possible penalty that might be imposed upon Enrile is only
reclusion temporal due to the presence of two mitigating circumstances, suffice it to state that the
presence or absence of mitigating circumstances is also not consideration that the Constitution deemed
worthy. The relevant clause in Section 13 is "charged with an offense punishable by." It is, therefore, the
maximum penalty provided by the offense that has bearing and not the possibility of mitigating
circumstances being appreciated in the accused’s favor.36

Yet, we do not determine now the question of whether or not Enrile’s averment on the presence of the two mitigating
circumstances could entitle him to bail despite the crime alleged against him being punishable with reclusion perpetua
,37 simply because the determination, being primarily factual in context, is ideally to be made by the trial court.
Nonetheless, in now granting Enrile’s petition for certiorari, the Court is guided by the earlier mentioned principal
purpose of bail, which is to guarantee the appearance of the accused at the trial, or whenever so required by the court.
The Court is further mindful of the Philippines’ responsibility in the international community arising from the national
commitment under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights to:

x x x uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and dignity of every person. This
commitment is enshrined in Section II, Article II of our Constitution which provides: "The State values the
dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights." The Philippines, therefore,
has the responsibility of protecting and promoting the right of every person to liberty and due process,
ensuring that those detained or arrested can participate in the proceedings before a court, to enable it to
decide without delay on the legality of the detention and order their release if justified. In other words,
the Philippine authorities are under obligation to make available to every person under detention such
60
 remedies which safeguard their fundamental right to liberty. These remedies include the right to be
admitted to bail.38

This national commitment to uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and dignity of every
person has authorized the grant of bail not only to those charged in criminal proceedings but also to extraditees upon
a clear and convincing showing: (1 ) that the detainee will not be a flight risk or a danger to the community; and (2 )
that there exist special, humanitarian and compelling circumstances.39
In our view, his social and political standing and his having immediately surrendered to the authorities upon his being
charged in court indicate that the risk of his flight or escape from this jurisdiction is highly unlikely. His personal
disposition from the onset of his indictment for plunder, formal or otherwise, has demonstrated his utter respect for
the legal processes of this country. We also do not ignore that at an earlier time many years ago when he had been
charged with rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder, he already evinced a similar personal disposition
of respect for the legal processes, and was granted bail during the pendency of his trial because he was not seen as
a flight risk.40 With his solid reputation in both his public and his private lives, his long years of public service, and
history’s judgment of him being at stake, he should be granted bail.
The currently fragile state of Enrile’s health presents another compelling justification for his admission to bail, but
which the Sandiganbayan did not recognize.
In his testimony in the Sandiganbayan,41 Dr. Jose C. Gonzales, the Director of the Philippine General Hospital (PGH),
classified Enrile as a geriatric patient who was found during the medical examinations conducted at the UP-PGH to
be suffering from the following conditions:

(1) Chronic Hypertension with fluctuating blood pressure levels on multiple drug therapy; (Annexes 1.1, 1.2, 1.3);

(2) Diffuse atherosclerotic cardiovascular disease composed of the following :

a. Previous history of cerebrovascular disease with carotid and vertebral artery disease ; (Annexes 1.4, 4.1)

b. Heavy coronary artery calcifications; (Annex 1.5)

c. Ankle Brachial Index suggestive of arterial calcifications. (Annex 1.6)

(3) Atrial and Ventricular Arrhythmia (irregular heart beat) documented by Holter monitoring ; (Annexes 1.7.1, 1.7.2)

(4) Asthma-COPD Overlap Syndrom (ACOS) and postnasal drip syndrome; (Annexes 2.1, 2.2)

(5) Ophthalmology:

a. Age-related mascular degeneration, neovascular s/p laser of the Retina, s/p Lucentis intra-ocular injections;
(Annexes 3.0, 3.1, 3.2)

b. S/p Cataract surgery with posterior chamber intraocular lens. (Annexes 3.1, 3.2)

(6) Historical diagnoses of the following:

a. High blood sugar/diabetes on medications;

b. High cholesterol levels/dyslipidemia;

c. Alpha thalassemia;

d. Gait/balance disorder;

e. Upper gastrointestinal bleeding (etiology uncertain) in 2014;

f. Benign prostatic hypertrophy (with documented enlarged prostate on recent ultrasound).42

Dr. Gonzales attested that the following medical conditions, singly or collectively, could pose significant risk s to the
life of Enrile, to wit: (1) uncontrolled hypertension, because it could lead to brain or heart complications, including
recurrence of stroke; (2) arrhythmia, because it could lead to fatal or non-fatal cardiovascular events, especially under
stressful conditions; (3) coronary calcifications associated with coronary artery disease, because they could indicate
a future risk for heart attack under stressful conditions; and (4) exacerbations of ACOS, because they could be
triggered by certain circumstances (like excessive heat, humidity, dust or allergen exposure) which could cause a
deterioration in patients with asthma or COPD.43
Based on foregoing, there is no question at all that Enrile’s advanced age and ill health required special medical
attention. His confinement at the PNP General Hospital, albeit at his own instance,44 was not even recommended by
the officer-in-charge (O IC) and the internist doctor of that medical facility because of the limitations in the medical
support at that hospital. Their testimonies ran as follows:
JUSTICE MARTIRES:
The question is, do you feel comfortable with the continued confinement of Senator Enrile at the Philippine National
Police Hospital?
DR. SERVILLANO:
No, Your Honor.
JUSTICE MARTIRES:
Director, doctor, do you feel comfortable with the continued confinement of Senator Enrile at the PNP Hospital ?
PSUPT. JOCSON:

61
No, Your Honor.
JUSTICE MARTIRES:
Why?
PSUPT. JOCSON:
Because during emergency cases, Your Honor, we cannot give him the best.
JUSTICE MARTIRES:
At present, since you are the attending physician of the accused, Senator Enrile, are you happy or have any fear in
your heart of the present condition of the accused vis a vis the facilities of the hospital?
DR. SERVILLANO:
Yes, Your Honor. I have a fear.
JUSTICE MARTIRES:
That you will not be able to address in an emergency situation?
DR. SERVILLANO:
Your Honor, in case of emergency situation we can handle it but probably if the condition of the patient worsen, we
have no facilities to do those things, Your Honor.45
Bail for the provisional liberty of the accused, regardless of the crime charged, should be allowed independently of
the merits of the charge, provided his continued incarceration is clearly shown to be injurious to his health or to
endanger his life. Indeed, denying him bail despite imperiling his health and life would not serve the true objective of
preventive incarceration during the trial.
Granting bail to Enrile on the foregoing reasons is not unprecedented. The Court has already held in Dela Rama v.
The People’s Court:46
x x x This court, in disposing of the first petition for certiorari, held the following:
x x x [ U]nless allowance of bail is forbidden by law in the particular case, the illness of the prisoner,
independently of the merits of the case, is a circumstance, and the humanity of the law makes it a consideration which
should, regardless of the charge and the stage of the proceeding, influence the court to exercise its discretion to admit
the prisoner to bail ;47
xxx
Considering the report of the Medical Director of the Quezon Institute to the effect that the petitioner "is actually
suffering from minimal, early, unstable type of pulmonary tuberculosis, and chronic, granular pharyngitis," and that in
said institute they "have seen similar cases, later progressing into advance stages when the treatment and medicine
are no longer of any avail;" taking into consideration that the petitioner’s previous petition for bail was denied by the
People’s Court on the ground that the petitioner was suffering from quiescent and not active tuberculosis, and the
implied purpose of the People’s Court in sending the petitioner to the Quezon Institute for clinical examination and
diagnosis of the actual condition of his lungs, was evidently to verify whether the petitioner is suffering from active
tuberculosis, in order to act accordingly in deciding his petition for bail; and considering further that the said People’s
Court has adopted and applied the well-established doctrine cited in our above-quoted resolution, in several cases,
among them, the cases against Pio Duran (case No. 3324) and Benigno Aquino (case No. 3527), in which the said
defendants were released on bail on the ground that they were ill and their continued confinement in New Bilibid
Prison would be injurious to their health or endanger their life; it is evident and we consequently hold that the People’s
Court acted with grave abuse of discretion in refusing to re lease the petitioner on bail.48
It is relevant to observe that granting provisional liberty to Enrile will then enable him to have his medical condition be
properly addressed and better attended to by competent physicians in the hospitals of his choice. This will not only
aid in his adequate preparation of his defense but, more importantly , will guarantee his appearance in court for the
trial.
On the other hand, to mark time in order to wait for the trial to finish before a meaningful consideration of the application
for bail can be had is to defeat the objective of bail, which is to entitle the accused to provisional liberty pending the
trial. There may be circumstances decisive of the issue of bail – whose existence is either admitted by the Prosecution,
or is properly the subject of judicial notice – that the courts can already consider in resolving the application for bail
without awaiting the trial to finish.49 The Court thus balances the scales of justice by protecting the interest of the
People through ensuring his personal appearance at the trial, and at the same time realizing for him the guarantees
of due process as well as to be presumed innocent until proven guilty.
Accordingly, we conclude that the Sandiganbayan arbitrarily ignored the objective of bail to ensure the appearance of
the accused during the trial; and unwarrantedly disregarded the clear showing of the fragile health and advanced age
of Enrile. As such, the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in denying Enrile’s Motion To Fix Bail. Grave
abuse of discretion, as the ground for the issuance of the writ of certiorari , connotes whimsical and capricious exercise
of judgment as is equivalent to excess, or lack of jurisdiction.50 The abuse must be so patent and gross as to amount
to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation
of law as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility.51
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition for certiorari ; ISSUES the writ of certiorari ANNULING and SETTING
ASIDE the Resolutions issued by the Sandiganbayan (Third Division) in Case No. SB-14 CRM-0238 on July 14, 2014
and August 8, 2014; ORDERS the PROVISIONAL RELEASE of petitioner Juan Ponce Enrile in Case No. SB-14-
CRM-0238 upon posting of a cash bond of ₱1,000,000.00 in the Sandiganbayan; and DIRECTS the immediate release
of petitioner Juan Ponce Enrile from custody unless he is being detained for some other lawful cause.
No pronouncement on costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 153675 April 19, 2007
GOVERNMENT OF HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION, represented by the Philippine
Department of Justice
vs.
HON. FELIXBERTO T. OLALIA, JR. and JUAN ANTONIO MUÑOZ
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
For our resolution is the instant Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended,
seeking to nullify the two Orders of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 8, Manila (presided by respondent Judge
Felixberto T. Olalia, Jr.) issued in Civil Case No. 99-95773. These are: (1) the Order dated December 20, 2001
62
allowing Juan Antonio Muñoz, private respondent, to post bail; and (2) the Order dated April 10, 2002 denying the
motion to vacate the said Order of December 20, 2001 filed by the Government of Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region, represented by the Philippine Department of Justice (DOJ), petitioner. The petition alleges that both Orders
were issued by respondent judge with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction as there
is no provision in the Constitution granting bail to a potential extraditee.
The facts are:
On January 30, 1995, the Republic of the Philippines and the then British Crown Colony of Hong Kong signed an
"Agreement for the Surrender of Accused and Convicted Persons." It took effect on June 20, 1997.
On July 1, 1997, Hong Kong reverted back to the People’s Republic of China and became the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region.
Private respondent Muñoz was charged before the Hong Kong Court with three (3) counts of the offense of "accepting
an advantage as agent," in violation of Section 9 (1) (a) of the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance, Cap. 201 of Hong
Kong. He also faces seven (7) counts of the offense of conspiracy to defraud, penalized by the common law of Hong
Kong. On August 23, 1997 and October 25, 1999, warrants of arrest were issued against him. If convicted, he faces
a jail term of seven (7) to fourteen (14) years for each charge.
On September 13, 1999, the DOJ received from the Hong Kong Department of Justice a request for the provisional
arrest of private respondent. The DOJ then forwarded the request to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) which,
in turn, filed with the RTC of Manila, Branch 19 an application for the provisional arrest of private respondent.
On September 23, 1999, the RTC, Branch 19, Manila issued an Order of Arrest against private respondent. That same
day, the NBI agents arrested and detained him.
On October 14, 1999, private respondent filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus with application for preliminary mandatory injunction and/or writ of habeas corpus questioning the validity
of the Order of Arrest.
On November 9, 1999, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision declaring the Order of Arrest void.
On November 12, 1999, the DOJ filed with this Court a petition for review on certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 140520,
praying that the Decision of the Court of Appeals be reversed.
On December 18, 2000, this Court rendered a Decision granting the petition of the DOJ and sustaining the validity of
the Order of Arrest against private respondent. The Decision became final and executory on April 10, 2001.
Meanwhile, as early as November 22, 1999, petitioner Hong Kong Special Administrative Region filed with the RTC
of Manila a petition for the extradition of private respondent, docketed as Civil Case No. 99-95733, raffled off to Branch
10, presided by Judge Ricardo Bernardo, Jr. For his part, private respondent filed, in the same case,- a petition for
bail which was opposed by petitioner.
After hearing, or on October 8, 2001, Judge Bernardo, Jr. issued an Order denying the petition for bail, holding that
there is no Philippine law granting bail in extradition cases and that private respondent is a high "flight risk."
On October 22, 2001, Judge Bernardo, Jr. inhibited himself from further hearing Civil Case No. 99-95733. It was then
raffled off to Branch 8 presided by respondent judge.
On October 30, 2001, private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order denying his application for
bail. This was granted by respondent judge in an Order dated December 20, 2001 allowing private respondent to post
bail, thus:
In conclusion, this Court will not contribute to accused’s further erosion of civil liberties. The petition for bail is granted
subject to the following conditions:

1. Bail is set at Php750,000.00 in cash with the condition that accused hereby undertakes that he will appear and
answer the issues raised in these proceedings and will at all times hold himself amenable to orders and processes of
this Court, will further appear for judgment. If accused fails in this undertaking, the cash bond will be forfeited in favor
of the government;

2. Accused must surrender his valid passport to this Court;

3. The Department of Justice is given immediate notice and discretion of filing its own motion for hold departure order
before this Court even in extradition proceeding; and

4. Accused is required to report to the government prosecutors handling this case or if they so desire to the nearest
office, at any time and day of the week; and if they further desire, manifest before this Court to require that all the
assets of accused, real and personal, be filed with this Court soonest, with the condition that if the accused flees from
his undertaking, said assets be forfeited in favor of the government and that the corresponding lien/annotation be
noted therein accordingly.

