15. G.R. No.

134096 March 3, 1999

JOSEPH PETER S. SISON, petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondents.

ROMERO, J.:

Before this Court is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court which
impugns the Resolution 1 of public respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) dated June
22, 1998 that dismissed petitioner Joseph Peter S. Sison's earlier petition 2 in SPC No. 98-134,
entitled "In the Matter of the Petition to Suspend the Canvassing of Votes and/or Proclamation in
Quezon City and to Declare a Failure of Election."

It appears that while the election returns were being canvassed by the Quezon City Board of
Canvassers but before the winning candidates were proclaimed, petitioner commenced suit
before the COMELEC by filing a petition seeking to suspend the canvassing of votes and/or
proclamation in Quezon City and to declare a failure of elections. The said petition was
supposedly filed pursuant to Section 63 of the Omnibus Election Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 881,
as amended) on the ground of "massive and orchestrated fraud and acts analogous thereto
which occurred after the voting and during the preparation of election returns and in the
custody or canvass thereof, which resulted in a failure to elect." 4

In support of his allegation of massive and orchestrated fraud, petitioner cited specific instances
which are summarized and set forth below:

1. The Board of Canvassers announced that election returns with

no inner seal would be included in the canvass;

2. Board of Election Inspectors brought home copies of election

returns meant for the City Board of Canvassers;

3. Petitioner, through counsel, raised written objections to the

inclusion in the canvass of election returns which were either
tampered with, altered or falsified, or otherwise not authentic;

4. According to the minutes of the City Board Canvassers, there

were precincts with missing election returns:

5. Several election returns with no data on the number of votes

cast for vice mayoralty position;

6. Highly suspicious persons sneaking in some election returns and

documents into the canvassing area;

7. Concerned citizen found minutes of the counting, keys, locks

and mental seal in the COMELEC area for disposal as trash;
 8. Board of Election Inspectors have volunteered information that
they placed the copy of the election returns meant for the City
Board of Canvassers in the ballot boxes deposited with the City
Treasurer allegedly due to fatigue and lack of sleep.

9. Ballot boxes were never in the custody of the COMELEC and

neither the parties nor their watchers were allowed to enter the
restricted area where these boxes passed through on the way to
the basement of the City Hall where they were supposedly kept;
and

10. In the elections in Barangay New Era, there was a clear pattern
of voting which would show that the election returns were
manufactured and that no actual voting by duly qualified voters
took place therein.

While the petition was pending before the COMELEC, the City Board of Canvassers proclaimed
the winners of the elections in Quezon City, including the winning candidate for the post of vice
mayor. On June 22, 1998, the COMELEC promulgated its challenged resolution dismissing the
petition before it on the ground (1) that the allegations therein were not supported by sufficient
evidence, and (2) that the grounds recited were not among the pre-proclamation issues set
forth in Section 17 of Republic Act No. 7166.5

Hence, this petition.

Alleging that COMELEC overstepped the limits of reasonable exercise of discretion in dismissing
SPC No. 98-134, petitioner argues in the main that the electoral body failed to afford him basic
due process, that is, the right to a hearing and presentation of evidence before ruling on his
petition. He the proceeded to argue that the election returns themselves, as well as the minutes
of the canvassing committee of the City Board of Canvassers were, by themselves, sufficient
evidence to support the petition.

Upon a meticulous study of the parties' arguments together with the pertinent statutory
provisions and jurisprudence, this Court is of the opinion that there is no compelling reason why
we should withhold our imprimatur from the questioned resolution.

At the outset, we notice that petitioner exhibits an ambivalent stand as to what exactly is the
nature of the remedy he availed of at the time he initiated proceedings before the COMELEC in
SPC No. 98-134. At the start, he anchors his initiatory petition under Section 6 6 of the Omnibus
Election Code regarding failure of elections by he later builds his case as a pre-proclamation
controversy which is covered by Sections 241-248 of the Omnibus Election Code, as amended
by R.A. No. 7166. 7 In this respect, the rule is, what conjointly determine the nature of a pleading
are the allegations therein made in good faith, the stage of the proceedings at which it is filed,
and the primary objective of the party filing the same.

In any case, petitioner nonetheless cannot succeed in either of the remedies he opted to
pursue. Recently, in Mantalam v. Commission on Elections, 8 we have already declared that a
pre-proclamation controversy is not the same as an action for annulment of results or
declaration of failure of elections, founded as they are on different grounds.
Under the pertinent codal provision of Omnibus Election Code, there are only three (3) instances
where a failure of elections may be declared, namely: (a) the election in any polling place has
not been held on the date fixed on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other
analogous causes; (b) the election in any polling place had been suspended before the hour
fixed by law for the closing of the voting on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud,
or other analogous causes; or (c) after the voting and during the preparation and transmission
of the election returns or in the custody or canvass thereof, such election results in a failure to
elect on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous
causes. 9 (Emphasis supplied) We have painstakingly examined petitioner's petition before the
COMELEC but found nothing therein that could support an action for declaration of failure of
elections. He never alleged at all that elections were either not held or suspended. Furthermore,
petitioner's claim of failure to elect stood as a bare conclusion bereft of any substantive support
to describe just exaclty how the failure to elect came about.

