15. G.R. No.

134096 March 3, 1999

JOSEPH PETER S. SISON, petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondents.

FACTS

While the election returns were being canvassed by the Quezon City Board of Canvassers but before the
winning candidates were proclaimed, petitioner commenced suit before the COMELEC by filing a petition
seeking to suspend the canvassing of votes and/or proclamation in Quezon City and to declare a failure
of elections, pursuant to Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, as
amended) on the ground of "massive and orchestrated fraud and acts analogous thereto which occurred
after the voting and during the preparation of election returns and in the custody or canvass thereof,
which resulted in a failure to elect."

However, the City Board of Canvassers proclaimed the winners of the elections in Quezon City,
including the winning candidate for the post of vice mayor while the petition was pending before the
COMELEC. On June 22, 1998, the COMELEC promulgated its challenged resolution dismissing the
petition before it on the ground (1) that the allegations therein were not supported by sufficient evidence,
and (2) that the grounds recited were not among the pre-proclamation issues set forth in Section 17 of
Republic Act No. 7166.

ISSUE: WON the COMELEC gravely erred in dismissing the petition.

RULING:

NO. At the outset, we notice that petitioner exhibits an ambivalent stand as to what exactly is the
nature of the remedy he availed of at the time he initiated proceedings before the COMELEC. At the start,
he anchors his initiatory petition under Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code regarding failure of
elections, but he later builds his case as a pre-proclamation controversy which is covered by Sections
241-248 of the Omnibus Election Code, as amended by R.A. No. 7166.

In any case, petitioner nonetheless cannot succeed in either of the remedies he opted to pursue.
Recently, in Mantalam v. Commission on Elections, we have already declared that a pre-proclamation
controversy is not the same as an action for annulment of results or declaration of failure of
elections, founded as they are on different grounds.

Under the pertinent codal provision of Omnibus Election Code, there are only three (3) instances
where a failure of elections may be declared, namely: (a) the election in any polling place has not been
held on the date fixed on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes;
(b) the election in any polling place had been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of
the voting on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes; or (c) after
the voting and during the preparation and transmission of the election returns or in the custody or canvass
thereof, such election results in a failure to elect on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or
other analogous causes. Unfortunately, petitioner failed to support his claim. He never alleged at all that
elections were either not held or suspended. Furthermore, petitioner's claim of failure to elect stood as a
bare conclusion bereft of any substantive support to describe just exaclty how the failure to elect came
about.

With respect to pre-proclamation controversy, it is well to note that the scope of pre-
proclamation controversy is only limited to the issues enumerated under Section 243 of the Omnibus
Election Code, and the enumeration therein is restrictive and exclusive:

Sec. 243. Issues that may be raised in pre-proclamation controversy — The following
shall be proper issues that may be raised in a pre-proclamation controversy:
(a) Illegal composition or proceedings of the board of canvassers:
(b) The canvassed election returns are incomplete, contain material defects,
appear to be tampered with or falsified, or contain discrepancies in the same
returns or in other authentic copies thereof as mentioned in Sections 233, 234,
235 and 236 of this Code:
(c) The election returns were prepared under duress, threats, coercion, or
intimidation, or they are obviously manufactured or not authentic; and
(d) when substitute or fraudulent returns in controverted polling places were
canvassed, the results of which materially affected standing of the aggrieved
candidate or candidates.
 The reason underlying the delimitation both of substantive ground and procedure is the policy of
the election law that pre-proclamation controversies should be summarily decided, consistent with the
law's desire that the canvass and proclamation be delayed as little as possible. That is why such
questions which require more deliberate and necessarily longer consideration are left for examination in
the corresponding protest. However, with the proclamation of the winning candidate for the position
contested, the question of whether the petition raised issues proper for a pre-proclamation controversy is
already of no consequence since the well-entrenched rule in such situation is that a pre-proclamation
case before the COMELEC is no longer viable, the more appropriate remedies being a regular election
protest or a petition for quo warranto.