SO ORDERED.
On December 21, 2001, petitioner filed an urgent motion to vacate the above Order, but it was denied by respondent
judge in his Order dated April 10, 2002.
Hence, the instant petition. Petitioner alleged that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction in admitting private respondent to bail; that there is nothing in the Constitution or statutory
law providing that a potential extraditee has a right to bail, the right being limited solely to criminal proceedings.
In his comment on the petition, private respondent maintained that the right to bail guaranteed under the Bill of Rights
extends to a prospective extraditee; and that extradition is a harsh process resulting in a prolonged deprivation of
one’s liberty.
Section 13, Article III of the Constitution provides that the right to bail shall not be impaired, thus:
Sec. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is
strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided
by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended.
Excessive bail shall not be required.
Jurisprudence on extradition is but in its infancy in this jurisdiction. Nonetheless, this is not the first time that this Court
has an occasion to resolve the question of whether a prospective extraditee may be granted bail.

63
In Government of United States of America v. Hon. Guillermo G. Purganan, Presiding Judge, RTC of Manila, Branch
42, and Mark B. Jimenez, a.k.a. Mario Batacan Crespo,1 this Court, speaking through then Associate Justice Artemio
V. Panganiban, later Chief Justice, held that the constitutional provision on bail does not apply to extradition
proceedings. It is "available only in criminal proceedings," thus:
x x x. As suggested by the use of the word "conviction," the constitutional provision on bail quoted above, as well as
Section 4, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, applies only when a person has been arrested and detained for violation of
Philippine criminal laws. It does not apply to extradition proceedings because extradition courts do not render
judgments of conviction or acquittal.
Moreover, the constitutional right to bail "flows from the presumption of innocence in favor of every accused who
should not be subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter he would be entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be proved
beyond reasonable doubt" (De la Camara v. Enage, 41 SCRA 1, 6, September 17, 1971, per Fernando, J., later CJ).
It follows that the constitutional provision on bail will not apply to a case like extradition, where the presumption of
innocence is not at issue.
The provision in the Constitution stating that the "right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus is suspended" does not detract from the rule that the constitutional right to bail is available only in
criminal proceedings. It must be noted that the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus finds application
"only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion" (Sec. 18,
Art. VIII, Constitution). Hence, the second sentence in the constitutional provision on bail merely emphasizes the right
to bail in criminal proceedings for the aforementioned offenses. It cannot be taken to mean that the right is available
even in extradition proceedings that are not criminal in nature.
At first glance, the above ruling applies squarely to private respondent’s case. However, this Court cannot ignore the
following trends in international law: (1) the growing importance of the individual person in public international law
who, in the 20th century, has gradually attained global recognition; (2) the higher value now being given to human
rights in the international sphere; (3) the corresponding duty of countries to observe these universal human rights in
fulfilling their treaty obligations; and (4) the duty of this Court to balance the rights of the individual under our
fundamental law, on one hand, and the law on extradition, on the other.
The modern trend in public international law is the primacy placed on the worth of the individual person and
the sanctity of human rights. Slowly, the recognition that the individual person may properly be a subject of
international law is now taking root. The vulnerable doctrine that the subjects of international law are limited only to
states was dramatically eroded towards the second half of the past century. For one, the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials
after World War II resulted in the unprecedented spectacle of individual defendants for acts characterized as violations
of the laws of war, crimes against peace, and crimes against humanity. Recently, under the Nuremberg principle,
Serbian leaders have been persecuted for war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in the former
Yugoslavia. These significant events show that the individual person is now a valid subject of international law.
On a more positive note, also after World War II, both international organizations and states gave recognition and
importance to human rights. Thus, on December 10, 1948, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights in which the right to life, liberty and all the other fundamental rights of every
person were proclaimed. While not a treaty, the principles contained in the said Declaration are now recognized
as customarily binding upon the members of the international community. Thus, in Mejoff v. Director of Prisons,2
this Court, in granting bail to a prospective deportee, held that under the Constitution,3 the principles set forth
in that Declaration are part of the law of the land. In 1966, the UN General Assembly also adopted the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights which the Philippines signed and ratified. Fundamental among the rights
enshrined therein are the rights of every person to life, liberty, and due process.
The Philippines, along with the other members of the family of nations, committed to uphold the fundamental human
rights as well as value the worth and dignity of every person. This commitment is enshrined in Section II, Article II of
our Constitution which provides: "The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for
human rights." The Philippines, therefore, has the responsibility of protecting and promoting the right of every person
to liberty and due process, ensuring that those detained or arrested can participate in the proceedings before a court,
to enable it to decide without delay on the legality of the detention and order their release if justified. In other words,
the Philippine authorities are under obligation to make available to every person under detention such remedies which
safeguard their fundamental right to liberty. These remedies include the right to be admitted to bail. While this Court
in Purganan limited the exercise of the right to bail to criminal proceedings, however, in light of the various international
treaties giving recognition and protection to human rights, particularly the right to life and liberty, a reexamination of
this Court’s ruling in Purganan is in order.

First, we note that the exercise of the State’s power to deprive an individual of his liberty is not necessarily limited to
criminal proceedings. Respondents in administrative proceedings, such as deportation and quarantine,4 have likewise
been detained.

Second, to limit bail to criminal proceedings would be to close our eyes to our jurisprudential history. Philippine
jurisprudence has not limited the exercise of the right to bail to criminal proceedings only. This Court has admitted to
bail persons who are not involved in criminal proceedings. In fact, bail has been allowed in this jurisdiction to persons
in detention during the pendency of administrative proceedings, taking into cognizance the obligation of the Philippines
under international conventions to uphold human rights.

The 1909 case of US v. Go-Sioco5 is illustrative. In this case, a Chinese facing deportation for failure to secure the
necessary certificate of registration was granted bail pending his appeal. After noting that the prospective deportee
had committed no crime, the Court opined that "To refuse him bail is to treat him as a person who has committed the
most serious crime known to law;" and that while deportation is not a criminal proceeding, some of the machinery
used "is the machinery of criminal law." Thus, the provisions relating to bail was applied to deportation proceedings.
In Mejoff v. Director of Prisons6 and Chirskoff v. Commission of Immigration,7 this Court ruled that foreign nationals
against whom no formal criminal charges have been filed may be released on bail pending the finality of an order of
deportation. As previously stated, the Court in Mejoff relied upon the Universal declaration of Human Rights in
sustaining the detainee’s right to bail.

64
If bail can be granted in deportation cases, we see no justification why it should not also be allowed in extradition
cases. Likewise, considering that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights applies to deportation cases, there is no
reason why it cannot be invoked in extradition cases. After all, both are administrative proceedings where the
innocence or guilt of the person detained is not in issue.
Clearly, the right of a prospective extraditee to apply for bail in this jurisdiction must be viewed in the light of the various
treaty obligations of the Philippines concerning respect for the promotion and protection of human rights. Under these
treaties, the presumption lies in favor of human liberty. Thus, the Philippines should see to it that the right to liberty of
every individual is not impaired.
Section 2(a) of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1069 (The Philippine Extradition Law) defines "extradition" as "the
removal of an accused from the Philippines with the object of placing him at the disposal of foreign authorities to
enable the requesting state or government to hold him in connection with any criminal investigation directed against
him or the execution of a penalty imposed on him under the penal or criminal law of the requesting state or
government."
Extradition has thus been characterized as the right of a foreign power, created by treaty, to demand the surrender of
one accused or convicted of a crime within its territorial jurisdiction, and the correlative duty of the other state to
surrender him to the demanding state.8 It is not a criminal proceeding.9 Even if the potential extraditee is a criminal,
an extradition proceeding is not by its nature criminal, for it is not punishment for a crime, even though such
punishment may follow extradition.10 It is sui generis, tracing its existence wholly to treaty obligations between different
nations.11 It is not a trial to determine the guilt or innocence of the potential extraditee.12 Nor is it a full-blown
civil action, but one that is merely administrative in character.13 Its object is to prevent the escape of a person accused
or convicted of a crime and to secure his return to the state from which he fled, for the purpose of trial or punishment.14
But while extradition is not a criminal proceeding, it is characterized by the following: (a) it entails a deprivation of
liberty on the part of the potential extraditee and (b) the means employed to attain the purpose of extradition is
also "the machinery of criminal law." This is shown by Section 6 of P.D. No. 1069 (The Philippine Extradition Law)
which mandates the "immediate arrest and temporary detention of the accused" if such "will best serve the interest
of justice." We further note that Section 20 allows the requesting state "in case of urgency" to ask for the "provisional
arrest of the accused, pending receipt of the request for extradition;" and that release from provisional arrest
"shall not prejudice re-arrest and extradition of the accused if a request for extradition is received subsequently."
Obviously, an extradition proceeding, while ostensibly administrative, bears all earmarks of a criminal process. A
potential extraditee may be subjected to arrest, to a prolonged restraint of liberty, and forced to transfer to
the demanding state following the proceedings. "Temporary detention" may be a necessary step in the process
of extradition, but the length of time of the detention should be reasonable.
Records show that private respondent was arrested on September 23, 1999, and remained incarcerated until
December 20, 2001, when the trial court ordered his admission to bail. In other words, he had been detained for
over two (2) years without having been convicted of any crime. By any standard, such an extended period of
detention is a serious deprivation of his fundamental right to liberty. In fact, it was this prolonged deprivation of liberty
which prompted the extradition court to grant him bail.
While our extradition law does not provide for the grant of bail to an extraditee, however, there is no provision
prohibiting him or her from filing a motion for bail, a right to due process under the Constitution.
The applicable standard of due process, however, should not be the same as that in criminal proceedings. In the
latter, the standard of due process is premised on the presumption of innocence of the accused. As Purganan correctly
points out, it is from this major premise that the ancillary presumption in favor of admitting to bail arises. Bearing in
mind the purpose of extradition proceedings, the premise behind the issuance of the arrest warrant and the "temporary
detention" is the possibility of flight of the potential extraditee. This is based on the assumption that such extraditee is
a fugitive from justice.15 Given the foregoing, the prospective extraditee thus bears the onus probandi of showing that
he or she is not a flight risk and should be granted bail.
The time-honored principle of pacta sunt servanda demands that the Philippines honor its obligations under the
Extradition Treaty it entered into with the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. Failure to comply with these
obligations is a setback in our foreign relations and defeats the purpose of extradition. However, it does not necessarily
mean that in keeping with its treaty obligations, the Philippines should diminish a potential extraditee’s rights to life,
liberty, and due process. More so, where these rights are guaranteed, not only by our Constitution, but also by
international conventions, to which the Philippines is a party. We should not, therefore, deprive an extraditee of his
right to apply for bail, provided that a certain standard for the grant is satisfactorily met.
An extradition proceeding being sui generis, the standard of proof required in granting or denying bail can neither be
the proof beyond reasonable doubt in criminal cases nor the standard of proof of preponderance of evidence in civil
cases. While administrative in character, the standard of substantial evidence used in administrative cases cannot
likewise apply given the object of extradition law which is to prevent the prospective extraditee from fleeing our
jurisdiction. In his Separate Opinion in Purganan, then Associate Justice, now Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno,
proposed that a new standard which he termed "clear and convincing evidence" should be used in granting bail
in extradition cases. According to him, this standard should be lower than proof beyond reasonable doubt but higher
than preponderance of evidence. The potential extraditee must prove by "clear and convincing evidence" that he is
not a flight risk and will abide with all the orders and processes of the extradition court.
In this case, there is no showing that private respondent presented evidence to show that he is not a flight risk.
Consequently, this case should be remanded to the trial court to determine whether private respondent may be
granted bail on the basis of "clear and convincing evidence."
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. This case is REMANDED to the trial court to determine whether private
respondent is entitled to bail on the basis of "clear and convincing evidence." If not, the trial court should order the
cancellation of his bail bond and his immediate detention; and thereafter, conduct the extradition proceedings with
dispatch.
SO ORDERED.