With respect to pre-proclamation controversy, it is well to note that the scope of pre-
proclamation controversy is only limited to the issues enumerated under Section 243 10 of the
Omnibus Election Code, and the enumeration therein is restrictive and exclusive. 11 The reason
underlying the delimitation both of substantive ground and procedure is the policy of the
election law that pre-proclamation controversies should be summarily decide, consistent with
the law's desire that the canvass and proclamation be delayed as little as possible. 12 That is why
such questions which require more deliberate and necessarily longer consideration, are left for
examination in the corresponding protest. 13

However, with the proclamation of the winning candidate for the position contested, the
question of whether the petition raised issues proper for a pre-proclamation controversy is
already of no consequence since the well-entrenched rule in such situation is that a pre-
proclamation case before the COMELEC is no longer viable, the more appropriate remedies
being a regular election protest or a petition for quo warranto. 14 We have carefully reviewed all
recognized exceptions 15 to the foregoing rule but found nothing that could possibly apply to
the instant case based on the recitations of the petition. What is more, in paragraph 3 of the
COMELEC's Omnibus Resolution No. 3049 (Omnibus Resolution on Pending Cases) dated June
29, 1998, it is clearly stated therein that "All other pre-proclamation cases . . . shall
be deemed terminated pursuant to Section 16, R.A. 7166. 16 (Emphasis supplied). Section 16
which is referred to in the aforecited omnibus resolution refers to the termination of pre-
proclamation cases when the term of the office involved has already begun, which is precisely
what obtains here. We are, of course, aware that petitioner cites the said omnibus resolution in
maintaining that his petition is one of those cases which should have remained active pursuant
to paragraph 4 thereof. That exception, however, operates only when what is involved is not
pre-proclamation controversy such as petitions for disqualification, failure of election or
analogous cases. But as we have earlier declared, his petition, though assuming to seek a
declaration of failure of elections, is actually a case of pre-proclamation controversy and,
hence, not falling within the ambit of the exception. In any case, that omnibus resolution would
not have been applied in the first place because that was issued posterior to the date when the
herein challenged resolution was promulgated which is June 22, 1998. There was no provision
that such omnibus resolution should have retroactive effect.

Finally, as to petitioner's claim that he was deprived of his right to due process in that he was not
allowed to present his evidence before the COMELEC to support his petition, the same must
likewise fail.

First, we note that his citation of Section 242 of the Omnibus Election Code as basis for his right to
present evidence is misplaced. The phrase "after due notice" refers only to a situation where the
COMELEC decides and, in fact, takes steps to either partially or totally suspend or annul the
proclamation of any candidate-elect. Verba legis non est recedendum. From the words of the
statute there should be no departure. The statutory provision cannot be expanded to embrace
any other situation not contemplated therein such as the one at bar where the COMELEC is not
taking ant step to suspend or annul a proclamation.

Second, presentation of evidence before the COMELEC is not at all indispensable in order to
satisfy the demands of due process. Under the amendment introduced by R.A. No. 7166,
particularly Section 18 thereof, all that is required now is that the COMELEC shall dispose of pre-
proclamation controversies "on the basis of the records and evidence elevated to it by the
board of canvassers." This is but in keeping with the policy of the law that cases of this nature
should be summarily decided and the will of the electorate as reflected on the election returns
be determined as speedily as possible. What exactly those records and evidence are upon
which the COMELEC based its resolution and how they have been appreciated in respect of
their sufficiency, are beyond this Court's scrutiny. But we have reason to believe, owing the
presumption of regularity of performance of official duty and the precept that factual findings of
the COMELEC based on its assessments and duly supported by gathered evidence, are
conclusive upon the court, that the COMELEC did arrive at its conclusion with due regard to the
available evidence before it. That this is so can, in fact, be gleaned from petitioner's own
allegation and admission in his petition that " the election returns themselves as well as the
minutes of the Canvassing Committees and the City Board of Canvassers . . . are in the
possession of the COMELEC." 17 He even cites the paragraph (g), Section 20 of the Omnibus
Election Code to validate such allegation. Hence, it is not really correct to say that the
COMELEC acted without evidentiary basis at all or that petitioner was deprived of his right to
due process.

WHEREFORE, finding no grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on

the part of public respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC), the instant petition is hereby
DISMISSED. Consequently, the resolution of COMELEC in SPC No. 98-134 dated June 22, 1998 is
AFFIRMED.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Kapunan, Mendoza, Quisumbing, Purisima, Buena and
Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.

Vitug, J., abroad on official business.

Panganiban, J., is on leave.

Pardo, J., took no part.