In paragraph 3 of the COMELEC's Omnibus Resolution No. 3049 (Omnibus Resolution on

Pending Cases) dated June 29, 1998, it is clearly stated therein that "All other pre-proclamation cases . . .
shall be deemed terminated pursuant to Section 16, R.A. 7166. Section 16 in the aforecited omnibus
resolution refers to the termination of pre-proclamation cases when the term of the office involved has
already begun, which is precisely what obtains here. However, the petition filed was terminated as it does
not fall within the exceptions. The exception under Section 4 thereof operates only when what is involved
is not pre-proclamation controversy such as petitions for disqualification, failure of election or analogous
cases. But as we have earlier declared, his petition, though assuming to seek a declaration of failure of
elections, is actually a case of pre-proclamation controversy and, hence, not falling within the ambit of the
exception. In any case, that omnibus resolution would not have been applied in the first place because
that was issued posterior to the date when the herein challenged resolution was promulgated which is
June 22, 1998. There was no provision that such omnibus resolution should have retroactive effect.

As to petitioner’s claim that he was deprived of his right to due process – that he was not allowed
to present evidence, shall likewise necessarily fail. Section 242 of the Omnibus Election Code as basis for
his right to present evidence is misplaced. The phrase "after due notice" refers only to a situation where
the COMELEC decides and, in fact, takes steps to either partially or totally suspend or annul the
proclamation of any candidate-elect. Also, presentation of evidence before the COMELEC is not at all
indispensable in order to satisfy the demands of due process. Under the amendment introduced by R.A.
No. 7166, particularly Section 18 thereof, all that is required now is that the COMELEC shall dispose of
pre-proclamation controversies "on the basis of the records and evidence elevated to it by the board of
canvassers.

35. G.R. No. 190529 April 29, 2010

PHILIPPINE GUARDIANS BROTHERHOOD, INC. (PGBI), represented by its Secretary-General

GEORGE "FGBF GEORGE" DULDULAO, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

FACTS

The Philippine Guardians Brotherhood, Inc. (PGBI) files a petition for review and a motion for
reconsideration to nullify Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Resolution No. 8679 dated October 13,
2009 insofar as it relates to PGBI and the Resolution dated December 9, 2009. These resolutions delisted
PGBI from the roster of registered national, regional or sectoral parties, organizations or coalitions under
the party-list system.

According to Section 6(8) of Republic Act No. 7941, known as Party-List System Act, COMELEC,
upon verified complaint of any interested party, may remove or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the
registration of any national, regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition if: (1) it fails to participate
in the last two preceding elections or (2)fails to obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast
under the party-list system in the two preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered.
For May 2010 Elections, the COMELEC en banc issued Resolution No. 8679 deleting several party-list
groups or organizations from the list of registered national, regional or sectoral parties, organizations or
coalitions.

Among the party-list organizations affected was PGBI; it was delisted because it failed to get 2% of the
votes cast in 2004 and it did not participate in the 2007 elections.

PGBI filed its opposition to Resolution No. 8679 and likewise, sought for accreditation as a party-list
organization. One of the arguments cited is that the Supreme Court's ruling in G.R. No. 177548 –
MINERO (Philippine Mines Safety Environment Association) vs COMELEC cannot apply in the instant
controversy.
One of the reasons is because the factual milieu of the cited case is removed from PGBI's. Additionally,
the requirement of Section 6(8) has been relaxed by the Court's ruling in G.R. No. 179271 - BANAT
(Barangay Association for Advancement and National Transparency) vs COMELEC.

COMELEC denied the motion and in response, pointed out that the MINERO ruling is squarely in point,
as MINERO failed to get 2% of the votes in 2001 and did not participate at all in the 2004 elections.

Issue:
Whether the MINERO ruling can be use as a legal basis in delisting PGBI.