65
 G.R. No. 221697 March 8, 2016
MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S. POE-LLAMANZARES
vs.
COMELEC AND ESTRELLA C. ELAMPARO
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 221698-700
MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S. POE-LLAMANZARES
vs.
COMELEC, FRANCISCO S. TATAD, ANTONIO P. CONTRERAS AND AMADO D. VALDEZ
PEREZ, J.:
Before the Court are two consolidated petitions under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with
extremely urgent application for an ex parte issuance of temporary restraining order/status quo ante order and/or writ
of preliminary injunction assailing the following: (1) 1 December 2015 Resolution of the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) Second Division; (2) 23 December 2015 Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc, in SPA No. 15-001 (DC);
(3) 11 December 2015 Resolution of the COMELEC First Division; and ( 4) 23 December 2015 Resolution of the
COMELEC En Banc, in SPA No. 15-002 (DC), SPA No. 15-007 (DC) and SPA No. 15-139 (DC) for having been
issued without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
The Facts
Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares (petitioner) was found abandoned as a newborn infant in the Parish Church
of Jaro, Iloilo by a certain Edgardo Militar (Edgardo) on 3 September 1968. Parental care and custody over petitioner
was passed on by Edgardo to his relatives, Emiliano Militar (Emiliano) and his wife. Three days after, 6 September
1968, Emiliano reported and registered petitioner as a foundling with the Office of the Civil Registrar of Iloilo City
(OCR-Iloilo). In her Foundling Certificate and Certificate of Live Birth, the petitioner was given the name "Mary Grace
Natividad Contreras Militar." 1
When petitioner was five (5) years old, celebrity spouses Ronald Allan Kelley Poe (a.k.a. Fenando Poe, Jr.) and
Jesusa Sonora Poe (a.k.a. Susan Roces) filed a petition for her adoption with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of San
Juan City. On 13 May 1974, the trial court granted their petition and ordered that petitioner's name be changed from
"Mary Grace Natividad Contreras Militar" to "Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe." Although necessary notations were
made by OCR-Iloilo on petitioner's foundling certificate reflecting the court decreed adoption,2 the petitioner's adoptive
mother discovered only sometime in the second half of 2005 that the lawyer who handled petitioner's adoption failed
to secure from the OCR-Iloilo a new Certificate of Live Birth indicating petitioner's new name and the name of her
adoptive parents. 3 Without delay, petitioner's mother executed an affidavit attesting to the lawyer's omission which
she submitted to the OCR-Iloilo. On 4 May 2006, OCR-Iloilo issued a new Certificate of Live Birth in the name of Mary
Grace Natividad Sonora Poe.4
Having reached the age of eighteen (18) years in 1986, petitioner registered as a voter with the local COMELEC Office
in San Juan City. On 13 December 1986, she received her COMELEC Voter's Identification Card for Precinct No. 196
in Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila.5
On 4 April 1988, petitioner applied for and was issued Philippine Passport No. F9272876 by the Department of Foreign
Affairs (DFA). Subsequently, on 5 April 1993 and 19 May 1998, she renewed her Philippine passport and respectively
secured Philippine Passport Nos. L881511 and DD156616.7
Initially, the petitioner enrolled and pursued a degree in Development Studies at the University of the Philippines 8 but
she opted to continue her studies abroad and left for the United States of America (U.S.) in 1988. Petitioner graduated
in 1991 from Boston College in Chestnuts Hill, Massachusetts where she earned her Bachelor of Arts degree in
Political Studies.9
On 27 July 1991, petitioner married Teodoro Misael Daniel V. Llamanzares (Llamanzares), a citizen of both the
Philippines and the U.S., at Sanctuario de San Jose Parish in San Juan City. 10 Desirous of being with her husband
who was then based in the U.S., the couple flew back to the U.S. two days after the wedding ceremony or on 29 July
1991. 11
While in the U.S., the petitioner gave birth to her eldest child Brian Daniel (Brian) on 16 April 1992.12 Her two daughters
Hanna MacKenzie (Hanna) and Jesusa Anika (Anika) were both born in the Philippines on 10 July 1998 and 5 June
2004, respectively. 13
On 18 October 2001, petitioner became a naturalized American citizen. 14 She obtained U.S. Passport No. 017037793
on 19 December 2001. 15
On 8 April 2004, the petitioner came back to the Philippines together with Hanna to support her father's candidacy for
President in the May 2004 elections. It was during this time that she gave birth to her youngest daughter Anika. She
returned to the U.S. with her two daughters on 8 July 2004. 16
After a few months, specifically on 13 December 2004, petitioner rushed back to the Philippines upon learning of her
father's deteriorating medical condition. 17 Her father slipped into a coma and eventually expired. The petitioner stayed
in the country until 3 February 2005 to take care of her father's funeral arrangements as well as to assist in the
settlement of his estate.18
According to the petitioner, the untimely demise of her father was a severe blow to her entire family. In her earnest
desire to be with her grieving mother, the petitioner and her husband decided to move and reside permanently in the
Philippines sometime in the first quarter of 2005.19 The couple began preparing for their resettlement including
notification of their children's schools that they will be transferring to Philippine schools for the next semester; 20
coordination with property movers for the relocation of their household goods, furniture and cars from the U.S. to the
Philippines;21 and inquiry with Philippine authorities as to the proper procedure to be followed in bringing their pet dog
into the country.22 As early as 2004, the petitioner already quit her job in the U.S.23
Finally, petitioner came home to the Philippines on 24 May 200524 and without delay, secured a Tax Identification
Number from the Bureau of Internal Revenue. Her three (3) children immediately followed25 while her husband was
forced to stay in the U.S. to complete pending projects as well as to arrange the sale of their family home there.26

66
The petitioner and her children briefly stayed at her mother's place until she and her husband purchased a
condominium unit with a parking slot at One Wilson Place Condominium in San Juan City in the second half of 2005.27
The corresponding Condominium Certificates of Title covering the unit and parking slot were issued by the Register
of Deeds of San Juan City to petitioner and her husband on 20 February 2006.28 Meanwhile, her children of school
age began attending Philippine private schools.
On 14 February 2006, the petitioner made a quick trip to the U.S. to supervise the disposal of some of the family's
remaining household belongings.29 She travelled back to the Philippines on 11 March 2006.30
In late March 2006, petitioner's husband officially informed the U.S. Postal Service of the family's change and
abandonment of their address in the U.S.31 The family home was eventually sold on 27 April 2006.32 Petitioner's
husband resigned from his job in the U.S. in April 2006, arrived in the country on 4 May 2006 and started working for
a major Philippine company in July 2006.33
In early 2006, petitioner and her husband acquired a 509-square meter lot in Corinthian Hills, Quezon City where they
built their family home34 and to this day, is where the couple and their children have been residing.35 A Transfer
Certificate of Title covering said property was issued in the couple's name by the Register of Deeds of Quezon City
on 1June 2006.
On 7 July 2006, petitioner took her Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines pursuant to Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 9225 or the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003.36 Under the same Act, she filed with the
Bureau of Immigration (BI) a sworn petition to reacquire Philippine citizenship together with petitions for derivative
citizenship on behalf of her three minor children on 10 July 2006.37 As can be gathered from its 18 July 2006 Order,
the BI acted favorably on petitioner's petitions and declared that she is deemed to have reacquired her Philippine
citizenship while her children are considered as citizens of the Philippines.38 Consequently, the BI issued Identification
Certificates (ICs) in petitioner's name and in the names of her three (3) children. 39
Again, petitioner registered as a voter of Barangay Santa Lucia, San Juan City on 31 August 2006.40 She also secured
from the DFA a new Philippine Passport bearing the No. XX4731999.41 This passport was renewed on 18 March 2014
and she was issued Philippine Passport No. EC0588861 by the DFA.42
On 6 October 2010, President Benigno S. Aquino III appointed petitioner as Chairperson of the Movie and Television
Review and Classification Board (MTRCB).43 Before assuming her post, petitioner executed an "Affidavit of
Renunciation of Allegiance to the United States of America and Renunciation of American Citizenship" before a notary
public in Pasig City on 20 October 2010,44 in satisfaction of the legal requisites stated in Section 5 of R.A. No. 9225.45
The following day, 21 October 2010 petitioner submitted the said affidavit to the BI46 and took her oath of office as
Chairperson of the MTRCB.47 From then on, petitioner stopped using her American passport.48
On 12 July 2011, the petitioner executed before the Vice Consul of the U.S. Embassy in Manila an "Oath/Affirmation
of Renunciation of Nationality of the United States."49 On that day, she accomplished a sworn questionnaire before
the U.S. Vice Consul wherein she stated that she had taken her oath as MTRCB Chairperson on 21 October 2010
with the intent, among others, of relinquishing her American citizenship.50 In the same questionnaire, the petitioner
stated that she had resided outside of the U.S., specifically in the Philippines, from 3 September 1968 to 29 July 1991
and from May 2005 to present.51
On 9 December 2011, the U.S. Vice Consul issued to petitioner a "Certificate of Loss of Nationality of the United
States" effective 21 October 2010.52
On 2 October 2012, the petitioner filed with the COMELEC her Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for Senator for the
2013 Elections wherein she answered "6 years and 6 months" to the question "Period of residence in the Philippines
before May 13, 2013."53 Petitioner obtained the highest number of votes and was proclaimed Senator on 16 May
2013. 54
On 19 December 2013, petitioner obtained Philippine Diplomatic Passport No. DE0004530. 55
On 15 October 2015, petitioner filed her COC for the Presidency for the May 2016 Elections. 56 In her COC, the
petitioner declared that she is a natural-born citizen and that her residence in the Philippines up to the day before 9
May 2016 would be ten (10) years and eleven (11) months counted from 24 May 2005.57 The petitioner attached to
her COC an "Affidavit Affirming Renunciation of U.S.A. Citizenship" subscribed and sworn to before a notary public in
Quezon City on 14 October 2015. 58
Petitioner's filing of her COC for President in the upcoming elections triggered the filing of several COMELEC cases
against her which were the subject of these consolidated cases.
Origin of Petition for Certiorari in G.R. No. 221697
A day after petitioner filed her COC for President, Estrella Elamparo (Elamparo) filed a petition to deny due course or
cancel said COC which was docketed as SPA No. 15-001 (DC) and raffled to the COMELEC Second Division.59 She
is convinced that the COMELEC has jurisdiction over her petition.60 Essentially, Elamparo's contention is that
petitioner committed material misrepresentation when she stated in her COC that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen
and that she is a resident of the Philippines for at least ten (10) years and eleven (11) months up to the day before
the 9 May 2016 Elections.61
On the issue of citizenship, Elamparo argued that petitioner cannot be considered as a natural-born Filipino on account
of the fact that she was a foundling.62 Elamparo claimed that international law does not confer natural-born status and
Filipino citizenship on foundlings.63 Following this line of reasoning, petitioner is not qualified to apply for reacquisition
of Filipino citizenship under R.A. No. 9225 for she is not a natural-born Filipino citizen to begin with.64 Even assuming
arguendo that petitioner was a natural-born Filipino, she is deemed to have lost that status when she became a
naturalized American citizen.65 According to Elamparo, natural-born citizenship must be continuous from birth.66
On the matter of petitioner's residency, Elamparo pointed out that petitioner was bound by the sworn declaration she
made in her 2012 COC for Senator wherein she indicated that she had resided in the country for only six ( 6) years
and six ( 6) months as of May 2013 Elections. Elamparo likewise insisted that assuming arguendo that petitioner is
qualified to regain her natural-born status under R.A. No. 9225, she still fell short of the ten-year residency requirement
of the Constitution as her residence could only be counted at the earliest from July 2006, when she reacquired

67
Philippine citizenship under the said Act. Also on the assumption that petitioner is qualified to reacquire lost Philippine
Citizenship, Elamparo is of the belief that she failed to reestablish her domicile in the Philippines.67
Petitioner seasonably filed her Answer wherein she countered that:

(1) the COMELEC did not have jurisdiction over Elamparo's petition as it was actually a petition for quo warranto which
could only be filed if Grace Poe wins in the Presidential elections, and that the Department of Justice (DOJ) has
primary jurisdiction to revoke the BI's July 18, 2006 Order;

(2) the petition failed to state a cause of action because it did not contain allegations which, if hypothetically admitted,
would make false the statement in her COC that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen nor was there any allegation that
there was a willful or deliberate intent to misrepresent on her part;