35. G.R. No. 190529 April 29, 2010

PHILIPPINE GUARDIANS BROTHERHOOD, INC. (PGBI), represented by its Secretary-General

GEORGE "FGBF GEORGE" DULDULAO, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

BRION, J.:

The Philippine Guardians Brotherhood, Inc. (PGBI) seeks in this petition for certiorari1 and in the
motion for reconsideration it subsequently filed to nullify Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
Resolution No. 8679 dated October 13, 2009 insofar as it relates to PGBI, and the Resolution
dated December 9, 2009 denying PGBI’s motion for reconsideration in SPP No. 09-004 (MP). Via
these resolutions, the COMELEC delisted PGBI from the roster of registered national, regional or
sectoral parties, organizations or coalitions under the party-list system.

BACKGROUND

Section 6(8) of Republic Act No. 7941 (RA 7941), otherwise known as the Party-List System Act,
provides:

Section 6. Removal and/or Cancellation of Registration. – The COMELEC may motu proprio or
upon verified complaint of any interested party, remove or cancel, after due notice and
hearing, the registration of any national, regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition on
any of the following grounds:

xxxx

(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at least two per
centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding elections for
the constituency in which it has registered.[Emphasis supplied.]

The COMELEC replicated this provision in COMELEC Resolution No. 2847 – the Rules and
Regulations Governing the Election of the Party-List Representatives through the Party-List System
– which it promulgated on June 25, 1996.

For the upcoming May 2010 elections, the COMELEC en banc issued on October 13, 2009
Resolution No. 8679 deleting several party-list groups or organizations from the list of registered
national, regional or sectoral parties, organizations or coalitions. Among the party-list
organizations affected was PGBI; it was delisted because it failed to get 2% of the votes cast in
2004 and it did not participate in the 2007 elections. Nevertheless, the COMELEC stated in this
Resolution that any national, regional sectoral party or organizations or coalitions adversely
affected can personally or through its authorized representative file a verified opposition on
October 26, 2009.

PGBI filed its Opposition to Resolution No. 8679, but likewise sought, through its pleading, the
admission ad cautelam of its petition for accreditation as a party-list organization under the
Party-List System Act. Among other arguments, PGBI asserted that:
 (1) The assailed resolution negates the right of movant and those similarly situated to
invoke Section 4 of R.A. No. 7941, which allows any party, organization and coalition
already registered with the Commission to no longer register anew; the party though is
required to file with the Commission, not later than ninety (90) days before the election, a
manifestation of its desire to participate in the party-list system; since PGBI filed a
Request/Manifestation seeking a deferment of its participation in the 2007 elections
within the required period prior to the 2007 elections, it has the option to choose whether
or not to participate in the next succeeding election under the same conditions as to
rights conferred and responsibilities imposed;

(2) The Supreme Court’s ruling in G.R. No. 177548 – Philippine Mines Safety Environment
Association, also known as "MINERO" v. Commission on Elections – cannot apply in the
instant controversy for two reasons: (a) the factual milieu of the cited case is removed
from PGBI’s; (b) MINERO, prior to delisting, was afforded the opportunity to be heard,
while PGBI and the 25 others similarly affected by Resolution No. 8679 were not.
Additionally, the requirement of Section 6(8) has been relaxed by the Court’s ruling in
G.R. No. 179271 (Banat v. COMELEC) and the exclusion of PGBI and the 25 other party-list
is a denial of the equal protection of the laws;

(3) The implementation of the challenged resolution should be suspended and/or

aborted to prevent a miscarriage of justice in view of the failure to notify the parties in
accordance with the same Section 6(8) or R.A. No. 7941.2

The COMELEC denied PGBI’s motion/opposition for lack of merit.

First, the COMELEC observed that PGBI clearly misunderstood the import of Section 4 of R.A.
7941.3 The provision simply means that without the required manifestation or if a party or
organization does not participate, the exemption from registration does not arise and the party,
organization or coalition must go through the process again and apply for requalification; a
request for deferment would not exempt PGBI from registering anew.

Second, the MINERO ruling is squarely in point, as MINERO failed to get 2% of the votes in
2001 and did not participate at all in the 2004 elections.

Third, PGBI was given an opportunity to be heard or to seek the reconsideration of the action or
ruling complained of – the essence of due process; this is clear from Resolution No. 8679 which
expressly gave the adversely affected parties the opportunity to file their opposition.

As regards the alternative relief of application for accreditation, the COMELEC found the motion
to have been filed out of time, as August 17, 2009 was the deadline for accreditation provided
in Resolution 8646. The motion was obviously filed months after the deadline.

PGBI came to us in its petition for certiorari, arguing the same positions it raised with the
COMELEC when it moved to reconsider its delisting.

We initially dismissed the petition in light of our ruling in Philippine Mines Safety Environment
Association, also known as "MINERO" v. Commission on Elections (Minero);4 we said that no grave
abuse of discretion exists in a ruling that correctly applies the prevailing law and jurisprudence.
Applying Section 6(8) of RA 7941, the Court disqualified MINERO under the following reasoning:
Since petitioner by its own admission failed to get 2% of the votes in 2001 and did not participate
at all in the 2004 elections, it necessarily failed to get at least two per centum (2%) of the votes
cast in the two preceding elections. COMELEC, therefore, is not duty bound to certify it.