Held:
According to the Court, the MINERO ruling is an erroneous application of Section 6(8) of RA 7941; hence,
it cannot sustain PGBI's delisting from the roster of registered national, regional or sectoral parties,
organizations or coalitions under the party-list system.

First the law is clear in that the word "or" is a disjunctive term signifying disassociation and independence
of one thing from the other things enumerated; it should, as a rule, be construed in the sense in which it
ordinarily implies, as a disjunctive word. Thus, the plain, clear and unmistakable language of the law
provides for two separate reasons for delisting.

Second, MINERO is diametrically opposed to the legislative intent of Section 6(8) of RA 7941 and
therefore, simply cannot stand. Its basic defect lies in its characterization of the non-participation of a
party-list organization in an election as similar to a failure to garner the 2% threshold party-list vote.

What MINERO effectively holds is that a party list organization that does not participate in an election
necessarily gets, by default, less than 2% of the party-list votes. To be sure, this is a confused
interpretation of the law, given the law's clear and categorical language and the legislative intent to treat
the two scenarios differently. A delisting based on a mixture or fusion of these two different and separate
grounds for delisting is therefore a strained application of the law - in jurisdictional terms, it is an
interpretation not within the contemplation of the framers of the law and hence is a gravely abusive
interpretation of the law.

Instead, what should be taken into account is the ruling in BANAT vs COMELEC where the 2% party-list
vote requirement provided in RA 7941 is partly invalidated.

The Court rules that, in computing the allocation of additional seats, the continued operation of the two
percent threshold for the distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clause of Section 11(b)
of R.A. No. 7941 is unconstitutional; it finds that the two percent threshold makes it mathematically
impossible to achieve the maximum number of available party list seats when the number of available
party list seats exceeds 50.The continued operation of the two percent threshold in the distribution of the
additional seats frustrates the attainment of the permissive ceiling that 20% of the members of the House
of Representatives shall consist of party-list representatives.

To reiterate, Section 6(8) of RA 7941 provides for two separate grounds for delisting; these grounds
cannot be mixed or combined to support delisting; and the disqualification for failure to garner 2% party-
list votes in two preceding elections should now be understood, in light of the BANAT ruling, to mean
failure to qualify for a party-list seat in two preceding elections for the constituency in which it has
registered. This is how Section 6(8) of RA 7941 should be understood and applied under the authority of
the Supreme Court to state what the law is and as an exception to the application of the principle of stare
decisis (to adhere to precedents and not to unsettle things which are established).

The most compelling reason to abandon MINERO and strike it out from ruling case law is that it was
clearly an erroneous application of the law - an application that the principle of stability or predictability of
decisions alone cannot sustain. MINERO did unnecessary violence to the language of the law, the intent
of the legislature and to the rule of law in general.

Therefore, the Supreme Court grants PGBI’s petition and accordingly, annul COMELEC Resolution No.
8679 dated October 13, 2009 insofar as the petitioner PGBI is concerned and the Resolution dated
December 9, 2009 which denied PGBI's motion for reconsideration. PGBI is qualified to be voted upon as
a party-list group or organization in the May 2010 elections.

45. G.R. No. 160427 September 15, 2004

POLALA SAMBARANI, JAMAL MIRAATO, SAMERA ABUBACAR and MACABIGUNG

MASCARA, petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and EO ESMAEL MAULAY,
Acting Election Officer, Tamparan, Lanao del Sur or whoever is acting on his behalf, respondents.