(3) she did not make any material misrepresentation in the COC regarding her citizenship and residency qualifications
for:

a. the 1934 Constitutional Convention deliberations show that foundlings were considered citizens;

b. foundlings are presumed under international law to have been born of citizens of the place where they are found;

c. she reacquired her natural-born Philippine citizenship under the provisions of R.A. No. 9225;

d. she executed a sworn renunciation of her American citizenship prior to the filing of her COC for President in the
May 9, 2016 Elections and that the same is in full force and effect and has not been withdrawn or recanted;

e. the burden was on Elamparo in proving that she did not possess natural-born status;

f. residence is a matter of evidence and that she reestablished her domicile in the Philippines as early as May 24,
2005;

g. she could reestablish residence even before she reacquired natural-born citizenship under R.A. No. 9225;

h. statement regarding the period of residence in her 2012 COC for Senator was an honest mistake, not binding and
should give way to evidence on her true date of reacquisition of domicile;

i. Elamparo's petition is merely an action to usurp the sovereign right of the Filipino people to decide a purely political
question, that is, should she serve as the country's next leader.68

After the parties submitted their respective Memoranda, the petition was deemed submitted for resolution.
On 1 December 2015, the COMELEC Second Division promulgated a Resolution finding that petitioner's COC, filed
for the purpose of running for the President of the Republic of the Philippines in the 9 May 2016 National and Local
Elections, contained material representations which are false. The fallo of the aforesaid Resolution reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing considerations, the instant Petition to Deny Due Course to or
Cancel Certificate of Candidacy is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, the Certificate of Candidacy for
President of the Republic of the Philippines in the May 9, 2016 National and Local Elections filed by
respondent Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe Llamanzares is hereby CANCELLED.69

Motion for Reconsideration of the 1 December 2015 Resolution was filed by petitioner which the COMELEC En Banc
resolved in its 23 December 2015 Resolution by denying the same.70
Origin of Petition for Certiorari in G.R. Nos. 221698-700
This case stemmed from three (3) separate petitions filed by Francisco S. Tatad (Tatad), Antonio P. Contreras
(Contreras) and Amado D. Valdez (Valdez) against petitioner before the COMELEC which were consolidated and
raffled to its First Division.
In his petition to disqualify petitioner under Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure,71 docketed as SPA No. 15-
002 (DC), Tatad alleged that petitioner lacks the requisite residency and citizenship to qualify her for the Presidency.72
Tatad theorized that since the Philippines adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis, persons of unknown parentage,
particularly foundlings, cannot be considered natural-born Filipino citizens since blood relationship is determinative of
natural-born status.73 Tatad invoked the rule of statutory construction that what is not included is excluded. He averred
that the fact that foundlings were not expressly included in the categories of citizens in the 193 5 Constitution is
indicative of the framers' intent to exclude them.74 Therefore, the burden lies on petitioner to prove that she is a
natural-born citizen.75
Neither can petitioner seek refuge under international conventions or treaties to support her claim that foundlings have
a nationality.76 According to Tatad, international conventions and treaties are not self-executory and that local
legislations are necessary in order to give effect to treaty obligations assumed by the Philippines.77 He also stressed
that there is no standard state practice that automatically confers natural-born status to foundlings.78
Similar to Elamparo's argument, Tatad claimed that petitioner cannot avail of the option to reacquire Philippine
citizenship under R.A. No. 9225 because it only applies to former natural-born citizens and petitioner was not as she
was a foundling.79
Referring to petitioner's COC for Senator, Tatad concluded that she did not comply with the ten (10) year residency
requirement.80 Tatad opined that petitioner acquired her domicile in Quezon City only from the time she renounced
her American citizenship which was sometime in 2010 or 2011.81 Additionally, Tatad questioned petitioner's lack of
intention to abandon her U.S. domicile as evinced by the fact that her husband stayed thereat and her frequent trips
to the U.S.82

68
In support of his petition to deny due course or cancel the COC of petitioner, docketed as SPA No. 15-139 (DC),
Valdez alleged that her repatriation under R.A. No. 9225 did not bestow upon her the status of a natural-born citizen.83
He advanced the view that former natural-born citizens who are repatriated under the said Act reacquires only their
Philippine citizenship and will not revert to their original status as natural-born citizens.84
He further argued that petitioner's own admission in her COC for Senator that she had only been a resident of the
Philippines for at least six (6) years and six (6) months prior to the 13 May 2013 Elections operates against her. Valdez
rejected petitioner's claim that she could have validly reestablished her domicile in the Philippines prior to her
reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. In effect, his position was that petitioner did not meet the ten (10) year residency
requirement for President.
Unlike the previous COMELEC cases filed against petitioner, Contreras' petition,85 docketed as SPA No. 15-007 (DC),
limited the attack to the residency issue. He claimed that petitioner's 2015 COC for President should be cancelled on
the ground that she did not possess the ten-year period of residency required for said candidacy and that she made
false entry in her COC when she stated that she is a legal resident of the Philippines for ten (10) years and eleven
(11) months by 9 May 2016.86 Contreras contended that the reckoning period for computing petitioner's residency in
the Philippines should be from 18 July 2006, the date when her petition to reacquire Philippine citizenship was
approved by the BI.87 He asserted that petitioner's physical presence in the country before 18 July 2006 could not be
valid evidence of reacquisition of her Philippine domicile since she was then living here as an American citizen and
as such, she was governed by the Philippine immigration laws.88
In her defense, petitioner raised the following arguments:
First, Tatad's petition should be dismissed outright for failure to state a cause of action. His petition did not invoke
grounds proper for a disqualification case as enumerated under Sections 12 and 68 of the Omnibus Election Code.89
Instead, Tatad completely relied on the alleged lack of residency and natural-born status of petitioner which are not
among the recognized grounds for the disqualification of a candidate to an elective office.90
Second, the petitions filed against her are basically petitions for quo warranto as they focus on establishing her
ineligibility for the Presidency.91 A petition for quo warranto falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Presidential
Electoral Tribunal (PET) and not the COMELEC.92
Third, the burden to prove that she is not a natural-born Filipino citizen is on the respondents.93 Otherwise stated, she
has a presumption in her favor that she is a natural-born citizen of this country.
Fourth, customary international law dictates that foundlings are entitled to a nationality and are presumed to be citizens
of the country where they are found.94 Consequently, the petitioner is considered as a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines.95
Fifth, she claimed that as a natural-born citizen, she has every right to be repatriated under R.A. No. 9225 or the right
to reacquire her natural-born status.96 Moreover, the official acts of the Philippine Government enjoy the presumption
of regularity, to wit: the issuance of the 18 July 2006 Order of the BI declaring her as natural-born citizen, her
appointment as MTRCB Chair and the issuance of the decree of adoption of San Juan RTC. 97 She believed that all
these acts reinforced her position that she is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.98
Sixth, she maintained that as early as the first quarter of 2005, she started reestablishing her domicile of choice in the
Philippines as demonstrated by her children's resettlement and schooling in the country, purchase of a condominium
unit in San Juan City and the construction of their family home in Corinthian Hills.99
Seventh, she insisted that she could legally reestablish her domicile of choice in the Philippines even before she
renounced her American citizenship as long as the three determinants for a change of domicile are complied with.100
She reasoned out that there was no requirement that renunciation of foreign citizenship is a prerequisite for the
acquisition of a new domicile of choice.101
Eighth, she reiterated that the period appearing in the residency portion of her COC for Senator was a mistake made
in good faith.102
In a Resolution103 promulgated on 11 December 2015, the COMELEC First Division ruled that petitioner is not a
natural-born citizen, that she failed to complete the ten (10) year residency requirement, and that she committed
material misrepresentation in her COC when she declared therein that she has been a resident of the Philippines for
a period of ten (10) years and eleven (11) months as of the day of the elections on 9 May 2016. The COMELEC First
Division concluded that she is not qualified for the elective position of President of the Republic of the Philippines. The
dispositive portion of said Resolution reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to GRANT

the Petitions and cancel the Certificate of Candidacy of MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD SONORA POE-
LLAMANZARES for the elective position of President of the Republic of the Philippines in connection
with the 9 May 2016 Synchronized Local and National Elections.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration seeking a reversal of the COMELEC First Division's Resolution. On 23
December 2015, the COMELEC En Banc issued a Resolution denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
Alarmed by the adverse rulings of the COMELEC, petitioner instituted the present petitions for certiorari with urgent
prayer for the issuance of an ex parte temporary restraining order/status quo ante order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction. On 28 December 2015, temporary restraining orders were issued by the Court enjoining the COMELEC
and its representatives from implementing the assailed COMELEC Resolutions until further orders from the Court.
The Court also ordered the consolidation of the two petitions filed by petitioner in its Resolution of 12 January 2016.
Thereafter, oral arguments were held in these cases.
The Court GRANTS the petition of Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares and to ANNUL and SET ASIDE the:

1. Resolution dated 1 December 2015 rendered through its Second Division, in SPA No. 15-001 (DC), entitled Estrella
C. Elamparo, petitioner, vs. Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares.

2. Resolution dated 11 December 2015, rendered through its First Division, in the consolidated cases SPA No. 15-
002 (DC) entitled Francisco S. Tatad, petitioner, vs. Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares, respondent;
69
SPA No. 15-007 (DC) entitled Antonio P. Contreras, petitioner, vs. Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares,
respondent; and SPA No. 15-139 (DC) entitled Amado D. Valdez, petitioner, v. Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-
Llamanzares, respondent.

3. Resolution dated 23 December 2015 of the Commission En Banc, upholding the 1 December 2015 Resolution of
the Second Division.

4. Resolution dated 23 December 2015 of the Commission En Banc, upholding the 11 December 2015 Resolution of
the First Division.

The procedure and the conclusions from which the questioned Resolutions emanated are tainted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The petitioner is a QUALIFIED CANDIDATE for President in the 9 May
2016 National Elections.
The issue before the COMELEC is whether or not the COC of petitioner should be denied due course or cancelled
"on the exclusive ground" that she made in the certificate a false material representation. The exclusivity of the ground
should hedge in the discretion of the COMELEC and restrain it from going into the issue of the qualifications of the
candidate for the position, if, as in this case, such issue is yet undecided or undetermined by the proper authority. The
COMELEC cannot itself, in the same cancellation case, decide the qualification or lack thereof of the candidate.
We rely, first of all, on the Constitution of our Republic, particularly its provisions in Article IX, C, Section 2:

Section 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and functions:

(1) Enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite,
initiative, referendum, and recall.

(2) Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns, and
qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and city officials, and appellate jurisdiction over all
contests involving elective municipal officials decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction, or involving
elective barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction.

Decisions, final orders, or rulings of the Commission on election contests involving elective municipal
and barangay offices shall be final, executory, and not appealable.

(3) Decide, except those involving the right to vote, all questions affecting elections, including
determination of the number and location of polling places, appointment of election officials and
inspectors, and registration of voters.

(4) Deputize, with the concurrence of the President, law enforcement agencies and instrumentalities of
the Government, including the Armed Forces of the Philippines, for the exclusive purpose of ensuring
free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections.

(5) Register, after sufficient publication, political parties, organizations, or coalitions which, in addition to
other requirements, must present their platform or program of government; and accredit citizens' arms of
the Commission on Elections. Religious denominations and sects shall not be registered. Those which
seek to achieve their goals through violence or unlawful means, or refuse to uphold and adhere to this
Constitution, or which are supported by any foreign government shall likewise be refused registration.

Financial contributions from foreign governments and their agencies to political parties, organizations,
coalitions, or candidates related to elections constitute interference in national affairs, and, when
accepted, shall be an additional ground for the cancellation of their registration with the Commission, in
addition to other penalties that may be prescribed by law.

(6) File, upon a verified complaint, or on its own initiative, petitions in court for inclusion or exclusion of
voters; investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases of violations of election laws, including acts
or omissions constituting election frauds, offenses, and malpractices.

(7) Recommend to the Congress effective measures to minimize election spending, including limitation
of places where propaganda materials shall be posted, and to prevent and penalize all forms of election
frauds, offenses, malpractices, and nuisance candidacies.

(8) Recommend to the President the removal of any officer or employee it has deputized, or the
imposition of any other disciplinary action, for violation or disregard of, or disobedience to its directive,
order, or decision.

(9) Submit to the President and the Congress a comprehensive report on the conduct of each election,
plebiscite, initiative, referendum, or recall.

Not any one of the enumerated powers approximate the exactitude of the provisions of Article VI, Section 17 of the
same basic law stating that:

The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of
all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal
shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the
Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case
may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or

70
organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal
shall be its Chairman.

or of the last paragraph of Article VII, Section 4 which provides that:

The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose.