PGBI subsequently moved to reconsider the dismissal of its petition. Among other arguments,
PGBI claimed that the dismissal of the petition was contrary to law, the evidence and existing
jurisprudence. Essentially, PGBI asserts that Section 6(8) of RA 7941 does not apply if one is to
follow the tenor and import of the deliberations inclusive of the interpellations in Senate Bill No.
1913 on October 19, 1994. It cited the following excerpts from the Records of the Senate:

Senator Gonzales: On the other hand, Mr. President, under ground no. (7), Section 5 – there are
actually two grounds it states: " Failure to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or its
failure to obtain at least ten percent (10%) of the votes case under the party-list system in either
of the last two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered"

In short, the first ground is that, it failed to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections. The
second is, failure to obtain at least 10 percent of the votes cast under the party-list system in
either of the last two preceding elections, Mr. President,

Senator Tolentino: Actually, these are two separate grounds.

Senator Gonzales: There are actually two grounds, Mr. President.

Senator Tolentino: Yes, Mr. President.5 [Underscoring supplied.]

PGBI thus asserts that Section 6(8) does not apply to its situation, as it is obvious that it failed to
participate in one (1) but not in the two (2) preceding elections. Implied in this is that it also
failed to secure the required percentage in one (1) but not in the two (2) preceding elections.

Considering PGBI’s arguments, we granted the motion and reinstated the petition in the court’s
docket.

THE ISSUES

We are called upon to resolve: (a) whether there is legal basis for delisting PGBI; and (b) whether
PGBI’s right to due process was violated.

OUR RULING

We find the petition partly impressed with merit.

a. The Minero Ruling

Our Minero ruling is an erroneous application of Section 6(8) of RA 7941; hence, it cannot sustain
PGBI’s delisting from the roster of registered national, regional or sectoral parties, organizations or
coalitions under the party-list system.

First, the law is clear – the COMELEC may motu proprio or upon verified complaint of any
interested party, remove or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of any
national, regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition if it: (a) fails to participate in the last
two (2) preceding elections; or (b) fails to obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast
under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in which it has
registered.6 The word "or" is a disjunctive term signifying disassociation and independence of one
thing from the other things enumerated; it should, as a rule, be construed in the sense in which it
ordinarily implies, as a disjunctive word.7 Thus, the plain, clear and unmistakable language of the
law provides for two (2) separate reasons for delisting.

Second, Minero is diametrically opposed to the legislative intent of Section 6(8) of RA 7941, as
PGBI’s cited congressional deliberations clearly show.

Minero therefore simply cannot stand. Its basic defect lies in its characterization of the non-
participation of a party-list organization in an election as similar to a failure to garner the 2%
threshold party-list vote. What Minero effectively holds is that a party list organization that does
not participate in an election necessarily gets, by default, less than 2% of the party-list votes. To
be sure, this is a confused interpretation of the law, given the law’s clear and categorical
language and the legislative intent to treat the two scenarios differently. A delisting based on a
mixture or fusion of these two different and separate grounds for delisting is therefore a strained
application of the law – in jurisdictional terms, it is an interpretation not within the contemplation
of the framers of the law and hence is a gravely abusive interpretation of the law.8

What we say here should of course take into account our ruling in Barangay Association for
Advancement and National Transparency v. COMELEC9 (Banat) where we partly invalidated
the 2% party-list vote requirement provided in RA 7941 as follows:

We rule that, in computing the allocation of additional seats, the continued operation of the two
percent threshold for the distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clause of
Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 is unconstitutional. This Court finds that the two percent threshold
makes it mathematically impossible to achieve the maximum number of available party list seats
when the number of available party list seats exceeds 50. The continued operation of the two
percent threshold in the distribution of the additional seats frustrates the attainment of the
permissive ceiling that 20% of the members of the House of Representatives shall consist of party-
list representatives.

The disqualification for failure to get 2% party-list votes in two (2) preceding elections should
therefore be understood in light of the Banat ruling that party-list groups or organizations
garnering less than 2% of the party-list votes may yet qualify for a seat in the allocation of
additional seats.

We need not extensively discuss Banat’s significance, except to state that a party-list group or
organization which qualified in the second round of seat allocation cannot now validly be
delisted for the reason alone that it garnered less than 2% in the last two elections. In other
words, the application of this disqualification should henceforth be contingent on the
percentage of party-list votes garnered by the last party-list organization that qualified for a seat
in the House of Representatives, a percentage that is less than the 2% threshold invalidated in
Banat. The disqualification should now necessarily be read to apply to party-list groups or
organizations that did not qualify for a seat in the two preceding elections for the constituency
in which it registered.