FACTS

SUMMARY: Sambarani et al. are incumbent punong barangays of 5 barangays in Tamparan, Lanao del
Sur. They ran for new terms in the 2002 elections. However, COMELEC declared failure of elections in
the 5 barangays and set a date for special elections, which were not held because of the local election
officer’s failure to use the proper voting lists and records. The COMELEC did not assail this fact.
Sambarani et al. thus filed a petition for declaration of failure of special election. They also asked
COMELEC in their petition to set a new date for another special election. COMELEC did declare a failure
of election, but did not call a special election, citing logistical and financial problems, as well as Sec. 6 of
the Omnibus Election Code, which provided that special elections should be held “not later than thirty
days after the cessation of the cause of such postponement or suspension of the election or failure to
elect”. COMELEC also ordered DILG to appoint replacement barangay officials. Sambarani et al. assailed
this resolution before the SC, which reversed the COMELEC. SC held that COMELEC erred in not calling
a special election because it erroneously relied on OEC 6, because the prohibition in that provision is only
directory. The applicable provision is OEC 45, which provides that special elections should be held within
30 days from the cessation of the causes of postponement. Following such provision, the election may be
held anytime, as long as is within 30 days from the cessation of the cause of postponement. SC also cited
Basher v. COMELEC wherein a special election was ordered held in 2000 even if the original elections
were for 1997. On the issue of the propriety of the ordering DILG to appoint replacement officials, SC held
that the hold-over provision in RA 9164 must govern, it being the new law which prescribes the term of
office of barangay and SK officials. Under that law, the clear mandate is for the incumbent officials to
remain in a holdover capacity until their successors are elected and qualified.

DOCTRINE: RA 9164 is now the law that fixes the date of barangay and SK elections, prescribes the
term of office of barangay and SK officials, and provides for the qualifications of candidates and voters for
the SK elections.
LGC 43(c) limits the term of elective barangay officials to three years. However, RA 9164§5 explicitly
provides that incumbent barangay officials may continue in office in a hold over capacity until their
successors are elected and qualified. The application of the holdover principle preserves continuity in the
transaction of official business and prevents a hiatus in government pending the assumption of a
successor into office. Cases of extreme necessity justify the application of the holdover principle.
The prohibition on conducting special elections after thirty days from the cessation of the cause of the
failure of elections is not absolute. It is directory and not mandatory. COMELEC possesses residual
power to conduct special elections even beyond the deadline prescribed by law in OEC 6, which cannot
prevail against the right of suffrage of the people as guaranteed by the Constitution. The period under
OEC 45 was applied.

NATURE: Certiorari petition under Rule 65. Original petition before the COMELEC for declaration of
failure of elections and holding of special election.

FACTS:
 The following individuals [THE CANDIDATES] ran for Punong Barangay of 5 BARANGAYS in
Tamparan, Lanao del Sur in the 2002 Barangay and SK Elections.
o Polala SAMBARANI – Brgy. Occidental Linuk
o Jamal MIRAATO – Brgy. Pindolonan Moriatao Sarip
o Samera ABUBACAR – Brgy. Talub
o Macabigung MASCARA – New Lumbacaingud
o Aliasgar DAYONDONG – Tatayawan South
 Due to a previously declared failure of elections, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 5479, setting
special elections in 11 barangays in Tamparan (including the 5 barangays) for Aug. 13, 2002.
 Aug. 14, 2002 – Acting Election Officer Esmael MAULAY issued a certification that no special
elections were held on Aug. 13, 2002
 The candidates filed a Joint Petition for the declaration of failure of elections in the 5 barangays
and for the holding of another special election.
o The candidates blamed Maulay for the failure, claiming that he did not comply with
COMELEC Commissioner Mehol Sadain’s directive to use the 2001 ARMM
Computerized Voters’ List and the Voter’s Registration Records of the Lanao Sur
Provnicial Election Officer during the December 2001 registration of new voters.
 The COMELEC ordered Maulay and the candidates to submit their written memoranda. Maulay
was also directed to explain in writing why he should not be administratively charged for failing to
comply with Comm Sadain’s directive. Only the candidates filed a memorandum; and the
COMELEC considered the case submitted the case for resolution.
 Oct. 8, 2003 – ASSAILED COMELEC RESOLUTION
o directed the appointment of barangay officials in the 5 barangays in accordance with the
LGC
 o COMELEC agreed that the Aug. 13, 2002 special elections failed, but ruled that it was
untenable to hold another special election, because Sec. 6 of the Omnibus Election Code
provides that “special elections shall be held on a date reasonably close to the date of the
election not held, but not later than thirty days after cessation of the cause of such
postponement.”
o The COMELEC noted that more than thirty days had elapsed since the failed election.
Furthermore, it would be wasteful and cumbersome for the COMELEC to hold the special
elections. Hence, it allowed DILG to implement the provisions of the LGC and other laws
on the appointment of the Punong Barangay, Kagawad, SK Chair, and SK Kagawad.
o Ordered the furnishing of a copy of the resolution to the Law Department for investigation
into possible election offenses committed by Maulay
 Sambarani, Miraato, Abubacar, and Mascara (SAMBARANI ET AL.) filed the present recourse to
the SC