The tribunals which have jurisdiction over the question of the qualifications of the President, the Vice-President,
Senators and the Members of the House of Representatives was made clear by the Constitution. There is no such
provision for candidates for these positions.
Can the COMELEC be such judge?
The opinion of Justice Vicente V. Mendoza in Romualdez-Marcos v. Commission on Elections,104 which was
affirmatively cited in the En Banc decision in Fermin v. COMELEC105 is our guide. The citation in Fermin reads:

Apparently realizing the lack of an authorized proceeding for declaring the ineligibility of candidates, the
COMELEC amended its rules on February 15, 1993 so as to provide in Rule 25 § 1, the following:

Grounds for disqualification. - Any candidate who does not possess all the qualifications of a candidate
as provided for by the Constitution or by existing law or who commits any act declared by law to be
grounds for disqualification may be disqualified from continuing as a candidate.

The lack of provision for declaring the ineligibility of candidates, however, cannot be supplied by a mere
rule. Such an act is equivalent to the creation of a cause of action which is a substantive matter which
the COMELEC, in the exercise of its rule-making power under Art. IX, A, §6 of the Constitution, cannot
do it. It is noteworthy that the Constitution withholds from the COMELEC even the power to decide cases
involving the right to vote, which essentially involves an inquiry into qualifications based on age,
residence and citizenship of voters. [Art. IX, C, §2(3)]

The assimilation in Rule 25 of the COMELEC rules of grounds for ineligibility into grounds for
disqualification is contrary to the evident intention of the law. For not only in their grounds but also in their
consequences are proceedings for "disqualification" different from those for a declaration of "ineligibility."
"Disqualification" proceedings, as already stated, are based on grounds specified in § 12 and §68 of the
Omnibus Election Code and in §40 of the Local Government Code and are for the purpose of barring an
individual from becoming a candidate or from continuing as a candidate for public office. In a word, their
purpose is to eliminate a candidate from the race either from the start or during its progress. "Ineligibility,"
on the other hand, refers to the lack of the qualifications prescribed in the Constitution or the statutes for
holding public office and the purpose of the proceedings for declaration of ineligibility is to remove the
incumbent from office.

Consequently, that an individual possesses the qualifications for a public office does not imply that he is
not disqualified from becoming a candidate or continuing as a candidate for a public office and vice versa.
We have this sort of dichotomy in our Naturalization Law. (C.A. No. 473) That an alien has the
qualifications prescribed in §2 of the Law does not imply that he does not suffer from any of [the]
disqualifications provided in §4.

Before we get derailed by the distinction as to grounds and the consequences of the respective proceedings, the
importance of the opinion is in its statement that "the lack of provision for declaring the ineligibility of candidates,
however, cannot be supplied by a mere rule". Justice Mendoza lectured in Romualdez-Marcos that:

Three reasons may be cited to explain the absence of an authorized proceeding for determining before
election the qualifications of a candidate.

First is the fact that unless a candidate wins and is proclaimed elected, there is no necessity for
determining his eligibility for the office. In contrast, whether an individual should be disqualified as a
candidate for acts constituting election offenses (e.g., vote buying, over spending, commission of
prohibited acts) is a prejudicial question which should be determined lest he wins because of the very
acts for which his disqualification is being sought. That is why it is provided that if the grounds for
disqualification are established, a candidate will not be voted for; if he has been voted for, the votes in
his favor will not be counted; and if for some reason he has been voted for and he has won, either he will
not be proclaimed or his proclamation will be set aside.

Second is the fact that the determination of a candidates' eligibility, e.g., his citizenship or, as in this case,
his domicile, may take a long time to make, extending beyond the beginning of the term of the office.
This is amply demonstrated in the companion case (G.R. No. 120265, Agapito A. Aquino v. COMELEC)
where the determination of Aquino's residence was still pending in the COMELEC even after the elections
of May 8, 1995. This is contrary to the summary character proceedings relating to certificates of
candidacy. That is why the law makes the receipt of certificates of candidacy a ministerial duty of the
COMELEC and its officers. The law is satisfied if candidates state in their certificates of candidacy that
they are eligible for the position which they seek to fill, leaving the determination of their qualifications to
be made after the election and only in the event they are elected. Only in cases involving charges of false
representations made in certificates of candidacy is the COMELEC given jurisdiction.

Third is the policy underlying the prohibition against pre-proclamation cases in elections for President,
Vice President, Senators and members of the House of Representatives. (R.A. No. 7166, § 15) The
purpose is to preserve the prerogatives of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and the other
71
 Tribunals as "sole judges" under the Constitution of the election, returns and qualifications of members
of Congress of the President and Vice President, as the case may be.106

To be sure, the authoritativeness of the Romualdez pronouncements as reiterated in Fermin, led to the amendment
through COMELEC Resolution No. 9523, on 25 September 2012 of its Rule 25. This, the 15 February1993 version of
Rule 25, which states that:

Grounds for disqualification. -Any candidate who does not possess all the qualifications of a candidate
as provided for by the Constitution or by existing law or who commits any act declared by law to be
grounds for disqualification may be disqualified from continuing as a candidate.107

was in the 2012 rendition, drastically changed to:

Grounds. - Any candidate who, in action or protest in which he is a party, is declared by final decision of
a competent court, guilty of, or found by the Commission to be suffering from any disqualification provided
by law or the Constitution.

A Petition to Disqualify a Candidate invoking grounds for a Petition to Deny to or Cancel a Certificate of
Candidacy or Petition to Declare a Candidate as a Nuisance Candidate, or a combination thereof, shall
be summarily dismissed.

Clearly, the amendment done in 2012 is an acceptance of the reality of absence of an authorized proceeding for
determining before election the qualifications of candidate. Such that, as presently required, to disqualify a candidate
there must be a declaration by a final judgment of a competent court that the candidate sought to be disqualified "is
guilty of or found by the Commission to be suffering from any disqualification provided by law or the Constitution."
Insofar as the qualification of a candidate is concerned, Rule 25 and Rule 23 are flipsides of one to the other. Both do
not allow, are not authorizations, are not vestment of jurisdiction, for the COMELEC to determine the qualification of
a candidate. The facts of qualification must beforehand be established in a prior proceeding before an authority
properly vested with jurisdiction. The prior determination of qualification may be by statute, by executive order or by a
judgment of a competent court or tribunal.
If a candidate cannot be disqualified without a prior finding that he or she is suffering from a disqualification "provided
by law or the Constitution," neither can the certificate of candidacy be cancelled or denied due course on grounds of
false representations regarding his or her qualifications, without a prior authoritative finding that he or she is not
qualified, such prior authority being the necessary measure by which the falsity of the representation can be found.
The only exception that can be conceded are self-evident facts of unquestioned or unquestionable veracity and judicial
confessions. Such are, anyway, bases equivalent to prior decisions against which the falsity of representation can be
determined.
The need for a predicate finding or final pronouncement in a proceeding under Rule 23 that deals with, as in this case,
alleged false representations regarding the candidate's citizenship and residence, forced the COMELEC to rule
essentially that since foundlings108 are not mentioned in the enumeration of citizens under the 1935 Constitution,109
they then cannot be citizens. As the COMELEC stated in oral arguments, when petitioner admitted that she is a
foundling, she said it all. This borders on bigotry. Oddly, in an effort at tolerance, the COMELEC, after saying that it
cannot rule that herein petitioner possesses blood relationship with a Filipino citizen when "it is certain that such
relationship is indemonstrable," proceeded to say that "she now has the burden to present evidence to prove her
natural filiation with a Filipino parent."
The fact is that petitioner's blood relationship with a Filipino citizen is DEMONSTRABLE.
At the outset, it must be noted that presumptions regarding paternity is neither unknown nor unaccepted in Philippine
Law. The Family Code of the Philippines has a whole chapter on Paternity and Filiation. 110 That said, there is more
than sufficient evider1ce that petitioner has Filipino parents and is therefore a natural-born Filipino. Parenthetically,
the burden of proof was on private respondents to show that petitioner is not a Filipino citizen. The private respondents
should have shown that both of petitioner's parents were aliens. Her admission that she is a foundling did not shift the
burden to her because such status did not exclude the possibility that her parents were Filipinos, especially as in this
case where there is a high probability, if not certainty, that her parents are Filipinos.
The factual issue is not who the parents of petitioner are, as their identities are unknown, but whether such parents
are Filipinos. Under Section 4, Rule 128:

Sect. 4. Relevancy, collateral matters - Evidence must have such a relation to the fact in issue as to
induce belief in its existence or no-existence. Evidence on collateral matters shall not be allowed, except
when it tends in any reasonable degree to establish the probability of improbability of the fact in issue.

The Solicitor General offered official statistics from the Philippine Statistics Authority (PSA)111 that from 1965 to 1975,
the total number of foreigners born in the Philippines was 15,986 while the total number of Filipinos born in the country
was 10,558,278. The statistical probability that any child born in the Philippines in that decade is natural-born Filipino
was 99.83%. For her part, petitioner presented census statistics for Iloilo Province for 1960 and 1970, also from the
PSA. In 1960, there were 962,532 Filipinos and 4,734 foreigners in the province; 99.62% of the population were
Filipinos. In 1970, the figures were 1,162,669 Filipinos and 5,304 foreigners, or 99.55%. Also presented were figures
for the child producing ages (15-49). In 1960, there were 230,528 female Filipinos as against 730 female foreigners
or 99.68%. In the same year, there were 210,349 Filipino males and 886 male aliens, or 99.58%. In 1970, there were
270,299 Filipino females versus 1, 190 female aliens, or 99.56%. That same year, there were 245,740 Filipino males
as against only 1,165 male aliens or 99.53%. COMELEC did not dispute these figures. Notably, Commissioner Arthur
Lim admitted, during the oral arguments, that at the time petitioner was found in 1968, the majority of the population
in Iloilo was Filipino.112
Other circumstantial evidence of the nationality of petitioner's parents are the fact that she was abandoned as an
infant in a Roman Catholic Church in Iloilo City. She also has typical Filipino features: height, flat nasal bridge,
1âwphi1

straight black hair, almond shaped eyes and an oval face.

72
There is a disputable presumption that things have happened according to the ordinary course of nature and the
ordinary habits of life.113 All of the foregoing evidence, that a person with typical Filipino features is abandoned in
Catholic Church in a municipality where the population of the Philippines is overwhelmingly Filipinos such that there
would be more than a 99% chance that a child born in the province would be a Filipino, would indicate more than
ample probability if not statistical certainty, that petitioner's parents are Filipinos. That probability and the evidence on
which it is based are admissible under Rule 128, Section 4 of the Revised Rules on Evidence.
To assume otherwise is to accept the absurd, if not the virtually impossible, as the norm. In the words of the Solicitor
General:

Second. It is contrary to common sense because foreigners do not come to the Philippines so they can
get pregnant and leave their newborn babies behind. We do not face a situation where the probability is
such that every foundling would have a 50% chance of being a Filipino and a 50% chance of being a
foreigner. We need to frame our questions properly. What are the chances that the parents of anyone
born in the Philippines would be foreigners? Almost zero. What are the chances that the parents of
anyone born in the Philippines would be Filipinos? 99.9%.

According to the Philippine Statistics Authority, from 2010 to 2014, on a yearly average, there were
1,766,046 children born in the Philippines to Filipino parents, as opposed to 1,301 children in the
Philippines of foreign parents. Thus, for that sample period, the ratio of non-Filipino children to natural
born Filipino children is 1:1357. This means that the statistical probability that any child born in the
Philippines would be a natural born Filipino is 99.93%.

From 1965 to 1975, the total number of foreigners born in the Philippines is 15,986 while the total number
of Filipinos born in the Philippines is 15,558,278. For this period, the ratio of non-Filipino children is 1:661.
This means that the statistical probability that any child born in the Philippines on that decade would be
a natural born Filipino is 99.83%.

We can invite statisticians and social anthropologists to crunch the numbers for us, but I am confident
that the statistical probability that a child born in the Philippines would be a natural born Filipino will not
be affected by whether or not the parents are known. If at all, the likelihood that a foundling would have
a Filipino parent might even be higher than 99.9%. Filipinos abandon their children out of poverty or
perhaps, shame. We do not imagine foreigners abandoning their children here in the Philippines thinking
those infants would have better economic opportunities or believing that this country is a tropical paradise
suitable for raising abandoned children. I certainly doubt whether a foreign couple has ever considered
their child excess baggage that is best left behind.

To deny full Filipino citizenship to all foundlings and render them stateless just because there may be a
theoretical chance that one among the thousands of these foundlings might be the child of not just one,
but two, foreigners is downright discriminatory, irrational, and unjust. It just doesn't make any sense.
Given the statistical certainty - 99.9% - that any child born in the Philippines would be a natural born
citizen, a decision denying foundlings such status is effectively a denial of their birthright. There is no
reason why this Honorable Court should use an improbable hypothetical to sacrifice the fundamental
political rights of an entire class of human beings. Your Honor, constitutional interpretation and the use
of common sense are not separate disciplines.