To reiterate, (a) Section 6(8) of RA 7941 provides for two separate grounds for delisting; these
grounds cannot be mixed or combined to support delisting; and (b) the disqualification for
failure to garner 2% party-list votes in two preceding elections should now be understood, in light
of the Banat ruling, to mean failure to qualify for a party-list seat in two preceding elections for
the constituency in which it has registered. This, we declare, is how Section 6(8) of RA 7941
should be understood and applied. We do so under our authority to state what the law is,10 and
as an exception to the application of the principle of stare decisis.

The doctrine of stare decisis et non quieta movere (to adhere to precedents and not to unsettle
things which are established) is embodied in Article 8 of the Civil Code of the Philippines which
provides, thus:

ART. 8. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of
the legal system of the Philippines.

The doctrine enjoins adherence to judicial precedents. It requires courts in a country to follow
the rule established in a decision of its Supreme Court. That decision becomes a judicial
precedent to be followed in subsequent cases by all courts in the land. The doctrine of stare
decisis is based on the principle that once a question of law has been examined and decided, it
should be deemed settled and closed to further argument.11 The doctrine is grounded on the
necessity for securing certainty and stability of judicial decisions, thus:

Time and again, the court has held that it is a very desirable and necessary judicial
practice that when a court has laid down a principle of law as applicable to a certain state of
facts, it will adhere to that principle and apply it to all future cases in which the facts are
substantially the same. Stare decisis et non quieta movere. Stand by the decisions and disturb
not what is settled. Stare decisis simply means that for the sake of certainty, a conclusion
reached in one case should be applied to those that follow if the facts are substantially the
same, even though the parties may be different. It proceeds from the first principle of justice
that, absent any powerful countervailing considerations, like cases ought to be decided alike.
Thus, where the same questions relating to the same event have been put forward by the
parties similarly situated as in a previous case litigated and decided by a competent court, the
rule of stare decisis is a bar to any attempt to relitigate the same issue.12

The doctrine though is not cast in stone for upon a showing that circumstances attendant in a
particular case override the great benefits derived by our judicial system from the doctrine of
stare decisis, the Court is justified in setting it aside.13

As our discussion above shows, the most compelling reason to abandon Minero exists; it was
clearly an erroneous application of the law – an application that the principle of stability or
predictability of decisions alone cannot sustain. Minero did unnecessary violence to the
language of the law, the intent of the legislature, and to the rule of law in general. Clearly, we
cannot allow PGBI to be prejudiced by the continuing validity of an erroneous ruling. Thus, we
now abandon Minero and strike it out from our ruling case law.

We are aware that PGBI’s situation – a party list group or organization that failed to garner 2% in
a prior election and immediately thereafter did not participate in the preceding election – is
something that is not covered by Section 6(8) of RA 7941. From this perspective, it may be an
unintended gap in the law and as such is a matter for Congress to address. We cannot and do
not address matters over which full discretionary authority is given by the Constitution to the
legislature; to do so will offend the principle of separation of powers. If a gap indeed exists, then
the present case should bring this concern to the legislature’s notice.

b. The Issue of Due Process

On the due process issue, we agree with the COMELEC that PGBI’s right to due process was not
violated for PGBI was given an opportunity to seek, as it did seek, a reconsideration of Resolution
No. 8679. The essence of due process, we have consistently held, is simply the opportunity to be
heard; as applied to administrative proceedings, due process is the opportunity to explain one’s
side or the opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. A formal
or trial-type hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential. The requirement is satisfied
where the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the
controversy at hand. What is frowned upon is absolute lack of notice and hearing x x x. 14 We find
it obvious under the attendant circumstances that PGBI was not denied due process. In any
case, given the result of this Resolution, PGBI has no longer any cause for complaint on due
process grounds.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we GRANT the petition and accordingly ANNUL COMELEC
Resolution No. 8679 dated October 13, 2009 insofar as the petitioner PGBI is concerned, and the
Resolution dated December 9, 2009 which denied PGBI’s motion for reconsideration in SPP No.
09-004 (MP). PGBI is qualified to be voted upon as a party-list group or organization in the
coming May 2010 elections.

SO ORDERED.

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

45. G.R. No. 160427 September 15, 2004

POLALA SAMBARANI, JAMAL MIRAATO, SAMERA ABUBACAR and MACABIGUNG

MASCARA, petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and EO ESMAEL MAULAY,
Acting Election Officer, Tamparan, Lanao del Sur or whoever is acting on his behalf, respondents.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

Challenged in this petition for certiorari1 with prayer for temporary restraining order and
preliminary injunction is the Resolution of the Commission on Elections en
banc ("COMELEC")2 dated 8 October 2003. The COMELEC declared a failure of election but
refused to conduct another special election.