ISSUE (HELD)
1) W/N another special election may be held (YES)
2) W/N the DILG may appoint replacement barangay and SK officials in case of a failure of elections (NO)

RATIO
1) COMELEC’S REASONS FOR REFUSING TO HOLD SPECIAL ELECTIONS ARE VOID; DELAY WAS
DUE TO COMELEC’S FAULT; ERRONEOUS INTERPRETATION OF OEC 6 & 45
 Sambarani et al.: The failure of elections was due to Maulay’s failure to use the ARMM 2001
computerized voter’s list and to clean up the voters’ and candidates’ list for Tamparan. The
refusal to call another special election conflicts with the decision in Basher v. COMELEC.
 COMELEC/SolGen: A special election can only be held within 30 days after the cause of
postponement of failure of election has ceased. DILG has the power to appoint and fill vacancies
in the concerned barangay and SK offices
 SC: COMELEC must hold a special election. Its reasons for refusing to do so are void.
COMELEC GRANTED BROAD POWERS TO DISCHARGE ITS CONSTITUTIONAL MANDATE
 The text and intent of the provision gives the COMELEC all the necessary and incidental powers
necessary for the achievement of its fundamental objective of holding free, fair, honest, and
peaceful elections.
 The functions of the COMELEC under the Constitution are essentially executive and
administrative in nature.
o The declaration of a failure of elections falls under the administrative functions of the
COMELEC (Ampatuan v. COMELEC); and the courts will usually respect such
declaration following the administrative law principle according great weight and even
conclusiveness to administrative actions; but in this case the COMELEC cited
operational, logistical, and financial problems in refusing to hold the election.
 Neither the candidates nor the voters of the 5 barangays caused the failure of the special
elections.
 EO Maulay admitted that no elections were held; and neither the provincial nor the regional
COMELEC supervisors contested such fact.
 An election is the embodiment of the popular will and the sovereign power of the electorate. It
involves the choice or selection of candidates to public office by popular vote.
 The right of suffrage is enshrined in the Constitution because it is through exercising such right
that the people exercise their sovereign authority to choose their representatives. The fact that
the elections are involved are in the lowest level of political organization does not justify the
disenfranchisement of voters.
PROHIBITION ON SPECIAL ELECTIONS UNDER OEC 6 IS MERELY DIRECTORY
 COMELEC’s argument is based on Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code 1.
 Construing this provision, the SC in Pangandaman v. COMELEC held that “the holding of
elections within the next few months from the cessation of the cause of the postponement,
suspension or failure to elect may still be considered ‘reasonably close to the date of the election
not held’”, considering the second guideline laid down in that case, that the election must be
reasonably close to the date of the election not held, which is to be determined in light of the
peculiar circumstances of the case.
 The application of the holdover principle preserves continuity in the transaction of official business
and prevents a hiatus in government pending the assumption of a successor into office. As held
in Topacio Nueno v. Angeles, cases of extreme necessity justify the application of the holdover
principle.
DISPOSITION: Petition granted. Resolution declared void except insofar as it orders investigation of
Maulay. Sambarani et al. allowed to remain in office in hold-over capacity until election and qualification of
their successors. COMELEC ordered to conduct special elections within 30 days from finality of decision.