As a matter of law, foundlings are as a class, natural-born citizens. While the 1935 Constitution's enumeration is silent
as to foundlings, there is no restrictive language which would definitely exclude foundlings either. Because of silence
and ambiguity in the enumeration with respect to foundlings, there is a need to examine the intent of the framers. In
Nitafan v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,114 this Court held that:

The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with the fundamental principle of constitutional construction that the
intent of the framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it should be given effect. The primary task in
constitutional construction is to ascertain and thereafter assure the realization of the purpose of the framers and of
the people in the adoption of the Constitution. It may also be safely assumed that the people in ratifying the Constitution
were guided mainly by the explanation offered by the framers.115

As pointed out by petitioner as well as the Solicitor General, the deliberations of the 1934 Constitutional Convention
show that the framers intended foundlings to be covered by the enumeration. The following exchange is recorded:

Sr. Rafols: For an amendment. I propose that after subsection 2, the following is inserted: "The natural
children of a foreign father and a Filipino mother not recognized by the father.

xxxx

President:

[We] would like to request a clarification from the proponent of the amendment. The gentleman refers to
natural children or to any kind of illegitimate children?

Sr. Rafols:

To all kinds of illegitimate children. It also includes natural children of unknown parentage, natural or
illegitimate children of unknown parents.

Sr. Montinola:

73
 For clarification. The gentleman said "of unknown parents." Current codes consider them Filipino, that
is, I refer to the Spanish Code wherein all children of unknown parentage born in Spanish territory are
considered Spaniards, because the presumption is that a child of unknown parentage is the son of a
Spaniard. This may be applied in the Philippines in that a child of unknown parentage born in the
Philippines is deemed to be Filipino, and there is no need ...

Sr. Rafols:

There is a need, because we are relating the conditions that are [required] to be Filipino.

Sr. Montinola:

But that is the interpretation of the law, therefore, there is no [more] need for amendment.

Sr. Rafols:

The amendment should read thus:

"Natural or illegitimate of a foreign father and a Filipino mother recognized by one, or the children of
unknown parentage."

Sr. Briones:

The amendment [should] mean children born in the Philippines of unknown parentage.

Sr. Rafols:

The son of a Filipina to a Foreigner, although this [person] does not recognize the child, is not unknown.

President:

Does the gentleman accept the amendment or not?

Sr. Rafols:

I do not accept the amendment because the amendment would exclude the children of a Filipina with a
foreigner who does not recognize the child. Their parentage is not unknown and I think those of overseas
Filipino mother and father [whom the latter] does not recognize, should also be considered as Filipinos.

President:

The question in order is the amendment to the amendment from the Gentleman from Cebu, Mr. Briones.

Sr. Busion:

Mr. President, don't you think it would be better to leave this matter in the hands of the Legislature?

Sr. Roxas:

Mr. President, my humble opinion is that these cases are few and far in between, that the constitution
need [not] refer to them. By international law the principle that children or people born in a country of
unknown parents are citizens in this nation is recognized, and it is not necessary to include a provision
on the subject exhaustively.116

Though the Rafols amendment was not carried out, it was not because there was any objection to the notion that
persons of "unknown parentage" are not citizens but only because their number was not enough to merit specific
mention. Such was the account,117 cited by petitioner, of delegate and constitution law author Jose Aruego who said:

During the debates on this provision, Delegate Rafols presented an amendment to include as Filipino citizens the
illegitimate children with a foreign father of a mother who was a citizen of the Philippines, and also foundlings; but this
amendment was defeated primarily because the Convention believed that the cases, being too few to warrant the
inclusion of a provision in the Constitution to apply to them, should be governed by statutory legislation. Moreover, it
was believed that the rules of international law were already clear to the effect that illegitimate children followed the
citizenship of the mother, and that foundlings followed the nationality of the place where they were found, thereby
making unnecessary the inclusion in the Constitution of the proposed amendment.

This explanation was likewise the position of the Solicitor General during the 16 February 2016 Oral Arguments:

We all know that the Rafols proposal was rejected. But note that what was declined was the proposal for
a textual and explicit recognition of foundlings as Filipinos. And so, the way to explain the constitutional
silence is by saying that it was the view of Montinola and Roxas which prevailed that there is no more
need to expressly declare foundlings as Filipinos.

Obviously, it doesn't matter whether Montinola's or Roxas' views were legally correct. Framers of a
constitution can constitutionalize rules based on assumptions that are imperfect or even wrong. They
can even overturn existing rules. This is basic. What matters here is that Montinola and Roxas were able

74
 to convince their colleagues in the convention that there is no more need to expressly declare foundlings
as Filipinos because they are already impliedly so recognized.

In other words, the constitutional silence is fully explained in terms of linguistic efficiency and the
avoidance of redundancy. The policy is clear: it is to recognize foundlings, as a class, as Filipinos under
Art. IV, Section 1 (3) of the 1935 Constitution. This inclusive policy is carried over into the 1973 and 1987
Constitution. It is appropriate to invoke a famous scholar as he was paraphrased by Chief Justice
Fernando: the constitution is not silently silent, it is silently vocal. 118

The Solicitor General makes the further point that the framers "worked to create a just and humane society," that "they
were reasonable patriots and that it would be unfair to impute upon them a discriminatory intent against foundlings."
He exhorts that, given the grave implications of the argument that foundlings are not natural-born Filipinos, the Court
must search the records of the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions "for an express intention to deny foundlings the
status of Filipinos. The burden is on those who wish to use the constitution to discriminate against foundlings to show
that the constitution really intended to take this path to the dark side and inflict this across the board marginalization."
We find no such intent or language permitting discrimination against foundlings. On the contrary, all three Constitutions
guarantee the basic right to equal protection of the laws. All exhort the State to render social justice. Of special
consideration are several provisions in the present charter: Article II, Section 11 which provides that the "State values
the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights," Article XIII, Section 1 which mandates
Congress to "give highest priority to the enactment of measures that protect and enhance the right of all the people
to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and political inequalities x x x" and Article XV, Section 3 which requires
the State to defend the "right of children to assistance, including proper care and nutrition, and special protection from
all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial to their development." Certainly, these
provisions contradict an intent to discriminate against foundlings on account of their unfortunate status.
Domestic laws on adoption also support the principle that foundlings are Filipinos. These laws do not provide that
adoption confers citizenship upon the adoptee. Rather, the adoptee must be a Filipino in the first place to be adopted.
The most basic of such laws is Article 15 of the Civil Code which provides that "[l]aws relating to family rights, duties,
status, conditions, legal capacity of persons are binding on citizens of the Philippines even though living abroad."
Adoption deals with status, and a Philippine adoption court will have jurisdiction only if the adoptee is a Filipino. In
Ellis and Ellis v. Republic,119 a child left by an unidentified mother was sought to be adopted by aliens. This Court
said:

In this connection, it should be noted that this is a proceedings in rem, which no court may entertain
unless it has jurisdiction, not only over the subject matter of the case and over the parties, but also over
the res, which is the personal status of Baby Rose as well as that of petitioners herein. Our Civil Code
(Art. 15) adheres to the theory that jurisdiction over the status of a natural person is determined by the
latter's nationality. Pursuant to this theory, we have jurisdiction over the status of Baby Rose, she being
a citizen of the Philippines, but not over the status of the petitioners, who are foreigners.120 (Underlining
supplied)

Recent legislation is more direct. R.A. No. 8043 entitled "An Act Establishing the Rules to Govern the Inter-Country
Adoption of Filipino Children and For Other Purposes" (otherwise known as the "Inter-Country Adoption Act of 1995"),
R.A. No. 8552, entitled "An Act Establishing the Rules and Policies on the Adoption of Filipino Children and For Other
Purposes" (otherwise known as the Domestic Adoption Act of 1998) and this Court's A.M. No. 02-6-02-SC or the "Rule
on Adoption," all expressly refer to "Filipino children" and include foundlings as among Filipino children who may be
adopted.
It has been argued that the process to determine that the child is a foundling leading to the issuance of a foundling
certificate under these laws and the issuance of said certificate are acts to acquire or perfect Philippine citizenship
which make the foundling a naturalized Filipino at best. This is erroneous. Under Article IV, Section 2 "Natural-born
citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect
their Philippine citizenship." In the first place, "having to perform an act" means that the act must be personally done
by the citizen. In this instance, the determination of foundling status is done not by the child but by the authorities.121
Secondly, the object of the process is the determination of the whereabouts of the parents, not the citizenship of the
child. Lastly, the process is certainly not analogous to naturalization proceedings to acquire Philippine citizenship, or
the election of such citizenship by one born of an alien father and a Filipino mother under the 1935 Constitution, which
is an act to perfect it.
In this instance, such issue is moot because there is no dispute that petitioner is a foundling, as evidenced by a
Foundling Certificate issued in her favor.122 The Decree of Adoption issued on 13 May 1974, which approved
petitioner's adoption by Jesusa Sonora Poe and Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, expressly refers to Emiliano and his wife,
Rosario Militar, as her "foundling parents," hence effectively affirming petitioner's status as a foundling.123
Foundlings are likewise citizens under international law. Under the 1987 Constitution, an international law can become
part of the sphere of domestic law either by transformation or incorporation. The transformation method requires that
an international law be transformed into a domestic law through a constitutional mechanism such as local
legislation.124 On the other hand, generally accepted principles of international law, by virtue of the incorporation
clause of the Constitution, form part of the laws of the land even if they do not derive from treaty obligations. Generally
accepted principles of international law include international custom as evidence of a general practice accepted as
law, and general principles of law recognized by civilized nations.125 International customary rules are accepted as
binding as a result from the combination of two elements: the established, widespread, and consistent practice on the
part of States; and a psychological element known as the opinionjuris sive necessitates (opinion as to law or
necessity). Implicit in the latter element is a belief that the practice in question is rendered obligatory by the existence
of a rule of law requiring it.126 "General principles of law recognized by civilized nations" are principles "established
by a process of reasoning" or judicial logic, based on principles which are "basic to legal systems generally,"127 such
as "general principles of equity, i.e., the general principles of fairness and justice," and the "general principle against
discrimination" which is embodied in the "Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on
75
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, the Convention Against Discrimination in Education, the Convention (No. 111) Concerning
Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupation."128 These are the same core principles which underlie the
Philippine Constitution itself, as embodied in the due process and equal protection clauses of the Bill of Rights.129
Universal Declaration of Human Rights ("UDHR") has been interpreted by this Court as part of the generally accepted
principles of international law and binding on the State.130 Article 15 thereof states:

1. Everyone has the right to a nationality.

2. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied the right to change his nationality.

The Philippines has also ratified the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC). Article 7 of the UNCRC
imposes the following obligations on our country:

Article 7

1. The child shall be registered immediately after birth and shall have the right from birth to a name, the
right to acquire a nationality and as far as possible, the right to know and be cared for by his or her
parents.

2. States Parties shall ensure the implementation of these rights in accordance with their national law
and their obligations under the relevant international instruments in this field, in particular where the child
would otherwise be stateless.

In 1986, the country also ratified the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). Article 24
thereof provide for the right of every child "to acquire a nationality:"

Article 24

1. Every child shall have, without any discrimination as to race, colour, sex, language, religion, national
or social origin, property or birth, the right, to such measures of protection as are required by his status
as a minor, on the part of his family, society and the State.

2. Every child shall be registered immediately after birth and shall have a name.

3. Every child has the right to acquire a nationality.

The common thread of the UDHR, UNCRC and ICCPR is to obligate the Philippines to grant nationality from birth and
ensure that no child is stateless. This grant of nationality must be at the time of birth, and it cannot be accomplished
by the application of our present naturalization laws, Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended, and R.A. No. 9139,
both of which require the applicant to be at least eighteen (18) years old.
The principles found in two conventions, while yet unratified by the Philippines, are generally accepted principles of
international law. The first is Article 14 of the 1930 Hague Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of
Nationality Laws under which a foundling is presumed to have the "nationality of the country of birth," to wit:

Article 14

A child whose parents are both unknown shall have the nationality of the country of birth. If the child's
parentage is established, its nationality shall be determined by the rules applicable in cases where the
parentage is known.

A foundling is, until the contrary is proved, presumed to have been born on the territory of the State in
which it was found. (Underlining supplied)

The second is the principle that a foundling is presumed born of citizens of the country where he is found, contained
in Article 2 of the 1961 United Nations Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness:

Article 2

A foundling found in the territory of a Contracting State shall, in the absence of proof to the contrary, be
considered to have been born within the territory of parents possessing the nationality of that State.

That the Philippines is not a party to the 1930 Hague Convention nor to the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of
Statelessness does not mean that their principles are not binding. While the Philippines is not a party to the 1930
Hague Convention, it is a signatory to the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, Article 15(1) ofwhich 131 effectively
affirms Article 14 of the 1930 Hague Convention. Article 2 of the 1961 "United Nations Convention on the Reduction
of Statelessness" merely "gives effect" to Article 15(1) of the UDHR.132 In Razon v. Tagitis, 133 this Court noted that
the Philippines had not signed or ratified the "International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced
Disappearance." Yet, we ruled that the proscription against enforced disappearances in the said convention was
nonetheless binding as a "generally accepted principle of international law." Razon v. Tagitis is likewise notable for
declaring the ban as a generally accepted principle of international law although the convention had been ratified by
only sixteen states and had not even come into force and which needed the ratification of a minimum of twenty states.
Additionally, as petitioner points out, the Court was content with the practice of international and regional state organs,
regional state practice in Latin America, and State Practice in the United States.