The Facts

In the 15 July 2002 Synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections ("elections"),
Polala Sambarani ("Sambarani"), Jamal Miraato ("Miraato"), Samera Abubacar ("Abubacar"),
Macabigung Mascara ("Mascara") and Aliasgar Dayondong ("Dayondong") ran for re-election
as punong barangay in their respective barangays, namely: Occidental Linuk, Pindolonan
Moriatao Sarip, Talub, New Lumbacaingud, and Tatayawan South ("five barangays"), all in
Tamparan, Lanao del Sur.
Due to a failure of elections in eleven barangays in Lanao del Sur, the COMELEC issued
Resolution No. 5479 setting special elections on 13 August 2002 in the affected barangays in
Lanao del Sur including the five barangays. On 14 August 2002, Acting Election Officer Esmael
Maulay ("EO Maulay") issued a certification that there were no special elections held on 13
August 2002.

Consequently, Sambarani, Miraato, Abubacar, Mascara and Dayondong ("joint-petitioners")

filed a Joint Petition seeking to declare a failure of elections in the five barangays and the
holding of another special election. The Joint Petition attributed the failure of the special
elections to EO Maulay’s non-compliance with COMELEC Commissioner Mehol K. Sadain’s
("Commissioner Sadain") directive. Commissioner Sadain had directed EO Maulay to use the
Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao ("ARMM") 2001 computerized Voter’s List and the
Voter’s Registration Records of the Provincial Election Officer during the December 2001
registration of new voters.

The parties did not attend the hearing scheduled on 11 September 2002 despite due notice. In
the 1 October 2002 hearing, counsel for joint-petitioners as well as EO Maulay and his counsel
appeared. The COMELEC ordered the parties to submit their memoranda within 20 days. The
COMELEC also directed EO Maulay to explain in writing why he should not be administratively
charged for failing to comply with Commissioner Sadain’s directive. The joint-petitioners filed
their Memorandum on 25 October 2002. EO Maulay did not file a memorandum or a written
explanation as directed. The COMELEC considered the case submitted for resolution.

On 8 October 2003, the COMELEC issued the assailed Resolution, disposing as follows:

ACCORDINGLY, the Department of Interior and Local Government is hereby DIRECTED to

proceed with the appointment of Barangay Captains and Barangay Kagawads as well
as SK Chairmen and SK Kagawads in Barangays Occidental Linuk, Pindolonan
Moriatao Sarip, Talub, Tatayawan South, and New Lumbacaingud, all of Tamparan,
Lanao del Sur, in accordance with the pertinent provisions of Republic Act No. 7160,
otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991, and other related laws on the
matter.

Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished to the Department of Interior and Local
Government, the Municipality of Tamparan, Lanao [d]el Sur, and the respective
Sangguniang Barangays of Barangays Occidental Linuk, Pindolonan Moriatao Sarip,
Talub, Tatayawan South and New Lumbacaingud, of Tamparan.

Finally, let a copy of this Resolution be furnished to the Law Department for Preliminary
Investigation of Respondent ESMAEL MAULAY for possible commission of election
offense/s, and consequently, the filing of administrative charges against him if
warranted.

SO ORDERED.3

Sambarani, Miraato, Abubacar and Mascara ("petitioners") filed the instant petition.4

The COMELEC’s Ruling

The COMELEC agreed with petitioners that the special elections held on 13 August 2002 in the
five barangays failed. The COMELEC, however, ruled that to hold another special election in
these barangays as prayed for by petitioners is untenable. The COMELEC explained that it is no
longer in a position to call for another special election since Section 6 of the Omnibus Election
Code provides that "special elections shall be held on a date reasonably close to the date of
the election not held, but not later than thirty days after cessation of the cause of such
postponement." The COMELEC noted that more than thirty days had elapsed since the failed
election.

The COMELEC also pointed out that to hold another special election in these barangays will not
only be tedious and cumbersome, but a waste of its precious resources. The COMELEC left to
the Department of Interior and Local Government ("DILG") the process of appointing the
Barangay Captains and Barangay Kagawads as well as the Sangguniang Kabataan ("SK")
Chairmen and SK Kagawads in these barangays "in accordance with the Local Government
Code of 1991 and other related laws on the matter."5

The Issues

Petitioners contend that the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
of jurisdiction in –

1. Denying the prayer to call for another special election in barangays Occidental Linuk,
Pindolonan Moriatao Sarip, Talub, New Lumbacaingud ("subject barangays");

2. Directing the DILG to proceed with the appointment of the barangay captains,
barangay kagawads, SK chairmen and SK kagawads in the subject barangays;

3. Not declaring the petitioners as the rightful incumbent barangay chairmen of their
office until their successors have been elected and qualified.

The Court’s Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

First Issue:

Whether To Call Another Special Election

Petitioners fault the COMELEC for not holding another special election after the failed 13 August
2002 special election. Petitioners insist that the special barangay and SK elections in the subject
barangays failed because EO Maulay did not use the voter’s list used during the 2001 ARMM
elections. Neither did Maulay segregate and exclude those voters whose Voter’s Registration
Records ("VRRs") were not among those 500 VRRs bearing serial numbers 00097501 to 0009800
allocated and released to Tamparan. Finally, Maulay did not delete from the certified list of
candidates the name of disqualified candidate Candidato Manding. Petitioners contend that
COMELEC’s refusal to call another special election conflicts with established jurisprudence,
specifically the ruling in Basher v. Commission on Elections.6

The Solicitor General supports the COMELEC’s stance that a special election can be held only
within thirty days after the cause of postponement or failure of election has ceased. The Solicitor
General also maintains that the DILG has the power to appoint and fill vacancies in the
concerned elective barangay and SK offices.
Section 2(1) of Article IX(C) of the Constitution gives the COMELEC the broad power to "enforce
and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite,
initiative, referendum, and recall." Indisputably, the text and intent of this constitutional provision
is to give COMELEC all the necessary and incidental powers for it to achieve its primordial
objective of holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections.7

The functions of the COMELEC under the Constitution are essentially executive and
administrative in nature. It is elementary in administrative law that "courts will not interfere in
matters which are addressed to the sound discretion of government agencies entrusted with the
regulation of activities coming under the special technical knowledge and training of such
agencies."8 The authority given to COMELEC to declare a failure of elections and to call for
special elections falls under its administrative function.9

The marked trend in our laws has been to grant the COMELEC ample latitude so it can more
effectively perform its duty in safeguarding the sanctity of our elections. But what if, as in this
case, the COMELEC refuses to hold elections due to operational, logistical and financial
problems? Did the COMELEC gravely abuse its discretion in refusing to conduct a second
special Barangay and SK elections in the subject barangays?

Neither the candidates nor the voters of the affected barangays caused the failure of the
special elections. The COMELEC’s own acting election officer, EO Maulay, readily admitted that
there were no special elections in these barangays. The COMELEC also found that the Provincial
Election Supervisor of Lanao del Sur and the Regional Election Director of Region XII did not
contest the fact that there were no special elections in these barangays.

An election is the embodiment of the popular will, the expression of the sovereign power of the
people.10 It involves the choice or selection of candidates to public office by popular vote.11 The
right of suffrage is enshrined in the Constitution because through suffrage the people exercise
their sovereign authority to choose their representatives in the governance of the State. The fact
that the elections involved in this case pertain to the lowest level of our political organization is
not a justification to disenfranchise voters.

COMELEC anchored its refusal to call another special election on the last portion of Section 6 of
the Omnibus Election Code ( "Section 6") which reads:

SEC. 6. Failure of election. – If, on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or
other analogous cases the election in any polling place has not been held on the date
fixed, or had been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting,
or after the voting and during the preparation and the transmission of the election returns
or in the custody or canvass thereof, such election results in a failure to elect, and in any
of such cases the failure or suspension of election would affect the result of the election,
the Commission shall, on the basis of a verified petition by any interested party and after
due notice and hearing, call for the holding or continuation of the election not held,
suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect on a date reasonably close to the date
of the election not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect but not later
than thirty days after the cessation of the cause of such postponement or suspension of
the election or failure to elect. (Emphasis supplied)

The Court construed Section 6 in Pangandaman v. COMELEC,12 as follows –

 In fixing the date for special elections the COMELEC should see to it that: 1.] it should not
be later than thirty (30) days after the cessation of the cause of the postponement or
suspension of the election or the failure to elect; and, 2.] it should be reasonably close to
the date of the election not held, suspended or which resulted in the failure to elect. The
first involves a question of fact. The second must be determined in the light of the
peculiar circumstances of a case. Thus, the holding of elections within the next few
months from the cessation of the cause of the postponement, suspension or failure to
elect may still be considered "reasonably close to the date of the election not held."
(Emphasis supplied)

The prohibition on conducting special elections after thirty days from the cessation of the cause
of the failure of elections is not absolute. It is directory, not mandatory, and the COMELEC
possesses residual power to conduct special elections even beyond the deadline prescribed by
law. The deadline in Section 6 cannot defeat the right of suffrage of the people as guaranteed
by the Constitution. The COMELEC erroneously perceived that the deadline in Section 6 is
absolute. The COMELEC has broad power or authority to fix other dates for special elections to
enable the people to exercise their right of suffrage. The COMELEC may fix other dates for the
conduct of special elections when the same cannot be reasonably held within the period
prescribed by law.

More in point is Section 45 of the Omnibus Election Code ("Section 45") which specifically deals
with the election of barangay officials. Section 45 provides:

SEC. 45. Postponement or failure of election. – When for any serious cause such as
violence, terrorism, loss or destruction of election paraphernalia or records, force
majeure, and other analogous causes of such nature that the holding of a free, orderly
and honest election should become impossible in any barangay, the Commission, upon
a verified petition of an interested party and after due notice and hearing at which the
interested parties are given equal opportunity to be heard, shall postpone the election
therein for such time as it may deem necessary.

If, on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes, the
election in any barangay has not been held on the date herein fixed or has been
suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting therein and such
failure or suspension of election would affect the result of the election, the Commission,
on the basis of a verified petition of an interested party, and after due notice and
hearing, at which the interested parties are given equal opportunity to be heard shall call
for the holding or continuation of the election within thirty days after it shall have verified
and found that the cause or causes for which the election has been postponed or
suspended have ceased to exist or upon petition of at least thirty percent of the
registered voters in the barangay concerned.