76
Another case where the number of ratifying countries was not determinative is Mijares v. Ranada, 134 where only four
countries had "either ratified or acceded to"135 the 1966 "Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters" when the case was decided in 2005. The Court also pointed out that that
nine member countries of the European Common Market had acceded to the Judgments Convention. The Court also
cited U.S. laws and jurisprudence on recognition of foreign judgments. In all, only the practices of fourteen countries
were considered and yet, there was pronouncement that recognition of foreign judgments was widespread practice.
Our approach in Razon and Mijares effectively takes into account the fact that "generally accepted principles of
international law" are based not only on international custom, but also on "general principles of law recognized by
civilized nations," as the phrase is understood in Article 38.1 paragraph (c) of the ICJ Statute. Justice, fairness, equity
and the policy against discrimination, which are fundamental principles underlying the Bill of Rights and which are
"basic to legal systems generally,"136 support the notion that the right against enforced disappearances and the
recognition of foreign judgments, were correctly considered as "generally accepted principles of international law"
under the incorporation clause.
Petitioner's evidence137 shows that at least sixty countries in Asia, North and South America, and Europe have passed
legislation recognizing foundlings as its citizen. Forty-two (42) of those countries follow the jus sanguinis regime. Of
the sixty, only thirty-three (33) are parties to the 1961 Convention on Statelessness; twenty-six (26) are not signatories
to the Convention. Also, the Chief Justice, at the 2 February 2016 Oral Arguments pointed out that in 166 out of 189
countries surveyed (or 87.83%), foundlings are recognized as citizens. These circumstances, including the practice
of jus sanguinis countries, show that it is a generally accepted principle of international law to presume foundlings as
having been born of nationals of the country in which the foundling is found.
Current legislation reveals the adherence of the Philippines to this generally accepted principle of international law. In
particular, R.A. No. 8552, R.A. No. 8042 and this Court's Rules on Adoption, expressly refer to "Filipino children." In
all of them, foundlings are among the Filipino children who could be adopted. Likewise, it has been pointed that the
DFA issues passports to foundlings. Passports are by law, issued only to citizens. This shows that even the executive
department, acting through the DFA, considers foundlings as Philippine citizens.
Adopting these legal principles from the 1930 Hague Convention and the 1961 Convention on Statelessness is rational
and reasonable and consistent with the jus sanguinis regime in our Constitution. The presumption of natural-born
citizenship of foundlings stems from the presumption that their parents are nationals of the Philippines. As the
empirical data provided by the PSA show, that presumption is at more than 99% and is a virtual certainty.
In sum, all of the international law conventions and instruments on the matter of nationality of foundlings were designed
to address the plight of a defenseless class which suffers from a misfortune not of their own making. We cannot be
restrictive as to their application if we are a country which calls itself civilized and a member of the community of
nations. The Solicitor General's warning in his opening statement is relevant:

.... the total effect of those documents is to signify to this Honorable Court that those treaties and
conventions were drafted because the world community is concerned that the situation of foundlings
renders them legally invisible. It would be tragically ironic if this Honorable Court ended up using the
international instruments which seek to protect and uplift foundlings a tool to deny them political status
or to accord them second-class citizenship.138

The COMELEC also ruled139 that petitioner's repatriation in July 2006 under the provisions of R.A. No. 9225 did not
result in the reacquisition of natural-born citizenship. The COMELEC reasoned that since the applicant must perform
an act, what is reacquired is not "natural-born" citizenship but only plain "Philippine citizenship."
The COMELEC's rule arrogantly disregards consistent jurisprudence on the matter of repatriation statutes in general
and of R.A. No. 9225 in particular.
In the seminal case of Bengson Ill v. HRET, 140 repatriation was explained as follows:

Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This means that a naturalized
Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the
other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be
restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino.

R.A. No. 9225 is a repatriation statute and has been described as such in several cases. They include Sobejana-
Condon v. COMELEC141 where we described it as an "abbreviated repatriation process that restores one's Filipino
citizenship x x x." Also included is Parreno v. Commission on Audit,142 which cited Tabasa v. Court of Appeals,143
where we said that "[t]he repatriation of the former Filipino will allow him to recover his natural-born citizenship.
Parreno v. Commission on Audit144 is categorical that "if petitioner reacquires his Filipino citizenship (under R.A. No.
9225), he will ... recover his natural-born citizenship."
The COMELEC construed the phrase "from birth" in the definition of natural citizens as implying "that natural-born
citizenship must begin at birth and remain uninterrupted and continuous from birth." R.A. No. 9225 was obviously
passed in line with Congress' sole prerogative to determine how citizenship may be lost or reacquired. Congress saw
it fit to decree that natural-born citizenship may be reacquired even if it had been once lost. It is not for the COMELEC
to disagree with the Congress' determination.
More importantly, COMELEC's position that natural-born status must be continuous was already rejected in Bengson
III v. HRET145 where the phrase "from birth" was clarified to mean at the time of birth: "A person who at the time of
his birth, is a citizen of a particular country, is a natural-born citizen thereof." Neither is "repatriation" an act to "acquire
or perfect" one's citizenship. In Bengson III v. HRET, this Court pointed out that there are only two types of citizens
under the 1987 Constitution: natural-born citizen and naturalized, and that there is no third category for repatriated
citizens:

It is apparent from the enumeration of who are citizens under the present Constitution that there are only
two classes of citizens: (1) those who are natural-born and (2) those who are naturalized in accordance
with law. A citizen who is not a naturalized Filipino, ie., did not have to undergo the process of
naturalization to obtain Philippine citizenship, necessarily is a natural-born Filipino. Noteworthy is the
77
 absence in said enumeration of a separate category for persons who, after losing Philippine citizenship,
subsequently reacquire it. The reason therefor is clear: as to such persons, they would either be natural-
born or naturalized depending on the reasons for the loss of their citizenship and the mode prescribed
by the applicable law for the reacquisition thereof. As respondent Cruz was not required by law to go
through naturalization proceedings in order to reacquire his citizenship, he is perforce a natural-born
Filipino. As such, he possessed all the necessary qualifications to be elected as member of the House
of Representatives.146

The COMELEC cannot reverse a judicial precedent. That is reserved to this Court. And while we may always revisit
a doctrine, a new rule reversing standing doctrine cannot be retroactively applied. In Morales v. Court of Appeals and
Jejomar Erwin S. Binay, Jr.,147 where we decreed reversed the condonation doctrine, we cautioned that it "should be
prospective in application for the reason that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws of the Constitution,
until reversed, shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines." This Court also said that "while the future may
ultimately uncover a doctrine's error, it should be, as a general rule, recognized as good law prior to its abandonment.
Consequently, the people's reliance thereupon should be respected."148
Lastly, it was repeatedly pointed out during the oral arguments that petitioner committed a falsehood when she put in
the spaces for "born to" in her application for repatriation under R.A. No. 9225 the names of her adoptive parents, and
this misled the BI to presume that she was a natural-born Filipino. It has been contended that the data required were
the names of her biological parents which are precisely unknown.
This position disregards one important fact - petitioner was legally adopted. One of the effects of adoption is "to sever
all legal ties between the biological parents and the adoptee, except when the biological parent is the spouse of the
adoptee."149 Under R.A. No. 8552, petitioner was also entitled to an amended birth certificate "attesting to the fact
that the adoptee is the child of the adopter(s)" and which certificate "shall not bear any notation that it is an amended
issue."150 That law also requires that "[a]ll records, books, and papers relating to the adoption cases in the files of the
court, the Department [of Social Welfare and Development], or any other agency or institution participating in the
adoption proceedings shall be kept strictly confidential."151 The law therefore allows petitioner to state that her
adoptive parents were her birth parents as that was what would be stated in her birth certificate anyway. And given
the policy of strict confidentiality of adoption records, petitioner was not obligated to disclose that she was an adoptee.
Clearly, to avoid a direct ruling on the qualifications of petitioner, which it cannot make in the same case for cancellation
of COC, it resorted to opinionatedness which is, moreover, erroneous. The whole process undertaken by COMELEC
is wrapped in grave abuse of discretion.
On Residence
The tainted process was repeated in disposing of the issue of whether or not petitioner committed false material
representation when she stated in her COC that she has before and until 9 May 2016 been a resident of the Philippines
for ten (10) years and eleven (11) months.
Petitioner's claim that she will have been a resident for ten (10) years and eleven (11) months on the day before the
2016 elections, is true.
The Constitution requires presidential candidates to have ten (10) years' residence in the Philippines before the day
of the elections. Since the forthcoming elections will be held on 9 May 2016, petitioner must have been a resident of
the Philippines prior to 9 May 2016 for ten (10) years. In answer to the requested information of "Period of Residence
in the Philippines up to the day before May 09, 2016," she put in "10 years 11 months" which according to her pleadings
in these cases corresponds to a beginning date of 25 May 2005 when she returned for good from the U.S.
When petitioner immigrated to the U.S. in 1991, she lost her original domicile, which is the Philippines. There are three
requisites to acquire a new domicile: 1. Residence or bodily presence in a new locality; 2. an intention to remain there;
and 3. an intention to abandon the old domicile.152 To successfully effect a change of domicile, one must demonstrate
an actual removal or an actual change of domicile; a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence
and establishing a new one and definite acts which correspond with the purpose. In other words, there must basically
be animus manendi coupled with animus non revertendi. The purpose to remain in or at the domicile of choice must
be for an indefinite period of time; the change of residence must be voluntary; and the residence at the place chosen
for the new domicile must be actual.153
Petitioner presented voluminous evidence showing that she and her family abandoned their U.S. domicile and
relocated to the Philippines for good. These evidence include petitioner's former U.S. passport showing her arrival on
24 May 2005 and her return to the Philippines every time she travelled abroad; e-mail correspondences starting in
March 2005 to September 2006 with a freight company to arrange for the shipment of their household items weighing
about 28,000 pounds to the Philippines; e-mail with the Philippine Bureau of Animal Industry inquiring how to ship
their dog to the Philippines; school records of her children showing enrollment in Philippine schools starting June 2005
and for succeeding years; tax identification card for petitioner issued on July 2005; titles for condominium and parking
slot issued in February 2006 and their corresponding tax declarations issued in April 2006; receipts dated 23 February
2005 from the Salvation Army in the U.S. acknowledging donation of items from petitioner's family; March 2006 e-mail
to the U.S. Postal Service confirming request for change of address; final statement from the First American Title
Insurance Company showing sale of their U.S. home on 27 April 2006; 12 July 2011 filled-up questionnaire submitted
to the U.S. Embassy where petitioner indicated that she had been a Philippine resident since May 2005; affidavit from
Jesusa Sonora Poe (attesting to the return of petitioner on 24 May 2005 and that she and her family stayed with affiant
until the condominium was purchased); and Affidavit from petitioner's husband (confirming that the spouses jointly
decided to relocate to the Philippines in 2005 and that he stayed behind in the U.S. only to finish some work and to
sell the family home).
The foregoing evidence were undisputed and the facts were even listed by the COMELEC, particularly in its Resolution
in the Tatad, Contreras and Valdez cases.
However, the COMELEC refused to consider that petitioner's domicile had been timely changed as of 24 May 2005.
At the oral arguments, COMELEC Commissioner Arthur Lim conceded the presence of the first two requisites, namely,
physical presence and animus manendi, but maintained there was no animus non-revertendi.154 The COMELEC
disregarded the import of all the evidence presented by petitioner on the basis of the position that the earliest date
that petitioner could have started residence in the Philippines was in July 2006 when her application under R.A. No.

78
9225 was approved by the BI. In this regard, COMELEC relied on Coquilla v. COMELEC,155 Japzon v. COMELEC156
and Caballero v. COMELEC. 157 During the oral arguments, the private respondents also added Reyes v.
COMELEC.158 Respondents contend that these cases decree that the stay of an alien former Filipino cannot be
counted until he/she obtains a permanent resident visa or reacquires Philippine citizenship, a visa-free entry under a
balikbayan stamp being insufficient. Since petitioner was still an American (without any resident visa) until her
reacquisition of citizenship under R.A. No. 9225, her stay from 24 May 2005 to 7 July 2006 cannot be counted.
But as the petitioner pointed out, the facts in these four cases are very different from her situation. In Coquilla v.
COMELEC,159 the only evidence presented was a community tax certificate secured by the candidate and his
declaration that he would be running in the elections. Japzon v. COMELEC160 did not involve a candidate who wanted
to count residence prior to his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. With the Court decreeing that residence is distinct
from citizenship, the issue there was whether the candidate's acts after reacquisition sufficed to establish residence.
In Caballero v. COMELEC, 161 the candidate admitted that his place of work was abroad and that he only visited
during his frequent vacations. In Reyes v. COMELEC,162 the candidate was found to be an American citizen who had
not even reacquired Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 9225 or had renounced her U.S. citizenship. She was
disqualified on the citizenship issue. On residence, the only proof she offered was a seven-month stint as provincial
officer. The COMELEC, quoted with approval by this Court, said that "such fact alone is not sufficient to prove her
one-year residency."
It is obvious that because of the sparse evidence on residence in the four cases cited by the respondents, the Court
had no choice but to hold that residence could be counted only from acquisition of a permanent resident visa or from
reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. In contrast, the evidence of petitioner is overwhelming and taken together leads
to no other conclusion that she decided to permanently abandon her U.S. residence (selling the house, taking the
children from U.S. schools, getting quotes from the freight company, notifying the U.S. Post Office of the abandonment
of their address in the U.S., donating excess items to the Salvation Army, her husband resigning from U.S.
employment right after selling the U.S. house) and permanently relocate to the Philippines and actually re-established
her residence here on 24 May 2005 (securing T.I.N, enrolling her children in Philippine schools, buying property here,
constructing a residence here, returning to the Philippines after all trips abroad, her husband getting employed here).
Indeed, coupled with her eventual application to reacquire Philippine citizenship and her family's actual continuous
stay in the Philippines over the years, it is clear that when petitioner returned on 24 May 2005 it was for good.
In this connection, the COMELEC also took it against petitioner that she had entered the Philippines visa-free as a
balikbayan. A closer look at R.A. No. 6768 as amended, otherwise known as the "An Act Instituting a Balikbayan
Program," shows that there is no overriding intent to treat balikbayans as temporary visitors who must leave after one
year. Included in the law is a former Filipino who has been naturalized abroad and "comes or returns to the
Philippines." 163 The law institutes a balikbayan program "providing the opportunity to avail of the necessary training
to enable the balikbayan to become economically self-reliant members of society upon their return to the country"164
in line with the government's "reintegration program."165 Obviously, balikbayans are not ordinary transients.
Given the law's express policy to facilitate the return of a balikbayan and help him reintegrate into society, it would be
an unduly harsh conclusion to say in absolute terms that the balikbayan must leave after one year. That visa-free
period is obviously granted him to allow him to re-establish his life and reintegrate himself into the community before
he attends to the necessary formal and legal requirements of repatriation. And that is exactly what petitioner did - she
reestablished life here by enrolling her children and buying property while awaiting the return of her husband and then
applying for repatriation shortly thereafter.
No case similar to petitioner's, where the former Filipino's evidence of change in domicile is extensive and
overwhelming, has as yet been decided by the Court. Petitioner's evidence of residence is unprecedented. There is
no judicial precedent that comes close to the facts of residence of petitioner. There is no indication in Coquilla v.
COMELEC,166 and the other cases cited by the respondents that the Court intended to have its rulings there apply to
a situation where the facts are different. Surely, the issue of residence has been decided particularly on the facts-of-
the case basis.
To avoid the logical conclusion pointed out by the evidence of residence of petitioner, the COMELEC ruled that
petitioner's claim of residence of ten (10) years and eleven (11) months by 9 May 2016 in her 2015 COC was false
because she put six ( 6) years and six ( 6) months as "period of residence before May 13, 2013" in her 2012 COC for
Senator. Thus, according to the COMELEC, she started being a Philippine resident only in November 2006. In doing
so, the COMELEC automatically assumed as true the statement in the 2012 COC and the 2015 COC as false.
As explained by petitioner in her verified pleadings, she misunderstood the date required in the 2013 COC as the
period of residence as of the day she submitted that COC in 2012. She said that she reckoned residency from April-
May 2006 which was the period when the U.S. house was sold and her husband returned to the Philippines. In that
regard, she was advised by her lawyers in 2015 that residence could be counted from 25 May 2005.
Petitioner's explanation that she misunderstood the query in 2012 (period of residence before 13 May 2013) as
inquiring about residence as of the time she submitted the COC, is bolstered by the change which the COMELEC
itself introduced in the 2015 COC which is now "period of residence in the Philippines up to the day before May 09,
2016." The COMELEC would not have revised the query if it did not acknowledge that the first version was vague.
That petitioner could have reckoned residence from a date earlier than the sale of her U.S. house and the return of
her husband is plausible given the evidence that she had returned a year before. Such evidence, to repeat, would
include her passport and the school records of her children.
It was grave abuse of discretion for the COMELEC to treat the 2012 COC as a binding and conclusive admission
against petitioner. It could be given in evidence against her, yes, but it was by no means conclusive. There is precedent
after all where a candidate's mistake as to period of residence made in a COC was overcome by evidence. In
Romualdez-Marcos v. COMELEC,167 the candidate mistakenly put seven (7) months as her period of residence where
the required period was a minimum of one year. We said that "[i]t is the fact of residence, not a statement in a certificate
of candidacy which ought to be decisive in determining whether or not an individual has satisfied the constitutions
residency qualification requirement." The COMELEC ought to have looked at the evidence presented and see if
petitioner was telling the truth that she was in the Philippines from 24 May 2005. Had the COMELEC done its duty, it
would have seen that the 2012 COC and the 2015 COC both correctly stated the pertinent period of residency.

79
The COMELEC, by its own admission, disregarded the evidence that petitioner actually and physically returned here
on 24 May 2005 not because it was false, but only because COMELEC took the position that domicile could be
established only from petitioner's repatriation under R.A. No. 9225 in July 2006. However, it does not take away the
fact that in reality, petitioner had returned from the U.S. and was here to stay permanently, on 24 May 2005. When
she claimed to have been a resident for ten (10) years and eleven (11) months, she could do so in good faith.
For another, it could not be said that petitioner was attempting to hide anything. As already stated, a petition for quo
warranto had been filed against her with the SET as early as August 2015. The event from which the COMELEC
pegged the commencement of residence, petitioner's repatriation in July 2006 under R.A. No. 9225, was an
established fact to repeat, for purposes of her senatorial candidacy.
Notably, on the statement of residence of six (6) years and six (6) months in the 2012 COC, petitioner recounted that
this was first brought up in the media on 2 June 2015 by Rep. Tobias Tiangco of the United Nationalist Alliance.
Petitioner appears to have answered the issue immediately, also in the press. Respondents have not disputed
petitioner's evidence on this point. From that time therefore when Rep. Tiangco discussed it in the media, the stated
period of residence in the 2012 COC and the circumstances that surrounded the statement were already matters of
public record and were not hidden.
Petitioner likewise proved that the 2012 COC was also brought up in the SET petition for quo warranto. Her Verified
Answer, which was filed on 1 September 2015, admitted that she made a mistake in the 2012 COC when she put in
six ( 6) years and six ( 6) months as she misunderstood the question and could have truthfully indicated a longer
period. Her answer in the SET case was a matter of public record. Therefore, when petitioner accomplished her COC
for President on 15 October 2015, she could not be said to have been attempting to hide her erroneous statement in
her 2012 COC for Senator which was expressly mentioned in her Verified Answer.
The facts now, if not stretched to distortion, do not show or even hint at an intention to hide the 2012 statement and
have it covered by the 2015 representation. Petitioner, moreover, has on her side this Court's pronouncement that:

Concededly, a candidate's disqualification to run for public office does not necessarily constitute material
misrepresentation which is the sole ground for denying due course to, and for the cancellation of, a COC.
Further, as already discussed, the candidate's misrepresentation in his COC must not only refer to a
material fact (eligibility and qualifications for elective office), but should evince a deliberate intent to
mislead, misinform or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible. It must be made
with an intention to deceive the electorate as to one's qualifications to run for public office.168

In sum, the COMELEC, with the same posture of infallibilism, virtually ignored a good number of evidenced dates all
of which can evince animus manendi to the Philippines and animus non revertedi to the United States of America.
The veracity of the events of coming and staying home was as much as dismissed as inconsequential, the focus
having been fixed at the petitioner's "sworn declaration in her COC for Senator" which the COMELEC said "amounts
to a declaration and therefore an admission that her residence in the Philippines only commence sometime in
November 2006"; such that "based on this declaration, [petitioner] fails to meet the residency requirement for
President." This conclusion, as already shown, ignores the standing jurisprudence that it is the fact of residence, not
the statement of the person that determines residence for purposes of compliance with the constitutional requirement
of residency for election as President. It ignores the easily researched matter that cases on questions of residency
have been decided favorably for the candidate on the basis of facts of residence far less in number, weight and
substance than that presented by petitioner.169 It ignores, above all else, what we consider as a primary reason why
petitioner cannot be bound by her declaration in her COC for Senator which declaration was not even considered by
the SET as an issue against her eligibility for Senator. When petitioner made the declaration in her COC for Senator
that she has been a resident for a period of six (6) years and six (6) months counted up to the 13 May 2013 Elections,
she naturally had as reference the residency requirements for election as Senator which was satisfied by her declared
years of residence. It was uncontested during the oral arguments before us that at the time the declaration for Senator
was made, petitioner did not have as yet any intention to vie for the Presidency in 2016 and that the general public
was never made aware by petitioner, by word or action, that she would run for President in 2016. Presidential
candidacy has a length-of-residence different from that of a senatorial candidacy. There are facts of residence other
than that which was mentioned in the COC for Senator. Such other facts of residence have never been proven to be
false, and these, to repeat include:

[Petitioner] returned to the Philippines on 24 May 2005. (petitioner's] husband however stayed in the
USA to finish pending projects and arrange the sale of their family home.

Meanwhile [petitioner] and her children lived with her mother in San Juan City. [Petitioner] enrolled Brian
in Beacon School in Taguig City in 2005 and Hanna in Assumption College in Makati City in 2005. Anika
was enrolled in Learning Connection in San Juan in 2007, when she was already old enough to go to
school.

In the second half of 2005, [petitioner] and her husband acquired Unit 7F of One Wilson Place
Condominium in San Juan. [Petitioner] and her family lived in Unit 7F until the construction of their family
home in Corinthian Hills was completed.

Sometime in the second half of 2005, [petitioner's] mother discovered that her former lawyer who handled
[petitioner's] adoption in 1974 failed to secure from the Office of the Civil Registrar of Iloilo a new
Certificate of Live Birth indicating [petitioner's] new name and stating that her parents are "Ronald Allan
K. Poe" and "Jesusa L. Sonora."

In February 2006, [petitioner] travelled briefly to the US in order to supervise the disposal of some of the
family's remaining household belongings. [Petitioner] returned to the Philippines on 11 March 2006.
1a\^/phi1

In late March 2006, [petitioner's] husband informed the United States Postal Service of the family's
abandonment of their address in the US.

80
 The family home in the US was sole on 27 April 2006.

In April 2006, [petitioner's] husband resigned from his work in the US. He returned to the Philippines on
4 May 2006 and began working for a Philippine company in July 2006.

In early 2006, [petitioner] and her husband acquired a vacant lot in Corinthian Hills, where they eventually
built their family home.170

In light of all these, it was arbitrary for the COMELEC to satisfy its intention to let the case fall under the exclusive
ground of false representation, to consider no other date than that mentioned by petitioner in her COC for Senator.
All put together, in the matter of the citizenship and residence of petitioner for her candidacy as President of the
Republic, the questioned Resolutions of the COMELEC in Division and En Banc are, one and all, deadly diseased
with grave abuse of discretion from root to fruits.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions, to wit:
1. dated 1 December 2015 rendered through the COMELEC Second Division, in SPA No. 15-001 (DC), entitled
Estrella C. Elamparo, petitioner, vs. Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares, respondent, stating that:

[T]he Certificate of Candidacy for President of the Republic of the Philippines in the May 9, 2016 National
and Local Elections filed by respondent Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares is hereby
GRANTED.

2. dated 11 December 2015, rendered through the COMELEC First Division, in the consolidated cases SPA No. 15-
002 (DC) entitled Francisco S. Tatad, petitioner, vs. Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares, respondent;
SPA No. 15-007 (DC) entitled Antonio P. Contreras, petitioner, vs. Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares,
respondent; and SPA No. 15-139 (DC) entitled Amado D. Valdez, petitioner, v. Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-
Llamanzares, respondent; stating that:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to GRANT

the petitions and cancel the Certificate of Candidacy of MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD SONORA POE-
LLAMANZARES for the elective position of President of the Republic of the Philippines in connection
with the 9 May 2016 Synchronized Local and National Elections.

3. dated 23 December 2015 of the COMELEC En Banc, upholding the 1 December 2015 Resolution of the Second
Division stating that:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to DENY

the Verified Motion for Reconsideration of SENATOR MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD SONORA POE-
LLAMANZARES. The Resolution dated 11 December 2015 of the Commission First Division is
AFFIRMED.

4. dated 23 December 2015 of the COMELEC En Banc, upholding the 11 December 2015 Resolution of the First
Division.
are hereby ANNULED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD SONORA POE-LLAMANZARES is
DECLARED QUALIFIED to be a candidate for President in the National and Local Elections of 9 May 2016.
SO ORDERED.

81