When the conditions in these areas warrant, upon verification by the Commission, or
upon petition of at least thirty percent of the registered voters in the barangay
concerned, it shall order the holding of the barangay election which was postponed or
suspended. (Emphasis supplied)

Unlike Section 6, Section 45 does not state that special elections should be held on a date
reasonably close to the date of the election not held. Instead, Section 45 states that special
elections should be held within thirty days from the cessation of the causes for postponement.
Logically, special elections could be held anytime, provided the date of the special elections is
within thirty days from the time the cause of postponement has ceased.
Thus, in Basher13 the COMELEC declared the 27 May 1997 barangay elections a failure and set
special elections on 12 June 1997 which also failed. The COMELEC set another special election
on 30 August 1997 which this Court declared irregular and void. On 12 April 2000, this Court
ordered the COMELEC "to conduct a special election for punong barangay of Maidan, Tugaya,
Lanao del Sur as soon as possible." This despite the provision in Section 2 14 of Republic Act No.
6679 ("RA 6679")15 stating that the special barangay election should be held "in all cases not later
than ninety (90) days from the date of all the original election."

Had the COMELEC resolved to hold special elections in its Resolution dated 8 October 2003, it
would not be as pressed for time as it is now. The operational, logistical and financial problems
which COMELEC claims it will encounter with the holding of a second special election can be
solved with proper planning, coordination and cooperation among its personnel and other
deputized agencies of the government. A special election will require extraordinary efforts, but it
is not impossible. In applying election laws, it would be better to err in favor of popular
sovereignty than to be right in complex but little understood legalisms.16 In any event, this Court
had already held that special elections under Section 6 would entail minimal costs because it
covers only the precincts in the affected barangays.17

In this case, the cause of postponement after the second failure of elections was COMELEC’s
refusal to hold a special election because of (1) its erroneous interpretation of the law, and (2) its
perceived logistical, operational and financial problems. We rule that COMELEC’s reasons for
refusing to hold another special election are void.

Second and Third Issues: Whether the DILG may Appoint

the Barangay and SK Officials

Petitioners contend that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in directing the DILG to
proceed with the appointment of Barangay Captains and Barangay Kagawads as well as SK
chairmen and SK Kagawads in the four barangays. Petitioners argue that as the incumbent
elective punong barangays in the four barangays,18 they should remain in office in a hold- over
capacity until their successors have been elected and qualified. Section 5 of Republic Act No.
9164 ("RA 9164")19 provides:

Sec. 5. Hold Over. – All incumbent barangay officials and sangguniang kabataan
officials shall remain in office unless sooner removed or suspended for cause until their
successors shall have been elected and qualified. The provisions of the Omnibus Election
Code relative to failure of elections and special elections are hereby reiterated in this
Act.

RA 9164 is now the law that fixes the date of barangay and SK elections, prescribes the
term of office of barangay and SK officials, and provides for the qualifications of
candidates and voters for the SK elections.

As the law now stands, the language of Section 5 of RA 9164 is clear. It is the duty of this
Court to apply the plain meaning of the language of Section 5. Since there was a failure
of elections in the 15 July 2002 regular elections and in the 13 August 2002 special
elections, petitioners can legally remain in office as barangay chairmen of their
respective barangays in a hold-over capacity. They shall continue to discharge their
powers and duties as punong barangay, and enjoy the rights and privileges pertaining to
the office. True, Section 43(c) of the Local Government Code limits the term of elective
 barangay officials to three years. However, Section 5 of RA 9164 explicitly provides that
incumbent barangay officials may continue in office in a hold over capacity until their
successors are elected and qualified.

Section 5 of RA 9164 reiterates Section 4 of RA 6679 which provides that "[A]ll incumbent
barangay officials xxx shall remain in office unless sooner removed or suspended for
cause xxx until their successors shall have been elected and qualified." Section 8 of the
same RA 6679 also states that incumbent elective barangay officials running for the
same office "shall continue to hold office until their successors shall have been elected
and qualified."

The application of the hold-over principle preserves continuity in the transaction of official
business and prevents a hiatus in government pending the assumption of a successor into
office.20 As held in Topacio Nueno v. Angeles,21 cases of extreme necessity justify the application
of the hold-over principle.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the instant petition. The Resolution of the Commission on Elections dated
8 October 2003 is declared VOID except insofar as it directs its Law Department to conduct a
preliminary investigation of Esmael Maulay for possible commission of election offenses.
Petitioners have the right to remain in office as barangay chairmen in a hold-over capacity until
their successors shall have been elected and qualified. The Commission on Elections is ordered
to conduct special Barangay elections in Barangays Occidental Linuk, Pindolonan Moriatao
Sarip, Talub, New Lumbacaingud, all in Tamparan, Lanao del Sur within thirty (30) days from
finality of this decision.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., Puno, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Austria-

Martinez, Corona, Carpio Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, Tinga, and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.

Footnotes